JOHANNALYN M.

SANCHEZ
JD - 1

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Statement of the Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three
(33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios
shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this
Act or by Act of Congress.” Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is
premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in
question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected
by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios
composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M.
Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

Statement of the Case:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos.
93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon
after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of
the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power.

Ruling:
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of
its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other
words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested
in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68,
as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment.

PRINCIPLES:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope
of their authority.
G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of
FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND
SENATE), respondents.

Statement of the Facts:

President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 107. After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged
Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the
well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three
justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935
Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local governments. Among the
Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial
annulment of the Municipality of Andong.
This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon—the
municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not
supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies,
there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of
Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades
ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and
hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.

Statement of the Case:

The issued several Executive Orders creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao.
Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and
void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion,
ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a
valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity
of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power
of the Chief Executive over local governments. Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive
Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the
present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong.

ISSUES:
 (1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by executive fiat was previously
voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing
statute.

(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

RULING:

(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107 establishing Andong was
declared void ab initio (from inception) by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Further, the
Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in many cases. Finally, No
subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts,
there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as
having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was
created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that
for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact
that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive
order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in
the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that
whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have
been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”

PRINCIPLES:

Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that "municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective
sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."

Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the
municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code."

G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ
VS.
HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258. The Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of
the Revised Admin. Code.Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO
258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was
approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban
and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier
resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to
alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities
is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and
EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, 2 dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid
claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara
Alto,3 based on the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board
of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.
In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed
area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the
Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental,
in its Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and
Jimenez.
In its decision dated October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part
of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was
void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that
power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P.
Blg. 337), §134. The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion
of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed against
Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the
Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive Secretary. On February
10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation
since it had completely organized itself even prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for
forty years before its existence was questioned; that Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the
existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal existence of
Sinacaban by entering into an agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and that any question
as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by §442(d) of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision but its
motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacaban has
legal personality to file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or
in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for
adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality.

RULING:

Yes. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso
v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation:
1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged;
2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the
municipality; and
3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part
of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the
seats in the House. In this case, the following factors are present:
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the
validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned.
2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned.
3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation
for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complaned of was done
or committed.
4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering into an
agreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc.
5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs
in the country. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.” Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part
of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities
created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in
Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created
before, such as Sinacaban.

PRINCIPLES:

At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, the applicable
law was §2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:
Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled. — Disputes as to jurisdiction of
municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in
which such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be
duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved
to the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.
Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the
provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of
their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose
decision shall be final.

The power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is
obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is
not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment.
G.R. NO. 176951 NOVEMBER 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) REPRESENTED BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG REPRESENTED BY MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, AND JERRY P. TREÑAS IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS TAXPAYER, PETITIONERS,
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City
of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws
and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the
12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale
for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed
to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On
22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved
the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the
President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING:

(1) Yes. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code
to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took
effect on 30 June 2001. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any
exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly
exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

(2) Yes. If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an
exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be
scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if
found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification.
However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such
exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No.
9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines
differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we take into account
the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from
the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection
clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending
in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted.

PRINCIPLES:
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VALID CLASSIFICATION
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class

PROHIBITION OF CONGRESS FROM CREATING PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

EXCEPT BY A GENERAL LAW

(1) Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

(2) Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress
from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
 The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability. (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. NO. 118303 JANUARY 31, 1996

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ

VS.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

This Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the
City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual
income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a
component city.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included
Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred
to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5,
1993. On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB
No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the
House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993. On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817
was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on
December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. Meanwhile, a
counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate.
It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after
the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817. On February 23, 1994,
or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on
Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee
submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved
without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No.
1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing
said report as member of the Committee on Local Government. On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No.
378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994.
On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved
the amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994,
was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act
was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the
conversion of Santiago into a city.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an
independent component city

(2) Whether or not the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into
Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required.

RULING:
(1) we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form
part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a
component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos
for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by
the Department of Finance. The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject
to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its
implementing rules and regulations. Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full
import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized
by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the
internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but
exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds,
sales of fixed assets, and similar others" (Emphasis ours).
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the
local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

(2) Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of
Representa-tives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is
untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first
before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate inthe House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill.

