Priscian

PRISCIAN
On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception
with
‘SIMPLICIUS’
On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12
This page intentionally left blank
PRISCIAN
On Theophrastus
on Sense-Perception
Translated by Pamela Huby
with
‘SIMPLICIUS’
On Aristotle
On the Soul 2.5-12
Translated by Carlos Steel

In collaboration with J.O. Urmson
Notes by Peter Lautner
LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway

London New York
WC1B 3DP NY 10018
UK USA
www.bloomsbury.com
Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
First published in 1997 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

Paperback edition first published 2014
© 2013 Richard Sorabji, Pamela Huby, Carlos Steel, Peter Lautner
Richard Sorabji, Pamela Huby, Carlos Steel, Peter Lautner have asserted their
right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified
as Authors of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system,
without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting

on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication
can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-2752-5

PB: 978-1-4725-5847-3
ePDF: 978-1-4725-0188-2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
The present translations have been made possible by generous

and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs,
an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust;
the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal
Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello
Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University;
the Leventis Foundation; the Humanities Research Board of the
British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry
Brown Trust. The editor wishes to thank Dolores Iorizzo for her
help in preparing the volume for press.
Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain
Contents
Preface Richard Sorabji vii
Priscian: On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception

Translation by Pamela Huby
Introduction 3
Bibliography 5
Textual Emendations 7
Translation 9
Notes 49
English-Greek Glossary 71
Greek-English Index 82
Index of Passages 99
‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12

Introduction and translation by Carlos Steel
Notes by Peter Lautner
Introduction 103
Textual Emendations 141
Translation 143
Notes 213
Index of Names and Subjects 260
Preface
Richard Sorabji
The translation of ‘Simplicius’ on On the Soul by Carlos Steel is based on

a complete draft by J.O. Urmson. Urmson’s original annotations are
marked J.O.U. Apart from a few annotations by the general editor, some-
times marked ‘Ed.’, the great bulk have been supplied by Peter Lautner.
There is a purpose in presenting this translation alongside Pamela
Huby’s translation, with notes, of Priscian’s Paraphrase of Theophrastus
on Sense-Perception. The juxtapostion should help readers to make up
their own minds regarding the question of authorship. In 1972, F. Bossier
and C. Steel questioned the attribution of the On the Soul commentary to
Simplicius and argued for its attribution to his colleague Priscian of Lydia
instead. They thus revived the hypothesis put forward by Franciscus
Piccolomini in 1602. But their article, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de In de Anima
van Pseudo (?) Simplicius’ (Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34, 1972, pp. 761-
822), being in Dutch, has been less widely read than it deserves to be.
Carlos Steel has now updated his views and presents a revised version of
the article in English. The portion of the text he here translates is
commenting on Aristotle’s views on sense perception. This makes a com-
parison all the easier, because Huby’s text, which is acknowledged to be
by Priscian, purports to represent the views of Aristotle’s successor, Theo-
phrastus, on the very same subject: sense perception. Both texts give a
highly Neoplatonist account.
Theophrastus’ text was an eight-book treatise on Physics. The fifth book
discussed not only sense-perception, but also intellect and imagination
and Aristotle’s views on all of these. These topics are reflected in Priscian’s
paraphrase. There is a reference by ‘Simplicius’ at in DA 136,29 to his own
epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics. Bossier and Steel (p. 763) take this to
be a reference by Priscian to the paraphrase of Theophrastus on Sense-
Perception which is translated here.
Priscian and Simplicius, to whom the commentaries are ascribed, were
among the seven Neoplatonist philosophers who went to Persia when the
Christian Emperor Justinian closed the Athenian School in 529. The
identity of ‘Simplicius’ remains to be decided.
PRISCIAN
On Theophrastus on
Sense-Perception
translated by
Pamela Huby
Introduction
Priscian of Lydia and his works

Priscian of Lydia was one of the group of Neoplatonists who were active in
the Academy of Athens before A.D. 529, when Justinian closed the school
because of its paganism. Together with several others, of whom the most
prominent were Simplicius and Damascius, he went off for a while to the
Persian court, and as a result produced answers to a set of questions
supposedly put to him by the king Chosroes. These survive in a Latin
translation. They cover a variety of topics from the soul to the Red Sea,
and in many cases the sources of the replies are identifiable. There seems
to be little original thought here. We are also told in one manuscript,
Coislinianus 387, that he wrote commentaries on Plato, none of which have
survived, and that he was attacked by Philoponus.
The Metaphrase, or, as we shall call it, Paraphrase, of Theophrastus’ On
the Soul translated here is the only other surviving work that is certainly
by Priscian, though there are respectable arguments by Steel and Boissier
that he was also the author of the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul
attributed to Simplicius. An alternative view is that the similarities
between these two works are due to the fact that both drew heavily on
Iamblichus.
We do not know when the Paraphrase was written or what happened to
Priscian after he left Persia.1 The Paraphrase is built around Theophras-
tus’ On the Soul, which has not come down to us. We can however
reconstruct parts of it from Priscian and from Themistius’ Paraphrase of
Aristotle’s On the Soul, which gives quotations from it that overlap with
those given by Priscian and confirm the accuracy of both. It is clear that
Theophrastus, Aristotle’s pupil, colleague and successor (c. 371-286 B.C.)
had Aristotle’s On the Soul before him in the form in which we now have
it, and that he raised questions about its interpretation. There is a fine
summary of the contents of his work in Paul Moraux, ‘Le De Anima dans
la tradition grecque’, pp. 283-4. Priscian undertook the tour de force of using
it as a basis for his own Neoplatonist account of psychology.
The Paraphrase opens with a sentence containing the word ephexês
(next), and does not actually name Theophrastus, although it is clear that
he is the subject of the main verb. This implies that Priscian is here
continuing a commentary on a work of Theophrastus of which On the Soul
is not the first part, and we know from Themistius that it formed the fourth
and fifth books of Theophrastus’ Physics.2 Some fragments of the earlier
4 On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception
books survive,3 but nothing of Priscian’s work on them. Further, there is
a large lacuna in our text which starts in the section on imagination and
continues a short way into the section on intellect. There are a few other
lacunae, but they appear to be short. At the end the copyist has a note:
‘look out for the rest’, which confirms the impression that what we have is
not the end of Priscian’s work.
What we have is based on Aristotle’s On the Soul 2.5-3.5, with the
exception of the short chapter 2.6 and the very end of 3.5. Also left out is
3.3 429a2-9, but perhaps only because of the lacuna. So the greater part of
Aristotle’s positive views on psychology is covered. In a typically Neopla-
tonic way, however, Priscian divided his work into three sections: sense-
perception, imagination, and intellect, following Aristotle’s order but
placing greater emphasis on imagination than Aristotle did, for reasons
explored by H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on
Phantasia’, Rev. of Metaphysics 31, 1977, pp. 242-57. Themistius in DA
102,24-9 and 108,18-109,1 (= Theophrastus 320B and A FHSG) includes
some material about the agent intellect quoted from Theophrastus which
is not in Priscian and would appropriately follow what we do have from
him. We might also, with great caution, extract some information from
Theophrastus 321-7 FHSG, passages from Averroes and medieval Latin
writers who attribute certain psychological views to Theophrastus.
Neoplatonism
Priscian uses a Neoplatonist framework derived from Iamblichus of a
much simpler form than that found for example in Proclus. He holds that
the human intellect on the one hand participates in a higher intellect and
on the other is related to the body. It contains logoi by which it can become
aware of material objects, but it can also think of abstract things.4 Priscian
uses this framework to answer the questions raised by Theophrastus about
the meaning of Aristotle’s text.
He clearly drew a great deal on Iamblichus. Iamblichus (c. A.D. 245-326)5
was influenced by Porphyry, who himself was a pupil of Plotinus. Thus his
activity was about two centuries before that of Priscian. He had great
influence on later Neoplatonists, but much of his most important work has
been lost. It seems unlikely that he wrote an actual commentary on
Aristotle’s On the Soul,6 and he probably did not know, or at least did not
take much notice of, Theophrastus’ work. But he did write an independent
On the Soul of his own, and Priscian largely accepted his views. Although
at 7,20 Priscian says that his present purpose is not to study Iamblichus
in detail, but to study Theophrastus for additions to the work of Aristotle
and to consider the difficulties that he raises, he still makes much use of
Iamblichus.
The fact that what we have is not the opening of Priscian’s work may
explain the way in which he introduces Iamblichus’ name. It occurs at
Introduction 5
intervals almost casually, and that would make sense if in an earlier
passage, in his consideration of the earlier books of Theophrastus’ Physics,
he had given some explanation of how he was using Iamblichus’ work. We
may also assume that he was writing for readers familiar with Iamblichus,
so that there was no need to refer to him continually. The result is that we
have to use some detective work to establish what is going on, but I am
inclined to think that what we have in Priscian is quite a large amount of
fairly pure Iamblichus.7
The text
Bywater describes eight manuscripts. The most important is his L
(Laurentianus LXXXVII.20) of the fourteenth century. The others are
either derived from it or are from one very similar to it, but are not to be
ignored. There is also a Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino, based on a
poor manuscript but still of some value. The first edition appeared in Basle
in 1541, and Wimmer edited a Teubner text in 1854.
Bibliography
Priscian of Lydia Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, CAG suppl. I,2, Bywater, 1886
Philoponus in DA 1-2, Philoponus (?) in DA 3, CAG XV, M. Hayduck, 1897
Simplicius(?) in DA, CAG XI, M. Hayduck, 1882
Themistius in DA, CAG V.3, R. Heinze, 1899
Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, Quaestiones infinitae vol.

VI, Utrecht 1993
E. Barbotin, La Théorie Aristotélicienne de l’Intellect d’après Théophraste, Coll.
Aristote, traductions et études, Louvain and Paris 1954
H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark (eds), The Divine Iamblichus, Bristol 1993
H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd (eds), Soul and the Structure of Being in Late
Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius, Liverpool U.P. 1982
W.W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds) (FHSG), Theo-
phrastus, Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Leiden 1992
A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1990
Paul Moraux, ‘Le De Anima dans la tradition grecque: quelques aspects de l’inter-
pretation du traité de Théophraste à Themistius’ in Aristotle on Mind and the
Senses, ed. G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen, Cambridge 1978
R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their
Influence, London 1990
C. Steel and F. Boissier, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de in De Anima van Pseudo(?)-
Simplicius’, Tijdschrift voor filosofie 34, 1972
C. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism, Iam-
blichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978
R.B. Todd, Themistius On Aristotle on the Soul, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1996
G. Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought, Galway U.P. 1988
Notes
1. Where he went after leaving Persia is uncertain. There has recently been
strong support for the view that the whole group went to Harran in what is now
south-east Turkey, and set up a new Academy there. See I. Hadot, ‘The life and
work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources’ in Aristotle Transformed, pp.
278-89, and P. Athanassiadi, ‘Persecution and response in late paganism: the
evidence of Damascius’, JHS 113, 1993, pp. 24-9. But the case is still open.
2. Bywater in the preface to his edition (p. v) says that Priscian is only concerned
with the fifth book. He seems to be assuming that the fourth book covered the
material relating to Book 1 of Aristotle’s On the Soul, which is historical, and the
first three chapters of Book 2, which contain Aristotle’s general account of the soul.
He is perhaps supported by the fact that at 22,33-4 Priscian says he wants to go
on to the rest of the fifth book, implying that he is already commenting on that at
the end of the section on sensation. But if Bywater is correct nothing survives of
that fourth book. Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, p. 246,
considers whether Theophrastus’ De Sensu could have fitted into the fourth book,
and thinks not.
3. See Theophrastus 143-4, 146, 149, 153, and 176 FHSG.
4. For a simple account of the psychological views of Simplicius – who may
indeed be Priscian – in his Commentary on the On the Soul see H.J. Blumenthal,
‘The psychology of (?) Simplicius’ Commentary on the De Anima’ in Blumenthal
and Lloyd, pp. 75-92.
5. But his dates are uncertain. See the Introduction to The Divine Iamblichus,
p. 1.
6. See H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Did Iamblichus write a Commentary on the De
Anima?’, Hermes 102, 1974, pp. 540-56.
7. See my ‘Priscian of Lydia as evidence for Iamblichus’ in The Divine Iam-
blichus, pp. 4-13.
Textual Emendations
1,19 katatetagmenon for katatetamenon.

2,9 following some MSS and omitting Bywater’s inserted hê.
3,6 reading sunthesis with the MSS instead of Bywater’s sunesis.
3,33 keeping the apo of the MSS for Bywater’s hupo.
8,7 I have suggested a lacuna.
10,15 horaton instead of the horatou of the MSS.
11,16 to de of some MSS for the ta de of Bywater.
11,16 diateinôn for Bywater’s diateinein.
11,24 keeping meinai against Bywater.
14,31 keeping the sentence which Bywater wanted deleted.
17,29 keeping antilegein estin against Bywater.
18,23-4 following the MSS in keeping mê nomizesthai and rejecting
komizesthai.
19,21 inserting tou di’ before amphoin.
22,4 reading hekastê for hekastêi (Steel).
22,12 reading to with some MSS for Bywater’s tôi.
27,10 omitting to before pathos with the MSS.
28,14 keeping asômatois which Bywater wished to delete.
28,16 reading Wimmer’s pôs for the hôs of the MSS.
28,21 keeping êi which Bywater athetised, suggesting a lacuna.
28,24 reading Bywater’s tentative tropên for tropon, which he read.
33,19 hautêi for autê.
Priscian of Lydia the Philosopher 1,1
Paraphrase of the books of Theophrastus1
On Sense-Perception <aisthêsis>2
On sense in general: what is the ‘becoming

like’ of the sense-organ?
His <Theophrastus’> next target is concerned with sense-perception.
Since Aristotle3 wants the sense-organs, when moved by the objects
of sense, to become like those objects by being affected passively,4 he
asks what the becoming like5 <consists in>.6 For with the sense- 5
organs, and even more with the soul,7 the capacity to become like <an
object> in colour and tastes and sound8 and shape9 seems absurd.10
Indeed he himself11 also says that the becoming like occurs with
regard to the forms and the logoi12 without matter.13
But more work must be done on whether the form is from outside,
and as what <poion> and where it comes to appear, and whether what
is divided up around bodies14 and not gathered together into one is 10
sufficient for knowledge, since every piece of knowledge comes into
existence by way of the gathering into one and the indivisible encom-
passment of the whole known object.15 It is necessary, then, for that
which knows to be in an active state corresponding to the form of the
object known, and to have projected before itself the distinguishing
mark <kharaktêr> of that thing, and this is the becoming like. But it
is necessary for an effect <pathêma> on the sense-organ to initiate 15
perception.
For sense-perception is not a faculty that exists entirely separate
from bodies, but one that is brought into actuality in the downward
inclination16 towards the sense-organs, and that, being completive17
of the living thing, is not capable of being in an active state without
them. Nor again, when it is aroused, does it take the initiative18 in
jointly stimulating the sense-organ, like imagination,19 because <that
organ> is largely allocated to matter,20 and because of its own whole
extension around the things outside, and because it needs the pres- 20
ence of the objects of sense themselves also.21 The objects of imagina-
tion are not outside, even if they are simulacra <aphomoiômata> of
the things outside, but the objects of sense are outside: for sense-
perception22 is of these and not of the effects in the sense-organs, but
together with these it grasps the forms in the <external> bodies. It is 2,1
not like soulless things that the sense-organs are affected by sense-
objects, but as a living body is affected. Hence neither is the whole
thing <the motion> a passive effect nor is it entirely from outside, but
it is also by way of <the sense’s> own activity: and it is not the case
5 that it is moved first and is active later, but it is not moved at all
without at the same time23 being active. And, further, it is not active
without being moved. Indeed this kind of motion24 in the sense-organs
is made like the sensible forms in that it is produced at the same time
by them and also by way of the arousing in the sense-organ of the
representative image25 connected with life <zôtikês> which occurs in
response to them.
But this, the likeness <homoiôma> of the sense-objects in the
10 sense-organ, is not yet perception;26 it is rather a passive than an
active thing, and is corporeal and divisible and stretched out in time,
and is hastening towards form but is not yet in its form but is still in
movement; but perception encompasses without division the begin-
ning and the middle parts and the end of the sensed object, and is
actuality and complete awareness27 and altogether as a whole in the
present, and exists directly by way of the form of the sensed object.
15 Hence it is not independent of the effect in the sense-organ, and yet
this is not perception for this reason: even though we are affected we
are sometimes not conscious <of it>, both when sleeping and when
awake.
Therefore after the passive effect that which is like the object of
sense must be perfected into form; for sense-perception, when it is
aware <of the object>, accords with perfect form. But this form of the
perceived object is not in the sense-organ: for <what is there> is an
20 effect and a motion and is in division but not a form; nor indeed is it
in the representative image, connected with life, which is transmitted
to the sense-organ from the soul; for the action <energêma> of this
<the image> is accompanied by a passive effect, and common to both
is the motion of the organ and of the life in it. But obviously the form
by which sense-perception occurs is indeed in life, in that which
consists in activity28 – not that which is separate, but the life of the
25 soul which is completive29 of the living being, and in its30 vital
projection which is divided up round bodies.
But not even this is sufficient for sense-perception. For the form
which has been perfected round the sense-organ in actuality, in that
it is divided up around bodies, and does not revert31 to one indivisible
unity, is not cognitive, but there is some logos of the objects of sense
received beforehand in the soul, which <logos> lives even of itself and
30 is not only32 of the compound <of body and soul>; that is why it is both
active undividedly and exists as a capacity of individuals (but not in
the way that some one particular form comes to be in them), and is a
logos cognitive of the objects of sense, subsisting in the soul but not
Translation 11
settled in the body, one33 thing indeed but not like individual things,34
but having the one comprehending the many, and fitting35 <the soul> 3,1
to each of them; for with the one logos of white the soul perceives all
the particular whites. It is necessary therefore for a logos of this kind
to have been projected36 if there is going to be perception; and it is
projected as to something akin, <namely> the <appropriate> vital
form, being aroused37 and fitted to this likeness of the external form, 5
and being active together with it; for that which is aware is the logos,
and the synthesis38 connected with the sensitive soul, and the gath-
ering together into the indivisible in the hypostasis39 separate from
bodies.
So, then, the soul has the form of the perceived object by the
projecting of its40 logos, but not as receiving from it <the object> some
shape or impression as from a seal.41 For the awareness and the
activity are from within and are connected with life. The logos, then, 10
is within the soul and of its substance <ousiôdês>, but the life
completive of the living being, being fastened to these substantial
logoi,42 but subsisting by way of its stretching towards the body, this
too is connected with sense and is the determination43 and perfection
of the living being. Therefore in this <the life> is the likeness of the
perceived object perfected, but in the sense-organ the activity is
incomplete and mixed with a passive effect;44 and the effect is from 15
outside, but the activity is from the life; and the form is in the life of
the living being, but the awareness and the understanding are in the
activity of the logos. In what way then is the soul made like the objects
of sense? Not by receiving something from them, but by being active
in accordance with their logos through the representative image of
the external forms.45 How, then, is it made like several things at once, 20
and sometimes opposites? <It is> because while it is not possible to
be affected at the same time by opposites, it is possible to be active
<about them>;46 and sense-perception is connected with activity and
awareness but not with passive effect; for perception is connected
with the logos, and the passive effect is in the sense-organ; and the
sense-organ, being body and divisible, is not incapable itself of grasp-
ing several things at the same time, and even opposites, in different
parts. But the logos is active in gathering together in <something> 25
indivisible the opposites and whatever different things there are;
hence it is aware of their difference47 <from one another> since it
holds several at the same time in an indivisible <unity>. When then
Theophrastus also wants the becoming like to occur by way of the
forms and the logoi without the matter, let us accept it, but not that
they <the forms> are simply coming in from outside,48 but that they
are arising from the internal logoi in the life by way of the activity of 30
the senses, yet also by being extended towards the things outside and
being made like them. It is reasonable then that sense-perception is
considered to be a faculty as well, since it involves activities.49 The
becoming like is, then, on the one hand, in the case of the soul, by way
of the activity of the logos, and on the other, in the case of the
sense-organ, it is by way of the effect <pathên> from50 the sense-
object, and its own simultaneous vital activity. How then is it affected
35 at the same time by both the bitter and the sweet?51 For it is not, he
<Theophrastus> says, that it is affected by this thing on one part of
4,1 the tongue, and by the other <on another>,52 but on the same; and
with hearing likewise, if indeed it is actually possible to divide up
hearing.53 Alternatively, whether it is the tongue that is the organ of
taste or the airs <pneumata> in the tongue, in any case, being an
entirely divisible body, it is not impossible for it to be affected by one
5 thing on one part, and by another on another; as becomes evident
from touch: for it is possible to become warm in one part and to become
cold in another at the same time; and the sensitive air of hearing is
clearly also divisible. And it has been said54 that the logos is indeed
indivisible but is not prevented from being active about opposites at
the same time. For it is being affected in the same respect that is not
possible with opposites. But whereas heat, as a natural power, would
10 act upon the sense-organ, how would shape and form55 and movement
and number make it like <themselves>? Or shall we say that these
too have some active force, but act rather in a formal way?56 Just as
heat and its coordinate powers <act> in a more bodily way and for
this reason more strikingly and to produce something more like a
passive effect – unless after all it is the case that the special objects
15 of each sense have their activity more clearly and the common ones
<have theirs> more obscurely,57 the former being near by as proper
<to the senses>, and the others further off. And perhaps the common
<objects of sense>, as being on a higher level, are not equally congru-
ent with the sense. But even so, the common are still objects of sense
and are not known only by thought <dianoia>. It is true however that
thought, being withdrawn itself by itself, reasons with regard to some
<aspects> of the objects of sense which are not apprehensible by
20 sense, as when it knows the being <ousian> of the objects of sense.58
And if sense does not grasp time and number either, thought will have
knowledge of these by transmission <anapempomenê> from the ob-
jects of sense.
But if knowledge is by becoming like, how, without being affected
by the <properties> of the objects of sense, is thought made like them?
And if it is affected, of what kind is this effect? Alternatively, is it that
25 not even the awareness of sense is by a passive effect, as we said (I
am no longer talking about understanding by thought <dianoêtikê
sunesis>), but by activity and the projection of logoi? And just as59
from the effect in the sense-organ, which is being perfected into a form
resembling the object, is projected the logos of the objects of sense,
Translation 13
which is being fitted to the sensitive form as its own and60 aroused61
towards its own congruently <summetrôs>, so also the logos that is
aware of the sensible qualities moves the power cognitive of the 30
substance of the sensible objects in the way proper to it, in accordance
with the proper relation of the sensible qualities to the substance from
which they proceed.
Since, on the one hand, the sense-organ is struck by the special
objects of sense with clarity,62 but, on the other, the particular sense
grasps the common objects not primarily but secondarily – for pri-
marily sight is of colour, but secondarily of size and movement – the
common objects might seem to belong rather to the soul, and it would 5,1
be as it were incidentally that the common objects were known by
sense. But, as has been said, this very thing63 is known by sense,
secondarily indeed, but not by thought alone. And it is not by means
of an impression <epereisin> that sight64 is conscious of the colourless
and the dim, and hearing of silence, but the sense becomes conscious 5
<of them> by the very fact that its activity is checked when it makes
the attempt, knowing that there <is something> wanting and at
variance in them by the fact that the logos does not fit, and indeed
the sense-organ is also turned off in a way through being affected by
the object.65 This, then is the general account of sense-perception.
The particular senses

But about the particular senses, like sight, hearing, and the rest, this 10
meanwhile must be laid down, that sense is not one single thing, as
some say, which is differentiated into various kinds by the participat-
ing organs; for the variety <heterotês>66 of the organs is not the major
factor in the differentiation <diaphorâs> of the faculties, nor is it
responsible for the division of the faculties, but sense itself, being
one,67 of itself is also divided into five, into the means of discerning 15
the particular objects of sense; and on the distinguishing <diakrisei>
of the senses follows also the differentiation <diaphorotês> of the
organs which adapts them appropriately to each <sense>; for the
formal variety takes precedence over the material division connected
with the sense-organs, and is more important to their users.
But what is seeing or hearing or smelling? And are they all through
some medium, as sight is through the transparent, or do some come 20
in contact with their objects immediately? And what is the transpar-
ent?68 Well, I think that sight is made complete neither by reception,
as being given shape by its objects by way of some effluence from
them, nor by emission, with some body being sent out and touching
its objects; nor is it that colours move the transparent69 and as it were 25
give it shape, and the transparent then <moves> the sight; but the
forms, having an active <drastêrion> power to act <drân> each on
what is suitable for being affected, are not in every case in contact,
but <act> also on things that are at a distance so long as the distance
is correct for the former to act and for the latter to be acted upon. For
through their <the forms> being corporeal and confined in something
30 and circumscribed by space, they do not work <energei> on an existent
of any kind whatsoever, but on what is at a correct distance for the
active <drastikêi> power of the things which act and for the suitable
6,1 state of the things acted upon, and also for the size of the effect
<peisis>.70 For instance, the object seen acts <drâ> on the organ of
sight from a certain distance which is correct for both that which is
seeing and that which is being seen, for the latter for being acted upon
<pathein>, and for the former for acting <poiêsai>. But since it is not
simply the case that the effect <peisis> upon that which has <the
power of> sight from that which is seen creates the perception – for
5 an <effect> which is excessive interferes because it is out of scale in
regard to the size of the effect by which the perception <would occur>71
– it also requires distance. Hence very bright things which are nearer
than the right amount hinder and completely prevent seeing. But
since perception is made complete not only in the sense-organ’s being
acted upon, but also, as has been said, in its being active <energein>,
10 that which sees will also be active <energêsei> about that which is
seen, not altering it or having any effect <pathos> on it, but being
active about it in a conscious way. For it is not as a body, but as a
living thing and a thing that can see, that it is active. Indeed it is
because this kind of life and this cognitive power is in a body, and
does not contain in itself the causes of the objects of sense in the way
the heavenly <life>72 does, but is made complete by means of the
15 interval between it and them, that this too needs the interval con-
necting them to be of the right size.
These points are also common to hearing and any other <sense>
that of necessity does not touch its proper objects. But with sight there
is the special need for light, which completes both the seeing thing to
make it see, and the visible thing to make it be seen, for neither,
without light, would the visible thing do <draseien> anything to that
20 which can see, nor would that which sees be active <energêseien>
about the visible thing. For, being like light, both that in us which
can see, as some living things show conspicuously, lighting up before
them the things being seen by them – hence they can see even by
night73 – and also, <being like light>, the colours which are seen at
the edges74 of the transparent in bodies with definite limits, are, it is
reasonable to say, both completed by light, having in themselves that
25 which is like light in a more obscure form as compared with their
completed actuality in relation to one another. Hence both need
external light, that which can see as being like light, and colours as
being lights of a kind75 themselves, as their receptacle shows, for these
Translation 15
are limits of the transparent; and the transparent is a suitability76
for the reception of light, or is some obscure trace of light, which also
fills up the gap involved in sight not like air or like water or any other 30
thing, but as the transparent already perfected into actuality by the
thing that gives light, and perfecting both, <that is> the seeing thing
and the seen. Since, if it is the case that the seen thing is so placed 7,1
for77 brightness that it by itself is sufficient to make sight complete,
in the way that we see fire and things that are bright even in
darkness, the medium is no longer useful as making complete but
only as providing distance of a suitable length; for when placed on the
eyes the bright thing is not seen,78 through the disproportion <of the 5
distance>; but neither are the colours which are seen in light seen
when placed on the eyes, because they are not lighted up. Many
therefore are the complications which arise in the case of sight. For
it seems both to advance outwards through being active about the
sense-object which lies outside, and to receive into itself something
from the thing which is seen, through being affected in a way by it,
and the transparent and the <space> between are believed to convey 10
it79 in that they make it complete by means of light and provide the
appropriate length in distance.
Summary
And let us add the observations we have made which are common to
all sense-perceptions: (a) the representative image of the sensed
object in the sense-organ which is constituted in the likeness of the
sensed object by the passive effect <peisis> and the simultaneous
activity <in the sense-organ>; (b) the representative image perfected
into a form in the common life of the compound being; and (c) the logos
fitted to these forms which is projected from the sensitive soul, by 15
which judgment <krisis> and understanding (sunesis) occur.80
Such is the method of enquiry about each sense, which one must
take over above all from the philosophical results of Iamblichus in his
<books> On the Soul, from which we too now, wishing to sketch the
outline of his precise enquiry about each <sense>, have written these
things briefly;81 since our present project is not this, to go in detail 20
through his dissection of them, but <to study> the works of Theo-
phrastus, <aiming> both, if he adds anything beyond what Aristotle
has handed down, to bring it together, and, if he offers us anything
by his raising of difficulties, to work it out as well as we can.82
Is there always a medium between the

sense-organ and its object?
Let us go back then to the views of Theophrastus. He too, indeed,
clearly requires that no sense immediately83 touches the object
sensed.84 ‘For it is not reasonable’, he says, ‘for what is not common
25 or similar <to exist> in homogeneous things.’
The transparent
And he brings in the transparent because it might disturb some
through its unusual nature, in that it is said to be seen not in itself
but through the colour of something else:85 as if something were said
to be tastable through the flavour of something else.86 But the appar-
ent disturbance is easily resolved. For light is said to be the colour of
something else as having come from somewhere else, i.e. from the
30 thing that gives light, since light is most closely connected with the
things that are seen in that it completes them and brings them into
actuality. Hence either, if the transparent has its own87 colour, it is
completed, like the colours of other things as well, by light – for light
does not remove the proper <colours of things> but on the contrary
brings them into actuality – or, if it is colourless88 in itself, it is
8,1 completed by being as it were coloured by light, and is made capable
of being seen. What, then, is the nature of the transparent? For it is
not enough to say that it exists in air and water and aether and in
certain solids. ‘It is necessary’, he says, ‘for it to be either a passive
effect <pathos> or a state <diathesis>: for it cannot be a body in a
5 body;89 but if it is an effect or a state, we will enquire by what <it is
brought about>. For it is either by one or by several of the simple
<bodies>. But that is not possible. For the simples themselves, both
air and water, are transparent. But that with respect to fire * * * 90
earth too, nay even all compound bodies, if all things are coloured,
and colour is the limit of the transparent.’ 91
I92 say that the transparent is not an effect or a state created by
10 something, but exists as a form capable of joining the bodies in
creation to the perfection of light, and providing them with a suitabil-
ity for the reception of both light and darkness, so that they partake
essentially of one of them, or in turn of both, or in some mixture.93 For
the transparent in fire has light essentially, but that in earth essen-
15 tially darkness. Hence just as fire is a thing that produces light, so
earth is a thing that makes darkness: for darkness is not the privation
of light, but itself too an actuality.94
But perhaps we do wrong in supposing that the transparent exists
even in earth, if it is true that the transparent is receptive of light.
Or we do not do wrong. For it is receptive not only of light, but also
Translation 17
of darkness, as has been said. And then even earth is coloured, and
colour is the limit of the transparent in bodies that are bounded;95 so
that even in earth the transparent is not <to be seen as> essentially 20
only receptive of darkness, but of this in its depths, but on its surfaces
of light also, if colours are lights of a kind, and if it is true that even
earth is illuminated on its surface. But the <transparent> in air and
water is receptive of both <light and darkness> in turn – and this we
are accustomed to call transparent more properly – but that in
compounds is <receptive> according to the mixture. We will not 25
therefore enquire by which of the simple <bodies> the transparent
<is produced>: for the forms are not <produced> by96 the elements
nor by bodies generally, but they <elements and bodies> partake of
the forms and are given their characteristics in accordance with them;
and for this reason some need light in addition in order to be seen and
some do not, like fire and things that shine, in that to a sufficient
degree they partake essentially of the light-giving form, and do not
need more of it.
Light and the transparent

And in what way is it that the light which extends through it <the 30
transparent> by means of that which gives light is the actualisation
<energeia> of the transparent?97 For it would seem rather to be the
activity98 of that <which gives light>.99 But having raised this problem 9,1
he goes on to solve it, saying that the case is similar to what happens
in other things which are affected passively, showing this equally,
that as heat is the activity of fire as an active thing, but of the thing
being heated as of a thing being affected passively, so also light would
be spoken of as an actuality as being an affect <pathêma> of what 5
receives it, not properly being named activity. Hence also he brings
in that it is not necessary to look into its names, but that it is sufficient
if we understand its nature.100
First therefore I want to make this distinction, that the caused
light is one thing, and its cause another, such as that in the sun or in
fire; and the argument in the enquiry about what light is is not about
the cause, but about that which goes out from it,101 which is what is 10
said to be the actualisation of the transparent which is in air and
water and in those things which receive light and darkness in turn.
And then, following Iamblichus,102 I want this to be neither body, like
the Peripatetics,103 nor indeed an effect <pathos> or quality of any
kind of body; for it is not in the air that light has its being: at any rate
when that <the air> is moving it <light> stands still, and when that 15
is turning in many ways it is isolated separately104 and preserves its
undivided continuity with its cause. But also the immediate presence
of it over everything that is capable of receiving it, when that which
gives light is present,105 and again its immediate cessation when it
has gone away, leaving behind no trace of itself, is a sign that light is
not a thing <pathêma> that air undergoes. For the affections <pathê>
20 it does undergo, like heat, do not occur in it immediately, and when
fire has gone away it <the fire> leaves behind some faint form of itself
in the thing it has affected. And the facts that it <light> does not occur
by transmission nor by change, and that it is not confined within a
certain compass, but goes on to everything that is capable of receiving
it, and that lights do not combine with one another, all these show
25 that the activity of light is separate from bodies. In what way, then,
is it <light> said to be an actualisation <of the transparent>? Not as
a passive effect <pathos>, I will say, nor as a perfection of it occurring
in it as in a substratum, but as perfecting it on a separate level,106 not
itself <belonging as a part> to that <the transparent>, but making it
belong to itself,107 remaining itself in continuity with that which gives
light, and being carried around together with that. This then I have
recorded briefly in this way, so that we should not conjecture that
30 light also occurs in a similar way to that in which <activities occur>
in other things which are passively affected.108
The nature of light, sight, and colour

‘But if light is incorporeal,109 why’, he <Theophrastus> says, ‘is it that
it occurs in the presence of fire or, in general, body? For it would
appear to be a kind of bodily effluence and a body.’110 It is to solve this
that he says: ‘It must not be taken in this way, but as is natural’,111
showing that, at all events, the actuality of light is in some way formal
10,1 <eidêtikê>;112 since heat too is from a form. Hence it is not a body. For
it is not by division or effluence, but this itself is the activity of the
shining form or whatever we ought to call the form which is the cause
of light. ‘But if darkness is seen without light, light will not be the
cause in every case of being seen, or else’, as he himself adds,
5 ‘darkness is not visible.’113 For we do not perceive it through an
impression, but by privation114 and not seeing; but fire, and anything
else there may be of this kind, are seen in darkness as being them-
selves the cause of the <actually> transparent and for this reason not
needing that <light> to be seen.115 Therefore fire, in order to be seen,
does not need the transparent in actuality, that is, already illumi-
10 nated: but since there must be some medium116 (for seeing is not by
means of contact), this must be transparent, so that it should not, by
being solid and resistant, hinder with its darkness-producing prop-
erty117 the activity of the luminous things on one another, fire I mean
and the organ of sense.
‘It follows’, he says, ‘that the cause of colours being seen is colour,
15 and of visibles tout court the visible, if it is the case that light is the
Translation 19
cause, being the colour of the transparent,118 and visible.’ 119 ‘And it
is not absurd’, he says, ‘but even in agreement with the rest:120 for,
also, taste is through flavour.’121 ‘But’, someone will say, ‘as flavour
is the proper sense-object of taste, and sound of hearing, needing
nothing else from outside for the organ of sense to be moved, unless
indeed someone should speak of the transsonant,122 as colour needs
the transparent, yet even so sound is at once perceived if the correct 20
amount of air is in between, but colour needs the light-giving thing
from outside, if it is going to become visible.’ Or else this is special
about sight, that it needs light not because it is less perfect than in
the case of the other senses, which need nothing else from outside to
complete them, but because of the superiority and extraordinary
nature of its actuality, since the sensitive faculty is not self-sufficient, 25
but needs some more divine form. For just as our body does not need
the soul for the purpose of being heavy and for being carried down-
wards, but <does need it> for movement by volition (because this kind
of movement is beyond what it can do by nature), and <movement>
by volition is not for this reason inferior to that which is natural, but
superior, so sight too is superior to the other <senses> because its
actualisation is superior, needing something else to complete it. 30
Perhaps someone may say that the primary visible123 is the thing
which shines and light itself, which of itself moves sight and about
which it <sight> is active, needing nothing else from outside to
complete it; and that on the other hand colours, as obscure lights of
a kind, are not visible in themselves, but need the primary visible
which completes them also. ‘But on this account’, someone might say, 11,1
‘light should not have been active along with colours for them to be
seen, but, on the contrary, in order to conceal them, as also the greater
sound124 pushes out the lesser, and in the case of actual objects the
brighter does not allow the less bright to shine through: in the sun,
for example, the light of a lantern is not seen. Or perhaps there is not 5
the same relationship between the greater and the less and the
primary and what follows <it>. For it is not as less visible that colour
is compared with light; for it is not visible at all without light: hence
it is visible in a derivative way in that it is completed by it and is seen
through that,125 but light itself in itself is sufficient for being seen.
But if nothing analogous is found in the case of the other senses, like 10
there being a primary and a derivative audible or tastable, it is a
superiority of the primary visible, which, you know, we say to be light,
that it perfects other kinds of visibles, with the faculty of seeing being
aware not only of light but also of other things through light.
And since he <Theophrastus> is clearly wanting126 the transparent
to be moved by colours,127 and extending the problem about how the 15
movement comes about, whether by some effluence,128 or whether the
latter <colours> are active and the former <the transparent>129 is
passive, also to those who do not make seeing happen by means of
the transparent, but from colours themselves being borne in, and
again to those who suppose that the sense-organ sends <something>
out,130 it is right for us to enquire further also if in fact the transparent
is moved, and what is its movement.131
20 Well, it is clear that colours are seen through the transparent as a
medium, and if they are placed on the sight itself they are not seen.
With regard to this we said that there is a need for the transparent
as a medium in order that the things seen may be illuminated. But
even when the thing seen is shining, there is a need for the transpar-
ent as a medium, in the way that we said then also, because the
distance needs to be correct * * * 132 <and> the medium <must> not
25 be solid, so that it may not hinder the activity by its darkness-produc-
ing <quality>. Is it then that the transparent is useful only as not
being a hindrance, just as would be the case if the <space> between
were empty?133 Or is that not reasonable, but ought it also to contrib-
ute something? For it is not for no reason that the <thing>134 between
12,1 is a body, but it obviously makes a contribution even with regard to
colours; for we would not see <them> if the <thing> between were not
lighted up. It follows therefore that it also has something to give with
regard to things that are shining.
And again, if in the case of hearing air is in fact moved in some
way, and in the case of smell, and even in the case of touch,135 when
it is between that which is warming and that which is being warmed,
5 and in the case of taste, if there is something between the moist
things, 136 or if even in the case of these by having been mixed,137 but
not by being active, it follows that it is also so in the case of sight.
Again, everything which gives light is clearly active on the transpar-
ent; such is even that which is too bright: so that even that which
shines dimly is active, even if not in such a way as to give light: and
colours, having been perfected and illuminated by that which gives
10 light, would themselves also move the transparent. Is it then that
they <move> the transparent, and it moves the sight,138 as if it were
given shape by the colours? But if the transparent were affected in
this way we would perceive it and not the colour;139 but if <we
perceive> the colour, this would also move our sight. But as for the
transparent – the transparent is also of itself a thing which moves
15 sight, when it is illuminated not by means of something else and not
in the way that it is moved by colours – what then is its movement?
So that we may know also how the things seen themselves move sight
through the medium. I say therefore that just as the thing which gives
light perfects the transparent with the activity from that <the thing
which gives light> being present, separately, to it <the transparent>
and to our eye through the transparent, <which is> not as something
passively affected but as itself also being made perfect by way of that
Translation 21
separate activity,140 so also colour, when illuminated, acts on the 20
transparent with a separate activity, which is borne141 upon it,142 and
for this reason is present to it not by transmission but immediately
and in all of it altogether and as a whole undividedly everywhere, and
as it were giving it form separately, and together with that which is
thus given form <the transparent> also moving our sight; in such a
way that colour itself also acts on our sight, but by using the trans-
parent as a substratum for its own private activity, not as something 25
being affected passively, but as something being given form sepa-
rately by it. Hence also the activity of colour is present to sight in an
unmixed form, and yet is not present in any other way than as being
borne on the transparent, since it is borne upon it without being
mixed with it.
What then does the transparent contribute to seeing, if the activity
of colour falls upon it without being mixed with it? Surely it is clear 30
that it is by transporting it.143 For it <colour> actually comes upon
our sight being borne as a separate thing upon the transparent, as
has been said, being present in all of it and undividedly. Hence also
all in the same <place> who may be looking perceive the same thing,
and as a whole, just as also all those in the theatre hear the sound of
the voice as a whole; for sound144 is also an activity which is present 13,1
in it <the transparent> undivided, as a whole everywhere the same,
as a separate thing, in that it is neither carried along together with
the air nor altered along with it; for it is evidence of its unbroken
presence that it exists as a whole both in all and in each of the hearers
and fills them all uniformly.
What then? Is it not the case that both the air and the sense-organ 5
are struck and moved in a passive way <pathêtikôs> by that which
makes the sound? Or else the effect <pathêma> and the movement
begin beforehand around the bodies, but it is not these <the effect and
the movement>145 that are actually sound, nor again <are they>
hearing, <which is>146 the perfection in actuality set up by way of the
form of the movement. But here the effect <pathos> on the air comes
first, since what is heard is <produced> through a blow: but what is
seen is not <produced> through the transparent being affected, but 10
is itself already the colour.147 But if here too someone were to grant
that some passive condition <pathêtikên diathesin> were produced
on the air by colours, it is not by this that the colour is made perfect
so as to be visible, but by the perfect and immediate and everywhere
whole actuality of the form being present unbroken in the transpar-
ent,148 and indeed moving the sense-organ to produce a passive effect
<pathêtikôs>, but with sight existing not in the effect <pathos> but 15
in the formal perfection of the life and the projection of the logos.
But with regard to the object of smell and <the activity of>
smelling,149 the effect <pathêma> which occurs in between is clearer,
since even when the object smelt has gone away the smell remains,
not only through the particles which have flowed off, but also because
the air has been affected in some way, just as also it has been warmed
20 when it is between that which is warming and that which has been
warmed, and as the air is made sweet which is between the tongue
and the honey. And here150 too both the perception and its object are
<produced> by way of the form, but, through the fact that both the
sense-organ and the sensible form are more involved in matter in
these cases, the effect <pathos> appears more forcefully, and for this
reason more clearly, both upon the sense-organs and in the air, so
25 that it <the air> may share in the sensible form. But neither do we
sense these <objects of taste and smell> by means of an effluence, nor,
still more, does anything flowing off from colours produce seeing, but
they are seen by being active.
And how is it that the power of colour is so strong as to move
<sight> without effluence and to do this continuously? It is clear that
it is continuously active in its own activity, unless, like fire, it needs
30 material151 and a source of light, the transparent. Or perhaps it is the
case that not colour only, but, as has been said, actually every object
of sense moves the senses by being active; but colour both does not
<move them> always, but when it is illuminated, and when, as he
himself said,152 its matter is present, <namely> the transparent,
which at the same time both perfects colours by light and is given
14,1 form in a way by them by the activity from them which is separate –
but light is visible not through the transparent but in the transparent
and of itself. ‘And the transparent is the same as light, or not to be
separated from it’, he says, speaking correctly.153 For neither is there
light without the transparent, nor is there perception of this <the
5 transparent> without light; and if it is true that light is the colour of
the transparent, this would not be another visible thing alongside
colours. What then is the nature of the effect the transparent under-
goes <paskhon> to produce sight? For some say that it receives an
outline.154 Or perhaps it is not like this, but it has been said that <it
is by> receiving the activity from the objects seen unbroken and
joining this to the sense-organ. But visible things are not only colours,
but also sizes and shapes, even if in a secondary way, as has already
10 been determined.155
Smell and hearing

‘And smell’, he says, ‘seems <to be produced> through the air as it
were being mixed in a way and affected,156 but hearing <through its>
being given a shape.’157 But it has been said that sense-perception is
not by way of a passive effect, nor is sound a shape, but a kind of
perfect form of the activity. And <the sense-perception of> smell is
Translation 23
also not the passive effect but the form. But the air is affected more
by these <sound and smell> as being more enmattered and more 15
corporeal forms.
The medium
And he enquires if each <object of sense-perception> gets through to
the sense similarly, or some more and some less.158 It is very clear, I
think, that it is not similarly, but that it <depends> both on the
greater or lesser power the perceived object has to act, and on the
clarity and purity or murkiness of the sense-organ, and again also on
the greater or less suitability of the medium for passing on the 20
activity; and again, with regard to distance, according to whether the
perceived object is further away or nearer, there arises some differ-
ence for its getting through.
But how with every <sense> there is an intermediate, even if with
some the medium is outside, and with others in us, has both been
determined sufficiently in Aristotle159 and been thought worthy of
mention only by Theophrastus, and no difficulties have been raised.160 25
But someone might enquire into this, how it is that if, as we said, the
presence of the sound occurs immediately, those nearer hear <it>
louder and more quickly, or how it is that we see the woodcutter
striking earlier, but are aware of the noise later:161 for it is clear that
it is not simultaneous with the blow. Surely it is because it is
necessary for some effect to have occurred and for the air to have been
set in motion earlier,162 and the form of the sound supervenes upon it 30
as a whole later; and the effect and the movement are in time, and
the form as a whole supervenes later upon what is happening.163 In
the particular case of sound, therefore, the form of the activity
<supervenes> later upon the effect, to the extent that the effect gets
through by means of the continuity of the air. Hence it is that those
who are nearer hear more quickly and louder; for those who are
nearer the point at which the thing was struck also receive the effect 15,1
more quickly and to a greater extent: but that which is seen, on the
other hand, does not act on the transparent by producing a passive
effect, since neither does that which gives light <act in this way>.
Hence it is seen instantaneously, and at the same time, by all by
whom it is seen, even if it is not in the same way, but in greater detail
by those nearer, because while it is indeed an activity <energei>, it
still <acts on> those who are spatially near as on more suitable 5
subjects, because they are bodies.
Reflections
‘We must also determine’, says Theophrastus, ‘matters connected
with reflections <anaklaseis>.164 For we say, you know, that as it were
an imprinting165 of the shape as well occurs in the air’, himself also
equally, like Plato,166 supposing that there occurs some phantasmal167
representative image of the corporeal forms in the light round the
smooth <object>.168 But even so we must not suppose that the bend-
10 ings <klaseis> are corporeal: for that would be a passive effect and
out of tune with activity in accordance with nature, and most of all in
the case of the heavenly light;169 but we must conceive of the bendings
too as involving activity, with that which gives light and that which
sees being active to a greater extent on what is smooth and dense and
shining, so as to illuminate or see other things also by means of it.
For the second activity is of that,170 with the object which is smooth
15 and shining also cooperating because of its kinship with light. And
because that which gives light is active on either side, the second
<activity> is also continuous with the first; and because the smooth
<surface> cooperates in the second, a certain division of the two
occurs, and this is the bending; and in the case of the viewing of faces
by means of mirrors there occurs also the bending of sight in actuality,
as has been said,171 but the reflection is not by means of a passive
20 effect on the original. And172 Plato too wants some phantasmal
representative image of corporeal forms to subsist in the outgoing
activity of sight round the smooth <object>, not by means of effluence
of bodies but by means of the shadow-painting of the forms, in
seeming and appearing. Theophrastus, you know, also equally shows
this, saying that in reflections there occurs as it were an imprinting173
25 of the shape on the air. And he adds that in some cases the sense-
organ appears to be homogeneous with its objects.174 For both the
tongue senses flavours through the moist, and hearing senses sound
through the air enclosed <in the ears> being set in motion. He
enquires why therefore (a) it is not the same in the other cases also,
30 and (b) in what way like is affected by like,175 the air by the external
air,176 and the moist by the moist. <In answer to (a)> Or perhaps the
account is the same in the other cases also. For in each the sense-
organ is such as is also the external substratum to the activities of its
objects, the transparent in the case of sight,177 and the transsonant
16,1 in the case of hearing; for it is not as air but as transsonant that it
receives sound; and as transodorant in the case of smell;178 hence here
also what is in between is either moisture or air; and it is moisture
in the case of taste,179 and in the case of touch that which can receive
the qualities related to touch. <In answer to (b)> And it is not that
the like is affected by the like, but the potential by the actual:180 not
5 indeed as air is affected by air, but as the potentially transsonant by
Translation 25
the actually transsonic.181 Why then is it moisture in the case of sight,
and not what is common to water and air, since the transparent is
common to both?182 And why is it not what is common in the case of
hearing also, if it is true that the transsonant is also in water? And
there is a similar problem in the case of smell also. Or else either of
the two is sufficient. For it is also true in the case of things outside,
that they do not need a mixture, but whether what is between is water 10
or air, seeing occurs. Why then is the eye-jelly of the eye of water?183
Because water is easier to keep in than air, and denser.184 And why
is hearing of air?185 Because air is easier to set in motion, and motion
contributes to the perception of sound. But if it is possible to smell
without breathing in,186 he says, what stops us from also hearing
without air? Because it is not possible for sound to occur without the 15
striking of the air in our ears.187 For the organ of hearing is188 air: but of
smell it is not the breath which is being brought in in breathing in, but
that is useful for opening up the pores connected with smell189 in those
<creatures> in which they are covered up:190 but for those in which <they
are not>, smelling <can occur> even without breathing in.
Sound
‘But as for sound,’ he says, ‘is it in every case against a solid,191 or
<can it occur> even apart from a solid, like that of the winds? But 20
these too make a noise by falling upon the earth, and so do thunder-
claps <make a noise>, with the blast breaking against a cloud as
against a solid.’192 But if the air is connatural with hearing, when the
external <air> is joined <to the inner> by a blow, this too193 always
being moved and sounding, movement would perceive movement and
not sound sound;194 and yet that which is inside would prevent this, 17,1
as in the other cases also.195 Or is it that the internal sound is not
straightforwardly perceptible? At any rate we do not sense it sound-
ing unless we block up our ears.196 But, also, its movement is a living
one and not like that of that which is struck. But when it is affected
by what has been struck, and receives the form of the sound, then the 5
activity is hearing. The former sound is not therefore a hindrance,
since it is not perceived, but its movement, being a living one, even
cooperates towards the perception of that which has been struck. But
if the sound gets through from outside as far as where hearing occurs,
how is it that he197 declares that no sense-perception occurs when the
object of sense is in contact? Since in the case of smell also we draw
up the smell by breathing in until, obviously, it falls upon <the organ> 10
proper. Or else the sensible object is where the blow is too, and where
the fragrant herb, just as it is also where the colour is; these indeed
are things which cannot be brought near to the sense-organs if there
is going to be a sense-perception<of them>. But the form of the
activity which arises from them in the medium must be present to
the sense-organ as well. For it is not the case, as he himself <Theo-
phrastus> also brings in, that if nothing came through from the object
15 of sense some perception would be aroused. For indeed colour moves
the sight through the transparent, with the medium also doing
something and cooperating and itself being moved in a way by the
object seen – and in what way has already been described as far as
was possible198 – and the perception is not of the medium but of that
which is producing the effect. For the act of production and what
produces are not the same, nor activity and what is active. And that
20 which produces <an effect> produces it by way of <kata> the act of
production, and that which is affected is affected by <hupo> that
which produces <the effect>, but by way of the act of production from
it, and not by the act of production. And we perceive therefore not the
activity from the object sensed, but the object indeed, but by way of
the activity from it, and so not the medium but the emitting object by
way of the form of activity being sent out in the medium.
25 And when Aristotle199 says that the differentiae of sounds, like high
and low, are displayed in sound when it is actually being made, and
adds that just as colours are not seen without light, so high and low
are not <heard> without sound, he <Theophrastus> approves, <say-
ing> that it is possible to argue against200 a man who says that light
is in a similar relation to colours as sound is to high and low; for it is
30 not light but colour that is in a similar relation to white and black.
Or, as a genus, colour, but not light, is analogous to sound. And since
colours are not seen without light, just as also high and low <are not
heard> without sound, in this respect alone does the comparison hold
with regard to being seen.201
Taste
18,1 But202 why does Aristotle claim that the organ of taste is neither moist
nor incapable of being moistened, since, he says, what can be tasted
is moist? Or it is not as203 moist, someone might say, that it is
perceptible by taste, but as moist with flavour.204 In that case the
organ should only have been flavourless. Or, since taste grasps its
5 proper object by touching205 as well <as by tasting>, it is necessary
that it is affected passively, and as by a thing touched; so that also as
by a moist thing: hence it is not necessary for the sense-organ to be
occupied beforehand by its appropriate moisture.
But Aristotle,206 whom Theophrastus also follows, does not want
the tongue to be the real organ of taste, nor flesh that of touch, but
these <tongue and flesh> to be analogous to the things which are in
10 between in the cases of sight and hearing. For in the cases of touch
and taste also there must be something in between, at least if it is
Translation 27
true that the object of sense, when it falls on the organ itself, never
arouses perception; but in these cases that which is in between is not
external; for, even when there is something in between, taste or touch
is not through this, but together with it; just as, if a shield were in
the middle, the stone strikes the hand not through the shield, in the
way that the colour is seen through the air, but <it strikes> the hand 15
too, together with the shield, since both have been struck at the same
time. Since then, in the cases of touch and taste, that through which
<perception occurs> is not outside, it will be inside us. And this is in
one case the flesh, and in the other the tongue.207
That, then, flesh is also affected is obvious; and it is clear that it is
not in the same way as with inanimate things; it is, then, <affected>
as a function of life, and since the life of the flesh is connected with
sense, as a function of sense also. Why then, if it is not that the
cognitive element is actually in it? For even if there were also some 20
other organ of touch that was more so and more precise like breath
<pneuma>, yet still the flesh has <the power of> sensing; and let it,
on analogy with air in the case of sight, be between the sense-organ
more properly so called <and its object>, but through not being
outside but being grown within us it is not thought to be so, but208 it
is not for this reason insensitive.
Why then, if the flesh has <the power of> sensing, should we
suppose any other organ of touch to be prior <to it>? Because, I would 25
say, when it <the flesh> is too strongly affected by its object falling
upon it directly, it dislodges the activity of sensing by the violence of
the effect. Hence Aristotle209 also wants there to be something in the
middle in the cases of both touch and taste. And by postulating that
this grows within living things he also clearly knows that the medium
in these cases is connected with life and perception. And that too is 30
rightly claimed,210 that a) the sense-organ must exist in a middle 19,1
position within the contrariety in the objects of sense, not by way of
a mixture of the extremes,211 for it would then already have been
affected, but as what is not capable of being affected but is receptive
of effects – since what is <a mixture> of the extremes will not be aware
of the intermediates: for the like is not capable of being affected by
the like,212 and b) the sense-organ is a body and a quantity,213 but it 5
is not as a quantity that it has perception, but <it has it> by ratio
<logos>214 and potentiality. For the sense-organ is in a certain ratio
to the objects of sense and is characterized by the form of life which
has awareness of bodies. (But since all the objects of sense are
attributes <pathê> or differences <diaphorai> of bodies – for they are
qualities and quantities: and by what each thing is known, in these
its existence also lies – every body would appear to be <known by its
attributes and>215 its differences. Or else the body can be known not 10
only by sense but also by doxastic reason <logos>.216 For according to
Plato217 it is knowable by opinion <doxêi> together with perception,
and opinion is capable of grasping bodily substance <ousia>.218
The number of the senses: Aristotle’s view

Aristotle believes that there are no more senses <than five> be-
219
15 cause of the fact that all things are perceptible by us, the touchable
by touch, and those through a medium because <the senses>220 have
these things by which the medium is known – for, on the one hand,
this <the medium> is known only through two simples, air and water,
and, on the other, out of these two simples are our sense-organs also
<made>:221 for fire either belongs to none or is common to all; nor is
earth <involved>, or if it is, it is mixed in some way in touch – and he
20 wants, if more than one <kind of> object is perceived through one
sense-organ,222 the possessor of this to be adequately equipped for the
several <kinds>, but if the same thing is perceived through more than
one <sense>, that which has one of the two to be perceptive of what
is perceived through both.223
Theophrastus’ questions224
Responding to this, Theophrastus asks (1) first how,225 since <sensing
is> through air and water only. For surely in us <it is> through these
alone, since our sense-organs are also of these, sight226 of water and
25 hearing of air, and smell of either of these. And (2) secondly, if several
<kinds of object are sensed> through the same <sense-organ>, what
has this will not in every case also know the several <objects>, as for
example if through air <it can know> both the objects of smell and
those of hearing, <it will> not necessarily <actually know> both: for
it does not also hear the things that it smells: nor is the air simply a
thing capable of smelling or simply a thing capable of hearing – at
30 any rate what is in the windpipe is neither – but according to a ratio,
and it must have a ratio to each, and what does not have it will not
20,1 sense both. He urges also: (3) Surely even that is not true, that the
sense-organs are simply of unmixed <simples>,227 but they are in
accordance with what predominates; at any rate we say (a) that the
hot is common <to them>,228 and in some cases the moist: since also
(b) <on that view> that which is most unmixed will be most capable
of perceiving, so that even that which is separated from the living
5 creature will be capable of perceiving. Again, (4) if ratio is the cause
of perception – for, also, it <perception> is destroyed when the ratio
is dissolved,229 and the ratio is in the mixture of the several <ele-
ments> – each of the organs of sense would be <composed> out of
several.230 But why are the senses of two only? For living is more in
the hot,231 and sense <is part> of living.232
Translation 29
Priscian’s replies
Starting from the beginning, then, we will say in reply to these 10
questions that, (1) not according to appearance but in accordance with
what is scientifically reasonable, the medium is in two <elements>
only. For of the simple <elements> earth, through its solidity and
resistance, is not easily affected or receptive of the limits <horoi>233
from other things, and fire in a different way through its active nature
and the fact that it itself makes forms; air and water however, because
they are easily delimitable,234 easily receive <limits> and are easily
affected and as it were given forms easily: in consequence then our 15
sense-organs are indeed of these.235 (How therefore236 is it that with
the Pythagoreans the visual organ is said to be fiery237 and like the
sun?238 As being receptive of light, I will say, both through its fine and
most transparent and most clear membranes, and through the most
limpid liquids contained in them: for light is a fiery form, not as a
body but as being participated in by fire.) To sum up, it is through 20
their being easily delimitable that the medium is in two <elements>
only.239
And (2) if several <kinds of thing> are <known> through the same
<sense>, that which has this will know also the several <kinds of
thing>, in those animals which are not maimed or imperfect.240 For
this is well maintained by Theophrastus, that several things are
known through the same <sense> in accordance with ratios, and
different ratios with regard to <each of> the several.241 And it is
necessary for what is really <tôi onti> perfect to have all the ratios, 25
if it is going to be perfect. But perfect, clearly, is what participates
also in the powers which transcend sense-perception, like man, at any
rate if he has received a share of intellect as well. But those who <can>
smell but do not hear are imperfect.242
And (3) even if the hot is common to all, and the moist to some, the
organs of sense will not be mixed on account of that.243 For neither do
the external air nor the water become mixed in their partaking of the 30
hot; for as long as they do not change essentially the simple <ele-
ments> remain: and even if they are mixed, yet what predominates
<predominates> only out of the two; and if they are simple, what is
separated <from the rest> will not be capable of sense:244 since it was 21,1
not as simple, but as characterized by a certain kind of life, that they
were capable of sensing, and deprived of that it is plausible that they
were senseless – unless indeed on the more Platonic view it is the
things that are really simple to the fullest extent that are most
capable of sensing, and the really simple are those that remain in
their own wholenesses.
How is ratio the cause of sense-perception?

