Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan:

Trends in Media Discourse, State Policy, and Popular

Perceptions

Aziz Burkhanov
Nazarbayev University

Introduction

T
his paper examines issues of multiculturalism and civic identity in Kazakhstan. Since
the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, like many other post-Soviet states, had faced
a challenge of creating a new sense of national identity. Despite calls and temptations
for more revengeful and nationalistic policies, the country’s leadership depicts Kazakhstan as a
model for peaceful coexistence of multiple ethnic groups. This model of multiculturalism inte-
grated a new civic supranational identity with preserved ethnicity-based identities, highlighting
their peaceful coexistence.
This study focuses on the three main approaches to analyze Kazakhstani national identity.
First, in terms of policy analysis, I focus on the recent policy instruments implemented by the
Kazakhstani government to handle ethnic diversity, as well as to promote ethnicity-based mul-
ticulturalism. Second, I incorporate an analysis of public discourse regarding perceptions of
civic “Kazakhstani” national identity in the media as well as in official Kazakhstani government
statements regarding multiculturalism and nation-building. Finally, I also analyze results of sur-
veys conducted in Kazakhstan in 2005 and 2016 to explore substantial dynamics in the respon-
dents’ perceptions vis-à-vis ethnic-civic national identity issues. By incorporating these different
approaches, this study illustrates the complexity of the Kazakhstani nation-building project by
highlighting perceptions from the two main actors: the state and society.
By using these different approaches, the study illustrates the complexity of the Kazakhstani
supranational identity project and incorporates views and perceptions from the three main actors:
the state, media, and society. This paper aims to contribute to the discussion on the Kazakhstani
national identity discourse by focusing on both the “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives
simultaneously.
Scholarship of national identity issues in Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet Central Asian
countries expanded considerably after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The literature concen-
trated on several key areas, such as the growing “revenge nationalism” process; the relationship
between Kazakhs and other ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan, primarily Russians; the role of
intra-Kazakh cleavages and continuity between Soviet policies and independent Kazakhstan’s

© 2019 Hartford Seminary.

DOI: 10.1111/muwo.12316
24
 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

approaches to the language situation.1 More recent works on national identity in Kazakhstan
have focused on the role of the state and policy instruments, such as the Assembly of People of
Kazakhstan2 and micro-level developments, arguing that the multicultural approach of
Kazakhstan remains more of an accidental choice rather than a cohesive policy.3
The scholarship of the mass media industry in post-Soviet Central Asia tends to concentrate
on a generic framework of comparative authoritarianism studies and to focus on the role that
mass media play (or, rather, are allowed to play) in modern authoritarian political regimes.4
Scholars of Central Asian media also highlight the restrictive environment in which media outlets

1  Rodgers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sally Cummings, “Legitimation and Identification in Kazakhstan,” Nationalism
and Ethnic Politics 12 (2006): 177–204; Pauline Jones Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies
from Soviet Rule to Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Michele Commercio, “The ‘Pugachev
Rebellion’ in the Context of Post-Soviet Kazakh Nationalization,” Nationalities Papers 32, no. 1 (2004): 87–113;
Chong Jin Oh, “Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Ethnic Korean Minority in Kazakhstan and its Lessons
from the Crimean Tatars in Turkey,” Nationalities Papers 34, no. 2 (2006): 111–29; Sébastien Peyrouse, “The
Imperial Minority: An Interpretive Framework of the Russians in Kazakhstan in the 1990s,” Nationalities Papers
36, no. 1 (2008): 105–23; Yerlan Karin and Andrei Chebotarev, “The Policy of Kazakhization in State and
Government Institutions in Kazakhstan,” Middle East Studies Series 51 (March 2002); William Fierman, “Changing
Urban Demography and the Prospects of Nationalism in Kazakhstan,” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism
XXVII (2000): 7–19; Bhavna Dave, “Entitlement Through Numbers: Nationality and Language Categories in the
First Post-Soviet Census in Kazakhstan,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 4 (2004): 439–59; Natsuko Oka,
“Nationalities Policy in Kazakhstan: Interviewing Political and Cultural Elites,” in The Nationalities Question in Post-
Soviet Kazakhstan, ed. Natsuko Oka (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2000); Pål Kolstø, “Bipolar
Societies?” in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies, ed. Pål Kolstø (Boulder: Westview Press,
1999), 15–43; Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Rob Kevlihan, “State-building, Identity and Nationalism in Kazakhstan:
Some Preliminary Thoughts,” Working Papers in International Studies 1 (Centre for International Studies, Dublin
City University, 2011), 1–18.
2 
Kristoffer Rees and Nora Webb Williams, “Explaining Kazakhstani Identity: Supraethnic Identity, Ethnicity,
Language, and Citizenship,” Nationalities Papers, 45, no. 5 (2017): 815–39; Aziz Burkhanov and Dina
Sharipova,“Kazakhstan’s Civic-National Identity: Ambiguous Policies and Points of Resistance,” in Nationalisms
and Identity Construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, Dynamics and Directions, ed. Mariya Omelicheva (Maryland:
Lexington Books, 2015), 21–35; Aziz Burkhanov, “Kazakhstan’s National Identity-Building Policy: Soviet Legacy,
State Efforts, and Societal Reactions,” Cornell International Law Journal 50, no. 1 (2017): 1–14.
3  Dina Sharipova, Aziz Burkhanov and Alma Alpeissova, “The Determinants of Civic and Ethnic Nationalisms

in Kazakhstan: Evidence from the Grass-Roots Level,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 23, no. 2 (2017): 203–26;
Burkhanov, “Kazakhstan’s National Identity-Building Policy,” 1–14.
4  Eric Freedman, “When a Democratic Revolution isn’t Democratic or Revolutionary,” Journalism 10, no. 6