PRINCIPLES:

THE PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION UNDERLYING THE

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INTENSIFIED EMPOWERMENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SYSTEM.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed
of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, he local government unit is
autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Power
which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their
own resources and assets.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a
law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration;
otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the
immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the
Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of
this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
G.R. NO. 118577 MARCH 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. ET AL., PETITIONERS,

VS.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR
BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano,
Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.” G.R. No. 118577
involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr.,
Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano,
Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to
alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article
X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a)
it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3)
years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the
title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands
at only 450,000. G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds
as aforestated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one
of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

RULING:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who
are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

PRINCIPLES:
 Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set
forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).

Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or
its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and
projected capacity to provide services.

G.R. NO. 146342 OCTOBER 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., PETITIONER,

VS.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF
SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.8806
which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.On August
16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an"Act Creating The City Of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor.” The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a president
and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
on the following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B. Respondent
COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. Petitioner instituted another
petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: 1. The creation of
Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450 (a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires thatonly "a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2)
subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the(b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill” rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution.Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created
only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what
R.A. No. 8806 has done.

ISSUE:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon

(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1),
Article VI ofthe Constitution

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

RULING:

(1) Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase"A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply
one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows
the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay inaccordance
with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government
unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under t
heConstitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the
Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we a
re not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial
power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we
feel it is unwise or impractical.”
(3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of theCity of
Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger.The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is
rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of
the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord
with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must be be
yond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

PRINCIPLES:

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is rooted in
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.7 The theory is that every law, being the joint act
of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the
fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a
petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one.9 In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,10 for to
doubt is to sustain.

ONE TITLE RULE

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
G.R. NO. 209185 OCTOBER 25, 2013

MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS, PETITIONER,

VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES JR.
AND THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION OFFICER OF DAVAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MA.
FEBES BARLAAN, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon.
Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same province, House Bill No.
4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law
as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental. Section 46
of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a plebiscite. Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of
Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the
votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this
Charter. As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May
2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC decided to hold
the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay
Elections to save on expenses. Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is
without authority to amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only
Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites three causes of
action: 1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY Section 46 of Republic
Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS who can validly amend,
repel [sic] or modify existing laws, thus COMELEC [sic] act in suspending the holding of a plebiscite is
unconstitutional; 2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this coming October
28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No.
10360 has already lapsed; and 3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from
holding the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental except
through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction because COMELEC had
already commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay and SK elections this coming October 28, 2013. On
17 October 2013, we issued a Resolution requiring respondents COMELEC, represented by its Chairperson,
Hon. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., and the Provincial Election Officer of Davao del Sur, represented by Atty. Ma.
Febes Barlaan, to file their comment to Cagas’ petition not later than 21 October 2013. The respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their comment on 21 October 2013. The OSG raises
the following arguments: 1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the
creation of a local government unit; 2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC
to hold a plebiscite at a mere two months’ notice; 3. Legislative intent is for R.A. No. 10360 to be
implemented; 4. Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted; and 5. The COMELEC did not
abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite
for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the
Barangay Elections.

RULING:
No. The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” The
COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text and intent of Section
2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.” The right of suffrage should
prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. The tight time frame in the
enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the
subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution,
rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or
before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC's
burden in the accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections. The logistic and
financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen
and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of
B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing
the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to
synchronize it with the Barangay Elections. To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite
then, as insisted, petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its tasks for the National and Local
Elections. If COMELEC abandoned any of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the
accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013
National and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its manpower
and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it
would not be derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.

PRINCIPLES:

THE COMELEC’S POWER TO ADMINISTER ELECTIONS

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” The
COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text and intent of Section
2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.”

THE COMELEC’S THE POWER TO SET ELECTIONS TO ANOTHER DATE

Sec. 5. Postponement of election.- When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision,
the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the
election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that
reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. Thus, a too literal interpretation of the law
that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to —
x x x admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill
its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth
but in the spirit that vivifieth’ x x x
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional provision
is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

POLITICS
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions x x x. There
are no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to
the conduct of election x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on
Elections that initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

G.R. NO. 125646 SEPTEMBER 10, 1999

CITY OF PASIG, PETITIONER,

VS.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

There are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta
and the City of Pasig. G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No.
128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico.
The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of
Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated
from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into
a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation
of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig
similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for
this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality
of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the
Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)3 and
March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the
attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch
74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites
should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. In
UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the
plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled
with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646
by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being
moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of
Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of
G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two
local governments.

RULING:
The plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation
of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are
included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether
the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta
or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico.
Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction
is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we
would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Indeed,
in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that —
The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be over emphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state,
any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. Moreover, considering the
expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the
same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly
within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig. Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite
had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of
Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its
petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are
still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

PRINCIPLES: