Rule 15
G.R. No. 202069, March 07, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT AND NAILYN TAÑEDO-
DIMARUCOT
Facts:
Respondents met sometime in 2002 this friendship immediately progressed and
turned into an intimate romantic relationship two months later, the Respondents wed in civil
rights. Nailyn gave birth to the Respondents' first child years later, Nailyn gave birth to
Respondents' second child. It appears, however, that Respondents' whirlwind romance
resulted in a problematic marriage, as Alvin filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage (RTC Petition) before the RTC in September 2009.
In the RTC Petition, Alvin alleged that Nailyn suffers from psychological incapacity
which renders her incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Hence,
Alvin prayed that his marriage with Nailyn be declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.The Provincial Prosecutor was deputized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to assist in the case.
In 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Respondents' marriage null and
void. In 2010, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of
even date, alleging that "[Alvin] failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of his wife's alleged psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the Republic's MR
through order saying that the instant motion is considered one which is not set for hearing
and therefore, a mere scrap of paper. In 2010, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari (CA
Petition) before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for issuing
the August and September 2010 RTC orders. The Republic claimed that its MR substantially
complied with the requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 governing motions. Hence,
the RTC should not have treated said MR as a mere scrap of paper solely because of the
misstatement of the proposed hearing date in the Notice of Hearing appended thereto,
considering that the RTC is "not without any discretion" to set the MR for hearing on a
different date.
The Court of Appeals held that the CA Petition warrants outright dismissal
because it was filed without the benefit of a motion for reconsideration— an indispensable
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.31 The CA further held that in
any case, the Republic's allegation that its MR substantially complied with all the
requirements under Rule 15 lacks merit.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred when it caused the outright dismissal of the CA Petition because it was
filed without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC
Order.
2. Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the August and September 2010 RTC orders which
denied the Republic's MR and subsequent Notice of Appeal on procedural grounds.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court grants the Petition. A prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary
for a petition for certiorari to prosper in cases where such motion would be useless. It is true
that this Court has ruled that "certiorari, as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct
its assigned errors."46 However, this general rule is subject to well-defined exceptions, thus:
Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-
defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as [i] where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; [ii] where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; [iii] where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; [iv]
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; [v] where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; [vi] where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; [vii] where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; [viii] where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and [ix] where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.47 (Citations omitted; emphasis and italics in the original)
The Republic invokes the fourth exception above, and argues that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC Order would have been useless as it was based
on the earlier August 2010 RTC Order.48 The Court agrees. To recall, the denial of the
Republic's Notice of Appeal through the September 2010 RTC Order was premised on the
RTC's earlier finding that the MR was a pro-forma motion due to non-compliance with Rule
15. As well, it is necessary to emphasize that the September 2010 RTC Order explicitly states
that the RTC Decision had "attained finality" because the Republic's MR did not toll the
Republic's period to appeal.49
Clearly, the Republic's direct resort to the CA via certiorari was warranted under the
circumstances, as it was led to believe that seeking reconsideration of the September 2010
RTC Order would have been a useless exercise. The CA thus erred when it caused the
outright dismissal of the CA Petition solely on the basis of the Republic's failure to file a prior
motion for reconsideration.
2. Yes. Strict compliance with Rule 15 should have been waived in the interest of
substantial justice. The Republic concedes that it misstated the proposed hearing date in
the Notice of Hearing attached to its MR. It argues, however, that this misstatement does not
serve as sufficient basis to treat its MR as a mere scrap of paper, considering that said Notice
of Hearing fulfilled the purpose of Rule 15, that is, "to afford the adverse parties a chance to
be heard before [the MR] is resolved by the [RTC]."50 The Republic's argument proceeds
from the assumption that the only defect in its Notice of Hearing was the typographical error
in its proposed hearing date. This is an error. Reference to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is
in order:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon
by the court without proof of service thereof. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
The requirements outlined in the cited provisions can be summarized as follows:
1. Every written motion which cannot be acted upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party must be set for hearing;
2. The adverse party must be given: (a) a copy of such written motion, and (b) notice
of the corresponding hearing date;
3. The copy of the written motion and the notice of hearing described in (ii) must be
furnished to the adverse party at least three (3) days before the hearing date,
unless otherwise ordered by the RTC (3-day notice rule); and
4. No written motion that is required to be heard shall be acted upon by the receiving
court without proof of service done in the manner prescribed in (iii).