5 ‘In what way, then, is ratio the cause of sense-perception? For ratio
lies in the mixture of the several and in the relationship of them to
one another.’ This too he solves, placing the ratio not in the relation-
ship245 of the elements, but in that of the sense-organ to its objects.246
But I think it would be better to consider the ratio <logos>247 con-
nected with sense as not primarily in a relationship, but as in a living
substance which is aware of the objects of sense; and to suppose that
10 the destruction of the ratio lies in the unsuitable state of the organ
which receives it; and to suppose that it is unsuitable by reason of the
incongruent application of the object of sense, which destroys its
suitability for receiving the ratio. And if it is also the case that
perception belongs to living, and living is more in the hot, the hot will
also be in the simple <elements> in us by way of their adventitious248
15 partaking of life; and if they are actually mixed, yet the predomi-
nance, as has been said, is by way of the two <elements> alone.
The common sensibles

Again Aristotle,249 having shown that there is not a special sense for
the common <sensibles>, says that we perceive the common <sensi-
bles> by movement (and in this way know them by more than one
sense, like size by both sight and touch). But Theophrastus says that
it is absurd if <we perceive> shape <morphê>250 by movement, when
20 it has not been determined I think * * * .251 We ought then to say that
we are able to know the common <sensibles> by movement not in this
way, that <we are aware> of movement primarily, and incidentally
or secondarily of the rest, but that we are aware in a similar way of
all the common <sensibles>, and in the case of absolutely all by
movement, that is by being altered.252 And if sight is moved by size,
25 it does not perceive it incidentally as it does the sweet; for sight is not
affected or altered by the sweet.253 And even if size had some special
sense, it would be perceptible incidentally by the other <senses>, as
the sweet is. But as it is, it is not like this, but by producing movement.
There is not therefore anything peculiar, as a sense, to size; and it is
the same for the other <sensibles> which are common. And shape in
particular produces movement, and the effect <pathos> from it is less
30 obvious, but more <obvious is> the activity of the sense, because
shape moves the sense, through being more formal, more actively and
more steadfastly.
Translation 31
How we perceive that we perceive

Following this, about how we perceive that we perceive, he <Theo-
phrastus> sets out his argument on the same lines as Aristotle,254
wanting the common sense to be that which has this extra awareness,
since it perceives both the activity of each <sense> and its inactivity. 22,1
For the opposites are of the same <sense>.255 But the common sense
is neither the same as the particular ones nor entirely different. For
it is by way of the synthesis of all <the senses> and their concentration
into an undivided one; hence in a way each256 <sense> is conscious
<sunaisthanetai> that it perceives, not as having been divided off but
as joined together in the one.257 For it belongs to a power already 5
separate from bodies258 to revert into259 itself and know itself, and
each is more corporeal in so far as it has been divided up, and it goes
up more to what is apart260 by means of its indivisible unity261 with
the others. For in fact this indivisible unity is appropriate to the forms
which are apart from bodies. But if, as he himself well claims, it
belongs to the same <sense> to be aware of opposites, and for this 10
reason of <its own> inactivity also, on the one hand even each <sense>
will grasp what is separate in a way from its own organs262 – for
<otherwise> sight would not have perceived that the sense-organ’s
not being affected263 was darkness, for it <sight> appears to be active
even when <that> is not affected – and, on the other, to a greater
extent the common <sense>, which is aware also of the inactivity of
the senses themselves.264
Hence, also the common <sense>, but not each <individual one>,
will be conscious of itself and of its own activity: and if of its activity, 15
then also of its inactivity: and if of its inactivity, it would at the same
time be both inactive and active, in that it was conscious <in this
way>. Therefore it is inactive, on the one hand, as being divided off
and by itself, and, on the other, it is active and as it were transcends
its own special activity and inactivity. So that265 <it is active> in
respect of being <kata> the common <sense>, connected with <kata>
which also is each <sense>, not as each <individual one>, nor <all>
as divided off, but as united in <kata> the one union of all <the
senses>, of which it is the function to be aware of the objects of all the 20
senses in the same <centre> and undividedly, being active in accord-
ance with the different logoi. Hence also what is aware is in number
one and indivisible, but in its being <toi einai> divisible,266 in that it
is active in accordance with different logoi.
And voice has been called concord <sumphônia> in Aristotle,267
since it is perceived in actuality when it is heard; and it is heard when 25
voice and hearing have become one, when they are in concord and
conjunction <sunarmostheisai> with one another.268 For an excess of
the object of sense-perception dissolves or destroys the activity of the
sense; and perception lies in proportion <summetriai>, and we say
that things that are proportionate are pleasant. Is it then that when
the sense is not active, it is not in itself proportionate? Or, since it is
30 not active in itself but in its extension <apotasis>269 towards the
things outside and its relation to the objects of sense, it is clear that
it will also not have the active proportionality in itself: it will however
have the proportionality in potentiality. For the potentiality is pre-
sent first and in itself is an object of knowledge <theôreitai>.270
But let us go on to what comes next, working through the rest of
the fifth271 book from another starting-point.272
23,1 Priscian of Lydia the Philosopher

Paraphrase of the books of Theophrastus
On Imagination273
Of imagination, about which next, following Aristotle,274 he works out
a view, it must be taken from that man’s works that it is another
5 faculty besides sense-perception;275 and that it differs also from opin-
ion and all rational apprehension; and that, just as perception is
moved by sensible forms, being roused as a vital function, and being
active about them through the projection of its own logoi, so imagi-
nation too is moved by sensible forms, using these as its immediate
10 objects and being active about them.276 Hence this too is a corporeal
form of life, and one that is not active without the bodily organs, since
the sensible forms by which it is moved are also completed from the
representative images in the sense-organs.
And we must also add the views of Iamblichus,277 that imagination
has developed naturally beside all the faculties of the soul, and
represents in itself and moulds all the likenesses <homoiotêtas> of
15 the forms, and transmits representative images connected with the
one set of faculties278 to the others, rousing up279 the one set <of
images>280 from sense-perception to opinion <doxa>, and presenting
to opinion the second, from intellect, and receiving in itself the images
<phantasmata> from the wholes: and that it is characterized in a
special way by <kata> this assimilation, in both producing and
receiving what are similar either to the intellective activities <ener-
20 gêmata>, or to those connected with <the world of> generation,281 or
to those in the middle, both representing in itself all the activities
<energeias> of the soul, and fitting those outside to those inside and
placing upon the lives282 stretched out round the body the repre-
sentative images coming down from the intellect. In itself, then,
imagination is a faculty of assimilating them283 to itself from there,
and it also joins them to the other faculties, being the first cause of
Translation 33
their being active <energeiais>; it is not a passive effect nor a move- 25
ment, but an indivisible and determined activity, and is not moulded
by receiving something from outside like wax,284 but is roused from
within and by way of the projection of the assimilative logoi to the
awareness of the images <phantasmatôn>. 24,1
But if, as Iamblichus says,285 it also represents in itself the other
lives and the rational and intellective activities themselves, how is
what Aristotle says still true, that imagination is moved by sensible
forms?286 Is it that even if it represents all the superior activities, it
is still made into images <apeikonizetai> in accordance with the 5
sensible forms in shape, and as divided up, and in accordance with
the reference to the objects of sense, so that it represents even the
superior activities by the fact287 that it is moved by the sensible forms?
How then is imagination moved even when the sensible <objects>
are not present? For even if it is moved by the sensible <forms>, yet
these too it projects when the sensible objects are present and ceases
<doing so> when they are absent. Or perhaps it is not the case that, 10
in the way that sense is moved only when its objects are present, so
also is imagination, but rather, when it has been set in motion288 once,
it can be aroused on its own account and project the images <phan-
tasmata> in accordance with their reference to the forms which have
set it in motion. But sometimes289 it needs to have been set in motion
not once or twice but several times for it to extend from itself things
similar to those that have set it in motion. And it shares having shape
and being divided up with sense-perception: but by the fact that it 15
extends from itself images even when the things that set it in motion
are no longer present it transcends sense-perception; and by the fact
that it always has reference to other things and is assimilated to the
different activities of the soul, by this it is both cognate with all the
faculties of the soul, and it is a peculiarity of the soul by reason of its
power of becoming like <other things>.
‘In what then is imagination?’ enquires Theophrastus. ‘For it is 20
neither in <that part of the soul> connected with sense, since some-
times when the sense-perception is true the image <phantasia>290is
false; nor is it in the sense-organ;291 For the effect made on the
sense-organ happens when its object is present, but the images
<phantasmata> occur also when it is absent.292
Well, I say that imagination is another faculty beside sense-
perception, but adjacent to it293 and for this reason somehow set in 25
motion by it, and as it were using the sensible forms as its objects,294
from which it is aroused and to which it refers its images <phantas-
mata>, and embroidering295 these in all kinds of ways in virtue of its
superior standing;296 and of itself, after having been set in motion <by
sense-perception> once, it is aroused to changing its shape as it may
wish; and the sense-organ also receives the representative images of
30 the forms being projected from the imagination, as is shown by the
fact that their forms,297 having shape and being divisible, do not
display what is separate from bodies.298 And I agree, on the other
hand, that clearly it is often the case that when the body is moved
together with the images <phantasiai>, and disposed in accordance
with them, the images <phantasmata> also appear in the sense-
organ, but <in the organ> not as being connected with sense (hence
35 not from outside), nor as undergoing a change by the action of some
25,1 bodies, but as receiving the forms connected with imagination. And
that is not surprising: since even some sort of representative im-
ages299 of our reasoning activity come down into our body, as is shown
by the turning inwards of our eyes and the knitting of our brows in
our studying;300 and if even these solid parts301 are sympathetically
affected, it must be that the sense-organ itself receives the traces of
5 life much sooner, as being more closely connected with life. For,302
further, in those things in which the only form of life is that of sense,
the organ is also only a sense-organ, but in those in which there is
<the life> of imagination and desire and reason the organ is also
suitable for the reception of this <form of> life. It will, therefore,
receive also the representative images connected with imagination,
insofar as it is capable of imagining, and false ones, if the images
10 <phantasiai> are false. And303 just as when perceiving true <objects>
we can at the same time project false images about them, so, in
consequence, our spirit <pneuma>,304 in that it is on the one hand
capable of sensing, receives the true images from the things connected
with sense, and, in that it is on the other capable of imagining,
<receives> the false from the objects of sense and the true from
imagination: as when seeing the sun a foot across305 we imagine it to
15 be many times the size of the earth, following the constraints of the
measurement of the earth. And neither is the perception <a percep-
tion> of the image <phantasma>, since the image is actually in the
sense-organ, but the perception is based on <kata> the objects of
sense, and the images are from <apo> the projection by the imagina-
tion: nor is it impossible for the substrate to receive both true and
false representative images about the same things, for example the
20 sun, since it receives opposites from different faculties and by way of
different forms of life. And nothing prevents the image <phantasma>
and the sense-experience <aisthêma> from coinciding in the same
<thing>, even if they are opposites, since they are not entities on the
same level <sustoichia>, nor actions <energêmata> of the same fac-
ulty; and since also the belief <doxa> and the perception about the
size of the sun are in the same <thing>, although they are opposites.
Let us then give our account of this in this way. And that also has
25 been said, that there is not always a need for the objects of sense to
Translation 35
be present for imagination to be set in motion, but when it has been
aroused and in the projective * * * of such a shape * * * 306
<ON INTELLECT>307
Intellect as potential
* * * For it308 <intellect> must not be taken like this, he <Theophras-
tus> says, nor in the same way:309 for that is a sophistry; but as some
underlying potency,310 as is also the case with material objects.311 And
going on a little further he adds: ‘Perhaps this too would seem to be 26,1
absurd, if the intellect has the nature of matter, being nothing, but
capable <of being> everything. But it must not be taken in this way,
nor of all intellect, but it is necessary to make distinctions. Of what
kind, then <is it>, and what is <the basis of> the distinction? For
matter is not a “this something”, but intellect, if it is not like this,312
what else <would it be>?’ We must therefore take the ‘potentially’ also 5
analogically, with regard to the intellect that is connected with the
soul;313 for <it must be interpreted> in relation to the intellect in
actuality, that is, that which is separate.314 Matter indeed, as being
at the lowest level, is reasonably <said to be> everything potentially,
but sense is not like matter. For sense is even said to be form315 and
essentially <kat’ ousian> contains the logoi of the objects of sense.
But in another way it is said to be potentially the objects of sense
as being moved by them to its projection, and needing them to be 10
present and acting on the sense-organ for its own actualisation. But
the intellect connected with the soul is neither like matter nor like
sense. For it is both a form and a container316 of all forms by its own
being, and is active of its own accord, and in itself contains the objects
of intellect. But through its kinship with the soul, and through its 15
essential <ousiôdê> relationship with it, and through its inclination
<aponeusis>317 as it were towards the divisible, it itself has descended
from the inviolably undivided and entirely united intellective sub-
stance and actuality, and also the objects of intellect in it fall short of
the exceedingly bright and self-illuminating state <hupostasis> of the
primary intelligibles, and the continuity between the two has been
loosened318 in a way, and is not exact as is the unity in the separate 20
<intellect>. And for this reason it itself needs the actually perfecting
intellect for purely undivided knowledge, and the intelligibles in it
also need the illumination from the separate intelligibles, so that they
may be perfected as complete intelligibles – for which reason Aris-
totle319 himself likens them to colours needing the light <augê> from
the sun – and the conjunction of the two of them is made indivisible
by their inviolable unity when joined together. It is in this way 25
therefore that the intellect connected with the soul is potential, that
is, in relation to the separate intellect, because that is purely indivis-
ible and inviolably united to the intelligibles, which are exceedingly
bright and primary and perfect lights, and in that it is perfected by
this kind of intellect.
And, therefore, we must understand the unwritten tablet320 by
analogy with it <the intellect connected with the soul>. For it is <like
30 that> not as not having the forms at all, but, just as it itself is intellect
potentially, not as not being intellect at all, but as being intellect of
such a kind as to need to be perfected by the first intellect, so also the
intelligibles in it are indeed intelligibles but such as to need the
illumination from those that are separate, so that they may be
27,1 inviolably intelligibles. Hence also they have been likened to col-
ours,321 and the tablet has been called unwritten by reference to the
reception of these perfect forms. Theophrastus is therefore right to
declare that it is absurd to ascribe a material nature to intellect, and
<to do so saying> that it is like matter in being nothing, but capable
<of being> everything. And he recommends that we ought not to take
5 it in this way, but should seek how it may be said to be potential in
another way.322 But how <it may be> has been said sufficiently for
our present purposes: and at the same time the distinction has been
made that not all intellect is potential, but what kind is.
Intellect and the intelligibles

Next he raises the question how it becomes323 the intelligibles, and
what is its being affected.324 For it must <be affected>, if it is going to
come into actuality like the senses. But what is effect,325 or of what
10 kind is alteration, of an incorporeal thing by an incorporeal thing?
And is the starting-point from that <the object> or from itself? For by
the fact that it is affected it would seem to be from that; for none of
the things that are being affected <acts> of itself; but from the fact
that thinking is the starting-point of everything and in its own
power,326 and not as with the senses, <it would seem to be> from
itself.327
Priscian’s reply
It does therefore become the intelligibles, but, through the looseness,
15 as has been said, of the union328 it is not in the way that the separate
intellect is things; and since on the one hand it is joined to them
exactly, being brought together by the intellect in actuality, on the
other through this it is yet also affected in a way, because having
descended from the purely and entirely undivided unity329 of the
separate intelligibles, and as it were going out through its kinship
with the soul, it is brought to perfection, as one thing by others, by
Translation 37
both the intellect in actuality and the intelligibles in it. But since it 20
itself brings itself to perfection330 both being aroused of itself and
fitting itself to the intellect in actuality, and receiving its perfection
from that by its own activity, and since it has not entirely gone out
from the intellect in actuality, but, although descended, is joined even
so to that, in that it is itself also intellect – hence also, not turning
outward in any direction but entering into itself and being brought 25
together with itself as much as possible, it is also brought to perfection
by the intellect in actuality331 – for these reasons therefore it is
affected in a different way from the senses, and in general it is affected
not in the proper sense but homonymously,332 and, rather, it is active.
For by its own activity it receives also the perfections from the
<entities> that are prior and does not receive what it thinks from
outside.
For it itself also is things, having been made perfect in a secondary 30
way, united with its own objects and at the same time joined to the
<entities> that are superior because its own <objects> have not been
torn away from those that are prior. And the intelligibles are also
active on the intellect, as are also the objects of sense on sense, but
<the former> not from outside, since they have not been separated 28,1
<from the intellect>. Hence the activity of both is one, that of the
intellect about the intelligibles, and that of the intelligibles on the
intellect, by the fact that they have not been torn apart, but the
intellect is the intelligibles.333 Again, even with sense it is round the
sense-organ that the effect produced occurs, since the primary sensi-
tive is made perfect by way of its own activity, and as receiving the 5
movement from the objects of sense not passively but actively; and to
a greater extent the intellect is both active of itself and receives its
perfection from the intelligibles not passively but actively; if we even
ought to say that it receives <it> but does not bring <it> forward; for
starting from itself it is made perfect. And in general, in those things
that are moved by something else the effect is as on things being
aroused from outside, but in those things whose activities are all from 10
within and which are active as wholes through wholes,334 it is impos-
sible to conceive of any passive effect, except homonymously. For even
the potential intellect is activity in its very being335 in a secondary
way, and this activity is the opposite of a passive effect, and would
never be disposed passively.
Return to Theophrastus, with Priscian’s comments

And, simply, in those incorporeal336 things which are separate from
bodies, as he himself says, ‘What is the effect, or of what kind the 15
alteration?’ And passive effects are from outside, but the intellect is
a starting-point and from itself. In what way,337 then, is it passive?
‘For if it is wholly impassible,’338 he says, ‘it will grasp nothing
intelligible’,339 calling the perfecting from the intelligibles a passive
effect, since it is necessary for the intellect to be pure340 in every way.
But since it is made perfect also from the intelligibles by way of its
own activity, for this reason we would understand those words ‘a
passive effect’ in a broader sense, and not strictly.
20 ‘For the intellect is an impassible thing,’ says Theophrastus, ‘un-
less indeed <the word> “passive” is <taken>341 in another way, not as
moving,342 for motion is incomplete, but as activity. And these are
different. But it is sometimes necessary to use the same names.’343
You see that in the case of the intellect he redefines ‘passive effect’
neither as incomplete nor in terms of change344 or any kind of
25 movement, nor as from outside, but in connection with activity.
And he asks <people> to agree to his use of the names, because we
transfer the names from the objects of sense to intellective things.
And he asks leave to redefine ‘being affected’ <in this way>. And it
has been said that with the second <entity> being made perfect
actively by way of the process of perfecting being given from345 the
superior * * *346
‘And in what way is an intelligible <thing> affected by an intelli-
gible?’347 <The answer is>: Since it is as a second object of intellect,
30 that is, as capable of activity and as ruling <archon> and as being
self-actively348 determined by its superior. ‘And in what way does it
itself perfect itself?’349
29,1 Because, as has been said, it receives <what it does> even from its
superior self-actively. ‘And for what reason <does it>350 not always
<think>?’351 Or perhaps the intellect is always active, but the soul
does not always use the intellect even when it is present, in its turning
towards bodies. And these men, namely Aristotle and Theophrastus,
appear, as we have indeed already said,352 to call intellect sometimes
5 even the whole rational life,353 where at any rate they extend the name
of intellect even as far as the imagination.354 And in this way he would
with reason enquire in the case of the soul ‘For what reason not
always?’ not from the fact that it does not have the potentiality, but
from the fact that it is extended towards what is secondary and
corporeal and wholly outside itself through the double nature355 of its
individual life. For in its turning <strophê> into itself and its inclina-
tion <sunneusei>356 towards intellect is its process towards perfection,
10 and in its tendency <rhopê> towards bodies is its departure <aposta-
sis> from thinking, and the soul is also made perfect both beginning
from itself and bringing itself towards the intellect, and self-actively
also receiving its perfecting from that. Since, as he says, ‘it is absurd
that the activity of the intellect should be from something else moving
it, both for other reasons and <because> it is to make something else
15 prior to the intellect, and thinking not to be in its own power,357 unless
Translation 39
there is some other intellect which sets it in motion.’358 And these
things are true whether he were to call intellect the undivided
substance participated in by soul or the rational soul itself.359
But what is the implication? ‘For if it is as being active’, he says
‘that it becomes things, and then it is most fully both <intellect and
things>, things and the intellect would be one and the same’.360 For
not only is it the things which are thought <ta nooumena>, but also 20
it is then most fully intellect, when it is thinking. For that reason he
said ‘both’. If therefore when it is things then it is also intellect,
intellect and things would be one and the same. Is it then the case
that when it is not thinking, not being things it is also not intellect?361
Or perhaps the real <ontôs> intellect and the potential one which is
participated by soul thinks,362 in that it is also, even though secon-
darily, itself essentially actuality. But in the case of the individual
soul the difficulty would have standing: for this certainly does not 25
always think.
‘Is it therefore nothing before it thinks?’363 Or else it is like matter,
and it is given form from outside by the things which come upon it,
when it knows1 <ginôskei>364 them. But the soul is actually something
before it knows2 <epistasthai>, and it is not from outside but from
itself that it both makes a beginning and projects the known1 objects,
and entering into itself discovers things. And therefore, before know-
ing1, it is things, but since by this fact the soul has also been divided 30
in a way through not being activity in its substance,365 but possessing
a secondary cognitive2 activity which proceeds366 from its substance
<tês ousias>, as is also the case when it is not knowing2, so also it is
things not actively but in its substance <ousiôdôs>. For it is necessary
also to think the things in it in a way appropriate to <sustoichôs> the 30,1
soul:367 they are not thought by being <them>, but by a cognitive1 act,
and they are made objects of cognition1 through the secondary activity
which proceeds from its substance – unless then, in the case of the
soul, neither existence nor activity are simple nor of one kind, but the
one kind <is> stable and the other changing, with the one that is 5
changing proceeding round the one that is stable, with the soul as
whole being conscious368 in accordance with both, and for this reason
both staying the same and changing at the same time; and at the
same time both always being active with regard to the hidden369
activity which is cognate with the stable substance and also with
regard to the life which proceeds outwards and changes;370 when it
<the soul> as a whole is turned round the secondary and divided, 10
being also active with regard to these, using opinion <doxêi> together
with sense-perception,371 but not with regard to the objects of knowl-
edge2, which are the things inside it, nor still more with regard to the
intelligibles, to which through the objects of knowledge2 it is con-
nected as it were in a single continuity. And when to be sure it calls
back towards the stable things in it the life and activity that have
been projected, it is not active about everything at the same time, but
15 <about> now these and now others through its divided nature. So its
‘potential’ and its ‘active’ are with reference to change. Or372 when its
outgoing activity by which knowledge2 occurs is not present, then we
say that the stable entity which is projective of this <the outgoing
activity> is potential, being things, but not being active by way of its
outgoing activity. And if, therefore, it does not know1 everything at
the same time, but different things at different times, it is not the
20 case that for this reason it actually is different things at different
times, and never the same, because it does not change utterly, but
there is also something in the soul which is stable, thanks to which
things are always situated in it. ‘For it is also absurd’, he says, ‘if
existing potentially it is nothing, but in actuality it is something other
than itself, when it does not know <noei>373 itself, and through
knowing one thing and another is never the same. For this is a kind
25 of undiscriminating and disorderly374 nature’; thus he refutes those
who suppose that the intellect is potentially everything and nothing
in itself extremely well.375 For first, when it does not think <noei>, it
will be nothing; and then even when it is thinking, when it thinks
other things and not itself, it will be another thing and not itself, and
different at different times and continually changing. For this reason
he says ‘it is not to be taken like this’, but in the way that was said
earlier in the passage in which he thought it right to understand
30 ‘potential’ and ‘in actuality’ analogically,376 and not, as with matter,
so with the intellect. For the intellect is a ‘this something’. Nor again
31,1 as with sense-perception: for this, as he now also adds, does not
<exist> without the body, but that <intellect> is separate <from the
body>.377 Hence it does not need things that come outwards for its
perfecting. And when, then, the soul is not knowing1 <anything>, it
is in actuality everything in accordance with its permanent and
essential perfection, but its projective activity is lacking: hence it is
5 potential with regard to this; and since it is cognate with the objects
of knowledge2 when it knows2 something or other, being in actuality
what the object of knowledge2 is, it is not other than itself, because
this <the soul> has substantial existence <ousiôtai> in connection
with <kata> all the objects of knowledge2. But it does indeed appear
in some way to be in a state of becoming. ‘For when it378 has become
each thing in the sense in which it is said to know2 them in actuality,
and we say that this happens when it is able to be active through
10 itself, then too it is potential in a way, but not in the same way as <it
was> before having learned and found out. By what, then, is its
coming to be <something brought about>379? Well, it is either by
disposition and potentiality or by substance. It seems to be more a
matter of disposition, and this as it were perfects its nature.’380 At any
Translation 41
rate the soul comes to be381 in a way because it is not uniform like the
intellectives, nor purely stable; but it stays the same and has change 15
within its nature at the same time, and it is ambivalent382 because of
its intermediate position and its life which is constituted <aphori-
zomenê> in movement. Hence, also, it is carried down into ignorance
by means of its tendency <rhopê> towards the worse, and again it is
perfected by knowledge2 by way of its turning <strophê> towards the
better. Hence at times it becomes imperfect and <at times> perfect,
being on the one hand imperfect when it is ignorant and for this
reason potential, since it has the potentiality of knowing1 even then:
but when on the other hand it knows2 it is perfect. Hence it is active, 20
and in its being active is its perfection; but since even when it knows2
it is not entirely active, ‘it is on the one hand potential even then, but
not however in the same way as <it was> before it had learned and
found out’,383 in that it has already received its disposition and
perfected the projective power of its activities connected with knowl-
edge2.
‘By what, then,’ he says, ‘is its coming to be <something brought 25
about>? By disposition and potentiality, or by substance?’384 That is,
<he asks> whether the change in the soul comes about in disposition
only and potentiality, or also in substance.385 Well, since both the
dispositions and the activities are from the substance, it is impossible
to suppose that the substance, remaining entirely unchanging and
always in the same condition, is sometimes productive of activities
which are perfect and of a good type, and sometimes of imperfect and
corrupted <activities>. For substances are the causes of activities, 30
and the nature of their activities provide us with the material for
deducing the type of their potentiality and of their substance.
But if someone were to have the idea that there were a twofold386
substance in us and twofold potentialities and activities, and were to
think that the one kind were always perfect, but the others were
sometimes imperfect and sometimes perfect, if he is talking of them 32,1
as separate387 <entities>, he will make the one <entity> many living
things, and completely set apart the superior substance, as neither
ruling <our> life nor having anything in common, if at least with
regard to the second <substance there is> what is in turn imperfect
and perfect, in which the life of man is contained <horizetai>. But if
in speaking of twofold relations or logoi or lives he were not to destroy 5
the unity of the two, so that what is ours should not resemble a
company <khoros> or any other crowd, but so that all things should
come together into one <thing>, and grow together towards one
principle, we will enquire about this one <thing> whether it is
uniform and entirely pure and unchanging. But on this account again
there will never be in souls either in <their> substance or in <their>
activity imperfection or evil or suffering <pathos>: for their activities 10
are in accordance with their substance. But neither is it possible to
agree that it <the one> is changing in every way: for its life remains
through its changes.
According to Iamblichus,388 then, the individual soul has received
together equally both the stable and the changing, so that in this too
15 <its> intermediacy is preserved. For the superior are stable only, and
the mortal are entirely changeable. But the individual soul, as being
in the middle, and being divided together with and being multiplied
along with all the kinds of things <genera> of this world, is not only
stable but also changes, living through so many partial lives. And not
only with regard to its dispositions, but also with regard to its
substance, it changes somewhat. And indeed I think that he himself
<Theophrastus> is demonstrating this when he says ‘It seems to be
20 more <a matter of> disposition.’ For the change and perfecting ac-
cording to dispositions is obvious: hence ‘more’: but his speaking of
‘more’ itself hinted also at the perfecting by way of substance. Hence
he also adds: ‘And this as it were perfects its nature’, <the nature>,
clearly, of the active, as it was not perfect before; for if the substance
were entirely perfect neither would the disposition be imperfect, nor
25 the activity which proceeds from the substance alone.
Forms with and without matter

And next he himself also, like Aristotle,389 supposes that some of the
forms are without matter, and in these each is itself identical with its
being <what it is>:390 for its being <what it is> shows its logos and its
form, and it itself <shows> its whole nature <hupostasis>, and in the
case of those without matter the whole nature is connected with
<kata> the form and the logos only; and <he supposes that> some
<forms> are enmattered, and in them the thing itself and its being
30 <what it is> are different; for it itself <exists> by way of the combi-
nation of both <form and matter>, but its being <what it is> is on the
contrary by way of the form; since the potential intellect is contem-
plative <theôrêtikos> of both, he enquires ‘How <does it know> each
of the two, that is, how the <forms> in matter, and <how those> in
abstraction?’ For in fact it is conscious of the enmattered themselves
either by way of the combination of both or by way of the form alone.391
Well, these matters have been distinguished more clearly in the
genuine expositors of Aristotle, I mean Iamblichus and Plutarch son
35 of Nestorius.392 But still we also must make mention of them in a few
33,1 words as we examine thoroughly what we are seeking. I say, there-
fore, that the potential intellect, both that participated in by the soul
and the rational <soul> itself,393 when it purely uses reason and is not
stretched off to the things outside with perception and imagination
<phantastikôs>, in contemplating394 the forms within it and the
Translation 43
matterless logoi395 within it, by means of these <logoi> contemplates
both the matterless and the enmattered, the former by way of identity 5
and the unity of the matterless with one another, and the latter,
which are similar to their cause, as being from <that> cause. For as
the intellect in actuality in thinking itself knows1 also all the things
after itself, in that it is itself the things which are causes and from
these causes also it thinks the effects <aitiata> on a higher level than
that on which they exist, so also the potential intellect knows1 the
enmattered <forms> in a secondary way from the contiguous causes
in it, knowing1 <first> those in itself without matter, and then <them 10
as> causes of the enmattered. But it knows1 the enmattered not like
sense, for this <knows them> as made particular through qualities,
e.g. as hot or cold or white, or something of the kind; but the intellect
and the rational life <knows> substances also by way of the common
forms of the enmattered. Will it then not know1 that fire is hot? Or
perhaps the qualities and all the accidents proceed also from each 15
substance. Hence the intellect which knows1 the substance * * * 396
and becomes acquainted with the accidents on a higher level by
means of the logos of the substance.
But the problem before us is: How does the soul know1 both? – the
<forms> without matter, I mean, and the enmattered. Indeed, as has
been said, <it knows> both by means of the logoi in itself,397 but the
former as coordinate with those in itself or even as superior, and the
latter as effects. But those in abstraction are in a way the same as 20
the enmattered forms, but they are thought of in themselves, that is,
not with their matter: since they neither subsist separately, nor are
they thought of as having been given separate substantial existence.
But when we know1 them with their matter, then <we know them>
as enmattered, but when as forms alone, knowing1 that they subsist
in matter and not otherwise, then as a result of <ex> abstraction.
‘Is it that it is aware of <krinei> the matterless and the enmattered 25
by different <powers>, or by <the same> in a different state,398 and
again of the things in matter and those resulting from abstraction, or
by the same <power> and in the same state?’ Or perhaps both are
true.399 For (a) it is the same thing that is aware of differences, what
is intellective <noêtikon>, I mean, and in the same state. <For it does
it> by means of its own logoi. And (b) <it does it> by <powers>
different in a way and in a different state, since either it is conscious
of <theôrei> its own logoi as causes, when from them it is conscious 30
of the enmattered, or <it is conscious of them> as coordinate with the
matterless, or even as effects of the intellective400 forms, and in this
way they <the logoi> are made different and in a different state. And
in general in the same way that things <pragmata> are separable
from matter, so also are the <things> connected with intellect <sepa- 34,1
rable from intellect>, both Aristotle401 and Theophrastus declare402 –
either showing this, that just as enmattered forms are separated from
matter in thought only and are cognised <krinetai> by this with a
different <power> and in a different state, as being set apart in
thought alone, so also the forms are separated from the potential
5 intellect in thought alone, since in reality <kat’ ousian> it always
exists together with the forms. So that we may understand also how
it is said to be potential and nothing actually, because <the forms are
separated from it> in thought alone – either then they mean this (for
it is in this way that Plutarch interprets them), or403 because just as
with the things separate from matter, some are really separate like
those without matter, but others in thought <alone> like those in
10 abstraction, so too both are thought of, the former as really separate,
the latter, even if they too are separated in thought, yet would not be
subsisting otherwise than enmattered.
Or <perhaps it is> rather that we must deal with the <things>
about the intellect in the same way as we treat of the separate and
matterless, so that we may understand ‘separate’ not with regard to
thought but in its primary sense.404 For just as matterless forms are
really separate, so also is the intellect separate: for it is necessary for
15 the matterless forms to subsist before the enmattered, and also to
subsist in the realm of intellect, in that they are indivisible and as
wholes through wholes405 are full of life and of unified knowledge1; for
lifelessness and ignorance are through <kata> privation, and priva-
tion is in the mixture with matter. Since therefore the <forms>
without matter are intellective, it is clear that they are actually in
the intellect. And the intellect itself is both without matter and
essentially joined with <sunousiôtai> the forms which are without
20 matter, if at least both its life and its knowledge1 reverting into itself
and finding the entities in itself are indivisible. But since even among
the things that are really separate and without matter there is some
distinction with regard to descent <kath’ hupobasin> – for some are
entirely indivisible, but others are with some unfolding,406 and others
are intermediate as being indivisible and yet definitive of those being
unfolded407 – so also the intellect is primarily separate, that in
actuality, but secondarily the potential which is participated in by
25 soul, and the rational <soul> itself. For this too, even if with unfold-
ing, yet also brings together and is brought together into the indivis-
ible, and both begins <to act> of itself and also contemplates the
entities in itself: this too then is separate and is full of the separate
logoi.
Translation 45
Return to ‘potential’
And Theophrastus again suggests most philosophically that the
statement that the intellect is things both potentially and actually408 30
must also409 be taken in the appropriate way, in order that we should
not understand ‘potential’, as with matter, in the sense of privation,
nor ‘actually’ in the sense of an external and passive perfecting, but
neither also as in the case of sense-perception,410 where the projection 35,1
of the logoi occurs by means of the movement of the sense-organs, and
this411 is contemplative of external objects; but both the ‘potential’ and
the ‘actual’ of the intellect’s being things are to be taken in an
intellective sense: ‘actual’ with regard to <its> indivisible unity and
inviolable determination and unified perfection – for intellect’s being
things is to be taken in an intellective sense: ‘actual’ with regard to
<its> indivisible unity and inviolable determination and unified
perfection – for the intellect in actuality is things not by participation 5
nor dividedly, nor as other, but also not as being determined or made
perfect by them: but as itself being things and the determination of
all and their perfection412 – but the ‘potential’ by way of the conjunc-
tion with otherness and the descent into what is being determined in
a way and being made perfect, with the otherness appearing more
obviously in the case of the rational soul, as is shown also by its <mode 10
of> contemplation, being brought together with the objects of knowl-
edge1 with unfolding, neither itself being entirely divided up nor being
at a distance from things: for <otherwise> it would not have been
brought together into the indivisible, nor would it of its own accord
and in itself have contemplated the objects of knowledge1; but <it is>
as it were having its union with things loosened. Hence also it is
dependent on that which is inviolably united, and in this way it is 15
potential. Further, this loosening is more obvious in the case of the
soul,413 but <it is> still also <there> in the case of the intellect which
is participated in by it <the soul>, being both participated in through
its descent and suspended from its united and entirely indivisible
determination <horos>,414 and being essentially perfected by it;
hence415 ‘potentially’. But since it itself <the participated intellect> is
also undivided and not at a distance nor through complete otherness,
has descended from the First,416 for this reason it is perfected neither 20
as moved by something else nor as <perfected> by something else,
but perfecting itself and by means of the determining power of that
<the intellect in actuality>, as being in a secondary way what that is,
and united with that also by way of some secondary union. This, then,
is the appropriate sense in which, in the case of the intellect, the word
‘potentially’ must be taken. And it seems to me that, <when he> here
too makes the distinction: ‘we ought to take it in an appropriate
sense’, <he is> glancing at the tablet with no writing on it which is 25
adduced somewhere here by Aristotle417 as a simile for the potential
intellect, in order that we should regard also the ‘with no writing on
it’ as being in <that> intellect,418 which on the one hand has the forms
essentially and has them perfect, but, on the other, is being perfected
by the First Intellect and being actually written upon. For the
indivisibility and unity of perfection are from there. ‘Potentially the
30 potential intellect is its objects’, as on the one hand by descent and
with some otherness, but <on the other as> aroused from itself into
the indivisible perfection from the First Intellect: for such is the
intellective ‘potential’. ‘But it is in actuality nothing before it
thinks’,419 that is, not indivisibly nor in union, until it has been made
36,1 perfect by the First; but ‘before’, even if it applies to the soul, yet it
must not be understood in any way temporally, in the case of the
participated420 intellect at least, but with regard to its inferior position
and its separation in thought and with regard to its special nature.
For as being inferior and as itself, the potential intellect is not yet
actuality,421 but in that422 it is joined to the First, being perfected by
5 it or rather perfecting itself in accordance with that, <it is actuality>.
Relations between the thinker and the thought

Following these matters, <Theophrastus> sets out the views of Aris-
totle, in which that writer brings the separate and matterless into
identity with intellect, but <says that> in the enmattered each of the
intelligibles exists <only> potentially, and the intellect is not actually
present in these things. <Then Theophrastus> makes further distinc-
tions about what is said and adds some problems.423 So therefore that
we may grasp these things also more clearly, we must give a prelimi-
10 nary analysis of the words of Aristotle424 as far as is possible in a few
words. ‘Since’, he says, ‘some are in matter and some are without
matter’ – such as the incorporeal and separate entities – ‘in those
which are separate the thinker and the thought are one and the same.’
For both the intellect, not being extended outside but remaining in
itself, thinks things: hence it is the same as its objects: and also all
15 the things without matter, being indivisible and full of life and
knowledge1, are as a matter of fact intellective; since also the objects
of sense on the one hand, through their being torn apart by matter,
are capable of being sensed by others, but some of them are in no way
able to be sensed by themselves, but the things without matter, on
the other, being objects of intellect, differ also in this way from the
objects of sense in not having been torn apart from that which thinks
nor being made perfect from outside, but being perfectly thought from
themselves. Hence even as thinkers, being still undivided, they are
united indivisibly also with that which thinks, and as wholes through
20 wholes being objects of thought they are united as wholes through
Translation 47
wholes with the intellect, and being objects of thought not by accident
but essentially <kat’ ousian>, and being perfect essentially, and for
this reason also perfect in their own essence <kata tên oikeian
ousian>, the objects of thought and the thinkers would be one and the
same: so that actually in themselves they would be both objects of
thought and perfect objects of thought.
But Aristotle has reminded us from the case of knowledge2 also
that in the things which are separate the thinker and the thought are 25
one and the same. ‘For speculative <theôrêtikê> knowledge2,’ he says,
‘and that which is known2 in this way are one and the same’425 – that
is, because knowledge2, although not being entirely extended outside,
but remaining in itself and working within, yet in fact is conscious
<theôrêtikê> of things, and what is known2 in this way is the same
<as the knower>. For since we say that both <the forms> that are in
matter and those that are in abstraction are objects of knowledge2, 30
with knowledge2 being conscious of them not as coordinate but as from
the logoi in itself which are their causes, making distinctions in
relation to these he says ‘what is known2 in this way’ – that is, what
is known2 as coordinate, and such is what is causative even in the
soul itself, and it is this that is the same as knowledge2. Indeed even
in the case of sense-perception it has been said already that knowl-
edge1 is not completed in any other way than when the knowledge1 35
in actuality comes to be identical with that which it knows1 in
actuality; so that also the knowledge2 in actuality is the same as that 37,1
which it knows2 in actuality: but the difference is that that which
is the primary object of knowledge1 has not come from outside and
does not lie outside as in the case of sense-perception. But if
therefore knowledge2 and the object of knowledge2 are identical,
even more so, surely are the thinker <to nooun> and the thought
united.
Why are we not always thinking?