(2009): 843–61; Anna Matveeva, “Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and
Symbolic Power,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 7 (2009): 1095–121; Natalya Krasnoboka, “Between the Rejected
Past and an Uncertain Future Russian Media Studies at a Crossroads,” Annals of the International Communication
Association 34, no. 1 (2010): 317–53; Yuliya Kartoshkina, Richard Shafer, and Eric Freedman, “The Ukrainian
Press as an Agent of Social Change through the Soviet Era, Independence, and the Orange Revolution,”
Communication and Social Change 1, no. 1 (2007): 4–21; Alisher Juraev, “The Uzbek Mass Media Model: Analysis,
Opinions, Problems,” Central Asia and the Caucasus 13, no. 1 (2002): 130–8.

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

have to operate, including censorship, extensive legal regulations limiting blogging and indepen-
dent journalism, lack of a functioning and competitive mass media market, limited financial
resources, and dependence of journalists on the state and private sponsorship and patronage.5
At the same time, relatively little has been done to address the role of media outlets in the
nation-building process, though there were some recent studies related to the perception of
“self ” and “other” in the Kazakhstani media discourse.6 This aspect of the media is especially
important as media outlets can “set the agenda” for domestic and international politics; they not
only inform the audience of politically salient issues, but also influence readers’ evaluations by
interpreting news and facts in a positive or negative manner.7 This is especially the case in ethni-
cally diverse and multilingual societies, where media can also reflect different perceptions, preju-
dices, and stereotypes that various ethnic groups possess and express about each other.
Kazakhstan makes a good case to examine the public debates on national identity being a multi-
ethnic post-Soviet state in the process of nation-building with significant ethnic minorities pres-
ent in the country as well as two languages that are widely used in the media and everyday life.
Survey-based studies on Kazakhstan’s national identity issues have been expanding in the
last few years. Rees, Sharipova et al., among others, focus on mass surveys and interviews to
highlight popular perceptions of national identity issues, as opposed to the earlier predominant
approach in the scholarship that focused almost exclusively on the “top-down” state approach
and narratives.8

Kazakhstan’s Nation-Building: Between Ethnic Nationalism and

Civic-Nationhood
National Identity and Citizenship Policy
In the post-1991 period, the government of Kazakhstan has adopted interethnic stability and
promoted friendship between all ethnic groups living in the country as a point of pride, both for
domestic and international audiences, which has also become part of the nation-branding dis-
course. The government actively promotes an image of Kazakhstan as a stable and harmonious

5  Eric Freedman and Richard Shafer, “How Media Censorship and Enduring Soviet Press Practices Obstruct

Nation-Building in Central Asia,” Journal of Development Communication 14, no. 2 (2003): 57–62; Olivia Allison,
“Loyalty in the New Authoritarian Model: Journalistic Rights and Duties in Central Asian Media Law,” in After
the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, eds. Eric Freedman and Richard Shafer
(East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2011), 143–60; Olivier Ferrando, “Ethnic Minorities and the
Media in Central Asia,” in After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, eds. Eric
Freedman and Richard Shafer (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2011), 161–84.
6  Aziz Burkhanov and Yu-Wen Chen, “Kazakh Perspective on China, the Chinese, and Chinese Migration.”

Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no. 12 (2016): 2129–48.

7  Wayne Wanta, Guy Golan, and Cheolhan Lee, “Agenda Setting and International News: Media Influence on

Public Perception,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 81, no. 2 (2004): 364–77; Salma Ghanem, “Filling
in the Tapestry: The Second Level of Agenda-Setting Theory,” in Communication and Democracy: Exploring the
Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory, eds. Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw and David Weaver (Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1997), 3–14.
8  Rees and Williams, “Explaining Kazakhstani Identity,” 815–39; Sharipova, Burkhanov and Alpeissova, “The

Determinants of Civic and Ethnic Nationalisms in Kazakhstan,” 203–26.

