Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Remedial Law Cases Complete
Remedial Law Cases Complete
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private
property for public use. In National Power Corporation v. Jocson” the Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings have two phases:
"‘The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.’ An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,
of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the right
of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.’
"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court
of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue.’"
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation
suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the
propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings
are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial courts.
The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in
respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the present action involves the title to or
possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an
eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples
of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land.
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal
actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of
courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases
is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private
property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents’
title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for
the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent
sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public
necessity, convenience or welfare may demand."
DONATO vs CA (Rule 7)
The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before
the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then
prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91. It provides that the petitioner himself must make the
certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of
the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even
counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled that with respect to the
contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so
because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.
The Court’s pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals is worth echoing: “cases should be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
justice would be better served. Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to
lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities. This guideline is especially true when the
petitioner has satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for
reconsideration, as in this case.
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action
against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If
the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, §13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporation’s president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale
of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers received by him.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, §13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However, it
is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than those
mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule
14, §13, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation,
there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been attained.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the
summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons from
the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return;
and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on
whom the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through
such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to
the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit
is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct
proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of
the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there was
direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is
allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on
whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person served must be
shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and the filing of the complaint
against it through some person or means other than the person actually served, the service of
summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is
serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in
fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return, there is nothing to show that
Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled this question. The rule prior
to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for dismissing the
action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. This rule no longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by
jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La Naval:
Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to
dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of
this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an
estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
Finally, we turn to the effect of petitioner's prayer for "other reliefs" in its Motion to Dismiss. In De
Midgely v. Fernandos, it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer "for such other reliefs as"
may be deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to voluntary appearance. This, however,
must be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval that estoppel by jurisdiction must be
unequivocal and intentional. It would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and
intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it
might be entitled when the only relief that it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of
the complaint against it.
MASON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Rule 14)
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to
the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa)
with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City,
entered into a sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial Development
Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent
initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
denied the motion and ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired
jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari.
We decided in Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case. We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was
made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondent’s
substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner’s
assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following
the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of
Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the
rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case
is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress that Millenium was decided when the
1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the
new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial
compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to
present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. We
will deprive private respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if
we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
Since we have ruled that service of summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk
cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent
proceedings held before it, including the order of default, are null and void. As private respondent
points out, the second issue has become moot and academic.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available
to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In order for a petition
for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has
faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in
Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is
reckoned from the time the party’s counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of
the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.
In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the judgment of the lower court through
their counsel, Attorney Ralph Lou I. Willkom on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to
have received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March
24, 1995 when they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for
relief, which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, was filed
out of time. This Court has consistently held that the failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on
time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not
excusable. However, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal
is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
We are not persuaded by the YEES’ claim that they were denied due process inasmuch as they
were not denied their day in court. In fact, they were able to prosecute their action and actively
participated through counsel in the proceedings before the lower court. Their failure to file an
appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is not a denial of due process. They may
have lost their right to appeal but they were not denied their day in court. The right to appeal is
not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. In the same
manner, the YEES’ failure to file their petition for relief within the period provided for under the
Rules is not tantamount to a denial of due process. More important, no evidence was presented
to support respondents’ bare and self-serving allegation that their lawyer did not inform them of
the decision against them. It bears stress that we are not concerning ourselves with the lawyer’s
duty to his client but with the timeliness of the filing of the petition for relief which cannot be given
due course on the simple and expedient claim of a party that their lawyer failed to inform them of
the decision in the case. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise
the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost+- though
inexcusable negligence.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners’ allegation of extrinsic fraud
should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the
default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the
beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense.
And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this issue.
Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals
sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court
will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.
The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support of their
petition. These contentions should have been raised in the MeTC, as they have been available to
them since the beginning.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or
a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the
right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.i[27] Petitioners, however, place the blame on their
counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal education, hence,
were not aware of the required period for filing an appeal. ii[28]
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the
various opportunities available to them at the different stages of this case. Public interest
demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained
finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
ii