PALE 2017 - Digest

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1. SUSAN LOBERES-PINTAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMONCITO B. BAYLOSIS, Respondent.

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A.C. No. 11545 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3439]
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FACTS Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Baylosis for committing perjury, falsification of public Formatted: Outline numbered + Level: 1 + Numbering
documents and the use of falsified documents. She alleged that Roldan C. Pintal (Roldan) filed a Petition for Declaration Style: 1, 2, 3, … + Start at: 1 + Alignment: Left +
of Nullity of Marriage, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC); that Atty. Baylosis conspired with Roldan Aligned at: 0.25" + Indent at: 0.5"
by making it appear in the petition that he was a resident of Caloocan City when, in truth and in fact, he was a resident
of Quezon City; and that Atty. Baylosis notarized the verification and certification against non-forum shopping of the
petition on May 13, 2011, but, at that time, Roldan was out of the country. Complainant submitted a Certification 2 from Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 12, Zone 1, District II of Caloocan City, attesting that Roldan was not a resident Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
thereof and a Certification3 from the Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from April 10, 2011
to September 8, 2011. Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Atty. Baylosis denied the accusation and insisted that Roldan personally appeared before him, swore in accordance Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
with law and verified his petition in accordance with the Rules of Court Atty. Baylosis further averred that the date of
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recording on May 13, 2011 of the Verification and Certification of the petition was an honest mistake and excusable
error on the part of his staff but his claim that Roldan personally appeared before him to attest to the truthfulness of
the verification and certification was true.
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) set the case for mandatory conference but before its conclusion, on September
7, 2012, complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance 6 manifesting that she was no longer interested in continuing with Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
the complaint and that she was withdrawing it. Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
For said reason, the CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, 7 recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Atty. Baylosis. Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
In its Notice of Resolution No.XXI-2014-610,8 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors reversed and set
aside the report and recommendation of the CBD. In its Extended Resolution, 9 the IBP-Board of Governors found Atty.
Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice when he made it appear that Roldan was present during Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
the notarization of the petition on May 13, 2011 and recommended the immediate revocation of his notarial Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.
ISSUE Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:

WON Atty. Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
RULING
YES. Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice specifically provides:
Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.1âwphi1
Without a quibble, Atty. Baylosis was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public when he notarized the
petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage without the presence of Roldan. This was evidenced by the
Certification) issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Roldan was not in the Philippines on May 13, 2011 as he had
left the Philippines on April 10, 2011 and came back only on September 8, 2011. Atty. Baylosis' contention that he
personally interviewed Roldan when the latter went into his office and personally read and signed the petition cannot
be accorded a shred of credence.
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In notarizing a document in the absence of a party, Atty. Baylosis violated not only the rule on notarial practice but also
the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
or deceitful conduct. 10 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the document, he attested that Roldan personally Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
appeared before him on the day it was notarized and verified the contents thereof. His conduct is fraught with Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the
public accord to notarized documents. 11 Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
It must be emphasized that a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. 12 It is
for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. 13 In Gonzales v. Atty.
Ramos, 14 it was written: Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. The notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
confidence in the integrity of the document would be undermined. 15 Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Following the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice, 16 Atty. Baylosis should be permanently Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
barred from being commissioned a notary public. Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
2..
ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ELENA C. CAMA, OSWALDO CASTELO, JOCELYN LLANILLO, AND BENJAMIN CASTELO, Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
Complainants, v. ATTY. RONALD SEGUNDINO C. CHING, Respondent.
FACTS: Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:

In 2013, complainants Castelo heirs received summons from the MeTC for an ejectment case filed against them by Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Leonida Delen and Spouses Nestor Delen and Julibel Delen (the Delens), who alleged that they were the owners of the
house and lot located in Sta Cruz, Manila. The subject property was the residence of the Castelo heirs and covered by a Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
TCT in the name of the Delens. Custom Color(RGB(67,67,67))
Upon verifying the authenticity of TCT with the RD, the Castelo heirs discovered that the previous title covering the
subject property which was in the name of the Castelo heirs' parents, Spouses Castelo, had been cancelled by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24, 2010. The Deed was purportedly executed by the Spouses Castelo and the
Delens, and was notarized by Respondent Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching despite the fact that Perzidia S. Castelo died
on May 4, 2009. Also, the acknowledgment page of the Deed showed that only community tax certificates had been
presented to Atty. Ching, and not valid government -issued identification cards as required by the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. The Castelo heirs filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) this administrative case against
Atty. Ching based on the latter's gross negligence in notarizing the Deed. Atty. Ching denied notarizing the deed,
countering that he did not know the Spouses Castelo and the Delens, and that the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs
had been falsified.
Atty. Ching's notarial books were presented. However, Atty. Ching failed to attend the said conference and refute the
authenticity of the Deed. Upon verification, the IBP concluded that the copy of the Deed presented by the Castelo heirs
in their Complaint was indeed a faithful machine copy of the original contained in Atty. Ching's notarial books.
Thereafter, the Castelo heirs submitted their position paper. Atty. Ching, however, failed to submit his.
Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and Recommendation, finding that Atty. Ching was grossly negligent in
notarizing the Deed. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the said Report and
Recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ching was grossly negligent. (YES)
RULING:
Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to observe any of the requirements of a notarial
act under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which would result in putting the rights of a person to his liberty or
property in jeopardy. This includes, among others, failing to require the presence of the signatories to a notarial
instrument and ascertaining their identities through competent evidence thereof, and allowing, knowingly or
unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself, to sign notarial documents, affix the notarial seal therein,
and make entries in the notarial register.
Commissioner Robles observed that while Atty. Ching denied having notarized the Deed by showing the discrepancy
between his purported signature therein and the specimen signatures when he submitted in his Answer, he miserably
failed to explain how the Deed ended up in his notarial books. Commissioner Robles concluded that while it would not
be fair to conclude that Atty. Ching actually signed the Deed, he was nonetheless grossly negligent for failing to give a
satisfactory reason why a supposedly forged Deed was duly recorded in his notarial books.
The Court agrees. Atty. Ching failed in ensuring that only documents which he had personally signed and sealed with
his notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the completeness of the same and the identities of the parties who affixed
their signatures therein, would be included in his notarial register. This also means that Atty. Ching failed to properly
store and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other people from notarizing documents by forging his
signature and affixing his notarial seal, and recording such documents in his notarial books, without his knowledge and
consent. This is gross negligence.
Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in letting another person notarize the Deed had also unduly put the
Castelo heirs in jeopardy of losing their property.
As for the penalty to be imposed, and taking into account the possible undue deprivation of property on the part of the
Castelo heirs as a result of Atty. Ching's gross negligence, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the recommended
penalty of the IBP.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching is found GUILTY of gross negligence in the performance of his duties
as notary public. His existing notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is also PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public. Moreover, he is hereby SUSPENDED FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR SIX (6) MONTHS. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.

3.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016 Formatted: Font: (Default) Verdana, 9 pt, Font color:
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent. Custom Color(RGB(0,3,5))
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: Formatted: Font: (Default) Verdana, 9 pt, Font color:
Complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that Custom Color(RGB(67,67,67))
"misled the Court.". The Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint,
that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Custom Color(RGB(67,67,67))
Fortunato Jadulco.
Respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals. She could not properly defend herself
without a copy of the title, and the title presented by the respondent was fabricated. She presented Certifications from
the DENR and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT
No. 1730. Respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of the lot owned by
complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation
respondent notarized. She accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge who was his former
client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor. She narrated the outcomes in the cases of Estrellers.
She further charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal
as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) - University
of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of
the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
Respondent opposed the allegations and claimed that the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed
Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the
certification of Lupon Chairman. The free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-1118
and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. He argued that the notarization of the deed of donation
had no relation to the case filed against the occupants of the lot. The matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to
his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.
He was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. His
designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent
stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as
Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He
likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative case against him, who
interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this Court.
IBP noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent
described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before
the wife of that married man died. Such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross
misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."; found that respondent is guilty
of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she has
submitted."; recommended the suspension from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct
HELD:
Using foul language in pleadings - In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a
"dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative case."
.We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case.
While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from using improper
language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong, x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
Respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states: Rule 8.01 - A lawyer
shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in the
barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court. 14 Complainant claims that there is no such certificate
in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the
certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco.
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x was the
certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18
October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he used in
Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent
that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other
words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title – did not constitute dishonesty. Court of Appeals was furnished
a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately
did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with
the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could
examine the same.
Whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an examination
of the parties' respective evidence. This matter falls outside the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear and
convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications
do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does
not exist in their official records.
Conflict of interest - notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial acts
authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature
witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as
counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring
with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any proof.
Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings. She conveniently failed to present any concrete
evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Charges of bias and partiality
on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