Hence also with good reason he <Aristotle> indicated in the middle 5
as worthy of enquiry and consideration: ‘Why ever then are we not
always thinking, at least if both the thinker and the thought are in
us? For both are the same.’426 About this we earlier enquired in the
way that was possible for us.427 To sum up, in things which are
separate <from matter>, the thinker and the thought are one and the
same, as has been said: but in things with matter each of the
intelligibles exists potentially. For the enmattered are not intelligi- 10
bles in themselves, nor essentially, nor coordinately with the intel-
lect. In what way, then is ‘potentially’ used? For if <they are>
potentially <objects of thought>, they will also be actually objects of
thought at some time. Or rather they will be, but not coordinately,
but in accordance with their own causes <aitia (pl.)>428 in the intellect.
And since they are of the same property <idiotês> as their causes,
they are said also to be intelligible, but potentially, because they are
<intelligible> to the transcendent thinker, but by way of the transcen-
15 dent cause, and not to themselves; for they do not think themselves.
Hence he <Aristotle> also brings in: ‘so that the intellect does not
exist in them’, meaning the enmattered, because they are not objects
of thought to themselves, since they are enmattered, but the intellect
is without matter; ‘for <it is> without matter’, he <Aristotle> says,
‘<that> the intellect is the potentiality of such things.’429 Here ‘without
matter’ indicates the matterless <nature> of the intellect; but the
intellect is the potentiality of the enmattered either (a) as cause of
20 their actualisations (thus Plutarch) or (b) as contemplating them not
coordinately but on a higher level, because from a cause; or (c) the
potential intellect is the potentiality of such things also, as thinking
of these also in accordance with its perfecting from the superior.430
So, the intellect does not exist in the enmattered, but in it the
intelligible will exist.431 And having set this out Theophrastus adds:
‘But whenever these things <the enmattered> have come into being
25 and been thought, clearly it <the intellect> will possess them, but <it
will possess> the intelligibles always, if indeed speculative knowl-
edge2 is the same as things, and this is obviously <knowledge> in
actuality: for that is its most proper state.’ ‘In the intellect’, he says,
‘the intelligibles’ – that is the matterless – ‘always exist’, since it
coexists with them essentially and is what the intelligibles are. ‘But
the enmattered, when they have been thought, they will also exist in
30 intellect’,432 not as going to be thought coordinately by it; for the
enmattered <are> never <thought in this way> by the intellect which
is without matter. But whenever the intellect knows1 the things in it
not as themselves only but as causes of the enmattered, then the
enmattered will exist in the intellect also by means of their cause. I
would not say that these things had been said about the intellect in
actuality (for that is not a potentiality), nor the words ‘Whenever they
come into being.’433
Notes
1. This title is found in all the MSS, and is repeated at the head of the following
section at 23,1-2. Priscian’s subject is Theophrastus’ lost work De Anima <On the
Soul>, which was itself concerned with Aristotle’s work of the same name. ‘Para-
phrase’ is the word used for the rather similar works of Themistius. The Greek
word used here is metaphrasis, which is also used by Photius cod. 74 (I 153, Henry
= 52a, 15-19 Bekker) of those works of Themistius, and there seems to be no
difference in meaning. References to the De Anima (DA) which follow are to
Aristotle.
2. aisthêsis covers both ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’, as well as ‘sense-perception’;
these terms will be used as appropriate. Similarly the verbs ‘to perceive’ and ‘to
sense’ will be used for aisthanesthai, and also sometimes ‘to be aware’.
3. At DA 2.5 418a3-5 Aristotle says that at the time when that which is capable
of sensation is affected it is not like its object, but when it has been affected it has
become like, and is such as, its object. Theophrastus asks how this comes about.
Priscian’s answer draws upon a number of concepts: (a) the object of sense, (b) the
effect made by it on the sense-organ, (c) the form and the logos of the object, (d) the
life of the living being that has the sense, (e) the logos within the living being, (f)
the image which links the logos with the sense to produce sensation, (g) the form
resembling the sense-object, which is in the life of the living being. Only (a), (b)
and (c) derive directly from Aristotle and Theophrastus, and the relationship
between the logos in (c) and that in (e) is puzzling. At 3,5 it seems to be (g) that is
a likeness of (c), and at 7,16 (e) is that by which judgment occurs. At 4,28 the status
of the ‘sensitive’ form is unclear. See the discussion there. There is a short account
of Priscian’s system in C. Steel, The Changing Self, ch. 10, (henceforth CS).
4. DA 2.5 416b33-5; 418a5-6.
5. Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, p. 65 n. 61 thinks
that the term used here, homoiôsis, is Theophrastus’ own, but that exomoiôsis and
its related verb, used at 1,4 (not 2), 7 and 8 are Priscian’s. See also 1,14 and 4,11.
At De Sensu 19, Theophrastus says that the word homoios, ‘like’, is vague (aoristos).
6. See Baltussen, ibid. 64.
7. The reference to the soul is more appropriate to Priscian than to Theophras-
tus. The sentiment of the rest may come from Theophrastus.
8. DA 2.12 424a22-3. There is no obvious reason why ‘tastes’ here replaces
Aristotle’s ‘taste’. Shape is an addition to Aristotle’s list.
9. Or, ‘like colour and tastes and sound and shape’.
10. This could mean that Theophrastus thought this notion was absurd, or that
he believed that Aristotle held it, but rejected it himself. Caution is necessary with
atopon: Baltussen (as yet unpublished) has argued that it need mean no more that
‘strange’.
11. It is not clear whether this is Theophrastus or Aristotle. Aristotle <DA 2.12
424a17-31> says that sense can receive form without matter, and in accordance
50 Notes to pp. 9-10
with the logos of the object. Theophrastus was accepting these remarks and may
have repeated them.
12. Priscian is here following Aristotle, DA 2.12 424a26-31. For Simplicius form
was a unity that embraced many logoi, cf. in DA 12,22-3; 92,16-18; 113,20-1. That
view is not to be found in Priscian. (Henceforth ‘Simpl.’ alone will be used to refer
to the commentary on the DA traditionally ascribed to Simplicius. That fact should
not be taken to imply any views about whether this commentary is by Priscian
himself.) Between 19,6 and 21,8 only ‘ratio’ is an appropriate translation for logos,
but after that Priscian introduces a different interpretation. No single English
word is appropriate in every case. I therefore keep logos, except where ‘ratio’ or
‘reason’ or ‘account’ is clearly required. Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human
Morals (London and Ithaca N.Y., 1994) p. 48, shows the influence of the Middle
Platonist view found in Alcinous/Albinus’ Didascalicus ch. 4 of logoi as concepts of
later Neoplatonists, including Olympiodorus in Phaedonem 11.7; 12.1, lines 9-25
and Damascius in Phaedonem Part 1,274, Part 2,15 as well as Priscian, but he
admits that logoi can also be norms and be actively creative.
13. 1,3-8 = Theophrastus 273 FHSG (first part). Baltussen (as in n. 5), 64-5,
compares this section with other aspects of Theophrastus’ views.
14. See n. 20 below. Anything associated with bodies, including the form here
discussed, is thought of as divided up in a way that contrasts with the unity of
higher entities.
15. cf. Simpl. 125,25-7.
16. That of soul. For neusis see CS 61 n. 32. The word, along with rhopê, is also
used frequently by Simpl.? in DA. (Steel refers to the author of this in DA as
Priscian. He may be right, but this usage can be confusing.) Both terms ‘indicate
the declining of the soul towards the body’, probably following Iamblichus. Plotinus
already used neusis similarly: see I.1.12, 21-8. ‘The use of these terms seems to
suggest that the tendency of the soul downward is inherent in its nature.’ But
sunneusis is upwards.
17. For sumplêrotikê (completive) see A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism
(Oxford, 1990) pp. 86-92. All Imperial philosophers used the jargon-term sum-
plêrotikê (sc. tês ousias) for an attribute which completes the existence or substance
of some object. Here sensation is such an attribute. Lloyd’s account is difficult,
matching the difficulty of his subject-matter. To put it shortly, a substance on any
level can exist only as a complete thing with all its essential attributes, and each
of these is completive of it. See also John Ellis, ‘Alexander’s Defense of Aristotle’s
Categories’, Phronesis 29 (1994) pp. 70, 83-8.
18. cf. Simpl. 125,28-9.
19. ‘Imagination’ is a suitable term in this connection for phantasia, the faculty
between sense and reason.
20. Reading katatetagmenon with several MSS. For this interpretation see
Lloyd, as in n. 17, p. 65. katatetagmenos ‘was understood in the same way by
Porphyry and all his Neoplatonic successors. It indicates the universal, that is the
genus or the species as it is “in” the species or individual respectively’. Here it is
equivalent to ‘divided up around bodies’ in line 10 above. Bywater’s katatetamenon
would mean ‘extended’, but applied to the sense-organ it is inappropriate, and it is
redundant, in view of the following clause, if applied to the faculty.
21. cf. Simpl. 202,3-5; 214,21-2; and 24,24-7 below.
22. The following passage as far as 2,14 is almost identical with Simpl. 125,30-
126,3.
23. Reading Wimmer’s emendation hama. The MSS have mia, which would give
‘without as one thing also being active’.
Notes to pp. 10-11 51
24. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.219 attributes to Theophras-
tus, among others, an analysis of sensation and imagination in terms of motions,
which is developed further in what follows.
25. ‘Representative image’ stands for emphasis, a word that recurs throughout
Priscian’s account. In earlier philosophers it means sometimes ‘reflection’, some-
times ‘appearance’, but here it is the lowest manifestation of life in the ensouled
organism (Steel). At 15,8 and 20 there is a different kind of emphasis which is
thought to occur in reflections.
26. This renders the touto aisthêsis of the MSS HM2P: BLM1QV have toutôn:
Bywater, following Simpl. 125,37 preferred touto hê.
27. krisis and the verb krinein have a basic meaning of ‘discriminate’ or ‘judge’.
See R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, pp. 35-6 and 58. But in many
cases in this work the emphasis seems to be on the part played by consciousness
in cognition. It is this that turns mere effects in a sense-organ into cognition. What
discriminates must be conscious or aware, and so I have used ‘awareness’ and ‘be
aware’ for these words in most cases.
28. See n. 98 for alternative ways of translating energeia.
29. See n. 17 above; this life is that of the living being, but also of the soul as
the source of that life. See also 3,11-13 below.
30. This is difficult; the pronoun is feminine, and grammatically should look
back to aisthêsis (sensation) in line 23, or possibly to zôê (life) in line 25, though
that is difficult coupled with zôtikê (vital); it may then refer to soul, concealed in
the adjective behind ‘of the soul’ in line 25. The whole perhaps means that the form
is projected by the soul. Other occurrences of probolê in Priscian are not helpful,
and usually it is a logos that is projected. See n. 36. It should be noted that the
alternative reading prosbolê (application) instead of probolê (projection) has had
considerable support.
31. For this term see Lloyd, as in n. 17, pp. 126-30, for a full discussion of
reversion, and p. 160 for its relation to knowledge. Reverting towards higher
entities is the opposite of declining towards body. For divided forms see Lloyd p.
162. But what Priscian is saying here is simply that the form of a sensible object
is divided up round the sense-organ. To be known, even at the level of sensation,
there must be consciousness of its unity, achieved by reversion. For reverting into
oneself see 22,6 and n. 258.
32. Wimmer read meros, meaning ‘part’.
33. Simpl. 126,9-12.
34. Simplicius, using a poetic term, refers to the ‘straitened’ (apestenômenên)
unity of these individuals.
35. Bywater follows Simplicius in reading epharmozôn. The MSS reading
epharmozon would have ‘the one’ as its subject, and could be intransitive. For
epharmozein see H.J. Blumenthal in The Criterion of Truth, p. 259.
36. Steel, CS p. 138, discusses various uses of proballesthai and related terms.
Here the logos in the soul is projected from the soul to connect with the likeness of
the form of the object which is in the sense-organ.
37. We might say ‘activated’. See n. 61 below.
38. Reading sunthesis with the MSS instead of Bywater’s sunesis <under-
standing>, which is perhaps supported by Ficino’s cogitatio, and the occurrence of
sunesis at line 16 below. sunthesis would mean the combining of various data of
sense, so as to be aware of the objects with which they are connected.
39. level of reality.
40. autou is ambiguous as between ‘the form’s’ and ‘the object’s’. The latter is
more probable.
41. cf. Simpl. 165,4-5; 126,4; Plotinus IV 3,26,30; 6,1,1-36.
42. Steel, CS pp. 133 and 140, says that the soul has these ‘ideal concepts’ in its
essence which must always be objects of knowledge. He thinks the idea comes from
Iamblichus.
43. See Steel, CS pp. 125-9, for this widespread use of horos. Here it is life which
determines and perfects the living being. In C. Steel and F. Bossier, ‘Priscianus
Lydus en de “in De Anima” van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius’ in Tijdschrift voor filosofie
34 (1972) p. 772 n. 26, it is said that horos is the fundamental concept of the
hierarchical relations between levels. The absolute intellect is the horos of all forms
<eidê>; cf. Simpl. 217,26. The relationship between the different levels of being is
that higher beings in a way always regulate the activity of lower ones.
44. The reading of some MSS would give: ‘but in the sense-organ is <the
likeness> incomplete and mixed with a passive effect, and the activity’.
45. Simpl. 126,14-16.
46. Simpl. 196,22-3; cf. 198,35-199,5.
47. Literally, ‘otherness’. But the metaphysical sense of that term seems
inappropriate here; cf. 5,13 below. In this sentence, logos must mean ‘reason’, and
its activity is on an empirical level.
48. 3,27-9 = end of Theophrastus 273 FHSG.
49. While this seems to be using the standard coupling of dunamis and energeia,
it is also making the point that one can only know about dunameis from energeiai,
and it is because sensation involves energeiai that we can call it a faculty. Cf. DA
2.4 415a16-20; 1.1 402b10-14.
50. Translating the apo of the MSS. Bywater preferred hupo – ‘produced by’.
51. Sens. 7 448a2-6; cf. DA 3.2 426b29-427a8.
52. Reading Bywater’s addition allôi, supported by Ficino’s alia.
53. 3.34-4.2 = Theophrastus 274 FHSG.
54. Above, 3,25.
55. tupos was used by Stoics and Epicureans to mean ‘impression’, but here
‘form’ in the sense of shape is appropriate.
56. For what follows see Simpl. 127,9-14.
57. The special objects are qualities perceived by one sense each, like colour,
odour, flavour, and sound; the common are common to two or more senses, like
shape, motion, and number.
58. cf. 19,7-13 below. Priscian is arguing that while some common objects are
known by sense, others are known by thought. Of those he mentions here only
number is given by Aristotle as such a common object, but both time and being (or
substance or essence or existence) raise related problems, as belonging in a way to
sense-objects. Priscian then asks how thought is made like its objects, either with
or without being affected by them. Instead of answering he suggests that perhaps
no kind of awareness is by means of a passive effect, not even sense. There is a
further discussion of common objects at 21,16.
59. The view that logoi are projected from the effect in the sense-organ seems
to be different from the one, expressed e.g. at 3,3-9, 16-17, and 7,14-15, that it is
the soul that projects them. Here we seem to have (a) a logos of sensible objects,
which can be fitted to a sensitive form (but see n. 60), and (b) a logos aware of (or
that discriminates) sensible qualities, which enables the faculty cognitive of the
substance/essence of sensible objects to get to know that. Both logoi are projected
upwards to dianoia. See also 19,6-14.
60. This follows Bywater’s reading eidei for the ei de of the MSS, which would
give: ‘adapted to the object of sense as its own, and if ’. That is ungrammatical, and
some change is called for. But it should be noted that ‘form’ <eidei> is not in the
original.
61. It is only here that this word is used of logos on the level of sensation. It is
used frequently about phantasia, and once (21,27) of nous. On my interpretation
Priscian is here describing an unrealised possibility. Contrast the use of diegei-
romenos at 3,4 of the logos projected from the soul, as opposed to this one projected
from the effect on the sense-organ.
62. This renders Bywater’s suggestion enargôs for the incomprehensible read-
ings of the MSS.
63. The MSS have de, dê, and de dê here. But the singular form auto de touto is
itself puzzling. Presumably it refers to one or other of the common sensibles.
64. cf. DA 2.10 422a20-1; Simpl. 134,35-135,4.
65. cf. Simpl. 189,23-8, an account in simple language of how the eyes may try
to see, and be aware of the effect.
66. See 3,26 and n. 47 above.
67. cf. Sens. 7 449a17-19.
68. Bywater took lines 19-21 to be a quotation from Theophrastus. He may be right.
69. Simpl. 136,8-15, 20-4.
70. peisis, found here, and in lines 4 and 6, was originally a medical term, which
is to be contrasted with pathos in line 10. Both are effects, but of different kinds,
peisis being the result of the activity of forms.
71. cf. DA 2.12 424a28-32; 3.2 426a30-b2
72. Neoplatonists developed the triad being <ousia>, life <zôê>, and intellect
<nous> from Plato’s Sophist 248E-249A and Timaeus 39E. Cf. Iamblichus ap.
Proclum in Tim. III 45,8-11 = in Tim. Fr. 65 Dillon. But the notion of divine life
encompassing thought comes also from Aristotle, Metaphysics 7, 1072b18-30,
where God as thinker and God as living are considered. For the notion that a life
may contain the causes of sensible objects see 33,6-11.
73. These can hardly be phosphorescent things, but must be creatures with
‘search-light’ eyes. See Sextus Empiricus, PH I 45.
74. See Sens. 3 439b1-14. Colour is there defined as ‘the limit of the transparent
in a body that is bounded’. We need not think of the rainbow effects of prisms. See
also DA 2.7 418a31-b10.
75. cf. Simpl. 129,30-1; 135,35; Plato, Timaeus 67C; below 8,22.
76. cf. Simpl. 132,29-31.
77. Or, ‘has such a share of ’.
78. cf. DA 2.7 419a12-14.
79. cf. Philoponus in DA 354,14-16 (Theophrastus 277C FHSG). But there it is
colours that are conveyed, while here it seems to be sight. Themistius also uses the
word colour at PDA 62, 11. Todd points out that it is also used by Plato at Symp.
202e3, but that is of Eros as intermediary between gods and men.
80. cf. Simpl. 128,24-9; 165,1-6; 189,34-190,21, a long and technical account.
81. For an examination of the influence of Iamblichus in what precedes see P.M.
Huby, ‘Priscian of Lydia as Evidence for Iamblichus’ in The Divine Iamblichus, pp. 8-9.
82. The way in which Theophrastus carries out this programme is indicated by
Baltussen (as in n. 5) pp. 62-3.
83. ‘immediately’: the Greek is autothen, which replaces amesos (also ‘immedi-
ately’) in 5.21. For that reason ‘immediately’ is preferable here to the ‘spontane-
ously’ which has also been suggested.
84. DA 2.11 423b1-8.
85. DA 2.7 418b5-6.
86. 7,20-8 = Theophrastus 275A FHSG.
87. Sens. 3 439b13.
88. For the following see DA 2.7 418b4-32.
89. Discussed by Baltussen 74, who refers to Theophrastus’ treatment of
Alcmaeon at De Sensu 26.
90. Something is missing. Bywater read ei for the hê of the MSS, without a
lacuna. His text would give: ‘But if earth too is related to (kata) fire, nay even’, but
the grammar is awkward, and one would expect more in view of lines 14-23 below.
91. Aristotle Sens. 3 439a30, b11-12. 8,1-9 above = Theophrastus 278 FHSG.
Aristotle thinks that all compound bodies have an admixture of the transparent
elements, air, water, and fire, and that their colour is the boundary not of the bodies
themselves, but of their transparent ingredients.
92. The language of what follows shows that this must be Priscian speaking.
The word phôtourgos – ‘light-producing’ at 8,15 below is attested by LSJ only for
this passage, and skotopoios – ‘darkness-making’ – only for Priscian and some
scholia. Both words also appear in [Dionysius], Caelesti hierarchia at 7.1 and 8.2,
but are extremely rare.
93. cf. below, 8,23 and 9,11-14, and Simpl. 135,9-10.
94. cf. Simpl. 133,11-13. But that has a different account of earth and dark-
ness/light.
95. Aristotle’s insistence on ‘bounded’ is an attempt to get rid of colourless fluids,
which lack a boundary of their own. He ought also, however, to have got rid of
colourless solids like glass, crystal, and diamond.
96. Bywater here reads hupo for the apo of the MSS. That would give ‘the forms
are not from the elements’.
97. Theophrastus here takes up Aristotle’s claim at DA 2.7 418b9-10 that light
is the actualisation of the transparent qua transparent.
98. In this and following passages the word energeia, while often translated
‘actuality’, or ‘actualization’, sometimes seems to call rather for ‘activity’. See J.F.
Finamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’ in The Divine Iamblichus, p.
56, and S. Sambursky, ‘Philoponus’ Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Light’ in
Osiris 13 (1958) pp. 114-17.
99. Discussed in Baltussen 74-5.
100. 8,29-9,7 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG (second part).
101. J. F. Finamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’ in The Divine
Iamblichus, p. 62 n. 9 thinks that this passage suggests that Priscian thought that
light travels.
102. For the following compare Simpl. 131,38-132,2, but he does not mention
Iamblichus and is much compressed, and the vocabulary is different. Iamblichus
in fact held a very complicated view of light which is not reflected in Priscian. See
J.F. Finamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’ in The Divine Iam-
blichus, pp. 55-64 and n. 101. See also Huby pp. 9-10 and n. 81.
103. Bywater notes that some MSS omit ‘like the Peripatetics’, and others place
it after ‘any kind of body’; he hints that it may be a gloss. Could the sense be: ‘like
the Peripatetics I want it not to be body’? It could be argued that Strato of
Lampsacus held that light was a body (Frr. 65a and 86 Wehrli), but most Peripatet-
ics did not.
104. Some MSS have autokheiristôs for auto khôristôs. That would mean ‘by its
own power’.
105. cf. Themistius, in Phys. 197,4-8 = Theophrastus 155B FHSG; Simpl. in
Phys. 998,13-16.
106. cf. Simpl. 132,13-14. He speaks of the perfecting of the transparent in
131,16-32. The word teleiotês is not used by Aristotle in this connection.
107. This is a typical idiom of Iamblichus. I owe the interpretation to Carlos
Steel.
108. This probably means that there is no passive effect in the case of light and
the transparent. Here again sometimes ‘actuality’ and sometimes ‘activity’ seems
appropriate.
109. DA 2.7 418b14-17.
110. Baltussen p. 72 refers to the treatment of Empedocles at De Sensu 8 and
15.
111. 9,30-3 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG (third part). Baltussen p. 72 explains ‘as
is natural’ as ‘in accordance with its natural character of being the colour of light
in the transparent’, but light can hardly be the colour of light.
112. Baltussen p. 72 perhaps goes too far in saying that Priscian here ‘explains’
what Theophrastus meant. Rather he conjectures that Theophrastus meant some-
thing that fits in with his own views.
113. 10,3-5 = Theophrastus 278 fourth part.
114. cf. [Aristotle] Col. 1 791b3, though there darkness actually is the privation
of light. H.B. Gottschalk, ‘The De Coloribus and its Author’, Hermes 92, pp. 83-5,
argues that this work is by Theophrastus.
115. DA 2.7 419a23-5.
116. DA 2.7 419a20.
117. See n. 92 above.
118. DA 2.7 418b11.
119. Reading horaton for the horatou <‘of the visible’> of the MSS; cf. DA 2.10
422a16-17. The argument is: (a) light is the cause of colours being seen, but light
itself is (a) colour, being the colour of the transparent, therefore colour is the cause
of colours being seen; (b) light is the cause of visibles being seen, but light itself is
visible, therefore the visible is the cause of visibles being seen.
120. Baltussen p. 64 n. 59 points to Theophrastus’ interest in a general
explanation.
121. 10,13-17 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG fifth part.
122. cf. Philoponus, in DA 354,14-15 = Theophrastus 277C FHSG. Philoponus
says that Theophrastus coined the word translated ‘transsonant’. See also n. 178.
123. cf. Simpl. 135,25-136,2 on DA 2.7 419a6-7: Aristotle does not give the reason
why some things are not seen in light, but it is clearly because the primary visible
is light and the bright thing that gives off light. So the latter is itself visible and
through its light is a cause of the visibility of the transparent and the things seen.
But the things that do not have brightness of a kind to give off light are not the
cause of others being seen, but are themselves seen through their brightness and
in darkness only, because when illuminated by light they cannot show forth their
own brightness. So the causes of light are (1) the bright, (2) light and the
transparent in actuality, and (3) coloured things; these are perfected by light by
way of their own kinship, whether colours are lights of a kind (according to Plato),
or limits of the bounded transparent. This appears to be the position introduced
here with ‘someone may say’, and criticised by someone else at 11,1. Whether the
latter is Priscian himself is not clear, but it is likely that he is opposing a view held
by the writer of the ‘Simplicius’ commentary, and therefore not that writer himself.
He does go on at 11,5 to suggest an alternative to the criticism he has just
expressed, but at 11,11-12 the words ‘the primary visible, which, you know, we say
to be light’ may be emphatic, contrasting his own view with that of 10,31 above,
where ‘that which shines’ is coupled with light. For ‘obscure lights of a kind’, see
also 6,26.
124. The general topic is discussed at length by Aristotle, Sens. 7 447a14-27.
The word translated ‘sound’ here, psophos, is not in the MSS, which rather
confusedly refers to light, but was plausibly inserted by Bywater.
125. Presumably the transparent.
126. This follows the reading of several MSS, but others have boulomenous
instead of boulomenos. Either reading is difficult. I also read diateinôn here for
Bywater’s diateinein and the dia tinôn of most MSS in line 16. The text appears to
be corrupt and other possibilities exist.
127. DA 2.7 418a31-b1; 419a13-14.
128. DA 2.7 418b15; Sens. 3 440a20; Theophrastus, De Sensu 1.
129. Keeping the reading of some MSS to de. Others have ta de.
130. cf. Theophrastus, De Sensu 5.
131. 11,14-20 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG sixth part.
132. The lacuna follows Bywater’s reading. He also, following some MSS and
earlier editors, deleted meinai (to remain) after ‘<must> not’. The sense is unlikely
to be altered, whatever the reading.
133. DA 2.7 419a16.
134. This cannot be the transparent (see above 8,5-30). Priscian does not see the
transparent as a body, and it must be air or water.
135. DA 2.7 419a25-30.
136. The tongue and the object being tasted. At 13,21-2 below the example of
honey is given.
137. DA 2.10 422a13-14.
138. DA 2.7 419a13-15.
139. cf. Simpl. 136,26-8.
140. cf. Simpl. 132,13-15; 136,8.
141. epokheisthai frequently means ‘riding upon’, but the image seems inappro-
priate; the sense is revealed in line 25: colour uses the transparent as a substratum.
142. cf. Simpl. 136,8-10; 137,3-5.
143. cf. Simpl. 136,24 (= Theophrastus 279 FHSG) and 37. Simplicius(?) gives
the analogy of a lever transporting the movement of a hand to a block of stone.
144. cf. Simpl. 142,4.
145. Bywater suggested ‘<peri> tauta’ for ‘tauta’ in line 13,7. That would give:
‘but sound is not actually about these <the bodies>’.
146. This follows Bywater’s reading dê for the de of the MSS. With the latter we
would have: ‘but the perfection  movement is <hearing>’.
147. DA 2.7 418a26.
148. cf. Simpl. 137,5; 155,22-3, and below 14,7.
149. DA 2.12 424b15-16.
150. The immediately preceding case is one of taste, and ‘here’ probably refers
to both smell and taste.
151. If the text is sound this must involve an analogy between fire as needing
fuel and something to kindle it, and colour as needing the transparent both as its
matter and as providing light.
152. Since Aristotle nowhere says precisely this, ‘he himself ’ is presumably
Theophrastus.
153. 13,30-14,3 = Theophrastus 278 FHSG seventh part.
154. Democritus supposed that the air between the eye and its object received
an impression to form an image <emphasis>. Theophrastus criticized this in De
Sensu 51-3.
155. Above 4,33-5,4.
156. DA 2.12 424b16-18. Theophrastus’ views on smell are found also in his de
Odor., which opens with the statement that smells are all from mixture, and in
Caus. Plant. 6.1.1, where we have in full what is compressed by Priscian: the
transparent is that which is common to air and water, and it has present in it the
dry ingredient in flavour, which is odour. What is mixed in air or the transparent
should not however be taken to be some kind of effluence, for that view is criticized
at De Sensu 20 (but see also 90), but should probably be taken along with the
statement that the air undergoes some effect.
157. cf. Sens. 6 446b8-9; [Aristotle] de Audibilibus 800a3-4 where this view is
rejected; Probl. 11.23 901b16. Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed p. 16 n. 71 sees a wave
theory of sound here, but appears to be more cautious in ‘From Aristotle to
Brentano’ in Aristotle and the Later Tradition, where at p. 231 n. 18 the reference
to Stobaeus should be to Porphyry, in Ptolemaei Harmonica 1.3 p. 64 = Theophras-
tus 716,88 FHSG. Baltussen (as in n. 5) p. 65 considers Theophrastus’ theory of
hearing. Andrew Barker, ‘Theophrastus on Pitch and Melody’ in Theophrastus of
Eresus On his Life and Work, ed. Fortenbaugh et al., New Brunswick and Oxford,
1985, p. 311, is sceptical about whether Theophrastus held the view that hearing
is due to shape at all. 14,10-12 above = Theophrastus 277A FHSG.
158. 14,16-17 = Theophrastus 276 FHSG.
159. DA 2.7 419a13-b3; 2.11 422b34-423b27; Alex. Aphrod. in Sens. 126,21 =
Strato fr. 114 Wehrli.
160. 14,22-5 = Theophrastus 275B FHSG.
161. Sens. 6 446a24-b6; Simpl. 142, 10-11.
162. Or, ‘for the air to be affected in some way and be set in motion earlier’.
163. Bywater, following Wimmer, wants to delete the last clause, ‘the form 
happening.’ If we keep it, it and the preceding sentence should be seen as making
a more general claim, with sound as a particular case.
164. DA 3.12 435a5-10.
165. Baltussen p. 72 and nn. 96 and 97, discusses the term apotupôsis, but he
does not refer to the fact that the question here is about reflections. Hans
Gottschalk, Strato of Lampsacus: some texts (Proc. of the Leeds Phil. and Lit. Soc.,
Lit. and Hist. Section vol. XI (1965) p. 155) compares Strato’s theory of light –
Fr.133 Wehrli.
166. Timaeus 46AB; Alcibiades 132D-133A; Sophistes 266C.
167. This expression involves a distinction between this representative image,
a shape in the air, and the one connected with life introduced at 2,8. At Div. Somn.
2 464b10 Aristotle uses eidôlon of the reflection seen in water, and relates it to but
distinguishes it from an emphasis. cf. Syrianus, in Metaph. 7,31-2. Eidôlikê
emphasis is found in Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 3.13 (p. 130,3 Parthey) in connection
with false prophecy.
168. 15,6-9 = Theophrastus 277B FHSG first part.
169. The sun’s.
170. The sentence is obscure; probably ‘that’ is ‘that which sees’. An alternative
version is: ‘for the secondary activity belongs to that which <sees and> cooperates,
and to the underlying object which is smooth and shining .’
171. Possibly a reference to 15,13 above.
172. From here to 17,33 = Theophrastus 277B FHSG second part.
173. cf. Theophrastus De Sensu 50-3.
174. See Baltussen p. 64.
175. DA 2.5 416b35-417a2. See Baltussen p. 64 and n.60.
176. DA 2.8 420a3-11.
177. Sens. 2 438a13-15.
178. cf. Alex. Aphrod. in Sens. 88,18-89,5; Philoponus in DA 353,8-12; 354,12-16
= Theophrastus 277C FHSG; Themistius in DA 62,29-32; Simpl. 139,2-5; Arius
Didymus ap. Stobaeum 1.52.9 (vol. 1 p. 484,19-21 Wachsmuth), who attributes
diêkhês to Aristotle. Baltussen is ambivalent here. On p. 65 he accepts that
Theophrastus invented these terms, and (n. 66) refers to his habit of creating
neologisms in botany, but on p. 257 he says that they look like commentators’
jargon. He ignores the use of diêkhês in Stobaeus mentioned above, which Diels
attributed to Arius Didymus. If Diels is correct, this word was supposed to have
been used by Aristotle in the time of Augustus. That seems to be wrong, but at least
the word was already in use and applied to the Peripatetics.
179. DA 2.9 421b9; cf. 2.10 422a8-12.
180. DA 2.5 417a17-20.
181. Compare, about taste, DA 2.10 422b15-17; about smell, Sens. 2 438b21-4.
Baltussen p. 77 relates these ideas to Theophrastus’ De Sensu.
182. Sens. 2 438a12-16.
183. Philoponus, in Phys. 4,20-2 attributes to Theophrastus the view that sight
needs ‘optical pneuma’ (144A FHSG). This is not mentioned in Priscian.
184. This renders Wimmer’s emendation eupilêtoteron, following several MSS
of Sens. 438a16. Most MSS of Priscian have euepilêptoteron or euupolêptoteron,
which might mean ‘more easily enclosed’.
185. See [Aristotle] Probl. 31.29 960a33. But there it is also said that the eye
(omma) is of fire.
186. This appears to disagree with DA 2.9 421b18-19, where it is denied that,
unlike animals, men can smell without respiration. The matter is discussed further
in Sens. 5 442b27-445a16.
187. cf. DA 2.8 420a9-14.
188. Baltussen p. 75 thinks this may be just a careless formulation. But at
16,10-14 above the point seems to be that the eye is made of water, and the
corresponding organ of hearing is made of air.
189. GA 2.6 744a1-3.
190. DA 2.9 421b32-422a3; Sens. 5 444b20-4.
191. DA 2.8 419b19-21.
192. Lines 19-20 are clearly from Theophrastus; 20-2 open with ‘but’, and could
be his reply that even the winds make a noise by falling on the earth, a solid, and
so on. Alternatively it could be Priscian’s comment, but another ‘but’ in line 22
suggests that Priscian comes in here. The following lines are probably corrupt. The
argument seems to begin with the statement of Aristotle that air and hearing are
connatural (DA 2.8 420a4, but at 420a12 the external air is connatural with the
air inside the ears); it passes on to the movement of the external air as the result
of a blow, and appears to raise an objection to these points on the ground that
movement would be perceived but not sound. At 420a9 Aristotle equates sound
with the movement of undispersed air, and at 21 it is the movement of what can
be moved in a certain way. Perhaps Theophrastus or Priscian is objecting to this
account, and perhaps something is here lost. There is a difficulty in how Aristotle
can pass from movement to sound, and Priscian solves it with the ideas of living
movement and form at 17,3 and 5. (At De Sensu 19 Theophrastus said that we do
not sense sound by sound, but that is different.) Simpl. 143,23-31 stresses the
continuity of the air from the initial blow to the actual hearing, and uses the notions
of an organ with life and an acoustic life.
193. Probably the air inside the ear.
194. An alternative is: ‘movement would be perceived as movement, but sound
not as sound’. In any case the problem is how we pass from the movements of the
external and internal air to hearing and sound.
195. ‘The other cases’ must surely be the senses other than hearing. Most likely
the reference is to DA 2.11 423b17-23, where Aristotle deals with all the senses
and denies that something placed actually on the sense-organ would sense it: 7,23-4
above indicates that Theophrastus also held this view.
196. DA 2.8 420a16-17; De Sensu 19; Simpl. 145,11-12.
197. Probably Aristotle. cf. DA 2.7 419a26-31; 2.11 423b20-5.
198. Above 6,27-7,1.
199. DA 2.8 420a26-8.
200. Keeping antilegein estin, which Bywater deletes. Theophrastus contrasts
this mistaken view with the correct one of Aristotle. Baltussen compares CP 6.8.2
ho logos ho antilegomenos.
201. 17,33 concludes Theophrastus 277B FHSG second part.
202. Aristotle, DA 2.10 422a34-b2 actually says: ‘Since what can be tasted is
moist, it is necessary that the organ be neither actually moist nor incapable of being
moistened.’ Priscian’s account looks garbled, but the point is probably to question
Aristotle’s concentration on the moist in the case of taste, when flavour is more
important. What follows may be from Theophrastus, first raising difficulties and
then resolving them.
203. Bywater has added hôs.
204. Sens. 5 442b29.
205. DA 2.10 422a8.
206. DA 2.11 423a11-b26.
207. 18.7-17 = Theophrastus 294 FHSG.
208. I have here followed the MSS readings. Bywater inserted komizesthai
<brought> in line 23, and deleted mê nomizesthai in line 24. That would give: ‘but
by not being brought from outside, but being grown within us’.
209. DA 2.11 422b34-423a21.
210. DA 2.11 424a4-5.
211. DA 424a2-10, but where Aristotle is supposed to have tês aisthêseôs
Priscian has to aisthêtêrion; some MSS of Aristotle, including the important E, are
said by Ross to have tou aisthêtêriou before tês aisthêseôs, though Ross ignores that
and just says that tês aisthêseôs means the organ of touch. This suggests that the
– or one – MS of Aristotle available to Priscian did have tou aisthêtêriou.
212. cf. DA 2.4 416a32.
213. DA 2.12 424a26-8.
214. Here, as in the corresponding passage of Aristotle (note 213), ratio is the
only suitable translation.
215. The Greek words corresponding to ‘known by its attributes and’ are not in
the MSS; an alternative: ‘in the attributes and’ is suggested by Ficino and accepted
by Bywater.
216. Priscian introduces as an alternative a different psychological classifica-
tion, based on Plato, which he does not pursue. cf. Alcinous/Albinus, Didascali-
cus 4.6-7,18,22. Proclus in Tim. 1.246,10-18 divides logos into doxastikos,
epistêmonikos, and noeros: see H.J. Blumenthal in The Criterion of Truth, pp.
270-1.
217. Timaeus 28A and C. cf. Sophist 264B and 30.10-11 below.
218. This appears to be a parenthesis in which the question of how the ousia
(substance) of a body is known is raised. On the first view it is not known separately,
because its existence lies in its properties, but on the second it does exist apart
from them and can be known by opinion. See 4,18-20 above where it is thought,
dianoia, that knows the ousia of objects of sense, which is not apprehensible by the
senses, and n. 59.
219. DA 3.1 424b22-425a8.
220. I owe this interpretation to Carlos Steel. A puzzle is that there is nothing
in Aristotle about knowing the medium: rather he says that things that are sensed
through a medium (are sensed) by the simples, like air and water.
221. The whole sentence is obscure and perhaps corrupt, but the relevant
chapter in Aristotle (n. 219) is also obscure.
222. This may misrepresent Aristotle. At 424b31-3 he has: ‘If through one
several are perceived being different in genus, it is necessary that one who has a
sense-organ of this kind be sensitive to both’. In view of the example of air being of
sound and colour at 424b33-4, ‘through one’ must mean ‘through one medium’ not
‘through one sense-organ’.
223. Inserting tou di’ before amphoin, in accordance with some MSS of, and
commentators on, DA 3.1 425a2-3.
224. The following sections are numbered to indicate how Priscian’s replies are
related to Theophrastus’ questions.
225. Or, ‘with what’.
226. Aristotle here has korê – ‘eye-ball’ or ‘eye-jelly’. Priscian has opsis – ‘sight’,
but at 16,10 he did use korê. I assume that Priscian meant what Aristotle meant.
Further, Aristotle, like Priscian, has osphrêsis, which usually means ‘smelling’, but
must here refer to the organ of smell.
227. cf. DA 3.1 425a3-5.
228. At DA 3.1 425a5-6 Aristotle says that fire is either ‘of no <sense>’ or
common to all, for nothing is capable of sensation without heat. Theophrastus has
telescoped this. G.M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psycho-
logy before Aristotle, London 1917, repr. Amsterdam 1964, p. 34 takes him to mean
that all the sense-organs have heat in common, and some have moisture. It is not
clear how, after talk of air and water, the hot and the moist fit in. For Aristotle air
was hot and wet and water cold and wet, so Theophrastus may be arguing that a
sense-organ, being necessarily hot, cannot be just of water, i.e. cold and wet only.
229. DA 2.12 424a28-31.
230. For Theophrastus’ solution see 21,5-8 below.
231. Long. 5 466a18-19.
232. 19,14-20,9 = Theophrastus 282 FHSG first part.
233. This must be understood in the light of n. 234.
234. For euoristos (easily delimitable) see DGC 2.2 329b31, of the wet and the
dry as delimitable in opposite ways, and Meteor. 2.4 360a23 of steam, 4.1 378b24
of the hot as being capable of being affected, and 4.4 381b29 again of water.
235. Simpl. 174,20-6 has a similar account of air, water, earth and fire.
236. This seems to be a parenthetical question and answer.
237. Aristotle, Sens. 2 437b32-438a3, quotes Empedocles (fr. 84 Diels) to the
effect that the eyes are fiery, but the language is not like Priscian’s. Plato Timaeus
45B gives his own account of the fiery constitution of the eyes. It is unlikely that
Priscian had access to any work of Pythagoras himself, but he could have known
the Pythagorean writings of the first and second centuries A.D.
238. Plato, Rep. 6 508B.
239. Priscian supports Theophrastus’ point in (1).
240. DA 3.1 425a9-10.
241. DA 2.12 424a28; 3.2 426a29-b8. 20,22-5 above = Theophrastus 282 FHSG
second part.
242. Priscian has here passed from an endorsement of what Theophrastus says
in (2) to his own view that a perfect being has all logoi – and intellect.
243. Priscian is attacking (3a).
244. Priscian is replying to (3b), and bringing in his own idea that life is
necessary for sensation.
245. cf. Simpl. 195,9.
246. Theophrastus de Sens. 32. 21,4-8 above = Theophrastus 282 FHSG third
part.
247. Up to this point the sense of logos has been ratio, as in the relevant part
of Aristotle. But now Priscian, responding to Theophrastus’ point (4), develops his
own theory about logos, playing upon the mathematical idea involved but hardly
producing a comprehensible argument.
248. Iamblichus (Simpl. 49,31-4; cf. 219,18-19) said that the life of the ‘heavenly
body’ was kath’ hauto, ‘intrinsic’, not epiktêtôs, as here.
249. DA 3.1 425a13-18.
250. This corresponds to the word skhêma in Aristotle’s list of common sensibles
in the above passage.
251. Wimmer indicated a lacuna here. It is not clear how much is lost, but after
it Priscian appears to be developing his own views, though they may be based on
those of Theophrastus. The final words before the lacuna, ‘when it has not been
determined, I think’ seem to be Priscian’s too. 21,16-20 above = Theophrastus 295
FHSG. Peter Lautner, ‘Rival Theories of Self-awareness in Later Neoplatonism’
BICS 39 = ns 1 (1994) p. 114 takes this to mean that Theophrastus thought it was
impossible to apprehend shape through movement. That is surely going too far.
252. Alteration is one species of movement.
253. DA 3.1 425a24.
254. DA 3.2 425b12-26; Somn. 2 455a13-21.
255. 21,32-22,1 = Theophrastus 296 FHSG first part.
256. Reading hekastê for hekastêi (Steel).
257. cf. DA 3.1 425a31, but that is about common sensibles.
258. cf. Simpl. 187,31-3.
259. cf. n. 31, but reverting into oneself is different from reverting to higher
entities. See Peter Lautner, as in n. 251, pp. 114-15.
260. This follows Bywater’s emendation of a difficult passage.
261. cf. Simpl. 185,35-6.
262. Or, ‘will have some kind of separation from its own organs’.
263. Reading the to of the MSS for Bywater’s tôi.
264. 22,9-14 = Theophrastus 296 FHSG second part.
265. cf. Simpl. 186,6-9.
266. cf. DA 3.2 427a2-5.
267. DA 3.2 426a27. All the MSS of Aristotle have the Greek equivalent of ‘if
concord is voice’, but Ross, using Sophonias and this passage of Priscian, emended
to ‘if voice is concord’. See pp. 278-9 of his edition of the De Anima. Aristotle’s
passage is discussed at length by Andrew Barker in ‘Aristotle on Perception and
Ratios’, Phronesis 26 (1981) pp. 248-66. A.A. Long, ‘The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue’
in Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford 1991, pp. 99-100 n. 6, accepts that the
correct reading of Aristotle is uncertain, but points out that two Aristotelians,
Priscian and Sophonias, ‘saw no difficulty in the thought that the human voice 
is a harmonious sound’.
268. Nothing in this section is attributed to Theophrastus by Priscian, and it
reads like his own comments on a difficult passage of Aristotle. The first part is an
attempt to explain why voice should be seen as concord: it is in terms of the concord
between voice and hearing when they are one, which is not Aristotle’s meaning.
Aristotle’s word logos is avoided by Priscian who uses summetros – proportionate
– and related terms instead, perhaps because his own use of logos is different.
269. Although Aristotle uses apotasis of voice at DA 2.8 420b8, where Ross
interprets it as ‘volume’, comparing HA 5.14 545a15-20, the only other case in
Aristotle, and Hamlyn has ‘pitch’, and Hett ‘compass’, it is used here, as elsewhere,
in a different, Neoplatonic, sense.
270. This may be based on Sens. 4 441b21-3 perhaps with some confusion. After
a reference to potentiality Aristotle says that perception is analogous not to the
acquisition of knowledge but to the exercise of it (theôrein) (Hett’s translation).
271. Of Theophrastus’ Physics. See Introduction.
272. 22,23-4 = Theophrastus 297 FHSG first part.
273. This is an inadequate, but the best available, rendering of phantasia.
274. DA 3.3 427b29-429a9; 3.9 432a30-b3; Insomn. 1 458b30; 459a15-17.
275. 23,4-5 = Theophrastus 297 FHSG second part.
276. DA 3.8 432a9-10.
277. Simpl. 213,25 is like this but not very close. See Blumenthal, ‘The Psycho-
logy of (?) Simplicius’ Commentary on the De Anima’ in (ed.) Blumenthal and Lloyd,
Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism, p. 87. For a discussion of
23,13-25,26 see P.M. Huby, ‘Priscian of Lydia as Evidence for Iamblichus’ in The
Divine Iamblichus, pp. 6-7.
278. The grammar is difficult. Even so Wimmer’s tas tôn heterôn dunameôn for
tais tôn heterôn dunamesin, though it has Ficino’s support, is unnecessary.
279. i.e. bringing into consciousness.
280. For this interpretation compare lines 22-3 below, where the representative
images coming down from the intellect are mentioned.
281. cf. Iamblichus, ap. Proclum in Tim. I 157,6 = in Tim. fr. 17,10 Dillon and
Protrepticus III p. 14,2 Pistelli: the Carmina aurea attributed to Pythagoras refer
to the two-fold in human nature, and the alien creature which has grown beside
us from birth, which some call the many-headed monster, others a mortal form of
life, and others the generative nature.
282. This is the first occurrence of lives in the plural. The doctrine that the soul
when it inclines towards the body brings forth lower lives seems to derive from
Iamblichus. See CS 62.
283. The auta of the MSS is neuter plural and has no obvious antecedent.
Wimmer preferred talla – ‘the others’, and Bywater wonders about atta – ‘some
things’.
284. cf. DA 2.12 424a19.
285. cf. Simpl. 214,18-19.
286. DA 3.3 429a1-2. But there is no mention of forms there.
287. This follows the reading of Bywater and earlier editors. hêi: the MSS all
have ê = ‘or’, which is difficult to understand. But Bywater’s reading is also difficult.
288. Or ‘stimulated’, but that obscures the reference to motion.
289. cf. Simpl. 214,6-8.
290. Here, exceptionally, phantasia must mean the individual mental image.
Theophrastus is following DA 3.3 428a11-12, where Aristotle uses phantasiai in
this way.
291. cf. DA 3.3 425b23-5.
292. 24,20-4 = Theophrastus 299 FHSG.
293. cf. Simpl. 214,20-2.
294. cf. DA 3.8 432a9-10.
295. cf. Simpl. 214,12.
296. cf. Simpl. 214,21.
297. tupoi: see n. 55.
298. cf. Simpl. 215,9-13.
299. What these are is unclear; they connect thinking with facial effects, and
perhaps the turning inwards of the eyes is supposed to involve a scanning of
images, but if so would these images be in our body? And in the next sentence these
bodily parts are treated as inferior to sense-organs.
300. cf. Barlaam de Seminaria, Ethica secundum Stoicos 2.13 PG vol. 151 col.
1362B-C = Theophrastus 447 lines 8-12 FHSG.
301. cf. Simpl. 214,1-2.
302. Gerard Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought, Galway U.P. 1988, p. 35
says that Priscian here returns to reporting Aristotelian and Theophrastean
positions.
303. Watson thinks this reports Theophrastus’ advance on Aristotle. But the
language still seems to be that of Priscian.
304. pneuma as a vehicle connecting the soul with the body plays a frequent but
small role in Neoplatonic psychology. See e.g. Simpl. 213,37-214,4. Is it more than
a coincidence that Theophrastus’ successor Strato (fr. 111 Wehrli) refers to pneuma
in connection with sensing?
305. DA 3.3 428b3-4; Insomn. 2 460b16-20; Simpl. 213,15-20.
306. Bywater noted a single lacuna here, indicated by both sets of stars. It covers
the end of the section on Imagination, the conjectural title, On Intellect, and the
opening of the section on intellect. Bywater suggested that ousiai or dunamei
should be supplied, apparently relying on the use of these words with ‘projective’
at 30,17 and 31,24 below; the former is inappropriate but the latter, meaning
‘power’ is possible. Perhaps we should have ‘in the power projective of a shape such
as ’. Ficino has in talis formae partu iam enititur sibi ipsi sufficere, which may
mean ‘and in the birth of such a form it now produces self-sufficiency’. This may
represent what he read, but the conceit is unlike Priscian, and since he goes on:
pergamus ad reliqua ‘let us go on to the rest’, which cannot have been in Priscian’s
original, and adds more to bridge the gap at the beginning of the section on intellect,
this may all have been just his conjectural addition. The reference back in line 24
may be to 24,7-17, but there it is only images, not shapes, that are projected.
307. This title must have existed in the lacuna together with a passage about
the intellect, perhaps a discussion of Aristotle DGA 2.3 736b28 and 737a7-13, which
is covered in the Themistius passage mentioned in n. 309, at 107,31-2.
308. This is the end of a question about DA 3.4 429a22-4; 429b30-1, as we know
from Themistius.
309. This and following quotations from Theophrastus occur in almost identical
words in Themistius in DA 107,32-108,7 = Theophrastus 307A FHSG. Instead of
‘nor in the same way’ <oude hôsautôs> Themistius has ‘that it is not even itself ’
<hôs oude autos>. Daniel Devereux, ‘Theophrastus and the Intellect’ in Theophras-
tus, His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, RUSCH V edd.
W.W. Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas (New Brunswick and London 1992) pp. 35-6,
suggests reading ouden for oude there, which would give: ‘that it is nothing itself ’.
This is possibly supported by the Arabic version of Themistius. But all this relates
primarily to the question of what Theophrastus wrote, not to our present text. See
also n. 375 below. 25,28-9 = Fr.Ia Barbotin.
310. cf. DA 3.5 430a10-12.
311. That Theophrastus explored the similarities and differences between
intellect and matter is suggested by Averroes Comm. magn. in DA (CCAA 6,1
387,22-389,63 Crawford) = 308A FHSG and 399,344-6 and 351-61 = 309A, and De
connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine (AOCAC 9 f.156F-G) = 308B FHSG;
there are further developments by Albertus Magnus in 309C and D FHSG.
Averroes indicates that for Theophrastus the main difference was that intellect
was potentially all ideas (intentiones) of universal material forms, and received
universal forms, while prime matter was potentially all the sensible forms, and
received individual forms (308A,5-13 FHSG). The argument is attributed wrongly
to Aristotle, but Theophrastus and Themistius are introduced later and it is
reasonable to suppose that Theophrastus originated it. But caution must be used
in interpreting Averroes. See also 29,26-30.
312. i.e. a ‘this something’, an independent substance. cf. 30,31 below.
313. It is uncertain whether this <psukhikou> is Theophrastus’ word or Pris-
cian’s. It may take up Aristotle’s odd expression ho kaloumenos tês psukhês nous –
‘what is called the intellect of the soul’ at DA 3.4 429a22, and have been used by
Theophrastus in that connection. But Priscian uses it below (26,12 and 26) to
distinguish this intellect from one on a higher level, as does Simpl. (243,37 and
245,37) on DA 3.5 430a17. Simplicius also distinguishes it from the passible
intellect at 243,37-8, but the expression is not commonly used by him. Steel CS, p.
148 n. 25 accepts it as from Theophrastus.
314. 25,28-26,7 = Theophrastus 307B FHSG; 26,1-6 = fr. Ic Barbotin.
315. DA 3.8 432a2.
316. cf. DA 3.4 429a27-9, where ‘some people’ are said to have described the soul
as the place of forms, but Aristotle limits this to the intellective soul.
317. cf. nn. 14, 16, 31.
318. Steel, CS p. 66 n. 53 says that khalaô and related terms are first found in
this sense in Priscian, Simplicius, and Damascius.
319. DA 3.5 430a16. But Aristotle does not use augê.
320. DA 3.4 430a1.
321. cf. Simpl. 243,1-6.
322. 27,3-6 = Theophrastus 307C FHSG first part.
323. At DA 3.5 430a14-15 Aristotle says that the potential intellect becomes
all things (panta). At 3.4 430a2-5 he deals with the identity of the thinker and
the thought, saying that in things without matter – like intellect and its objects
– the thinker and the thought are the same. But, we may add, the objects of
thought exist somehow when not thought, and equally the thinker, when not
thinking exists somehow. This is unlike the separate intellect, which has its
thoughts all the time.
324. cf. DA 3.4 429b24-5; Themistius in DA 108,1-6 = Theophrastus 307A FHSG.
Commonsense, and Aristotle (Physics 3.3), believe that in the material world, and
even in things like teaching and learning, change comes about by something acting
on something else, which itself is affected reciprocally, but it is not obvious how
this analysis can be transferred to non-material things. So Theophrastus raised a
series of questions. His thought is continued at 28,13-29,1 below, and his solution
was to say that words must be understood in a different sense in this sphere.
Priscian also applies his own theories to this problem.
325. Following the MSS, which omit the definite article.
326. DA 2.5 417b24.
327. 27,8-14 = Theophrastus 307C FHSG second part; fr. Ib Barbotin. Barbotin
considers and rejects Moraux’s interpretation at pp. 282-3.
328. cf. Simpl. 62,7. In what follows Priscian distinguishes between the potential
intellect and the separate intellect (that in actuality); the potential is made perfect,
i.e. actually thinks, by means of (a) the intellect in actuality and (b) the intelligibles.
The intellect in actuality has the intelligibles in it, and (line 30) the potential
intellect can be united with its own objects (i.e. intelligibles on a secondary level),
and through them with the higher intelligibles.
329. cf. Simpl. 230,23; 236,5, where however similar language is used for a
different doctrine. For fuller discussion see n. 348.
330. As well as the activities of the intellect in actuality and the intelligibles
Priscian recognises that the potential intellect is also a source of activity.
331. The theory is that this intellect has gone out or descended from the intellect
in actuality, and that it can also enter into itself and be united with the objects
that are there; through them it is related to higher entities. Cf. 29,25.
332. cf. DA 2.5 418a2.
333. DA 3.4 429b30, 3.7 431b17, 3.8 431b21-6. Barbotin takes ‘the intellect is
(identical with) the intelligibles’ as a quotation from Theophrastus = his fr. II.
334. Simpl. DA 305,7-8 gives as an example of wholes through wholes the
relationship of convex and concave.
335. DA 3.5 430a18, but Aristotle there uses the expression of the productive
intellect. Barbotin sees 28,12 têi ousiai estin energeia (it is activity in its very being)
as Theophrastus’ words and makes them his fr. III.
336. Bywater deleted asômatois (incorporeal), but it is in all the MSS.
337. I adopt, with some hesitation, Wimmer’s pôs for the hôs of the MSS. The
argument is compressed in Theophrastus’ manner. He seems to have been trying
to reconcile the Anaxagorean view of intellect that it is impassible with the fact
that knowledge involves some kind of change. This worries Priscian who attempts
in what follows to reconcile his own view that knowledge is a perfecting with
Theophrastus’ reference to passivity.
338. DA 3.4 429b23-5.
339. 28,13-17 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG first part; 16-17 = fr. IV Barbotin.
340. i.e. unmixed with anything else, cf. DA 3.4 429a18-21.
341. Bywater athetised this, suggesting that there was a lacuna, and comparing
Themistius in DA 108,16 (= Theophrastus 307A 25-7 FHSG), but that seems
unnecessary, and in any case the sense is not affected.
342. DA 2.5 417a14-17; 3.7 431a6-7. The same passage of Theophrastus is
quoted by Themistius in DA 108.15-17 but with kinêton for kinêtikon, except for
the late MS C (Paris. gr. 1888) of the fifteenth century. Theophrastus is trying to
give a suitable account of ‘passive’ as applied to intellect. We need a middle term
to connect activity with passivity; Themistius and Priscian between them give us
a passive and an active form of ‘moving’: each is only partially adequate. But
Theophrastus’ point is that no analysis in terms of moving is appropriate. See his
Metaph. 7b12-16. Priscian’s account of this is in lines 23-6 below.
343. DA 2.5 418a2-3. 28,20-3 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG second part.
344. Reading tropên, as Bywater tentatively suggested, comparing Simpl. 18,35,
for the tropon of the MSS, which he printed.
345. In the Addenda et Corrigenda p. xiv Bywater withdraws the confusing note
in the apparatus.
346. The lacuna indicated by Bywater here must have been of considerable
length. Before it Priscian begins a comment of his own, and after it we are back
with Theophrastus. ‘The superior one’ must be the higher intellect.
347. cf. DA 3.4 429a14. 28,29 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG third part; fr. Va
Barbotin.
348. See CS, p. 136 n. 72, pp. 148-50; S and B 776-7. The same terms are used
to express different relations between aspects of the soul in the Metaphrasis and
the De Anima Commentary. In Metaphr. 27,20-28,30 and 29,11 the soul’s own
activity in its thinking is emphasised, whereas at Simpl. 229,38, 230,23, and 236,5
the part played by the higher intellect in giving the soul its thoughts is central. For
autoenergeia see Philoponus, in DA 35,1; Ammonius, in De Int. 248,18-19, 251,1;
Proclus frequently uses the related adjective, e.g. at in Parm. 188,8, 248,15, 279,22
and 301,1 always together with autokinêtos (self-moved).
349. 28,31 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG fourth part; fr. Vb Barbotin.
350. In Aristotle this is the intellect: Priscian brings in both soul and intellect.
351. DA 3.4 430a5-6; Themistius in DA 108,27 (= Theophrastus 320A FHSG).
29,1 = Theophrastus 307D FHSG fifth part; fr. Vc Barbotin.
352. This back-reference cannot be traced. It may refer to something that was
in the lacuna at 25,26, which must have contained further remarks on the
imagination.
353. cf. Simpl. 220,38; 286,27-32 (= Theophrastus 298A FHSG). Discursive
rationality, or thinking step-by-step, is distinguished in Neoplatonism from the
non-progressive thinking of intellect, which takes in everything all at once. Aris-
totle usually used ‘intellect’ more widely as interchangeable with rationality
(logos).
354. 29,3-6 = Theophrastus 298B FHSG.
355. See CS 55 and nn. 12 and 91. ‘amphibios’ can mean amphibious in the
biological sense, as was spelt out by Simpl., in Enkh. Epikt. 78,1-9: amphibians can
live in the sea or on earth as they wish; but it was also used by Plotinus, IV, 8,4,32
and later writers of the soul, as intermediate and living two kinds of lives. Cf.
amphibolos, ambivalent, at 31,15.
356. cf. n. 16 and 26,16. sunneusis is upwards and aponeusis downwards.
357. DA 2.5 417b24.
358. 29,12-15 = Theophrastus 311 FHSG first part; fr. VI Barbotin.
359. See n. 353 for this wider usage.
360. DA 3.4 430a4-5; 3.5 430a19-20; 3.7 431a1-2, b16-17.
361. 29.18-23 = Theophrastus 311 FHSG second part; 29,18-20 and 22-3 = parts
of fr. VIIa Barbotin.
362. Here Priscian applies his own theory of intellect to Theophrastus’ problem.
The real intellect is on a higher level, and can be seen as Aristotle’s intellect in
actuality: he equates the one participated by soul with Aristotle’s potential intel-
lect.
363. cf. DA 3.4 429a24, but that is slightly different. Barbotin sees this as
another quotation from Theophrastus; it is part of his fr. VIIa. Here three possibili-
ties are considered, that the intellect is nothing before it thinks, or that it is like
matter, or that it is indeed something; cf. n. 323.
364. In the following pages several words relating to cognition are used,
gignôskein, epistasthai, theôrein and krinein, with related nouns and adjectives.
One-to-one translation is impossible because English does not have a similar set
of verbs with related nouns and adjectives; gignôskein is a general term, but
epistasthai means knowledge on a lower level than intuitive thought (nous), which
might be called ‘scientific’; gignôskein will be rendered by ‘know1’ and epistasthai
by ‘know2’; theôrein means ‘be conscious of ’, or ‘contemplate’, and for krinein, used
by Theophrastus and taken over by Priscian, I have used ‘be aware’. See also n.
373.
365. ‘The separation of the act from the substance is the first and most
fundamental division experienced by the soul in its descent into the body.’ Steel,
CS, p. 138 n. 80, thinks this doctrine goes back to Iamblichus.
366. proienai is one of a triad of terms, along with menein, to remain, and
epistrephein, to revert, which were first used by Iamblichus to express the structure
and behaviour of the soul. See Proclus, in Tim. II, 215, 5-29 (= Iamblichus, in Tim.
fr. 53 Dillon), In CS 68-9 it is discussed in Hegelian terms.
367. cf. Simpl. 33,24-34; 276,18-21.
368. For this rendering of theôrein see Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, p.
182.
369. See CS, pp. 139-40. The hidden activity is the activity belonging to the
being of the soul, its essence, as opposed to the projected or extroverted cognitive
activity.
370. This life may be seen as that of sense-perception, which goes out to the
external world, and then is called back (line 14).
371. DA 3.3 428a25; Plato, Timaeus 28A. cf. n. 216 above.
372. This is a second account of the meaning of ‘potential’ in this context. In
each case the point is made that there is something stable in the soul at all times.
373. Theophrastus uses noein here in his own, and Aristotle’s, sense, but at
30,20 Priscian has preferred to use ginôskein in the same connection.
374. I have translated ataktos as ‘disorderly’, although E. Barbotin, La théorie
aristotélicienne de l’intellect d’après Théophraste, Louvain 1954, p. 261 (on fr. VIIb)
wanted ‘indefinable’. Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 134,6 uses ataktôs in the sense
of ‘in a disorderly way’ in a passage that seems to echo a part of Theophrastus’
Metarsiology, which survives only in Arabic and has recently been translated by
Hans Daiber, ‘The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation’
in Theophrastus, His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings (see n.
260) pp. 166-293. At [14] 14-15 he gives: ‘it is not correct (to say) that God should
be the cause of disorder in the world’. Probably some form of the word ataktos was
used by Theophrastus here. See Jaap Mansfeld, ‘A Theophrastean Excursus on
God and Nature and its Aftermath in Hellenistic Thought’, Phronesis 37 (1992) pp.
325-6. (At Metaph. 4a4 Theophrastus uses ataktotera of the study of nature, and
atakton at 11b4 with apeiron and amorphia for what in Plato and the Pythagoreans
result from the indefinite dyad and its relationship to the One.) The language is
not un-Aristotelian: Aristotle equates ataktos with para phusin at DC 2 301a4, so
that an ataktos phusis will well convey the difficulty of understanding the nature
of intellect which Theophrastos is developing. akritos is used from Homer onwards
in a variety of senses, and though it occurs only once in Aristotle, at Meteor. 2.5
361b30 of Orion as an unreliable weather sign, it is appropriate here.
375. Who are the people who suppose that intellect is all things potentially and
nothing in itself? The view resembles one Aristotle expresses in several places, but
is not put exactly in his words. Rather, he distinguishes between ‘potentially’ and
‘actually’ or ‘in activity’. The big question is whether kath’ hauton, ‘in itself ’, has
a technical sense here. Priscian may be attacking recent people who hold a view
unacceptable to Neoplatonists, for whom Intellect means something more positive.
If that were the case it might be right to keep the manuscript reading and reject
Wimmer’s insertion of ton before noun. Alternatively Priscian may have supposed,
rightly or wrongly, that Theophrastus was refuting a view held by some of his
contemporaries, who would then also be interpreting Aristotle’s words. See also n.
309 above.
376. 26,3-6 above.
377. DA 3.4 429b4-5; Themistius, in DA 108,18 (= Theophrastus 307A FHSG).
30,22-31,2 above = Theophrastus 312 FHSG; 30,22-5 and 29 = fr. VIIb, and 31,1-2
= fr. VIIc Barbotin.
378. It is likely that this is a quotation from Theophrastus. In any case it follows
DA 3.4 429b5-9 closely, and ‘it’ there is intellect, but Priscian treats it as equivalent
to soul. ‘Actually to know’ renders epistêmôn kat’ energeian, taken from Aristotle.
379. This refers to line 8 above, ‘has become each thing’.
380. 31,8-13 = Theophrastus 316 FHSG first part; fr. VIII Barbotin.
381. This takes up ‘coming to be’ in line 12, but is applied in a different sense
by Priscian.
382. cf. n. 355 above.
383. This is a close repetition of lines 9-10 above, which accounts for the
expression ‘on the one hand’. See n. 378.
384. This passage of Theophrastus, together with Priscian’s development of it
(31,24-32,18), is discussed in CS 55,8. Steel thinks the latter is an almost verbatim
account of Iamblichus’ views. 31,24-5 above = Theophrastus 316 FHSG second part.
385. This section features the triad of being or substance, activity, and potenti-
ality, but that is already there in Theophrastus. Involved here is a question about
changes kat’ ousian – ‘in substance’, to which Priscian replies that substances must
change if they are the source of good and bad activities.
386. Simpl. 240,8-10 speaks of our intellect as twofold, and of its proceeding into
lives and thoughts – theôrias – which are either imperfect or perfect. For discussion
of this passage see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic Elements in the De Anima
Commentaries’, Phronesis 21, 1976, pp. 79-81. This may be Priscian’s target, and
if so Simplicius and Priscian are unlikely to be identical.
387. See CS 90, n. 43 and 100 n. 28 for similar use of this word in Simpl. (251,21;
262,25).
388. See also Simpl. 6,16; 89,33; 240,37, for references to Iamblichus by name.
For related views in Proclus see Steel, ‘L’Ame: Modèle et Image’ in The Divine
Iamblichus, pp. 19-20, 25 n. 31. See also G. Shaw, ‘The Geometry of Grace’, ibid.
pp. 110-20, and for a discussion of Iamblichus here see Huby, ibid. p. 8, and for the
possibility that Priscian was using Iamblichus in the previous pages ibid. pp. 10-12.
389. DA 3.4 429b10-23.
390. 32,25-7 = Theophrastus 318 FHSG first part; 32,21-2 = fr. IXa Barbotin.
391. Steel, CS pp. 17-18 nn. 50-1, says that in what follows Priscian uses the
three ways by which something can be known derived from Iamblichus: gnôsis can
be superior to its objects (politics), or on a level with them (introspection), or inferior
(gods); cf. Ammonius in De Int. 135,14-32; Stephanus in De Int. 35,19-33. 32,29-33
above = Theophrastus 318 FHSG second part.
392. cf. Philoponus in DA 529,22-3. Plutarch, an Athenian, was leader of the
school of Athens in the early part of the fifth century, dying c. 431/2. He was
influenced by Iamblichus and taught Syrianus and, in his old age, Proclus.
393. Priscian here relates Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ potential intellect to
the Neoplatonists’ intellect participated in by soul and the rational soul. Cf. 29,3-5
above, and n. 353, and 34,24-5. Priscian leaves it unclear whether the participated
intellect and the rational soul are one and the same. See also 35,15-17 and n. 414.
394. This participle is feminine singular. Its antecedent should therefore be the
rational soul. But the following ‘it’ is also feminine singular, and should refer to
something else. Perhaps we should read hautêi for autêi and translate ‘within
itself ’. See n. 397.
395. For logoi in the soul see Proclus in Alc. 250.5-251 and Blumenthal in The
Criterion of Truth, p. 274.
396. Bywater indicates a lacuna here, to be filled with something like ‘knows
also the accidents’. This is easy palaeographically, but the sense might better
support ‘knows also the qualities’. Perhaps nothing is needed, and we should have
‘also’ instead of the lacuna followed by ‘and’. There remains a puzzle about the
switch to the soul, rather than the intellect, in what follows.
397. Reading hautêi for autêi.
398. DA 3.4 429b20-1.
399. 33,25-7 = Theophrastus 318 FHSG third part; fr. IXb Barbotin. It is
uncertain where the quotation from Theophrastus ends, but in any case it is
followed by Priscian’s exposition of his own account. Aristotle had said obscurely
that the intellect is aware of different kinds of intelligibles either by (something)
different or by the same thing differently disposed. This is fully discussed by
Charles Kahn, ‘Aristotle on Thinking’ in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, eds M.C.
Nussbaum and A.O. Rorty, Oxford 1992, pp. 370-2. Theophrastus seems to have
enquired about this, but we cannot extract much from Priscian about any answer
he may have given. Rather Priscian tries to answer the problem in terms of the
Neoplatonist account of the various levels of intellect and its objects.
400. This translates the word noeros, which was not used by Aristotle, and
means ‘of the nature of ’, or ‘on the level of ’ intellect. For want of better alternatives
we have also used ‘intellective’ for noêtikon at 33,28 above.
401. DA 3.4 429b21-2. Priscian quotes Aristotle’s words almost exactly. They
are however obscure, and he goes on to give three Neoplatonist interpretations.
Presumably Theophrastus had added nothing. Aristotle used pragmata to refer to
material objects, but the parallel statement has only the article ta – the ‘things’ in
the loosest sense, presumably the intelligibles. ‘Separable’ must mean only ‘sepa-
rable in thought’.
402. 33,32-34,2 = Theophrastus 318 FHSG fourth part; 33,32-34,1 = fr. IXc
Barbotin.
403. cf. Simpl. 234,6-10. In view of 32,34-5 above, this is likely to be the view of
Iamblichus.
404. i.e. as existing independently. This is part of a third view. Is it Priscian’s
own? See also n. 430.
405. cf. n. 334 above.
406. Steel, CS pp. 126-7, explains anelixis as discursivity, a characteristic of the
soul which has descended into division and ‘unfolds its total being  in a succession
of states and forms’. (The quotations in his notes are from Simplicius’ commentary,
not from the present work of Priscian.) The verb anelittein is used, as Todd points
out, by Plato at Philebus 15E3, as well as by Themistius PDA 28,14, but in both
cases with no metaphysical implications.
407. cf. Simpl. 221,25-8 and Steel, CS p. 127. But Steel relates this passage to
intellect and soul, whereas it seems rather to deal with their objects, the forms and
intelligibles, supposing that corresponding to the hierarchy among intellects and
soul there is a similar one among their objects, so that the entirely indivisible are
in the intellect in actuality, the intermediate are effects of the latter and causes of
those being unfolded, i.e. those in the soul. See 32,25 ff. especially 33,1-32.
408. DA 3.4 429b6-9.
409. Theophrastus has elsewhere called for care in the interpretation of Aris-
totle’s words. See e.g. 26,5.
410. 34,29-35,1 = Theophrastus 317 FHSG first part; 34,29-31 = fr. Xa Barbotin.
411. Perhaps sense-perception, though probolê, projection, is the immediate
antecedent.
412. Simpl. 217,26.
413. In this passage a distinction is made between the soul (unqualified) and
the participated intellect, but it is clear from line 10 above that this is still the
rational soul.
414. This must be the First Intellect. See n. 416.
415. ‘Hence’ renders Bywater’s dio. L1 has ou – ‘not’, which seems unsatisfac-
tory. L2 and the other MSS have ho, which could give ‘which is’.
416. In the comparatively simple system that appears in Priscian this must be
the First Intellect which is at the highest level of intellect and soul, and from which
the rest are descended; the full expression, ‘First Intellect’, is given at line 28 below.
So we have the series: First Intellect, participated intellect, rational soul.
417. DA 3.4 429b30-430a1.
418. 35,24-7; 29-30; 32-3 = Theophrastus 317 FHSG second, third and fourth
parts; 35,29-30 and 32-3 = fr. Xb Barbotin.
419. Lines 29-30 and 32-3 should be taken together and are similar to DA
429b30-1, but there are some differences, of which the most noteworthy is the
introduction of ‘potential’, so that where Aristotle has ‘the intellect’ Theophrastus
has ‘the potential intellect is potentially its objects’. Aristotle does not say this, but
later writers have taken it for granted that this was what he meant. If Priscian is
correct – and he may not be – Theophrastus is the pioneer in this interpretation.
The other differences are trivial: men  de may have been substituted for all’ by
Theophrastus to avoid the harsh hiatus of entelekheiai ouden; Theophrastus, with
whom Simplicius agrees, has prin noein, but Aristotle, followed by Themistius, has
prin an noei.
420. i.e. by the soul; see 33.1-2 above and n. 393.
421. Bywater suggests an alternative, entelekheiai, which would give ‘is not yet
in actuality’.
422. Reading hêi for ê.
423. 36,6-9 = Theophrastus 319 FHSG first part.
424. DA 3.5 430a10-19; 3.4 430a3-4. But except for the words ‘the thinker and
the thought are one and the same’ this is not a precise quotation from Aristotle,
and the question arises whether Priscian is being careless or whether he is here
quoting from Theophrastus.
425. This is an almost exact quotation of DA 3.4 430a4-5.
426. DA 3.4 430a5-6. But again Priscian gives at best a paraphrase of Aristotle’s
words, and again we may ask whether it is rather Theophrastus whom he is
quoting.
427. 29.1-3 above.
428. In the following section we must distinguish between aitia as the singular
first cause, and aitia as the plural causes on a lower level.
429. Lines 16-18 relate to DA 3.4 430a7-8. For the changes in the approach to
the concept of dunamis indicated in the following lines, see H.J. Blumenthal,
‘Dunamis in “Simplicius”,’ in Dunamis nel Neoplatonismo. Atti del II Colloquio
Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo, edd. F. Romano and R.L.
Cardullo, Florence 1996, 149-72.
430. As at 34,2-21 three views are given, of which the first is that of Plutarch.
431. Almost a quotation of much of DA 3.4 430a7-9. Is it a direct quotation from
Theophrastus?
432. 37,23-30 = Theophrastus 319 FHSG second part; 34,24-7 = fr. XI Barbotin.
433. The copyist of the ancestor of our MSS clearly supposed that this was not
the end of Priscian’s work, for he wrote the word zêtei – ‘look out <for the rest>’ at
this point.
English-Greek Glossary
be able: dunasthai affected: en pathei