Perusal of the foregoing shows that the Republic failed to comply with the first and third
requirements.Notably, while the Republic furnished Alvin and Nailyn's respective counsels
with copies of the MR and Notice of Hearing, the Republic did so only by registered mail. 51 As
a result, Alvin received notice of the Republic's MR only on August 11, 2010.52 Hence, even if
the RTC construed the Republic's typographical error to read August 6, 2010 instead of July
6, 2010, the Republic would have still failed to comply with the 3-day notice rule.
To be sure, the 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit of movant but for the
adverse party, in order to avoid surprises and grant the latter sufficient time to study the
motion and enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein.53 The duty to ensure receipt
by the adverse party at least three days before the proposed hearing date necessarily falls on
the movant.
Nevertheless, considering the nature of the case and the issues involved therein, the Court
finds that relaxation of the Rules was called for. It is well settled that procedural rules may be
relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the "strict and rigid application, [of
procedural rules] which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed."54
Here, the State's policy of upholding the sanctity of marriage takes precedence over strict
adherence to Rule 15, for the finality of the RTC Decision necessarily entails the permanent
severance of Alvin and Nailyn's marital ties. Hence, the RTC should have exercised its
discretion, as it did have such discretion, and set the MR for hearing on a later date with due
notice to the parties to allow them to fully thresh out the Republic's assigned errors. The CA
thus erred when it affirmed the RTC in this respect.
2. Acampado vss. Cosmilla, 771 SCRA
Facts:
The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document
filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. Spouses Cosmilla
alleged that the sale of their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged SPA
and is therefore null and void.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint of the respondents for failure to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged.
Aggrieved, respondents filed an MR seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision.
However, for failure of the respondents to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as
required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo
denied the MR.a
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter to the CA by filing a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
TRO seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition.
It affirmed the RTC decision that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
the Rules of Court is nothing but a useless piece of paper and does not stall the running of
the reglementary period.
On MR, however, the CA reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed the relaxation of the
procedure. Hence, the appellate court vacated the Order of the RTC and directed the court a
quo to thresh out the MR filed by the respondents on the merits. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC praying that the CA
Resolution be reversed and set aside.
Issue: WON the RTC in ruling that failure to comply with the notice of hearing under
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is fafat.
Held: Petition granted. The Decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint of the respondents
and its Order declaring their Motion for Reconsideration as, pro forma are hereby
REINSTATED.
Rationale:
The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the
required notice and hearing and service to the adverse party. as mandated by the Rules 15,
Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary).
The requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously
complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply with the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of
paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to
act upon. The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer
which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to
oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives
the other party the opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant.
It is important, however, to note that these doctrines refer exclusively to a motion, since a
motion invariably contains a prayer, which the movant makes to the court, which is to repeat
usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose and in the observance of due process,
the other party must be given the opportunity to oppose the motion. In keeping with the
principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the
chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded. Failure to comply with the required notice
and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents cause.
Section 6 commands that '(n)o motion shall be acted upon by the Court, without proof of
service of the notice thereof x x x.' It is therefore patent that the motion for reconsideration in
question is fatally defective for it did not contain any notice of hearing. We have already
consistently held in a number of cases that the requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and that failure to comply with the same is fatal to
movant's cause."
Nevertheless, the three-day requirement is not a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been
given an opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is
compliance with the rule. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to
have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which
it is based.
We consulted the records and we found that no notice of hearing was appended to the
Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent. As discussed above, a motion for
reconsideration is a litigated motion where the right of the adverse party will be affected by its
admission. The adverse party in this case had the right to resist the motion because it may
result to the reversal of a prior favorable decision. The proof of service was therefore
indispensable in order to avoid surprises on the opposite party. The absence thereof is fatal
to the motion.