We dismissed respondent as Acting Judge for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which is the accessory penalty
of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-
College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor. The prohibition on reemployment does
not distinguish between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not
in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact
that complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency. Failure to comply with Formatted: Font: (Default) Verdana, 9 pt, Font color:
Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or
even disbarment.
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PALE CASE DIGESTS - 2017 3A DIGEST POOL
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4. VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10911. June 06, 2017. En Banc. Tijam,J.
FACTS:
Complainant was one of the plaintiffs in a civil action for Recovery of Possession, while respondent was the defendants’
counsel therein. It was alleged that when respondent filed a Notice of Appeal in said case, respondent indicated his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance number without indicating the date of issue thereof. The
same thing happened when respondent filed the appellants’ brief.
Similarly, in a petition for injunction filed by respondent for the same clients, he once again only indicated his MCLE
Compliance Number. Respondent also filed a Motion for Leave of Court in the said special civil action, indicating his
MCLE Compliance Number without the date of issue.
Upon inquiry by the complainant, the MCLE Office issued a Certification stating that respondent had not yet complied
with his MCLE requirements. Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately and
unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and counsels into believing that he had complied with the MCLE
requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent guilty and recommended that Atty. Echanez be disbarred. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investigating
Commissioner. It should be noted that respondent was given ample opportunity to answer the imputations against him
and defend himself but he did not do so despite due notices.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint
and evidence on record?
HELD: YES.
First, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. No less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that
respondent had not complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE.
Second, despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number in his
pleadings before the trial courts. In indicating patently false information in pleadings filed before the courts of law, not
only once but four times, the respondent acted in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. Respondent's act of filing
pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of the courts, especially this Court, considering
that it is this Court that authored the rules and regulations that the respondent violated. The Lawyer's Oath in Rule
138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and
acting with fidelity to both court and client. In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also
put his own clients at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client's cause as pleadings wi th such false
information produce no legal effect. In so doing, respondent violated his duty to his clients as enunciated in Canons 17
and 18 of the CPR.
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Third, the respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the trial court, the IBP-CBD, and also this Court
despite due notice. In the special civil action, the trial court directed the respondent to file a comment, but he did not
file any. This Court also directed respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint but he failed to do so. When
this Court issued a show cause order against the respondent, he did not heed the order. The IBP-CBD also notified the
respondent to appear before it for mandatory conference/hearing but the said notice was also ignored. Clearly,
respondent's act of ignoring the said court orders despite notice violates the lawyer's oath and runs counter to the
precepts of the CPR.
Respondent's culpability is further highlighted by the fact that respondent had already been sanctioned by the IBP
twice. Respondent was found guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission in 2 different
occasions. Taken altogether, considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings,
his repeated failure to obey legal orders, and the fact that he had already been sanctioned twice by this Court on
separate cases, we are constrained to affirm the recommendation for respondent’s disbarment to prevent him from
further engaging in legal practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a
member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
- Denise
5. DR. EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR. Complainant, vs. ATTY. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Respondent.
FACTS:
Lamorena, et. al. filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of void documents, recovery of ownership and possession,
accounting of fruits derived from illegal occupation of property, exercise of right of legal redemption and application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the said complaint, Lamorena, et al. questioned the occupancy of Dr. Eduardo
Alicias and his co-defendants of a certain parcel of land. Lamorena, et. al. claimed that they are entitled to possession
of the same, being the surviving heirs of the lawful owners of the subject property, spouses Vicente and Catalina
Lamorena (Catalina).
Dr. Alicias and his co-defendants filed their Answer, stressing, that they legally acquired the subject property by virtue
of a contract of sale from its lawful owner, Catalina, as the same is her paraphernal property.
It appears, however, that an amended complaint for reconveyance, annulment of deeds and quieting of title was filed
by Lamorena, et. al. against herein complainant and Urvillo Paa before the MTCC in Vigan City. However, it was not Atty.
Baclig who acted as counsel in this case.
Dr. Alicias filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Baclig. He averred that Atty. Baclig consented to
false assertions when his clients allegedly made false statements in their amended complaint. Complainant also stated
that Atty. Baclig knowingly filed an action which was: (1) already barred by res judicata and laches; and (2) without the
jurisdiction of the RTC where such complaint was filed. Lastly, Dr. Alicias claimed that Atty. Baclig consented to the
filing of a complaint, which asserted similar relief, when a similar case was filed before the MTCC.
Atty. Baclig contended that the allegations in the subject complaint contained absolutely privileged communication,
which insulates him from liability. Also, the issues as to whether or not the assertions in the subject complaint are false
statements and whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action are yet to be decided;
hence, the complaint against him holds no water.
ISSUE:
Is Atty. Baclig administratively liable? Yes.
RULING:
1. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but
is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and
the courts.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. The proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.
Dr. Alicias alleged that Atty. Baclig consented to falsehood when the allegations in the amended complaint specified,
among others, that the subject property is a hereditary property when in fact it is a paraphernal property; that the
property is unregistered property; and that it was inherited in 1952 when it was not.
However, noteworthy is the fact that such assertions are the matters in dispute in the case before the RTC. In other
words, the assertions as to the nature of the property and the time when it was inherited also deal with the main issue
of the case. To recall, Lamorena, et. al.'s main contention is that the subject property is a hereditary property, being the
property of their parents. On the other hand, Dr. Alicias alleged that they brought the property from Catalina and the
latter had every right to sell it even without the consent of her spouse because it is her paraphernal property. In other
words, the issue in the amended complaint is who between Lamorena, et. al. and complainant herein has the right of
possession over the subject property. Hence, Atty. Baclig cannot be faulted for consenting to his clients' act of asserting
such statements.
At any rate, it must be considered that Atty. Baclig's pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action
against him as an attorney.
2. As regards res judicata, laches, and jurisdiction, the same are not founded on substantial evidence.
3. As to the matter of forum shopping, the court finds that Atty. Baclig resorted to the same.
It must be noted that an amended complaint was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against Dr. Alicias and Paa before the MTCC
in February 2010. In sum, such amended complaint sought for the nullification of the mortgage contract and deed of
sale which transferred the property to herein complainant and his co-defendants and the declaration of Lamorena, et.
al. as the absolute owners of the subject property. Eventually, the case before the MTCC was dismissed with prejudice.
However, another amended complaint was filed by Lamorena, et. al. against complainants, Robert and Paa, but this
time, before the RTC. A cursory reading of the complaint reveals that the reliefs sought pertain to the nullification of
any and all the documents in the form of a written agreement which may be executed without the consent of Lamorena,
et. al. In esse, such complaint before the RTC prayed for similar reliefs as those which were sought for in the complaint
before the MTCC.
Atty. Baclig consented to the filing of another complaint before another forum which deals with the same parties and
same reliefs. Thus, a ruling in one case would resolve the other, and vice versa. Regardless of the fact that Atty. Baclig
did not act as counsel in the case before the MTC, it would not exempt him from culpability. Atty. Baclig did not
categorically deny the allegations of complainant regarding the commission of forum shopping. Moreover, it is
surprising that he was able to answer the 10 causes of action raised by complainant, except the issue on forum
shopping. Hence, he is deemed to have admitted that he has knowledge of the pendency of a similar complaint before
the MTC when a complaint before the RTC was filed.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter runs contrary to Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12
of the CPR. Canon 1 of the CPR requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 prohibits the undue delay of a case by misusing court
processes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Vivencio S.
Baclig for violating Canon 1 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is STERNLY
WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely.
- alit
6. JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant vs. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent

A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017, FIRST DIVISION, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch Xl, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case
RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation. Consequently,
complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of ₱8,000.00
as attorney's fees. Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of her position paper,
complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same. As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in the total amount of
₱633,143.68. When complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell
her farm to pay the farm workers. Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was left defenseless
and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment; hence, she filed the
instant complaint.
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 14, 2014, the IBPCBD found respondent administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the
IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
In a Resolution dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report
and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable l aws and
rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in order to
account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of their
importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for free. To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair
and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as follows:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.1âwphi1
CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and respondent when
the latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the
amount of ₱8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client
relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money
representing legal fees from the latter, as in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to
"serve his client with competence and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the necessar y
position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein
complainant. To be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in
support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to completely abandon his client's
cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant's case, respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and
defend the latter's interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. In A bay v. Montesino, it was explained that regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the
latter must still present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause.
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively
liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show that he
indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit of complainant's
intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera, the
Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood.
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any
person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral[.]
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity Formatted: Balloon Text
thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence
of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined."
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano, the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1)
year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly, in Conlu v.
Aredonia, Jr., the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required
pleading to the prejudice of his client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty
recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala, where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the
Court hereby revokes respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
7. PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN
A.C. No. 1346, July 25, 2017, PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: In October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and later became its Director, Treasurer,
Administrative Officer, VP for Finance, then its counsel. In one case, E.E. Black Ltd., through its counsel, sent a letter to
Paces regarding the latter's outstanding obligation to it. In the negotiations that transpired thereafter, Salandanan was
the one who represented Paces.
Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the stockholders and officers in the
corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out their shareholdings in the company to the
group of Mr. Nicolas C. Balderama.
After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but now, representing E.E.
Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application for preliminary attachment against Paces for the
collection of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in obtaining an order of attachment, writ of attachment,
and notices of garnishment to various entities which Paces had business dealings with.
Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., he
represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full extent, all the information he had acquired as its stockholder,
officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he was never employed nor paid as a counsel by Paces.
There was no client-lawyer contract between them. He maintained that his being a lawyer was merely coincidental to
his being a stockholderofficer and did not automatically make him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect
to its account with E.E. Black Ltd. He added that whatever knowledge or information he had obtained on the operation
of Paces only took place in the regular, routinary course of business as him being an investor, stockholder, and officer,
but never as a lawyer of the company.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salandanan is administratively liable.
RULING: Yes. It is clear that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces, but it later became his duty to oppose the same
for E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was eventually opposed by him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus,
Salandanan had indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights and obligations of Paces which had
been placed in him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led him to the identification of those attachable
properties and business organizations that eventually made the attachment and garnishment against Paces a success.
To allow him to utilize said information for his own personal interest or for the benefit of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse
party, would be to violate the element of confidence which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship. Formatted: Balloon Text
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a
client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be
allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation
of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of
the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of the conflict of interest, Salandanan should
have either outrightly declined representing and entering his appearance as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E.
Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another lawyer. Unfortunately, he did neither, and must necessarily suffer
the dire consequences.
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan from the practice of law for three (3) years.
8. NANETTE B. SISON, REPRESENTED BY DELIA B. SARABIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SHERDALE M. VALDEZ,
RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 11663, July 31, 2017; PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
Complainant, an overseas Filipino worker in Australia, engaged respondent's legal services to file an action against
Engr. Eddie S. Pua of B.S. Pua Construction and Engr. Dario Antonio for failing to construct complainant's house.
Although no written agreement was executed between the parties specifying the scope of legal services, respondent
received the total amount of P215,000.00 from complainant. Respondent acknowledged receipt of the first two (2)
installments in a handwritten note, stating that the amount of P165,000.00 was for litigation expenses, i.e., attorney's
fees, filing fees, bond, and other expenses.The last payment was deposited online to the bank account of respondent's
wife, Ma. Analyn M. Valdez.
On a certain time, complainant terminated respondent's legal services via e-mail and text messages with a demand to
return the amount given by which was not heeded notwithstanding several demands. Hence, complainant, filed the
instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), alleging that despite receipt of her payments:
a) respondent failed to render his legal services and update her regarding the status of the case;
b) commingled her money with that of respondent's wife;
c) misappropriated her money by failing to issue a receipt for the last installment of the payment
received; and
d) fabricated documents to justify retention of her money.
For his part, respondent claimed that the expenses where applied to the sending of demand letters, drafting of a
complaint for breach of contract and damages. Respondent further averred that he was supposed to personally meet
complainant for the first time upon the latter's arrival in the Philippines in the second week of November 2012. During
the meeting, he intended to personally report the status of the case, have the pleadings signed, and explain how her
payments would be applied. However, no phone call or e-mail was made by complainant to confirm the meeting.
Respondent later learned from complainant's new contractor that she did not want to meet with him for fear that he Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
would only ask for more money.
Instead of filing their respective position papers before the IBP-CBD, the parties filed a Joint Manifestation agreeing to
settle the matter amicably and acknowledging that the disbarment complaint was filed because of "misapprehension
of facts due to pure error in accounting and honest mistakes by respondent." In turn, complainant undertook not to
pursue nor testify against respondent in this administrative case, as well as in the Estafa case.
The IBP - CBD Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating his
obligations under the CPR with a stem warning never to commit the same mistakes again.
At the outset, the IC disapproved the Joint Manifestation, noting that a compromise agreement would not operate
to exonerate a lawyer from a disciplinary case. As to respondent's liability, the IC observed that he committed
several violations of the CPR during the period of his engagement with complainant from September 2012 up to January
8, 2013.
First, he failed to inform his client about the status of the case. The IC acknowledged that respondent rendered
some legal services to complainant, but only came up with the list of services after his termination, thus,
supporting the conclusion that he indeed failed to update his client about the developments of the case. Formatted: Balloon Text
Second, he asked for payment of fees from complainant even before he prepared the draft complaint. The IC
explained that a prudent lawyer would first wait for the computation of court fees before seeking payment of
filing and bond fees.
Third, respondent failed to issue the proper receipt for the full amount he received from complainant.
Fourth, respondent commingled the funds of his client with that of his wife when he asked that the P50,000.00
be deposited to his wife's bank account.
Hence, in a Resolution IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IC's Report and Recommendation, but
modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. Respondent moved
for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of
RULING: YES.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence and
to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. In this relation, a lawyer has the duty to
apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other relevant information.
In this case, respondent alleged that he waited for complainant's arrival in the Philippines in November 2012
to personally report on his accomplishments, to have the necessary pleadings signed, and to explain how the
money given will be applied. However, the meeting did not push through.
Indeed, respondent cannot justify his non-compliance by shifting the blame to complainant for failing to meet
with him, especially so that he failed to inform his client of the pleadings she needed to sign.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon
demand. His failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has appropriated it for his own use, and the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross violation of his professional obligation under Canon
16 of the CPR.
In this case, respondent failed to account for the money received from complainant when he only
acknowledged receipt of P165,000.00 for litigation expenses despite admittedly receiving P215,000.00. When
complainant terminated his legal services, the fact that no case has been filed in court should have prompted
him to immediately return to complainant the amounts intended as filing and bond fees, as these were
obviously unutilized.
In fact, respondent admitted that, based on his belief, he was entitled to only P65,000.00 as compensation for
his legal services. As such, he should have returned the excess amount of P150,000.00 out of the P215,000.00
he received from complainant.
Notably, Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows a lawyer to retain the amount necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements.Hence, respondent's persistent refusal to return the money to complainant despite several
demands renders him administratively liable.
Considering the surrounding circumstances of this case, such as the short duration of the engagement, respondent's
return of the money, his expression of humility and remorse, and the fact that this is his first administrative case,
the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months sufficient
and commensurate to respondent's violations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez is found GUILTY of violating Rule 18.04, Canon 18, as well as Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
-Ina
9. ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO,, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Elibena Cabiles filed this administrative complaint before the IBP seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro
Cedo for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle. According to Elibena, she engaged the services of
respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case, where therein respondents were Elibena’s business partners.
Respondent lawyer was paid Php5, 500.00 for drafting therein respondents' position paper and Php2,000.00 for his
every appearance in the NLRC hearings.
During the hearing, only Danilo Ligbos, the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his Reply. On the other
hand, respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients, despite being paid his appearance fee earlier. The Labor
Arbiter ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and
13th month pay. Worse still, the NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer for failure to
post the required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in perfecting an appeal.
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the said
hearing; and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash
vouchers that would refute Danilo' s claim that he was a regular employee.
Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed to a certification
issued by the MCLE Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second, and third compliance
periods of the (MCLE) requirement.
Elibena also averred that she hired respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita Claudit;
that as evidenced by a handwritten receipt, she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing
of the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00; and that in order to come up with the necessary amount,
she sold to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an
unnotarized Deed of Sale. Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not
exert any effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on the ground of prescription.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two years. Aside from
respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him
grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26, 2009 hearing in the
NLRC, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who had no knowledge
of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the
unjust vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation,
but modified the recommended administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to one year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)
RULING:
Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional requirement to
enable them to practice law. This is "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." Non-compliance
with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP member.
Respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number and date of issue
of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010,
considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE
Office, Elibena discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance periods. For
this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which reads:
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACH1EVE HIGH ST AND ARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE
PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.
Further, the circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for
failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the
following:
CANON 17 - A LA WYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently
fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he accepted, although he had been fully
compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in
advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor case on March 26,
2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore, although respondent lawyer had already received the sum of
Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed to promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with the City
Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the
cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing
the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the
required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's
mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.
With regard to the labor case for which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers whic h,
according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the discretion
being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were available legal defenses for his client, and conceding, too,
that it was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way of handling the
appeal before the NLRC. Aside from handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of
the day, at the last day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to advise Elibena and the rest of his
clients about the requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena and her companions to be conversant
with the indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC. And, in the criminal case, he
should have known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that operate to extinguish criminal liability. All
these contretemps could have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and diligence.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high standard of legal proficie ncy with his
refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena’s interest in view of his
lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate to the
facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one year.

Prepared by: Sherissa Marisse Bernabe
10. CARMELO IRINGAN v. ATTY. CLAYTON B. GUMANGAN

A.C. No. 8574. August 16, 2017, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
CTCs no longer qualifies as competent evidence of the parties' identity as defined under Rule II, Section 12 of the 2004 Rules Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
on Notarial Practice.
FACTS:
Carmelo believes that the Contract of Lease, which was being used as basis for Illegal Detainer case filed by Renato, was Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
spurious as he had never entered into such a contract with the latter. In fact, by simple examination, the same was
executed and subscribed before him on December 30, 2005, when in fact Renato’s CTC was issued on January 17, 2006;
That Carmelo's own CTC does not appear thereon, meaning that he never appeared to execute it; That besides not
appearing before Atty. Gumangam Carmelo has not been or seen the alleged witnesses to the contract. As a
consequence, he filed a disbarment case against Atty. Gumangan.
On the other hand, Atty. Gumangan admitted that he notarized the Contract of Lease, but maintained that Carmelo,
together with Renato, personally executed said Contract before Atty. Gumangan and in the presence of two witnesses,
namely, Hilda Langgaman (Langgaman) and Narcisa Padua (Padua). Atty. Gumangan attached to his Comment/Answer
the Joint Affidavit dated July 20, 2009 in which Langgaman and Padua affirmed that they were persona lly present at
Atty. Gumangan's office when Carmelo and Renato signed the Contract of Lease, and that they saw with their own eyes
Carmelo signing said Contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Gumangan should be held administratively liable.
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Gumangan herein violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the Contract of Lease on Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
December 30, 2005 without competent evidence of identity of Renato and Carmelo and, thus, committing an expressly Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
prohibited act under the Rules.
Atty. Gumangan did not allege that he personally knew Renato and Carmelo when they appeared before him on Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
December 30, 2005 for the notarization of the Contract of Lease. There was no showing that Renato and Carmelo
presented current identification documents issued by an official agency bearing their photographs and signatur es
before Atty. Gumangan notarized their Contract of Lease. Langgaman and Padua witnessed Renato and Carmelo signing
the Contract of Lease in person at Atty. Gumangan's office, but they did not attest under oath or affirmation that they
personally knew Renato and Carmelo, and neither did they present their own documentary identification.
According to Renato, Atty. Gumangan asked them to present their CTCs, but neither Renato nor Carmelo had CTCs at
that moment. Renato only secured a CTC on January 17, 2006, which he belatedly presented to Atty. Gumangan for
recording.
CTCs no longer qualifies as competent evidence of the parties' identity as defined under Rule II, Section 12 of the 2004 Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
Rules on Notarial Practice. In Baylon v. Almo, considering the ease with which a CTC could be obtained these days and Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
recognizing the established unreliability of a CTC in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his document
notarized, the Court did not include the CTC in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized. Worse, neither Renato
nor Carmelo had CTCs with them on December 30, 2005, yet, Atty. Gumangan still proceeded with notarizing the
Contract of Lease, allowing Renato to belatedly present his CTC weeks later, while Carmelo did not present any CTC at Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
all. Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
WHEREFORE, his incumbent commission as notary public, if any, is REVOKED, and he is PROHIBITED from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately.
11. RAFAEL PADILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN SAMSON,, Respondent.

August 22, 2017
A.C. No. 10253
PERALTA, J
FACTS:
Complainant Rafael Padilla filed a Complaint on November 25, 2013 against his former counsel, respondent Atty. Glenn
Samson, in connection with his case, entitled Indelecia Balaga and Enrique Balaga v. Rafael Padilla. Padilla contends
that Samson suddenly cut all communications with him, which almost caused him to miss the due date for the filing
of a required pleading. He even wrote a demand letter asking Samson to withdraw his appearance and return all the
documents pertinent to his case, but to no avail. Also, Padilla had been asking Samson for the refund of his overpayment
amounting to ₱19,074.00. However, Samson failed to offer any response.
When ordered by the Court as well as the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
to refute the allegations in Padilla's complaint and explain his side, Samson refused to do so. On January 26, 2016, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended Samson’s suspension for six (6) months. the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-176,2 which adopted and approved, with modification by increasing the
penalty to one (1) year suspension considering the gravity of the offense committed by the Respondent, the
abovementioned recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Atty. Samson should be held administratively liable?
RULING:
The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP that Samson should be held administratively
accountable.
Ordinarily, lawyers may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry
it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) to undertake the task with zeal, care, and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.
Every case which a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of importance.
Canons 15, and 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
In the case at bar, Samson completely abandoned Padilla without any justification, notwithstanding his receipt of the
professional fees for services rendered as well as the latter's efforts to reach him. His continuous inaction despite
repeated follow-ups reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his client's cause, in blatant
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Also, despite numerous demands, Samson has unjustifiably refused to return
Padilla's documents and the amount of P19, 074.00 as overpayment for his legal services. It is a hornbook principle
that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes, not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending
scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court. Further, Samson
failed to file his Answer to the complaint despite due notice from the Court and the IBP. His unwarranted tenacity
simply shows, not only his lack of responsibility, but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as pronounced
in case law, is indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled against him.
The CPR requires lawyers to give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case.
Knowing whether a case would be potentially successful is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of
lawyers. If ever Samson found that his client's cause was defenseless, then he should have met with Padilla so that
they would be able to discuss their possible options, instead of abruptly dropping the case without any notice or
explanation. Samson's failure to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Withal, his persistent refusal to return Padilla's money and case files despite frequent demands clearly reflects his lack
of integrity and moral soundness. Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client's money and property that may come
into their possession. Thus, Samson's failure to return Padilla's money upon demand gave rise to the
presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust that was reposed upon him,
which constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
The Code does not only exact from lawyers a firm respect for the law, legal processes, and the courts, but also mandates
the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship. Verily, Samson fell short of the demands required of him as a faithful member of the bar. His inability to
properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable, not just to Padilla, but also to the Court, to the legal
profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his
misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In previous cases, lawyers who have been held liable for infractions similar to those which Samson committed were
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Finally, Samson must also return all the properties
and documents in his possession relative to Padilla's case, and the amount of Pl 9,074.00 as overpayment of fees since
the same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil
liability, it must be clarified that said rule remains applicable only when the claim involves moneys received by the
lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct from and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. And considering the fact that Samson's receipt of said amount and documents from Padilla remains
undisputed, the Court finds the return of the same to be in order.
-JV FERMIN
12. LITO V. BUENVIAJE v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO

A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017, PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Buenviaje alleged that he was married to the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje as evidenced by NSO issued Marriage Contract.
Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed a criminal case for
bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a certain Amalia Ventura in 1978, thus, making
him guilty of bigamy. In an attempt to protect the rights and interests of his clients in securing the monies of their
sibling, deceased Fe Gonzalo, Atty. Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of Depositor to the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI)-Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje and Fe appeared to have a joint account.
Buenviaje averred that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice of Death of Depositor dated October 11, 2007 sent to the BPI-
Dagupan Branch, he untruthfully and maliciously quoted the following statements: (1) "a clever swindler by the name
of Lito Buenviaje made it appear on spurious document that he is the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact Lito
Buenviaje is married to Amalia Valero", (2) "since August 24, 2007, Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice as he
has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-
103365 pending in the City of Manila", and (3) "Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life" to his prejudice.
Buenviaje filed an administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo, docketed as A.C. No. 11616
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that Atty. Magdamo be reprimanded for his unethical
actuations. However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a Notice of Resolution suspended Atty. Magdamo from the practice
of law for three (3) months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Magdamo should be held administratively liable (YES)
HELD:
We cannot countenance Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and disrespectful language in his Notice addressed to BPI-
Dagupan. He clearly violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for his actions erode the
public's perception of the legal profession. We, thus, sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of
Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Canon 8 of the Cod e of Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
The records show that he referred to Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with pure malice for he had
no evidence that Buenviaje is committing swindling activities. Even if he was suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have
refrained from making such malicious reference or name-calling for he should know as a lawyer that the mere filing of
a complaint against a person does not guarantee a finding of guilt, and that an accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. Undoubtedly, his malicious imputation against Buenviaje is unfair as the latter was unnecessarily
exposed to humiliation and shame even as there was no actual case yet to be filed in the courts.
Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the marriage documents of Buenviaje and
Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life". He should know
better that without the courts' pronouncement to this effect, he is in no position to draw conclusions and pass judgment
as to the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage of Buenviaje and Fe. At the very least, Atty. Magdamo's
actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice
as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People vs. Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending
in the City of Manila". Upon review, it appears that case number 7H-103365 is the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings
filed against Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's Office of Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo made the subjects statement
in the Notice to BPI-Dagupan, he knew that there was no final resolution yet from the prosecutor's office, no case has
yet to be filed in the courts, there was no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje, and more importantly, there was no
evidence that Buenviaje had any intent to flee prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the
proceedings hereto.
We had an occasion to say that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements by
an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the canons of
professional ethics. Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense.
Prepared by: Mika Ituriaga
13. JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS,
Respondents
October 3, 2017, A.C. No. 11754, TIJAM, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty.
Era. The Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal. Bonifacio and the corporation
brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were decided
against them. Thus, a Writ of Execution was issued to implement the decision. Two alias were later on issued, directing
the sheriff to collect the sum representing the judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees. Meanwhile, an
administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests. In July 16, 2013 Decision,
this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for two years for its guidance.
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the
business establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. On the same
day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees who were
there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually
stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pullin g out the
auctioned properties. As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to
Bonifacio's business establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to
pull out the auctioned properties. This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery,
and trespassing. In its Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas
for grave coercion.
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in February
and with regard to the subject labor case. Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint. In his defense, Atty. Era
further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his
clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SPA, he
was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He
added that he never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty.
Bragas, being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as
said law firm's clients.
In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the
dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The IBP Board of Governors
(Board April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions. Corollary to
this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an unauthorized
practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of
the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing. Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139 -B
of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this Court.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not Atty. Era’s acts constituted “practice of law”. (YES)
b) Whether or not Atty. Era was engaged in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that
would warrant another disciplinary action against him. (YES)

c) (If the first issue is in the affirmative):Whether or not Atty. Bragas is guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise
of its disciplining authority against her. (YES)
RULING:
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
1. YES. Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
Black defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing cou nsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate."
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co.)
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients
in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the
certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the premises
at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed
entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law
office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be
exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, Atty. Era's acts
clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each course
of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award. Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent
them in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor case
as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era. Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in
seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement
without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer. It could readily be seen that the said SPA
was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, this Court is one with the Board's submission that
the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the practice of law in performing
the acts above-cited as such SPA cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which
We cannot countenance.
2. YES. Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision dated
July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to December 2013.
Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to
circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this Court's
lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders
and processes. Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and
to show respect to their processes.
3. YES. Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must
likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Indeed, it is a
lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded
upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in
education and character.
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice could
be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should
have not participated to such transgression.Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the
suspension order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era
as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era,
who admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful
order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B.
Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both
Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of another offense
will warrant a more severe penalty.
Prepared by: Nicole Ann Crysta M. Romero
14.
LUZVIMINDA S. CERILLA V. ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA
A.C. No. 11483 October 3, 2017 Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Luzviminda S. Cerilla, complainant, filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct against Atty. Samuel
Lezama, respondent, before the IBP.
In her complaint, complainant alleged that she is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land, located in Sibulan, Negros
Oriental. The heirs of Gringio sold it to heirs of Fabio Solmayor, including the complainant.
Being co-owner, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file an unlawful detainer case against Garlito with
the MTC.
However, at that time, complainant was working at Camp Aguinaldo in EDSA; hence, she executed a special power of
attorney (SPA) in favor of respondent to represent her in filing of the case, to appear during preliminary conference,
including amicable settlement of the case if necessary.
Thereafter, by virtue of the SPA, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant, to sell the
property of complainant for P350,000, without her consent or special authority. The compromise agreement was
approved; hence, a writ of execution was issued.
Complainant argued that the respondent should be suspended or disbarred because he misrepresented that she was
willing to sell the property, considering there are other co-owners, and respondent misconduct was the proximate
cause of loss of property.
In defense, respondent argued that he was duly armed with an SPA to enter into a compromise agreement, and the
price of P350,000 was the actual price paid by complainant to owner. Hence, he entered into the compro mise
agreement under the honest and sincere belief that it was the fairest and most equitable arrangement.
The IBP- Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended a suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. During the preliminary
conference, respondent admitted that complainant did not grant him the authority to sell the property in P350,000.
Hence, he acted beyond the scope of his authority.
The IBP- Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING:
Yes, respondent is found guilty of violating Canons 5, 15, and 17 of the CPR. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the
suspension from the practice of law for a period of 2 years.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is imperative that lawyers be conversant with basic legal principles. Here, nowhere it
is expressly stated in the SPA that respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of property. Hence, he clearly
acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No.:XXI-2014-386, stated that his action was
based on an honest belief that he was serving both the interest of his client and the policy of the law to settle cases
amicably. However, his justification does not persuade, because his alleged honest belief prejudiced his client, since the
property she was not willing to sell was sold at a price decided upon by respondent on his own, which caused his client
and her co-owners to file further cases to recover their property that was sold due to respondent's mistake. He
overlooked the fact that he was not authorized by his client to sell the property. Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 5 – A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS
WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION
REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also violated Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 17- A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
Prepared by: Paola E. Camilon
15. A.C. No. 8887 ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant vs. Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR., Respondent
November 7, 2017, PER CURIAM
FACTS:
Verano executed an SPA in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing the latter to use Verano's as guaranty to obtain a
bail bond for particular criminal cases4 that had been filed against Atty. Diores. Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety) in order to use the subject property Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
as guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases of Estafa and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been filed against
him. Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty. Diores to enter into such MOA, much less to use the subject property
as collateral for bail bonds of the more than 61 Estafa cases filed against the latter which were other than those he
authorized under the SPA, causing great loss and damage to Verano.
Thereafter, the RTC branch, where the estafa cases were pending, found Atty. Diores guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code by engaging in a Ponzi scheme.
Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. Diores. After due proceedings, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. In its Resolution, the IBP Board
of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the said Report and Recommendation, but recommended that Atty. Diores
be disbarred.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diores should be disbarred.
RULING:
YES.
In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor, both in their private and professional capacities. Thus, any form of deception or fraudulent act
committed by a lawyer in either capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but also severely undermines the
trust and confidence of people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's
moral character into serious doubt as a member of the Bar, rendering him unfit to continue his practice of law.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful disobedience to such
orders, especially to those issued by this Court, is a sufficient ground to disbar a lawyer or suspend him from the
practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Formatted: Balloon Text
In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that while there was an SPA executed by Verano in favor of
Atty. Diores for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee for the bail bonds, it only authorized Atty. Diores to use the
same for specific criminal cases, and not for the other criminal cases filed against him. In addition, Atty. Diores failed to
file his comment to Verano's letter-complaint filed against him despite two (2) notices from the Court ordering him to
do so, failed to attend the mandatory conference and file his position paper despite orders from the IBP, and jumped
bail in the criminal cases filed against him.
The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's observation. While the SPA executed by Verano
empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to use the subject property as guaranty for his bail bond in some of his
criminal cases, this did not grant him carte blanche to use the said property to secure bail bonds in his other
criminal cases which were not included in the SPA, much less enter into a MOA with Visayan Surety for the said
purpose. Such act not only violates the trust granted to him by Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral character.
Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him, failed to file a comment
in the instant case despite notice from the Court, and also failed to attend the mandatory conference and file his position
paper when he was directed to do so by the IBP, shows his propensity to willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no
less - and other judicial authorities, including the IBP, which is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which should
be penalized to the greatest extent.
As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's recommendation that
Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in view of the totality of infractions he had committed, compounded by his
conviction for six (6) counts of Estafa by the RTC.
It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of defrauding another person, whether committed through
abuse of confidence, false pretenses or other fraudulent acts, is a crime involving moral turpitude which is also a
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and
fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows his criminal
tendency to defraud and deceive other people into remitting to him their hard-earned money, which the legal
profession condemns in the strongest terms.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and Willful Disobedience to a Lawful Order of the Court and Conviction for Estafa, both
in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. He is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ordered STRICKEN
FROM the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of this Decision.
PREPARED BY: ROCHELLE NIEVA D. CURIBA
16. [ AC. No. 10532, Nov 07, 2017 ]