be absent: apeinai affected (to be affected), paskhein
abstraction: aphairesis affected easily: eupathês
accident: sumbebêkos affected (incapable of being affected):
accidentally, by accident: kata apathês
sumbebêkos affection: pathos
accord (of its own accord): eph’heautou agree: homologein, sungignôskein,
aph’heautou sunkhôrein
accordance (be in accordance with): air: aêr, pneuma
akolouthein allocated to matter: katatetagmenos
account (give an account of): alter: alloioun
apologizesthai alter along with: sunalloioun
account (on its own account): aph’ alteration: metabolê
heautou ambivalent: amphibolos
acquainted (become acquainted with): analogically: kata analogian
gnôrizesthai analogous, on analogy with: analogos
act: dran, energein, poiein analogous (be analogous): analogein
acted (be acted upon): paskhein analogy: analogia
action: energêma, dran (pres. part.) analysis (give a preliminary analysis):
active (be active): energein, poiein prodiarthrein
active state (be in an active state): appear: phainesthai, diaphainesthai,
energein ekphainesthai, emphainesthai
active: drastikos, energêtikos appear (come to appear):
active thing: energêma epiphainesthai
actively: energêtikôs appearance: to phainomenon
activity: energêma, energeia; be an application: prosbolê
activity: energein; by its own apprehensible: katalêptos
activity: autenergêtikôs; capable apprehension: hupolêpsis
of activity, involving activity: appropriate: oikeios
energêtikos appropriate (be appropriate): prosêkein
actual(ly): energeiai, entelekheiai appropriately: oikeiôs
actualisation: energeia, energein appropriateness: oikeiotês
actuality: energeia; in actuality: approve: episêmainein
entelekheiai, kat’ energeian; be arise: gi(g)nesthai, engi(g)nesthai,
brought into actuality: ousiousthai histanai
adapt: sunarmozein arouse: diegeirein, egeirein
adequately (be adequately equipped): arousing: diegersis
arkein ask, ask leave: axioun, zêtein
adjacent: prosekhês assimilate: aphomoioun
advance outwards: proienai assimilation: aphomoiôsis
adventitious: epiktêtôs assimilative: aphomoiôtikos
affect (n): pathêma, pathos attribute (n): pathos
72 Indexes to On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception
audible: akoustos bring towards: prosagein
awake: egrêgorôs brought (be brought into actuality):
aware (be aware): aisthanesthai, ousiousthai
sunaisthanesthai, krinein, by itself: kath’ heauton
theôrein
aware: kritikos call back: epanakalein
awareness: krisis, epikrisis can: dunasthai
awareness (having awareness): capable: dunamenos, dunatos, hoios te
kritikos capacity to: dunaton
awareness (have extra awareness): carry along together: sumpherein
epikrinein carry around: sumperiagein
carry down: hupopherein
be: gi(g)nesthai, einai carry downwards: hê epi to katô phora
bear: epipherein causative: aitiôdês
become, be in a state of becoming: cause: aitia, aition, aitios; be a first
ginesthai cause: prokatarkhein; caused:
begin, make a beginning: arkhesthai aitiatos; as the causes of: aitiôdôs
begin beforehand: prokatarkhein cease: apoleipein
beginning: arkhê cessation: apoleipsis
being: ousia, to einai; come into being: change (n): tropê, metabolê; (v):
gi(g)nesthai metaballein, alloioun
belief: doxa changeable: metablêtos
belong: einai (+ gen.) characteristics: kharaktêrizein
bending: klasis characterize: kharaktêrizein
better (the better): kreittôn check: kôluein
between: metaxu circumscribe: perigraphein
between (the thing/space between): to clear: katharos, enargês, akribês
metaxu clearly: saphôs
bitter: pikros cloud: nephos
black: melas coexist: suneinai
blast: pneuma cognate: sumphuês
block: emphrattein cognate (be cognate): paraphunai
blow: plêgê cognise: krinein
bodily: sômatikos, sômatoeidês cognitive: gnôristikos, gnôstikos,
body: sôma epistêmonikos
borne (be borne): epokheisthai cognitive (the cognitive element): to
bounded (be bounded): horizesthai krinon
break: prosrhêgnunai cognitive (by a cognitive act): gnôstôs
breath: pneuma coincide: sumbainein
breathe in: anapnein colour (n): khrôma; (v): khrônnunai,
breathing (in): anapnoê khrôzein
briefly: sunêirêmenôs colourless: akhrous
bright: lampros combination: to sunamphoteron
bright (exceedingly bright): combine: sunkeisthai
huperlampros come: hienai, hêkein
brightness: lamprotês come down: kathêkein katienai
bring: komizein (Bywater) come outwards: proerkhesthai
bring in: eispherein, epagein, come through: diikneisthai
epipherein come together: sunerkhesthai
bring forward: proagein come in: engi(g)nesthai
bring near: prospelazein come into being: gi(g)nesthai
bring together: sunagein, sunairein come to be in: engi(g)nesthai
come into existence: histanai contact (come in contact): ephapatein
come upon: epigi(g)nesthai contain: periekhein, horizein
come to be something (v): gi(g)nesthai container: periektikos
coming to be <something> (n): genesis contemplate: theôrein
company: khôros contemplation: theôria
compare: paraballein contemplative: theôrêtikos
comparison: parabolê contiguous: prosekhês
compass (confine within a compass): continuity: sunekheia
perigraphein continuity (in continuity): sunekhês
complete (adj): teleios, pantelês continuous: sunekhês
complete (vb): teleioun, epiteleioun, continuously: sunekhôs
epitelein contrariety: enantiôsis
complete (make complete): apotelein, contribute: suneispherein, suntelein
epitelein, teleioun contribution (make a contribution):
completed: teleios suntelein
completely: pantelôs convey: diaporthmeuein
completive: sumplêrôtikos, sumplêrein cooperate: sunergein
complications: poikilia coordinate: sustoikhos
compound: sunthetos coordinately: sustoikhôs
comprehending: perilêptikos corporeal: sômatikos, sômatoeidês
conceal: epikaluptein correct: summetros, summetrôs
conceive: noein, huponoein corrupt: diastrephein
concentration: apokoruphôsis cover up: epikaluptein
concord: sumphônia creation: genesis
condition: diathesis
confine: katekhein darkness: skotos
congruent: summetros darkness-producing, that which
congruently: summetrôs makes darkness: skotopoios
conjunction: sunaphê deduce: sullogizesthai
conjunction (put in conjunction): define: aphorizein
sunarmozein definitive: horistikos
connatural: sumphuês delimitable (easily): euoristos
connect: sunaptein dense: puknos, eupilêtos
connected with: oikeios departure: apostasis
conscious (be conscious): dependent (be dependent on): artên
sunaisthanesthai, epaistanesthai, deprive: stêrein
theôrein depths: bathos
conscious (become conscious of): derivative: hepomenos: in a derivative
krinein way: hepomenôs
conscious of: theôrêtikos descend: hupobainein
conscious (in a conscious way): descent: hupobasis
kritikôs describe: diarthrein
consequence (in consequence): desire: orektikos
akolouthôs, hepomenôs destroy: anairein, dialuein, ptheirein
consist in: histanai destruction: dialusis
conspicuously: periphanôs determination: horos
constitute: aphorizein determine: horizesthai, diorizesthai
constituted (be constituted): sunistanai determining (power): horos
constraint: anagkê develop naturally beside: paraphunai
contact (n): epaphê differ: diapherein
contact (be in contact): ephaptein, difference: heterotês, diaphora
haptesthai
different: diaphoros, heteros, heterôs, aitiatos; receive or undergo effect:
allos paskhein; effect to occur: paskhein
different (make different): heteroioun effluence: aporrhoê, aporrhoia
differentia: diaphora element: stoikheion
differentiate (into various kinds): embroider: poikillein
eidopoiein, diaphorôs emission: ekpompê
differentiation: diaphora, diaphorotês emit: ekpempein
dim: eskotismenos empty: kenos
dimly: amudrôs enclose: apolambanein
directly: êdê, amesôs encompass: perilambanein
discerning (means of): diagnôsis encompassment: perilêpsis
dislodge: ekkrouein end: telos
disorderly: ataktos enmattered: enulos, enulôs
display: dêloun enter into: eisienai
dispose: diatithenai entity: ousia
disposition: hexis equally: isos, isôs, hôsautôs
disproportion: assumetron essence: ousia
dissection: diarthrôsis essential: ousiôdês
dissolve: dialuein, luein essentially: kat’ ousian, ousiôdês, -ôs
distance: apostasis, diastasis, evidence: tekmêrion
diastêma; be at a distance: evident: enargês, -ôs
diistanai; be at a correct distance: evil: kakia
summetrôs excess: huperbolê
distinction: diaphora, diairesis; make excessive: huperballein
distinction(s): dielein, exist: histanai, huparkhein, einai;
diorizesthai; make further exist in: enuparkhein; exist
distinctions: epidiarthrein, together with: sunousiousthai
antidiastellein, episêmainein existence: ousia; have, be given,
distinguish: diakrinein substantial existence:
distinguishing (n): diakrisis; ousiousthai; come into existence:
distinguishing mark: kharaktêr histanai
divide: merizein, summerizein extend: apoteineisthai, diateinein,
divided: meristos; divide off: diairein, parateinein
merizein; divided off: meristos; extension: apotasis
divide up: merizein, dielein; external object: exô keimenon
divided up: meristos; as divided extraordinary: huperphuês
up: meristôs extreme: akros
dividedly: diêirêmenôs eye: ophthalmos, omma
divisible: meristos, diairetos eye-jelly: korê
division: merismos, merizein,
apomerismos, diairesis; without faculty: dunamis
division: ameristôs faint: amudros
do: dran, poiein fall short of: apoleipesthai
double (nature): amphibios fall upon: prospiptein
doxastic: doxastikos false: pseudês
fasten: artan
ear: ous fiery: purios
earth: gê; of the measurement of the fill: plêroun; fill up: teleioun
earth: geômetrikos fine: leptos
edge: peras fire: pur
effect: pathêma, pathê, pathos, peisis, first: prôtos
fit: epharmozein, sunarmozein, akouston; capable of hearing:
sunaptein akoustikos
flavour: khumos; with flavour: heat (n ): thermotês
enkhumos; flavourless: mê heat (v): thermainein
enkhumon heavenly: ouranios
flesh: sarx heavy: barus
flow off: aporrhein herb: arôma
follow: hepesthai, sumbainein; follow hidden: kruphios
on: epakolouthein; it follows: high (of pitch): oxus
akolouthon; following: akolouthôs hinder, be a hindrance: empodizein,
force (active force ): drastêrion parapodizein
forcefully: sphrodrôs hold: ephaptesthai
form: eidos, tupos; give form: homogeneous: homogenês
eidopoiein; that makes form: homonymously: homônumôs, kath’
eidopoios homônumian
formal: eidêtikos, eidikos; in a formal honey: meli
way: eidêtikôs hot: thermos
fragrant: euôdês hypostasis: hupostasis
from itself: aph’ heautou
full: plêrês identity: tautotês
function: ergon ignorance: agnoia ; to be ignorant:
agnoein
gap: to metaxu illuminate: katalampein,
gather together: sullambanein, epilamprunein, lamprunein,
sunairein; gathering (together) ellampein, phôtizein;
(n): sunairesis illumination: katalampsis
generation (connected with image: phantasma, phantasia,
generation): genesiourgos emphasis; make into images:
genus: genos apeikonizein
get through: diikneisthai imagination: phantasia; by the
getting through: diixis imagination: phantastikos; object
give: suneisagein, endidonai of imagination: phantaston;
glancing at: hupidomenos capable of imagining:
go away: aperkhesthai phantastikos; connected with
go back: epanienai imagination: phantastikos
go on: proieinai imaginatively: phantastikôs
go out: ekphoitan, proienai imagine: phantazesthai
go up: anienai immediate: prosekhôs, athroos
good of its kind: agathoeidês immediately: amesôs, autothen,
grasp (v): antilambanein, ekhein, athroôs, athroos
noein; capable of grasping: impassible: apathês
antilêptikos imperfect: atelês
grow together: sumphuesthai; grow imperfection: ateleia
within: sumphuês implication: to epagomenon
impossible: adunatos
hand: kheir impression: tupôsis, epereisis
handed down: paradosis imprinting: apotupôsis
happen: sumbainein, gi(g)nesthai in between: metaxu
hasten: speudein in itself: kath’ hauto
have: ekhein inactive (be): argein
hear: akouein; heard: akoustos; inactivity: argia
hearing: akoê; object of hearing: inanimate: apsukhos
incidentally: kata sumbebêkos knowledge, piece of knowledge:
inclination: neusis, aponeusis gnôsis; knowledge: epistêmê;
incomplete: atelês having knowledge: gnôristikos;
incongruent: asummetros connected with knowledge:
incorporeal: asômatos epistêmonikos
individual: atomon, kata meros,
merikos lacking (be) elleipein
indivisible: amerês, ameristos, lantern (of a) lukhniaios
adiairetos lay down: diorizesthai
indivisibly: ameristôs learn: manthanein
indivisibility: to ameriston leave: enkataleipein, kataleipein
inferior: kheirôn; inferior position: length (of a suitable length):
huphesis; be inferior: huphiesthai summetros
initiate: proêgeisthai; taking the level (lowest): eskhatos; on a higher
initiative: proêgoumenôs level: kreittonôs; on the same
insensitive: anaisthêtos level: sustoikhôs
inside, to be inside: enuparkhein lie: keisthai
instantaneously: akhronôs life: zôê; connected with life: zôtikos;
intellect: nous; object of intellect: as a function of life: zôtikôs;
noêton; in the realm of intellect: lifelessness: azôia
noêtôs; intellective: noeros, light: phôs, augê; that which produces
noêtikos; in an intellective sense: light: phôtourgos; give light:
noêrôs phôtizein, ellampein; light-giving:
intelligible: noêtos phôteinos; like light: phôtoeidês;
interfere: parapodizein light up: phôtizein, diaphôtizein,
intermediacy: mesotês prolampein
intermediate: ana meson, mesos; like: homoios; become like:
intermediate position: mesotês exomoiousthai; becoming like:
interval: apostasis, diastasis exomoiôsis, homoiôsis; of
inviolable: akraiphnês; inviolably: becoming like: aphomoiôtikos;
akraiphnôs make like: aphomoioun; liken:
involve: epipherein apeikazein
isolate: apotemnein likeness: homoiôma, homoiotês
limit: horos, peras; with limits:
join: sunairein, sunaptein; essentially horizesthai
joined with: sunousiousthai; join limpid: diaphanês
together: sunaptein; capable of liquid: hugros
joining: sunarmostikos live: zên; live through: diazên; living:
judgment: krisis zôion; living being, living
creature, living thing: zôion
keep in (easy to): euphulaktos living: zôtikos
kind: genos; of one kind: monoeidês logos: logos
kinship: suggeneia, homophuia loosen: khalazein
knitting (of brows): sunagôgê looseness: to kekhalasmenon,
know: (see n. 364) ginôskein, khalasmos
gnôrizein, eidenai, noein, low (of pitch): barus
epistasthai; (be) know(ing): luminous: phôtoeidês
epistêmôn; knowable, known:
gnôstos; known: epistêtos; known maimed: pepêrômenos
object (object known), object of major factor: proêgoumenos
knowledge: gnôston, epistêton; make: poiein; make capable of being
able to know: gnôristikos; seen: apotelein
man: anthrôpos; of man: anthrôpeios obvious: enargês; be obvious:
many times the size of: pollaplasios diaphainesthai, diaphanês
material: hulikos, hulê occupy beforehand: prokatalambanein
matter: hulê; involved in matter: occur: gignesthai, engignesthai,
enulos, hulikos; matterless: aêlos sumbainein, sumpiptein
medium: meson of itself: kath’ hauton, aph’heautou
membrane: humên one: heis
middle: mesos; middle position: open up: dianoigein
mesotês; in the middle: ana opinion: doxa
meson, metaxu opposite: enantios, antikeimenos; be
mirror: katoptron opposite: antikeisthai,
mix: mignunai, anamignunai; mixed: antikeimenôs ekhein
summigês, miktos; without being organ: organon
mixed: amigôs organ of sense: aisthêtêrion
mixture: mixis, summixis original: prôtotupon
moist: hugros other: allos
moisten: hugrainein otherness: heterotês
moisture: hugrotês, hugron ought: dein, deisthai
mortal: thnêtos out of scale: asummetros
motion: kinêma, kinêsis; set in motion: outline: tupos; receive an outline:
kinein hupotupousthai
mould: diaplattein, ekmattein own: oikeios, idios, heautou
move: kinein; move together with:
sunkinein; that which moves: part: meros, morion
kinêtikos; that which is moved by partial: meristos
something else: heterokinêtos partake: metekhein; partaking:
movable: kinêtikos metalêpsis
movement: kinêsis; produce participate: metekhein
movement: kinein: movement participation: methexis
comes about: kineisthai particle: morion
multiply along with: sumplêthunein particular: meristos, kata meros, kath’
murkiness: amudros hekasta; made particular: merikos
pass on: dibibazein
name (n): onoma passive (thing): pathêma
name (v): onomazein passive, effect: pathos, pathêma;
nature: hupostasis, phusis; in passively: pathêtikôs
accordance with nature: kata peculiar: idios
phusin; within its nature: peculiarity: idiôma
emphutos; by nature: phunai; perceive: aisthanesthai
beyond nature: huperphuês; perceived object: aisthêton
natural: phusikos; be natural: perceptible: aisthêtos
phunai, kata phusin; develop perception: aisthêsis
naturally beside: paraphunai perceptive: aisthêtikos
necessity: anankazein perfect: teleios; perfectly: teleiôs
need (n): khreia; (v): khrêizein perfect (v), make perfect: apotelein,
night: nux teleioun, epitelein
noise: êkhos; make a noise: psophein perfecting (n): teleiôsis
number: arithmos perfection: teleiotês, teleiôsis; bring to
perfection: teleioun; process
object: pragma, hupokeimenon towards perfection: teleiôsis
obscurely: amudros permanent: menôn
phantasmal: eidôlikos
place: aphorizein quality: poiotês
place upon: epitithenai quantity: megethos, posotês
pleasant: hêdus
point: arkhê ratio: logos
pore: poros rational: logikos
possess: iskhein, ekhein real: ontôs; really: tôi onti, ontôs
potency: dunamis reality, in reality: kat’ ousian
potential: dunamei reason: logos; of reason: logikos;
potentiality: dunamis; in potentiality: reasonable: eulogos; with reason:
kata dunamin eulogôs; for no reason: matên
potentially: dunamei reason (v): logizesthai; reasoning:
power: dunamis; in its own power: logikos
eph’ heautôi; more powerful: receive: dekhesthai, eisdekhesthai,
kreittôn anadekhesthai, paradekhesthai;
precedence, take precedence: apolambanein; receive a share of:
proêgeisthai metalambanein; receive together:
precise: akribês sullambanein; receive
predominance: epikrateia beforehand: prolambanein; that
predominate: epikratein which receives: dektikos; easily
presence: parousia, pareinai; be receive: euparadektos
present: pareinai, enuparkein receiving (n): paradokhê
preserve: sôzein receptacle: hupodokhê
prevent: kôluein reception: eisdokhê, hupodokhê
primarily: prôtôs, proêgoumenôs receptive: dektikos
primary: proêgoumenôs; in its primary record: hupomimnêskein
sense: kuriôs redefine: aphorizesthai
principle: arkhê reference: anaphora
prior: proteros refer, have reference: anapherein
private: idios reflection: anaklasis
privation: sterêsis refute: elenkhein
proceed: proienai, proerkhesthai relation: skhesis
produce: poiein; be produced: relationship: parabolê, skhesis
engignesthai; act of production: remain: menein, diamenein, emmenein
poiêsis remind: hupomimnêskein
productive: apodotikos remove: aphaireisthai
project: proballein represent (in itself): apotupousthai
projection: probolê representative image: emphasis
projective: problêtikos, kata probolên require: axioun, dein, deisthai
proper: oikeios, idios, kurios; in the resemble: proseoikenai; resembling:
proper sense: kuriôs; properly: homoios
idikôs, kuriôs resistance: antitupon
property: idiotês, idiôma resistant: antitupos
proportion: summetria; resolved easily: euapolutos
proportionality: summetria responsible: kurios
proportionate: kata summetrian, en revert: epistrephesthai, strephein
summetriai rouse: anegeirein, egeirein
provide: parekhesthai rule: arkhein
pure: kathareuein, akêratos; purely:
katharôs same: homoios; be in the same
purity: katharotês condition: hôsautôs ekhein; in the
push out: ekkrouein same respect: kata to auto; in the
same way: homoiôs
scientifically: kata to phusikon diaphainesthaisthai; shining:
seal: sphragis lampros
second, secondary: deuteros sight: opsis
secondarily, in a secondary way: silence: siôpê
deuterôs similar: homoios; be similar:
see: horan, theôrein, idein; that which proseoikenai; similarly, in a
can see: horatikos; seeing: horan, similar way: homoiôs; in a similar
horasis; of seeing: horatikos; relation: homoiôs; be in a similar
object seen: horaton; seen: horatos relation with: analogein
seeming: dokein simile: paradeigma
self-actively: autenergêtôs simple: haplous; simply: haplôs
self-illuminating: autophanês simulacrum: aphomoiôma
self-sufficient: arkein heautôi simultaneous: hama
send out: ekpempein, ekpempesthai, situated, be situated: histanai
hienai size: megethos, metron; of the right
sensation, sense-perception: aisthêsis; size: summetros
object of sensation, object of sketch: hupographein
sense-perception: aisthêton sleep: katheudein
sense (n): aisthêsis; (v): aisthanesthai; smell (n): osmê, osphrêsis; (v):
sense-experience: aisthêma; osphrainesthai; of smell:
sense-object: aisthêton; osphrantikos; object of smell:
sense-organ: aisthêtêrion; osphranton; sensation of smell:
connected with sense: organikos, osphranton; smelling: osphrêsis;
aisthêtikos; capable of being capable of smelling: osphrantikos
sensed: aisthêtos; capable of smooth: leios
sensing: aisthêtikos; of sense, of solid: stereos; solidity: stereon
the senses: aisthêtikos; sophistry: eristikon
sense-perception: aisthêsis; soul: psukhê; of the soul: psukhikos;
senseless: anaisthêtos soulless: apsukhos
sensible: aisthêtos sound (n): psophos, êkhos; (v) êkhein
sensitive: aisthêtikos source: aph’ hou
separable: khôristos space: topos
separate (adj): khôristos spatially: kata topon
separate (v): diairein, khôrizein, special: idios, exairetos; in a special
diaspan; separately, on a way: idiôs; special nature: idiotês
separate level, as a separate speculative: theôrêtikos
thing: khôristôs spirit: pneuma
separation: khôrismos stable: monimos; be stable: menein
set apart: khôrizein, aphistanai, stand still: histanai
apodialambanein start: arkhesthai
set out: diarthrein, diatithenai, starting-point: arkhê
ektithenai state: hupostasis, diathesis
set up, be set up: histanai stay the same: menein
settled: hidrumenos steadfastly: stasimôs
shadow-painting: skiagraphia stimulate jointly: sunkinein
shape: morphê; having shape: stone: lithos
morphôtikos; changing its shape: stretch off: apoteinein
diamorphôsis; give shape: stretch out: parateinein, katateinein
morphoun stretching: tasis
share: metekhein, koinônein strictly: kuriôs
shield: aspis strike: plêttein
shine: lampros; shine through: striking (n): plêgê; strikingly: plêktikôs
strong: iskhuros; strongly: sphrodrôs touch (n): haphê; (v) thingannein;
studying: zêtêsis touchable: haptos; related to
subsist: huphistanai touch: haptikos; by touching:
substance: ousia; substantial, of a haptikôs
substance: ousiôdês; in its tout court: haplôs
substance: ousiôdôs trace: ikhnos
substrate, substratum: hupokeimenon transcend, be transcendent:
suffering: pathos exaireisthai
sufficient: hikanos; to a sufficient transfer: metapherein
degree: arkontôs; be sufficient: transmit: diapempein, endidonai; by
arkein transmission: anapempein,
suggest: hupomimnêskein diadosis
suitable: epitêdeios transodorant: diosmos
suitability: epitêdeiotês transparent: diaphanês, diaugês
sun: hêlios; of the sun: hêliakos transport: diabibazein
superior: kreittôn, kreittonôs transsonant: diêkhês
superior standing to: huperanekhein transsonic: diêkhêtikos
superiority: kreitton, periousia be out of tune with: apaidein
supervene: epigi(g)nesthai turn: strephein; in turn: para meros;
suppose: hupolambanein, turn off: paratrepein
hupotithenai, tithenai; suppose to turning (n): strophê, rhopê
be prior: proupotithesthai turning inwards: sustrophê
surface: epiphaneia, peras twofold: dittos
suspend: apaiôrein type: eidos
sweet: glukus; make sweet: glukazein
sympathetically affect: sundiatithenai unbroken: apolutos, apolutôs
synthesis: sunthesis unchanging: ametablêtos
undergo effect: paskhein
tablet: grammateion underlying: hupokeimenos
take: lambanein; take over: lambanein understand: epistasthai, akouein,
taste: khumos, geusis; tastable: huponoein
geustos; what can be tasted: understanding: sunesis
geustos; of taste: geustikos undiscriminating: akritos
tear apart: diaspan; being torn apart: undivided: adiairetos, ameristos
diaspasmos undividedly: ameristôs
tear away: apospan unfold: anelittein
temporally: khronikôs unfolding: anelixis
tendency: rhopê unify: henoun
thing: pragma uniform(ly): monoeidês, monoeidôs
think: noein, noesthai; think of: noein, union: henôsis; in union: hênômenôs
epinoein; thinking: noein; thinker: unite: henoun; unity: henôsis, to
to nooun; thought: dianoia, hênômenon; in unity: hênômenôs
epinoia, to nooumenon; that unmixed: amigês, amiktos; in an
which is thought: nooumenon; unmixed form: amigôs
object of thought: noêton; be unsuitable: anepitêdeios; unsuitable
thought: noêtos; by thought: state: anepitêdeiotês
dianoêtikôs; think right: axioun unusual: asunêthês
this something: tode ti unwritten: agraphos
through itself: di’ heautou use: khrêsthai, khrêsis
thunder-clap: brontê useful: khrêsimos
time: khronos
tongue: glôtta variance, be at variance: diistanai
variety: heterotês whole: holos; as a whole: holos;
violence: sphodrotês wholeness: holotês; wholes
visible: horatos through wholes: holoi di’ holôn
visual: optikos windpipe: pharunx
vital: zôtikos, tês zôês wish: horman
voice: phônê withdraw: anagein
volition: hormê without matter: aülos
woodcutter: drutomos
wanting, defective: ellipes work: energein; work through, work
warm: thermos out: epexergazesthai
wax: kêros world, of this world: perikosmios
Greek-English Index
adiairetos, indivisible, undivided, 14,19; 15,26.31; 16,16; 17,12;

