G.R. No.

71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of
her minor children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO.
DOMINGO, respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on May
31, 1984 entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al., v. City Court of Manila et al., modifying the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII 2 in Civil Case No.
121921 ordering the defendants (herein petitioners,) to give plaintiffs (herein private
respondents) the right to use a burial lot in the North Cemetery corresponding to the
unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon, to search the remains of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a substitute lot to be chosen by the
plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo, Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr.
who is the father of the litigating minors, died on June 4, 1971 and buried on June 6, 1971
in the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the
period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. In the case at bar, the full payment of the rental
therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by a receipt. The burial record for Block No. 149 of Manila
North Cemetery in which subject Lot. 159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration
of the lease thereover in favor of the St. Domingo.
On year 1978, the subject Lot No. 159 of Block 194 in which the mortal remains
of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest was made ready for exhumation in
accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, dated March 6, 1975. The
authorities of the North Cemetery which is headed by the defendant, Joseph Helmuth
authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Sto.
Domingo. He then placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the
depository or bodega of the cemetery. Thereafter, the lot that is in question was rented
out to another lessee. When the day Sto. Domingos went to the lot on All Souls Day they
were shocked and dismayed that the resting place of the lat Sto. Domingo did not
anymore bear the stone marker. The lease of the lot to another lessee was then told to
Irene Sto. Domingo and was informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased
husband in the warehouse of the cemetery. What she was advised to do was simply
unacceptable; hence, the bereaved widow came to court for relief even before she could
formally present her claims and demands to the city government and to the other
defendants named in the present complaint.
The Regional Trial Court then rendered its decision that is favorable on the part of
the complainants. The decision was appealed to the CA which rendered a decision
modifying the decision appealed from. Petitioners alleges that the North Cemetery is
exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of
the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They concluded that since the City is a political
subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is therefore immune from
tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees.
Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for
damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or any
other laws, or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. Moreover, they also
allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the
Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law. The respondents in
this case on the other hand, maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of
lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene
Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the
contract of lease.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a
governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila.

RULING:
The private respondents contention is correct. Under Philippine laws, the City of
Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law,
and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted
with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand,
and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those
exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and
they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand
are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those
which are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the
rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as regards
the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar
as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. In
connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public
or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides
such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and
further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the
Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. The Court further
stressed that Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort....
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the
negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment,
by which another who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations
under the conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule of law, and are
liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-
exist. ... The court added that while the following are corporate or proprietary in character,
viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments,
wharves, ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and
airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary
character. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the
North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by
resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The
administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the
order and police of the cemetery , the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming
of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure
and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North
Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there
is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the
City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute
that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease
contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore,
a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty
for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

PRINCIPLE:

CORPORATE POWERS
 Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.–(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation,
shall have the following powers:

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into
by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract
shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city,
municipal or barangay hall.

Municipal corporations have dual personality. They act as governmental entity and
as a corporate entity. As it clearly appears from the foregoing provision, prior authorization
by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive may enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Municipal corporations exist in a dual
capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and
as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.
SANCHEZ, JOHANNALYN M. JD-1

G.R. No. L-52179 195 SCRA 692 April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA,
JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the
orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV,
Bauang, La Union entitled "Juana Rimando Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al."
dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16,
1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and
the decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses,
actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees
and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing

under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent
Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While
private respondents, Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña,
Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano
Baniña Sr. before the aforesaid court. In the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot, a gravel and sand
truck driven by Jose Manandeg and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and
four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney. The defendants at bar filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and
the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Consequently, the case was transferred to Branch
IV, presided over by respondent judge. The private respondents amended the complaint
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first
time as defendants. The Municipality of San Fernando, La Union filed its answer and
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney which is the cause of the aforementioned collision.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

RULING:
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the
exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the
State in the guise of the municipality. The respondent judge deferred the resolution of the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However,
said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and
thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. However, said judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held
the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine
of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Stated in simple
parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent
to be sued.
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may be
embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued
in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083.
A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged
quasi-delict. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies
of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable;
on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability
is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove,
if it can, that the defendant is liable.

PRINCIPLES:

The Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when
it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. In the
case at bar, the state cannot be sued without it giving any consent either express or
implied.

A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged quasi-delict. While implied consent occurs when the government enters into
business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and
also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan

Traffic Command, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Branch 62, Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, METRO MANILA,
PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE, respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted
the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by respondents Municipality of Parañaque
and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitioner herein.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of

Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea
market located in the streets of Caloocan. On January 5, 1979, Metropolitan Manila
Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea
markets subject to several conditions. Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea
markets and the stall owners filed a case against the aforementioned action. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the said case by the reason that the streets in questions;
Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce
of man. Thereafter, from the time the decision has been rendered, there was a change in
the city administration and current mayor, Mayor Macaria Asistio, Jr., did not pursue the
action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as is. Being the
resident of Heroes del '96, Francisco V. Dacanay, filed a petition for mandamus to remove
the stalls in their street.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of

Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for
flea markets is valid.