REYNALDO A. CABUELLO v. ATTY. EDITHA P. TALABOC + Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
FACTS: On October 12, 2010, complainant Reynaldo A. Cabuello filed an administrative complaint against respondent
Atty. Editha P. Talaboc with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant engaged the services of
respondent to represent his parents who were charged with the crime of qualified theft of coconuts. Complainant
alleged that he paid for the legal services of respondent, but she did not attend any hearing. She also failed to file the
necessary complaint against the policemen (who arrested the accused) as agreed upon by them. Complainant alleged
that because respondent did not attend the hearings of the case, he was forced to go back and forth from Manila to the
province for 10 months to attend to the cases of his parents. Every time he went home to the province, he spent
P5,000.00 for his bus and plane fares and P1,000.00 for the van. He spent a total amount of about P150,000.00 due to
the negligence of respondent. Unsatisfied with respondent's legal services, complainant sent respondent a dema nd
letter[2] dated February 15, 2009 and a second demand letter[3] dated September 13, 2010, asking respondent to
return the payments given to her, but respondent disregarded his demand letters. Complainant stated that he filed this
complaint so the respondent will not repeat her negligence of duty toward her client's case and for the return of the
payments given to respondent, because she failed to fulfill her legal obligation toward his parents as their lawyer. On
October 13, 2010, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline ordered respondent to file her Answer within 15 days from notice.
However, respondent failed to file her answer despite receipt of the order. The hearing was reset many times for failure
of the respondent to file an answer. Ultimately, the respondent never filed an answer before the IBP. Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner On July 25, 2011, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
submitted his Report and Recommendation[9] on the administrative complaint, finding respondent guilty of violating
Canons I 7 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for six months. The IBP Commissioner found that the cases of complainant's parents were set for
arraignment on July 27, 2007. On the said date, respondent failed to appear. Hence, a counsel de officio was assigned
to assist complainant's parents. Thereafter, the hearing was set on October 1 and 12, 2007. On August 31, 2007,
respondent filed a Motion to Transfer Dates of Hearing, [10] praying that the hearings set on October 1, 2007 and on

October 12, 2007 be cancelled and transferred to November 8 and 9, 2007 allegedly for convenience, economic reason
and to maximize efforts and results.
After the trial court granted the motion to transfer the hearing to November 8 and 9, 2007, respondent again filed an
Urgent Motion to Reset Hearing (Scheduled on November 8 and 9, 2007)[11] to January 18, 2008, because respondent
was allegedly suffering from severe and recurring back pains due to a vehicular accident that occurred on September
7, 2007, and she submitted a medical certificate[12] therefor. Thus, the pre-trial was reset to November 28 and 29,
2007,[13] which did not proceed, because respondent filed another motion to reset the hearing to December 19 and
20, 2007.[14] Several postponements followed until June 19, 2008 when respondent failed to appear because of peptic
ulcer.[15] (In the Order[16] dated June 19, 2008, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of the
accused). Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest with
Apologia Cum Explanation, [17] and requested that the hearing of the motion be set on July 25, 2008, but since the
court would not be in session on the said date, the hearing of the motion was set on July 31, 2008.[18] On the said date,
respondent again failed to appear despite due notice. This was followed by other settings until the pre-trial conference
was set on September 25, 2008.[19] On the scheduled pre-trial conference on September 25, 2008, respondent again
failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, the trial court appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion of the Public Attorney's
office (PAO) as counsel for complainant's parents. Notwithstanding the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de
officio due to the repeated absences of the respondent, the latter still filed a Motion to Reset Hearing, [20] praying that
the hearings of the case for trial on the merits scheduled on November 27, 2008 and December 11, 2008 be reset to
January 15, 2009 and February 19, 2009, which motion was denied by the trial court.[21] On December 11, 2008, before
the prosecution presented its first witness, Atty. Salvacion manifested to the trial court that respondent's secretary
called up to inform her that respondent would still be appearing in the said case and that she would be available on
January 15, 2009. Thereafter, the respondent never communicated with the complainant or his family. The demand
letters sent by complainant to respondent for the return of the payments made to her were just ignored.
Respondent admitted that she was engaged to represent the accused Spouses Cabuello in the criminal cases for
qualified theft. However, she said that at that time, she already intimated to Mr. Cabuello that she has health problems
so that in case she cannot attend the hearings, she may have to withdraw from the case, although in terms of legwork
or filing of pleadings and the like, her assistant Marivic Alusitain can assist them. Thus, respondent filed an Omnibus
Motion in the second case for Qualified Theft, which motion prayed for:
(1) the early resolution of accused's prayer for reduction of bail incorporated in respondent's (as accused's counsel)
Formal Entry of Appearance;
(2) the remand of the custody of both the accused, pending the proceedings of the case, from the provincial jail to the
Calbiga Municipal Jail where they were previously detained; and
(3) the cancellation of the hearing of the case on August 17, 2007 and resetting it on October 1, 2007 or October 12,
2007 at 8:30 a.m.
Respondent caused a request for reduction of the bail of the accused, and in the trial court gave notice that the req uest
for reduction of bail from P24,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively, to P5,000.00 for both cases would be heard on
August 17, 2007.
In the Order, the court stated that coaccused Cecilia Cabuello posted thru Marivic Alusitain the amount of P22,000.00
as cash bail for both cases. In view thereof, co-accused Cecilia Cabuello was ordered released from detention.
In one of the hearings of the case, both accused were indisposed due to medical reasons; hence, an order for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against them was issued. Thus, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
said Order with an Affidavit of Waiverso that the absence of the accused thereafter may be excused.
During the subsequent hearings of the case, either the court or the respondent, who was afflicted with several ailments,
[reset the hearings] as evidenced by the orders of the court for the resetting of the case and some of the medical
certificates attached to the motion.
All the resetting of the hearings of the case that were filed by the respondent were with the knowledge and conformity
of her clients as well as complainant Reynaldo Cabuello.
Thus, respondent and Mr. Cabuello agreed, for economic reasons, that the Cabuellos would verify from the court, days
before a hearing is scheduled, if the hearing would push through so that there would be no need for them to go to court
in case a hearing is or would be cancelled.
For the February 6, 2008 hearing, respondent purchased a PAL ticket, but she was informed by complainant Reynaldo
Cabuello the day before the hearing that the said February 6, 2008 hearing was cancelled due to the retirement of the
Presiding Judge of the court.
j) Because of the foregoing events and incidents, which have caused problems, stress and inconvenience as well as
expenses for all parties, both accused, thru complainant Reynaldo Cabuello, informed the respondent that they will
terminate her services and they will get a new lawyer to represent them. As far as respondent knows, the accused were
already represented by a new counsel of record in the case (per the trial court's Order[34] dated February 5, 2009).
Thus, respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused with the conformity of the accused and duly
received by the court. Corollary thereto, respondent surrendered to the accused all the records of the case in her
possession, as evidenced by the Acknowledgmentof Ms. Cabuello.
Ruling of the IBP Board of Governor

The penalty meted by Atty. Editha Talaboc increased from six (6) months SUSPENSION from the practice of law to two
(2) years. Moreover, she is hereby Ordered to Return the amount received from Complainant with legal interest from
the time the demand was made within thirty (30) days from notice.
Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 (YES)
Ruling: The Court agrees with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner and affirms Resolution No. XX-2013-234
and Resolution No. XXI-2014-96 of the IBP Board of Governors, but modifies the penalty imposed on the respondent
and the amount of money to be refunded by respondent to complainant.
The records show that as counsel of the complainant's parents, respondent was remiss in her duty toward them by
never appearing in the hearings of the criminal case, which contributed to the delay of the pre-trial of the case for
eleven months or almost a year until the trial court finally appointed a counsel de officio for respondent's clients so the
pre-trial and trial on the merits could proceed. Respondent kept on filing a motion to reset the scheduled pre-trial,
including those dates of hearings requested by her, from the start until her withdrawal as counsel. This is borne out by
the Orders of the RTC having jurisdiction over the cases of complainant's parents. The Order dated June 19, 2008 states:
It appears from the records that the arraignment of these cases was conducted on July 27, 2007 yet but no pre-trail
conference was conducted because Atty. Editha Talaboc, the counsel for both accused had fil ed a series of
postponemenis alleging every thinkable ground as reasons for her nonappearance.
Considering that sufficient time had already been granted by the Court to the accused, further considering that in all
of these scheduled hearings both accused were not present, issue a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of accused
Alejandro Cabuello and Cecilia Cabuello.
To the Order quoted above, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest with
Apologia cum Explanation[ dated June 24, 2008. The trial court set the respondent's motion for hearing on July 31,
2008.
In the Order dated July 31, 2008, the trial court lifted the warrant for the arrest of the accused as they were present in
court. Respondent, however, was not available on that day, so the court re-scheduled the pre-trial conference on August
28, 2008 and stated that if respondent would not appear on that day, the court will appoint a counsel de officio to assist
the accused.
In an Order dated August 21, 2008, the pre-trial conference was reset to September 25, 2008. On September 25, 2008,
respondent was not present, so the court appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion of the PAO to represent complainant's
parents. Thereafter, the hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled on November
27, 2008 and December 11, 2008. Respondent again filed a Motion to Reset Hearing, alleging that she was not available
during the scheduled hearings as she was committed to appear in other branches of the RTC in Metro Manila, and
praying that the trial of the cases be reset to January 15,2009 and February 19,2009.
The trial court denied the motion as it had already appointed Atty. Prescilla A. Salvacion to assist the accused and she
had already ably assisted the accused during the pre-trial conference of the case on September 25, 2008. During the
hearing of the presentation of evidence for the prosec ution scheduled on December 11, 2008, Atty. Prescilla A.