9,16; 22,22; 26,25.27 20,17; 21,7; 22,12; 23,12;
adiairetôs, undividedly, 22,21 24,22-25,6 passim; 26,11; 28,4;
adunatos, incapable, 3,25; 18,2; 35,1
impossible, 4,5; 25,17; 28,11; 31,27 aisthêtikos, of sensing, of the senses,
aei, always; 13,32; 16,23; 24,17; 25,25; 3,30; of sense; 25,6; connected
29,1.2(bis).7.26; 30,8.22; 31,28.33; with sense, 24,21; 25,12; capable
34,5; 37,6.25.28; continually; 30,28 of sensing, 25,11; sensitive (with
aêr, air; 6,30; 8,2.6.23; 9,11.14.19; eidos, form), 23,9.11; 24,26;
10,20; 12,3; 13,3-24 passim; perceptive, 19,22; sensitive, 4,7;
14,10.14.29.33; 15,8; 15,25-16,22 28,4
passim; 18,15.22; 19,17-30 aisthêton, object of sense,
passim; 20,14.30 sense-object, 1,3-6,17 passim;
agathoeidês, of a good type, 31,29 7,24; 10,17.20; 13,22-4; 14,18;
agnoein, be ignorant, 31,19 15,26.32; 17,9.10.15.22(bis);
agnoia, ignorance, 31,17; 34,17 21,8-28 passim; 22,20-23,7
agraphos, unwritten, with no passim; 24,6-23 passim; 25,13.25;
writing, 26,29; 27,2; 35,25.26 26,9.10; 27,32; 28,5.26; 36,16-17;
ainissesthai, hint; 32,21 capable of being sensed, 36,16
aisthanesthai, be aware, 11,14; aisthêtos, perceptible, perceived,
14,28; perceive, sense, 3,2; 10,15; 17,2.6; sensible (of form, cf.
12,12.33; 13,25; 15,28; 16,24; aisthêtikos), 2,7; 13,24
17,2.21; 19,31; 21,17.32(bis); aithêr, aether, 8,3
22,4.11; 25,10 aitia, cause, 31,30; 33,6-10 passim;
aisthêma, sense-experience, 25,21 37,15.21.33
(contrast phantasma, energêma) aitiatos, caused, effect, 9,8; 33,8.20.31
aisthêsis, perception, sensation, aitiôdês, which is a cause, 33,8;
sense-perception, 1,3-22 passim; causative, 36,33
2,9-26 passim; 3,21.23.32; 5,9; aitiôdôs, as the causes of, 6,13
6,5.6.9; 7,11; 13,22; 14,4.12; aition (neu.), cause, 9,8.9.16;
17,7.8.12.15.18; 18,12; 19,11; 10,14.15; 37,13(bis)
20,5.26; 21,5.13; 22,28; 23,5.7.16; aitios, cause, 10,3.4.7; 20,5; 21,5;
24,15.17.21.25; 25,15.16.23; 31,1; 33,11.29; 36,31; 37,20.32
33,3.11; 35,1; 36,34; 37,3; sense, akêratos, pure, 32,8
4,14-15,16 passim; 7,16.24; 10,23; akhronôs, instantaneously, 15,2
11,9; 13,31; 14,16; 19,10.14; akhrous, colourless, 5,4; 7,34
20,8.9; 21,17.18.28.30.32.33; akoê, hearing, 4,2(bis).7; 5,5.10.20;
22,13.20.29; 23,7.16; 24,10; 6,16; 10,18; 12,3; 13,7; 14,11(T);
26,8.9.13; 27,9.14.27; 28,1.3; 30,11 16,16; 17,5
aisthêtêrion, sense-organ, organ of akolouthein, to be in accordance
sense, 1,4-5,8 passim; 6,2.8; with, 32,10
10,18; 11,18; 13,6-14,8 passim; akolouthon, it follows, 12,2.6
akolouthôs, in consequence, 20,15; be analogous, 17,30; 18,9; on
following, 23,4 analogy with; 18,22
akouein, hear, 12,33; 13,4; 14,27.34; analogia, analogy, 26,29; kata
16,14.23; 19,28; 20.28; 22,25(bis); analogian, analogically, 26,5;
understand, 26,29; 28,20; 30,30; 30,30
34,13; 36,2 analogos, analogous, 11,10
akoustikos, capable of hearing, 19,29 anamignunai, mix, 14,10(T)
akouston, object of hearing, 19,27 anankazein, of necessity (does), 6,16
akoustos, audible, heard, 11,11; 13,9 anankê, constraint, 25,15
akraiphnês, inviolable, 26,25; 35,4 anapempein, by transmission, 4,22
akraiphnôs, inviolably, 26,16.27; anapherein, have reference, 24,17;
27,1; 35,15 refer, 24,27
akribês, clear, 14,19; in detail, 15,3; anaphora, reference, 24,6.13
exact, precise, 18,21; 26,20 anapnein, breathe in, 16,19
akribôs, exactly, 27,16 anapnoê, breathing, 16,17; breathing
akritos, undiscriminating, 30,24 in, 17,19
akros, extreme, 19,2.3 anegeirein, rouse, 23,16
alêthês, true, 20,1; 24,3.21; anelittein (Att.), unfold, 34,23
25,10.12.13.18; 29,16; 33,27 anelixis, unfolding, 34,23.26; 35,10
alloioun, alter, 6,10; 21,23.25 anemos, wind, 16,21
allos, different, 30,19.20.28; other, anepitêdeios, unsuitable, 21,11
35,6 anepitêdeiotês, unsuitable state,
amerês, indivisible, 2,28; 3,7.25.27; 21,10
4,8 anienai, go up, 22,7
ameriston (neu.), indivisibility, 35,29 anthrôpos, man, 20,27
ameristos, indivisible, 1,11; anthrôpeios, of man, 32,4
22,8(bis).23.25; 26,16.27; 34,16-26 antidiastellein, make distinction,
passim; 35,4.12.18.31; 36,14; 36,32
undivided, 13,1; 22,3; 26,21; antikeimenos, opposite, 25,20.21;
27,18; 29,16; 35,19; 36,19 antikeimenôs ekhein, be opposite,
ameristôs, without division, 2,12; 25,23
undividedly, 2,30; 12,22.31; antikeisthai, be opposite, 28,13
indivisibly, 35.33; 36,19 antilambanein, grasp, 2,1; 4,21.34;
amesôs, immediately, directly, 5,22; 18,5; 36,9
18,26 antilêptikos, capable of grasping,
ametablêtos, unchanging, 31,28; 32,8 19,13
amigês, unmixed, 20,4 antilegein, argue against, 17,29
amigôs, in an unmixed form, 12,27; antitupon, resistance, 20,12
without being mixed, 12,28.29 antitupos, resistant, 10,11
amiktos, unmixed, 20,1 apaidein, be out of tune with, 15,11
amphibios, double (nature), 29,8 apaiôrein, suspend, 35,18
amphibolos, ambivalent, 31,15 apathês, impassible, not capable of
amudros, murky, 14,19; faint, 9,20; being affected, 19,2.4; 28,16.20
obscure(ly), 4,15; 6,24.28; 10,3 apeikazein, liken, 26,23; 27,1
amudrôs, dimly, 12,8 apeikonizein, make into images, 24,5
anadekhesthai, receive, 17,4 apeinai, be absent, 24,10.24
anagein, withdraw, 4,19 aperkhesthai, go away, 9,18.20
anairein, destroy, 32,6 aph’ heautou, on its own account, of
anaisthêtos, insensitive, 18,24; its own accord, 24,12; 26,14; of
senseless, 21,2 itself; 24,28; 27,21; 28,6; 34,26;
anaklasis, reflection, 15,6.20.24 from itself; 24,14.16; 27,11[12
analogein, be in a similar relation,
with MSS reading].14; 28,8.16(T); apsukhos, soulless, 2,2; inanimate,
29,11.28; 35,31; 36,19 18,18
aph’ hou, source, 13,30 argein, be inactive, 22,16(bis)
aphaireisthai, remove, 7,33 argia, inactivity, 22,1(T).10.14-16.18
aphairesis, abstraction, 32,32; Aristotelês, Aristotle, 1,5; 7,21; 14,24;
33,20.24.26; 36,30 17,25; 18,1.7.28; 19,14; 21,16.33;
aphistanai, set apart, 32,2 22,24; 23,4; 26,23; 29,3; 32,25.34;
aphomoioun, make like, 3,31; 34,1; 35,25; 36,6.10.24
assimilate; 23,23; 24,17 aristotelikos, what Aristotle says,
aphomoiôma, simulacrum,1,21 24,3
aphomoiôsis, assimilation, 23,18 arithmos, number, 4,11.21; 22,21
aphomoiôtikos, assimilative, 23,27; arkein, be sufficient, 16,9; be
of becoming like, 24,19 adequately equipped, 19,20;
aphorizein, place, 21,8; define, arkein heautôi, be self-sufficient,
redefine, 28,25.27; constitute; 10,25; arkontôs, to a sufficient
31,16 degree, 8,29
apodialambanein, set apart, 34,4 arkhein, rule, 28,30; 32,3
apodotikos, productive, 31,29 arkhesthai, begin, make a beginning,
apokoruphôsis, concentration, 22,3 29,11.29; 34,27; start, 28,9
apolambanein, enclose, 15,27; arkhê, beginning, 2,12;
receive, 31,23 starting-point, 22,34; 27,13;
apoleipein, cease, 24,10 28,17; point, 15,1; principle, 32,7
apoleipesthai, fall short of, 26,18 arôma, herb, 17,11
apoleipsis, cessation, 9,18 asômatos, incorporeal, 27,10(bis);
apolutos, unbroken, 13,3 28,14; 36,11
apolutôs, unbroken, 13,13; 14,7 artan, fasten, 3,12; (pass.) be
apomerismos, division, 10,1 dependent on, 35,14
aponeusis, inclination, 26,16 aspis, shield, 18,14.15
apophainesthai, declare, 17,8; 27,3; asummetron, disproportion(ate), 7,5
34,1 asummetros, out of scale; 6,5;
aporein, raise difficulties, problems, incongruent, 21,11
questions, 7,22; 9,1; 14,25; 27,8 asunêthês, unusual, 7,26
aporia, difficulty, 29,25; problem, ataktos, disorderly, 30,25
11,15; 16,8 ateleia, imperfection, 32,10
aporrhein, flow off; 13,18; 13,26 atelês, incomplete, 3,14; 28,21.24;
aporrhoê, effluence, 5,23; 9,32; 10,2; imperfect, 20,22.28; 31,18.19.30;
11,15; 13,28 32,1.4.24; less perfect, 10,22
aporrhoia, effluence, 13,25; 15,22 athroos, immediate, immediately,
apospan, tear away, 27,31 9,16.18; 13,13; 14,26; as a whole,
apostasis, departure, 29,10; interval, 14,30; athroôs, immediately, 9,20;
6,14; distance, 35,19 12,22
apotasis, extension, 1,20; 22,30 atomon, individual, 2,33
apoteinesthai, be stretched off, 33,3; atopos, absurd, 1,6; 10,16; 21,19;
extend, 3,31; 29,8; 36,13.27 26,1; 27,3 (all T)
apotelein, make complete, 5,22; augê, light, 26,24
make perfect, 13,12; perfect, aülos, without matter, 32,26.28;
26,23; 30,2; make (capable of 33,10.18; 34,9.18.19(bis).21;
being seen), 8,1 36,14.17; 37,17.31; matterless;
apotemnein, isolate, 9,15 33,4-6.25(T?).31; 34,12.14.15;
apotupousthai, represent (in itself), 36,7; 37,19.28
23,14.20; 24,2.4.7 autenergêtôs, self-actively, 28,30;
apotupôsis, imprinting, 15,7.25 29,1.12; by its own activity, 27,22
autophanês, self-illuminating, 26,18 dialusis, destruction, 21,10
axios, worthy, 37,5 diamenein, remain, 32,11
autothen, immediately, 7,24 diamorphôsis, changing its shape,
axioun, require, 7,24; claim, 18,1.30; 24,29
22,9; want, 18,28; maintain, dianoêtikos, by thought, 4,25
20,23; ask, 28,23; 33,25; ask dianoia, thought, 4,18(bis).21.24; 5,4
leave, 28,27; think right, 30,30 dianoigein, open up, 16,17
azôia, lifelessness, 34,17 diapempein, transmit, 23,16
diaphainesthai, shine through, 11,4;
barus, heavy, 10,26; low, appear, 13,25; be obvious, 21,29;
17,25.28.29.32 32,20
bathos, depths, 8,21 diaphanês, transparent,
blepein, look, 12,32 5,20.21.25.26; 6,18.27.28.30;
brontê, thunder-clap, 16,21 7,9.26.32; 8,1-30 passim; 9,11;
10,7-19 passim; 11,14-26 passim;
dei, deisthai, need, 1,20; 6,14.26; 12,7-31 passim; 13,10.14.30-14,6
10,8.9.19.21.22.25.27.30.33.34; passim; 15,2.33; 16,7; 17,16;
11,24; 16,9; 24,14; limpid, 20,19; obvious, 35,9.15
26,11.21.24.32.33; 31,2; there is a diaphora, difference, 14,22; 19,8.10;
need, 11,22.23; require, 6,60; 33,27; distinction, 34,21;
ought, 11,27; must, 17,13 differentiation, 5,12; differentia;
dekhesthai, receive, 3,9.18; 9,4.17.23; 17,25
14,7; 16,1,3; 21,10; 23,19; 24,30; diaphoros, different, 3,24.25;
25,1.5.12.18.20; 27,22.29; 22,21.23; 24,18.20.24; 25,19.20
28,6.8(bis); 29,1.12 diaphorôs eidopoiein, differentiate
dektikos, receptive, 8,17.18.21.23; into various kinds, 5,12
19,3; 20,12.18; which receives, diaphorotês, differentiation, 5,17
9,12; 21,12 diaphôtizein, light up, 12,2
dêloun, display, 17,26; show, 6,27; diaplattein (Att.), mould, 23,26
9,24.34; 24,31; 32,27; 34,2; 35,11; diaporthmeuein, convey, 7,9
indicate, 37,19 diarthrein, describe, 17,18; set out,
deuteros, second, 15,14.16.17; 37,24
28,28.29; 32,4; secondary, 29,7.31; diarthrôsis, dissection, 7,20
30,3; 35,22 diaspan, separate, 32,1; tear apart,
deuterôs, in a secondary way, 14,9; 28,3; 36,18
27,30; 28,12; 33,9; 35,22; diaspasmos, being torn apart, 36,16
secondarily; 4,33.34; 5,3; 21,22; diastasis, distance, 5,28; 6,6; 7,3.10;
29,24; 34,24 11,24; interval, 6,15
diabibazein, transport, 12,30; pass diastêma, distance, 6,2; 14,21
on, 14,20 diastrephein, corrupt, 31,30
diadosis, transmission, 9,21; 12,22 diateinein, extend, 11,16; 29,6
diagnôsis, means of discerning, 5,15 diatithenai, set out, 21,33; dispose;
diairein, separate, 14,3(T); divide off, 24,33; 28,13; treat of; 34,13
22,19; diêirêmenôs, dividedly, 35,6 diathesis, state, 8,4.5; condition,
diairesis, division, 15,17; distinction, 13,11
26,4 diaugês, transparent, 20,18
diairetos, divisible, 22,22 diazên, live through, 32,17
diakrinein, make distinction, 27,7; diegeirein, arouse, 3,4; 28,10
distinguish; 32,33 diegersis, arousing, 2,8
diakrisis, distinguishing, 5,16 diêkhês, transsonant, 10,19; 15,33;
dialuein, dissolve, 20,6; destroy; 16,1.5.8
21,12 diêkhêtikos, transsonic, 16,6
dielein, make a distinction, 9,7; 23,7; 24,1.12.27.29; 25,26; 27,21;
26,3(T); divide up; 4,2(T) 35,31
dieukrinein, examine thoroughly, egrêgorôs, awake, 2,16
33,1 eidenai, know, 19,27; 20,22;
di’ heautou, through itself, 31,10 33,14.16.24
diikneisthai, come through, eidêtikos, formal, 5,18; 9,34; 13,15;
17,15(T); get through; 14,16.33; 21,30
17,7(T) eidêtikôs, in a formal way, 4,12
diistanai, be at a distance, 5,27; 6,1; eidikôs, formal, 21,30
35,12; be at variance, 5,7 eidôlikos, phantasmal, 15,8.20
diixis, getting through, 14,22 eidopoiein, give form, 12,23(bis).26
diorizesthai, lay down, 5,11; make a (contr. paskhein); 13,33; 20,15;
distinction, 9,6; determine, 21,19 29,27; (with diaphorôs)
diosmos, transodorant,16,2 differentiate into various kinds,
dittos (Att.), twofold, 31,32.33; 32,5 5,12; eidopoios, that makes forms,
dokein, seeming, 15,23 20,13;
doxa, belief, 25,23; opinion, 19,11.12; eidos, form, 1,8.9.14; 2,1-3.8 passim;
23,6.16.17; 30,10 3,16.20.28; 4,17.18; 5,26; 7,14.15;
doxastikos, doxastic, 19,11 8,10.26.27.29; 9,21; 10,1.2.3.26;
dran, act, 4,10.12; 5,26; 6,1; 26,11; do, 13,8.13.21.23.25;
6,19; (pres. part.) action, 24,35 14,13-15.30.31.32; 15,9.21.22;
drastêrion, active force, 4,11; active, 17,5.13.24; 19,7; 20,19; 22,9;
5,26; active nature, 20,13 23,7.9.12.15; 24,4-25.1 passim;
drastikos, active, 5,31 25,20; 26,8.13(bis).30; 27,2;
drutomos, woodcutter, 14,28 32,26-33,4 passim; 33,14-34,21
dunamei, potentially, 16,5; passim; 35,27; type; 31,32
26,5.7.9.31; 37,9.11(bis).14; eikotôs, reasonably, 26,7
potential, 16,4; (of nous, ousia), einai, exist, 8,17; 19,9.10; 30,4.23;
26,26; 27,6.7; 28,12; 29,33; 33,9; 34,20.27; 36,7; 37,10; being,
30,16.18.22.25.30; 31,5.10.19.22; 9,14; 30,4; being (what it is),
32,31; 33,1.9; 34,5.6; 34,24-36,4 32,27(bis).29.30; tôi einai (contr.
passim; 37,21; kata dunamin, as arithmôi), in its being, 22,22 (cf.
well as we can, 7,23; in onta); einai (+ gen.), belong; 5,1;
potentiality, 22,32 22,5
dunamenos, capable, 9,17.23 eisdekhesthai, receive into itself, 7,8;
dunamis, faculty,1,16; 3,31; 5,14; receive, 27,29; eisdokhê,
10,25; 11,13; 23,5.13.15.23.24; reception, 5,22
24,19.24; 25,19.22; potentiality, eisienai, enter into, 27,25; 29,29
19,6; 22,32; 29,7; 31,12-33,20 eispherein, bring in, 16,17
passim; 37,18.19.21.34; potency, ekhein, possess, 37,25; grasp, 3,24;
2,30; 25,29; power, 4,9.13.30; 22,10; have, 14,18
5,26.31; 6,13; 13,27; 14,18; 20,27; êkhein, sound, 16,24; 17,2
22,5; 31,24 êkhos, sound, 10,20; 17,2,6; noise,
dunasthai, be able, 31,9; can; 24,11 14,28
dunaton (to), capacity, 1,7 ekkrouein, push out, 11,3; dislodge,
dunatos, capable, 26,2; 27,4; possible, 18,27
3,21; 4,6; 16,13.14; ekmattein (Att.), mould, 23,14
ekpempein, emit, 17,24; send out,
êdê, directly, 2,14; already, 6,31; 10,9; 5,24; 11,18; 17,24; ekpompê,
13,10; 19,2; 22,5; 31,23; 36,34 emission, 5,23
egeirein, arouse, rouse, 1,18; 4,29; ekphainesthai, appear, 35,10
ekphoitan, go out, 27,18.23
elleipein, be wanting, be lacking, 5,6; 30,2.5.8.10.15.18;
31,4 31,10.21(bis).22; act; 5,30;
emmenein, remain, 13,18 12,20.25; 14,19; 15,2; work, 5,30;
emphainein, display, 24,32 32,23; 36,28; actualisation, 10,30
emphainesthai, appear, 24,33 energêma, active thing (contr.
emphasis, representative image, pathêma), 2,10; action (contr.
2,8.20; 3,19; 7,12.14; 15,9.21; kinêma), 2,22; (contr. phantasma
23,12.15.22; 24,29; 25,2.9.12.19 and aisthêma); 25,22; activity
emphrassein, block, 17,3 (contr. energeia), 23,20
emphutos, within its nature, 31,15 energêtikos, involving activity, 15,11;
empoiein, have (an effect), 6,10 active, 22,31; 28,11; capable of
enantios, opposite, 3,20.21.25; 4,8.9; activity, 28,30
22,1.10 energêtikôs, actively, 21,31;
enantiôsis, contrariety, 19,1 28,6.7.28; (contr. ousiôdôs) 29,33
enargês, clear, 4,14; 13,17.24; engi(g)nesthai, come in, 3,29; come
evident, 4,5; obvious, 18,18 to be in, 2,31; occur, 9,20.22.30; be
enargôs, clearly, 24,32; with clarity, produced, 2,8; 13,11; arise in,
4,32 17,13
endeiknunai, show, 9,3; enkataleipein, leave, 9,21
demonstrate, 32,19 enkhumos, with flavour, 18,3; mê
endidonai, transmit, 2,21; give, 28,28 enkhumon, flavourless, 18,4
energeia, actuality, 2,13.27; 6,25.30; entelekheia, actuality, 36,4 (T)
7,31.34; 8,16; 9,5.34; 10,24; 13,13; (entelekheiai, in actuality,
26,17; 27,9; 29,25; 30,23.30; 31,4; Bywater)
activity, 2,4.24; 3,10-34 passim; entelekheiai, actually, 35,28; in
4,15.26; 5,6; 7,13; 9,1.4.5.25; actuality, 35,32(T)
10,2.12; 11,25; 12,18-13,1 passim; enulos, enmattered, 14,14; 32,29-34,2
13,28-14,32 passim; passim; 34,15; 36,7; 37,10-32
15,11.14.21.32; 17,5-24 passim; passim; involved in matter
18,27; 21,30.34; 22,15(bis).18.27; (Comp.), 13,22; in matter, 36,30
23,21 (contr. energêma); 23,26; enulôs, enmattered, 34,11
24,3.4.7.18; 25,1; 27,28; 28,2-24 enuparkhein, exist in, 8,2; 13,4; be
passim; 29,13; 29,31-30,19 inside, 17,1; be present in, 36,8
passim; 31,24-33 passim; epagein, bring in, 7,26; 9,6; 37,16;
32,10.11.24; being active, 23,25; add, 10,5; 15,25; 17,26; 26,1
actualisation, 8,30; 9,10.24; 26,12; epagomenon (to), implication, 29,18
37,20; energeiai, actually, 16,5; epaisthanesthai, be aware, 2,16
26,21; 27,19.21.23.26; 34,6.30.32; epakolouthein, follow on, 5,16; 25,15
37,12; in actuality, 26,6; 27,16; epanakalein, call back, 30,14
30,23.30; 31,3.6; 33,7; 34,24; 35,5; epaphê, contact, 10,10
37,33; actual, 16,4; 35,3.5; kat’ epereisis, impression, 5,5; 10,5
energeian, in actuality, 7,13; 13,7; eph’ heautês, of its own accord, 35,13
17,26; 22,25; 31,9; 37,1.26; actual, eph’ heautôi, in its own power, 27,13;
36,35; 37,1.2; connected with 29,15
activity, 3,22; 17,26 ephaptein, come in contact, 5,21; be
energein, be in an active state, in contact, 5,27; (Med.) hold, 3,27
1,13.17; be an activity, 15,4; be epharmozein, fit, 3,1; 5,7; 7,15
active, 2,4-6,30; 3,5; 3,19-4,20 epigi(g)nesthai, arise, 17,13; come
passim; 7,8; 10,32; 12,6-8; upon, 29,27; supervene, 14,30.31
13,27.29.31; 15,13.16; epikaluptein, conceal, 11,2; cover up,
22,16.17.21.23.29.30; 23,8.10.11; 16,19
26,14; 27,28.32; 28,7.10; 29,2; epikrateia, predominance, 21,15
epikratein, predominate, 20,2.32 exairetos, special, 6,17; 10,22
epikrinein, have extra awareness, exêgêtês, expositor, 32,34
21,34 exêgeisthai, interpret, 34,8
epikrisis, awareness, 24,1 exô, external, 15,32; 16,23; 20,3,30;
epiktêtôs, adventitious, 21,15 outwards, 27,24; 30,9; 31,2;
epilamprunein, illuminate, 12,9 outside, 1,21.22; 14,23; 16,9;
epinoia, thought, 34,3-5.7.9.11.13 22,30; 33,3; 36,13.27; 37,2
epiphainesthai, come to appear, 2,8 exô keimenon, external object, 35,2;
epiphaneia, surface, 8,23 that which lies outside, 7,8; 14,23
epipherein, bear in, 11,17; bring in, exomoiôsis, becoming like, 1,8.14
17,14; involve, 3,32 exomoioun, make like, 4,11
episêmainein, approve, 17,28; make exomoiousthai, become like, 1,4.7
a distinction, 35,24; indicate, 37,5
episkêptein, urge, 20,1 gê, earth, 8,7.14.15.17.19.22; 16,21;
epistasthai, know2, 29,28; actually 19,12; 20,12; 25,14
know, 29,28.33; 31,6.20.21; geômetrikos, of the measurement of
understand, 34,7 the earth, 25,14
epistêmê, knowledge2, 30,17; 31,17; genesiourgos, connected with
36,26.27.31.34; 37,1.3.25 generation, 23,20
epistêmôn, (be) know(ing)2, 31,8 genesis, creation, 8,11; coming to be
epistêmonikos, cognitive2, 29,32; <something>, 31,12.25
connected with knowledge2, 31,24 genos, genus, 32,16
epistêton, object of knowledge2, geusis, taste, 10,18; 12,5; 16,2;
30,11.12; 31,5-7; 36,29; 37,2 18,3.5.9.10.13; geustikos, of taste,
epistêtos, known2, 36,26.29.32(bis) 4,3
epistrephesthai, revert, 2,28; 22,6 geustos, of taste, 18,1; what can be
epitarassein, disturb, 7,26 tasted, 18,2; tastable, 7,28; 11,11
epitêdeios, suitable, 5,27; 15,4; 25,8 gi(g)nesthai, arise, 14,22; become,
epitêdeiotês, suitability, 6,28; 8,11; 10,21; 20,30; 27,8.14; 29,18;
14,20; 21,13; suitable state, 5,31 31,8(bis).19; be in a state of
epitelein, make complete, 6,9; becoming, 31,8; come to be
perfect, 11,12; complete, 36,35 <something>, 31,13; come into
epiteleioun, complete, 11,1 being, 37,24.34; occur, 3,28;
epizêtein, enquire, 11,19 16,10.15; 17,8; 24,24; 35,2;
epokheisthai, be borne, happen, 14,31; be, 17,12; 18,10
12,21.28(bis).31 gi(g)nôskein, know, 1,13; 5,2;
ergon, function, 22,20 19,16(bis); 20,23; 29,27.30; know1,
eristikon, sophistry, 25,28 30,20; 31,3.20; 33,7.10.11.17.23;
eskhatos, on the lowest level, 26,7 37,32
eskotismenos, dim, 5,4 glôtta (Att.), tongue, 4,1.3(bis); 13,21;
euapolutos, easily resolved, 7,28 15,27; 18,8.17.28
eulogos, reasonable, 7,25(T); 11,27; glukus, sweet, 3,35; glukazein, make
20,11 sweet, 13,20
eulogôs, with reason, 29,6 gnêsios, genuine, 32,34
euôdês, fragrant, 17,10 gnôrizein, know, 4,18.20; 5,3.7;
euoristos, easily delimitable, 20,14.20 21,18; 22,6
euparadektos, easily receive, 20,14 gnôrizesthai, become acquainted,
eupathês, easily affected, 20,12.14 33,17
euphulaktos, easy to keep in, 16,11 gnôristikos, able to know, 21,20;
eupilêtos, dense, 16,11 cognitive, 2,32; having
exaireisthai, transcend, 20,26; 22,17; knowledge, 4,22
24,17; be transcendent, 37,14.15 gnôsis, piece of knowledge, 1,12;
knowledge, 1,10; 4,22; 26,21; heterôs, in a different way, 20,13;
knowledge1, 34,16.20; 27,26; 33,25.29.32; 34,3
36,15.35(bis) heterotês, difference, 3,26; otherness,
gnôstikos, cognitive, 2,28; 6,13 35,8.10.20.30; variety, 5,13.19
gnôston, known object, object known, heterokinêtos, be moved by
1,11.13; 29,29; object of something else, 28,9; 35,20
knowledge1, 35,11.13; 37,3 hexis, disposition, 31,11.12.23.25-7;
gnôstos, knowable, 19,12; known, 32,18.20(bis).24
19,9.11; that which it knows1 37,1 heuriskein, discover, 29,29; find,
gnôstôs, by a cognitive1 act, 30,2 34,20; (find out), 31,11.23
graphein, write, 35,28 hidrumenos, settled, 2,33
hienai, send out, 7,30; come, 12,30;
hama, simultaneous, 3,34; 7,12; 27,9; 36,2
14,29; at the same time, 2,5.7.14; hikanos, sufficient, 1,10; 2,26; 7,1;
3,21,24-6.34; 4,8; 13,33; 15,3; 9,7; 11,9
25,10; 27,31; 30,7(bis).15.19; 31,15 histanai, exist, 2,14; come into
hapax, once, 24,11.13.28 existence, 1,12; arise, 3,30; (be)
haphê, touch, 4,5; 19,15 set up, 13,8; consist in, 2,24; be
haplous, simple, 8,6(bis).25; 19,17.18; situated, 30,22; stand still, 9,15;
20,11.31.32; 21,1.3.4.14; 30,4; be, 24,19
haplôs, tout court, 10,14; hoios te, capable, 1,18; possible, 3,21;
straightforwardly, 17,2; simply, 4,9; 8,6; can, 8,4
3,29; 6,4; 19,29; 20,1; 28,14 holos, whole, 1,19; 2,3; 23,17;
haptesthai, be in contact, 17,8 32,27.29; 34,16; 36,20(bis); as
haptikos, related to touch, 16,3; of whole, 30,6.10; as a whole, 2,14;
touch, 18,25 12,22.33(bis); 13,1.4.13; 30,6.10;
haptikôs, by touching, 18,4 holoi di’ holôn, wholes through
haptos, touchable, 19,15 wholes, 28,10; 34,16; 36,20(bis)
hêdus, pleasant, 22,28 holôs, entirely, 2,5; 36,27; generally,
hê epi to katô phora, being carried 8,26; in general, 9,31; 27,27; 28,9;
downwards, 10,27 wholly, 28,16; 29,8; at all, 11,7;
heis, one, 1,10.11; 2,28.31.33(bis); 3,1; 26,30.31
5,11.14; 8,5; 22,3.5.19.22.25; 28,1; holotês, wholeness, 21,4
30,13; 32,2.7(tris) homogenês, homogeneous, 7,25(T);
hêkein, come, 7,30 15,25
hêliakos, of the sun, 25,23 homoios, like, 2,2.17; 15,29(bis);
hêlioeidês, like the sun, 20,16 16,4(bis); 19,4(bis); resembling,
hêlios, sun, 9,9; 11,4; 25,14.18; 26,24 4,27; similar, 7,25(T); 15,31; 16,8;
henôsis, union, 22,20; 26,20.25; 27,16; 24,14; the same, 33,6
35,14.23; unity, 22,8(bis); 27,18; homoiôs, similarly, 14,16.17; in the
32,5; 33,6; 35,4 same way, 15,3; 31,11.22; the
henoun, unite, 22,19; 26,17.27; 27,30; same, 15,29; 21,28; in a similar
35,15.17.24; 36,20.21; 37,5; unify, relation, 17,28.30;18,18; in a
34,16; 35,4; to hênômenon, unity, similar way, 21,22
35,29; hênômenôs, in unity, 35,33 homoiôsis, becoming like, 1,5;
hepesthai, follow, 11,6; 18,8 3,28.33; 4,22
hepomenôs, derivative, in a homoiotês, likeness, 7,13; 23,15;
derivative way, 11,8.10; in homoiôma, likeness, 2,9; 3,5,14
consequence, 25,11 homoioun, make like, 2,7; 3,18.20;
heteroioun, make different, 33,31 4,23
heteros, different, 22,2; 33,25.29; 34,3 homologein, (T) agree, 10,16
homônumôs, homonymously, 28,11;
kath’ homônumian, huperlampros, exceedingly bright,
homonymously, 27,27 26,27
homophuia, kinship, 27,19 huperphuês, extraordinary, beyond
horan, see 6,3-7,6 passim; 7,31; 8,28; nature, 10,24.28
10,3.4.6.7.8.13; 11,2-23 passim; huphesis, inferior position, 36,2
12,16; 13,27; 14,27; 15,3.13.14; huphiesthai, be inferior, 36,3
17,27.32(bis); 18,15; 25,14; seeing, huphistanai, subsist, 2,32; 3,12;
5,19 15,23; 33,22.24; 34,11.15(bis)
horasis, sense of sight 6,8; 10,10; hupidomenos, glancing, 35,25
12,29; 13,26; 16,10 hupobainein, descend, 26,17;
horatikos, that can see, 27,17.23; 35,20
6,12.19.20.26; of seeing, 11,12 hupobasis, descent, 34,22; 35,9.17.30
horaton, object seen, 6,1; 14,8; 17,17 hupodokhê, receptacle, 6,27;
horatos, visible, 6,18-20; reception, 6,28; 8,12; 25,8; 27,2
10,14(bis).15; 11,6.7.8.11.12; seen, hupokeimenon, substrate,
6,4; 7,1.8.27(T?); 8,1; 13,9; 14,8; substratum, 9,26; 12,25; 15,33;
15,1.3; 17,17 25,19; object, 15,14; 23,9; 24,26
horizesthai, be contained, 32,4; be hupokeimenos, underlying, 25,29
determined, 23,26; 28,30; 35,6.8; hupolambanein, suppose, 11,18
bounded, 8,19; with limits, 6,23 hupolêpsis, apprehension, 23,6
horistikos, definitive, 34,23 hupomimnêskein, record, 9,24;
horman, wish, 24,29 remind, 36,24; suggest, 34,29
hormê, volition, 10,27.29 huponoein, conceive, 28,11
horos, limit, 20,13; determination, hupopherein, carry down, 31,17
3,13; 35,4.7.18; determining hupostasis, hypostasis, 3,7; nature,
power, 35,22 32,28.29; state, 26,19
hôsautôs, equally, 4,16 hupotithenai, suppose, 21,11; 30,26;
hôsautôs ekhein, in the same 31,28
condition, 31,28; 33,26.28 hupotupousthai, receive an outline,
hudôr, water, 6,30; 8,2.7.23; 9,11; 14,6
16,6.8.10(bis).11; 19,17.23.24;
20,14.30 iamblikheios, of Iamblichus, 23,13
hugrainein, moisten, 18,2 Iamblikhos, Iamblichus, 24,2;
hugros, moist, 12,5; 15,27.30.31; 32,13.34
18,2-6 passim; 20,2.29; liquid, idikôs, properly, 8,24
20,19 idiôma, property, 10,11; peculiarity,
hugron, moisture, 16,2(bis).6 24,20
hugrotês, moisture, 18,7 idios, special, 4,14.32; 21,17.26;
hulê, matter, 1,8; 3,29; 13,32; 22,17; own, 7,32; 12,2; 25,17;
26,2.4.7.8.12; 27,4; 29,27; 30,31; proper, 10,17; private, 12,25;
32,32; 33,21-34,8 passim; peculiar, 21,28
34,17.31; 36,11(bis); 37,18.19; idiôs, in a special way, 23,18
material, 13,29; hulikos, material, idiotês, special nature, 36,3; property,
15,17; 25,29; 27,3; by matter, 36,16 37,13
humên, membrane, 20,18 ikhnos, trace, 6,28; 9,18; 25,5
huparkhein, exist, 2,31; 13,15; 19,1; iskhein, possess, 29,32
34,6; 37,16-32 passim iskhuros, strong, 13,27
huperanekhein, superior standing, isôs, equally, 9,3; 15,8.24; ex isou,
24,28 equally, 32,13
huperballein, be excessive, 6,5
huperbolê, excess, 22,27 kakia, evil, 32,10
kalein, call, 10,3; 28,17; 29,16
kata to auto, in the same respect, 4,9 separate level, 9,27; as a separate
katalampein, illuminate, 15,13 thing, 12,17.31; 13,2
katalampsis, illumination, 26,22.33 khoros, company, 32,6
kataleipein, leave, 9,18 khrêizein, need, 10,24
katalêptos, apprehensible, 4,19 khreia, need, 6,17
katateinein, stretch out, 23,22 khrêsimos, useful, 7,4; 11,26; 16,18
katatetagmenos, allocated to matter, khrêsis, use, 28,26
1,19 khrêsthai, use, 5,17; 12,25; 23,10;
katekhein, confine, 5,29 24,26; 28,22; 29,2; 30,11; 33,3;
kathareuein, be pure, 28,18 34,11
katharos, clear, 20,18 khrôma, colour, 1,6; 4,34; 5,25;
katharôs, purely, 26,21.26; 27,17; 6,22.26; 7,6.29.32; 8,19.22;
31,14; 33,2 11,14.17.20; 12,9.15.27;
katharotês, purity, 14,19 13,30.31.33; 14,5.6.9; khrônnunai,
kathêkein, come down, 25,2 colour, 7,34
katheudein, sleep, 2,16 khronikôs, temporally, 36,2
kath’ heauto, in itself, 6,24; 7,27.34; khronos, time, 2,10; 4,6.20; 14,31
10,34; 11,9; 22,29-31.33; 23,23; khrôzein, colour, 8,8.19
30,26; 36,23 khumos, taste, 1,6; flavour, 7,28;
kath’ heauton, of itself, 2,28; 5,14; 10,17(bis); 15,27
10,32; 12,14; 14,2; by itself, 4,19; kinein, move, 1,4; 2,4-6; 4,30; 9,14;
22,17 10,18.28.32; 11,14.19; 12,3-24
kath’ hekasta, particular, 4,32; 5,15 passim; 13,5.14.28.31; 16,24;
katienai, come down, 23,22 17,16.17; 21,24.31; 23,7.9.12;
katoptron, mirror, 15,18 24,4.7-10; 26,10; 29,13; movement
keisthai, lie, 37,3 comes about, 11,15; set in motion,
keimenon, see exô 14,29; 15,28; 24,11.13.26.29;
kekhalasmenon, looseness, 27,15 25,25; 29,15; produce movement,
kenos, empty, 11,26 21,28.29
kêros, wax, 23,26 kinêma, motion, 2,6.19.22 (cf.
khalazein, loosen, 26,19; 35,14 energêma)
khalasmos, loosening, 35,15 kinêsis, motion, 16,12; 28,22;
kharaktêr, distinguishing mark, 1,14 movement, 2,12; 4,11; 5,1; 10,27;
kharaktêrizein, characterize, 19,7; 11,19; 12,16; 13,6.8; 14,30;
21,1; 23,18; give characteristics, 16,24(bis); 17,3.6; 21,17.19-21.23;
8,27 23,25; 28,5.24; 31,16; 35,1
kheir, hand, 18,15 kinêtikos, movable, 28,21; which
kheirôn, inferior, 10,28; worse, 31,17 moves, 5,25; 12,14
khôra, standing, 29,25 klasis, bending, 15,8.10.18
khôris, apart, 22,7.8 koinônein, share, 24,15
khôrizein, separate, 20,4; 21,1; 28,1; koinos, common, 2,22; 4,15-17,33;
34,3-28 passim; 36,6; set apart, 5,1.2; 6,16; 7,14.25(T); 16,6-8;
34,5 19,18; 20,3.28; 21,16-22,18
khôrismos, separation, 36,3 passim; 32,3; 33,14; general, 5,9;
khôristos, separable, 33,32; separate, in a broad sense, 28,19
1,16; 2,24; 3,7; 9,24; 12,19; 14,1; komizein, bring, (18,23 Bywater’s
22,5.11; 24,31; 26,7.20.22.26.34; conjecture)
27,15.18; 28,14; 31,2; 34,8-28 korê, eye-jelly, 16,10
passim; 36,6.12(bis) kreitton (to), superiority, 10,24; the
khôristôs, separately, 9,15; better, 31,18; the superior,
12,21.23.26; 33,22(bis); on a 28,27.31; 29,1; 37,22
kreittôn, (Att.) on a higher level,
4,16; superior, 10,29(bis); 32,2.15; meli, honey, 13,21
33,20 menein, be stable, stay the same,
kreittonôs, superior, 10,30; on a 30,5.7.13.17.21; 31,15; 32,17;
higher level, 33,9.16; 37,21 remain, 9,28; 20,31; 21,4; 31,28;
krinein, be aware, 2,18; 3,6.26; 36,13.28
22,10.13.20.22; 33,25(T); become menôn, permanent, 31,4
conscious (of), 5,6; cognise, 34,4 merikos, made particular, 33,12;
krinon (to), the cognitive element, individual, 29,8.25; 32,13.16
18,20 merismos, division, 2,20; 5,18
krisis, awareness, 2,13; 3,10.16.22; meristos, partial, 32,18; particular,
4,25; judgment, 7,16 2,31; divisible, 2,10; 3,23; 4,4.7;
kritikos, having awareness, 19,7; 24,31; 26,16; divided off, 22,17;
aware, 4,29; 19,4; 21,9; 33,27 divided, 30,10.15; divided up,
kritikôs, in a conscious way, 6,11 24,15
kruphios, hidden, 30,8 meristôs, as divided up, 24,6
kurios, proper, 17,10; 37,27; merizein, divide up, 1,10; 2,25.27;
responsible, 5,14 22,7; 35,11; divide off, 22,4;
kuriôs, properly, 9,4; in the proper divide, 5,15; 29,31; division, 5,1
sense, 27,27; strictly, 28,19; meros, part, 3,24.35; 4,1; kata meros,
properly so-called, 18,23; in its particular, 3,2; 5,10; 22,2;
primary sense, 34,13; important, individual, 2,31; para meros, in
5,18 turn, 8,13.23; 9,11; 32,4
mesos, intermediate, 19,3; 34,23;
lampros, shining, that shine, 8,28; middle, 2,12; 23,20; 32,16; ana
10,2.31; 11,22; 12,2.8; bright, 6,7; meson, intermediate, 14,23; in the
7,2; 10,31; 11,4 middle, 18,14; 23,20; 32,16;
lamprotês, brightness, 7,1 meson, medium, 5,20; 7,3;
lamprunein, illuminate, 12,20 11,20.21.23
leios, smooth, 15,9.12.15.17.21 mesotês, intermediate position, 31,16;
leptos, fine, 20,17 middle position, 19,1;
leukos, white, 3,2(bis); 17,30; 33,12 intermediacy, 32,14
lithos, stone, 18,14 metaballein, change, 20,31; 24,35;
logikos, rational, 23,6; 24,2; 29,5.17; 30,5-28 passim; 32,11.14.17.19
33,2.13; 34,25; 35,10; reasoning, metablêtos, changeable, 32,15
25,1; of reason, 25,7 metabolê, alteration, 27,10; 28,15
logizesthai, reason, 4,19 (both T); change, 30,16; 31,15,26;
logos, account, 5,9; 15,31; ratio, 32,12.20
19,5-21,12 passim; argument, 9,9; metalambanein, receive, 20,27
21,32; reason, 19,11; 33,2 metalêpsis, partaking, 20,30; 21,15
logos (see n. 3), 1,8; 2,29-5.7 passim; metapherein, transfer, 28,26
7,15; 13,16; 22,21.23; 23,8.27; metaxu, gap, 6,29; between, 12,4.5;
26,9; 32,5-33,30 passim; 35,1; 13,19.21; 16,10; 18,22; the (thing)
36,31 between, 12,1.2; the (space)
luein, dissolve, 22,27 between, 7,10; 11,26; in between,
lukhniaios, of a lantern, 11,4 10,21; 13,17; 16,2; 18,9.11.12.13;
in the middle, 18,28; (the)
manthanein, learn, 31,10.23 medium, 10,10; 11,24; 12,16;
matên, for no reason, 11,27 14,20.23; 17,13.16.23.24; 18,30;
megethos, size, 5,1; 14,9; 19,16(bis); 20,10.21
21,18.24.26.28; 25,23; quantity, metekhein, share, 13,24; 20,27;
19,5(bis) partake, 8,13.27.29; participate,
melas, black, 17,30
5,12; 20,20.27; 29,16.24; 33,1; nous, intellect, 20,27; 23,17.22;
34,25; 35,16.17; 36,2 26,2-27.7 passim; 27,20-28,6
methexis, participation, 35,5 passim; 28,12-29,23 passim;
metron, size, 6,1.6 30,26.31(bis); 32,31; 33,12.16;
mignunai, mix, 12,6; 19,19 34,1-35,5 passim; 35,17-36,8
miktos, mixed, 20,29-31; 21,15 passim; 36,13.21; 37,11-33 passim
mixis, mixture, 8,14; 16,9; 19,2; 20,7; nun (to nun), the present, 2,14
21,5; 34,18 nux, night, 6,22
monimos, stable, 30,5.8; 31,15;
32,14.15 oiesthai, think, 32,1
monoeidês, of one kind, 30,4; oikeios, own, 2,4; 4,28.29; 21,4;
uniform, 31,14; 32,8 22,11.15; 23,8; 26,11; 28,5.19;
monoeidôs, uniformly, 13,4 33,28.30; 36,22; akin, 3,4;
morion, particle, 13,18; part, 4,4.6; appropriate, 18,6; proper, 4,16;
25,4 6,16; 7,33; 18,5; connected with,
morphê, shape, 1,7; 3,9; 4,10; 7,30
15,7(T).24(T); 21,19(T).29.31; oikeiôs, appropriately, 4,30; 5,17; in
25,26 its proper sense, 35,23.24
morphôtikos, having shape, 24,15.31 oikeiotês, appropriateness, 4,32
morphoun, give shape, 5,22.25; 12,11 omma, eye, 12,18; 25,3
onoma, name, 28,23.25.26; 29,6
nephos, cloud, 16,21 onomazein, name, 9,6
Nestorios, Nestorius, 32,35 onta, entities, 25,22; 34,20.27; 36,12
neusis, inclination, 1,17 ontôs, real, 18,8; 29,23; really,
noein, conceive, 15,12; think, 21,3(bis); 34,9.10.14.21; tôi onti,
27,13.29; 29,10-35 passim; really, 20,25
30,27(bis).28; 33,7.9; ophthalmos, eye, 7,6
36,14.18.19.20.23; 37,15.25.29.30; opsis, sight, 4,34; 5,4.10.20.22.26;
think of, 33,22; 34,10; 37,22; 6,2.17; 7,2.7; 10,29.32; 11,21;
know, 30,23.24; grasp 12,7-31 passim; 13,15; 14,6;
(intelligible), 28,17; understand, 15,21.33; 16,6; 17,16; 18,10.22;
9,7 19,24; 21,18.24.25; 22,12
noeros, intellective, 23,19; 24,2; optikos, visual, 20,17
26,17; 31,14; 33,31; 34,18; 35,32; orektikos, of desire, 25,7
36,15 organikos, connected with a
noerôs, in an intellective sense, 35,2 sense-organ, 5,17
noêtikos, intellective, 33,28 organon, organ, 1,19; 2,22;
noêton, object of intellect, 26,14.18; 5,12.13.16; 10,13; 21,11; 22,11;
28,29; 35,30; 36,14.17; object of 23,11; 25,6.7
thought, 36,20.21.23(bis).24; osmê, smell, 13,18; 17,9
37,12.17.23(bis).24; be thought, osphrainesthai, smell, 16,13; 19,28;
36,19 20,28; smelling, 5,19
noêtos, intelligible, 26,19; 26,22-27,1 osphrantikos, connected with smell,
passim; 27,8.14.20.30.32; 28,2-29 16,18; capable of smelling, 19,29
passim; 30,12; 36,8; osphranton, object of smell, object
37,10(bis).14.23.25.27.29 smelt, 13,16; 19,27; sensation of
noêtôs, in the realm of intellect, 34,15 smell, 14,14
nomizein, believe, 7,9; think, 18,24 osphrêsis, smelling, 13,16; 16,20;
nooumenon, object of thought, 36,13; smell, 12,4; 14,10; 16,1.8.16; 17,9;
thing which is thought, 29,20; 19,25
thought, 36,13.25; 37,4.7.9 ouranios, heavenly, 6,13; 15,11
nooun, thinker, 36,12; 37,4.6.9.14 ous, ear, 16,15; 17,3
ousia, substance, 4,30.31; 21,9; 12,18.23.27.32; 13,2.13.33; 17,13;
29,16.31.32; 30,3.8; 31,12; 24,8-10.16.23; 25,25; 26,10; 29,2;
31,25-32,2 passim; 32,9.10.18.25; 30,16
33,13.15.16.17; being 4,20; 26,13; parousia, presence, 9,17.31; 13,3;
30,18; entity, 36,12; existence, 14,26
19,12; kat’ ousian, essentially, paskhein, undergo effect, 14,6; be
26,9; 35,18.27; 36,21.22; 37,10.28; passively affected, 9,2.4 (contr.
in reality, 34,5; in its very being, poiein); 9,30; 12,19.26 (contr.
28,12; kata tên oikeian ousian, in eidopoieisthai); be affected, 1,4;
their own essence, 36,22 2,2.16; 3,21.35; 5,8.27; 12,12;
ousiôdês, essential, 26,15; 31,4 13,10; 14,11.14; 15,30; 16,4;
essentially, 8,14.15 substantial, 17,4.20(bis); 18,18.26; 19,2; 21,25;
3,11.12 22,12.13; 27,8.11.17.27(bis);
ousiôdôs, in its substance, (contr. 28,27.29; be acted upon, 5,28.31;
energêtikôs 29,33) 30,1; 6,3 (all contr. poiein); 6,8 (contr.
essentially, 8,13.20.29; 20,31 energein); receive effect, 14,34;
ousiousthai, have, be given, effect to occur, 14,29; be passive,
substantial existence, 31,7; 33,22; 11,16 (contr. poiein)
be brought into actuality, 1,17 pathê, effect, 3,34; pathêma, effect,
oxus, high, 17,25.27.29.32 1,14; 2,15.19; 13,6; 24,23; passive
effect, 2,17; affect, 9,5; passive
pantêi, entirely, 2,3; 22,2; 26,17; thing, (contr. energema); 2,10;
27,18; 31,28; 32,8.15.23; 34.22; thing undergone, 9,19 (cf. pathos)
35,11; in every way, 28,18; 32,11; pathêtikos, passive, 13,11; 28,16.21;
utterly, 30,21 34,32
pantelês, complete, 35,20 pathêtikôs, in a passive way, 13,5; to
pantelôs, entirely, 1,15; 27,22; 35,17; produce a passive effect, 4,14;
completely, 32,2 13,14; passively, 28,6.7.13
pantodapôs, in all kinds of ways, pathos, attribute, 19,7.19; effect,
24,27 passive effect, 2,1.3.21;
pantôs, entirely, 4,4; 31,22; at all 3,15(bis).22.23; 6,10; 8,3.4.9;
events, 9,32; in every case, 16,19; 9,13.26; 13,9.15.25;
19,26; absolutely, 21,23 14,12.13.30.32-4; 15,1.10.19;
paraballein, compare, 11,6 18,27; 19,3; 21,20; 23,25; 27,10;
parabolê, relationship, 11,5; 28,9-26 passim; effect produced,
comparison, 17,33 28,4; affect, 4,14; thing
paradeigma, simile, 35,26 undergone, 9,19 (cf. pathêma);
paradekhesthai, receive, 23,18 suffering, 32,10; en pathei, being
paradokhê, receiving, 23,26 affected, 27,12
paradosis, what has been handed peisis, effect, 6,1.4.6; passive effect,
down, 7,22 7,12
parakeleuein, recommend, 27,5 pepêrômenos, maimed, 20,22
paraphunai, develop naturally peras, surface, 8,21; edge, 6,23; limit,
beside, 23,13; be cognate, 24,19 6,27; 8,9(T).19
parapodizein, hinder, 10,11; 11,25; periekhein, contain, 6,14; 20,19;
be a hindrance, 17,5; interfere, 6,5 26,8.14
parateinein, stretch out, 2,11; periektikos, container, 26,13
extend, 8,30 perigraphein, circumscribe, 5,29;
paratrepein, turn off, 5,8 confine within a compass, 9,22
parekhesthai, provide, 7,4.10; 8,12; perikosmios, of this world, 32,16
31,32 perilambanein, encompass, 2,13
pareinai, be present, 1,20; perilêpsis, encompassment, 1,12
perilêptikos, comprehending, 2,33 phusis, nature, 8,1(T); 9,7(T); 26,2(T);
periousia, superiority, 11,11 27,4(T?); 30,15.25; 31,13(T);
Peripatêtikoi, Peripatetics, 9,13 32,22(T); kata phusin, natural,
periphanôs, conspicuously, 6,21 10,29; in accordance with nature,
phainesthai, appear, 15,23; 31,8; 15,10
seem, 26,1 pikros, bitter, 3,38
phainomenon, appearance, 20,11 Platôn, Plato, 15,8.20; 19,12
phantasia, imagination, 1,19; platônikos, on the Platonic view, 21,3
23,3-24,30 passim; 25,13; 29,5.25; plêgê, blow, 13,9; 14,29; 16,23;
image, 24,22(T).33 (contr. striking, 16,15
phantasma); 25,9 (contr. plêktikôs, strikingly, 4,13
emphasis); 25,11 plêrês, full, 34,16; 36,15
phantasma, image, 23,17; plêroun, fill, 13,4
24,1.12.16.24(T).27.34 (contr. plêttein, strike, 4,32; 13,5; 14,27;
phantasia); 25,15-17.21 15,1; 17,7; 18,14.16
phantastikos, by the imagination, Ploutarkhos, Plutarch, 32,35; 34,8;
25,17; connected with the 37,20
imagination, 25,8.9; of pneuma, breath, 16,18; 18,21; blast,
imagination, 25,7; capable of 16,22; air, 4,3.7; 25,11; spirit,
imagining, 25,12 25,11
phantastikôs, with imagination, 33,3 podiaios, a foot across, 25,14
phantaston, object of imagination, poiein, do, 17,16; make, 29,14; 32,2;
1,21; connected with imagination, act, 5,28.31; 6,3 (all contr.
24,35 paskhein); be active, 9,4; 11,16
phantazesthai, imagine, 25,14 (both contr. paskhein); produce,
pharunx, windpipe, 19,30 9,27; 13,26; 14,6;
philosophein, (produce) 17,18.19(bis).20(bis); 23,19
philosophical results, 7,18 poiêsis, act of production, 17,19;
philosophôs, philosophically, 34,29 20,21(bis)
phônê, the sound of the voice, 12,33; poikilia, complications, 7,7
sound, 13,1.7; 14,12.26.30.32; poikillein, embroider, 24,28
15,28; voice, 22,24.26 poiotês, quality, 4,29.31; 9,13; 16,3;
phôs, light, 6,17.24.26(bis).28(bis); 19,8; 33,12.15
7,5.10.29.33(bis).34; 8,11-30 poros, pore, 16,18
passim; 9,5-10,4 passim; posotês, quantity, 19,8
10,15.22.32.33; 11,2.5.7(bis).9; pothen, how (or, with what), 19,22
12,12.13(bis); 13,30-14,5 passim; pragma, object, 11,3; thing, 27,15.30;
15,9.11.15; 17,27.28.29.31(bis); 29,18-30,1 passim; 30,12.18.22;
20,17.19; 26,28 33,8.32; 34,21-35,14 passim;
phôteinos, light-giving, 8,29 36,14.28; 37,28
phôtizein, give light, 6,31; 7,30; proagein, bring forward, 28,8
8,30(T); 10,21; 12,7.9.10.17; proballein, project, 1,14; 3,3(bis).8;
15,2.13.16; light up, 7,6; 4,27; 7,15; 24,9.12.30; 25,11;
illuminate, 8,22; 10,9; 11,22; 12,15 29,29; 30,14
phôtoeidês, like light, 6,26; luminous, problêtikos, projective, 25,26; 30,17;
10,12 31,24
phôtourgos, that produces light, 8,15 probolê, projection, 2,25; 4,26; 13,16;
phtheirein, destroy, 20,6; 22,27 23,8.27; 25,17; 26,10; 35,2; kata
phunai, be natural, 9,33; by nature, probolên, in connection with
10,28 projection, 31,4
phusikos, natural, 4,10; kata to prodiarthrein, give a preliminary
phusikon, scientifically, 20,11 analysis, 36,10
proêgeisthai, initiate, 1,15; take 26,15; 27,19; 29,2; 29,11-30,7
precedence, 5,18 passim; 30,21; 31,3.14.26;
proêgoumenos, major factor, 5,13 32,9.13.16; 33,2.18; 34,25; 35,6;
proêgoumenôs, taking the initiative, 36,1.33; 37,8
1,18; primarily, 21,9.21; primary, psukhesthai, become cold, 4,6
10,31.33; 11,6.10; 37,3 psukhikos, of the soul, 2,25;
proerkhesthai, proceed, 4,31; come connected with the soul,
outwards, 31,2 26,6.12.26
proienai, go on, 9,22; go out, 9,10; psukhros, cold, 33,12
15,21; 30,16; proceed, 29,32; puknos, dense, 15,12
30,3.6.9; 32,25; 33,15; advance pur, fire, 7,2; 8,7-10,12 passim; 13,29;
outward, 7,7 19,18; 20,13.20; 33,14
prokatalambanein, occupy purios, fiery, 20,16.19
beforehand, 18,7 Puthagoreioi, Pythagoreans, 20,16
prokatarkhein, begin beforehand,
13,6; be first cause, 23,24 rhopê, tendency, 29,10; 31,17
prolambanein, receive beforehand,
2,29 sarx, flesh, 18,17.18.21.24
prolampein, light up, 6,21 siôpê, silence, 5,5
propherein, adduce, 35,26 skhêma, shape, 14,9.12
prosagein, bring towards, 29,11 skhêmatizein, give a shape, 14,11
prosbolê, application, 21,12 skhesis, relationship, 21,6.8(bis);
prosdeisthai, need in addition, 8,28; 26,15; relation, 22,31; 32,5
need more, 8,29 skiagraphia, shadow-painting, 15,22
prosêkein, be appropriate to, 22,9 skotopoios, darkness-producing,
prosekhês, nearer 15,4; near by, 4,15; 11,25; that makes darkness, 8,15
adjacent, 24,25; contiguous, 33,10 skotos, darkness, 7,2;
prosekhôs, immediate, 23,9 8,12.15.16.18.20; 9,12; 10,3.5.7;
proseoikenai, be similar, 23,19; 22,11
resemble, 32,6 sôma, body, 1,10.16; 2,1.3.25.33;
prospiptein, fall upon, 12,29; 16,20; 3,7.12.23; 4,4; 5,24; 6,11.12;
17,10; 18,11.26 8,4(bis).8.26; 9,12.13.31.32;
prosrêgnunai, break against, 16,22 10,1.26; 11,27; 19,4.7.8.10.11;
prostithenai, add, 7,22; 23,13 20,19; 23,22; 24,32.35; 25,2; 31,1
proteinein, offer, 7,22 sômatikos, corporeal, 5,29; 15,9.21;
proteros, prior, 27,28.32 29,8; bodily, 9,32; 19,12; 23,11
prôtos, first, 26,32; 35,20.28.31.33; sômatoeidês, corporeal, 2,10; 14,15;
36,4 22,6; 23,10; bodily, 4,13
prôtôs, primarily, 4,33.34; primary, sôzein, preserve, 9,16; 32,14
11,11; 26,18 speudein, hasten, 2,11
prôtotupon, original, 15,20 sphodrôs, forcefully, 13,23; strongly,
prouparkhein, be present first, 22,32 18,26
proupotithesthai, suppose to be sphodrotês, violence, 18,27
prior, 18,25 sphragis, seal, 3,9
pseudês, false, 25,9.10.13 stasimôs, steadfastly, 21,31
psophein, make a sound, 13,5; make sterein, deprive, 21,2
a noise, 16,21 stereon, solidity, 20,12
psophos, sound, 1,7; 10,18; 11,3; stereos, solid, 25,4
16,1.13.15.20.24(bis); 17,4-32 sterêsis, privation, 8,16; 10,6;
passim 34,17(bis).31
psukhê, soul, 1,4; 2,21-3,32 passim; stilbein, shine, 15,12.15
5,1; 7,15; 23,13; 24,18(bis).19; stoikheion, element, 8,26; 21,7
strephein, turn, 27,24; revert, 34,20 sunaphê, conjunction, 26,24; 35,8
strophê, turning, 29,3.9; 31,18 sunaptein, join, 14,8; 16,23; 23,24;
sullambanein, gather together, 3,26; 27,16.23.31; 36,4; join together,
receive together, 32,13 22,5; fit, 27,21; connect, 6,15;
sullogizesthai, deduce, 31,32 30,12
sumbainein, follow, 10,13; happen, sunarmostikos, capable of joining,
24,23; 31,9; coincide, 25,21; occur, 8,10
28,4 sunarmozein, fit, 3,4; 4,28; 23,21;
sumbebêkos, accident, 33,15.16; kata adapt, 5,17; <put> in conjunction,
sumbebêkos, incidentally, 5,2; 22,26
21,21.24.26; by accident, 36,21 sundiatithenai, sympathetically
summerizein, divide, 32,16 affect, 25,4
summetria, proportion, 22,27; suneinai, coexist, 37,28
proportionality, 22,31.32; en sunêirêmenôs, briefly, 7,18
summetriai, 22,29 and kata suneisagein, give, 12,3
summetrian, 22,28 proportionate suneispherein, contribute, 11,27
summetros, congruent, 4,17; correct, sunekheia, continuity, 9,16; 14,33;
5,28; 6,2; 10,20; 11,23; of the right 26,19; 30,13
size, 6,15; of a suitable length, sunekhês, in continuity, 9,28;
7,4; appropriate length, 7,10 continuous, 15,16
summetrôs, congruently, 4,29; at a sunekhôs, continuously, 13,28.29
correct distance, 5,30 sunergein, cooperate, 15,14.17;
summigês, mixed, 3,14 17,6.16; be active along with, 11,1
summixis, mixture, 8,25 sunerkhesthai, come together, 32,6
sumperiagein, carry around, 9,28 sunesis, understanding, 3,6; 3,16;
sumpherein, carry along together, 4,25; 7,16
13,2 sungeneia, kinship, 15,15; 26,15
sumphônia, concord, 22,24 sungignôskein, agree, 28,25
sumphuês, connatural, 16,22; sunistanai, be constituted, 7,13
cognate, 30,8; 31,5; grow<n> sunkeisthai, combine, 9,23
within, 18,29 sunkhôrein, allow, 11,4; agree, 32,11
sumphuesthai, grow within, 18,23; sunkinein, move together with,
grow together, 32,7 24,32; jointly stimulate, 1,18
sumpiptein, occur, 15,17 sunneusis, inclination, 29,9
sumplêrôtikos, completive, 1,17; 3,11 sunousiousthai, be essentially joined
sumplêroun, be completive, 2,24 with, 34,19
sumplêthunein, multiply along with, suntelein, make a contribution, 12,1;
32,17 contribute, 12,29; 16,12
sunagein, bring together, 34,26 sunteleoun, perfect, 12,9
sunagôgê, knitting (of brows), 25,3 sunthesis, synthesis, 3,6
sunairein, join, 26,25(bis); gather sunthetos, compound, 2,30; 7,14;
together, 1,11; bring together, 8,8.25
7,22; 27,17.25; 34,26; 35,11.12 sustoikhia, level, 25,22
sunairesis, gathering, 1,11; sustoikhos, coordinate, 4,12; 33,19.30
gathering together, 3,7; synthesis, sustoikhôs, in an appropriate way,
22,3 30,1; coordinately, 36,30.32;
sunaisthanesthai, be aware, 21,23; 37,11.12.20.30
be conscious, 5,5; 22,4.14.16; sustrophê, turning inwards (of eyes),
perceive, 21,34 25,2
sunalloioun, alter along with, 13,2
sunamphoteron, combination, tarakhê, disturbance, 7,29
32,30.32 tasis, stretching, 3,12
tautotês, identity, 33,5 thermainesthai, become warm, 4,5
teleios, perfect, 2,18; 13,12; 14,13; thermos, hot, 20,2.9.28.30; 21,13.14;
20,25; 26,23.28; 27,2; 33,14
31,19.20.29.33; 32,1.4.23.24; thermotês, heat, 4,9.12; 9,2.20; 10,1
35,27; 36,22(bis); complete, 2,13; thinganein, touch, 5,24; 6,16; 7,24
26,23; 36,22(bis); completed, 6,25 thnêtos, mortal, 32,15
teleiôs, perfectly, 36,19 tithenai, suppose, 8,17; 15,9.10;
teleiôsis, perfecting, 28,17; 32,20.22; 21,11; 32,25; postulate, 18,29;
34,32; perfection, 13,15; 28,7; deal with, 34,12
process of perfecting, 28,28; tode ti, this something, 26,4; 30,31
process towards perfection, 29,9 topos, space, 5,29; kata topon,
teleiotês, perfection, 3,13; 8,11; 9,26; spatially, 15,4
13,8; 27,22.29; 31,4.21; tropê, change, 9,22; 28,24
35,4.7.29.32 tropos, method, 7,16; (28,24 v.l.)
teleioun, make perfect, perfect tunkhanein, be as a matter of fact,
change, 1,17.26; 2,17.26; 3,14; 36,15; be in fact, 36,29
4,27; 6,31(bis); 7,14; 9,27; tupos, form, 4,10; outline, 7,19
12,17.20; 13,33; 26,21.28.32; tupôsis, impression, 3,9
27,20(bis).26.30; 28,5.9.19.28.31;
29,11; 31,13.18; 32,22; 34,32; zên, live, 2,3.29; 20,9(bis).29(bis);
35,7-36.5 passim; 36,18; bring to 21,13(bis)
perfection, 27,20(bis).26.29; make zêtein, ask, 1,5; 19,22; enquire,
complete, 6,14; 7,2.3.10; complete, 8,5.25; 14,16,25; 15,28; 24,20;
6,18.24; 7,31.32; 8,1; 10,23.30.33; 29,7; 32,8,31; look into, 9,6; 27,5;
11,8; 23,12; fill up, 6,29 seek, 33,1
teleôs, completely, 6,7 zêtêsis, enquiry, 9,10; 37,5; studying,
telos, end, 2,12 25,3; question, 20,10
thea, viewing, 15,18 zôê, life, 2,23(bis).25; 3,11.15.16.30;
theatron, theatre, 13,1 6,12; 7,14; 13,15; 18,19; 19,6;
theios, divine, 10,25 21,1.14; 23,10.22; 24,2;
Theophrastos, 24,20; 27,3; 28,20; 25,5.6.8.20; 29,5.9; 30,9.14; 31,16;
29,4; 34,2.29; 37,24 32,3.5(bis).12.18; 33,13; 34,16.20;
theôrein, be conscious, 30,6; 32,33; 36,15; tês zôês, vital, 2,20
33,29.30; 36,31; contemplate, zôion, living thing, 1,17; 6,21; 18,29;
33,4.5; 34,27; 35,13; 37,21; see 32,2; living being, 2,25;
6,23 3,11.13.16; living creature, 20,5
theôrêtikos, speculative, 36,26; (T); living, 2,3; animal, 20,22
37,26; contemplative, 32,31; 35,2; zôtikos, vital, 2,25; 3,4.34; connected
conscious of, 36,28 with life, 2,8.25; 3,10; 18,29; 25,5;
theôria, contemplation, 35,10 living, 6,12; 17,3.6; 21,9
thermainein, warm, 4,10; 12,4.5; zôtikôs, as a function of life, 18,9; as
13,19.20; heat, 9,3 a vital function, 23,7
Index of Passages
References in bold type are to note numbers.
ALCINOUS/ALBINUS 186; 2.9 421b32-422a3, 190; 2.10

Didascalicus 4, 12; 4.6-7,18,22, 216 422a8-12, 179; 2.10 422a8, 205;
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS 2.10 422a13-14, 137; 2.10
In De sensu 88,18-89,5, 178; 126,21, 422a16-17, 119; 2.10 422a20-1,
159 64; 2.10 422a34-b2, 202; 2.10
AMMONIUS 422b15-17, 181; 2.11
In De interpretatione 135,14-32, 391; 422b34-423b27, 209; 2.11
248,18-19, 251,1, 348 422b-423a21, 209; 2.11
ARISTOTELES 423a11-b26, 206; 2.11 423b1-8,
De Generatione et Corruptione 2.2 84; 2.11 423b17-23, 195; 2.11
329b31, 234 423b20-5, 197; 2.11 424a2-10,
Meteorologika 2.4 360a23, 234; 2.5 211; 2.11 424a4-5, 210; 2.12
361b30, 374; 4.1 378b24, 234; 4.4 424a19, 284; 2.12 424a22-3, 8;
381b29, 234 2.12 424a17-31, 8; 2.12 424a26-8,
De Anima 1.1 402b10-14, 49; 2.4 213; 2.12 424a28-31, 229; 2.12
415a16-20, 49; 2.4 416a32, 212; 424a26-31, 12; 2.12 424a28-31,
2.5 416b33-5, 4; 2.5 241; 2.12 424a28-32, 71; 2.12
416b35-417a2, 175; 2.5 424b15-16, 149; 2.12 424b16-18,
417a14-17, 342; 2.5 417a17-20, 156; 3.1 424b22-425a8, 219; 3.1
180; 2.5 417b24, 326, 357; 2.5 424b31-4, 222; 3.1 425a2-3, 223;
418a2, 332; 2.5 418a2-3, 343; 2.5 3.1 425a3-5, 227; 3.1 425a5-6,
418a3-5, 3; 2.5 418a5-6, 4; 2.7 228; 3.1 425a9-10, 240; 3.1
418a26, 147; 2.7 418a31-b10, 74; 425a13-18, 249; 3.1 425a24, 253;
2.7 418a31-b1, 127; 2.7 418b5-6, 3.1 425a31, 257; 3.2 425b12-26,
85; 2.7 418b9-10, 97; 2.7 418b11, 254; 3.2 425b23-5, 291; 3.2
118; 2.7 418b14-17 109; 2.7 426a27, 267; 3.2 426a29-b8, 241;
418b15, 128; 2.7 418b4-32, 88; 2.7 3.2 426a30-b2, 71; 3.2
418b14-17, 109; 2.7 419a6-7 123; 426b29-427a8, 41; 3.2 427a2-5,
2.7 419a12-14, 78; 2.7 419a13-14, 266; 3.3 427b29-429a10, 274; 3.3
127; 2.7 419a13-15, 138; 2.7 428a11-12, 290; 3.3 428a25, 371;
419a16, 133; 2.7 419a20, 116; 2.7 3.3 428b3-4, 305; 3.3 429a1-2,
419a13-b3, 159; 2.7 419a23-5, 286; 3.4 429a14, 347; 3.4
115; 2.7 419a25-30, 135; 2.7 429a18-21, 340; 3.4 429a22-4,
419a26-31, 197; 2.8 419b19-21, 308; 3.4 429a22, 313; 3.4 429a24,
159; 2.8 420a3-11, 176; 2.8 420a4, 363; 3.4 429a27-9, 316; 3.4
192; 2.8 420a9-14, 187; 2.8 429b4-5, 377; 3.4 429b5-9, 378;
420a12, 192; 2.8 420a16-17, 196; 3.4 429b6-9, 408; 3.4 429b10-23,
2.8 420a26-8, 199; 2.8 420b8, 269; 387; 3.4 429b20-1, 398; 3.4
2.9 421b9, 179; 2.9 421b18-19, 429b21-2, 401; 3.4 429b23-5, 338;
100 Index of Passages
3.4 429b24-5, 324; 3.4 429b30-1, BARLAAM DE SEMINARIA
308; 3.4 429b30, 333; 3.4 Ethica secundum Stoicos 2.13, 300
429b30-430a1, 417, 419; 3.4 DAMASCIUS
430a1, 320; 3.4 430a2-5, 323; 3.4 in Phaedonem 1,274, 12; 2,15, 12
430a3-4, 424; 3.4 430a4-5, 360, EMPEDOCLES
425; 3.4 430a5-6, 294, 426; 3.4 84 Diels, 237
430a7, 428; 3.4 430a7-8, 429; EPICURUS
430a7-9, 430; 3.5 430a10-12, 310; Letter to Menoecus 134,6, 373
3.5 430a10-19, 424; 3.5 430a15, IAMBLICHUS
323; 3.5 430a16, 319; 3.5 430a17, De Myst. 3,13 (p.130,3 Parthey), 167
262; 3.5 430a18, 335; 3.5 Protrept. III 14,2 Pistelli, 281
430a19-20, 360; 3.7 431a1-2, 360; in Tim. Fr. 17,10 Dillon, 281; 53
3.7 431a6-7, 342; 3.7 431b16-17, Dillon, 365; 65 Dillon, 72
360; 3.7 431b17, 333; 2.8 ap. Simpl. in de Anima 49 and 219,
431b21-6, 333; 3.8 432a2, 315; 3.8 248
432a9-10, 276, 294; 3.9 OLYMPIODORUS
432a30-b3, 274; 3.12 435a5-10, in Phaedonem 11,7; 12,1, lines 9-25,
164 12
De Sensu 2 437b32-438a3, 237; 2 PHILOPONUS
438a13-15, 147; 2 438a12-16, 182, in de Anima 35,1, 348; 353,8-12, 178;
184; 2 438b21-4, 181; 3 439a30, 354,12-16, 178; 354,14-16, 79,
91; 3 439b1-14, 74, 91; 3 439b13, 122; 529,22-3, 392
87; 3 440a20, 128; 4 441b21-3, in Phys. 4,20-2, 183
269; 5 442b27-445a16, 186; 5 De Aeternitate Mundi 18-19, 80
442b29, 204; 5 444b20-4, 190; 6 PLATO
446a24-b6, 161; 6 446b8-9, 157; 7 Alcibiades 132D-133A, 166
447a14-27, 124; 7 448a2-6, 51; 7 Philebus 15E3, 406
449a17-19, 67 Respublica 6 508B, 238
De Longitudine Vitae 5 466a18-19, 231 Sophistes 248E-249A, 72; 264B, 217;
De Somno 2 455a13-21, 254 266C, 166
De Insomniis 1 458b30, 459a15-17, Symposium 202E3, 79
274; 2 460b16-20, 305 Timaeus 28A and C, 217, 371; 39E,
De Divinatione Somn. 2 464b10, 167 72; 45B, 198; 46AB, 166; 67C, 75
Metaphysica 12 1072b18-30, 72 PLOTINUS
Historia Animalium 5.14 545a15-20, I 1,12 21-8, 16
269 IV 3,26,30, 41; 6,1,1-36, 41; 8,4,32, 355
De Generatione Animalium 2.3 PORPHYRY
736b28, 307; 2.3 737a7-13, 307; in Ptolem. Harmonica I 3 p.64, 157
2.6 744a1-3, 189 PROCLUS
[ARISTOTELES] Aet.mundi 18-19, 75
De aud. 800a3-4, 157 In Alc. 250,5-251,2, 395
De col. 1 791b37 114 in Parm. 188,8, 248,15, 279,22, 301,1,
Probl. 11.23 901b16, 157; 31.29 348
960a33, 185 In Tim. 1 157,6, 228; 246,10-18, 216; 2
ARIUS DIDYMUS ap. Stob. I 484,19-21, 215,5-29, 366
178 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS
AVERROES Adv. Math. 7.219, 24
Comm. magn. in DA (CCAA 6,1 PH I 45, 73
387,22-389,63 Crawford), 311; SIMPLICIUS
399,344-6 and 351-61, 311 In De Anima 6,16, 388; 12,22-3, 12;
De connexione int. abstr. cum homine 18,35, 344; 33,24-34, 367; 49,31-4,
(AOCAC 9f,156F-G), 311 248; 62,7, 328; 89,33, 388;
Index of Passages 101
92,16-18, 12; 113,20-1, 12; STRATO
125,25-7, 15; 125,28-9, 18; 65a and 86 Wehrli, 103
125,30-126,3, 22; 125,37, 26; 111 Wehrli, 304
126,4, 41; 126,9-12, 33; 126,14-16, 114 Wehrli, 159
45; 127,9-14, 56; 128,24-9, 80; SYRIANUS
129,30-1, 75; 131,16-32, 106; in Metaph. 7,31-2, 167
131,38-132,2, 102; 132,13-14, 106; THEMISTIUS
132,13-15, 140; 132,29-31, 76; In De Anima 28,14, 406; 62,11, 79;
133,11-13, 94; 134,35-135,4, 64; 62,29-32, 178; 107,31-2, 307;
135,9-10, 93; 135,35, 75; 107,32-108,7, 309; 108,1-6, 324;
135,25-136,2, 123; 136,8-15, 20-4, 108,15-17, 342; 108,16, 341;
69; 136,8, 140; 136,8-10, 142; 108,18, 377; 108,27, 351
136,24, 143; 136,26-8, 139; In Physica 197,4-8, 105
136,37, 143; 137,3-5, 142; 137,5, THEOPHRASTUS
148; 139,2-5, 178; 142,4, 144; Passages from FHSG: 155B, 105; 273,
142,10-11, 161; 143,23-31, 192; 13, 48; 274, 53; 275A, 86; 275B,
145,11-12, 196; 155,22-3, 148; 160; 276, 158; 277A, 157; 277B,
165,1-6, 80; 165,4-5, 41; 174,20-6, 168, 172, 201; 277C, 79, 122, 178;
235; 185,35-6, 261; 186,6-9, 265; 278, 91, 106, 111, 113, 121, 131,
187,31-3, 258; 189,23-8, 65; 153; 279, 143; 282, 232, 241, 246;
189,34-190,21, 80; 195,9, 245; 294, 207; 295, 251; 296, 255, 264;
196,22-3, 46; 198,35-199,5, 46; 297, 272, 275; 298A, 353; 298B,
202,3-5, 21; 213,15-20, 305; 354; 299, 292; 307A, 309, 324,
213,25, 277; 213,37-214,4, 304; 341, 377; 307B, 314; 307C, 322,
214,1-2, 301; 214,6-8, 289; 214,12, 327; 307D, 339, 343, 347, 349,
295; 214,18-19, 285; 214,20-2, 351; 308A, 311; 308B, 311; 309A,
293; 214,21, 296; 214,21-2, 18; 311; 309CD, 311; 311, 358, 361;
215,9-13, 298; 217,26, 43, 412; 312, 377; 316, 380, 384; 317, 410,
219,18-19, 248; 220,38, 353; 418; 318, 388, 389, 397, 399; 319,
221,25-8, 407; 229,38, 348; 423, 432; 320A, 351, 447, 300;
230,23, 329, 348; 234,6-10, 403; 716,88, 157
236,5, 329, 348; 240,8-10, 386; Barbotin Ia, 309; Ib, 327; Ic, 314; II,
240,37, 388; 243,1-6, 321; 333; III, 335; IV, 339; Va, 347;
243,37-8, 313; 245,37, 313; Vb, 349; Vc, 351; VI, 358; VIIa,
251,21, 387; 262,25, 387; 361, 363; VIIb, 374, 377; VIIc,
276,18-21, 367; 286,27-32, 353; 377; VIII, 380; IXa, 390; IXb, 399;
305,7-8, 334 IXc, 402; Xa, 410; Xb, 418; XI, 432
In Physica 998,13-16, 105 De Sensu. 1, 128; 5, 130; 19, 5, 192,
In Enkh. Epikt. 78,1-9, 355 196; 26, 89; 32, 246; 50-3, 173;
STEPHANUS 51-3, 154
in De Int. 35,19-33, 391 Metars. [14] 14-15, 374
STOBAEUS Metaph. 4a4, 374; 7b12-16, 342
vol.1 484,19-21, 148 De Odor. opening, 156
Caus. Plant. 1.1.1, 156; 6.8.2, 200
‘SIMPLICIUS’
On Aristotle
On the Soul 2.5-12
translated by
Carlos Steel
Introduction
The author of the Commentary On the Soul
Whoever studies the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ attributed to

Simplicius and is acquainted with his voluminous commentaries on the
Physics, the De Caelo and the Categories starts doubting whether this
commentary is by the same author. This was Urmson’s experience when
he started translating in DA after in Phys. 4: ‘Coming to this commentary
after translating the huge commentary of Simplicius on Physics 4, I was
immediately convinced, after a couple of pages, that it was not by the same
author; the whole style was unfamiliar.’1 This was also my experience
when, preparing my doctoral dissertation on Iamblichus’ doctrine of the
soul, I came to study this commentary extensively because, as its author
says, it is deeply influenced by Iamblichus’ thought. These doubts where
shared by my older friend F. Bossier who was then working on the medieval
tradition and reception of the commentaries of Simplicius. So we agreed to
publish an article in which we assembled all of the arguments against the
traditional attribution and attempted to prove that the commentary is the
work of Priscian of Lydia, who belonged together with Simplicius to the
Academy in Athens and went with him into exile at the Persian court after
the suppression of the School in 529. When we had nearly finished the
article, we discovered that the Italian philosopher Francesco Piccolomini
had already anticipated our hypothesis and also furnished the main
arguments in his own commentary on the DA.2 The article was published
in Dutch in the Louvain Tijdschrift voor Filosofie and immediately received
the attention of Mme I. Hadot in her monograph on Simplicius.3 We were
often asked to publish an English version of the article, but we believed
the evidence of the inauthenticity to be so overwhelming that we lost all
motivation to repeat the elaborate argumentation to justify our conclusion.
Our argument has always been: just start reading and ‘after a couple of
pages’ you will be convinced. However, to our surprise, many scholars
continued to question our argument and still defended the traditional
attribution. Mme Hadot, who first had given her reserved approval, later
came back to the question and became the principal advocate of the
traditional attribution of the in DA to Simplicius. In her view, the obvious
differences between the in DA and the other commentaries of Simplicius
could also be explained by postulating an evolution in Simplicius’ commen-
106 On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12
tary technique and his growing dependence upon Iamblichus or by pointing
to the different intentions of the works commented upon. The textual
parallels with the work of Priscian could be explained by a common school
tradition.4 In the introduction of her edition of the commentary on the
Enchiridion she again develops her main arguments against our thesis,
rejecting above all any suggestion of a difference between the doctrine of
the soul in the in DA and that in the other commentaries of Simplicius.5
The publication of the translation of the in DA in this series gives me the
opportunity to develop, without any polemics, the main arguments Bossier
and I developed in the 1972 article, summarizing it and using new evidence
and new instruments such as the Thesaurus linguae graecae.6
In this essay I will first argue against the traditional attribution of the
commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima to Simplicius, and then argue that
Priscian of Lydia is the real author of the in DA.
I. The Commentary is not a work of Simplicius

A. The traditional attribution
In the Preface to the Berlin Edition M. Hayduck describes 14 manuscripts
(and the ‘editio princeps’ of 1527) which can be divided into two groups.
There is first a large group of manuscripts that offer almost the entire text
of the Commentary and share some striking features: they all miss the
first part of the prooemium (1,1-3,1) and they have important lacunae in
the last pages of the commentary (325-9). The oldest manuscript in this
group is the Laurentianus 85,21 (A) from the 13th-14th century (with many
later revisions) which is certainly the source, directly or via intermediaries,
of all other copies in this group. Because the beginning of the prooemium
is lacking in this manuscript, we also miss the title and the attribution of
the work. However, Simplicius is explicitly mentioned as author in the
titles of Books II and III. To the second group belong a number of manu-
scripts that only offer small parts of the commentary. The most important
is the Matritensis Bibl. Nat. (D) from the 14th century which contains the
entire prooemium and the first section of the first book (until 31,19). It has
the title ,Ek tîn toà Simplik8ou e9j tÕ per< yucÁj ,Aristot2louj m2roj.
Other manuscripts only have the prooemium, and/or some selected scholia
in the margin of the Aristotelian text. In some manuscripts those excerpts
are anonymous. There are many more partial copies of the commentary
than those mentioned by Hayduck. Without a full investigation of the
manuscript tradition it is not possible to establish whether all those
manuscripts depend upon the same model. In any case, A and D are so
similar that they must derive from a single model (from the 13th century),
which must also have been the source for the other partial versions of the
text. This manuscript had the full prooemium and the title with the
attribution to Simplicius.
Introduction 107
The manuscript tradition is confirmed by the indirect tradition of the
text. The commentary was used by Michael Psellus (11th century) in his
compilation De omnifaria doctrina, but, unfortunately, this philosopher
never refers to Simplicius by name. Important also is the testimonium of
Sophonias (around 1300). In the prooemium of his own commentary on the
DA, the compiler tells us that he has taken much from the previous
commentators and particularly from the commentary of Philoponus. How-
ever, a careful analysis shows that he also used the commentary attributed
to Simplicius. Cf. Sophonias 125,6-14 = Simpl. 224,2-10; Soph. 3,2-3 (a
Christian transposition of Simpl. 1,20-1). In the same preface the author
also presents the different types of exegetical works devoted to Aristotle.
Thus he distinguishes clearly between the real commentaries and the
paraphrases. And he mentions as the most celebrated commentators of
Aristotle: Simplicius, Ammonius, Philoponus and Alexander. Of course,
this passage is not specifically about commentaries on the De Anima (there
is no such commentary by Ammonius), and cannot be used as an argument
that the author knew the commentary of the De Anima under the name of
Simplicius. However, it seems plausible that this was the case. This
supposition is further confirmed by the reference to Simplicius in a list of
recommended commentaries on Aristotle which has been preserved in the
Jerusalem Codex Patr. 106, f.7 (end 13th century):
e9j tÕ per< tÁj yucÁj tÕ Ólon FilÒponon, {j ka< kre8ttwn, À

Simpl8kion À Qemist8ou par£frasin
This list in fact enumerates the three commentaries on Aristotle’s On

the Soul that have come down to us: those by Philoponus, Themistius and
the one attributed to ‘Simplicius’. It thus seems that the attribution of the
commentary to Simplicius was commonly accepted in the Byzantine tradi-
tion. A commentary on On the Soul by Simplicius is also mentioned in the
famous catalogue in the Fihrist of al-Nadim (987-990). ‘The [treatise On
the Soul] is extant, with a good commentary which is attributed to Sim-
plicius, in Syriac, and which was made for Athawalis.’7 This reference in
the Fihrist is very valuable because it is the oldest attribution of such a
commentary to Simplicius. However, the text is puzzling. For in no manu-
script of the Greek tradition is there a dedication to any Athawalis.
Besides, Simplicius never dedicated any of his commentaries. Perhaps the
dedication was added to the Syrian translation. After all Athawalis seems
to be a Syriac name.8 Anyhow one can conclude from the Fihrist that
already in the 7th-8th century (when most Syriac translations were made)
a commentary on the DA circulated under the name of Simplicius. It is not
evident whether this commentary must be identified with the one that is
still extant, but this seems plausible. If not, one must admit that there was
another commentary on On the Soul attributed to Simplicius which has
not survived.
The unanimous attribution of the in DA to Simplicius, both in the
manuscripts and in the indirect tradition, is of course a strong argument
in favour of the traditional authorship. However, one should not forget that
there are other cases of unanimous attribution which have been proven to
be false. Thus in all the manuscripts of Simplicius’ in De Caelo the first
book is attributed to Damascius, although nobody would ever contest its
attribution to Simplicius.9 And what about the pseudo-Philoponus and
many other pseudo-attributions in late Neoplatonism?
B. Arguments against the traditional attribution

