Name: Ngoc Vu Duc Huynh (Brian) ID: a1758488 Workshop day & time: Tuesday

(10am-12pm)

New Source 1

I will use the source:

Buljan, A & Shapira, Z 2005,’Attention to production schedule and safety as determinants of risk-taking in NASA’s
decision to launch the Columbia shuttle’, in WH Starbuck & M Farjoun (eds), Organization at the limit: lessons
from the Columbia disaster, Blackwell, Malden, pp. 140-156.

The idea I will use from this source is:

“The conflict between safety and economics grew even more problematic in the 1990s. As Cabbage and Harwood
(2004) observe, the idea of the primary goals of NASA as being the pursuit of safety and scientific research was
modified during the decade after the Challenger disaster…. [I]n the months leading up to the Columbia launch,
NASA was fixated on launching on time... [A]ttention shifted away from the safety goal to focus on the aspiration
goal. Since progress toward launching the Columbia was behind schedule, the pressure to meet the target resulted in
tilting the cost–safety tradeoffs in favor of time and cost control. Focusing on meeting the target led to a
phenomenon known as “narrowing of the cognitive field”, where the preoccupation with a goal prevents decision-
makers from considering alternatives modes of action” (Buljan and Shapira 2005, pp. 148-150).

Buljan and Shapira (2005, pp. 148-150) state that due to the more complicated clash between safety and economics,
the focus on safety and scientific research was changed after the Challenger disaster had happened. They further
point out that during Columbia space shuttle launch, NASA sticked on promptly launching this shuttle, leading to
the inattention to safety goal. Due to the increased schedule pressure, safety was compromised in consideration of
time and cost control. Also, alternative solutions were hindered as a consequence.

The extract from Buljan and Shapira (2005, pp. 148-150) is relevant to

a discussion of management decision making

in particular deprioritising safety

 Name: Ngoc Vu Duc Huynh (Brian) ID: a1758488 Workshop day & time: Tuesday
(10am-12pm)

I can use this extract:

to expand upon the information presented by Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003, p. 169), our Set source
4C, which says engineers in Debris Assessment Team had to prove that the Shuttle was unsafe to launch in order to
obtain the image of left wing. Dombrowski (2006, p. 245), our set source 6, shows that this requirement was
impossible.
The new information from Buljan and Shapira (2005, pp. 148-150) gives an understanding that NASA decided to
stick on the schedule and did not spend more money and time on non-serious incidents, leading to the risk of the
Columbia launch.
References
Buljan, A & Shapira, Z 2005,’ Attention to production schedule and safety as determinants of risk-taking in
NASA’s decision to launch the Columbia shuttle’, in WH Starbuck & M Farjoun (eds), Organization at the limit:
lessons from the Columbia disaster, Blackwell, Malden, pp. 140- 156.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 2003, Report volume 1, (HW Gehman, Chairman), NASA and the
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Dombrowski, PM 2006, ‘The two shuttle accident reports: context and culture in technical communication’,
Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 231-252.
 Name: Ngoc Vu Duc Huynh (Brian) ID: a1758488 Workshop day & time: Tuesday
(10am-12pm)

New Source 2

I will use the source:

Dombrowski, PM 2007, ‘The evolving face of ethics in technical and professional communication:
Challenger to Columbia’, IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 306-
319.

The idea I will use from this source is:

“In the Challenger’s case, the O-rings on the rocket boosters were designed never to be exposed to the
heat and pressure of the explosive exhaust gases. From the earliest missions, however, it was noted with
serious concern that some O-rings had experienced charring, some almost burning through entirely. At
first, these instances were referred to as “anomalous.” Over time, though, as successive flights returned
with charring and with the vehicle intact, the instances came to be perceived as normal and of little
concern” (Dombrowski 2007, p. 313).

Dombrowski (2007, p. 313) shows that the designed O’ rings in Space Shuttle Challenger could not resist
heat and pressure of explosive exhaust gas. Nevertheless, from many successful previous missions, some
anomalous phenomena of O’ rings were considered to be normal.
The extract from Dombrowski (2007, p. 313) is relevant to

a discussion of inadequate risk management

in particular acceptable risk of O-ring damage

I can use this extract:

to expand upon the information presented by Mannan (2012, p.3093), our Set source 2B, which says
some events beyond the safety standards occurred in both Challenger and Columbia were considered to
be acceptable since these previous events posed no serious cases for both shuttles.

I can use the new information from Dombrowski (2007, p. 313) to show that both Challenger and
Columbia disaster had similarity. Not only, the normalization of deviance occurred in Space Shuttle
Columbia disaster since the foam shedding that struck the left wing considered to be acceptable. But also,
it happened in Challenger disaster when the O-rings. damage had little concern.

References
Dombrowski, PM 2007, 'The evolving face of ethics in technical and professional communication: Challenger to
Columbia', IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 306-319.

Mannan, S 2012, Lees' loss prevention in the process industries: hazard identification, assessment and control, 4th
edn, Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, Science Direct.
 Name: Ngoc Vu Duc Huynh (Brian) ID: a1758488 Workshop day & time: Tuesday
(10am-12pm)

New Source 3
I will use the source:
Mahler, JG & Casamayou, MH 2009, 'Political and budgetary pressures', in Organizational learning at
NASA: the Challenger and Columbia accidents, Georgetown University Press, pp. 101-139.
The idea I will use from this source is:
“During this period of fiscal and personnel reductions, launch pressures were reinstituted because
constructing and servicing the International Space Station depended on the shuttle…[N]ewly appointed
administrator Sean O’Keefe announced that completing the initial space-station assembly in 2004 was a
test of the agency’s capabilities and the fate of human space flight. In addition, meeting this deadline could
position the agency for a presidential announcement in a presidential re-election year on the ‘‘next logical
step’’: a Moon–Mars mission…[A]fter all, NASA was ‘‘on probation’’ in terms of its ability to ‘‘meet
schedules and budgets’’ (131)…[I]t was in this environment that a particularly severe foam strike occurred
but due to schedule pressures did not trigger a requirement to resolve the problem before future launches”
(Mahler & Casamayou 2009, pp. 130, 131, 133).

Mahler and Casamayou (2009, pp. 130, 131, 133) show that the requirement to meet the schedules and
budgets put NASA under political pressure. As a consequence, while foam separation happened, NASA
was still inattentional to tackle this problem.
The extract from Mahler and Casamayou (2009, pp. 130, 131, 133) is relevant to

a discussion of management decision making

in particular political pressure in NASA

 Name: Ngoc Vu Duc Huynh (Brian) ID: a1758488 Workshop day & time: Tuesday
(10am-12pm)

I can use this extract:

to expand upon the information presented by Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003, p. 169), our
Set source 4C, which says engineers in Debris Assessment Team had to prove that the Shuttle was unsafe to
launch in order to obtain the image of left wing. Dombrowski (2006, p. 245), our set source 6, shows that
this requirement was impossible.

The new information from Mahler and Casamayou (2009, pp. 130, 131, 133) gives an understanding that
NASA ignored the risk of foam separation and tried to meet schedules and budgets due to the increased
political pressure, leading to the disaster later.
References
Mahler, JG & Casamayou, MH 2009, 'Political and budgetary pressures', in Organizational learning at NASA: the
Challenger and Columbia accidents, Georgetown University Press, pp. 101-139.
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 2003, Report volume 1, (HW Gehman, Chairman), NASA and the
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Dombrowski, PM 2006, ‘The two shuttle accident reports: context and culture in technical communication’,
Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 231-252.