Salvacion informed the court that respondent's secretary called up to inform her that respondent will still be
representing the accused in the case and that she is available on January 15, 2009.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that respondent indeed violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
A member of the legal profession owes his/her client entire devotion to the latter's genuine interest, and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his/her rights.An attorney is expected to exert his/her best efforts and ability to
preserve his/her client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his/her client, likewise, serves the ends of
justice.Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but
also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
Camara v. Atty. Reyes held: Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome of the case. This is also the reason why this Court may investigate charges against lawyers regardless of
complainant's standing.
In regard to the refund sought for payments made to respondent alleged to be in the total amount of P97,500.00,
complainant failed to present receipts or documents to evidence the same. The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated
in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as
long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
In this case, there was no retainer's agreement between the parties to be able to ascertain the attorney's fees agreed
upon and received by respondent. In his Complaint, complainant sought the return of acceptance fees in the amount of
P20,000.00 for the criminal cases and P15,000.00 for the case supposed to be filed against the police officers who
arrested the accused. The Court notes that in Annex "14"[64] of respondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent
admitted to having received the amount of P25,000.00 as attorney's fee/acceptance fee for the two criminal cases and
P15,000.00 for the case supposed to be filed with the fiscal's office plus P5,000.00 for expenses, and P5,000.00
representing the refund of the PAL ticket rescheduled four times due to the cancellation and resetting of the court
hearings, totaling P50,000.00, which amount respondent offered to return to complainant's mother Cecilia
Cabuello.Cecilia Cabuello, however, declined and denied receipt of such payment from respondent's representative,
Marivic Alusitain, because she had no right to receive the money that belonged to her children
Hence, in the absence of receipts or documentary evidence to substantiate the amount of P97,500.00 sought to be
recovered by complainant from respondent, complainant is entitled to a refund in the amount of P50,000.00, which
had been admittedly received by respondent from the Cabuellos as payment for attorney's/acceptance fees and other
expenses including refund of a PAL ticket and which amount respondent offered to return to Cecilia Cabuello. The Court
modifies the penalty of suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors on respondent from two years to one year.
In Chang v. Hidalgo, the Court stated that in several cases, it has imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension from
the practice of law for violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
17. MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROLANDO T. RUIZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10564, November 07, 2017 -
FACTS
The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased parents, spouses Pedro F. Valin
(Pedro) and Cecilia Lagadon (Cecilia). Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of land (subject land) covered
by an OCT.
Pedro died on December 7, 1992 while he was in Hawaii.
Several years later, Honorio discovered that the subject land has been transferred to respondent, the godson of Pedro,
resulting in the cancellation of OCT of TCT in the name of respondent. He learned from the Register of Deeds that the
subject land was conveyed to respondent in consideration of P10,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale (subject
deed), dated July 15, 1996, and executed in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent
of his spouse, Cecilia.
The complainants alleged that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures therein of Pedro and Cecilia
were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii at that time. The complainants pointed to
respondent as the author of the falsifications and forgeries because the latter caused the registration of the subject land
unto his name and because he was the one who benefited from the same.
In his Answer, respondent claimed that Rogelio L. Valin (Rogelio), one of the children of Pedro and Cecilia, sold the
subject land to him sometime in 1989 allegedly in representation of Pedro. Rogelio offered to sell the subject land and
claimed that it was his share in their family's properties. He asked Rogelio for his authority to sell the subject land but
the latter claimed that he could not locate his authority from his parents in their house. Respondent claimed that he
knew that it was hard to transfer the title because the title owner, Pedro, was out of the country at the time of the sale
and without a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) for the purpose; thus, Rogelio undertook to transfer the title.
Respondent also denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject deed in 1996. He insisted that he
neither falsified the said deed nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was Rogelio who processed the
transfer of the title of the subject land in his name.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Respondent should be held administratively liable.
RULING
Atty. Ruiz shall be liable.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether
they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR.
From the time that the sale of the subject land was negotiated in 1989 until it was executed and registered through the
subject deed in 1996, there were patent irregularities, which respondent cannot ignore.
First, in 1989, respondent admitted that he entered into with Rogelio a contract of deed of sale over the subject property
owned and registered to Pedro without any SPA. As a lawyer, he knows that "[w]hen a sale of a piece of land or any
interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void."
Second, in spite of the deficient SPA from Rogelio's father, respondent allowed many years to pass without probing him
regarding the sale of the land. This is obviously contrary to human experience.
Third, it is a difficult pill to swallow that respondent was oblivious of Pedro's death in 1992. He admitted in his petition
that he is a close family friend and godson of Pedro.26 Certainly, he could not claim such strong ties to the family of
Pedro if he never heard about the latter's demise.

Fourth, in 1996, respondent directed his house helper Baligad to sign the release of the title in his name. He admitted
in his answer that he instructed Baligad to go to the RD and sign for him the release of the title because he was busy at
that time. Respondent was neither surprised nor doubtful of the title's release in his name in 1996. He never attempted
to contact Rogelio to verify if he was the one who transferred the property to his name. He also did not i mmediately
request the production of his authority to sell the subject land.
Fifth, the subject deed executed in 1996 was readily available at the RD. Respondent could have effortlessly and briefly
verified the said deed, which was the basis of the transfer of the title to him. It is to be noted that the subject deed was
not signed by Rogelio on behalf of Pedro; rather, it was purportedly signed by Pedro personally and confirmed by
Cecilia. Evidently, the sale contemplated by the said deed was not anymore a sale through an agent, which was the
original agreement of respondent and Rogelio back in 1989.
Sixth, as a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of deed of sale and its registration. He
knows how important it is to ensure that the registered instrument is complete and regular on its face. He is also duty-
bound to denounce illegally acquired deeds of sale, which deceive and betray the general public.
In fine, the Court is convinced that respondent is the author or, at the very least, has connived with the author of the
subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal benefits. Respondent incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind
to the anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land. Whether through deliberate intent or gross negligence, he
participated in the successful registration and release of the title that originated from an absolutely falsified deed of
sale.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
Prepared by: Zarina
18. FREDDIE A. GUILLEN, Complainant vs. ATTY. AUDIE ARNADO, Respondent