1. The method of the commentary
(a) The method of Simplicius10
Simplicius always approaches the Aristotelian text with the primary
intention of explaining it to his readers as faithfully as possible. ‘His
exposition of Aristotle is faithful and acute, and, while clearly written by
a Neoplatonist, it is an honest elucidation of the views of Aristotle.’11
Therefore, his works rank even today among the most valuable commen-
taries on Aristotle, and no scholar can attempt to understand a difficult
Aristotelian text without consulting them. His commentaries also contain
a rich historical and doxographical documentation, which has considerably
enlarged our knowledge of the antecedents of Aristotle’s philosophy and of
the later development of the Peripatetic school. In fact, in order better to
understand Aristotle’s text, and in particular the purpose of his often acute
criticism of his predecessors, Simplicius makes an effort to bring us in
direct contact with the philosophers who preceded Aristotle and against
whom he reacted (the Presocratics and Plato), quoting long extracts from
their works. In doing so he in fact continues a procedure that had already
started with Aristotle himself, who in his treatises often gives a historical
survey of the various views of his predecessors and occasionally quotes
from them in order to criticize them. Whenever Simplicius discusses those
sections in Aristotle, he asks whether his criticism is justified and he tries
to find out what precisely Aristotle is attacking in them. This is an
important question, because the commentator knew from experience that
stupid or malign readers (such as John Philoponus) liked to use these
critical remarks to ridicule the whole endeavour of philosophy by pointing
to the insoluble disagreements between the philosophers.12 Therefore, he
let the accused parties speak for themselves, quoting from their work.
Thanks to this ‘historical’ interest of Simplicius we have preserved long
sections of the Presocratics (such as the Poem of Parmenides). He also gives
long quotations from the dialogues of Plato to show that the opposition
between the disciple and the master is not about the truth and reality –
but only a question of different language. For whereas Aristotle uses the
ordinary meaning of terms, Plato (and the Presocratics) often used a more
Introduction 109
poetical and metaphorical language, which Aristotle criticized because he
understood the terms in their ‘apparent meaning’ (tÕ fainÒmenon), for
instance when Plato talks about the ‘motion’ of the soul. However, if one
is aware of the difference in language and in method, it becomes evident
that Plato and Aristotle are in fundamental agreement about the ‘truth’.13
Simplicius uses the same historical method of interpretation whenever
he is confronted with an obscure or ambiguous passage or an apparent
contradiction in the Aristotelian text. He usually confronts his own exege-
sis with the different interpretations in the tradition. He discusses the
problems and solutions of the famous commentators on Aristotle and often
quotes long sections from their work before he carefully proposes his own
views on a question. Among all commentators he respects most of all
Alexander of Aphrodisias: he calls him the most careful and industrious,
the most authentic of all commentators on Aristotle.14 He is the commen-
tator par excellence. In fact, Alexander’s commentaries on the Physics and
the De Caelo constitute the substrate of Simplicius’ own works. However,
this respect and gratitude to Alexander does not imply that he accepts
without discussion all his interpretations. On the contrary, he often criti-
cizes his views for the sake of the truth, knowing that Alexander himself
would have preferred the truth above friendship.15 One of the questions on
which he departs from Alexander is the latter’s naturalistic interpretation
of the soul as ‘entelecheia’ of the body.16 He also castigates him for his
suspicious and even malevolent attitude towards Plato which prevents him
from seeing the fundamental harmony between Aristotle and his master.17
Iamblichus is another authority for Simplicius, particularly in his commen-
tary on the Categories. In the introduction of this work he frankly admits
that he attempted to follow as far as possible the exegesis of Iamblichus,
that he has copied many sections from his commentary, and that he has
often used the actual words of the Syrian philosopher. In this commentary
the influence of Iamblichus is dominant. However, this never leads Sim-
plicius to a distorted interpretation of the Aristotelian text nor to a simple
repetition of Iamblichus. He remains faithful to his own method: he is
primarily interested in explaining the text and tries to solve the problems
that arise from it in a confrontation with different views. Thus even this
commentary is a well documented study which contains valuable informa-
tion on the logical and semantic discussions in the Stoic and Peripatetic
tradition. Moreover, on many occasions Simplicius manifests a certain
reserve vis-à-vis the over-subtle and speculative considerations of Iam-
blichus.18 And he often tries to bring down the lofty thoughts of Iamblichus
to a more commensurate level, that is, to a mode of discourse in which
terms are used in their proper sense and not metaphorically. We find here
again the soberness of the commentator, who has a great admiration for
Iamblichus’ elevated thought, but watches out for the overspeculative
character of his exegesis.
To conclude. The commentaries of Simplicius give us a clear and scho-
lastic interpretation which remains close to the Aristotelian text, though
the general frame of his exposition is Neoplatonic. They contain a rich
documentation of the development of the philosophical debate from its
beginnings to late Antiquity. His commentaries are thus a beautiful
example of the ideal he cultivated during his whole life: the philomathia,
the desire to know, to learn, and to gain an encyclopaedic knowledge with
a great respect for the classical Greek tradition.
(b) The commentary on the De Anima

The commentary on the DA is a genuine ‘commentary’: it follows Aristotle’s
text, line by line, develops his arguments and explains difficult phrases
and words. Yet it is ‘totally untrustworthy’ as an exposition of Aristotle’s
work.19 It may occasionally have some value for elucidating some point of
detail in the text, but mostly the commentator passes over the text and the
obvious meaning of the argument. Instead of clarifying Aristotle’s text, the
author approaches the text from a preconceived view of the soul which he
absolutely wants to find within the Aristotelian text itself. As R.D. Hicks
rightly observes, ‘The Neo-Platonist Simplicius distorts Aristotle’s ac-
count, in order, as far as possible, to adapt it to his own philosophical
presuppositions.’20 This is clear from the very beginning of this work. After
having expounded in a general introduction his own views on the soul, the
author concludes: ‘But the whole development of the arguments will make
these doctrines more clear as being the views of Aristotle and as being
expressed more obviously by Iamblichus. So now let us turn to the text.’21
And in the important introduction to DA 3.4-6, after having developed his
own doctrine about the active and passive intellect, the commentator
concludes: ‘After having determined those things beforehand let us take
the Aristotelian text again and investigate whether what we have deter-
mined beforehand conforms with it.’22 One understands that a commentary
with such a hermeneutical approach rarely contributes to a better under-
standing of Aristotle’s work, which is what frustrated our modern com-
mentators. Thus Torstrik in his own commentary shows his irritation with
this work. He supposes that it was composed at the end of Simplicius’ life
when the author had lost some of the capacities we admire in his other
works. For his interpretative method in this work has a certain ‘senile’
quality. Being an old man, the author can never stick to his text and starts
all kinds of digressions: ‘Ipsum interpretandi genus quo in hac re utitur
habet senile quiddam ne dicam anile: tantopere a re proposita discedit et
nescio quo evagatur.’23 This may be true from the point of view of a
commentator who is only interested in better understanding what Aris-
totle meant in a particular text. But whoever takes the trouble to go
through the difficult digressions will discover in this commentary, hidden
under Aristotelian terms, a most original philosophical doctrine on the
soul.
Introduction 111
Just like Simplicius, the commentator of the in DA always tries to defend
the Presocratic philosophers and Plato himself against the criticism of
Aristotle. In his view Aristotle only examines ‘the apparent meaning’ (tÕ
fainÒmenon) and understands their words ‘in a colloquial sense’ (sunˇqeia
tîn Ñnom£twn) without searching for their deeper significance. In fact,
those ancient philosophers often liked to express their views in poetical
language using vocabulary in a metaphorical sense. Aristotle attacks them
on the superficial level of expression, for instance when he criticizes Plato
for talking about the ‘motion’ of the soul. Nevertheless both philosophers
have fundamentally the same doctrine of the soul, though they express it
differently.24 All these declarations fit perfectly with the statements of
Simplicius in the three other commentaries. However, the author of the in
DA simply maintains this harmony position (which was generally accepted
in the school) and never tries to corroborate his interpretation by quoting
from those ancient philosophers to let us evaluate their opinions more
fairly against Aristotle’s critique. Although the first book of Aristotle’s DA
contains an extremely rich documentation of the Presocratics, the author
never gives a literal quotation that goes beyond Aristotle’s text. He seems
to admit that the information in Aristotle is sufficient.25 A nice example is
in DA 250,22-3 where he quotes a text of Empedocles from Aristotle, while
Simplicius in in DC 587,1-2, on the occasion of the same quotation in
Aristotle (DC 3.2 300b31) gives two more lines of Empedocles not quoted
by Aristotle. Only about the doctrine of the Pythagoreans do we find in the
in DA more information than what is provided by Aristotle, but this extra
information probably comes from Iamblichus.26 Even more remarkable is
the fact that the author never gives a quotation from the dialogues of Plato,
although he continuously defends his doctrine and sometimes refers to his
works. He seems to suppose that his readers know the texts of Plato
sufficiently. But this again shows that this author lacks the sense of
historical documentation which so characterizes Simplicius.
Further, in the explanation of difficult passages of the Aristotelian text
our author follows an entirely different method from that of Simplicius.
We never have that wide comparison of different views before he formu-
lates his own interpretation. On the contrary, as the author explicitly
writes, he will avoid polemics with others and try to ‘investigate the
consistency of the philosopher both with himself and with the truth’
(1,14-15). In the interpretation of problematic passages he will first seek
help from other texts and statements of Aristotle that are clear. This may
be an excellent hermeneutical principle: try to explain Aristotle through
Aristotle. However, we read further that he ‘will strive to the uttermost for
the truth in accordance with the teaching of Iamblichus in his own writings
about the soul’ (18-20). The author is not interested in polemics because
he is convinced that the truth about the soul has been perfectly expressed
by Iamblichus himself, ‘the excellent judge of truth’. For an authentic
interpretation of the Aristotelian text one must follow Iamblichus’ guid-
ance. In fact, our author has an unlimited admiration for this philosopher
who has reached the summit of knowledge. In opposition to Simplicius, he
never expresses any reservation about his lofty speculations and never
tries to bring them down to a more commensurate level. ‘We never would
dare to say something opposite to Iamblichus, but we try as far as possible
to conform to him who has reached the summit of science.’ 27 The whole
commentary is sustained by an Iamblichean inspiration and an Iam-
blichean language, even if the author – that again is characteristic of him
– never gives a literal quotation from his work, whereas we owe to
Simplicius large extracts from Iamblichus’ works, particularly in his in
Cat. He does not even make it clear whether Iamblichus’ work On the Soul
on which he depends so much, is a commentary or an independent treatise.
Besides Iamblichus the author refers to Alexander, to Plutarch of Athens,
and once to Themistius. There are twenty references to Alexander and
there is a long quotation in which his explanation of the echo is discussed
(141,22-32). One wonders why so much attention is given to this topic. But
it is evident that Alexander does not have the authority that he had for
Simplicius. Our commentator seems to have had a certain appreciation of
Plutarch of Athens whom he quotes fourteen times, but he rarely follows
his interpretations which remain rather close to the text.
2. Language and style

(a) The vocabulary
An analysis of the vocabulary of the in DA compared with the authentic
works of Simplicius provides several hard arguments against the tradi-
tional attribution of the commentary. When Bossier and I published our
article, we had to rely on the indices of the Berlin editions which are often
very deficient. Now it is possible to check the entire vocabulary thanks to
the Thesaurus linguae graecae. Of course, the author of the in DA shares
with Simplicius the standard Neoplatonic vocabulary and the typical
phrases of the Aristotelian commentary tradition. Nevertheless he often
uses a particular terminology that sets him apart not only from Simplicius
but also from the other commentators. It seems that he has often coined
new terms in order better to express his original doctrine on the soul. If
there are any parallels, it is with ‘Priscian of Lydia’ (which is not surprising
if he is the real author) and with Damascius.
Let me start with some innocent examples without doctrinal implica-
tions. The commentator of in DA uses 12 times the verb 1pexerg£zomai in
the sense of ‘to examine, to investigate thoroughly’ (1,9; 2,4; 4,8; 5,22; 5,26;
81,3; 101,4; 159,34; 191,1; 233,29; 246,30; 270,39; 319,26), twice 1pexer-
gas8a (5,26; 81,4) and once ¢nepex2rgastoj (4,13). The use of this term in
this sense is very rare in the Greek commentaries. Simplicius uses the
term or its derivatives nowhere in his commentaries (altogether about
Introduction 113
2,500 pages in the Berlin edition). The only contemporary author using the
term is Priscian of Lydia: see Metaphr. 1,9; 7,22; 22,34; 23,4. If Simplicius
really were the author of in DA, why should he have avoided this term in
all his other commentaries? My second innocent example: there are in in
DA four examples of the use of 1rî (17,29; 158,34; 178,27; 329,26) and three
of fˇsw (17,34; 36,25; 293,10) as an interjection (‘inquam’). In the whole
corpus of Simplicius we could find not a single example of this use. But we
find two examples (9,26 and 20,17 ) of it in Priscian. This cannot be a
coincidence. The rare verb ¢na8nomai (‘refuse, reject’) occurs six times in
in DA. There is only one instance in Simplicius (in DC 115,10), but in
Damascius there are 14 examples. Another remarkable expression is the
construction ∑stamai kat£ with the accusative, which always gives the
modern translator terrible problems. This expression is not absent in
Simplicius and other Neoplatonic authors, but in in DA it is so often used
(about 80 cases) that it becomes like an expletive verb having lost its strong
sense. Again Priscian offers nice parallels for this usage. A particular use
of this construction is the expression kaq,Órouj (or ba8nein kaq,Órouj) to
talk about discrete acts of knowledge (as opposed to a continuous motion).
See for instance: 11,32; 39,4; 42,13; 43,5; 45,33-4; 46,19; 47,37; 61,27; 103,3;
121,32; 221,27. There is one instance in Damascius, De Princ. II, 162,20,
but not a single case in Simplicius.28
Another interesting example is the metaphorical use of some terms in
a specific Neoplatonic context. Thus the verb cal£w (and calasmÒj) in
the sense of ‘relaxation’ or ‘loosening’ (for example of unity) is attested by
12 examples in in DA. Simplicius uses the term, but never in its metaphori-
cal sense, except in one passage (in Phys. 88,14) where he gives a summary
of Damascius’ interpretation of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides.
Damascius often uses the term in this peculiar sense (13 examples). Here
again Priscian confirms the usage of in DA: there are five cases. Another
striking example of metaphorical use of a term is ¢post2nwsij and the
related verb ¢postenÒw. We find them 23 times in in DA (three times the
rare adverb ¢pestenwm2nwj): not a single example in this sense in Sim-
plicius (there are two cases, in DC, 485,2 and in Phys. 18,4 but in the
standard physical sense), but eight in Damascius. Another example is
Øfiz£nw (‘to sink downwards’) which occurs in in DA five times, but never
has this metaphorical sense in the genuine Simplicius. Again Damascius
offers examples of a similar use of the term. Simplicius never uses the
adjective diexodikÒj, which occurs seven times in the in DA. Another
favourite term of the in DA is ¢n2lixij (¢nel8ttw). This term is, of course,
much beloved by Neoplatonic authors, such as Proclus, when talking about
the ‘unfolding’ of a unity. But we have 34 instances of these terms in the
DA commentary, whereas in the whole work of Simplicius there are only
seven examples of a metaphorical use (four of which are quotations from
Iamblichus, and the others stand in an Iamblichean context). Again there
are nice parallels in Priscian’s Metaphrasis (four instances) here again. On
the other hand, the author of the in DA never uses the term aÙqupÒstaton,
which Simplicius uses to characterize the hypostatic Intellect, nor the
favourite expression of Simplicius Ólon Ólü 0autù 1farmÒttein when
talking about the self-reflection of the soul which can wholly convert upon
itself.29
Probably the most conspicuous group of terms in the in DA is Óroj and
the related (di-)[ristikÒj and (di-)[r8zw, not just in the logical sense of
‘defining, definition’, but more often in the ontological sense. To ‘define’
something means ‘to give it form’, to ‘constitute it’. The term Óroj is almost
equivalent with e!doj. For the form is the defining principle of its subject
matter; thus the soul is the ‘defining’ principle of the body, insofar as it
constitutes it as a living organism. This group of terms together with
related terms such as carakthr8zw, carakthristikÒj, e9dopoi2w,
e9dhtikÒj occur more than 300 times in this commentary. They are cer-
tainly the most characteristic signature of this work.30 Of course, those
terms, and particularly [r8zw, Óroj, [ristikÒj are also used by Simplicius,
but never in this particular sense, although he had many occasions to use
this vocabulary when talking about the matter-form relation. In my view,
this vocabulary argument suffices in itself to demonstrate that the in DA
cannot be a work of Simplicius. Other examples of peculiar vocabulary in
the in DA will be mentioned when we discuss the doctrinal differences
between this commentary and the genuine works of Simplicius.
As we have seen, the only parallels for a particular use of terms (except
Priscian) are to be found in Iamblichus and Damascius. Therefore it is no
surprise that there is more terminological resemblance between the in DA
and the in Cat. of Simplicius and the corollaria de loco and de tempore,
because in those texts Simplicius is much more dependent upon Iam-
blichus and his Athenian master than in his other running commentaries.
(b) Style
Simplicius formulates his arguments in a clear scholastic discourse. His
long periods have a transparent syntactic structure corresponding to the
order of the argumentation which makes it easy for the reader. He does
not like brachylogy or elliptical sentences and avoids a terse and obscure
style. He rather likes a certain redundancy to express his thought, which
makes his commentaries verbose, prolix and drawn out. The reader never
has to make a special effort to understand what the author had in mind
without expressing it in writing; he never has to halt at a phrase whose
connection with the whole sentence remains obscure. On the contrary, he
can cursorily read the long scholastic periods and easily summarize for
himself what the commentator has set out at length.
This scholastic approach to the text is also evidenced by his interest in
formal questions. Thus Simplicius ‘frequently supplies premises to Aris-
totle’s arguments to make them formally valid, and classifies them as
Introduction 115
being, e.g., in this or that figure of the syllogism’.31 He also shows a great
interest in the composition and the articulation of the Aristotelian text,
both as a whole and in its various sections. Thus, at the beginning of a new
section, he often summarizes the ‘status quaestionis’: what Aristotle has so
far argued, what the next problem is and how it is related to the preceding
section. Such an introductory sentence often begins with a participle such
as e9pèn or de8xaj.32 Therefore the commentary is always clearly distin-
guished from the text of the lemma. The first words or phrases of an
exposition never stand in a syntactic connection with the Aristotelian text.
The commentary always begins with an independent sentence which can
easily be understood without the lemma. The lemmas are usually given in
a shortened form with the 3wj toà formula. The polished construction of
the sentences, the orderly character of the exposition, and the arrangement
and clarity of the argument confer a character of tranquillity and scholarly
seriousness on the whole work. The style is never nervous or terse. Even
in the sharp invectives against John Philoponus the expression remains
elegant, expansive and drawn out, and the pathos with which he defends
his philosophy against Philoponus is translated into a rhetorical abun-
dance rather than into a compact structure. One may say that the style of
his commentaries reflects faithfully his own spiritual life and the true
nature of his intellectual enterprise. Simplicius is not a creative thinker
who develops in writing his own philosophical views; he is above all the
industrious encyclopaedic and erudite scholar who studies with quiet zeal
what his great predecessors in the philosophical tradition have said,
surveying, ordering and critically examining their divergent opinions. In
writing his commentaries his first ambition is to get better acquainted with
the text and better to articulate his own thoughts about some disputed
questions. But in doing so he hopes that his readers too may profit from
his work.
How different is the eloquence of the author of the in DA. Gone are
clarity, order, and the calm discursive argument in well formed periods
with respect for classical grammar.33 The style is terse and often ‘jerky’,
full of anacolutha and interruptions. It is as if we see the author struggling
with his ideas when writing. Many periods are not well constructed
because the author takes liberties with syntactical rules. He cannot refrain
from adding a new consideration or from inserting an additional explana-
tion in the period, which often destroys the syntactical unity: this explains
the frequent anacolutha.34 Besides he makes ample use of adjectives,
participles and dependent adverbs turned into substantives often followed
by complements.35 There are awful examples of substantival constructions
with tÒ.36 This makes his style very complex, untransparent, harsh and
stiff. In many passages the author does not take his time to write down
quietly and integrally the whole explanation: a short indication, an inde-
pendent phrase suffice to express what he means. Unfortunately for the
reader those phrases are not at all clear. Only after having read the
commentary several times and having become acquainted with the
author’s personal views, can the reader understand what is hinted at in
some obscure phrases. This is not easy or smooth reading. Often the reader
must make a real effort to follow the complex grammatical construction,
and has to stand still at a phrase that is too dense for him to understand
what is at stake. Therefore most modern articles written about topics in
this commentary, for instance the noetics, contain numerous errors of
interpretation, because scholars have not first read the commentary as a
whole.
In comparison with Simplicius, this author has little interest in the
logical structure and in the articulation of the Aristotelian text. But
probably the most striking contrast with Simplicius’ procedures is the way
he connects the lemmata with their respective commentaries. In fact, in
many sections the commentary does not begin with an independent sen-
tence (which is the rule in Simplicius), but with a phrase that is syntacti-
cally dependent upon the preceding lemma.37 The explanation of a text may
be connected to the lemma as an apposition introduced by tout2sti,
dhladˇ38 or through a causative conjunction such as 1peidˇ, diÒti, æj39 or
as a genitive absolute (as in 20,6-8; 82,15). As in Simplicius’ works the
commentary sections often start with participles such as l2gwn, e9pèn.
However, often the principal verb is lacking, which means that fhs<
,Aristot2lhj must be supplied in the preceding lemma to make the
construction grammatically correct.40 Some comments are nothing but
hasty observations noted without much attention to style and grammar.
One has the impression that many lemmata in the edition of Hayduck were
originally not lemmata in the technical sense and should be reintegrated
into the running commentary. As we have seen, in a number of manu-
scripts the commentary is written in the form of scholia in the margin of
the Aristotelian text. This may have been the oldest tradition of the
commentary (except for some introductory sections in which the author
gives his general views about a particular subject before attacking the
text). A new edition could clarify this text tradition.
3. Doctrinal differences
It is not easy to compare the doctrines developed in the in DA with those
discussed in the genuine commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle. After
all, the commentary on On the Soul only rarely touches upon cosmological,
physical or logical problems. On the other hand, we do not find discussions
on psychological issues in the other commentaries. Besides one should not
expect great divergence between those commentaries and the in DA since
both Simplicius and the author of the in DA share a common Neoplatonic
view of the World, the Soul, the Intellect and the Forms, and both try to
interpret Aristotle in harmony with Plato. Nevertheless, on many import-
ant issues the two authors have divergent views.
Introduction 117
(a) The doctrine of the soul

Both commentators defend the fundamental tenets of the Neoplatonic
doctrine of the soul: it is a self-moving principle of life and motion, immortal
and incorporeal, separate from the body (at least the intellective soul),
impassive, the intermediary between the divisible and indivisible, etc.
However, throughout the in DA we find an original doctrine of the soul
which is not shared by Simplicius.
(1) First there is the definition of the soul as an ‘entelecheia’ of the body.
According to the in DA the soul is an ‘entelecheia’ of the body in a double
sense, both as the formal principle which gives the body its organic
structure and life functions and as the motive principle which uses the
living organism as an instrument. ‘So the whole soul of the living being is
one, but it has an element that is transcendent, which initiates motion and
is the user, and another that reaches out and belongs to the living thing
as that which determines it’ (87,33-5). To designate the soul as formal
principle the commentator uses a variety of terms such as tÕ [ristikÒn,
carakthristikÒn, e9dhtikÒn, tÕ e9dopoioàn, etc. However, his favourite
expressions to distinguish the two modes of the soul are the prepositional
constructions tÕ kaq,Ó versus tÕ Øf,oá.41 The use of the two constructions
is so frequent that it is almost the signature of this text. Therefore, it is all
the more surprising that Simplicius, in the hundreds of pages of his own
commentaries, never uses this distinction when talking about the soul and
its twofold mode of being an ‘entelecheia’.42
Even more astonishing is the fact that Simplicius never uses this
distinction to explain the difference between soul and nature, a question
he often discusses (against Alexander). To be sure, both Simplicius and our
commentator admit that nature is just a principle of being moved and being
changed passively, whereas the soul is also an active principle of change.
However, the commentator on the DA explains this difference between
nature and soul using his favourite expressions: ‘Even if nature be the
cause of change, the soul is still more so. For the origin of change is superior
to the principle according to which things change. For that is how nature
is a principle, as being that in accordance with which (tÕ kaq,Ó) not that
by the agency of which (tÕ Øf,oá)’.43 Simplicius himself never uses this
prepositional expression. On the contrary, he even explicily denies that
nature may be called the kaq,Ó principle of bodies (cf. in Phys. 289,4-13).
In his view nature is neither form nor matter, but rather a ‘capacity’
(1pithdeiÒthj) for being moved and changed.44
(2) The definition of the soul as self-motion. In the in DA we find a
peculiar interpretation of the Platonic notion of aÙtok8nhton. According to
this view Plato designates by the compound term aÙtok8nhton the identity
within change which characterizes the soul. For the soul is not simply
movement and change as is the physical body, it is a self-in-change. The
compound term thus indicates how the soul, as an intermediary between
the divisible and the indivisible, simultaneously shares both extremes. It
can be called kinhtˇ insofar as it goes outside itself into becoming and
division, and aÙtÒ insofar as it never completely goes outside itself, but,
in its movement, preserves its identity and undividedness, thus remaining
itself. This interpretation of aÙtok8nhton deviates considerably from the
generally accepted Neoplatonic explanation which understood this term
primarily as self-movement.45 This was not forgotten by our commentator.
Nevertheless, he clearly shifted the emphasis from self-movement to
preservation of identity in change. Simplicius, on the contrary, always
gives the standard Neoplatonic interpretation of the term, pointing to the
double character (diplÒh) of the soul as being both moved and moving.46 It
is interesting to notice that the author of the in DA also talks about a
diplÒh in the soul, but he thus designates the double character of the soul
between the permanent and the changing element.47
(3) The doctrine of the substantial change of the soul. Following Iam-
blichus, the author of the commentary on the DA defends the provocative
thesis that the human soul changes substantially. Simplicius nowhere
defends such a doctrine in these terms. For a full exposition of this
argument it suffices to refer to my The Changing Self. In her recent edition
of Simplicius’ Commentary on Epictetus, Mme I. Hadot has attempted to
detect traces of such a doctrine also in the work of Simplicius.48 I know
those texts: but they only show that Simplicius is somehow dependent on
Damascius in his doctrine of the soul. On the other hand, the author of the
in DA never uses the typical vocabulary of Damascius as e!doj tÁj
Øp£rxewj and oÙsièdhj m2qexij to talk about the substantial change of
the soul.
(4) The doctrine of the probolˇ or projection outwards of the soul is one
of the most original contributions of this commentary in DA to the Neopla-
tonic doctrine of the soul. This doctrine, again, is entirely absent from
Simplicius’ genuine work, together with the vocabulary of prob£llw,
probolˇ, problhtikÒj, that is so typical of the in DA. For a discussion of
this topic I again refer to my The Changing Self.
(b) Logical issues

Even in the use of logical and semantical terms the author of the in DA
often deviates from the standard school terminology as we know it from
the commentaries on Aristotle. So in characterizing substance he likes to
use the verb 0dr£zw (and its derivative aÙq2draston: 68,32; 83,4 and
0drastikÒj) a term never used in this context by Simplicius. There is also
the expression kat> b£qoj diafor£ (‘difference in depth’) which indicates
that a term is predicated of its different subclasses in an ‘analogical sense’,
neither univocally nor homonymously, but kreittÒnwj or Øfeim2nwj: thus
the rational soul is said to be more ‘soul’ than the vegetative.49 But the
most interesting example of an idiosyncratic terminology is his peculiar
Introduction 119
use of the distinction between divisive (diaretika8) and constitutive differ-
ences (sustatika8). This distinction goes back to Porphyry and was stand-
ard in the School of Ammonius.50 Divisive differences divide a genus into
different subclasses or species: those differences do not belong to each
subject in the genus, but only to that subject that belongs to a particular
species. Thus, according to Simplicius, rational and non-rational, perish-
able and imperishable are divisive differences of the genus ‘animal’. Con-
stitutive differences characterize the genus or the common nature as a
whole and make abstraction of the specifying differences of the subclasses.
Thus, whatever is a feature of ‘animal’ (or ‘living being’) as such and what
sets it apart as a genus from other genera, for example ‘minerals’, is a
constitutive difference of ‘living being’, for example self-motion, perception,
etc. The author of the in DA has quite an original interpretation of the
‘constitutive differences’. In his view those differences modify the generic
character of a concept in such a way that it becomes an analogical concept
that cannot be predicated in the same sense of all the subjects belonging
to the genus. Thus ‘substance’ and ‘accident’ are constitutive differences of
‘being’, because they do not make two coordinate species within the genus
(as horse and man within the genus animal) but modify the generic concept
intrinsically in its constitutive features. For a self-supporting substance is
‘being’ in another sense than the accidents. For that reason ‘perishable’
and ‘imperishable’ must also be considered as constitutive differences of
the common nature ‘animal’, whereas rational and non-rational are not.
‘For being an animal is different for a man and for a horse, but by divisive
differences and not by constitutive differences, and therefore not qua
animal. But the heavenly and the earthly differ also qua animal. For being
imperishable and perishable are divisive differences of being, but are
constitutive differences of animal.’51 The Commentator explains further:
‘There is no univocity when the constitutive features of what is predicated
differ, as in the case of the perishable or imperishable animal, because
being perishable or imperishable are not divisive differences of “animal”.
But they are divisive differences of substances, but constitutive differences
of what falls under substance [i.e. animal]. And so the perishable is
separated from the imperishable by a constitutive difference.’52 Simplicius,
on the contrary, considers ‘perishable’ and ‘imperishable’ to be divisive
differences. In his view it is even excluded that contrary terms such as
mortal and immortal could be constitutive terms; ‘for nothing is constituted
by contrary terms’.53 Simplicius never links the constitutive differences
with the problem of analogical concepts. He would also have rejected as
impossible what is a consequence of the doctrine in the in DA, namely that
constitutive differences cannot be predicated of each subject of which the
generic term is predicated. That, however, was precisely the definition of
the constitutive differences in Simplicius’ own view. On this point the
differences between the two authors amount to a contradiction.
(c) Some other examples

One could mention many other doctrinal differences between Simplicius’
Commentaries and this Commentary on the DA. Consider the doctrine of
the divine movers of the celestial bodies. Whereas in his Commentary on
the Physics Simplicius argues that the movers of all the celestial spheres
are totally unmoved and even excludes accidental motion from them, the
author of the in DA declares that it has been proved in Book 8 of the Physics
that only the First Mover is totally immobile, both per se and per accidens,
whereas the other celestial movers are moved per accidens.54 Of course,
one could not exclude that Simplicius might have changed his mind on this
debated question. However, if he had changed his position, he would never
have referred explicitly to his commentary on Physics 8 where we find
exactly the opposite thesis defended.
It is also interesting to notice that for the author of the in DA the
transcendent causes may not be called poihtik£ (because all efficient
causality implies a coming to be) but must be considered as t> Øpostatik£
(because they are causes of being, not of becoming: see 235,36 and 112,5-6).
Simplicius, on the contrary, never avoids talking about the divine intellect
as ‘efficient cause’: cf. in Phys. 314,21 and 316,2.
Let me conclude this section with one last example inter multa. In the
prooemium of the in DA the term e∏dhsij is interpreted as ‘scientific
understanding’ (6,22-4) whereas Simplicius (rightly) argues that this term
denotes the general concept of knowledge of which ‘science’ is a particular
kind.55
4. The references to previous works

In the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul the author refers six times
to his previous works. There is one reference (136,29) to an epitome of the
Physics of Theophrastus: there is no such a work of Simplicius, but, as we
will show in the second part of this essay, this epitome must almost
certainly be identified with the Metaphrasis of Priscian. Two references
(28,20 and 217,27) are to a commentary on the Metaphysics. There is no
commentary on this work by Simplicius. However, there is some indirect
but problematic evidence that Simplicius may have written such a com-
mentary.56 However that may be, we can not compare the cross-references
of the in DA with this lost commentary. Finally, there are three references
to a commentary on the Physics (35,14; 120,24 and 198,5). If Simplicius
actually is the author of the in DA, it should not be difficult to identify
these references because we still have his bulky commentary on the
Physics. However, a comparison of the relevant sections in both commen-
taries reveals such a divergence in content and expression that it is
impossible to accept that the cross-references in the in DA relate to the in
Phys. of Simplicius. Therefore, the three references to a commentary on
Introduction 121
the Physics furnish three important arguments for rejecting the attribution
of the in DA to Simplicius.
The first reference to a commentary on the Physics occurs at 35,10-15.
In this section an objection is raised against Aristotle’s argument that the
soul never undergoes change. It seems evident that the soul is not subject
to quantitative change; but what about qualitative change? Is the transi-
tion from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge not an alteration?
For a solution to this objection the commentator refers to Aristotle’s
discussion of alteration in Physics 7.3 (246a10-48a9): ‘Transformations
occur after affections (p£qh) that are not of the soul but of the living being.
For the sudden presence (¢qrÒa parous8a) of the disposition is in the soul,
but the transitional transformation (diexodik] metabolˇ) prior to its
presence is in the composite thing. And we have explained this more clearly
in our commentary on this passage.’ That the reference here is to Physics
7.3 is confirmed by another reference at 121,29-35. Learning, it is said, is
‘a sort of coming to be’ (g2nesij). This does not imply that ‘the soul itself is
altered – for alteration is a change that is continuous and everywhere
divisible, whereas the soul always halts at discrete terms (kaq,Órouj
∑statai) but the soul comes to be in a cognitive disposition all of a sudden
(¢qrÒwj) whereas the alteration is seen to happen in the living being, as
has been said in Physics Book 7’.57
In Simplicius’ Commentary on Physics 7 we read an extended and
detailed exposition of Aristotle’s argument at 246a10ff. All alterations
concerning ‘affective qualities’ are processes in time. However, the acqui-
sition of virtues is not an alteration, but a perfection of the soul, although
it may be preceded and accompanied by bodily changes. Besides, virtues
have their existence ‘in relation to’ something, and there is no alteration
of relative entities. Therefore neither the acquisition of a virtue nor the
actualization of it may be considered as an ‘alteration’. In this long
scholastic exposition Simplicius gives us the standard interpretation of
Aristotle’s doctrine. In this sense, the whole argument ‘is in line with the
discussion’ in the in DA58 which presupposes that interpretation. Nowhere,
however, either in this section or elsewhere in his long commentary on the
Physics, does Simplicius make an opposition between ¢qrÒa parous8a
and diexodik] metabolˇ, nor does he use the remarkable expression
kaq,Órouj ∑stasqai, which plays a role in the in DA.
As a matter of fact, throughout this commentary, the expression
(kaq,Órouj ∑stasqai) is used to characterize the thinking of the soul.
As we experience it, the cognitive activity of the soul is a discursive process.
In reasoning the soul passes from one term to another, composes proposi-
tions with subject and predicates, concatenates propositions in syllogisms,
etc. For the soul cannot render intelligible every form in one indivisible act,
as does the divine intellect which thinks eternally always the same objects.
The soul is forced to think 1n parat£sei, now this form, then another, and
to pass from one intelligible object to another and so through intermediar-
ies back to the same. In this process of thought there no longer exists an
indivisible connection of the knowing subject with the objects known; there
is only a kind of touching them (1pafˇ). In this discursive process the soul
manifests its divisible character. Even divine souls have this discursivity,
but they have it in an eternal time. However, notwithstanding this discur-
sivity and divisibility, all rational souls share in the indivisibility of the
intellect. For, as our commentator shows, their thinking activity is not a
continuous (sunecˇj) process, as is a physical motion or an alteration.
Thinking is a discontinuous process, a jumping, as it were, from one
moment to another, as if it were composed out of discrete monads. In fact
in each act of knowledge, the soul somehow stands still at the object known
which is its Óroj or its defining term: = kat> tÕ gnwstÕn tÁj gnws2wj
st£sij (11,31-3). And even when the soul passes (meta-ba8nein) continu-
ously from one term to another, the act of thought is not itself 1n metab£sei
but always stands still at each term of knowledge.59 This ‘standstill’
(st£sij) of the cognitive act upon the known object and its transition from
one term to another (= kaq,Órouj ¢e< 1n tÍ metabolÍ b£sij) manifests its
participation in indivisibility. Hence acts of thought never have a continu-
ous extension ‘but it is rather as those who run from one term to another,
with an undivided activity at each stage, since each thought is known
undivided and as a whole’.60
When we then turn to Simplicius’ Physics commentary, we nowhere find
a discussion of the discontinuous character of knowledge, and the very
specific vocabulary (kaq,Órouj ∑stasqai, ba8nein) is entirely lacking.
There is an interesting digression on the distinction between physical time
and psychic time in the Corollary in Time, in which Simplicius discusses
the opinions of Iamblichus and Damascius. We know that Damascius
argued that time proceeds by leaps and discontinuously. It is very plausible
that the author of the in DA was influenced by both philosophers in his
views on time. However, Simplicius himself never develops such a theory
in his own commentary, and even in the Corollary he never gives an
account of the doctrine of time in terms used in the in DA.
We have another allusion to the same doctrine in the third reference to
the Physics, which occurs in the commentary on DA 3.2 426b23-6. In this
section Aristotle is discussing the ‘common sense’. He argues that this
sense can compare and distinguish impressions from the different particu-
lar senses, for example, white and sweet. This discrimination, however,
occurs not at separable moments, oÙd,1n kecwrism2nü crÒnü. After a brief
explanation of this phrase, the commentator offers a possible deeper
meaning: ‘Perhaps Aristotle suggests (a9n8ttetai) that the pure and per-
fect activities of the soul, which always advance according to terms, are in
a time which is composed out of now-moments as monads, but not such a
time as the physical time which is a continuum. We have discussed this
matter at length in our commentary on the Physics. For judgement is not
divisible, but a perfect act, and whole at once in the now.’61 This is a rather
Introduction 123
obscure suggestion, and we are happy to know that it has been discussed
‘at length’ in the author’s commentary on the Physics. But, to our surprise,
we find no more explanation of this interesting doctrine in Simplicius’
commentary on the Physics, not even in the Corollary on Time, where
Iamblichus’ views on time are discussed at length. The editor of the in DA
was puzzled about this reference to the Physics. Where could Aristotle have
discussed this theory of time? I believe that we have here again a reference
to 7.3 and particularly to the concluding paragraph: ‘For it is because the
mind is at rest and has come to a halt that we are said to know’ (247b9-13).
Aristotle here nicely explains the verb 1p8stamai as a sort of standing still
or halting (stÁnai t]n di£noian). This section of the Physics could have
offered Simplicius an excellent occasion to develop ‘at length’ a doctrine of
thought as a discontinuous process, which advances and comes to a halt
according to terms (kaq,Órouj). But we find no single comment of this kind.
On the contrary, Simplicius gives quite a different explanation of this
Aristotelian text (cf. 1077,3f.). Aristotle, it is said, here follows his master
Plato who in the Timaeus explains how our incarnated souls have suffered
from the shock of birth and have fallen into ignorance: only when souls
have acquired rest again, may they recover their innate knowledge. Aris-
totle has this doctrine in mind when he says that the soul comes to a halt
in knowledge. It is nice to find in this Aristotelian text a harmony with
Plato, but it remains a rather dull comment on a most interesting obser-
vation of Aristotle which has quite a different meaning. In this case, the
commentator on the DA surpasses Simplicius in originality and philosophi-
cal speculation.
The second reference to the Physics occurs in an explanation of DA 2.5,
417a14-17: ‘We first talk as if to be affected (p£scein) and to be changed
(kine√sqai) and to be active (1nerge√n) were the same thing. The three
terms must, however, be distinguished. For motion or change (k8nhsij) is
not the same as activity (1n2rgeia): it is an imperfect activity, as Aristotle
says.’ But, as the commentator observes, Aristotle has not yet explained
how ‘being affected’ (p£scein) and being moved or changed (kine√sqai)
differ from each other. Therefore he makes his own attempt to differentiate
these terms. If p£scein is used as a specific term for all changes according
to ‘affective qualities’ (such as becoming hot or wet), then the term
kine√sqai has a much wider extension: for it also comprehends locomotion,
substantial change, etc. But if the term is used unqualifiedly for all kinds
of transformation (tropˇ) that come about by the agency of something else,
it may seem that ‘to be affected’ is equated with ‘change’ (metab£llein).
For all change is by the agency of something else and involves some
transformation. However, one should make a further distinction. Not all
change, perhaps, is identical with ‘to be affected’, but only substantial,
qualitatitive and quantitative change. For change occurs whenever a whole
is in transformation ‘through a different ordering with different things at
different times’ (¥llote ¥lloij sunt£ttesqai). ‘But such a change as both
preserves the same ordering with other things and remains in its natural
state, when what is in change (or motion) is not affected, but activates the
transmigration (met£stasij) through different spaces, is not, as we have
said in the commentary on Physics Book 4, a case of being affected, since
it involves no transformation.’62
Some further comments about this obscure explanation of the difference
between kine√sqai and p£scein would be most welcome. But all our
attempts to find an explanatory parallel text in the voluminous commen-
tary on the Physics have been in vain. The reference to Physics 4 is probably
a copyist’s error for Physics 8. Simplicius approaches the problem men-
tioned here in his commentary on Physics 8.7 261,13-23 when discussing
the ontological primacy of locomotion over all other forms of motions.
Following Aristotle he explains that locomotion does not change the status
of the thing in motion, neither in substance nor in quantity nor in quality.
Therefore a thing in locomotion is more perfect than a thing involved in
another mode of change (in Phys. 1272,19-25). The argument of this section
in the commentary is certainly coherent with the ideas expressed in the in
DA. However, here again we do not find an explanation of the rather
obscure phrases used in the commentary on DA. This is, however, a
reasonable expectation if a commentator refers explicitly to an earlier
work. Thus in the whole commentary on the Physics we never find the
expression ¥llote ¥lloij sunt£ttesqai or 1nerge√n t]n di£foron tîn
tÒpwn met£stasin. The possible origin of this vocabulary about change is
again Iamblichus. According to Iamblichus the different accidents co-
subsist in the substance and they form one coordination (sÚntaxij) with
it.63 Probably our commentator is influenced by this Iamblichean vocabu-
lary, and uses the expression ¥llote ¥lloij sunt£ttesqai to designate a
modification in the structural arrangement of substance and accidents
which is characteristic of change, whereas in locomotion we have just a
migration in space without any structural change or tropˇ.
To conclude: the cross-references, which are usually a strong argument
in favour of an attribution, are in the case of the commentary in DA a
serious counter-argument.
Conclusion
I have argued that the commentary on Aristotle’s DA stands apart from
the other commentaries of Simplicius in its different technique, in its
particular style and idiosyncratic vocabulary, and in its doctrinal differ-
ences. In addition there are no cross-references between this commentary
and the other commentaries. Are those arguments, which could be sup-
ported by many more examples, sufficient to reject the traditional attribu-
tion to Simplicius? Is it not possible to explain those differences through a
development in the thought and commentary style of Simplicius? One
might suppose that there is an evolution in his work from an Alexandrian
Introduction 125
perspective to a more Athenian Neoplatonism (Damascius and the influ-
ence of Iamblichus). In his earlier work (the in Ench.?) the Athenian
influence would be limited, whereas in the in DC and the in Phys. we find
already a more speculative tendency as is evident from the Corollaries on
Place and Time, which show a strong influence of Iamblichus and Damas-
cius. Still later we have the in Cat. where the author follows Iamblichus
closely, and finally there is the in DA where the author is fully inspired by
Iamblichus in his speculative explanations of Aristotle’s treatise and has
lost all interest in an ‘historical’ approach to the text.
However, this hypothesis of a doctrinal evolution seems to be untenable
for two reasons:
(1) Within the authentic works of Simplicius one can discover no evolu-
tion in thought, vocabulary or style. On the contrary, it is surprising how
coherent and homogeneous the doctrinal content is of all those works and
how similar the style and vocabulary. Even the commentary on the
Enchiridion, which has a somewhat peculiar character, defends the same
doctrines and uses a very similar vocabulary and cannot be considered a
special Alexandrian work (pace K. Praechter). And although the influence
of Iamblichus may be strong in the commentary on the Categories, the
author keeps a distance from his too lofty speculations, as we have seen.
Besides, on all issues where we find doctrinal differences with the in DA,
the other commentaries of Simplicius constitute a coherent doctrinal bloc.
So if there were an evolution in Simplicius’ work, this hypothesis could
only be verified in his ‘last’ work, the in DA. Only in this work would he
have distanced himself from his previous works.
(2) If there is an evolution in a literary production, it should never be
such that it abolishes the identity of an author. The hypothesis of an
evolution may explain some doctrinal differences. Thus it is always possi-
ble that a philosopher changes his opinion, has another view on a certain
problem, makes other distinctions, or offers another emphasis (as we will
see in the case of Priscian who modified his interpretation of Aristotelian
noetics). It is also possible that he is later more influenced by an authority
(say Iamblichus) than at an earlier stage. But this hypothesis cannot
explain radical differences in language and style, in the technique of
commenting, and in fundamental doctrines. Why should an author switch
to an entirely different mode of commenting, to a new style and vocabulary?
Why should he start using a term like 1pexerg£zomai? And how could one
explain through an ‘evolution’ such terminological and doctrinal differ-
ences as the interpretation of aÙtok8nhton or the meaning of sustatika<
diafora8?
From all these considerations only one conclusion is valid: the commen-
tary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ cannot be the work of Simplicius.
II. The Commentary is the work of Priscian of Lydia

In this second part I will argue that the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the
Soul’ is the work of Priscian of Lydia, author of the Metaphrasis in
Theophrastum. Our main argument for this attribution is the reference
that the author of the commentary makes at 136,29 to his ‘Epitome of
Theophrastus’ Physics’. This earlier work must be identified with the
Metaphrasis in Theophrastum of Priscian.
The Metaphrasis is the only work of Priscian which has survived in
Greek, and even that text is only partially preserved.64 We have the
sections on Perception and on Imagination, and, after a lacuna in the
manuscripts, a discussion of Intellect. The Metaphrasis is not just a
summary of Theophrastus’ Physics: the author also attempts to solve some
of the problems raised by Theophrastus within the Neoplatonic framework
of Iamblichus’ doctrine of the soul. Unfortunately this important work of
Theophrastus, which consisted of eight books, has not survived, but we can
reconstruct parts of it.65 As we learn from Themistius, the discussion on
the Soul occupied the fourth and the fifth book of Theophrastus’ Physics:
1n tù p2mptü tîn Fusikîn, deut2rü d5 tîn Per< yucÁj.66 The extant
section of the Metaphrasis only concerns the fifth book (cf. 22,34: t> d2
loip> toà p2mptou bibl8ou). But it is probable that Priscian also com-
mented upon the previous and the later books of the Physics. Certainly he
must have ‘epitomized’ also the fourth book in which Theophrastus dis-
cussed the definition of the soul after a doxographical introduction. As a
matter of fact, the Metaphrasis as we have it now opens ex abrupto with a
sentence which only makes sense if there was a previous discussion: per<
a9sqˇsewj aÙtù [ skopÕj 1fexÁj. Notice the 1fexÁj and the implicit
reference to Theophrastus with aÙtù. There is also a reference to an earlier
discussion on 29,4 (}dh 4famen) which cannot be identified in the actual
surviving text. This again must be a reference to the lost epitome of the
fourth book. Whether Priscian also summarized the Books 1-3 and 6-8, or
was only interested in the psychological discussion, remains uncertain.
The work of Theophrastus was also known to Simplicius who quotes from
the first and the third book, but never uses it in a discussion about the
soul.67
In all manuscripts, which depend upon a 14th-century copy, this para-
phrase of Theophrastus is attributed to Priscian of Lydia. The actual title
cannot be the original one since the term met£frasij is not used before
the Byzantine period. Not much is known about Priscian besides the fact
that he belonged to the group of Neoplatonic philosophers around Damas-
cius who went in exile to Persia after the closing of the Academy in Athens.
Whether this paraphrase is really his work, we cannot check. For the only
possible term of comparison is the Solutiones ad Chosroem which only
exists in Latin and is nothing but a compilation. However, there are no
serious arguments to doubt the traditional attribution. For Priscian of
Introduction 127
Lydia is such a little known philosopher that it is implausible that his name
would have been attached to an anonymous commentary. It seems, how-
ever, that he had some reputation in the tradition because his name is
mentioned in an old list among the famous commentators of Plato, but this
testimonium remains doubtful.68 However it may be, if our argument is
correct, we must also ascribe to him this original and speculative commen-
tary on Aristotle’s On the Soul.
As I have said, our main argument for this new attribution is the
reference to an ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’ which occurs in the
commentary on DA 2.7 419a13-19. Aristotle here discusses the function of
the transparent medium in visual perception. A colour stimulates the
transparent which in turn stimulates the sense-organ. This explanation
emphasizes the mechanic-passive character of the sensation process. The
commentator, however, tries to reduce this passivity by insisting on the
active and direct character of sensation. The medium only plays a subsidi-
ary function (sunerge√n 136,13.36). Its only role is to transfer the activity
of the colour without being modified by it itself. Therefore it does not
activate sight by itself without colour. ‘For if the transparent had stimula-
ted sight by itself, the perception would have been of that medium, and not
of the coloured object. As it is, we grasp both it and the intervening interval.
I have explained this more clearly in the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’
(136,26-9).
As a matter of fact, one finds an extended discussion of the nature and
the function of the transparent in the Metaphrasis (8,1-15,5) where Pris-
cian starts from the problems raised by Theophrastus: ‘What then is the
nature of the transparent?’ From 11,25 onwards, the commentator exam-
ines the role of the transparent in sense perception. He first establishes
that the transparent is not only required because of the need of an interval
between object and organ, but also because it contributes something to the
senses (suneisf2rein ti de√ 11,27). But what is this contribution? Is it that
the colour stimulates the transparent and that it in its turn stimulates the
sight to perceive, as if it were informed by the colours? But in this manner
we would perceive the transformed medium and not the colour, which
would destroy the immediacy of perception. However, we do see the colour
itself and immediately. Hence it must be the colour itself which stimulates
the organ of sight. What then is the function of the ‘movement’ of the
medium? It must be such a movement that the perceived object is conveyed
by it immediately and without modification. ‘I say therefore that the colour,
when illuminated, acts upon the transparent with an activity which is
brought upon it in a separate manner (cwristîj) and for this reason it is
present to it not by transmission but immediately and in all of it altogether
and as a whole undividedly everywhere.’ Therefore Priscian rightly com-
pares the presence of the activity of colour in the transparent to the
presence of the light in it, which actualizes it while being present in it in
a separate manner.
A comparison of this section of the Metaphrasis with the corresponding
pages in the in DA gives strong evidence that the author of this commen-
tary is referring at 136,29 to this section of the Metaphrasis. In fact, we
find in both texts a similar formulation of the problem concerning the
function of the transparent and a similar solution expressed in the same
peculiar terminology. Moreover, the text of the Metaphrasis is more elabo-
rate, whereas the in DA argues as if the doctrine of the Metaphrasis is
presupposed. Let us compare the two texts (using S provisionally as sign
for the author of the in DA, P for Priscian).
The aporia:
Introduction 129
The aporia:
P 12,14.12-13
The transparent can also of itself stimulate sight.