Considering that the running of the period towards the finality of the judgment was not
stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31 March 2005 became final and executory. Every litigation
must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just
as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution
and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law. To frustrate it by dilatory
schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of
the courts. It is in the interest of justice that we should write finis to this litigation.
3. Laude vs. Gines-Jabalde, 775 SCRA
FACTS:
This case involves the celebrated case of a transgender woman, Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude,
who was murdered at Celzone Lodge in Olongapo City allegedly by 19 yr old US Marine
Scott Pemberton. A complaint for murder was filed by the Petitioner Marilou Laude (sister of
Jennifer) in the Olongapo City Office of the Prosecutor wherein a subsequent Information was
filed in the RTC of Olongapo and lastly, a Warrant of Arrest against Lt. Pemberton.
Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Ginez-Jabalde and was then arraigned. During
arraignment on December 19,2014, Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Compel Armed
Forces of the Philippines to surrender custody of accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a
Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The Motion was scheduled for hearing on December 22,
2014. According to the Petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s
counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have furnished a copy of the
Motion personally at the hearing of the motion. The Motion was denied by Respondent judge
for lack of merit.
In the SC, petitioners argue that the 3-day notice rule on Motions under Rule 15 Sec 4 is not
absolute and should be liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent
circumstances. Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the notice rule is satisfied when
there is an opportunity to be heard, which was present in this case because Pemberton’s
counsel and the Public Prosecutor were present in the hearing of the 2 motions. In addition,
petitioner also aver that the notice rule should be liberally applied due to the timing of the
arrest and arraignment which contained holidays. Petitioners also argue the Respondent
Judge should not have dismissed the Motions considering the issues are of transcendental
importance and of primordial public interest.
Respondents on the other hand, Pemberton avers that he voluntarily surrendered on
December 19, the same day the Motions were filed. Petitioners failed to personally serve a
copy of the Urgent Motion on Pemberton at least three days prior to the hearing thereof. He
also avers that on December 22, Judge Ginez-Jabalde heard the Urgent Motions and
Pemberton’s counsel was indeed present but did not have knowledge of the Motions.
Counsel for Pemberton received a copy of the Urgent Motion only a few minutes before it was
to be heard. He states that an opposing party is given an opportunity to be heard when he is
afforded sufficient time to study the motion and to meaningfully oppose and controvert the
same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3-day notice rule is Applicable in the case at bar
RULING:
NO. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule
15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted
upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate
his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in
order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In
this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to
study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this
belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on
Pemberton's counsel. They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a
reference to the Christmas season and the "series of legal holidays"where courts would be
closed. To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December
22, 2014, attended by Pemberton's counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day
notice rule.
These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion's deficiencies. Even granting that
Pemberton's counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which
incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study
and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-
Jabalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on
noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton's
rights as an accused.
4. De Guzman vs. Ochoa, 684 SCRA
De Guzman, Jr. vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 169292,
April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 677.
Topic: OMNIBUS MOTION; MOTION TO DISMISS.
MENDOZA, J.
Facts: Respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli
Azores, ostensibly acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced an action seeking the annulment of
contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages.
The petitioners, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the
complaint did not state a cause of action. The respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners'
motion to dismiss. Then the petitioners filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the
certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the
principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
rendering the complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible. The respondent RTC Judge
issued an order denying the second motion to dismiss and thereafter denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA via a petition for certiorari
contending that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was
fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa but by
Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. They
invited the attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers delegated to Azores did not
include the authority to institute an action in court. Thus, according to the petitioners, the
denial by the RTC of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical and arbitrary,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and should be struck down as null and void.
The CA denied the petition for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners were
deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss.
Held:
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a
pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it
attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other
omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the
motion because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived."
