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Management continued to self-censor by focusing “on the information that tended to support
the expected or desired result at that time … believing the safety of the mission was not at
risk, managers drew conclusions that minimized the risk of delay” (CAIB, 2003, p. 200). In
addition, management did not probe or question for more information. Instead, the Chair of
the Mission Management Team, Linda Ham, actively turned down requests for imaging,
raising budget concerns that she didn’t want to spend the resources, but later she “publicly
stated she did not know of the Debris Assessment Team member’s desire for imaging”
(CAIB, 2003, p. 153). Most likely, she unconsciously blocked out any actions that would
delay the next launch for which she would be the Launch Integration Manager.

The conflict between safety and economics grew even more problematic in the 1990s. As
Cabbage and Harwood (2004) observe, the idea of the primary goals of NASA as being the
pursuit of safety and scientific research was modified during the decade after the Challenger
disaster…. [I]n the months leading up to the Columbia launch, NASA was fixated on
launching on time... [A]ttention shifted away from the safety goal to focus on the aspiration
goal. Since progress toward launching the Columbia was behind schedule, the pressure to
meet the target resulted in tilting the cost–safety tradeoffs in favor of time and cost control.
Buljan and Shapira (2005, pp. 140-156) explain that due to the more complication of the
clash between safety and economics in the 1990s, the focus on safety and scientific research,
which was the main purpose of NASA, was changed after the Challenger disaster had
happened. They further point out that during Columbia space shuttle launch, NASA sticked
on promptly launching this shuttle, leading to the inattention to safety goal. Due to the
increased schedule pressure, safety was compromised in consideration of time and cost
control.

The Challenger exploded within a short period after lift-off because of a malfunction of an O-
ring that failed to seal due largely to cold weather conditions. The Columbia exploded on
reentry into the earth’s atmosphere 16 days after its launch. Foam had struck the wing at lift-
off and caused the surface area to allow burn-through on reentry and this action caused the
structure to be fatally weakened. Both accidents are similar, however, in the sense that
managers responsible for decisions that affected the safety and well-being of the astronauts
were generally considered somewhat less than acceptable…[I]n any event, there is a
consensus from investigators of both accidents that management problems were at the least
partially responsible for the disasters and more likely were central to both tragedies

Pressure to launch and/or reenter the earth’s atmosphere was driven by executive-level
concerns due largely to costs and deadlines. This pressure was further exacerbated in the case
of Columbia by the actions of NASA administrator Sean O’Keefe, who was well known as a
budget cutter and primarily concerned with keeping NASA’s costs down to a minimum.17
Midlevel managers such as Mulloy and Kingsbury in Challenger and Dittemore and Ham in
Columbia face the pressure to perform the missions despite the warnings initiated from
below, in each case the engineers involved in the shuttle program. The result in both
instances was a failure of the NASA organization, beyond the scope of the actual technical
problems in both tragedies, resulting in the deaths of the astronauts.

In the case of Columbia, the deviance involved continual instances of damage to the TPS by
foam debris falling from the external tank or elsewhere. Keep in mind that the TPS was
designed with the explicit understanding that it, including the wing leading edges, would
never be struck by anything… [A]s mission after mission returned without disaster yet with
tile damage, this deviation from specification came to be considered unremarkable, even
normal. It thus was no longer perceived as an indicator of serious risk… [T]he CAIB states
that the parallels between Columbia and Challenger are “striking.” In the Challenger’s case,
the O-rings on the rocket boosters were designed never to be exposed to the heat and pressure
of the explosive exhaust gases. From the earliest missions, however, it was noted with serious
concern that some O-rings had experienced charring, some almost burning through entirely.
At first, these instances were referred to as “anomalous.” Over time, though, as successive
flights returned with charring and with the vehicle intact, the instances came to be perceived
as normal and of little concern.