But in that case, we would perceive the affection of the transparent
and not the colour; but if <we perceive> the colour
S 136, 26-8
But if the transparent stimulated sight of itself,

the perception would have been of that
and not of the coloured object. As it is, we grasp it <the coloured object> 
The solution:
P 12,17-30 Just as the thing which illuminates perfects the transparent

when the activity that comes from it is present to it in a separate manner
and present to our eye through the transparent, not as if <the transparent>
were passively affected, but as itself also being perfected by way of that
separate activity –, so also colour, when illuminated, acts on the transpar-
ent with an activity, which is carried upon it in a separate manner  and
is present at once and in all of it together and as a whole undividedly
everywhere, and as it were giving it form in a separate manner; together
with that which is thus given form <the colour> also stimulates our sight
.
Therefore the activity of colour is also present to sight in an unmixed way
since it is carried upon it without being mixed with it.
What then does the transparent contribute  ?
Surely it is clear that it is by transferring it.
13,12 The colour (is made visible) by the perfect  actuality of the form
being present in the transparent in an absolute manner 
S 132,13 <Light> is  activity  present in it [the transparent] in a

separate manner and perfecting it.
136,8 The colour that is perfected by light acts on the  transparent not
in a passive manner but as an actuality, as imparting to it a certain
light-like activity
137,3 The sense-organ is stimulated by the colour which supplies the
activity which is carried upon the transparent to the sense-organ, carried
separately and without mixture upon the intermediate.
Therefore the activity is present all at once and altogether as a whole 
136,24.37 By transferring the activity 
155,23 The colour is present in an absolute manner and as activity 
The conclusion, that the reference to the ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’
actually concerns the Metaphrasis, is further confirmed when we compare
the whole text of the Metaphrasis, in so far as it has been preserved, with
the in DA. For a detailed comparison shows that the correspondence we
have discovered between the two texts is not just an isolated case. In many
other sections of the in DA the commentator exploits the Metaphrasis
extensively and literally. So the opening section, with the general charac-
terization of sense-perception, is the substrate of the exposition of the same
topic in the commentary on the DA. A careful analysis shows that the
commentator follows the text of the Metaphrasis line by line, sometimes
literally copying it, sometimes paraphrasing or summarizing it. One may
compare:
P 1,11-2,6
Since all knowledge comes about through the conjoining into one and the
indivisible encompassing of the whole known object, the affection of the
sense-organ must precede the perception ; because of the whole extension
outside <of the sense-perception> it cannot be active without the <or-
gans>; nor indeed having been aroused itself previously does it stimulate
the organ (as in the case of imagination)  For perception is of <external
objects> and not of the affections in the sense-organs, but together with
Introduction 131
these it grasps the forms in the bodies. It is not like inanimate things that
the sense-organs are affected by sense-objects, but as a living body is
affected. Therefore it is not entirely an affection nor altogether from
outside, but it is also by way of its own activity, and it is not the case that
it is moved first and is active later, but it is not moved at all without at the
same time being active. Nor yet indeed is it active without being moved.
S 125,25-34
Since all knowledge comes about through the conjoining into one and the
indivisible encompassing of the whole know object, and since the affection
of the sense-organ must precede because of the inclination outside of the
sensitive life which cannot be active without the organ nor, having been
aroused previously, also stimulate the organ, it is clear that it is not
perceiving the affections in the sense-organs, but that together with these
it grasps the forms in the bodies. And this also is clear that the sense-organ
is not affected by things external in the way that the inanimate things are;
it is affected as being alive. Therefore it is not entirely an affection nor
altogether from outside but by way of its own activity, and at the same time
it is moved and active.
It is superfluous to quote more Greek texts. One may still compare P

2,6-14 with S 125,34 – 126,4. But as a last illustration of the procedures of
the commentator let us compare S 126,11b-15 with P 3,1-20a. We see how
the commentator has summarized the long text in P and made one single
period of it. The first clause is literally transferred from P, but is now made
a genitive absolute. The main clause is taken from P 3,18. What in P was
a question and an answer, has been transformed into one affirmative
sentence without even changing the order of words. The commentator skips
the middle section of the argument in P (3,2-17), because it is a repetition
of an argument he discussed earlier in his work. It will suffice to summarize
it in a parenthesis.
P 3,1-20
For with the one concept of white the soul perceives all particular whites
things.
In what way then is the soul made like the sensible objects? Not by
receiving something from them, but by being active in accordance with
their concept.
S 126,11-16
For the soul perceives all particular white things with the one concept of
white.
Therefore the soul is made like the sensible objects not by receiving
something from them, but by being active in accordance with the concept
appropriate to them.
About the ‘sensibilia communia’ we find similar arguments in P 4,9-5,4

and in S 126,24 – 127,14. One notices again typical terminology such as
plhktikèteron e9dhtikîj. In the in DA the commentator adds a point that
is not directly based upon the Aristotelian text, namely that a sensible
object must act upon the sense organ ‘at a suitable distance’: ‘For these
points must be inserted, even if they are not now clearly stated by Aristotle’
(127,2). This topic, however, is discussed at length in P 5,21-7,6. These
parallels between P and S are probably not accidental.
Another example. At 419a6 Aristotle leaves the question open ‘why some
objects are not seen in light, but only in darkness, like charcoal’. The
commentator gives his own explanation of the phenomenon (see 135,25-
136,2). Priscian offers a similar explanation of it at 10,30 – 11,14. A most
interesting correspondence between the two texts occurs regarding an
account of the nature of darkness. In P we find a most extravagant theory
regarding the essence of darkness which goes against the traditional view;
particularly the Aristotelian. As it is said in 8,16: ‘Darkness is not the
privation of light, but is itself an actuality’ (8,15-16). ‘For just as the
transparent in fire has light essentially, that in earth has darkness
essentially. Hence just as fire is a thing that produces light, so earth is a
thing that produces darkness (skotopoiÒn).’ And further he talks about
the ‘darkness-producing property’ of the earth ( skotopoiÕn 9d8wma
10,11-12). This most extravagant theory of darkness (which even has a
Manichaean flavour) has to my knowledge never been defended by any
philosopher in antiquity. It is therefore no coincidence that we find a
reference to this theory in the in DA, whereas the real Simplicius is silent
about it in all of his commentaries. In the commentary on 418b10 S raises
the question whether darkness is the privation of light or the ‘actuality of
the earth’. In the first case, the transparent is not subject to light or to
Introduction 133
darkness through two potencies, but only through one: when it is actual-
ized, there is light; when it is not, darkness. However, if darkness is not
just a privation, but is itself an actuality of the earth, so that it does not
create darkness by interposition, but by imparting some specific character
(9diÒthta) opposite to light, as is the case with cold in relation to hot, and
black to white, then there will be two potencies, one characterised by the
ability to illuminate, the other by the ability to darken; for darkness will
not consist only in the absence of light, but will need something positive to
be present (133,8-17). There is no reason why the commentator should
discuss both alternatives here. Certainly there is no occasion for it in
Aristotle’s text because the philosopher strongly defends the privation
theory as the commentator knows: ‘But Aristotle treats it as a privation’
(133,17) notes the commentator, and he stops the discussion. The only
reason to insert this heterodox view on light in this section of the commen-
tary is that he himself must have once adhered to it, as is clear from the
Metaphrasis, perhaps following Iamblichus’ views.
For the other correspondences between the two texts we only give the
references. P 15,6-25 and S 142,25-7 (on the echo); P 16,14-17,15 and S
143,23-31; 145,6-12 (about the air in the organ of hearing); P 18,7-30 and
S 158,14-36; 161-4 (about touch; and in particular S 161,9=P 18,25); P
20,9-16 and S 174,18-26; P 20,22 and S 175,11. Further P 21,16-32 and S
182,34-183,20; P 21,32-22,23 and S 185,27-186,11 and S 187,31f.; P 21,4-16
and S 195,1-12; P 5,4-6 and S 135,1-7 and 189,23-8. In all these cases there
are no literal parallels, but there is a strong similarity in terminology and
style and such a similar development of the problems that we can only
explain it by accepting the identity of P and S.
Additional evidence is the affinity between the second part of the
Metaphrasis about imagination (phantasia) and the general discussion
that the commentator upon the DA devotes to this topic before starting his
detailed explanation of the lemmata of Aristotle. In both texts there is a
remarkable influence from Iamblichus (cf. 214,19 and P 24,2; 23,13). A
lengthy comparison would again oblige us to quote long sections of Greek
texts. Let us just indicate the main similarities: P 23,1-10 and S 213,25-33;
P 23,24-7 and S 213,34-5; P 24,32-25,13 and S 213,35-214,4; P 24,8-14 and
S 214,5-13; P 24,27-8 and S 214,12 (215,36; 206,20-208,10); P 24,1-7 and
S 214,18-20; P 24,28-32 and S 215,9-13. Again, those parallels are not so
literal as in the section on perception. It is, however, evident that S has
made his commentary on DA with the Metaphrasis before his eyes (and
not vice versa). For in some cases the text of P is more developed, and
sometimes the phrases of P are so mixed up and summarized in S that one
cannot fully understand the ‘new’ text in S without having first read P. A
beautiful example is S 213,35-214,4. It is said that the activities of thought
in our soul also have a repercussion upon the body, not only the pneumatic
body, but also the ‘solid organ’. What this ‘solid organ’ might be and what
kind of a disposition it may acquire is not at all clear in the text. It becomes,
however, clear when we compare this passage with the corresponding
section in P 24,32-25,5: the repercussion of thought on the ‘solid body’ is
nothing but the frowning of the eyebrows which accompanies our rational
activities.
The third part of the Metaphrasis that survives is devoted to the
interpretation of the celebrated Aristotelian doctrine of the intellect ‘in
potency’ and ‘in act’. When we compare this section with the commentary
on De Anima 3.4-6, we again find the same vocabulary and similar phrases
in the discussion of the noetic doctrine. There is, however, a striking
difference between the two texts. In the Metaphrasis Priscian identifies
the noàj 1nerge8v with the unparticipated divine intellect, and the noàj
dun£mei with the participated intellect. In the in DA the commentator
understood both the intellect-in-act and the intellect-in-potency as princi-
ples belonging to the structure of the rational soul. In The Changing Self
I have compared both interpretations. In my view, the doctrinal difference
between the two works can easily be explained if one admits that Priscian
in his earlier work, the Metaphrasis, rather faithfully reproduces the
Iamblichean doctrine of the Intellect, whereas in the later commentary he
came back to the more traditional interpretation of DA 3.4-6, reading those
chapters as a characterization of the immanent structure of the rational
soul. The peculiar terminology that he had employed in the Metaphrasis
to describe the relation between the absolute and the participated intellect,
he now transfers to the moments of the rational life within the soul.
Nonetheless, he was convinced that by this application he remained
perfectly true to Iamblichus’ thought.69 As an exegesis of Aristotle’s doc-
trine, this is a radical shift. However, there is no fundamental difference
in doctrine because both texts, the Metaphrasis and the in DA, develop the
same doctrine of the intellect.
Conclusion
As we have seen, there exists between the Metaphrasis of Priscian and the
commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ attributed to Simplicius a remark-
able similarity in doctrine, vocabulary and style: ‘modus loquendi necnon
sententia simillima’ (as Piccolomini said). For many expressions in the in
DA which rarely or never occur in Simplicius’ authentic works, we find
parallels in the Metaphrasis. Both texts also heavily depend upon Iam-
blichus in the formulation of their psychological doctrine.
In principle there are four possible hypotheses to explain those striking
similarities.
(1) The author of the in DA plagiarizes Priscian. Against this hypothesis,

we can argue than when someone is plagiarizing another, one can easily
set apart in his work the ‘excerpts’ taken from that other source, because
they have another vocabulary and stylistic characteristics. But we have
Introduction 135
seen that the parallels with the Metaphrasis are not isolated, but run
through the entire commentary. Moreover, the author of the in DA uses
language like Priscian’s in the Metaphrasis, even when he diverges from
the doctrine defended there, as is evident in his interpretation of Aristotle’s
doctrine of the active and passive intellect. It is difficult to suppose that an
author would continuously imitate the vocabulary and the modes of ex-
pression of another author, unless there is an actual attempt at falsifica-
tion. But why would Simplicius try to imitate Priscian?
(2) For the same reason it is also excluded that Priscian plagiarizes the
in DA. Besides, the comparison of both texts has demonstrated that in DA
presupposes P and not vice versa.
(3) The authors of both works could have used a common source. One
may think of Iamblichus’ treatise On the Soul whom both authors profess
to follow closely in their explanations. Is it not better to explain the literal
correspondence between both texts through their dependence on a common
source, as is often the case? However, against this hypothesis, one can
argue (i) that an accurate comparison of some parallel passages shows that
the author of in DA was working with the text of P before him (and not a
common source), first transcribing, then summarising; (ii) the parallel
texts do not constitute sections that can be isolated in the two commentar-
ies, which is the case when two independent authors use the same third
source, but we find throughout in both texts similar vocabulary and
stylistic elements which can only be explained by the identity of their
author (for example, the use of 1rî, fˇsw as an interjection or the use of
the verb 1pexerg£zomai); (iii) although both texts refer to Iamblichus, they
never quote him literally: cf. S 240,37f. with P 32,13. Therefore a common
dependence upon Iamblichus is a very improbable hypothesis to account
for the literal resemblances between both texts, since in quoting their
common source they are never literal.
(4) The most plausible hypothesis remains that the two works must be
attributed to the same author, namely Priscian. Our main argument for
this hypothesis is the self-reference in the commentary on the DA which
can only refer to the Metaphrasis. Besides this reference, there is also
another implicit reference to the Metaphrasis in the commentary that I
have not yet discussed. At 286,27-32 the commentator notices that Aris-
totle sometimes uses the term noàj to designate what he calls in other texts
di£noia, ‘stretching the name of intellect to cover all rational life, as far as
imagination’: of course, not the imagination in irrational beings, but that
in humans ‘about which Theophrastus too inquires in his own Physics
whether it should be regarded as rational or irrational’. Now, Priscian
mentions the same opinion of Theophrastus in the same words in his
Metaphrasis 29,3-6 and he refers to an earlier passage in his work (now
lost) for a fuller discussion of this topic.
It is evident, then, that the author of the in DA considers the ‘Epitome

of the Physics of Theophrastus’ as his own work. When he started his
explanation of the Aristotelian treatise On the Soul he fell back on his
earlier work, his ‘Epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’, in which he had
already discussed similar problems, and he freely used arguments and
phrases taken from it. That an author so literally copies from his own work
is not exceptional. One can give many examples in contemporary academic
careers. Besides it is remarkable that we find the most literal quotations
from his earlier work in those sections of his Commentary where he unfolds
his own views on perception and phantasia and adopts a distance from the
Aristotelian text, as in the in DA 213,23-214,27 where he first presents his
own view on phantasia and only afterwards (starting from 214,28f.) gives
his interpretation of the DA 428b10. And the section on perception in in
DA 125,24-126,16 comes as a conclusion in which he summarizes his own
views.
That the Metaphrasis is an earlier work of the author of the in DA is
also clear from many indications. Thus we find in the Metaphrasis a first
development of the doctrine of the soul as [listikÒn which is so typical of
the in DA. And as we have seen, the exposition on the intellect in the
Metaphrasis represents an earlier stage in which the author stands much
closer to Iamblichus. After all, the whole work is not very systematic, the
use of certain technical terms is not fixed, and the problem of the relation
between the soul and its participated intellect is not solved.
There remains, however, one serious objection against our claim,
namely the exact formulation of the reference in the in DA 136: ‘I have
explained this more clearly in the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’. Is it
possible that Priscian would have characterised his own explanation of
Theophrastus as an ‘epitome’? The literary genre of the epitome was very
popular in antiquity.70 Authors made their own summaries, of their own
works and of their great predecessors. The reasons for this popularity are
well explained by Galen in the introduction of his sÚnoyij per< sfugmîn.
However, it seems difficult to consider the Metaphrasis of Priscian as an
‘epitome’, because he does much more here than summarize the basic
doctrines of Theophrastus. The situation is even more complicated because
we know from the catalogue of Theophrastus’ works that there had existed
an 1pitom] fusikîn besides the eight books of the Physics.71 Perhaps the
work of Theophrastus on which Priscian was commenting was not the
Physics of Theophrastus, but an epitome of his Physics. And we should
then correct the reference as follows: ‘I have explained this more clearly in
<my writing> on the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics’.72 However, this
solution is wholly implausible. First, as we have seen before, the Physics
on which Themistius and Priscian are commenting contained several
books, which is unlikely for an ‘epitome’. Secondly the expression used by
Priscian in this reference does not admit such an interpretation, particu-
larly the fact that Qeofr£stou is inserted between 1pitom] and fusikîn.
There is only one interpretation possible: ‘in the epitome (that I have made)
Introduction 137
of Theophrastus’ Physics’. If we take this as a reference to the Metaphrasis,
this earlier work must have originally had the title 1pitom] fusikîn
Qeofr£stou. However, can this work of Priscian with all its Neoplatonic
speculations on perception, imagination and intellect be considered an
‘epitome’ of Theophrastus? One may object that this ‘epitome’ is not really
a summary or shortening of the text in the strict sense, but an original
interpretation. But the same may be said of the ‘paraphrases’ of Themis-
tius, and the ‘epitomai’ of the Platonic works made by Galen (of which
unfortunately only the Arabic version of the epitome on the Timaeus
survives). It seems that the term ‘epitome’ should not be interpreted in too
narrow a sense.73 It is here used in contrast with a real ‘commentary’ upon
a work (ØpÒmnhma) which gives a detailed explanation of the texts (as is
the case with the commentary in DA), whereas the ‘Epitome-metaphrasis’
only presents the basic doctrine of Theophrastus’ doctrine, though set in a
Neoplatonic context.
Notes
1. cf. Simplicius. On the Soul, vol. 1, p. 2.
2. cf. Expositio in tres libros Aristotelis de anima, Venice 1602. We owe this
reference to the excellent study of B. Nardi, ‘Il commento di Simplicio al “De
Anima” ’ in Saggi sull’ Aristotelismo Padovano del secolo XIV al XV, Florence 1958,
pp. 431-3.
3. F. Bossier-C. Steel, ‘Priscianus Lydus en de In De Anima van pseudo(?)-Sim-
plicius’ in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 34, Leuven 1972, pp. 761-822. For the first
reaction to the article, see the Appendix in Le problème du Néoplatonisme Alexan-
drin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978.
4. cf. ‘La vie et l’oeuvre de Simplicius d’après des sources grecques et arabes’ in
Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, ed. I. Hadot, Berlin-New York 1987, pp.
23-7.
5. cf. Simplicius. Commentaire sur le manuel d’Epicète. Introduction et édition
critique du texte grec par I. Hadot, Brill 1996, p. 107: ‘Je ne reviendrai pas sur la
question de l’auteur de ce commentaire qui, jusqu’à preuve du contraire, reste, pour
moi, Simplicius.’
6. This revision of the 1972 article is my own work and has not been discussed
with F. Bossier. However, since most arguments are simply taken from that article,
they express our common opinion.
7. I owe this very literal translation from the original Arabic to Dr D. De Smet
(Leuven).
8. cf. the notice by M. Tardieu in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre,
sa survie, Berlin 1987, p. 26 n. 69.
9. cf. preface of the edition of Damascius. Traité des Principes, vol. I, Paris 1986,
pp. xxxvii-xxxviii ed. Westerink-Combès.
10. The following obervations are mainly based upon an analysis of the Com-
mentaries on Aristotle, leaving out the Commentary on Epictetus which has a
particular character.
11. cf. J.O. Urmson, Simplicius. On the Soul, vol. 1, p. 7.
12. cf. in Phys. 37,7-8.
13. cf. in DC 296,6-9; 297,1-4; 301,21-2; 557,19-20; 640,28-31; in Phys. 21,19-20;
36,28-30; 1249,12-17; 1336,35-6.
14. cf. in DC 378,21; in Phys. 80,15; 291,21; 1170,2.13; 1176,32.
15. cf. in DC 301,19-21.
16. cf. in DC 378,27-9; 381,9-10; in Phys. 1219,9-10.
17. cf. in DC 377,20-34; 358,27-364,14; 297,1-4.
18. cf. in Cat. 3,6-7; 315,2; 364,6-8; 376,13-33; cf. also 147,1-22; 232,31-233,2.
19. cf. J.O. Urmson, On the Soul, vol. 1, pp. 2-3.
20. cf. R.D. Hicks, Aristotle. De Anima, London 1907, p. lxv.
21. cf. in DA 6,15-16; 67,32.
22. cf. in DA 221,33-4.
23. cf. A. Torstrik, Aristotelis De Anima, Berlin 1862, p. vi.
24. cf. in DA 202,25-7; 98,9-12; for the expression sunˇqeia tîn Ñnom£twn (also
used by Simplicius, see in Phys. 1249,13-17) cf. 28,13; 34,5-6,17; 40,22-4; on the
harmony between Plato and Aristotle see 246,18-21.
25. cf. the laconic phrase in in DA 31,26-7: safÁ d5 t> per< Diog2nouj
;storhm2na.
26. cf. in DA 28,12-29,23 (with reference to his commentary on the Metaphysics).
27. cf. in DA 313,1-30.
28. After the completion of this Introduction I came upon two other examples
of peculiar vocabulary. The author of in DA uses the rare substantive = p£qh 25
times; this term never occurs in the authentic works of Simplicius, but there is one
instance in Priscian, 3,34. On the other hand, the term p£qhsij only occurs in
Simplicius’ authentic works, never in the in DA. My second example: the perfect
Øpestrîsqai in the sense of Øpoke√sqai is used 18 times in the in DA, but never
by Simplicius. There are four instances in Damascius.
29. cf. in Ench. I,93 and XXXVIII, 269-270 ed. Hadot and in DC 140,13-14.
30. cf. The Changing Self, pp. 125-6.
31. cf. J.O. Urmson, Simplicius. On the Soul, vol. 1, p. 4.
32. Other examples are 1kq2menoj, dior8saj, [ris£menoj, ¢podoÚj, sum-
peran£menoj, proq2menoj de√xai, m2llwn deiknÚnai, etc. Even in the commen-
tary on the Enchiridion, which has a peculiar character, we often find the same
structure.
33. For instance, the author often uses the ‘genitive absolute’ in constructions
that are not acceptable in a polished style: cf. 20,6; 41,13.; 69,8-10; 82,15-17.
34. Some examples: 42,1-20; 61,24-62; 221,20-32.
35. See adverbs such as aÙqormˇtwj (37,30; 324,26), aÙtenergˇtwj (225,30;
230,23; 236,5), ¢pestenwm2nwj (44,37; 62,23; 285,26; 307,26), ¢nexapatˇtwj
(126,37) and many other examples mentioned in the index of Hayduck. The
author likes to use adjectives of - ikoj followed by a genitive: thus 1ndotikÒj
metadotikÒj, . and even adverbs derived from them such as kinhtikîj,
gnwstikîj, [ristikîj, poihtikîj, kritikîj, periektikîj tinoj. A nice example
is 125,21-23.
36. e.g. 146,4-6 (with the unacceptable double tÕ tÕ) or again 147,3-5. Other
examples 157,15f.; 159,1.
37. Examples: 69,23-6; 46,7; 7,17; 13,22; 22,12; 31,8-11; etc.
38. Examples: dhladˇ, 8,35; 22,7; 27,6; 35,20; 39,33; 49,28; 64,12; etc.; tout2sti,
13,27; 22,31; 23,18; 32,26; 37,2; etc.
39. Examples: 24,11; 38,13; 58,14; 61,19; 31,15. 21; 36,3.
40. Examples: 17,2; 17,21; 48,24; 51,24; 53,7; 55,19; 69,28.
41. cf. 4,17-20; 45,14-19; 51,28-53,1; 56,35-59,14; 86,17-87,35; 90, 29-91,4;
105,10-11; 301,30-304,7. For a similar use of these prepositional constructions we
Introduction 139
can only quote some passages in Damascius: cf. De Princ. I, p. 48,7-49, 4th ed.
Combès.
42. Thus for example in in DC 279,6-22; 380,16-19; in Phys. 268-9. Simplicius
could have used this expression, when discussing how the soul is related as
principle of motion to the living body moved by it: see in Phys. 1208,30ff.
43. cf. 49,28-31; 24,27-31; 52,30-5; 71,26-30; 91,34.
44. cf. in Phys. 289,12; 287,13.20; in DC 379,11; 381,32-3.
45. cf. my discussion of this topic in The Changing Self, pp. 67-8.
46. cf. in Ench. I,95-105; XXXVIII,250-65; 317-19 ed.; in Phys. 317,11-18;
318,12-15; 421,28-9; 824,15-16.
47. cf. in DA 246,25-8.
48. In the introduction to this edition Mme Hadot devotes a very long section to
the question of the substantial change of the soul: see pp. 70-113.
49. Examples of the expression: 16,13; 29,13; 81,21; 82,24.27; 99,19; 103,25;
147,17; 251,21. We find two examples in the genuine Simplicius, in DC 505,16 and
507,10, but there the expression has no logical sense (t]n kat> b£qoj). See also n.
10 by Peter Lautner in this translation.
50. cf. Ammonius, in Isag. 118,11-18; Philoponus, in Cat. 40-1.
51. in DA 83,1-3 (translation of Urmson modified).
52. in DA 107, 21-7 (translation of Urmson modified).
53. cf. in Cat. 59,5-13 and 77,23-6.
54. cf. in DA, 34,22-4; 24,34ff. and 25,6-8. For Simplicius’ views cf. in Phys.
1261-3. I owe this reference to Dr Istvan Bodnar (Budapest) who is preparing an
article on ‘Alexandre of Aphrodisias on celestial motions’ in which the question of
per accidens motion of the celestial movers is discussed.
55. cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 12,17ff; and Philoponus, in DA 22,5-15.
56. cf. I. Hadot, ‘Recherches sur les fragments du commentaire de Simplicius
sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote’ in Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin
1987, pp. 225-45.
57. For other references to Physics 7.3: see 123,16-19 and 130,29-34.
58. cf. Charles Hagen, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 7, 1994, p. 148 n. 274.
59. cf. 47,37-8.
60. cf. 42,12-35.
61. cf. 198,2-7.
62. 120,22-6. Cf. also 121,8-9 1n tropÍ ka< tÍ ¥llote ¥llV diaq2sei.
63. cf. Simplicius, in Cat. 62,4-6 and 314,14f. and in Phys.; cf. also Iamblichus,
De Myst. I,4-13,1.
64. For a short presentation of this work, see also the introduction by P. Huby
in this volume.
65. On the various references to the ‘Physical works’ of Theophrastus, see
Theophrastus of Eresus, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, Leiden 1992, n. 137; for a short
presentation of the Physics see Die Philosophie der Antike, Bd. 3, her. H. Flashar,
Basel-Stuttgart 1983, pp. 480-1.
66. cf. Themistius, in DA 118.
67. cf. in Cat. 435,26 and in DC 564,24.
68. cf. the notice in ms. Coisl. 387 (10-11th c.): ‘The most useful commentators
on Plato are Gaius, Albinus, Priscianus, Taurus, Proclus, Damascius, John Phi-
loponus who also polemicized against Priscianus, and often against Aristotle.’ The
fact that ‘Priscianus’ is mentioned between Albinus and Taurus rather suggests
that he is a Middle Platonic commentator. However, the reference to Philoponus
puts him again in the late Neoplatonic circle. M.Baltes-H.Dörrie (Der Platonismus
im 2. und 3. Jh. n. Chr., Bd. 3, 1993, no 76,5) have corrected the text and replaced
the name of Priscianus after Taurus. However, if anything must be changed, I
would rather propose to correct he second ‘Priscianus’ into ‘Proclus’: ‘John Phi-
loponus who also polemized against Proclus, and often against Aristotle.’ That
there ever was a polemic between Priscian of Lydia and Philoponus cannot be
excluded, but it seems more obvious that this notice refers to the well known
treatises of Philoponus against Aristotle and against Proclus. In my opinion the
Priscianus who appears in this list of Plato-commentators is a contemporary of
Albinus and Taurus.
69. cf. The Changing Self, ch. 7.
70. On epitome as a literary genre, see I. Opelt, ‘Epitome’ in Reallexikon für
Antike und Christentum, V, Stuttgart 1962, col. 944-73.
71. cf. the references in Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings,
Thought and Influence, ed. by W. Fortenbaugh, Leiden 1992, sub no 137 ‘Inscrip-
tiones librorum ad opera physica spectantium’).
72. Thus Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, Leipzig 1858, p. 28; cf. M. Hayduck’s
note on p. 136 of his edition and H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879, p. 102,1:
1n tÍ 1pitomÍ (i.e. in commentario ad epitomen, breviter ut nos quoque). P.
Steinmetz, Die Physik des Theophrasts, Berlin-Zurich, 1964, p. 10,4 even proposes
to correct the text of the edition: 1n to√j e9j t]n 1pitomˇn.
73. The term 1pitomˇ is used by Alcinoos for his handbook of Platonic doctrines.
Its recent editor, J. Whittaker, remarks that this term should not be taken as a
‘résumé d’un ouvrage plus long’ (ed. Budé, Paris 1990, p. ix).
Textual Emendations
Proposed corrections to the Hayduck Edition
117,7 energeiai] energeia

120,25 tetarton] ogdoon
122,5 monou] monon
126,4-5 add ) after touto and ( before oude
128,10 exêrêmena] exêrêmenou
130,12 apapalin] anapalin misprint
130,26 perikhethen] periskhethen
131,20 proiontos] proientos
135,6 oude] oun ge
142,17 holô] holê
142,31 ta auta] tade
143,21 ton  ton ] to  to 
147,3 aisthêtikên] akoustikên
148,35 eti] epi and delete epi
153,24 aristês] aretês
156,6 aisthêtikou] aisthêtou
156,8 aisthêtikou] aisthêtou
158,17 heterois] heteron
159,32 semi-colon after aisthêtêrion
162,30 sômatikês] hoptikês
167,32 hê de] ho de
168,19 monês] monon
170,23 hôste] hote
Commentary on Book 2.5-12 of
Aristotle’s De Anima
CHAPTER 5
416b32 These matters having been settled, let us speak gener-

ally about all sense-perception.1
After his study of the vegetative soul he moves on to that which is 116,20
immediately superior to it, the sensitive soul. He will use the former
mode of exposition, starting, as I said before,2 from the objects and
moving through the activities which are intermediate towards its
essence.3 But meanwhile he discusses in advance things useful to-
wards his proposed study. For since sense-perception is a way of being 25
affected, as he has already stated when he said that the soul changed
the body qualitatively,4 sense-perceptions being alterations, he first
determines that what is affected by something requires to be poten-
tially similar to what affects it – not actually similar while being
affected, but having been affected. Thence he concludes that sense-
perception cannot be active unless it is moved by things external. For 30
if what senses must be affected, but nothing is affected by its like,
still less by itself, sense-perception could not be actual on its own
without what acts on it; so that before that thing acts on it the faculty
of sense-perception is potential, and not actual, but it becomes actual
when what acts on it is present. But since what acts on it is of two
kinds, potential and actual, such will be the case with sense-percep- 35
tion and perceiving, being sometimes potential, sometimes actual.
That is the whole aim of the proposed text. But the parts are to be 117,1
interpreted as follows.
416b32 Let us, he says, speak generally about all sense-perception.

For he will speak about each sense individually, but first he speaks
about sense-perception unqualified and makes a general study of 5
them all.
416b33 Sense-perception comes about by something being

changed and affected,
Not the sensitive life itself, for it is an activity of judgment,5 but by
the sense-organ being changed. This is why he used the words ‘by
something being changed’ – obviously the sense-organ. And since all
10 proper sensible objects by which the sense-organ is primarily changed
are qualitative, it is also reasonably said to be affected and altered.
For qualitative change is affection and alteration.6
416b34  for it seems to be some alteration.

‘Seems’, since sense-perception is not itself alteration but appears
such to those who transfer the affection of the sense-organ to the
15 activity which is bound up with it and uses it.
416b35 But some say that like is also affected by like. [It has
been said7 in the general discussion about acting on and being
affected how this is possible or impossible.]
He examines this also in On Generation and Corruption,8 where he
discusses the argument not in its application to the area of nourish-
ment or sensation but generally and simply about acting on and being
affected. This is why he now said that it was said ‘in the general
20 discussion of acting on and being affected.’ For he does not simply call
the work On Generation ‘general’ but the discussion presented there
is about acting on and being affected.
417a2 But there is a problem why there is no perception of the

senses themselves as well,
25 ‘But there is a problem’ is, I think, in response to ‘it has been said’.9
For he says that in that work there was a general discussion of acting
on and being affected and that the problem that seems to arise about
the senses has to be solved by those very discussions. But what is the
problem, and why does it seem to be a problem? Perhaps because an
activity, although it is vital and cognitive, is not directed to either
30 itself or its organs, although being self-aroused, unless the sense-
organ is changed, being first affected by something external. For to
118,1 be active from within and self-initiated and to change bodies is
characteristic of life, but not to need the change of those bodies for its
own activity. For ‘why is there not perception of the senses themsel-
ves’? He did not say ‘the senses’ as equivalent to ‘the sense-organs’ as
Alexander interprets him.10 For speaking of ‘the user’ as equivalent
Translation 145
to ‘the instrument (organon)’ is not likely. He adds the following
question: 5
417a3  and why without external objects they do not bring

about perception, when fire, earth and the other elements are
within,
Obviously the elements are within the organs; but this remark is not,
as Plutarch thinks,11 directed at Empedocles,12 who locates the ele-
ments in the senses themselves. For Aristotle has already refuted 10
that, while now, as well as not refuting it, he even defends the
seeming problem. So the problem is this, why the sensitive life, being
cognitive, is not cognisant of itself, being aroused itself, by itself, to
itself, but cognisant only of bodies, and moved by them. But if it also
has need of sense-objects, that are bodies, in order to achieve knowl-
edge of the sense-objects themselves, why is it not aroused towards 15
the sense-organs that are present, since they also are sensible,
through being composed of the four elements? ‘For’, he says, ‘why is
there no perception of the senses themselves?’ He first sets the
problem why they are not receptive of themselves, and then also ‘why
without external objects they do not bring about perception’, i.e. why
they are not active in sense-perception (for that is what it is for sense 20
to bring about sense-perception) although sense-objects are present,
even without the presence of anything external, since the elements
are present in the sense-organs.
417a5  of which there is perception, either of themselves or of

their attributes.
For perception is of the elements, either of their essential properties
or of the accidental attributes they have otherwise. For we perceive
the resistance of the earth which is its essential property and also 25
whatever colour or magnitude it may have.
417a6-9 It is thus clear that the faculty of sense-perception does

not exist actually, but only potentially. [Hence it must be as with
the fuel which does not burn through itself without something
to make it burn. Otherwise it would burn itself and need no
actually existing fire.]
He solves through these arguments the apparent problem. For
arousal of itself by itself belongs to a perfect and permanently active13 30
form of life. Such life as is not self-aroused or as reaches out to the
external objects is not self-sufficient, but needs something else and is
potentially and is somehow imperfect for that reason, as being in need
of the activity of something else either as object or as efficient cause.
But that life which is lacking in only one of these ways, either
119,1 self-aroused but moving towards the external or reverting upon itself
by external agency, is neither altogether imperfect nor wholly poten-
tial. But the life which is stimulated by something external and is
receptive only of the external is merely potential, as being lacking in
both ways. For the sensitive, being the lowest form of cognitive life,
is both primarily cognitive of other things and not of itself and also
5 moved by external things, not as inanimate things are, but being
aroused from within, in order that the activity may also be vital, and
also it is dependent on the affection which primarily comes into the
sense-organ by external causation, even though aroused from within.
While also perfected through the internal projection of the concepts,14
10 it is said to be perfected by things external, since it is perfectly
aroused by itself concerning the affection aroused in the sense-organ
by these external things; this is as they say that bread excites the
desire, though it does not act on the desire which is aroused from itself
concerning the bread, and as Plato blames the body for the badness
of the soul, not as acting on it, but because the soul is made bad by
itself through its excessive attention to the body.15 Similarly imagi-
15 nation also grasps only external things, and is originally stimulated
by the affections of the sense-organs; but after the first stimulation
it also from itself projects its impressions and is active even when
external stimuli are absent. But sense-perception always requires
them to be present in order to be active. Therefore the faculty of
sense-perception is only potential and not also actual, since it is never
20 active on its own without the presence of the external. Why then
is there no perception of the senses? It is because the reversion on
itself16 is characteristic of a self-perfecting activity, whereas sense-
perception is only potential. But why does it not grasp the elements
in the sense-organ? Because the sense-organ has to be acted on by the
sense-object in order that the sense-perception may be excited into
activity, but nothing is acted on by itself, just as the combustible does
25 not burn without what kindles it. So he met the second problem also
by this – that as the combustible does not burn without what kindles
it, so obviously the sense-organ would not be acted on by itself. But,
since fire is actually present in the sense-organ, why does it not
stimulate the sense? Because not even external fire acts on the sense
itself, but on the sense-organ, but itself does nothing to itself.
30 417a9 But since we use ‘to perceive’ in two ways, [(for we say
that that which potentially hears and sees hears and sees even
when asleep, as well as that which actually does so) ‘perception’
Translation 147
must be used in two ways, in one of the potential, in the other
of the actual.]
As he says that there are two uses of ‘to perceive’, of the potential
and of the actual, so ‘perception’ is used in two ways. For him,
‘perception’ denotes the essence of such and such a soul, ‘to perceive’
its activity. Rightly, he treats the activity as the guide to the essence.
So the essence also will be either potential or actual, not potential in 35
the primary and most imperfect way, which consists in privation, but
in the second way, like the condition of the man who knows but does
not activate his knowledge; for the essence is already characterised
by the sensitive form. But even this is imperfect as potential; for
perfection comes with activity, and a perfect essence is that which is
active according to its nature, while that which is sometimes not
active falls short of absolute perfection.
417a13 Likewise also ‘to perceive’17 [both potentially and actually]. 120,1
Led up from activity to essence as from effect to cause, he also
considers it to be more scientific to view an effect from its cause and
an activity from its essence.
417a14 We first talk18 as if to be affected (paskhein), to be 5

changed (kineisthai) and to be active (energein) were the same
thing. [For change is a kind of activity but imperfect, as has been
said elsewhere.]
He has previously said that sense-perception ‘comes about by being
changed and affected’, but later he has also said ‘already active’ in
distinction from the potential, and, in the same context, he has used
‘being changed’, ‘being affected’ and ‘being active’ of actual perception. 10
He acknowledges this, and defends ‘activity’ as being used well in a
certain way of change because, as was said in the Physics,19 change
is an imperfect activity; for it is clear that perfect and indivisible
activity is not change. But he has not yet explained how being affected
and being changed differ from each other. So, if one were to use ‘being 15
affected’ exclusively of change according to affective qualities,20 it is
clear that change would be of wider scope. But if simply of all sorts
of transformation (tropê) that come about by the agency of something
else, ‘being affected’ would seem to be equated with change. For all
change21 is by the agency of something else and involves some
transformation. Perhaps substantial, qualitative and quantitative
change always involve transformation, and particularly all change 20
that brings a transition from an unnatural state to a natural or the
reverse. For whatever is changing as a whole is in a transformation
through different ordering with other things at different times. But
such a change as both preserves the same ordering with other things
and remains in its natural state, when what is in change (motion) is
not affected but activates the transmigration through different
25 spaces, is not, as we have said in the commentary on Physics Book
8,22 a case of being affected, since it involves no transformation. But
we should pay attention to what Aristotle says:
417a17 But all things are affected and changed by that which
is efficient and in act.
It is clear that [the efficient cause] is ‘in act’ that character that the
30 thing acted on is at one time in potency, but later becomes it in act,
given that by being affected it becomes like what acts on it. But
neither does friction contain heat, although it produces it, nor does a
whip contain weals.23 For the productive need not undergo what it
produces, but be active, and in that way the productive is in act like
what is brought about in what is acted on, not as being affected but
as being active. For not only according to Plato but also according to
35 Aristotle, the forms of things brought about are anticipated in the
121,1 productive cause,24 not, obviously, as being affected but as active and
essentially in those beings where activity is identical with essence.
417a18 So things are affected in a way by their like, in a way

by the unlike, [as we said; while being affected it is unlike,25
having been affected it is like.]
5 For what is still being affected is potentially but not actually like what
acts on it, but what has been affected is like without qualification.
417a21 We must also distinguish between potentiality and

actuality.
By which being affected will be distinguished as involving transfor-
mation and a different condition at different times, but not an actual
change.
10 417a22 For we are now saying what we say about them simply.26
[There is something that is knowing in the way that we would
say that a man is knowing because man is among things that
know and possess knowledge. But there is a way in which we
call already knowing someone who has acquired grammar. Each
of these is capable but not in the same way, the one because the
species is like that, and the matter, the other because if he
Translation 149
wishes he can contemplate if there is no external impediment.
But he who is already contemplating it is in actuality and fully
understands this letter A. So both the former are potentially
knowing. But one of them has, by learning, been altered, and
has often varied from the opposite state,]
[‘Simply’ at 417a22] as equivalent to ‘without distinction’. In this
connection he sets out the duality of the potential by the illustration
of the knower. One sort is a potentiality to come to be, providing an
imperfect suitability, the other sort a potentiality to be active through
an already developed disposition to be active, but which is not in fact
active and thus falls short of perfection. For the perfect consists in 15
three: essence, potency and act. So every human being is potentially
a knower as having a natural capacity to become so by learning, and
this is so for the species, i.e. human nature, and this sort of potenti-
ality is material, as being perfected by becoming and by reception
from elsewhere. That is why ‘and the matter’ is added. But the other
who has already acquired a disposition to knowledge which he is not 20
activating, has not the same capacity; for he has no ability to become
but to contemplate, not through a material capacity but through a
formal capacity; but [it is the formal capacity] of divisible things, not
only because the activity has been torn apart from essence, but still
more because it is divided through not being always active, either
because man does not always wish for it, or because he is impeded by
something. Aristotle himself made both plain by ‘if he wishes he can 25
contemplate it if there is no external impediment’. For plainly a man
sometimes wishes and his wish is thwarted. But even if such a one
falls short of undivided perfection and of being always perfected, still
sometimes he becomes perfect by standards appropriate to him, when
he is actually contemplating. The former two sorts of knowers were
both somehow imperfect and potentially so, but the first of them has
been perfected by an alteration ‘through learning’, which is a sort of 30
coming to be. Not that the soul itself is altered – for alteration is a
change that is continuous and everywhere divisible, whereas the soul
always halts at discrete terms27 – but the soul comes to be in a
cognitive disposition all of a sudden, even if this occurs from time to
time, through a projection from within, whereas the alteration is seen
to happen in the living being, as was said in Physics Book 7.28 He said 35
‘has often varied from the opposite disposition’ either because the 122,1
perfect disposition later on suddenly supervenes upon several and
repeated projections of more particular concepts, or because ‘often’
was said as equivalent to ‘sometimes’, which I prefer more. For in the
Treatises on Demonstration he says clearly that one sort of ignorance
is negative, the other is an opposite, the first sort being merely29 5
deprived of the truth, the other embraces the contradictory false-
hood.30 So sometimes the turning to knowledge comes from false
opinion and from a contrary disposition.
417a32  but the other has been altered from the possession of
sense-perception or knowledge of writing without exercising it
to exercising it in another way. [But ‘being affected’ also has no
single sense, but one is some destruction by its contrary,]
10 In order to be cognitively active the organ does not at all need to be
altered in any way, unless the person be drunk or diseased or asleep.
But to be sensibly active it needs to be affected in some way, not,
indeed, through substantial coming to be in order to become sensitive,
being changed in substantial characters, but changing in regard to
15 certain accidental qualities that are themselves affective – thus ‘in
another way’. But before making plain in what sort of other way, since
he said that capacity was of two sorts, he now recalls that being
affected is also in two ways. For something must be said about both.
‘Since one is some destruction’ and change from form to privation
brought about by the contrary, perhaps warmth by cold, so that
having reached privation of warmth it may be made like the cold thing
20 that acted on it, in which the privation of warmth is inherent.
417b3  the other is rather the coming to be31 and preservation

of the potentially existent [by the actually existent to which it
is like in the way that potentiality is to actuality.]
He accurately adds ‘rather’, since even in coming to be a perfective
principle contributes, and what is affected is changed by that princi-
ple which is in actuality that which the affected is potentially.
25 Therefore the affected is like the agent, but as the potentially existent
is like the actually existent. Thus, having meanwhile clarified the
double nature of being affected, he will finally explain how that which
has a disposition comes in another way to actuality from not being
actual.
417b5 For what has knowledge comes to exercise it, [which

either is not alteration, for the advance is to itself32 and to
actuality, or is another kind of alteration. Therefore it is not well
to say that the thinker, when he thinks, is changed, as nor the
builder when he builds. So bringing to actuality from being
potential the contemplator and thinker is not teaching, but
ought to have another name, and that which learns and acquires
knowledge from that which is actual and can teach it should not
be said to be affected, or else there should be said to be two types
Translation 151
of alteration, the change into conditions of privation and that to
possession and a natural state.]
This should be joined onto ‘to exercising it in another way’.33 He had
said earlier both about the man who perceives in act and about the 30
man who exercises a knowledge of writing34 or knowledge in general,
that they [exercise it] ‘in another way’. Now he lays down how he who
knows changes from not exercising to exercising his knowledge. Later
he will speak of the man who perceives and will add the difference
between them. The arrival at contemplation from the possession of
knowledge is not alteration, because alteration is qualitative bodily 35
change, but in the contemplation of knowledge there is no need of 123,1
bodily change, unless, as was said, the person be ill or asleep or drunk,
when there is need of change, not so that the body will aid in the
activity but so that it will not impede it. Only the psychic advance to
activity from non-active possession is necessary. That is also clear.
‘For the advance is to itself and to actuality’, that which has the 5
knowledge being perfected by itself into activity itself, the body
remaining unaffected. Therefore such a change is not alteration ‘or is
another kind of alteration’, which is why Aristotle does not call
psychic change either alteration or process [kinêsis]. But, knowing
that Plato so calls them, not as being bodily processes or even
alterations,35 he says ‘another kind of alteration’. But it is not surpris- 10
ing that the thinker, when it thinks, is not altered, when the activity
is of the soul on its own; yet how is the builder not altered when he
builds? Is it because, even when he uses the change of place of his
body, he is not changed qualitatively? If even he who uses his body is
not altered, still more so he who does not even use it. Next, he also 15
gives the difference between the change of the soul from ignorance to
knowledge and that from possession to exercise: the former is brought
about by teaching and learning, on which certain bodily change
follows, as is said in Book 7 of the Physics36 the latter through the
sudden projection of concepts from itself. Now a certain bodily altera-
tion follows learning, because of the reference from perception to 20
concepts through the memory – not that learning is an alteration. For
learning itself comes about through the activity of the soul in regard
to concepts. Even the bodily alteration which follows on learning is
not an affection, if one understands affection as being only destruction
and the change to privation, as is the common custom, or else it is
affection of the other sort, if one calls the change to possession or 25
form or the natural condition37 an affection. Having determined
these points about cognition he applies them also to the sensitive
faculty.
417b16 Of the sensitive faculty the first change comes from the
begetter, [and, when generated, it has already sense-perception
in the same way as it has knowledge. And we speak of sense-
perception in actuality in a similar sense as ‘to contemplate’.]
30 [The first change comes from the begetter] because the sensitive life
is not simply of the soul, but of soul involved with body. Therefore it
comes into existence together with the living being, and the genera-
tion of that being is ‘the first change of the sensitive faculty’, which
brings it into existence. [This coming to be] corresponds to the
learning process, just as the ‘generated’ corresponds to the man who
has acquired the disposition [of knowledge]. ‘And we speak of sense-
perception in actuality in a similar sense as to contemplate. ‘In a
35 similar sense’ because in both cases perfection is in the same respect,
and because in the case of perceiving also the judgement is by the soul
and comes from within and through the projection of concepts. So ‘in
a similar sense’ in that respect.
124,1 417b19 But there is a difference because in the one case the
agents of the activity are from outside, [what is seen and what
is heard, and similarly the other sensible objects. The reason is
that actual perception is of particulars, but scientific knowledge
of universals, and these are in a way in the soul itself.]
That is to say that the sense-organ must be acted on by the external
sensible objects, which are not in the perceiver. These are said to be
5 the agents of the activity, not as introducing the judgement but as
producing some affection in the sense organ, with regard to which the
activity of judgement is aroused. But objects of scientific knowledge
are not thus agents. For they do not terminate in an affection nor do
they come from outside the cognitive faculty. For sensation is of
particulars, but scientific knowledge is of universals. But particulars
which are corporeal and divisible and caused exist entirely outside
10 the soul which is incorporeal and not divisible, and is the cause of
living things, while universals are in the soul, though not those
predicated of particulars.38 For these are in the particular things
themselves and are separated out by the soul only conceptually,39 but
the objects of scientific knowledge are superior to the sensible objects
by many degrees, as much as scientific knowledge is to perception.
Objects of scientific knowledge are in the soul. But he calls objects of
15 scientific knowledge ‘universal’ in the way that in Book 6 of the
Metaphysics he declares first philosophy to be ‘universal’,40 even
though he has laid it down that it is about separate and unchanging
substances, inferring ‘but, if there is some unchanging substance, this
is prior and universal philosophy because it is first in that way’. Also
Translation 153
the things in the soul are thus universal as first and causes of
particulars. But since the intelligible forms are above all first and 20
causes, being indivisible and substances belonging entirely to them-
selves, whereas those in the soul have their being through rational
unfolding,41 being not indivisibly unified, and are causes secondarily,
so for this reason universals are the absolutely first causes of all
things, the intelligibles, and scientific knowledge is anchored in them
through intellect. For it is by intellect that we know terms, and the
forms are terms. But these are not primarily in the soul but secon-
darily, and in so far as the soul is connected with the intelligibles. For 25
this reason they are said to be in the soul ‘in a way’, since it is through
the link42 with the intellect.
417b24 Therefore it is in its power to think whenever it wishes.

In the power of the intellective being, whether the intellect in the soul
itself, or the soul aroused to intellect, or the man with scientific
knowledge through his having within him the intelligible forms, from 30
which, as from causes, the secondary are scientifically known.
417b24 But to perceive is not within its power, [for the sensible
object must be available.]
He means clearly ‘[not within] the faculty of sense-perception’, be-
cause the sensible object, which is an individual and external, must
be available, and must not merely be there but also present to the
faculty of sense-perception so that it may act in a way on the
sense-organ and upon its being acted on the perceptive soul may
project the common concepts within it of the sensible things in a way 35
appropriate to the affect and recognise the sensible object through its 125,1
own activity, being in a state of accord with the form of the sensible
object.43
417b26 The same applies to the sciences of sensible things [also

for the same reason, that sensible objects are particular and
external.]
Such as those for which forms or rational entities are not sufficient, 5
as they are for the theoretical sciences, but which encompass particu-
lars and external things, such as are the practical sciences and
productive skills. For these need also the presence of sensible objects.
417b28 But another opportunity may occur again to clarify

these matters. [But now let so much be decided, that what is 10
said to be potential is not homogeneous, but one variety is as if
we were to say that a boy was capable of commanding an army,
the other as if we should say it of a man in his prime; this is so
for the faculty of sense-perception. But since we have no word
for this difference, but they have been distinguished as being
different and how different, we must use ‘be affected’ and ‘be
altered’ as if they were proper terms. The faculty of sense-
perception is potentially like what the sensible object is already
in actuality, as has been said. So it is affected when it is not like,
but, having been affected, it is made like its object.]
[He means: another opportunity] to clarify how universals and their

contemplation are within our power. He will speak more clearly about
this in Book 3.44 Next he concludes that the faculty of sense-perception
is potentially in living things in the second mode [of potentiality],45
and is said to be affected and altered improperly, since it is not the
15 soul that is affected or altered, but the sense-organ. And even this is
not affected in a destructive manner but in such a way that it comes
to be, not however as a substance, but as being self-sufficient to
receive the activity, just as a substantial affection produced the body
as receptacle for the perceptive substance. So the faculty of sense-
perception will be potentially as the sense-object already actually is.
For that is determined by some form, not potentially but actually, but
20 the faculty of sense-perception is not yet [determined] before it is
actual, but capable of being so according to the second potentiality;
but later, in being actual, it stands still46 at the form of the sensible
object, not as being affected – for it does not become white or hot –
but in activity, not acting like efficient causes, but in judgement and
cognition. However, some sort of affection remains in the sense-organ.
25 But since in actual perception47 the faculty of sense-perception stands
still at the form of the sensible object, as all knowledge stands still
through the conjoining into one and the indivisible encompassing of
everything known, and since the affection of the sense-organ must
precede because of the inclination outside of the perceptive life which
cannot be active without the organ, or especially without its arousing
30 and stimulating the organ, it is clear that it is not perceiving the
affections of the sense-organs but that with these it grasps the forms
in bodies. And this also is clear, that the sense-organ is not affected
by things external in the way that the inanimate is; it is affected as
being alive. Therefore it is not entirely an affection nor altogether
from outside, but is also in accordance with its own activity and at
once is acted on and acts. Such a joint affection and activity, which
35 comes about as caused by sensible objects and according to the arousal
towards them of the life in the sense-organ is made similar to the
Translation 155
forms in the sensible objects. But that is not yet perception, since it
does not occur as a pure activity, being divided and corporeal and 126,1
extended in time. For perception indivisibly encompasses the begin-
ning, middle and end of the sense-object, and it is an activity, being
a perfect judgment48 and standing still at once as a whole in the
instant at the form of the sensible object. This form is not imposed
like a seal on wax49 (which is not proper to life), nor does it proceed
into depth50 (still less does it stand still with a cognitive activity),51 5
but it is projected from within by the concept of sensible objects which
is preconceived in the soul. (This is not the soul that gives life to the
organ as an organ, but that which uses it when already alive, so that
by transcending the body it may act indivisibly and have knowledge
of sensible objects.) The concept is one, but not according to the
contracted unity52 in individual things, but as fitting53 each of them 10
in an appropriate way according to the formal unity which encom-
passes all individuals causally. For the soul perceives all particular
white things according to that one concept; for that which judges is
the soul through the appropriate contact54 of that which is known,
and it is appropriate because the soul has in its substance a precon-
ception of the same property [that is perceived]. Therefore, the soul
becomes like its sensible objects not by receiving something from
them but through being active in accordance with the concept appro- 15
priate to them. Now that this has been determined generally of all
sense-perception we must go on to what follows.
CHAPTER 6
418a7 Each sense must be discussed, beginning with the sensi-

ble objects. [‘Sensible object’ has three uses, in two of which we
say that we perceive them as such, in one incidentally. In one of
the two the object perceived is proper to each sense, in the other
common to all. I call proper that which cannot be perceived with
another sense and about which one cannot be deceived, as sight
of colour, hearing of sound, and taste of flavour.]
Since the study of each sense proceeds from that which is relationally 20
opposed, in accordance with the initial programme he reasonably
calls to mind the objects of sense first, noting that ‘sense-object’ has
three uses, in order to separate off incidental sense-objects and to
limit the discussion to sensible objects as such. And he will teach
which of these are primarily recognised, and which secondarily, by
each of the senses. For both the proper and the common are sensible
as such,55 but primarily the proper, since the essence of each sense is 25
assigned to these objects in its own way, secondarily the common
because they always act on the sense-organ together with the proper
sensibles which act upon the sense-organ pre-eminently and more
strikingly. But how can he say that the common are common to all?
For only sight and touch apprehend size and shape. So perhaps ‘all’
30 is used instead of ‘most’. But perhaps hearing is plainly also of size,
judging that the object faced is large or small by the resonance. Also
smell and taste [apprehend size, for] by the transference in more or
fewer parts, the one grasps the fragrant, the other the sweet. But
perhaps shape also might be recognised by these senses, even if not
accurately, for by the transference56 of the senses or of their objects
35 [one is aware] that the dimensions are about equal or that one is much
greater. So the proper and common sensibles differ from each other
in that way, in that the former belong to one, the latter to more senses,
and the former infallibly stimulate the sense that is related to them,
127,1 clearly when it is in its natural state and when acting at a suitable
distance and not impeded by an intervening body, as when the eye is
so by a thick mist or merely by an external object. (For these points
must be inserted, even if they are not now clearly stated by Aris-
totle.57) But the latter do not thus fall exactly under the senses, since
5 each sense is pre-eminently of the proper, but grasps the common
together with them. Also sight does not judge the size of the thing
seen as it does its whiteness, but, while accurately grasping the
colour, it recognises the shape roughly, sometimes mistakenly, seeing
the curved as straight and the straight as bent. Also, perhaps, the
proper, being more affective and corporeal, fall under perception with
10 better correlation, since it is a corporeal type of cognition, and one
distinguished from the light which through its very great activity is
accurately recognised by sight; but the common sensibles, being more
form-like seem to be less well correlated with perception; not that
they are not recognised at all by sense, but only by reason,58 as is
substance; for they are also object of perception, though not so clearly
as are the proper sensibles.
15 418a13 Touch has many different forms, [but each sense judges
about these objects and is not deceived about these being colour
or sound ]
 because touch is especially receptive of the affective qualities,59
since it is the most affective of the senses. There are many affective
qualities which touch recognises as proper sensibles, warmth, cold,
dryness and fluidity, hardness and softness, roughness and smooth-
20 ness, heaviness and lightness, since these are also affective.
Translation 157
418a16  but about what is coloured or where it is [or what is

making the sound or where it is. So it is such things that are
said to be proper to each sense. Common are motion, rest,
number, shape and size. For such things are proper to no sense
but common to all. For some change is perceptible to both touch
and sight.]
It is deceived about what the coloured substance is because substance
is known incidentally by sense. About where it is because the size of
the extension is grasped secondarily as being a common sensible.
418a20 Things are said to be incidentally sensible, [as, for 25

example, if the white thing is the son of Diares. This is perceived
incidentally because this that is perceived happens to be what
the white thing is.]
[‘Incidentally sensible’ are] such features as are present in sensible
objects but are themselves either totally imperceptible, such as being
the son of Diares or the substance of things, or are so at least to the
sense now active, as the sweetness of honey is to the eye. Such things
are incidentally sensible as being present in the sensible object.
Similarly we say that a bald man practises medicine because the 30
practitioner happens to be bald. And we call ‘incidental’ not only what
is incidental to that which is in itself of a certain kind, but also the
underlying substance, if it is not such qua substance; thus we say that
the master is incidentally a man and the sculptor likewise, since he
is not such qua man. So in that way even substance is incidentally 128,1
perceptible. But how could substance be reasonably said to be inci-
dental to the white thing that we perceive? For the opposite is true.
Or perhaps this is is even more true: regarding being itself, the white
is incidental to the substance in so far as it partakes in existence
through the substance, but regarding sensibility, the substance is 5
incidental to the white which is preeminently and as such sensible;
thus by coexisting with the white the substance partakes in being
perceptible, not by being secondarily sensible, like the common sen-
sibles, but because of its coexistence with the sensible reason is
aroused to form an opinion about it. Similarly in the Categories60 a 10
master was said to be incidentally a man.
418a23 Therefore also the perceiver is not as such affected by

the object. [Of things sensible as such it is the proper objects
which are principally sensible, and it is to these that the essence
of each sense is naturally related. So61 that of which there is
sight is what is visible.]
The perceiver is not affected by the white thing in the respect that
the white thing is the son of Diares, since neither secondarily nor at
all is being the son of Diares perceptible as such. If the proper
15 sensibles are primarily sensible objects as such (since the common,
even if they are sensible as such, are secondarily so, and the proper
sensibles are the cause of the common being perceptible), these proper
sensibles must be principally sensible.62 He himself adds why this is
so, that it is because the essential nature of each sense is to be related
to them. For certainly, they are also naturally related to the common
sensibles, but related not as such but through a more common
essence; each as itself and in its specific essence is related to the
20 proper sensibles. Therefore and of necessity we are led up to the
specific essence of each sense not from the common sensibles but from
the proper, because each has its natural relation to these. For sight
is not related to size qua sight, but to colour: in act when standing
still at its form in seeing, and before that characterised by potentia-
lity, neither being perfected from itself alone and from within, nor
25 only externally by the sensible object, but by the sense-organ being
affected by that in a way similar to what affects it; but the sense-organ
is affected in a vital manner and the affection terminates in formal
activity as the sensitive soul recognises the sensible object by projec-
tion of concepts and stands still at its form. So both the perfect state
30 of each sensation and its potency is determined by the form of the
sensible object itself, clearly being so vitally and actively and cogni-
tively, and therefore substantially, for the natural activity is akin to
the active substance. Consequently we are reasonably led from the
proper sensibles to the proper essence of each sense, since it is from
the more obvious and corporeal attribute that we are led to the
35 essential, vital, incorporeal and to what is rationally grasped from
the perceptible. He starts with sight as being the most obvious and
valuable sense because of the instantaneous activity, its active nature
that is affective in the least degree, its luminousness63 and its analo-
gical relation to the sun; and, since sight is of the visible, he teaches
us what the visible is.
CHAPTER 7
129,1 418a26 The visible is colour and what can be described verbally
but happens to be nameless. [What we are referring to will be
clear as we go on.]
Since whatsoever is perceptible is always body, clearly the visible is
so as well. The visible body either has in itself that through which it
5 is said to be properly visible, which he calls the visible as such, or it
Translation 159
receives adventitiously the cause of its being seen, as air is seen
because of light. Of that which has in itself the cause of its being seen,
some is seen only in light, like colours and such as are shining in such
a way as to be able actively to fill the intervening transparency, some
only in the dark, such as have a certain phosphorescence but not
enough to provide light as well, like the scales of some fishes and 10
fungi, some rotting pieces of wood and horns, some both in light and
darkness, as fire is seen in the dark when no light appears from
elsewhere and it itself is insufficient to illuminate all the intervening
air, and in light when the transparent becomes actually transparent
by its agency, or it is even seen in sunlight although it does not
contribute itself to the visibility of the sunlight. So already everything 15
visible will be so either through some adventitious perfection, such
as the actually transparent, or as being naturally visible. In the latter
case [the visibility] will either not be self-sufficient, and they will
require light to be actually seen, like coloured objects, or self-suffi-
cient, like that of everything luminous and fiery. But of these latter
again some will not be able, some will be able, to provide light, and 20
of these some will be able to fill all that intervenes, like the sun which
is always seen from the same distance and never becomes fainter in
itself, while some will sometimes fill the interval perfectly, by not
becoming faint and the interval being small, so that it can be seen by
its own light, sometimes will not illuminate the whole interval
through being faint or placed at a distance. So they are seen also in 25
darkness. Everything visible seems to be either light or akin to light;
fire and the sun are so through generating light; and the kinship of
light to everything luminous is also perceptibly obvious. So if, hypo-
thetically, the luminousness of horns and similar things were in-
creased it would itself provide light. In fact a piece of wood was seen
at night to provide a moonlike light for a whole room. But also colours, 30
as being lights of a sort according to Plato64 and as limits of the
transparency of solid things according to Aristotle,65 and as arousing
actual transparency, and as being seen in no other way than by being
themselves illuminated by light, make clear their community and
kinship with light. But we must turn to the text: 35
418a26 The visible is colour and what can be described ver-

bally.66
These words comprehend everything that is visible as such, such as
colour and what he says is nameless. For ‘luminous’ and ‘fiery’ signify
what illuminates but not that which appears only in the dark, like 130,1
that in fungi and scales. So not everything visible as such apart from
colour has a name, whether always in light or only in the dark or in
both light and dark.
5 418a29 For the visible is colour; [that is that which is upon that
which is visible as such. As such, not in account but because it
has in it67 the cause of its being visible. Every colour is capable
of stimulating the actually transparent, and that is its nature;
therefore it is not visible without light, but all the colour of each
thing is seen in light.]
Instead of ‘something visible’ we now have ‘the visible’. Upon this
object he explains ‘that which is visible as such’. ‘For’, he says, ‘that
[colour] is that which is upon that which is visible as such’. For it is
not colour nor luminousness that is seen but the coloured through its
10 colour and the luminous through its luminousness. Each of these, the
coloured and the luminous, is visible as such, ‘not in account’ because
being visible is not included in the definition of the coloured as
essential to it, nor conversely,68 as in the case of essential attributes,
but because it has in it ‘the cause of its being visible’ in contrast with
the transparent, which is seen not through what is its nature but
15 through the light adventitious to it. For the formal cause of the
coloured thing being seen is the colour, not as colour but as activating
the transparent and naturally conjoined with it. Also light is the cause
of air being visible, but sometimes coming and sometimes departing
while the air remains. On this subject, when setting out the differ-
ences between things visible as such, he first speaks about colour,
20 giving its definition not qua colour, as in About sense and its objects,69
but qua visible differently from other visible things, as activating the
actually transparent (clearly that surrounding it), when it itself
happens to be actually illuminated. The transparent is that which
throughout the whole of itself is sometimes without light but some-
times illuminated by the presence of what illuminates it. That is the
25 actually transparent, which is potentially so before receiving the
light. But colour, enveloped by the actually transparent and itself
perfected by light, activates the actually transparent, not by altering
it or transforming it nor by causing some affection. For to transform
and affect what receives them is specific to affective qualities. Also
everything that comes to be has need of these [affective qualities] in
30 order to be made suitable for the reception of forms, but, when
prepared, they are no longer perfected through affection but by the
forms through their active presence;70 as life comes to a body, as shape
to a house, as health, as knowledge, to things that receive them, as
is explained in Physics Book 8.71 So in order for the body to become
35 suitable for the reception of light it needs affective qualities; it
becomes such when it becomes air or water or glass. Being already
suitable, if a light-source be present, it is perfected without being
affected and through activity. For the forms are just this – activities
and perfections, while the affective qualities are not, at least without
Translation 161
qualification, forms, but affective forms72 if so at all, as being sullied 131,1
in the process of becoming and appearing in change and being full of
imperfection. That is why they appear together with a change from
imperfection to perfection. But such as are forms and perfections,
these come both actively and all at once. ‘Therefore it is not visible 5
without light’: for the actually transparent is illuminated, and is
activated by colour, but not the potentially transparent. For when not
illuminated nor surrounded by the actually transparent, colour is
invisible. It has been stated in what way it activates, that it does not
do so affectively nor by transformation, but actively, in a perfecting
way and by formal presence, not a substantial presence like that of
life, but through the activity proceeding from substance and after 10
substance, as do conditions and dispositions.
418b3 Therefore, concerning light we must first grasp73 [what

it is. There is something transparent.]
Perhaps because, as we have already said, everything that is seen is
either light or is akin to light. So the fact that colour is invariably
seen in light shows to those who are to learn about the visible and
sight that the account about light is necessary. But since light is the 15
perfection of the transparent we must first gather what the transpa-
rent is. For light is not like intellection which remains in the essence
which produces it and is identical with its essence. But light also is
an activity, but neither the same as what activates it nor remaining
in it, nor yet torn away from it, but it simultaneously itself holds to 20
that which sends it forth,74 and is given to another, not in an affective
manner, but suddenly and in a perfecting manner; its kinship to that
which receives it is everywhere to be seen, so that either can be
recognised from the other. For the receptive is potentially what that
which has received is actually. Actuality, definition and perfection75
are the nature that characterises that which has received – it is all 25
that actually, but that which is receptive is all that potentially; it is
like health, through which both that which is healthy and that which
can be made healthy are characterised; the latter in an imperfect way,
the former in a perfect, so that both that which is receptive and that
which has received are determined by the imparted actuality. Also
scientific knowledge, following nature, recognises from the defining
form both things that are actually so defined and things that are
receptive of the form as being characterised by its imperfect trace. But 30
some one who is still searching ascends from things caused and first in
relation to us to the naturally first, the causes, and from the imperfect
to the perfect, and from these recognises perfection. Indeed, we come
to know what light is from the transparent which underlies light as
its matter and is perfected through it when it becomes actually
35 transparent, because perception attends to that which is illuminated
and not primarily to the form.76 But he will also speak about the form
itself in the most clear way – for what could be more clear than light?
So the simple property of light also becomes known to our intellection
by simple intuition from perception. We reason that it is incorporeal
132,1 and that it is not an affection but actuality: the former since we see
it penetrating throughout the transparent, the latter because of its
timeless cessation and presence. For affections come to be and cease
in time, and bodies, at least material bodies, do not pass through each
other. However, the fire that comes from light is material, since it is
5 a body, but also the air that receives it. Is light then a substance, like
the life that is imparted to the body by the soul? But even if life itself
enters the body suddenly and again departs, nonetheless the progres-
sive generation of the composite must come first, and decay must
follow on life’s absence. But also life is receptive of opposites, and a
living thing is obviously a substance, so that its defining form, which
10 is life, also is a substance. But neither is the illuminated air substance
qua illuminated, just as the adventitiously warmed is not, nor is it or
light receptive of opposites, nor does any change precede its presence
or follow upon its absence. But it is simply actuality, not entering into
the transparent as into a substrate, but being in it separately and
15 perfecting it, never being separated from what brings it forth, but
seated in it and holding on to it. Therefore it changes places together
with its source, but it does not undergo changes in any way together
with what receives it when that changes.
418b4 Transparent I call that which, though visible, is not

visible through itself [properly speaking, but through the colour
of something else. Of such sort are air and water and many solid
bodies. For they are not transparent qua water or qua air, but
because the same sort of nature is present in both of them and
in the eternal body on high.]
20 In the light we do not only see the transparent, but also what is
coloured. The difference between both is that the transparent qua
transparent is only seen as illuminated, the coloured also as coloured.
Therefore the latter is visible through itself because it has in its own
nature the colour, which is precisely what is seen in the light, whereas
the transparent is not visible through itself, because the light is
25 something adventitious to it, which is solely seen as existing in the
transparent. For even if the same thing is both transparent and
coloured, as are horn and chalk, those things are solely seen as
transparent in the light. But what is the nature of the transparent?
In other works Aristotle also knows about the determinate transpa-
rent,77 but here his argument is about the indeterminate transparent,
Translation 163
which is a body which receives throughout the whole of itself (or even
from itself) the light as something adventitious and thus becomes 30
visible. And this is the nature of the transparent: the aptitude to
receive the light throughout the whole of the parts that have this
nature.
418b9 Light is the actuality of this thing, of the transparent qua

transparent.
Light is this as perfecting it, but not at all as proceeding from it. He 35
says ‘qua transparent’ since light is the perfection of the transparent
as such.
418b10 That in which it is78 is potentially also darkness. 133,1