26
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 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

society, in which all ethnic groups peacefully coexist, unlike in many other former Soviet coun-
tries affected by inter-ethnic conflicts and violence. This approach has been replicated in the
country’s legal and institutional framework.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked the end of the history of the
Soviet nation-building process, although its legacy in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations has
survived beyond the Soviet Union. Early post-independence Kazakhstan documents, such as the
“Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR” (adopted on October 25, 1990); the law
on “State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (December 16, 1991); Preamble of the
Constitution of 1993; and Preamble of the 1995 Constitution all address the issue of national
identity.
The first of these documents, the “Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR” of
1990 described the “Kazakh nation” as:

The Supreme Council of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, expressing the will of the
people of Kazakhstan; striving to build decent and equal living conditions for all citizens
of the Republic; . . . aware of the responsibility for the fate of the Kazakh nation; proceed-
ing from the determination to create a democratic state of law, proclaims the sovereignty
of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and adopts this Declaration.9

The second important document, the 1991 constitutional law on “State Independence of the
Republic of Kazakhstan” follows on this interpretation and mentions the “Kazakh nation” in
the context of the right to self-determination:

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, expressing the will of the people
of Kazakhstan…reaffirming the right of the Kazakh nation to self-determination, pro-
ceeding from the determination to create a civil society and a legal state.10

At the same time, Article 6 of Chapter 2 of this law states: “citizens of the Republic of all na-
tionalities, united by common historical fate with the Kazakh nation, together with it constitute
the unified people of Kazakhstan, which is the only carrier of sovereignty and source of state
power in the Republic of Kazakhstan.”11
This discourse was slightly amended and further expanded in the first post-independence
Constitution of Kazakhstan, adopted in January 1993.12 The preamble of this Constitution starts
with the sentence “We, the people of Kazakhstan,” and further, part 1 titled “Fundamentals of
the constitutional order” mentions “the form of statehood of a self-defined Kazakh nation.” In

9  “Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR,” Tengri News, October 25, 1990, https​://tengr​inews.kz/

zakon/​parla​ment_respu​bliki_kazah​stan/konst​ituts​ionny​iy_stroy_i_osnov​yi_gosud​arstv​ennogo_uprav​leniy​a/id-
B9000​01700_.
10 
“Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan,’”
December 16, 1991, https​://online.zakon.kz/Docum​ent/?doc_id=10007​98#pos=12;-60.
11  “Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan.’”
12  “1993 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Wikisource, https​ ://ru.wikis​
ource.org/wiki/
Кoнcтитyция_Pecпyблики_Кaзaxcтaн_1993_гoдa.

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

contrast with the independence law, the 1993 Constitution did not mention the “common histor-
ical fate” of citizens of all nationalities that make up the people of Kazakhstan.
The usage of both “People of Kazakhstan” and the “Kazakh nation” concepts demon-
strates that the political discourse of the early post-independence era was guided by the Soviet
legacy of interpreting nationalities. The way the independence law of December 16, 1991 defined
“the unified people of Kazakhstan” was based on a common historical fate and was much closer
to the civic-nation definition; however, the usage of the word “people” made it possible to avoid
assertion of civic nationhood. The 1995 Constitution changed and further modified the dis-
course by stating in its preamble: “We, the Kazakh people, united by a common historical fate,
creating statehood on the native Kazakh land… following the ideals of freedom, equity and
concord.”13
Article 1 of the 1995 Constitution also mentions the “founding principles of the Republic,”
which include “Kazakhstani patriotism” and “political stability.” Both Kazakhstan’s post-
independence constitutions highlight the state’s commitment to protect and develop “the
national-cultural traditions” of all ethnic groups living in the country. The 1995 Constitution of
Kazakhstan explicitly prohibits any form of discrimination based on “origin, social, official, and
property status, as well as gender, race, nationality, language, religion, creed, and place of resi-
dence.” Moreover, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race, language, and religion are also
explicitly mentioned in both post-1991 versions of Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code, adopted in 1997
and 2014, respectively. Such discrimination is punishable under the current Code by a fine of up
to approximately $1,800 or a jail term of up to 75 days. The Criminal Code also punishes “calls
for social, national, racial hatred,” which covers any calls or views of racial and ethnic superiority
expressed publicly or via social media, by a jail sentence of up to seven years.14 In all, Kazakhstan’s
legislation and institutional framework address issues of ethnic harmony and balance.
Kazakhstan had also developed a multiculturalism approach that involves granting certain
rights to ethnic communities in an institutionalized form and an overseeing role by the Assembly
of People of Kazakhstan (APK). For instance, in line with the declared state’s commitment to
“develop the national cultures and traditions of all ethnic groups living in the country,”15 the
state grants each of the officially recognized ethnic minority group a so-called “national-cultural
center.” These centers are usually allocated some funding from the state, and are overseen by the
APK.16 From a legal point of view, the Assembly has the status of a consultative body in charge
of ensuring interethnic harmony “in the process of forming a civic Kazakhstani identity . . .

13  “Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995,” Official Site, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,

www.akorda.kz/ru/offic​ial_docum​ents/const​itution.
14  “Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1997,” https​ ://online.zakon.kz/Docum​ ent/?doc_
id=1008032; “Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2014,” https​ ://online.zakon.kz/Docum​
ent/?doc_id=31575252.
15  “1993 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan;” “Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995.”
16  Yves-Marie Davenel, “Cultural Mobilization in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Views from the State and from Non-

Titular Nationalities Compared,” Central Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (2012): 17–29.

28
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 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

under the consolidating role of the Kazakh people.”17 The political importance of the APK
remained limited until the constitutional amendments of 2007, based on which the APK began
electing nine members of Mazhilis, the lower house of Parliament. Those seats, in line with the
multiculturalist approach, are reserved for ethnic minorities elected through the APK.
The latest developments in the identity-building policy include campaigns of “Mangilik Yel”
(eternal state) and “Rukhani Zhangyru” (spiritual modernization), which seem to strengthen a
vision that incorporates the multicultural policy of Kazakhstan with some elements of the
civic-nationhood ideas. For instance, the “Mangilik Yel” Patriotic Act was adopted in 2016 at the
XXIV session of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan.18 This document clearly outlines sev-
eral key values of Kazakhstan’s society, and mentions building up a “Nation of Unified Future”
and “Common History, Culture and Language.” The Act notes:

We have one Homeland—Independent Kazakhstan, we have one country—one destiny.