A.C. No. 10547
FACTS
Complainant Freddie Guillen is the registered owner of the City Grill Restaurant. He then invited respondent Atty. Audie
Amado and a certain Cedric Ebo to join the restaurant business. Each of them had to shell out ₱200,000.00 to make up
a total capital of ₱600,000.00. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was therefore executed and the business was
formally launched in May 2003. At first, everything went smoothly, until Amado's sister-in-law and Ebo's son
participated in the management, causing complications in the business operations, which later forced Guillen and his
wife to step down as general manager and operations manager, respectively. Because of the disagreements among the
parties, Guillen offered that he would waive his claims for profits, provided that Arnado would return the ₱200,000.00
that he paid as capital. Arnado allegedly claimed that said refund would still be subject to the billings of the Amado and
Associate Law Firm. Thereafter, Guillen was surprised to find out that Arnado had already caused the incorporation of
the restaurant with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was approved on February 16, 2004. Guillen
was likewise excluded from the business without the aforementioned refund of his capital. He was further charged with
Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. Thus, Guillen initiated the present administrative case.
For his part, Arnado admitted the existence and the contents of the MOA. He also admitted that he caused the
incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation. However, he insisted that the same was done in accordance with
the requirements under the law. Guillen could not validly claim for a refund, and if he was really entitled, he should
simply file an action to that effect. Arnado likewise contended that Guillen's refund would still be subject to the legal
compensation claim of his law firm.
The IBP adopted a resolution suspending Atty Arnado from the practice of law for three (3) months.
ISSUE
WON the IBP erred in its ruling to suspend Atty Arnado from the practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING
No. At the onset, it must be pointed out that the business name City Grill Restaurant registered under Guillen's name
was never dissolved in accordance with the law. Even Arnado failed to prove that the City Grill Restaurant business
had already been terminated. Although said business name was only used for a short period of time, the same had
already acquired goodwill among the residents and customers in the locality.
On February 26, 2004, City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation was registered with the SEC. Although Arnado and Ebo were
not included as incorporators, those persons reflected in the articles of incorporation as the company's incorporators
were their relatives. It is clear that when Arnado caused the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, he
was fully aware that City Grill Restaurant was still registered in Guillen's name. Obviously, he did the same to take
advantage of the goodwill earned by the name of City Grill Restaurant. Amado was likewise the one who actually
notarized some of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation's legal documents such as the Treasurer's Affidavit and a letter
addressed to the SEC.
The IBP Board thus aptly concluded that Arnado is guilty of taking advantage of his knowledge of the law and of
surreptitiously easing out Guillen from their restaurant business partnership by registering a corporation under a
different but similar name and style, in the same line of business, and using the same trade secrets. Arnado, although
not reflected as one of the incorporators of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, has deceived the public into believing
that City Grill Restaurant and City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation are one and the same, clearly violating Rule 1.01 of
the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer owes
substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and
takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the State, as an officer of the court.
Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing. 4 Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
Here, Arnado has certainly fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of
him.1âwphi1 On the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of Guillen to Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others. Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
19.
GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent.
FACTS:
In a verified complaint dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court, complainant narrated that she met
respondent sometime in September 1999. He was then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant
sought legal advice. After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at her residence and brought
gifts for her son. Respondent assured complainant's mother that although he was already married to Luzviminda
Balang, his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was not registered. Complainant believed his
representation that he was eligible to marry her.
Eventually, complainant moved in with respondent. She became pregnant and respondent allegedly wanted to have
the baby aborted but complainant refused. After the birth of their son Billy John, respondent spent more time with
them. He used their apartment as a temporary law office and he lived there for two to three days at a time.
After some time, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. To make ends meet, she decided to work in
a law office in Naga City. However, respondent compelled her to resign, assuring her that he would take care of her
financial needs. Respondent failed to fulfill his promise. Complainant went to respondent's office as he reneged on his
promise of support. To appease her anger, respondent executed a promissory note. However, he also failed to honor
the same.
In the evening of September 9, 2001, respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT
members and his wife. Visibly drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo and the lead pipe that
he was carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their previous apartment unit. As
respondent barged into the apartment, complainant sought help from the SWAT members and one of them was able to
pacify respondent.
In his answer, respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted that complainant merely wanted to
exact money from him. Respondent also denied that he lived together with complainant at the Puncia Apartment since
he was already married. Respondent also claimed that complainant falsified his signature in the Certificate of Live Birth
of Billy John.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and Recommendation, finding that respondent maintained
an illicit affair with complainant and that he should be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors approved the above recommendation and increased the recommended period of
suspension to three (3) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations with Complainant. (YES)
RULING:
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of respondent in this case showed his failure to live
up to the good moral conduct required of the members of the legal profession. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment or suspension if a member of the Bar is found guilty of
committing grossly immoral conduct. In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a
member of the Bar, his/her guilt must first be established by substantial evidence.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of the IBP as there is indeed
substantial evidence that respondent committed gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with
complainant.
One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the Decision dated of the MTCC
of Naga City in Civil Case for replevin. While the issues in the replevin case and the instant administrative case are
indeed different, they share a common factual backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting account of the true nature of their
relationship. From the evidence of both parties, the MTCC chose the complainant's version of the events. Incidentally,
it was respondent himself who brought to light the existence of the MTCC decision in the replevin case when he attached
the same to his answer in the present case to substantiate his narration of facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly plead that
the decision be disregarded after the statements and findings therein were used against him.
Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy John as proof of their romantic relations. A
perusal of these pictures convinces this Court that while the same cannot indeed prove Billy John's paternity, they are
nevertheless indicative of a relationship between complainant and respondent that is more than merely platonic.
With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John that contained
an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity, respondent likewise failed to provide sufficient controverting
evidence therefor. As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John, respondent did file a complaint for the cancellation of
his acknowledgment therein. Thus, the Court will no longer discuss the parties' arguments regarding the validity of
respondent's signature in said certificate of birth as the issue should be threshed out in the proper proceeding.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations with
complainant. As to whether respondent also sired complainant's second child, Billy John, the Court finds that the same
was not sufficiently established by the evidence presented in this case. The paternity and/or acknowledgement of Billy
John, if indeed he is respondent's illegitimate child, must be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the
proper tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the same. However, considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive
the courts and the IBP regarding his true relationship with complainant, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
the proper penalty in this instance is a three-year suspension from the practice of law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be punished with a more severe penalty.
20.
SECOND DIVISION
November 22, 2017
A.C. No. 11822
VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of C Five Holdings, Management & Consultancy,
Inc. (C Five), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office in Libis,
Quezon City. Respondent was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel who handled its incorporation and
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission'(SEC).
When C Five was exploring investment options, respondent recommended the purchase of a resort in Laguna,
with the assurances that the title covering the property was "clean" and the taxes were fully paid. Relying on
respondent's recommendation, C Five agreed to acquire the property and completed the payment of the purchase price.
Respondent volunteered and was entrusted to facilitate the transfer and registration of the title of the Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
property in C Five's name. Complainant personally handed the sum of ₱1,200,000.00 to respondent at her office in Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
Makati City. The said amount was intended to cover the expenses for the documentation, preparation, and notarization Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
of the Final Deed of Sale, as well as payment of capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other fees relative to the
sale and transfer of the property. Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
More than a year thereafter, however, no title was transferred in C Five's name. The title covering the property Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
is a Free Patent, rendering any sale, assignment, or transfer thereof within a period of five (5) years from issuance of
the title null and void. Thus, formal demand 7 was made upon respondent to return the ₱1,200,000.00 entrusted to her
for the expenses which remained unheeded, prompting C Five to file a criminal complaint for Estafa, as well as the Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
present disbarment case. Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
Respondent claimed that she paid the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) registration, Mayor's Permit, business
licenses, documentation, and other expenses using the money entrusted to her by complainant, 10 as itemized in a Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
Statement of Expense, and that she was ready to turnover the purchase price. C Five refused to receive the said amount, Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
insisting that the entire ₱l,200,000.00 should be returned. 12 Moreover, she pointed out that the criminal case for Estafa Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
filed against her by C Five had already been dismissed 13 for lack of probable cause. 14 As such, she prayed that the
disbarment case against her be likewise dismissed for lack of merit. 15 Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
IBP found the respondent administratively liable and thereby, recommending her suspension from the legal
profession for a period of three (3) years.
ISSUE: whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
HELD:
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. 27 A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of profess ional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. 28 Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the amount of ₱l,200,000.00 from complainant to be Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
used to cover the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject property under C Five's name. Respondent admitted
having received the same, but claimed that she had spent a portion of it for various expenses, such as documentation, Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
permits, and licenses, among others, as evidenced by the Statement of Expenses with attached receipts. However, it has Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
been established that the registration of the property in C Five's name could not have materialized, as the subj ect Formatted: Balloon Text
property was covered by a Free Patent issued on August 13, 2009 which, consequently, bars it from being sold,
assigned, or transferred within a period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus, and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined, 29 there Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
was no longer any reason for respondent to retain the money. Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
Furthermore, the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of Expenses, except for the documentation and
notarization fees for which no receipts were attached, do not relate to the purposes for which the money was given, i.e., Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
the documentation and registration of the subject property. As such, even if official receipts had been duly attached for
the other purposes - which, the Court notes, respondent failed to do despite the opportunity given - the expenditures
are not legitimate ones. Hence, the Court finds respondent to have violated the above-cited rules, to the detriment and
prejudice of complainant.
Respondent's assertion that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed, in view of the return of the full
amount to complainant and the latter's withdrawal of the complaint against her is specious. Such are not ample grounds
to completely exonerate the administrative liability of respondent. It is settled that a case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, 30 the latter not being a direct party to the Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:
case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. 31 A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent-lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. Custom Color(RGB(17,85,204))
-ash Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
21. SPS. VICENTE and PRECYWINDA GIMENA, Complainants vs. ATTY. JOJO S. VIJIGA, Respondent
A.C. No. 11828. November 22, 2017. Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Gimena alleged that they hired the respondent to represent them in a civil case for nullity of foreclosure
proceedings and voidance of loan documents filed against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, involving eight
parcels of land. The RTC dismissed the said action. Thus, they filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA issued a notice requiring complainants, (appellants therein), to file the appellants' brief, but the respondent
failed to file the same. The respondent filed an Omnibus Motion, citing illness and the damage to his law office due to
monsoon rains, as reasons for his failure to file the appellants' brief. The CA granted the motion and gave 15 days
within which to file the required brief. However, the respondent still failed to file it. Hence, the CA appeal was again
dismissed.
Complainants alleged that throughout the proceedings in the CA, respondent did not apprise them of the status of their
case. They were thus surprised when a bulldozer suddenly entered their properties. Complainants thereafter inquired
on the status of their case, and it was then that they discovered that their appeal was dismissed. The spouses alleged
that respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. They
claimed that respondent's lapse is tantamount to gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty.
Investigating Commissioner Arsenio Adriano recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
six (6) months. This was approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with the
complainants
HELD: YES.
Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear. A lawyer owes his client competent and zealous
legal representation.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Respondent's failure to submit the appellants' brief and update his clients, complainants herein, of the status of their
appeal falls short of the ethical requirements set forth under the CPR. Being a service-oriented occupation, lawyers are
expected to observe diligence and exhibit professional behavior in all their dealings with their clients. Lawyers should
be mindful of the trust and confidence, not to mention the time and money, reposed in them by their clients. When a
lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded
by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients' interests and take all steps or do all acts
necessary therefor.
As a lawyer, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable of the procedural rules in appellate practice. He is presumed
to know that dismissal is an inevitable result from failure to file the requisite brief within the period stated in the Rules
of Court. In this case, the fact that the appeal was twice dismissed further highlights respondent's indifference to his
client's cause. Interestingly, respondent failed to offer any explanation as to why he failed to submit the appellants'
brief within the 45-day period from his receipt of the notice to file the same, resulting to the dismissal of the appeal for
the first time. To the mind of this Court, such failure is an unequivocal indication of his guilt in the administrative charge.
Indeed, failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this case, respondent's neglect of his professional duties led to the loss of complainants' properties and has left them
bereft of legal remedies. They lost their case not because of merits but because of technicalities, specifically the
respondent's failure to file the required pleadings. Worse, respondent's failure to inform complainants of the
unfortunate fate of their appeal further amplifies his lack of competence and diligence. As an officer of the court, it was
respondent's duty to inform his client of whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client's
case. The purpose of informing the client is to minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the
attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the
practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is
ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.
- Denise
22. SIMEON TRINIDAD PIEDAD (deceased) survived and assumed by his heirs, namely: ELISEO PIEDAD
(deceased)*, JOEL PIEDAD, PUBLIO PIEDAD, JR., GLORIA PIEDAD, LOT PIEDAD, ABEL PIEDAD, ALI PIEDAD, and Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
LEE PIEDAD, Petitioners vs. CANDELARIA LINEHAN BOBILLES and MARIANO BOBILLES, Respondents.
FACTS: Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt
In 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan
Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano). The trial court ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the deed of
sale as null and void for being a forgery and ordered Candelaria and Mariano’s heirs and/or assigns to vacate the house
and surrender their possession of said house and all other real properties which are supposed to have been covered
by the voided deed of sale to the administrator of the estate of spouses Nemesio Piedad and Fortunata Nillas.
Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial
court ruling. Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on November 1, 1998. On October 22, 2001, Judge
Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
On December 4, 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against Candelaria and Mariano and referred it to
Sheriff Bellones for its implementation. That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition for the Probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently and that
it be raffled to another branch.
Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad was raffled to Branch 59,
RTC Toledo City, presided over by Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin.
Candelaria also filed a verified petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition. Judge Cesar 0. Estrera,
Executive Judge of the RTC of Toledo City and Presiding Judge of Branch 29, ordered the raffle of the petition against
Sheriff Bellones. A few days later, after summarily hearing the case, Judge Estrera issued a restraining order against
Sheriff Bellones.
Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Estrera consolidated the two proceedings.
Upon Candelaria's motion, Judge Villarin extended the temporary restraining order against Sheriff Bellones for 17 days.
The following motions were eventually filed before Judge Villarin, but he never resolved them: (1) a motion to dismiss,
as amended; (2) a motion requesting the issuance of an order lifting the injunction order; and (3) a joint motion to
resolve the motions.
The Heirs of Piedad filed an administrative complaint against Judges Estrera and Villarin. The administrative complaint
charged them with Issuing an Unlawful Order Against a Co-Equal Court and Unreasonable Delay in Resolving Motions.
The SC found both Judges Estrera and Villarin administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, and Judge Villarin
liable for undue delay in rendering an order.
The Heirs of Piedad filed their Motion Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the
Unfinished Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Demolition before Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Toledo City.
Judge Ruben F. Altubar (Judge Altubar) of Branch 29, RTC Toledo City denied the motion. Judge Altubar opined that
since more than 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory, the execution
should have been pursued through a petition for revival judgment, not a mere motion.
The Heirs of Piedad appealed, but it was dismissed for being the wrong remedy. The appropriate course of action for
the petitioner was to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the presiding judge who issued the assailed Orders. The Heirs of Piedad filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, where they adopted the findings of fact in the administrative case
against Judges Estrera and Villarin.
Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied their motion for the
resumption of the writ of demolition and their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners charged Judge Altubar for being
equally ignorant of the law as Judges Estrera and Villarin. They also point out that Court of Appeals Justice Gabriel T.
Ingles, who penned the dismissal of their appeal, presided over when he was still the acting RTC Judge and even issued
the Order.
Petitioners pray for the resumption of the writ of demolition. In its October 21, 2013 Resolution, the granted
petitioners' motion for extension and directed respondents to comment on the Petition.
Respondents opine that petitioners' motion for the implementation of the writ of demolition was already barred by
prescription since it was filed 12 years after the Court of Appeals Decision, which upheld the validity of the writ of
demolition, became final and executory. Respondents further claim that the ruling in the administrative case against
Judges Estrera and Villarin cannot bind them since they were not parties to the case and the issue resolved was the
administrative liability of these judges. They emphasize that this Court did not rule on the validity of Judges Estrera's
and Villarin's issuances and orders.
Respondents also question the personality of petitioners to institute the case on Piedad's behalf.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have duly established their personality to file the petition as heirs of Simeon Piedad (related
to the subject).
RULING:
Petitioners claim to be Piedad's children; thus, they assert that they are the real parties in interest to the action begun
by their father. On the other hand, respondents claim that petitioners did not properly substitute Piedad upon his death;
hence, they failed to substantiate their personality to move for the revival of judgment.
Respondents fail to convince. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad's rightful heirs not only by the
Court of Appeals but also by the sc. In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, petitioners filed an administrative
case in their capacity as Piedad's heirs and this Court acknowledged their standing to sue in this capacity. The same is
also true in the assailed Court of Appeals Decision where petitioners filed their appeal as Piedad's heirs and their
personality to represent their father was never questioned or assailed. The SC sees no reason to deny them the same
recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely an offshoot of their father's original complaint for nullity
of deed of sale.
Furthermore, this Court takes judicial notice of how respondents, through their counsels, deliberately and maliciously
delayed the execution of a final and executory judgment by filing patently dilatory actions. These actions include:
1. The Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad, filed in the same case as
Piedad's complaint for annulment of absolute deed of sale. The Petition for Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Simeon Piedad was filed in response to the Writ of Demolition.
2. the petition against Sheriff Bellones to restrain him from enforcing the writ of demolition; and
3. the extent of the insidious machinations employed by respondents and their counsels were highlighted
when they assailed petitioners' motion for execution for purportedly being filed beyond the prescriptive
period of 10 years, when they themselves were part of the reason for the delay in execution.
Counsels for respondents are "reminded that as officers of the law, they are mandated by Rule 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to "not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes."
While counsels for respondents are expected to serve their clients to the utmost of their ability, their duty to their Formatted: Balloon Text
clients does not include disrespecting the law by scheming to impede the execution of a final and executory judgment.
As members of the Bar, counsels for respondents are enjoined to represent their clients "with zeal within the bounds
of the law."
Thus, counsels for respondents are given a stern warning to desist from committing similar acts which undermine the
law and its processes. Any similar infractions in the future from counsels for respondents will be dealt with more
severely.
- alit
23. ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent
A.C. No. 10758, December 5, 2017, EN BANC, REYES, JR, J.
FACTS:
These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:
(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-
Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin) and docketed before the Court as A.C. No.
l 0758;
(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin and docketed
before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;
(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres (Atty. Andres),
docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and
(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by Atty. Dalangin
against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.
The Antecedents
A.C. No. 10758
The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged that Atty.
Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted
by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross
misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR.
It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed against Atty.
Torres by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and Melody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the losing
parties in an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of the
disbarment case was orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even
without explaining the contents and tenor of the document.
When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint with the IBP
against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new counsel's advice, Marzan
and Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty.
Dalangin also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the Clerk
of Court of the MTC, which complaints were nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the IBP’s
recommendation.
Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a clerk
at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as district public
attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still remained to be
employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter whom they named Julienne, even when each of them
had existing marriages with some other persons. The affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity of
Julienne, were known to the community, especially the courts. Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry as
Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the real father. The foregoing
acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.
Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He
allegedly collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from
whom he demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00,
Atty. Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [dito]." Without
prior authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district
public attorney.
Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was claimed
that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted a breach of Rule 10.02,
Canon 10 of the CPR. In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded his influence
and prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR.

Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent and
misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the case.
A.C. No. 10759
CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an incident that
happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at the lobby of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty. Dalangin allegedly hurled
slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the top of his voice and referred to her as a "certified
swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her participation in the filing of CBD Case No. 11-3215, and
then precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s tirade was heard and witnessed by
several persons, and some of them executed their respective affidavits to narrate the incident. The foregoing impelled
Alvaro to seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule
8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR.
A.C. No. 10760
The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.
In CBD Case No. 12-3369, Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross misconduct,
violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He claimed that both lawyers
conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda). The recording was without the prior
knowledge and consent of Pineda.
As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against Noveras,
who was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by Atty. Dalangin for
Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond that she posted in a case for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been dismissed by the trial court. This allegation was
negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but decided to give half
thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s dismissal.
A.C. No. 10761
The complaint docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct, dishonesty
for violation of Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.
Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit, which
allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants
in a disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue the perjured statements by
using as a leverage her own complaint for perjury against Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the
affidavits in exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.
After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers and the conduct of a series of hearings, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and Recommendation
dated February 11, 2013, which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the practice of law
for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other hand, were
recommended for dismissal.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-768, which adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be suspended from the practice of law. (NO)
RULING:
Procedure from Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a
petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action
on the complaints.
When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court,
the procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former
Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. The old rule read:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period
not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than
suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating
respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
Board’s resolution, the Supreme Co mi orders otherwise.
d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the
same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)
In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court applied
this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated June 17,
2008. The Court set the following guidelines:
In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no
motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be
furnished this Court.
If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall
thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-
day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to
this Court the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action.
Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning
the IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that
Atty. Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the
administrative cases where he served as complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent is
exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other interested party
filed with Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise. For this reason, the Court refused to make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review
notwithstanding the fact that it questioned the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law.
In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension
from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had to release its final action
on the matter. It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers. The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are also, by their
nature, recommendatory. In light of these precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's
recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact,
an examination of the IBP resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a
petition, because it is the Court that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a
lawyer's suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.
A.C. No. 10758
Gross Immorality
Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three
years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when their
marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.
Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s daughter
even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation.
Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the
family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.” When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality,
the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair
with Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.
The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court's perusal of the records reveals an
insufficiency of evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.
To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality
harped only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between
Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant and
unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth
certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin.
Julienne’s baptismal certificate also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s defense on his
closeness to Julienne for being her godfather.
The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any romantic
relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her children. It was
such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and
belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent and mindful of
his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual were
both married. "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." As
keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with great caution."
The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition
should suffice under the circumstances.
Gross Misconduct and Malpractice
Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit
that supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to
explain did not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed
by Marzan and Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely
alleged that they signed the affidavit even when they were not fully apprised of its contents. It was not alleged that
they were fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein
hurled against Atty. Torres were absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless
suit against a fellow lawyer had no leg to stand on.
The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO
lawyer also remained unsubstantiated by evidence. Such serious imputation could not have been adequately
established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for ₱8,000.00
was allegedly made in 2001. Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond his area of
jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public Attorney, a
defense which the complainants failed to refute. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption that the
respondent regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail, especially as the Court
considers it highly improbable for the courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity,
if Atty. Dalangin was indeed not authorized to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.
Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336 -SD(04)AF pending
with the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been
explained that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference.
Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his misquote
of jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05 entitled
Bangko Luzon v. Diaz.
Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. As counsel and officer of the court,
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was
remiss in the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument
of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved."
The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court
detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited
jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.
A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was intended
to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that was
embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.
A.C. No. 10759
In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was waiting
for the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits executed by
witnesses who did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty. Dalangin on the incident.
Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw Atty.
Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter. Two security guards stationed at
the trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly testified against Atty. Dalangin, likewise
confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired.
For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried out
within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of Atty.
Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the profession. Members of the legal
profession should commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION XX X.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment
case filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any responsibility for his conduct.
At most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise considers
its finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty. Dalangin with
Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon Atty. Dalangin a
fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future.
Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable
under the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct
administrative case that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense
likewise varies from the other breaches for which the Court has determined the admonition to be appropriate.
A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761
The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres.
In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also violated the lawyer's
oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR.
The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the
basic and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the act.
In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful recording
of a private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s affidavit in CBD
Case No. 11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in the transcription lends doubt as to
the allegation of a purported secret recording of an actual conversation. While Pineda denied knowledge that her
telephone conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she still refused to acknowledge the veracity of the
assertions that she allegedly made as contained in the transcript, which then appears to be a rejection of the supposed
conversation. Given the circumstances, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate the
charges in his complaint against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres, as
the person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11 -3215, Marzan and
Valdez claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres' disbarment without fully explaining to them
the contents thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make perjured statements, however, was not
established by clear and convincing proof. Even granting that statements of affiants were eventually determined to be
inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to at once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the
affidavits, in the absence of clear and sufficient proof that they actively participated in the intentional commission of a
fraud or declaration of fabricated statements.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:
(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in
handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;
(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed upon him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future; and
(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June 21, 2013 and
Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following complaints: (1) CBD Formatted: Balloon Text
Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2) CBD Case No. 12-3458
against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres.

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1. SUSAN LOBERES-PINTAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMONCITO B. BAYLOSIS, Respondent.

ISSUE Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:

Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x

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FACTS: Formatted: Font: (Default) Cambria, 9 pt, Font color:

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Non-submission of certificate to file action

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Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

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4. VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

Is Atty. Baclig administratively liable? Yes.

6. JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant vs. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable. (YES)

7. PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN

A.C. No. 1346, July 25, 2017, PERALTA, J.:

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salandanan is administratively liable.

9. ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO,, Respondent.

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10. CARMELO IRINGAN v. ATTY. CLAYTON B. GUMANGAN

11. RAFAEL PADILLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLENN SAMSON,, Respondent.

12. LITO V. BUENVIAJE v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO

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Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

CANON 5 – A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING

Prepared by: Paola E. Camilon

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diores should be disbarred.

16. [ AC. No. 10532, Nov 07, 2017 ]

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Ruling of the IBP Board of Governor

Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 (YES)

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18. FREDDIE A. GUILLEN, Complainant vs. ATTY. AUDIE ARNADO, Respondent

GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant vs. ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent.

November 22, 2017

A.C. No. 11822

VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS, Complainant

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL, Respondent

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