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Soriano Vs - Laguardia PDF
Soriano Vs - Laguardia PDF
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137 SCRA 628 (1985), the clear and present danger test “does not
lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State has a compelling interest
to protect minors, against offensive language in TV programs.—
The State has a compelling interest in extending social protection
to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and
immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling
interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms,
protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable
materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less,
in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and
protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-
being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the
field of nation-building. In the same way, the State is mandated
to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character. Petitioner’s offensive and
obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt,
was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have
exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday
use. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to
protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating
petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; The assailed order penalized petitioner
for past speech, not future speeches in a TV program.—Neither can
petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the
period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on
future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the
suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for
uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser
punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or
broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted was
simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and
administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed
in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past
speech made on prime-time “G” rated TV program; it does not bar
future speech of petitioner in other television programs; it is a
permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be
confused with a prior restraint on speech. While not on all fours,
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10 Id., at p. 182.
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11 Id., at p. 46.
12 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268
SCRA 747.
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13 Pimentel v. COMELEC, Nos. L-53581-83, December 19, 1980, 101 SCRA
769.
14 Agpalo, Administrative Law (2005); citing Matienzon v. Abellera, G.R. No.
77632, June 8, 1988, 162 SCRA 1.
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But the mere absence of a provision on preventive
suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to
deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as
preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly
empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among
others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose
sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further
violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither
amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law.
Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed
preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law.
Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done
in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to
the
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16 Alonzo v. Capulong, G.R. No. 110590, May 10, 1995, 244 SCRA 80;
Beja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 689.
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45 Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
46 16A Am Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Sec. 493; Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47.
47 Bernas, supra note 27, at pp. 219-220.
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54 Supra at p. 898.
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that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory
power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.” (Citation
omitted.)
Bernas adds:
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63 G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529, 544, 552.
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68 Supra note 17; citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936);
Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Batario, Jr., G.R. No. 92285, March 28, 1994, 231
SCRA 463.
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69 People v. Maceren, No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450,
458.
70 Id.
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71 Id.
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122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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