[…] We are committed to preserve cultural diversity of the people of Kazakhstan. We will
pursue the development of the state [Kazakh] language as a basis of consolidation of the
society; and the trilingual policy [Kazakh, Russian, and English] as a main condition of the
nation’s competitiveness. We are a Big Country—Big Family. Glory to our unified Nation!19

This ideological doctrine was also reincarnated in Astana’s toponymics and landmarks—in
2011, a Triumphal Arch named “Mangilik Yel” was opened in Astana on the main road connect-
ing Astana Airport with downtown, and later that road itself was renamed Mangilik Yel Avenue.
In 2017, the president announced another major ideological strategy called “Rukhani
Zhangyru” (spiritual modernization). While not directly touching upon matters of multicul-
turalism and identity, this program certainly includes several prominent and important sub-
initiatives: “Tughan Zher” [homeland], a community-development program aimed at local and
small projects in specific communities; “Sacred Geography,” which sponsors expeditions and
research projects to the major, yet understudied, historical monuments of Kazakhstan; and “100
New Faces,” a nationwide online poll for scouting prominent new figures in sports, business, and
academia. Other sub-initiatives include “100 new textbooks,” a government-sponsored program
of translating prominent Western university textbooks into the Kazakh language, and, finally, the
Latin alphabet switch.
At the same time, while the government tolerates people’s manifestations of their ethnic
identities during cultural celebrations—and even at times indirectly encourages them—the
regime is also very concerned with any potential political mobilization of ethnicities. For instance,
Kazakhstan’s legislation explicitly prohibits creation of political parties on an ethnic basis, and
any politically charged activity by ethnic minorities is closely monitored and controlled.20 In the

17 
“Law on Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan,” Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, October 20, 2008,
https​://assem​bly.kz/ru/docs/zakon-respu​bliki-kazah​stan-ob-assam​blee-naroda-kazah​stana​.
18 
Patriotic Act – “Magilik Yel,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, April 26, 2016, www.kazpr​avda.kz/news/polit​ika/patri​
otich​eskii-akt--mangi​lik-el-polnii-tekst​.
19 
Patriotic Act – “Magilik Yel,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda.
20  Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “On Political Parties,” https​ ://online.zakon.kz/Docum​
ent/?doc_id=1032141

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

early-mid-1990s, there were several occasions where Cossack and Russian movements were orga-
nizing political activities and rallies, all of which have been suspended by the government. In
other words, the government is willing to tolerate the manifestation of ethnic cultures, as long as
they do not pick up a political agenda.
However, in terms of continuity with the Soviet era, Kazakhstan largely relies on the Soviet
approaches of recording the ethnic background of its citizens and using it as an assigned cate-
gory in domestic statistics and identification documents. In continuation with Soviet practices, an
individual’s ethnic background is recorded and written on the domestically used national ID
cards (Law on the ID documents). This institutionalized ethnic identity is usually based on the
parents’ ethnicity or, in the case of mixed marriages, is chosen by the child at the age of sixteen.
It is also legally possible to change this ethnic identity record,21 and some seem to have been
doing so due to perceived career benefits.

Language Policy
Language remains one of the most sensitive national identity issues in Kazakhstan’s post-in-
dependence period. Due to rapid “Russification” that occurred during the later stages of Soviet
rule, the number of schools teaching in the Kazakh language decreased dramatically,22 and the
quality of Kazakh language teaching in the Russian schools of Kazakhstan became very limited.
At that point, most students (both Russians and urban Kazakhs) usually graduated with no, or
very minimal, knowledge of Kazakh.23 Furthermore, during the Soviet time, Russian became the
language necessary to secure a future successful career;24 therefore, most urban Kazakhs were
trained in Russian kindergartens, schools, and universities, and used Russian as their primary
communication tool. Only in 1989 did Kazakhstan (and most other republics of the USSR)
adopt a law that granted Kazakh language a “state language” status and listed some requirements
in Kazakh language proficiency for certain jobs and positions, even if the state’s capacity to en-
force these regulations would have been limited.
After independence, the government adopted several concept papers, resolutions, and
programs aimed at stricter introduction of the Kazakh language, according to which usage of
Kazakh would become more widely required. A complete switchover of office paperwork into
Kazakh was mandated several times, but this has been consistently postponed. Later, however,
due to demographic changes and developments, Kazakh language usage expanded greatly, espe-
cially in the southern areas of the country. It is unclear, however, if these developments are due
to policy changes or to demographic changes and migration of Slavs.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, debates about switching back to the Latin alphabet
were rekindled in the Turkic republics of the USSR and, shortly afterwards, Turkmenistan,

21  Family Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https​://online.zakon.kz/Docum​ent/?doc_id=31102748.

22  William Fierman, “Kazakh Language and Prospects for its role in Kazakh ‘Groupness,’” Ab Imperio 2 (2005):
393–423.
23  William Fierman, “Language And Education in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Kazakh-Medium Instruction in

Urban Schools,” The Russian Review 65, no. 1 (2006): 98–116.