As inferred from the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are
excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the
action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of
limitations or prescription. In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective
verification and certification of forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to
dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the
filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal
omission, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was deemed
waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to
dismiss. Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement regarding verification of
a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of the pleading, and non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. In fact, the court may order
the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. Similarly, the rule
requiring the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping, although obligatory, is
not jurisdictional. The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. As to whether the trial court should have
dismissed the complaint motu proprio, the Court rules in the negative. Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court is clear that failure to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum
shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of the case "upon motion and after hearing."
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. SISON
612 SCRA
Facts:
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted
by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found,
among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without proper bidding
procedures... and documentations; that calamity funds were expended without a State of
Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines,
electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
In ruling thus, the CA held that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial
evidence in order to convict Sison.
On July 22, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and
to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA
Issues:
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioner's right to intervene in the proceedings
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court
In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene, because (1)
the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the administrative
case against petitioner; (2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after the CA...
rendered its Decision; and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body
which rendered the impugned decision.
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court.[7] The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or... disallowing the intervention
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but
claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or
interpose their claim.[10] Its main purpose is to settle in... one action and by a single
judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1)
the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim... of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal... operation
and effect of the judgment.
It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their
decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a doctrine is
the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the...
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the
issues without the judges' active participation.
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed.
OMBUDSMAN vs. CHAVEZ
700 SCRA
FACTS:
The Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR) received an Order from the
Deputy Ombudsman directing it to enforce OMB’s Joint Decision and Supplemental
Resolution finding herein respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties. The BSU-BOR
issued Resolution No. 18, implementing the said Order of the OMB.
Thus, respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction before the RTC against the BSU-BOR to enjoin the
enforcement of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution.
The RTC dismissed the petition.
Respondents appealed and promptly filed a Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction with the CA.
The CA issued a Resolution granting respondents’ prayer for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18.
Thereafter, the OMB filed a Motion to Intervene with the Motion to Recall Temporary
Restraining Order.
Respondents opposed said motion and then filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
The CA issued the Resolution subject of the present petition, concluding that the
administrative penalty of dismissal from the service imposed upon appellants is not yet final
and immediately executory in view of the appeal interposed by the appellants before the CA.
The CA also denied the Ombudsman’s Motion to Recall the TRO. On the other hand,
appellants’ Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to intervene in the appeal of its
Decision;
Whether or not an appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman shall stop the
decision from being executory.
RULING:
1.
The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal
pending with the lower court. The wisdom of this course of action has been exhaustively
explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego. In resolving the issue of whether the
Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to intervene in the appeal of its Decision, the
Court ruled:
x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
directed against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of
public officers and employees) is at stake.
xxxx
The Office of the Obudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject matter of
litigation.
It asserted that it is a “competent disciplining body,” and correctly summed up its legal
interest in the matter in controversy.
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the
exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman’s powers as
provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
2.
x x x Here, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended, is categorical, an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the
Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27
of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power
to “promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers,
functions and duties” and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require.
For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of
the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will
render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when
a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision
in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is immediately
executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules of Court. Specialis
derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
The CA’s issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal
imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-
making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and
Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the
authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
From the foregoing elaboration, there can be no cavil that respondents do not have any right
to a stay of the Ombudsman’s decision dismissing them from service. Perforce, the BSU-
BOR acted properly in issuing Resolution No. 18, pursuant to the order of the Ombudsman,
as its legally-mandated duty.
The CA’s Resolution granting respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is
patently erroneous.
ANONUEVO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JALANDONI
636 SCRA
Facts:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate
Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration... to commence the judicial settlement of the latter's... estate... the
petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation[11] before the intestate court. In the
Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)--
who, in turn, was revealed to be the... daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John
Desantis.
petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother--Isabel--was, at the time of
Rodolfo's death, the legal spouse of the latter.[13] For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a
share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be
allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the
following documents:... a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;[16]...
b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;[17] and... c.) Their respective proof of
births.[18]
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as
its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the
ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel... as
an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed
that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was
purportedly married to Rodolfo.
As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was... a "legitimate" child of Isabel
and John Desantis.
The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."
The respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been... made in an official registry,
constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
According to the respondent, Isabel's previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it
was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.
Issues:
whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing
the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.
Ruling:
petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the
legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of... the petitioners and their siblings negates
their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo's estate.
the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately
established.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.[47] Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other... than the marriage
certificate.[48] Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a)
that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b)... that Sylvia is their "legitimate"
child.[50] In clear and categorical language, Sylvia's birth certificate speaks of a subsisting
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which,
properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John
Desantis.
RODRIGUEZ v. CA
698 SCRA 352
FERNANDEZ vs. CA
691 SCRA 167
CHING vs. CHENG
737 SCRA 610
Facts:
Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill sometime in 1996, he entrusted her
with the distribution of his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him. She alleged
that she handed all the property titles and business documents to-Ramon Ching for...
safekeeping.[15] Fortunately, Antonio Ching recovered from illness and allegedly demanded
that Ramon Ching return all the titles to the properties and business documents.[16]
On July 18, .1996, Antonio Ching was murdered.[17] Ramon Ching allegedly induced
Mercedes igne and her children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and
waiver[18] to Antonio Ching's estate in consideration of P22.5... million. Mercedes Igne's
children alleged that Ramon Ching never paid them.[19] On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching
allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of estate,[20] naming himself as the sole heir
and adjudicating upon himself... the entirety of Antonio Ching's estate.
After a year of investigating Antonio Ching's death, the police found Ramon Ching to be its
primary suspect.[23] Information[24] was filed against him, and a warrant of arrest[25] was
issued.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91046 (the first... case).[26]
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead additional
defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary stockholder.
The amended complaint was for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement
of Estate... and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.[30] Upon motion of the Chengs' counsel, however,
the Chengs and Lucina Santos were given fifteen
(15) days to file the appropriate pleading.
the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their
complaint in the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice
On November 22, 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the basis
that the summons had not yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and
they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the second case was made
without... prejudice.
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal should
have been with prejudice under the "two-dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil
Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title... with
Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 (the third case) and was
eventually raffled to Branch 6
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed their comment/opposition to the application for
temporary restraining order in the third case. They also filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res jiidicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure... of the complaint to state
a cause of action. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by both parties.
Branch 6 issued an omnibus order[40] resolving both the motion for reconsideration in the
second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. The trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration and the motion to dismiss, holding... that the dismissal of the second case
was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing of the third case.
while their motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending, Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the order dated November 22, 2002 and the portion of the... omnibus order
dated July 30,.2004, which upheld the dismissal of the second case... the trial court issued an
order denying the motion for reconsideration in the third case. The denial prompted Ramon
Ching and Po Wing Properties to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or the... issuance of a temporary restraining order (the
second certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals
The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties' reliance on the "two-
dismissal rule" was misplaced since the rule... involves two motions for dismissals filed by the
plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of the first case was upon the motion of
the defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the instance of the plaintiffs.
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the dismissal of the second case was with
prejudice since the non-filing of an amended complaint in the first case operated as a
dismissal on the merits.[48] They also argue that the second case should be... dismissed on
the ground of res judicata since there was a previous final judgment of the first case involving
the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Issues:
Whether the trial court's dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third
case, as per the "two-dismissal rule"; and
Ruling:
The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of
the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done
through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without...
prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been
pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss.
It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless... otherwise
declared by the court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to
prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu
propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared... by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the
defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16,
which covers motions to dismiss.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it
is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to
operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the... same
claim, the following requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on
the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.[72]
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation."[73] When a
complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the
same claim.