RULING:

No. In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal ordinance

authorizing the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the
laws in force during the time the said ordinance was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local Government Code, in connection with established
principles embodied in the Civil Code an property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). The properties of the local government
which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control
of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local
governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local
Government Code.

PRINCIPLES:

The Property Of Provinces, Cities And Municipalities Is Divided Into Property For
Public Use And Patrimonial Property
 Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be

governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public
dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside
the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit
to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied
with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show
that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service.
When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial
property of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code).
G.R. No. 175527 December 8, 2008

HON. GABRIEL LUIS QUISUMBING, HON. ESTRELLA P. YAPHA, HON. VICTORIA

G. COROMINAS, HON. RAUL D. BACALTOS (Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cebu), petitioners,
vs.
HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA (In her capacity as Governor of the Province of
Cebu), HON. DELFIN P. AGUILAR (in his capacity as Director IV (Cluster Director)
of COA), Cluster IV – Visayas Local Government Sector, HON. HELEN S. HILAYO
(In her capacity as Regional Cluster Director of COA), and HON. ROY L. URSAL
(In his capacity as Regional Legal and Adjudication Director of COA), respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Gabriel Luis Quisumbing (Quisumbing), Estrella P. Yapha, Victoria G. Corominas,

and Raul D. Bacaltos (Bacaltos), collectively petitioners, assail the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. CEB-31560, dated
July 11, 2006, which declared that under the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.
7160 (R.A. No. 7160), or the Local Government Code, and Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A.
No. 9184), or the Government Procurement Reform Act, respondent Cebu Provincial
Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia (Gov. Garcia), need not secure the prior authorization of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan before entering into contracts committing the province to
monetary obligations.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The Court of Appeals conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the
period ending December 2004. It's audit team rendered a report, Part II
of which states: "Several contracts in the total amount of P102,092,841.47 were not
supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing... the Provincial
Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160."[2] The
audit team then recommended that the local chief executive must secure a sanggunian
resolution authorizing the former to enter into a contract as provided under Section 22 of
R.A. No. 7160." Thereafter, Gov. Garcia, in her capacity as the Provincial Governor of
Cebu, sought the reconsideration of the findings and recommendation of the COA. She
then instituted an action for Declaratory Relief before the Regional Trial Court without
waiting for the resolution of the reconsideration sought. Impleaded as respondents were
Aguilar, Hilayo and Ursal in their official capacities as Cluster Director IV, Regional Cluster
Director and Regional Legal and Adjudication Director of the COA. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Cebu, represented by Vice-Governor Gregorio Sanchez,
Jr., was also impleaded as respondent. Alleging that the infrastructure contracts subject
of the audit report complied with the bidding procedures provided under R.A. No. 9184
and were entered into pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation
ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Gov. Garcia alleges that a
separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer necessary. Moreover, the
trial court rendered the assailed decision which declares that Gov. Garcia need not secure
prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu before entering into the
questioned contracts. A part of the decision entails that the trial court declares that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not posess juridical personality nor is it vested by R.A.
No. 7160 with authority to sue and be sued. On the question of the remedy of declaratory
relief being improper because a breach had already been committed, the trial court held
that the case would ripen into and be treated as an ordinary civil action.
The trial court further ruled that it is only when the contract which entered into by the local
chief executive involves obligations which are not backed by prior ordinances that the
prior authority of the sanggunian concerned is required.
At this junction, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu had already given its prior
authorization when it passed the appropriation ordinances which authorized the
expenditures in the questioned contracts. Thereafter, the trial court denies the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration filed by Quisumbing, Bacaltos, Carmiano
Kintanar, Jose Ma. Gastardo, and Agnes Magpale, in their capacities as members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu. In the Petition for Review, the said petitioners insists
that the Regional Trial Court has committed a reversible error in granting due course to
Gov. Garcia's petition for declaratory relief despite a breach of the law subject of the
petition having already been committed. Governor Gwendolyn F. Garcia, in her comment,
notes that the Regional Trial Court had already dismissed the case against the members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu because they did not have legal personality to
sue and be sued. Since, the COA officials which are the respondents in the petition for
declaratory relief neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor appealed the RTC
Decision, the said Decision became final and executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appropriation ordinance referred to in Sec. 346 in relation to

Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 is the same prior authorization required under Sec. 22(c) of
the same law.