24  Renata Matuszkiewicz, “The Language Issue in Kazakhstan – Institutionalizing New Ethnic Relations After

Independence,” Economic and Environmental Studies 10, no. 2 (2010): 211–27.

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 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan adopted different Latin alphabets. Their degrees of success, how-
ever, are different: if in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan the shift is more or less complete, in
Uzbekistan outcomes are more problematic. In contrast, in Kazakhstan, because of greater eth-
nic diversity, a significant Russian minority, and stronger political ties with Russia, the debates
about shifting back to the Latin alphabet were more moderate. Despite this, several projects of
Kazakh Latin alphabet were initiated by linguists, writers, and general enthusiasts. This issue is
still being discussed sporadically by politicians and linguists. In 2006, President Nazarbayev men-
tioned an eventual switch to the Latin alphabet at the meeting of the Assembly of People of
Kazakhstan. At around this time, several state-backed websites launched a version in the Kazakh-
Latin alphabet, although this alphabet was never officially approved.25 On the other hand, several
prominent Kazakh-language writers opposed switching to the Latin alphabet, claiming that it
would require republishing of all materials earlier published in Kazakh Cyrillic, and that the costs
of such reform would be too much.
The discussion and discourse about the Latin alphabet change were accelerated in the fall
of 2017. On October 27, 2017, the president signed an executive order changing the Kazakh
language alphabet into the Latin alphabet. The proposed alphabet was based on twenty-six let-
ters and assumed usage of apostrophes and diphthongs to designate specific Kazakh letters
and sounds. This was met with criticism by some sectors of the public and the media. Later, in
February 2018, the president amended the executive order, approving a modified version of the
Latin alphabet based on the usage of a special diacritical symbol “acute.” Although the deadline
for a complete switch is still maintained to be 2025, in major cities the linguistic landscape started
to change in 2018: more signs, advertisements, placards, and other urban visual infrastructure
appear to use Latin alphabet for Kazakh language instead of Cyrillic.

Citizenship Policy
After independence, the government of Kazakhstan adopted an inclusive citizenship model in
which citizenship was granted automatically to everyone who was living in Kazakhstan at the
time of independence, regardless of ethnicity or Kazakh language proficiency.26 In contrast,
similar citizenship laws in some other former Soviet countries—for instance, Estonia and
Latvia—have imposed substantial restrictions for obtaining citizenship rights for those who ar-
rived and settled during the Soviet period. Non-ethnic Estonians and non-Latvians had to go
through a long and complicated process of naturalization, which included passing exams on
Estonian or Latvian language proficiency and history tests to receive citizenship. Until then, they
were issued a so-called “alien’s passport,” which was substantially limited in terms of rights and
access to services.27 Interestingly, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries did not follow
the Baltic model of restrictive citizenship, despite the fact that, in many other areas, particularly

25  Kazinform International News Agency, 2019, http://inform.kz.

26  Michele Commercio, Russian Minority Politics in Post-Soviet Latvia and Kyrgyzstan: The Transformative Power of
Informal Networks (PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
27  Citizenship Act of Estonia, www.riigi​teata​ja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigi​kogu/act/50302​20160​04/conso​lide; Law on

Citizenship of the Republic of Latvia, https​://likumi.lv/ta/en/id/57512-citiz​enship-law.

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

in the toponymics, there were signs of a rushed temptation to take symbolic revenge over Soviet
legacy.
At the same time, citizenship policy also demonstrates some of the government’s concerns
about the complex ethnic situation in the country. For instance, having granted citizenship to
everyone living in its territory, Kazakhstan, on the other hand, never allowed dual citizenship,
which was solicited by some of the Russian communities in Kazakhstan. As a result, Russians
living in Kazakhstan were forced to choose between becoming foreigners in Russia if they picked
Kazakhstan’s citizenship, or becoming aliens in the country in which they live and work, should
they opt for Russian citizenship.28 Therefore, almost all documents published by Russian political
groups and organizations demand the reinstitution of dual citizenship status, and this is often
depicted as the main reason for dissatisfaction of ethnic Russian Kazakhstanis. The citizenship
issue is tied to all the various problems of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, such as fear for their
future in the new non-Russian state; the uncertainty associated with their own identity; their
desire to secure ties with their “historic homeland;” and a certain disappointment over Russia’s
unwillingness to actively assist ethnic Russians living in the post-Soviet states.29 The enforcement
of the dual citizenship ban remained mostly sporadic until 2014, in light of the Crimea crisis, when
the punishment was increased and violators were taken to court and punished with heavy fines.