The dismissal of the second case... was without prejudice in view of the
"two-dismissal rule"
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not
only new defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special
proceeding. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of...
lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court granted that motion to dismiss, stating that:
A careful perusal of the allegations of the Amended Complaint dated February 10, 1999, filed
by Plaintiff Joseph Cheng, show that additional causes of action were incorporated i.e. extra-
judicial settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio Ching and receivership,... subject
matters, which should be threshed out in a special proceedings case. This is a clear
departure from the main cause of action in the original complaint which is for declaration of
nullity of certificate of titles with damages. And the rules of procedure which govern... special
proceedings case are different and distinct from the rules of procedure applicable in an
ordinary civil action.
In view of the afore-going, the court finds the Motion to Dismiss filed by Atty. Maria Lina Nieva
S. Casals to be meritorious and the Court is left with no alternative but to dismiss as it hereby
dismisses the Amended Complaint.
However, on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias, counsel for the plaintiffs, he is given a
period of fifteen (15) days from today, within which to file an appropriate pleading, copy
furnished to all the parties concerned.
....
SO ORDERED.[74]
Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias failed to file the appropriate
pleading within fifteen (15) days, he violated the order of the court. This, they argue, made
the original dismissal an adjudication upon the merits, in accordance with Rule 17,... Section
3, i.e., a dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. Hence, they argue that when
respondents filed the second case and then caused its dismissal, the dismissal should have
been with prejudice according to Rule 17, Section 1, i.e., two dismissals caused by the...
plaintiff on the same claim.
Unfortunately, petitioners' theory is erroneous.
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days to file an
appropriate pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a request made by the... plaintiffs counsel
that had no bearing on the dismissal of the case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it
does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since
there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiffs default, the trial court's instruction... to file the
appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate
pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still
stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16,
Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
....
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
....
Under Section 5 of the same rule,[75] a party may re-file the same action or claim subject to
certain exceptions.
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that
had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to
dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at
the... plaintiffs instance.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the
service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of
right that is not subject to the trial court's discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction... and
Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and Development Corporation:[76]
[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff
under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the motion
cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court... has no choice but to
consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter
of right, regardless of ground[77] (Emphasis supplied)
For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated November 22, 2002 dismissing the case,
without prejudice. The order states:
When this Motion was called for hearing, all the plaintiffs namely, Joseph Cheng, Jaime
Cheng, Mercedes Igne and Lucina Santos appeared without their counsels. That they
verbally affirmed the execution of the Motion to Dismiss, as shown by their signatures over
their... respective names reflected thereat. Similarly, none of the defendants appeared,
except the counsel for defendant, Ramon Chang [sic], who manifested that they have not yet
filed their Answer as there was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic] and the latter
has not yet been... served with summons.
Under the circumstances, and further considering that the defendants herein have not yet
filed their Answers nor any pleading, the plaintiffs has [sic] the right to out rightly [sic] cause
the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure without prejudice. Thereby, and as prayed for, this case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[78] (Emphasis supplied)
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one
prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the
defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim,... it
does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be
examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this case.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file
the appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17, Section 3 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal in the second case is still considered as one... without
prejudice. In Gomez v. Alcantara:[79]
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits,
and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is... that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits
and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of
dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without... prejudice.[80]
(Emphasis supplied)
In granting the dismissal of the second case, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to
be without prejudice. It is only when the trial court's order either is silent on the matter, or
states otherwise, that the dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the... merits.
However, while the dismissal of the second case was without prejudice, respondents' act of
filing the third case while petitioners' motion for reconsideration was still pending constituted
forum shopping.
YAO vs. PERELLO
414 SCRA
FACTS: The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for
the satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its
managers, which included Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ,
the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and
the property was scheduled for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for
prohibition alleging that the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate
liability of her husband. The trial court granted the petition and exempted the subject property
from execution. Hence, the scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently,
petitioner filed a motion for intervention, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not lower Court grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion
for intervention on the ground that the same was filed late.

HELD: NO. Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the
said provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for
prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be
given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or
not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to
intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period
prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, in this case Petitioner filed his motion way beyond the
period set forth in the rules.

PINLAC vs. CA

410 SCRA

CHIPONGIAN vs. BENITEZ-LIRIO

768 SCRA 204