RULING:

The fact that Gov. Garcia, both in her petition for declaratory relief and in her
Comment on the instant petition, has failed to point out the specific provisions in the
general and supplemental appropriation ordinances copiously mentioned in her pleadings
which supposedly authorized her to enter into the questioned contracts before the
authorization by the Sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive
may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Garcia posits that
Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 are the exceptions to Sec. 22(c) and operate to
allow her to enter into contracts on behalf of the Province of Cebu without further authority
from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan other than that already granted in the appropriation
ordinance for 2003 and the supplemental ordinances which, however, she did not care to
elucidate on Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 merely contains a definition of terms. The Sec.
346 and Sec. 306 authorizes the local chief executive to make disbursements of funds in
accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations.
The "ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government
unit's budget, for which reason no further authorization from the local council is required,
the ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative authorization of the budget.
Furthermore, to construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec.
22(c) would render the requirement of prior sanggunian authorization superfluous,
useless and irrelevant. There would be no instance when such prior authorization would
be required, as in contracts involving the disbursement of appropriated funds. In the case
at bar, it is obviously not the effect that the Congress had in mind when it required, as a
condition to the local chief executive's representation of the local government unit in
business transactions, the priorauthorization of the sanggunian concerned. The
requirement was deliberately added as a measure of check and balance, to temper the
authority of the local chief executive, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate
powers of the local government unit are wielded as much by its chief executive as by its
council. It should be observed that, as indicated by the word "only" preceding the above
enumeration in Sec. 323, the items for which disbursements may be made under a
reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly, contractual obligations which were not included
in the previous year's annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the local
government unit. It follows, too, that new contracts entered into by the local chief
executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian. Therefore, it confirms the
indispensability of the sanggunian's authorization in the execution of contracts which bind
the local government unit to new obligations.

PRINCIPLES:

CORPORATE POWERS

Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.–(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation,

shall have the following powers:

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into
by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior
 authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract
shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city,
municipal or barangay hall.

Municipal corporations have dual personality. They act as governmental entity and
as a corporate entity. As it clearly appears from the foregoing provision, prior authorization
by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive may enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Municipal corporations exist in a dual
capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and
as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN,

ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL
MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the
Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed
FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

In the case at bar, it presents a petitions for review for the issue of whether or not
the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the
Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a
corporate or proprietary function of the municipality.

A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of
the Municipality of Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui,
province of Pangasinan, for a death which occurred during the celebration of the town
fiesta on January 22, 1959, and which was attributed to the negligence of the municipality
and its council members.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2

resolutions. One resolution entails the management of the town fiesta celebration and the
other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. Thereafter, the said council appropriated the amount of P100.00
for the construction of two (2) stages, one for the construction of the "zarzuela" and
another for the "cancionan."
While the zarzuela was taking place, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was
pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of the
deceased filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the
municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer, the
municipality which is the defendant in this case argued that as a legally and duly
organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town
fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to
answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendants which is the councilors on
the other hand, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying
out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration
and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for
profit. Furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the
municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in
selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. The Court of
Appeals has reversed the decision and ruled that all defendants be solidarily liable for
damages.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a

governmental or a corporate function of the municipality.

2. Whether or not the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla.

3. Whether or not the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the
fiesta committee liable for the death of Fontanilla.
RULING:

1. The town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of
a private or proprietary function of the municipality. The Section 2282 of the Chatter on
Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code gives authority to the municipality to
celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. A fiesta
even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is an act
for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as
claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town
inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For futher understanding, the maintenance of parks
is not a source of income because it is private undertaking as distinguished from the
maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. Therefore,
no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity. They exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and
as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Hence, their officers and agents
in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate
or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.

2. Pursuant to the Doctrine Of Respondent Superior, petitioner is liable for damages for
the death of Vicente Fontanilla on ground that the accident was attributable to the
negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. Under Art. 2176, Civil
Code it is well expressed that however by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Art. 2180, Civil
Code entails the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. It was found
that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for
the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden
planks, the post and braces used were of bamboo material. In the case at bar, the
disintegration of the stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers who
mounted the stage. The municipality or its agents had the necessary means within its
command to prevent such an occurrence. However, they failed take the necessary steps
to maintain the safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or
spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage. In this sence, a municipality
cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the
doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for
the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

3. In the case at bar, it is held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of
Malasiqui was not of a governmental function. Therefore, the legal consequence is that
the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the
municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a
corporation has a personality which is separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or
persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for
damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees
or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their
part. Moreover, the records failed to show that municipal councilors directly participated
in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.

PRINCIPLES:

Doctrine Of Respondent Superior

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .
 Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.

This Doctrine of Respondeat Superior is commonly used in tort. This principle

makes an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts done by an
employee or agent, if such acts occur within the scope of the employment or agency. In
the case at bar, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's
officers, employees, or agents.

Municipal Corporations Having Dual Personality

Municipal corporations have dual personality. They act as governmental entity and
as a corporate entity. As it clearly appears from the foregoing provision, prior authorization
by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive may enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Municipal corporations exist in a dual
capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and
as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.