Public Discourse
The Kazakhstani Nation and Multiculturalism
The public debates around the “Kazakhstani Nation” (Kazakhstanskaia natsiia in Russian;
Qazaqstandyq ult in Kazakh) began in the early to mid-1990s, following the publication of an
open letter in the Russian-language business-oriented newspaper Novoe Pokolenie (new genera-
tion) signed by about 150 prominent young Western-educated businesspeople and policymakers
of Kazakhstan. In this letter, they called for the creation of a “Kazakhstani nation,” which
would include every citizen of Kazakhstan regardless of ethnic background. In 1997, President
Nazarbayev addressed the issue several times in the context of the “Kazakhstan-2030” strategic
development document; although he preferred to use the term Kazakhstantsy (Kazakhstanis) in-
stead of Kazakhstanskaia natsiia (Kazakhstani nation). He argued that a nation develops through
a long, natural historical process, and emphasized the common fate of all Kazakhstanis living in
Kazakhstan.
In 2009–2010, the country experienced another round of debates around the “Kazakhstani
nation” in the context of the Doctrine of National Unity, a declarative document written by
semi-official think-tanks. This included references to the “Kazakhstani nation” and thus caused
a hostile reaction from Kazakh intellectuals who criticized the potential merging of all ethnicities
into the civic Kazakhstani nation.

28  Natsuko Oka, “The ‘Triadic Nexus’ in Kazakhstan: A Comparative Study of Russians, Uighurs, and Koreans,”
in Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship? ed. Osamu Ieda (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research
Center, Hokkaido University, 2006), 359–80.
29  Cengiz Sürücü, Western in Form, Eastern in Content: Negotiating Time and Space in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan (The

Oxford Society for the Caspian and Central Asia, 2005).

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In September 2009, the quasi-oppositional party, Ak-Zhol, published a “Conception of

New National Policy of Kazakhstan for 2010–2020.”30 This document refers to the “historically
Kazakh land” upon which the Kazakhs as a “state-forming” nation live in peace with Russians
and other ethnic groups. This conception suggests that Kazakhs play a consolidating role in
Kazakhstani society, and acknowledges that instead of real identity-building efforts, the govern-
ment was occupied with sending out propaganda slogans. According to the document, diasporas
and ethnic groups (between which the distinction is unclear) are civic communities that are part
of Kazakhstani society. Lately, however, Burikhan Nurmukhamedov, one of the main Ak-Zhol
ideologists, attempted to clarify certain issues: he claimed that the “Kazakh nation” is expected
to be an umbrella term to which all the ethnic groups and peoples living in Kazakhstan belong.
He added that national policy should prioritize building a community based on civic identity.31
In October 2009, President Nazarbayev attended the 15th APK Session and presented the
“Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan.” This Doctrine was prepared by the regime-backed
Assembly of Peoples, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (a think-tank advising govern-
ment on policies), and the Presidential Administration. The document focuses on creating one
civic community and identity instead of multiple ethnic-based communities, claiming that such
choice has become fundamental for preserving tolerance and stability in Kazakhstan.
The project was criticized in the media. The Presidential Administration and other highly
ranked officials did not expect such a hostile reaction to a government-backed project, and
offered that the nationalists publish their own vision of the document. Shakhanov’s alternative
document, titled “Concept of National Policies of Kazakhstan: Tasks for 2015,” was prepared;
it argues that the Kazakhs should be acknowledged as a “state-forming” nation, and that the
country should be renamed as the Kazakh Republic in order to emphasize the country’s portrayal
as a state created by Kazakhs. Values of the Kazakhs, according to the document, have priorities
over values of other ethnic groups living in the country; and, since the number of Kazakhs is
now more than two thirds of the population, Kazakhstan can be considered a “monoethnic
state.” In practical terms, the document suggested a further increase of the Kazakh-language
share of TV and radio broadcastings, and more state financing for the promotion of Kazakh
language. However, in terms of implementation, the document suggests a rather unclear plan for
its implementation by just briefly mentioning “adopting special laws” and “state programs.”32
In the latest developments, the term “Kazakhstani nation” has been gradually downsized in
the public discourse. The government is keen to avoid any politically charged discussions, and
seems to take a multicultural approach. The recent introduction of the “Gratuity Day”—when
non-Kazakh ethnicities are supposed to praise Kazakh hospitality towards the ethnic groups,
such as Germans and Koreans, that were deported to Kazakhstan by the Soviets—seems to

30  “The Concept of the New Nationality Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” ZonaKZ Internet Newspaper,

September 24, 2009, www.zonakz.net/artic​les/26602​.

31  Yuritsin, Vladislav. “Burikhan Nurmukhamedov: Opredelenie “Kazakh” dolzhno stat’ gosudarstvenno-

grazhadnskoi identichnostyu v Kazakhstane (Burikhan Nurmukhamedov: the Term ‘Kazakh’ Should Become
State-Civic Identity in Kazakhstan),” ZonaKZ Internet Newspaper, January 25, 2010, www.zonakz.net/artic​
les/27918​. Hereinafter, translations from Kazakh and Russian into English are made by the author.
32  ZonaKZ Internet Newspaper, January 26, 2010, www.zonakz.net/artic​les/27939​.

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

further cement this multiculturalist understanding of Kazakhstani identity, which is based on

group identities of ethnicities, as complementing them and not opposing them.
President Nazarbayev resurrected the term “Kazakhstani nation” in an August 2015 speech,
noting that “From this moment on, the Kazakhstani nation has been formed, woven by golden
threads of representatives of various ethnic groups and religious denominations. I see this as a
further success of the unity of our state.”33
The government discourse has also tried create a new unifying idea of nation-building out-
side the ethnic or civic framework, regarding economic performance and competitiveness as
unifying factors. For instance, in his message to the Assembly of People in October 2006, the
president discussed competitiveness as a “national idea, noting: “Today we talk a lot about the
national idea. In my view, the national idea is the nation’s competitiveness […]. Important condi-
tion of nation’s competitiveness is a strong spirit and knowledge, leading to the success in the
global competition […]. Another important component of a nation’s success is Kazakhstani
patriotism.”34

Analysis of Survey Data

In this section, I analyze the data gathered through two surveys conducted in Kazakhstan in
2005 and 2016. The 2005 AsiaBarometer project includes surveys conducted in fourteen coun-
tries in South and Central Asia. The Kazakhstan survey was conducted in September–November
2005, and was based on face-to-face interviews with a stratified random national sample of 800
cases. The 2016 survey was administered across Kazakhstan, in Almaty, Astana, and fourteen
oblast centers with about 1,600 respondents, and touched upon issues of identity and percep-
tions of ground-level nationalism.
While the two surveys used are not identical, they both include similar questions related to
the issues of national identity, citizenship, interethnic relations, and language policy and usage.
Analyzing the two datasets collected in 2005 and 2016 will permit tracing changes and dynamics
in the national identity vision.
The 2005 Asia Barometer survey included several questions that measure attachment to the
country and patriotic and nationalist sentiments, and clearly demonstrated a strong association
with an ethnic identity marker in Central Asia. For instance, in response to the question “Do you
think of yourself as being [YOUR COUNTRY’S PEOPLE], or do you not think of yourself in
this way?” most responses in Kazakhstan highlighted ethnic identity (46.9% Kazakhs and 33.4%
Russians) (Figure 1). This is consistent with other Central Asian countries, as similar results were
demonstrated in Kyrgyzstan (66.9% Kyrgyz, 11.9% Russians, and 9.9% Uzbek) and Uzbekistan
(59.8% Uzbeks, 11.1% Russians, and 5.6% Tatars).

33  “President Declared that Kazakhstani Nation Has Been Formed,” Kapital.kz, https​://kapit​al.kz/gosud​arstv​

o/43192/​prezi​dent-zayav​il-o-tom-chto-v-strane-sform​irova​las-kazah​stans​kaya-naciya.html.
34  “Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to XII Session of Assembly of People of

Kazakhstan,” www.zakon.kz/77635-vystu​plenie-prezi​denta-respu​bliki.html.

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 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

Figure 1.  Inoguchi, Takashi et al., AsiaBarometer Survey Data 2006 [computer file], AsiaBarometer Project (www.asiab​arome​
ter.org). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

In contrast, the 2016 survey results demonstrate that the level of civic identity or association
with citizenship had clearly increased since 2005. In this survey, 74.30% respondents agreed that
“Kazakhstani” would be an appropriate identity marker for people in Kazakhstan (Figure 2).
At the same time, in a survey conducted by a private sociological center in Kazakhstan in
2004 (Figure 3), 57% of respondents claimed to identify themselves as citizens of Kazakhstan,
26% highlighted belonging to a local community, and only 4.9% stated that ethnic identity would
be their primary identity marker. While the methodology and sampling of this survey are not
entirely clear, this still provides interesting data, with a rather high number of people preferring
“civic” identity, or even highlighting a global aspect, calling themselves “citizens of the world.”
One potential explanation for the different survey results could be that the respondent base con-
sisted of a younger, urban audience.
Similarly, in terms of national pride and patriotism, in Kazakhstan, 50.9% of respon-
dents stated that they were “very proud” of their country, and 34.8% were “somewhat proud.”
Compared to the 2016 survey, national pride was confirmed with almost 60% agreeing that they
would want to be citizens of Kazakhstan rather than any other country, and about 30% opted for
“rather agree.” Interestingly, in the 2005 survey, 74.4% of respondents claimed they cannot recite
the national anthem by heart, while only 23% were able to do so. In 2005, the country still had its
first post-independence anthem, which in 2006 was replaced with a more popular, yet modified
version of the song “My Kazakhstan.”
In the 2016 survey, about 90% of respondents agree that they would rather be citizens of
Kazakhstan than of any other country; 86.3% believe that Kazakhstan is better than any other
country in the world; and 73.5% think that people should support their country even if it does
something wrong. This shows that a high number of people are patriotic and tend to idealize
Kazakhstan. In other words, civic nationalist sentiments among the population are very high.
This is perhaps not a surprise, keeping in mind Kazakhstan’s relatively good economic perfor-
mance and other positive social indicators. However, there are some important differences across
ethnic lines. More ethnic Kazakhs (93.9%) than ethnic Russians (68%) agree that “Kazakhstan

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

Mostly disagree 3.40%

Neutral 15.90%
Kazakhstani
Mostly agree 74.30%

No answer 6.40%

Mostly disagree 50.60%

Neutral 19.10%
Kazakhs
Mostly agree 18.30%

No answer 12.00%

Figure 2.  Source: Data collected by the author, 2016. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

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Figure 3.  Survey results on primary identity markers in Kazakhstan conducted in 2004. Source: Roman Ivanov, “Where is
the Kazakhstani Nation Going, or What do Kazakhstanis Consider themselves to be?” 365Info.Kz, July 20, 2017, https​
://365in​fo.kz/2017/07/kuda-idet-kazah​stans​kaya-natsi​ya-ili-kem-sebya-schit​ayut-kazah​stantsy. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

36
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 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

is better than other countries.” Similarly, regional differences coincide with ethnic distribution.
In northern Kazakhstan, largely populated by ethnic Russians, only 55.7% of respondents agree
with this statement, whereas in the south and west of the country, mostly inhabited by ethnic
Kazakhs, 100% of respondents answered positively to the statement (Table 1).
In terms of Kazakh language proficiency, in the 2016 survey, 77.9% of respondents agreed
that every citizen of Kazakhstan should master the Kazakh language. However, significant dif-
ferences exist across ethnic groups. More Kazakhs (87.3%) agree that every citizen should know
the Kazakh language, whereas only 55.6% of Russians agree with this statement. This shows
that a significant portion of ethnic Russians had internalized the idea that they should know and
learn the Kazakh language. There are also differences in answers regarding toponyms: 58.2%
of respondents agreed that “Streets and cities should be given Kazakh names,” while 34% of
respondents disagreed. This clearly demonstrates that while there is a considerable portion of
the population that does not agree with the kazakhization of toponyms, the majority does sup-
port attribution of Kazakh names. The differences in answers are particularly high across ethnic-
ities: 65% of Russian respondents disagree with this statement, whereas only 21% of Kazakhs
disagree. Indeed, whenever the issue of renaming northern cities or city streets is raised, there
are heated debates and strong resistance on the part of the Slavic population, for whom those
toponyms present an important symbolic marker. Similarly, there is variation in opinion about
Kazakh language usage in state agencies and public service. Regarding the statement that all state
services should be provided exclusively in the Kazakh language, 59.2% of respondents disagreed
while 36.4% agreed. The differences were again particularly high between ethnic groups: 49.7%
of ethnic Kazakhs agree, while only 9.7% of Russian respondents agree with this statement. As
expected, the lowest percent of those who disagree are located in Atyrau and Qyzylorda oblasts
that are inhabited largely by ethnic Kazakhs. At the same time, the highest percentages of those
who disagree that state services should be provided exclusively in Kazakh, were in the north and
northeast oblasts with 78.6% and 83.3%, respectively.
The 2005 survey does not measure language proficiency but adds another important nuance
to the discussion. For instance, one of the questions asked which social circle(s) would be more

Table 1.  Survey results of 2016

I’d rather be a citizen of Kazakhstan than of Disagree 2.20%

any other country Rather disagree 4.90%
Rather agree 30.60%
Agree 59.40%
No answer 2.90%
When Kazakhstan’s athletes are successful, it Disagree 0.30%
makes me feel proud Rather disagree 2.10%
Rather agree 31.30%
Agree 63.10%
No answer 3.10%
People must support their country, even if it is Disagree 5.30%
doing something wrong Rather disagree 16.90%
Rather agree 31.30%
Agree 42.20%
No answer 4.40%

Source: Data collected by author, 2016.

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 The Muslim World   •   Volume 110   •   Winter 2020

important to the respondents, and most chose family (95.1%), relatives (85.1%), and people who
grew up in the same place (36.5%), while “people who speak the same language as you” only
scored 12.2% (Figure 4).

Implications and Concluding Remarks

As this study has demonstrated, state policy, media discourse, and public opinion may provide
different perceptions regarding several key issues related to Kazakh national identity, such as
importance of civic and ethnic identity, language, “state ownership,” and the role and place of
non-Kazakh ethnic groups in modern Kazakhstan. For instance, in terms of policies, the Soviet-
style notion of “one big family” living in peace and friendship, in which the role of the “older
brother” is taken over by the Kazakhs, as opposed to the Russians during Soviet times, seems

Figure 4.  Inoguchi, Takashi et al., AsiaBarometer Survey Data 2006 [computer file], AsiaBarometer Project (www.asiab​arome​
ter.org). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

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 Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan

to be the eventual “safe choice” that the government of Kazakhstan is relying on regarding the
country’s identity politics. After having experimented with different approaches and models—
including Eurasia, Turkic brotherhood, and civic Kazakhstani nation—in order to overcome
existing cleavages and polarizations along the ethnic lines that exist in modern Kazakhstan’s
society, the regime preferred not to implement radical and abrupt changes or to further stoke
potentially conflict-charged discussions.
The analysis of the public discourse on national identity in Kazakhstan clearly demon-
strates antagonism between “nationalizing” the “state of Kazakhs” and a “multiethnic state of
Kazakhstan” vision of Kazakhstan. Kazakh-language newspapers tend to divide society into
Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs, while Russian-language audiences remain disconnected from these
debates and focus on a multiethnic perception of the country. This antagonism remains one of
Kazakhstan’s key identity debates and policies. This paper has focused on the analysis of the
three main pillars of state policy, media discourse, and popular opinion, and has thus demon-
strated the complexity of the national identity-building process—some actors may advocate a
certain vision of a new society that may not necessarily be shared in the popular perception and
vice versa.

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