In those transparent things where the potential is, there is darkness;
since the celestial body has also been said to be, and is, transparent,
which it always is actually, as having in itself also the efficient cause
of light. For the celestial body79 is at once a source of light and
transparent. Therefore, even if some portion of it is prevented by the 5
cone of the earth from being illuminated by the sun’s light, still it is
not in darkness because of its own light. Where there is potentially
light, as in air, there is not only light but also darkness. So, if darkness
is the privation of light, the transparent is not sometimes substrate
to light, sometimes to darkness, through being subject to two poten- 10
tialities, but through the same potentiality being both perfected in
light and not in darkness. But if it is not a privation,80 but is itself an
actuality of the earth, so that it does not create darkness by interpo-
sition but by imparting some specific character opposite to light, as
is the case with cold in relation to heat and black to white, then there
will be two potentialities of them both, one by aptitude to illuminate, 15
the other by aptitude to darken. For darkness will consist not only in
the absence of light, but will need something to be present. But
Aristotle treats it as a privation. For even if he says that it is a
contrary, he does not place them in opposition as form to form, but in
order that we may not oppose it as privation to possession, but as
privation to form. For in one way both change into each other – as 20
privation and form – but in another way it is impossible – as from
privation to possession.81
418b11 For light is like a colour of the transparent [when it is

transparent in actuality because of fire or such a thing as the
body above. For this too possesses some property which is one
and the same. So it has been stated what the transparent and
light are.]
Because, as coloured things are seen because of their colour, so the
transparent is because of light. But light is not colour, all the same,
25 but ‘like a colour’ because it is not naturally fused with the transpar-
ent qua transparent as colour is with coloured objects, but it becomes
present through fire or the superior body. For, as we were saying, the
actuality of the transparent is not from its own agency but is a
perfection of it. Even if the celestial body is at the same time a source
of light and transparent, still it is different for it to be transparent
and to be a source of light.
30 418b14  that it is neither fire nor any body whatsoever, [nor

an emanation from any body – for thus also it would be a sort of
body,]
He adds this not about the transparent but about light and he is
aiming at the Timaeus.82 How in this text light is said to be a form of
fire and how daylight and the flow from sight become compacted to
form a single body, that can be gathered from the commentary of
35 Iamblichus on the Timaeus.83
134,1 418b16  but it is the presence of fire or something similar in

the transparent.
The phrase ‘something similar’ must be understood to refer only to
that which illuminates. This ‘presence’ must not be understood in a
local sense, but as the perfection of that which receives it through the
productive activity of that which illuminates, terminating not in an
affection but in actuality.
5 418b17 Nor is it possible for two bodies to be simultaneously in

the same place.
Material bodies, without a doubt.84 How then is the fiery light in the
air? For they will not go in little pieces through each other’s pores, as
Proclus supposes,85 both because the whole air is seen to be illumina-
ted throughout itself and because the continuity of the light with its
cause would not be preserved and because the illuminating source
10 would not be active through all of its parts, being impeded by what
resisted it, nor would the whole of its surface be seen by us all at once
when also the rays from our eyes, as they say, pass through the pores
of the transparent. And what would be the natural motion of light?
For being a body it will have one. Not a circular motion! It seems that
Translation 165
a motion in a straight line would suit it best. But yet it cannot be [a 15
motion] in a straight line, for up and down are opposites and not both
together. But light travels equally up and down and sideways. And
how could there be some timeless motion? For it would be faster than
that of the whole heaven, which revolves the sixth part in four hours,
but the starlight comes as soon as they rise, imperceptibly,86 as they
themselves would say, since it is in reality all at once everywhere.87 20
418b18 Also light seems to be the opposite of darkness. [But

darkness is the privation of such a state from the transparent,
so that it is clear that light is the presence of the state. Also
Empedocles and any one else who said the same were wrong to
say to say that light was in motion, sometimes arriving between
the earth and its environment but escaping our notice. For that
is contrary to the obviousness of the argument and contrary to
the observed facts; for it might escape attention over a short
distance, but it asks far too much to say that it escapes notice
travelling from east to west. The colourless can receive colour
and the soundless sound. The colourless is the transparent and
the invisible or scarcely seen as something dark seems to be.
The transparent is like that, but not when it is transparent in
actuality, but when it is so potentially ]
This also contributes to the clarification of the nature of light as not
being corporeal but having its being as a perfection. For darkness88
consists in absence and privation, but not of a body. For air in
darkness does not occupy a smaller place nor does it appear to have 25
become diluted, nor at sunset or the quenching of fire would there be
a sudden spatial repositioning of a body; but as darkness is the
privation of light, which he calls a ‘state’ as being the perfection of
what shares in it, in the absence of a source of light, so light is the
presence of this. The state of possession and perfection is called
‘presence’ while ‘this’ is ‘fire or something similar’ (for that is what it 30
refers to) because it proceeds through the productive activity of such.
He has said that light is like a colour of the transparent, but, as he
says, the transparent is in itself colourless. As such it would well
receive the adventitious, such as colour, since its own would not
impede what enters it. He does not say only that the transparent
without light is colourless but also that it is ‘invisible or scarcely seen’, 35
when we also say that it is ‘dark’,89 being invisible since not seen
through direct intuition.90 But since it is entirely sight that judges 135,1
that it is dark, as every sense also does the privation of its own
sensible object, and since sight does not judge that it is dark by seeing
anything, but by just not seeing, becoming aware of the dark in the
attempt to see. So it is ‘scarcely something seen’. This is proper to the
5 transparent without light, to be seen in some way, even if not through
intuition. Just as colours are themselves invisible without light, but
yet when one is trying to see them, they do provide a kind of
awareness of themselves.91
418b31  for the same nature is sometimes darkness, some-

times light.
The same nature is that of the transparent. For it is sometimes
10 darkness, sometimes light, as receptive of each in turn.
419a1 Not everything is visible in light [but only the colour

possessed by each thing. For some things are not seen in light
but cause perception in darkness, such as fiery phenomena and
luminous things (these do not have any single name) such as a
fungus, horn, the heads of fishes and their scales and eyes. But
their own colour can be seen in none of these.]
For luminous things that are not able to emit light, which he said
were nameless, are seen in darkness. But what does he mean when
he says that ‘only the colour possessed by each thing’ is seen in light?
Yet also the illuminated transparent can be seen. Is it that the
15 transparent is not seen in the light as in something else, as colour is,
light being as such the actuality of the transparent? Having said both
how the transparent is seen, when it is transparent in actuality, and
how colours are, he goes on to an account of things seen in darkness,
‘such as fiery objects and luminous things’, not so luminous as to
produce light (for they would no longer be seen in the dark) but like
20 charcoal and red clouds, glow-worms and other things that shine in
darkness without emitting light. Of any of these not even its own
colour is seen, only its brightness, since the colour of these also is seen
in light, and they shine without light.
419a6 The reason why these can be seen is another story. [Now
so much is clear, that what is seen in light is colour. Therefore
also it cannot be seen without light.]
25 He himself does not now give the reason, but it is clear. It is because
light and the luminous that gives out light are what is primarily seen.
That which is thus luminous is both itself visible and becomes
through light a cause of being seen for the transparent and things
seen in light. But things that do not have the sort of luminousness
30 that is able to provide light do not become a cause of other things
being seen, and are themselves seen because of their luminousness
and only in the dark, because things lit by light do not display their
Translation 167
own luminousness. So that primarily the luminous that is a cause of
light is seen, secondarily light and the actually transparent, thirdly
coloured things. These are perfected by light through their kinship
with it, whether colours are certain lights, as according to Plato,92 or 35
are present as limits of a definite transparent area.93 Besides things
in the dark are seen otherwise, and, above all, the darkness itself is 136,1
seen in a different way. In concluding his treatment of colour he also
writes as follows:
419a9 For that is what it is to be a colour – to be capable of

stimulating the actually transparent; [and the actuality of the
transparent is light. There is a clear indication of this; for if one
puts something coloured on the organ of sight itself it will not
be seen.]
[This is the characteristic of colour] as visible, clearly, and not as 5
colour, taking colour as what is visible without qualification. This is
so when it itself is perfected by light, since one lying in darkness does
not stimulate the air illuminated from elsewhere. But the illuminated
stimulates, not affectively94 but, like the source of illumination also,
actively. For the colour also that is perfected by light acts on the
actually transparent not affectively but as an actuality, as imparting 10
to it a certain activity in the form of light. It imparts this as in itself
perfected by light to the also perfected transparent, so as to stimulate
sight through the medium of the actually transparent and not imme-
diately, because the transparent also co-operates in the stimulation
of sight by the colour seen, just as a lever does in the manual moving 15
of a rock. An indication of this is that a coloured object placed on the
eye is not seen, as not being able to stimulate the eye without the
transparent.
419a13 But colour stimulates the transparent, such as air, and

the sense-organ is stimulated by this, which is continuous. [For
Democritus’ statement on this is incorrect, since he believes that
if what is in between were to become void even an ant in the
heavens would be seen exactly. For that is impossible. For sight
comes about when the sense-organ is affected in some way. Now
it cannot be affected by the colour seen itself. The only remaining
option is that it is affected by what is in between: hence there
must be something in between.]
For the transparent is stimulated by the colour as sharing in the 20
activity which it excites, and this stimulates the sense-organ as
imparting a share in its activity. But it does not do so as activating
and stimulating sight by itself and without the colour, as heated iron
does even when the fire that warmed it is not present, but by
25 transferring95 the activity of the colour as the lever moves the stone
while being itself moved manually. Therefore the transparent also no
longer stimulates the sight on its own when colour is absent. But if
the transparent stimulated sight by itself, the perception would have
been of that and not of the coloured object. As it is, we grasp both it
and the intervening interval. I have explained this more clearly in
30 the epitome of Theophrastus’ Physics.96 But now, having established
Aristotle’s statement, we say that colour stimulates the transparent
immediately. He says ‘by that which is continuous’, not with the eye
alone but also with the colour, so that through the continuity he might
show that the stimulation is immediate at both limits. The sense-
organ is stimulated by the intermediate; but we do not grasp the
35 intermediate as illuminated as being the stimulant in itself, but we
see the luminous or colours through it, while it does not stimulate the
sight by itself, but in such a way as by this co-operating with the object
of sight and transmitting its activity. When he adds, after his reply
137,1 to Democritus, ‘Now it cannot be affected by the colour seen itself.
The only remaining option is that it is affected by what is in between’,
we must supply ‘immediately’,97 since the sense-organ is stimulated
by the colour which supplies the activity which is carried upon the
transparent to the sense-organ, carried separately and without mix-
5 ture upon the intermediate. Therefore the activity is present all at
once and as a perfect whole, and the activities of the different colours
in the same medium. But why is it impossible for a sensitive faculty
to be immediately stimulated by the colour seen itself? Is it because
light is necessary for him who sees in order to grasp colours, and for
colour in order to stimulate sight? So both need to be contained within
10 light. That is why the actually transparent must be in between, so
that each can be perfected by it. Hence not absolutely everything
visible refuses to be seen when placed upon the eye, but what has
colour, for the luminous could be seen if it did not overwhelm the eye
by its incommensurability.
15 419a20 For if there were a void nothing would be seen at all,

never mind accurately. [So the explanation why it is necessary
that colour be seen in light has been given.]
Nothing with an intervening void, obviously; not just a coloured thing,
but absolutely nothing. For, since light is the actuality of the tran-
sparent, not even the medium would be seen. For the medium that is
seen must be actually transparent. But neither the coloured thing
would be seen, because there would be no actually transparent to
20 illuminate the eye and the colour, if the medium were void, nor any
luminous thing would be seen; for when these are at a distance, their
Translation 169
activity is transferred to the medium which is transparent either
potentially or actually.98
419a23 But fire is seen in both of them, dark and light [and
necessarily so. For by its agency the transparent becomes trans-
parent.]
For things whose luminosity is faint and not able to illuminate
stimulate the potentially transparent only in darkness, not by illu- 25
minating it, but enough to be seen through it, and in that way score
over colours by stimulating the transparent without light; but
through the faintness of the luminosity they are not seen in light. I
think that it is not that the luminous things do not act on the
illuminated transparency, but that the sight, through experiencing
the reception of a greater light, no longer has the power to see that 30
which is faint. But fire, because of its greater luminosity, so as also
to provide light, is seen in light, either in daylight, and generally
when there is another source of light, and it is not prevented from
being seen from a suitable distance, or in light provided by itself, so
that people near see it at night and even receive its light. To this he 35
adds ‘and necessarily so’ – that a thing should be seen in light,
obviously when, as must be added, it is looked at in its own light, since
fire is like that, so that it itself brings the potentially transparent to
be actually so. But even in darkness fire is seen at night by people at 138,1
a distance. But since what stimulates must either be present with
what is stimulated or the activity of what stimulates must be con-
veyed to it, consequently if the intervening interval were void the one
would not stimulate, the other would not be stimulated, nor would
mere suitability99 suffice for it to be affected. Alexander100 objects to 5
Aristotle that he seems to have discussed only visible things, with
nothing about the activity of sight, about which the discussion was
proposed, and defends him as having said that the visual power was
stimulated by the actually transparent, and became actually that
which was visible.101 Also towards the end of this book Aristotle says
this of all perception, that it is receptive of perceptible objects without 10
matter.102 All this is correct, but it should also be pointed out that
even if the activity in the sense-organ involves affection, still, in the
sensitive life, the reception of the sensible object is through its own
activity, and it does not receive anything externally,103 but by projec-
tion of concepts it stands still at the forms of the things perceived, not
being affected by them, but acting according to them cognitively, not 15
creatively.
419a25 The same account holds of sound and smell. [Nothing of

them that touches the sense-organ causes perception.]
The same in so far, as he immediately adds, as the activity is conveyed
through some medium from outside in those cases also.
419a27 But the medium is stimulated by smell and sound, and

20 by this each of the sense-organs. [But if one places the sounding
or odorous object on the sense-organ itself, it creates no percep-
tion.]
It has been said that [smell and sound] stimulate through a medium
which does not itself stimulate but which conveys the causation104
from the sensible object. Why then do we not perceive sensible objects
that lie on the sense-organs themselves? Because of asymmetry
perhaps, or also since there is need of an intermediary, as of the lever
25 in the movement of the rock manually.
419a30 The same is true of touch and taste [but it is not

apparent. The explanation will be clear later.]
For he holds that there is a medium even in these cases, but that it
is not apparent because the medium is internal,105 not external.
419a32 The medium of sound is air.

30 The air was thought worthy of mention now since its resonance is
more obvious, for water also carries sound, if less so, as he will say.106
139,1 419a32  but that of smell is nameless. [For it is an affection

common to air and water, related as transparency is to colour to
what smells and occurs in both. For also aquatic animals have
a sense of smell. But man, on the one hand, and other land
animals that breathe, cannot smell without breathing. But the
explanation of these facts will be given later.]
Some call this medium diosmon,107 as conveying the smell, analo-
gously to the transparent. For as that is given form by the activity of
light and colour and generally of things seen, so the resonant (diêk-
5 hes)108 is suited to the reception of sounds and the diosmon to that of
smells. The diosmon is in both air and water. With regard to ‘But man
on the one hand’, even if he has not stated the contrasting case it is
clear what that case would be – ‘but animals that do not breathe’ on
the other. He will later give the explanation why these can smell even
without breathing, whereas the animals that breathe do not.109
Translation 171
CHAPTER 8
419b4 Now let us first make distinctions about sound and 10

hearing. [Sound is of two sorts; one is actually such, the other
potentially. For we say that some things have no sound, such as
a sponge, wool, while others do, such as bronze and smooth
solids, because they can make a sound; this is to make a sound
actually between it and the sense of hearing.]
‘First’ since after sight it is more perfect than the others, since it has
a wider extension. ‘Sound is of two sorts, one actually such, the other
potentially.’110 ‘Actually’ and ‘potentially’ sometimes refer to the ex-
istence of the objects, but sometimes they refer to them not as beings,
but as sensible objects. For a piece of wax that is already white is
actually white but sometimes is potentially visible, and what is still 15
yellow is also potentially white. But what is in fact white and is seen
is actually in both ways. So with sound, one is potentially so and is
just that – sound – when the substrates are solid and smooth and
such as to have a sound, while when the substrates are not such there
is not even potentially sound. But the other which is already occurring
is actually sound, even if no one hears it, being a sound actually but 20
potentially audible, while when it is heard it is also actually sensible.
‘This is to make a sound actually between it and the sense of hearing’
is said of that which is actually so in both ways.
419b9 An actual sound is always of something against some-

thing in something. [For it is a blow that makes it. Therefore it
is also impossible for there to be the sound of a single thing; for
the striker and the struck are different. So what sounds sounds
against something.]
It is ‘of something’ that hits ‘against something’ that is hit, ‘in 25
something’ that is resonant by receiving the activity of the blow and
conveying it, when both or one of the things that fall upon each other
are solid, more so if they are smooth and the collision is hard and
severe and the medium is capable of receiving it and conveying the
activity that it receives from them. Therefore sound does not occur in 30
a void, since what conveys it must be a body, nor in what is not
resonant.111
419b13 A blow does not occur without local motion. [But, as we

said, a sound is not a blow by any chance thing. For if wool hits
something it makes no sound ]
For what strikes must approach from elsewhere and collide with what
is struck, so that there is some body between what is to strike and
140,1 what is struck, since there is no void. That is what the sound is in,
when it is resonant and is suddenly confined through the speed of the
motion and thus remains undispersed. For then it receives the activ-
ity of the blow.
419b15  but bronze and such things as are smooth and hollow,
[bronze because it is smooth, while hollow things produce many
strokes by reverberation after the first, since what is in motion
cannot get out.]
5 He now gives an account not simply of sound-sources, but of those
that are well sounding. These must be solid, as the example of bronze
also makes clear, and smooth, because the air confined between falls
on one surface of the sounding object and is preserved undispersed,
and the activity is received as a single whole. Hollow, because the
10 blow of the confined air is repeated many times and remains undis-
persed and swiftly moving through the sharp motion of what strikes
and entrapped in the hollows and strikes them repeatedly because of
the difficulty of making a way out.
419b18 Sound is heard in air, and in water, but less so. [But
neither air nor water controls the sound.]
The organ of hearing which is confined in the tympanum is air, but
15 the body that conveys from outside the sound is not only air but also
water, even if less than air as being denser and clogging the channels
of the ear.112 ‘But neither air nor water controls the sound’, since as
receptive they are the intermediate causes of the sound but not its
creators. Those control it. For what receive it are material things,
20 except that air itself makes a sound if struck by a whip or a rod, when
it answers to two accounts, one as that by which the sound is, the
other as that in which, and it controls it as that by which but not as
receptive. For not being in control was asserted of things receptive.113
419b19  but there must be a blow of solid objects against each

other and against the air. [This happens when the air that is
struck remains where it was and is not dispersed. Therefore if
it is struck swiftly and hard it makes a sound. The motion of the
object that strikes must be greater than that of the dispersal of
air, as if someone were to hit a pile or eddy of sand that was
moving swiftly.]
Translation 173
I think that what is said has to be understood in two ways. (1) If two 25
solids strike each other and the air contained between them by the
motion, then, if there is going to be a sound, [the air] must be struck
and remain where it is and not be dispersed, because of the speed and
severity of the blow, the motion of that which strikes exceeding the
dispersal of the air, as happens when by the rapid circular motion of 30
filled cups the liquid in them is not spilt, even though the mouth often
goes to the bottom, since the speed of the circular motion overcomes
the outpouring of the liquid. (2) He also mentions the case of the
beaten pile, e.g. of lying corn or anything else similar, or of a moving
eddy of sand or corn, if the beating remains swift as well as severe
and thus overcomes the scattering of the grains that are then to- 35
gether. For the blow scatters them, but the severe and swift blow 141,1
overcomes the dispersal through its swiftness and falls on the pile or
eddy as one, and, because it is severe, it produces a sound. So the
passage before us has thus to be understood in both ways: it is about
solid objects striking at once each other and the air between, and also
as separately about solid objects that sometimes strike each other, 5
and about those that sometimes strike the air, like the blow of the
whip when the air remains and is not dispersed. The rest similarly
to the above.
419b25 An echo happens when the air bounces back like a ball 10
from air that has become a unit because the container that limits
it prevents its dispersal.
Aristotle seems to say about the echo that, when the originally struck
air travels as far as something hard, smooth and hollow, which
becomes a sort of container because of its hollowness, and when it
remains a unit and undispersed and falls upon the smooth and hollow
solid, it travels back like a ball as it is reflected from it, and that this 15
is the echo. But I believe that Alexander rightly claims to understand
that an echo occurs neither because the air that is first struck travels
itself as far as the container nor because the same air is reflected back
from that container as far as what struck upon it. This he rightly
claims. For it is not plausible that the travel of the air should be so
fast through the blow, and it is necessary, as is claimed about things 20
thrown, that the mover should be always present with what is moved.
But we must consider whether he rightly judges the following matter.
He writes thus: ‘But the first air, when struck, remains continuous
and undivided because of the speed of the blow, and determines the
shape of that after it with a similar blow to be as it itself was given
by the blow, and this again the one after it, and thus the progression
goes on continuously as far as the container. For so long as the blow 25
given is stronger than the dispersal of the air, so long it continues,
each being shaped one after the other, which was shown to happen
also in the case of things thrown.114 The last one that is struck and
shaped close to the vessel is prevented from giving the blow still
30 further by the container, and rebounds back like a ball from the
resistance of the solid and again strikes and shapes the air this side,
and thus again the transmission of the blow and the sound happen
in the same way.’115 One may object against all these statements of
Alexander that they place sound in shape and do not determine the
35 transmission of the blow, whether the air first struck strikes what
succeeds it, as it is clearly said to shape it, and what blow – a resonant
blow – there could be on air by air which is continuous and remains
unified, or by the solid that struck the first air successively striking
that which came next. But, if we envisage a division [of the air]
throughout, the air that sounds will no longer remain unbroken, and
40 that which strikes would have to be present to each. So I do not think
that like the presence of the source of illumination and that of the
142,1 source of colour in the actually transparent, which immediately
activates that which is to become visible, the mere presence of the
solid in the resonant area activates the sound, but that it does so by
striking, i.e. by imparting some affection.116 For a blow is an affection.
But the sound is not an affection but an activity of the things that
strike which is present in the resonant together with the affection,
5 but in a separable manner.117 Therefore the affection precedes, and
all the air is affected so far as the activity extends, and the air
remains one, continuous and unbroken, but not throughout itself
pre-eminently, but in relation to that portion of itself near the solid,
while the other parts sympathise, as it were, more and earlier those
10 that are closest to the part first affected, less and later those further
off. That is why people nearer hear louder and earlier than those far
off. For the strength and speed and their opposites are determined
proportionally to the affection. So the latter parts are not struck or
shaped by former ones, but they sympathetically receive the same
form from that which strikes initially and activates, and the affection
15 is handed on in a divided manner since the bodies affected are divided,
and the earlier do not strike those that follow, but transfer the blow.
Also the resonant activity is present as a whole118 in a separable
manner in all of the air that suffers the blow; for otherwise the same
activity would not exist everywhere throughout the extent of the
20 sound. But it extends through the air that is there and hands on the
affection of the blow, the air remaining unbroken, continuous and a
unity. So when this unified air comes in contact with some solid and
no longer preserves a continuous straight path like the previous
portions because the solid forms a barrier, but ‘either in the part that
was affected and preserves the activity or in that adjacent to it’ the
activity of that which first sounded is carried to the parts119 on this
Translation 175
side of the solid, then the echo referred to comes about. It is not the 25
solid that is struck which makes the sound, but the air that sounded
at the beginning uses the solid which is smooth and hollow as a
contributing factor in the reflection, which through its smoothness
preserves the air unbroken, which is more compressed and given its
form by the sound and is not dispersed, and therefore given its form
more plainly. By the resistance the solid prevents the forward exit of 30
the activity and becomes a concomitant cause120 of the reflection in
this direction.121 That is how Aristotle’s ‘when the air bounces back
like a ball’ is also to be understood. It is not that the air is in motion
as transported, but that it is actively resonant throughout its sound.
419b27 It seems that there is always an echo, but not a clear 35

one, [since the same occurs with sound as with light. For light
also is always reflected – otherwise there would not be light
everywhere, but darkness where the sun did not shine. But it is
not reflected as by water or bronze or also anything else smooth,
so as to make a shadow, by which we determine the light. But
the void is rightly said to control hearing. For air seems to be
void, and it is this that causes hearing, when it is stimulated,
continuous and unified. But because of its loose texture it makes
no audible sound unless what is struck be smooth. But then it
becomes single at once, because of the surface, since the surface
of the smooth thing is single.]
[There is always an echo], clearly only when something makes a noise.
‘The same as with light; for light is also always reflected’: he is calling
reflection (anaklasis) not only the activity of light from solids at equal
angles to what is opposite to them, but also what more recent writers
call deflection (diaklasis)122 [or breaking up of rays] from liquids. For
from both the light is everywhere and not only where the sun strikes, 143,1
even if not always such as to cause a shadow, as does the reflection
from water or bronze. The sound reflected sideways imitates the
deflection of light; the fact that the echo is more readily heard by those 5
whose ear is placed at right angles shows that an echo also, like light,
proceeds rather in a straight line. An echo imitates a reflection, the
readily heard that which casts a shadow, that which is not heard
through faintness that which casts none. ‘But the void is rightly said
to control hearing’ by those who call air empty space123 and, as he
himself adds, it controls not as causing (for he denied that) but as
conveying,124 and in this way it causes hearing. He also reminds us 10
that what is struck needs to be smooth if there is to be a sound. For
if the surface of what is struck is smooth, the enclosed air remains
united and is not disrupted by the lumps and hollows of what is
struck.
420a3 So that which causes sound is that which sets in motion

15 a unit of air continuously as far as the hearing. [There is air
naturally fused with hearing.]
He calls ‘that which causes sound’ that ‘which sets in motion a unit
of air’, not that which is merely capable of moving it, but that which
actually does so. ‘A unit of air’, since that which is set in motion has
to remain unbroken, whether this be air or water. But now he is
speaking of that which conveys sound best. And he shows the way in
which the air is a unit by continuity; for air is not a unit as an
20 indivisible or as what is conceptually one, but as a continuum. ‘[That
which sets in motion] as far as the hearing’ means not what is really
heard but that which is sufficient to be heard, even if no one hears
it.125 ‘Air is naturally fused with hearing’126 – not the air outside
(which is not naturally fused with it ), but that which is conjoined
with it by nature to constitute an organ. For the air which is living
and characterized by auditive life is such as the liquid in the eyes
25 which is characterized by visual life.127
420a4 Since it is in air, the interior air is set in motion by the

motion of that outside.
‘Since it is in air’, clearly the hearing. For the interior air was said to
be naturally fused with that. Auditive life consists in this, in one way
30 as characterising a living organ, i.e. one vitally united, in another way
as making use of such an organ.128 So by being in air, i.e. in the
resonant, when that outside is set in motion and becomes actually
resonant, it itself is set in motion, taking a share in the sound. The
sense-organ also is affected by what first strikes, whilst the activity
from what strikes is conveyed through the exterior resonant air to
35 that which is naturally fused with it.
144,1 420a5 Consequently an animal does not hear with all of itself,
[nor does the air pass through into all of it. For it does not contain
air throughout but129 in only that part which is set in motion and
is animate.]
[‘not with all of itself ’] but where the vital organ of hearing is. ‘The
animal does not contain air throughout’ – obviously such air as is
naturally fused with the auditive life and is naturally given its form
in this way.
5 420a7 Air is soundless as such, [as being easily disrupted. When

it is prevented from being disrupted the motion of such air is sound.]
Translation 177
Throughout ‘soundless’ signifies to him that which does not activate
sound and what is not receptive of sound. So without qualification the
air qua air is soundless, as being easily disrupted. For the fact of being
easily disrupted is also a constitutive character of air. But when it is
prevented from disruption and set in motion either by what had
struck it first or what primarily had struck something else and
secondarily it, when the blow prevents disruption, it makes a 10
sound,130 so that it does not do so as air, but as being capable of being
prevented from disruption.
420a9 The air in the ears is confined in a chamber so as not to

be moved, in order that it may accurately perceive all differences
of motion.
The air naturally fused with the hearing is enclosed by solids in order 15
that it may not be immediately moved by what strikes it, for the sake
of the accuracy of the perception of all the different motions. For there
both must be an affection of the sense-organ, and yet the affection
must be commensurate in order that the activity of judgement131 be
successful and the activity be not blunted by the affection. But the
affection would not be commensurate, if the air were struck immedi-
ately. In order that it may perceive accurately, it must not be severely 20
affected but act undisturbed. For more severe affection impedes
judgement.
420a11 Because of this we hear also in water, [because it does

not invade the naturally fused air, or even into the outer ear,
because of the spirals in them. When that does happen hearing
ceases, as it does when the membrane is damaged, as in the case
of the skin covering the pupil of the eye.]
By ‘because of this’ he means because the air naturally fused with the
ears is confined in a chamber and enclosed by solid bodies and is not
immediately moved by things striking it. Because it is enclosed, water 25
does not enter the naturally fused air. For if it entered, it would blunt
the auditory activity either by chilling or by moistening or by con-
densing. So when it does get into the outer ear it impedes hearing;
but it does not easily enter because of the spirals. Just as what is
called the horn-like coating of the eye is transparent, when it com-
prehends the fluid organ naturally fused with the sight and stands 30
as an intermediate between the internal and external transparent
media, but when it is damaged, it prevents sight, so also the mem-
brane containing the naturally fused air,132 which conducts sound and
is between the external and internal conductors, prevents hearing
when it is damaged and not in its natural state.
145,1 420a15 Also it is a sign whether we hear or not that the ear will
always make a sound like a horn. [For the air in the ears always
has its own motion, but a sound is external and not within.]
Since nature absolutely does not wish the naturally fused air to be
struck immediately from outside, nor condensed nor disturbed, it has
5 guarded it with its barriers and spirals. So previously it was said to
be unmoved as not being immediately moved by the sound-sources.
But because it is living, it always has its own motion. For if we put
our hand to the ear and push gently inwards we hear a sound
occurring, the air inside being compressed by the push and, as it
moves, presses on the ears because of its small volume and makes a
10 sound, like the breath blown into horns used as instruments. The
sound is the sign of hearing, because the air has its vital motion;
otherwise there would be no sound when the ear was pressed. There
being no sound is a sign of lacking hearing because of illness or of the
air not moving at all or only weakly. But since the sound in the air
15 occurs when either a solid moves and strikes the air or air moves and
hits upon a solid, having laid down that the sound in the ears comes
about in this way he added ‘like a horn’. For also a horn used as an
instrument makes a sound when the wind is moving and strikes on
the solid. ‘For the air in the ear always has its own motion’: but it does
20 not always make a sound. For ‘a sound is external and not within’,
i.e. a sound does not occur through the air’s making its own internal
motion, but through either it itself striking something solid or some-
thing else striking it. Sound is external in this way.
420a18 That is why they say that hearing is by what is void and
resonant – because we hear by what contains determined air.
25 Those who incorrectly call air void,133 also say that we hear by what
is void, since we hear by the naturally fused proximate air as an
organ, so long as it is vigorous – to indicate which he added ‘and is
resonant’, obviously when there is that sort of pressure by the hand.
And ‘this is because we hear by what contains determined air’:
determined but not circumscribed, for that might happen to external
30 air as well; but it is characterised by its vital sound. ‘We hear’, that
is we composite beings or also we as constituted by a the soul as a
whole, hear ‘by what contains determined134 air’, i.e. by the auditive
life which makes use of [the determined air] as an organ.
420a19 Does what is struck or what strikes make the sound? Or

perhaps both [in different ways? For sound is the motion of what
is capable of movement in the way that things rebounding from
Translation 179
smooth surfaces are, when struck against them. But, as has
been said, not everything makes a sound when it hits or is hit,
as if a needle strikes a needle, but what is struck needs to be
smooth, so that the air will rebound and vibrate all together.]
It is things striking and being struck that must be responsible for 35
sound, and things that receive it, as resonant things. It has been said
that often both accounts apply to one and the same thing. For air is
at once what strikes and is struck and also what receives the sound. 146,1
The same applies to water. So he inquires whether what strikes or
what is struck is more responsible and adds that both are, even if in
different ways, the one as active, the other as passive. That strikes
which is in motion and impinges, what it impinges on is struck. That
both are responsible is shown by the fact that the resonant trapped 5
in between rebounds like things which bounce from smooth surfaces
when struck against them. For since it is not dispersed it must
rebound in this way in order to remain one and continuous, when
struck either primarily or also as sharing the blow with others that
were previously struck, but struck in such a way that the blow and
the resonant activity135 conferred by the things that struck anticipate
disruption. Its motion is not local motion, as is the case with things 10
that tremble, but a swift exchange of blow and activity, likened to the
leap ‘from smooth surfaces when struck against them’, because this
too occurs all at once through a blow from the both solid and smooth,
and is transferred from these to others. So, since both what strikes
and what is struck must have an even surface, i.e. a smooth one, so 15
that the air be trapped in greater quantity and ‘will rebound and
vibrate all together’, it is reasonable that not only that which strikes
but also what is struck is responsible for the sound. Conversely, the
rebounding shows the swift transmission of the blow and the sound.
420a26 The differences between sounding objects are shown in 20

actual sounds. [For just as colours are not seen without light, so
high136 and low are not without sound.]
For Plato says that we know the capacities and essences of things
from their activity,137 and therefore as we know the capacity to make
a sound from the sound, so we know that it does so in this way from
a sound of this sort. ‘For just as colours are not seen without light, so 25
high and low are not without sound.’ He does not mean the actual
sound by ‘high’ and ‘low’, but the things that make high and low
sounds, in order to accord with what precedes. He speaks of sounding
objects to show that, just as light is different from colours, so sound
also is different from high and low, except that light is the efficient
30 cause of the visibility of colours, sound is the cause of the recognition
of high and low as being their effect and indicating them.
420a29 These [‘high’ and ‘low’] are used metaphorically from

tangible things.
He does not mean that the words concerning the audible are used in
a similar sense as those about the tangible and the audible. For in
the case of the tangibles we call the opposite of ‘sharp’ [oxu] not low
35 but blunt. But he likens the cases to each other analogically, as he
will say clearly.
147,1 420a30 For the high stimulates sense-perception in a short time

for long, [the low in a long time for short.]138
He here refers to the high as the audible and to sensation as the
auditive.139 ‘In a short time for long’ means being heard ‘swiftly over
5 a long distance and remaining for a long time’, while the low is said
to do so ‘in a long time for short’ because it both is heard slowly and
penetrates to a shorter distance and persists for a shorter time.
Aristotle does not say this as his opinion but writes it as being said
by others. He seems to be aiming at the Timaeus140 which proposes
10 that concord comes from a high and a low sound, the high first and
more quickly stimulating the hearing and more intense initially, then
fainter, when the low which is concordant with it, falling on the sense
similarly to the fading high sound, is smooth and not rough, because
of the similarity, since the high first stimulates the hearing and lasts
a certain time, the low later. But Aristotle does not think it right to
15 distinguish the high and the low by being fast and slow, but analo-
gously to the sharp and blunt of masses, the one stabbing, the other
pushing. Similarly the high sound penetrates and, as it were, strikes
to the depth, while the low is more superficial and exerts pressure,
like things superimposed that press. Therefore, having stated the
opinion of others he adds:
20 420a31 But the high is not in fact fast, the low slow, [but the
stimulus of the one becomes such through its speed, of the other
through its slowness, and they seem to be analogous to the sharp
and blunt of the touch. For the sharp, as it were, pricks while
the blunt,141 as it were, pushes, because the one stimulates in a
short time, the other in a long time, so that it comes about that
the one is fast, the other slow. Let that be the explanation of
sound.
For even if speed is consequent upon being high, as in the case of
Translation 181
echoes from afar (for in the case of near ones the prior perception142
of the high either does not occur or is imperceptible), still the charac-
teristic [of swift and high] is different and exhibits a peculiar nature.
But even if, as we said, speed is consequent upon being high and
slowness on being low, still they are not the same, but, he says, ‘the 25
stimulus of the one becomes such through its speed’, of the high much
in a short time. ‘Through its speed’, i.e. according to its speed, not
according to its height, for to stimulate the sense in a short time is
indicative of speed, not of height, just as stimulation over a short
distance in a long time is indicative of slowness, not of lowness.
Therefore, even if we say that these stimulations are by the low and 30
the high, it is not qua high and low but qua fast and slow that we
shall be speaking of them. For as there is the sharp and the blunt in
masses, these being according to their shapes, so that the one pricks,
the other presses, since the one stimulates in a short time, the other
in a long time, it results that the former is quick and the blunt is slow
– for it is accidental in a way and not essential that the sharp is fast
or the blunt slow – so also the high and low in sounds are not as such 35
but consequentially fast and slow. That is the meaning of the text as
we have it before us. But if in the lemma the text did not read ‘but
the high is not in fact fast’ but ‘the high is fast in this way’143 it could
be understood as an objection against the obvious falsehood which 148,1
says that being fast and being high are the same thing, and the low
and the slow. On these he makes a distinction according to his opinion
that the stimulus by the high is short, that of the low is long, because
they are so through being fast and slow. Again the text reads: ‘The
sharp, as it were, pricks, while the blunt, as it were, pushes because 5
the one stimulates in a short time, the other in a long time’; but the
text does not say that ‘the one is fast, the other slow’. For in this way
he reasonably concludes ‘so it comes about’, and it is in a way
incidental that the sharp is fast, the blunt slow.144
420b5 Voice is a sound made by the animate; [for nothing

inanimate has a voice, but they are said to have it on account of
similarity. Examples are the aulos, the lyre and such other
inanimate objects that exhibit range, melody and articulation.145
This seems to be because voice also has these features. But many
living things do not have a voice, such as those that are bloodless
and, among those with blood, fishes. This is intelligible ]
Voice is a species of sound, belonging to other animals as well as the 10
rational, and in this way is unique as meaningful and communicative.
That is why it has gained a special name. It is clear that only animate
beings have a voice and that the aulos and the lyre are said to have
a voice through similitude, because they have a range which is called
15 an intervallic voice by musicians,146 like song, which musical instru-
ments imitate. For by the range they imitate the melody in the voice
and by the intervals of the sounds the language articulated by
syllables. It is also obvious that many animals do not have voice, those
namely that do not breathe.
420b11  since sound is motion of air. [But those that are said
to have a voice, like those in the Achelous, make a noise with
their fins or something else similar, but voice is the sound of a
living thing not produced by any chance part. But, since every-
thing makes a sound by something striking something in some
medium, which is air, it would seem reasonable that only those
things which receive air have a voice.]
20 By ‘air’ he means the breathed out air, and by ‘sound’ not every sort,
since sound also occurs in water, but voiced sound. Also, when he adds
‘since everything makes a sound by something striking something, in
some medium, which is air’, by ‘in some medium’ he clearly means
that which is most resonant and is needed by the voice, since water
is also resonant, even if less so. Why should there not be voice in water
25 also? Maybe because it involves an imagination that can signify,147
and to signify requires a more perfect life that can communicate and
has an articulated imagination,148 so that it must use organs that are
warmer and endowed with purer elements. Hence beings with a voice
have a heart and live in the air. But also the voice, as the best of
sounds since it comes from a more perfect form of life,149 also reason-
30 ably inhabits the most resonant medium.
420b16 Nature already makes use of the air breathed in for two
functions. [Just as it uses the tongue both for taste and for
talking, of which taste is necessary, wherefore more possess it,
but language is for the sake of well-being, so it also uses the
breath for the internal warmth as being necessary (why so will
be stated elsewhere) ]
‘Necessarily’ for the cooling of the warm region around the heart
and further to stimulate it by fanning. For if it remains inert it is
35 quenched, and if not cooled it destroys the animal by excess. Also
149,1 for150 the removal of the dirty superfluities that collect there. All
these functions, although they are multiple, have necessity as a
common character, and therefore are called ‘one’,151 and an account
of them is given by him in On the Parts of Animals and in On
Respiration.152
Translation 183
420b22  and for the voice to provide well-being. [The organ of

breathing is the pharynx.]
He himself also distinguishes in Platonic fashion things which con- 5
tribute to being, among which are the necessary, from things which
contribute to well-being.153 Voice as such is of this kind, existing for
signalling and communication, and still more language as also per-
fecting reason. For it is very obvious that taste is necessary as
contributory to nourishment, by which living things exist. ‘The organ
of breathing is the pharynx’ or what is called the rough windpipe, 10
through which the air breathed enters and exits. But the air does not
leave it altogether, since it does not like other tubes contract and
collapse, which its hardness and thickness prevent, so that it always
contains air in itself. So in vocalisation it is not only the windpipe but
also the air contained in it that is struck by the expelled air which is 15
held for a time and expelled all together.
420b23 That for which this part exists is the lung.

That for which it primarily and principally exists is the heart. But
the immediate goal of the windpipe is the lung, since this immediately
needs respiration. But primarily the heart, for this is the warmest,
and the lung through its juxtaposition to the heart. 20
420b24 For in this part animals with feet have more warmth
than others. [Also the area about the heart is first in its need for
breath. Therefore it is necessary for air to enter by being
breathed in. So the blow of the air breathed by the soul in these
portions on the so-called windpipe is voice. For not every sound
made by an animal is voice, as we said;]
He is calling animals with feet those that are not aquatic. Of these
animals those that breathe are warmer in this part, the lung, and
more so in the heart, as being more awakened through their life’s 25
being more perfect. ‘So the blow of the air breathed is caused by the
soul in those parts.’ For, since everything is moved by something else
and vital motions are caused by the soul, in order to exhibit the cause
of motion the Philosopher accurately said ‘by the soul’ and we should
not understand this as Alexander thinks ‘in accordance with the
soul’.154 For ‘by which’ exhibits the efficient cause, while ‘in accord- 30
ance with’ exhibits the formal. Within soul, one part is that ‘in
accordance with which’, as characterizing the vital organ, which alone
is regarded by Alexander, another is that ‘by which’, that which uses
the organ and which also activates the living body. So the soul in the
respiratory organs, i.e. that which uses them, by them regulates a
150,1 little and sets in motion all together the air that is breathed and with
it strikes the air that remains in the windpipe and the windpipe itself
with a significatory purpose,155 and this produces voice, which simply
is such a blow.
420b30 For it is possible to make a sound both with the tongue

5 and in the way those who cough do. [But that which strikes must
be animate and involve some imagination; for voice is some
significant sound and not the result of air breathed out as in
coughing. But with it it strikes the air in the windpipe against
the windpipe.]
It is plain that sound made with the tongue is not voice, nor that made
with the hands. But a cough may seem to be voice because it occurs
in the region of the windpipe and made by breathed out air but it is
surely not. For a cough is an involuntary and not purposive falling of
10 the breathed air on the windpipe itself, while voice is purposive and
is not directly the breathed air striking on the windpipe, which is what
happens in coughing through the attempt of nature to clear away
some phlegm or other thing solid or fluid that has fallen into the
windpipe. But the voice uses the air present in the windpipe as a
means, so that the held breath all together strikes the air present in
15 the windpipe, and through it the windpipe itself. This he makes clear
by saying that ‘voice  is not the result of air breathed out as in
coughing’, which directly strikes the windpipe. ‘But with it’, clearly
‘the air breathed out’, ‘it’, clearly the living being, ‘strikes the air in
the windpipe against’. So it is the contained air which is set in motion
20 by the sudden motion of the breathed air and strikes more forcibly on
the windpipe.
421a1 It is a sign of this that one cannot speak breathing in or

out, but holding one’s breath. It is with this that he who holds
his breath sets it in motion. [It is also clear why fishes have no
voice, for they have no pharynx. They have not this part because
they do not receive air nor breathe. The explanation of this is
another matter.]
The breather sets it in motion, clearly being animate and set in motion
by the soul, not using the air breathed in for breathing in or out, but
25 holding it in order that with it he may suddenly strike the air in the
windpipe and bang it against the windpipe. So one cannot simulta-
neously breathe in and speak if voice consists in the holding of air
breathed in and its motion in the windpipe, but breathing consists in
the passage of air out of or into the lung. He postpones speaking of
30 fishes as not breathing to On the Parts of Animals.156 For they use
Translation 185
water instead of air and gills instead of the lung for the cooling of the
heat around the heart.
CHAPTER 9
421a7 It is less easy to make distinctions about smell and the

odorous than about matters discussed above. For it is not clear
what sort of thing odour is, as what is sound or light157 or colour.
[The reason for this is that we do not have this sense in an
precise manner ]
The fact that our sense of smell does not recognise its object clearly, 35
save as something odorous, shows that we do not have this sense in
a precise nor in a articulated way. For sight does not recognise an
object merely as visible but also as light or as colour, together with 151,1
its shades. And hearing recognises a sound as such and its varieties.
The sense of smell does not thus recognise what the object is, yet is
not altogether unaware whether this smell is sweet, that bitter or dry
or sharp, but it does not clearly discriminate, as we may best know 5
from our consciousness.158 It is also clear from the fact that there is
no name given to the odorous in general which exhibits its underlying
nature and from the fact that all the more particular names are taken
from objects of taste. For it is thence that we have sweet, bitter and
sharp. But it is not the case as with objects of touch, where, even if
there is no common name because of their generic differences, the 10
more particular names are not taken from another sense. It is also
shown by the fact that we sense nothing odorous without its being
unpleasant or pleasant, not because smell is of these alone as Plu-
tarch suggested159 (for we sense also that it is bitter or sweet), nor
indeed is it as with taste, as Themistius would have it.160 For that
grasps certain tastes indifferently and without any pleasure or dis- 15
like, and, in those cases where pleasure or dislike follows, if the
tasting is in accordance with nature, something more judgmental161
prevails rather than affective attraction or repulsion through liking
and dislike. But the sense of smell is far more characterized through
this (i.e. affective attraction and repulsion) than acting according to
judgement about what causes the pleasure and the dislike. One might
ask whether man himself is responsible for having a poor sense of 20
smell, since he does not share in that sense with exactness, which is
why he is inferior to many animals in this respect; or is it, as Plato162
thinks, that the nature of the sense of smell is such because its object
also is hybrid and not included among the elements but among
intermediates, not because the forms of odorous things are imperfect
(for every form is perfect, or rather a perfection), but because the 25
things that receive the forms are composite and not simple and liable
to transformation? For Aristotle also locates the odorous in a mixture
of the flavoured dry with the shared moisture of water and air.163 Or
perhaps both are true; for the odorous is not simple and therefore the
sense of smell is not as precise as the others, and also man has a
30 poorer share in this than many other animals. But, since he gave a
partial explanation why odour and the odorous are less easily distin-
guished, which is that we do not have that sense in a precise form, he
gives grounds for suspecting that he regards it as the sole explana-
tion. In ‘what sort of thing odour is’ we must not understand ‘odour’
in contradistinction from ‘odorous’, but we should consider that the
35 odorous is conjoined with odour since the odour in act is also the
odorous. Thus the inference ‘as what is sound, light or colour’ follows
consistently, since the audible and the visible are consistent with the
odorous.
421a10  but inferior to that of many animals. For man has a

poor sense of smell 
40 He has a poor sense of smell because judgement here is contaminated
152,1 with the affections, and also in comparison with the other senses. It
is inferior to that of other animals not because they have better
judgment of odorous forms (for that is impossible for them in all kinds
of sensation, since for them in all kinds of sensation the confusion of
judgement with affection is much greater than ours in relation to
5 smell), but it is because they score over us by picking up the odorous
object at a greater distance as do vultures and insects, and by moving
towards the scent on a small occasion, like dogs following on the
tracks of wild beasts.
421a11  and senses nothing odorous without the pleasant or

10 unpleasant, since the sense organ is not precise.
Not because only these exhibit the pleasant and the unpleasant; for
these are always consequent on other things; nor because this sense
distinguishes the pleasantness and unpleasantness of the odorous
together with their other differences. For Aristotle would not on that
account have condemned the sense organ as inexact – on the contrary,
15 that is a sign of exactitude.164 But he says that because our organ of
smell is not precise for judgement, it needs stronger and more striking
impressions in order to be excited to recognition,165 so that through
its strength the impression becomes pleasant or unpleasant. And that
is why it is not without the pleasant and the unpleasant, as not
occurring without dislike or pleasure being felt, since the sense-organ
20 needs to be more strongly affected as being inexact. And this is
Translation 187
because it is not framed for easy judging activity, so that it also does
not deliver a pure judgement, being impeded by the affection. For
without exception the sense-organ must be affected in some way by
the object sensed, but the stronger affection inhibits the activity of
judgement. So, since our organ of smell naturally requires a stronger
affection, as is shown by the fact that always pleasure or distress is 25
felt, it is not surprising that its judgement is weaker in comparison
with our other senses.
421a13 It is likely that creatures with hard eyes should perceive

colours in the same way 
He uses hardness of eye as an example of an inexact sense-organ. For
among hard-eyed animals, such as crabs, the organ of sight needs a 30
greater and stronger affection.
421a14  and that the differences of colour should not be clear

to them except as being frightening or non-frightening. [That is
how the human race is in regard to odours.]
It is not that these animals sense only the frightening and the
non-frightening and not colour or differences of colour; for it is not 35
possible to be frightened about nothing, as is also the case with being
pleased. If they are sometimes afraid, sometimes oppositely disposed, 153,1
it is clear that they perceive different objects of sight – which are
colours. It is that they do not receive these without either being
disturbed or being soothed, of which he calls the one case frightening,
the other not so, because their sight is not stimulated except by being
strongly affected. This is shown by ‘except as being frightening or 5
non-frightening’, instead of ‘except of being frightened or fearless’,
since the term aphobos, ‘non-frightening’ is not used as denial (of fear)
but as signifying a state contrary to being frightening.
421a16 For it seems to be analogous to taste, and similarly the

species of flavour to those of smell. [But our taste is more
accurate because it is a kind of touch; and man has this sense
most accurate. For in the others he is inferior to many other
animals, but in touch he is much more accurate than the rest.]
For as the sense of smell is to things smelt, so is taste to things tasted, 10
and, alternando,166 as the sense of smell is to taste, so are the objects
of smell to those of taste. These have an affinity with each other since
the object of taste is flavour, which is the solution of the dry in water
and the object of smell is the solution of a flavoured dry (stuff) in a
moist compound of air and water. And the affinity of the sense of smell
15 to taste is its being receptive of a related substance; but taste exceeds
smell in accuracy because it too is a kind of touch and man has touch
most accurately of all because of the delicacy of his skin and his good
temperament167 of his body.
421a22 That is why he is the most intelligent of animals. [A sign

of this is that in the human race, the difference between being
well endowed and badly endowed is in accord with this sense,
and with no other. For the thick-skinned are badly endowed, but
those with soft skins are well endowed.]
20 Because the whole human organism is, by good temperament, suit-
able for the reception of the soul that works through intelligence.
‘Most intelligent’ is used either because the other species too that have
an articulated and skilful imagination,168 are said to be intelligent in
a general sense, in the way that we also speak of the ‘virtue’ of a horse;
or because, among things in the world of becoming, only the human
being shares in intelligence and virtue.169
25 421a26 Just as a flavour may be sweet or sharp, so with smells.

[But some things have a corresponding smell and taste, I mean
e.g. a sweet smell and a sweet taste, others the reverse. In the
same way a smell may be pungent and dry and acid and oily.
But, as we said, since smells are not very perspicuous, as are
flavours, they have been named according to likeness of objects,
the sweet from saffron and honey, the pungent from thyme and
similar things. The same applies to the other smells. As with
hearing and each of the senses one is concerned with the audible
and inaudible, another with the visible and invisible, so the
sense of smell with the odorous and the odourless. The odourless
is so either from being incapable of having a smell or as having
a slight and feeble one. ‘Tasteless’ is used in the same way. Smell
is also through a medium such as air or water. For water-
animals seem to perceive smells whether or not they have blood,
just like those that live in the air. For some of them also go to
meet their food from a distance as they get a scent of it. That is
why it seems a difficulty if they all smell equally, and yet man
can smell when he breathes in but not when he is not breathing
in but is holding his breath or breathing out, whether at a
distance or near, or even if the object is placed inside the nostril.
It is common to all that what is placed on the sense-organ itself
is imperceptible, but not perceiving without breathing in is
confined to humans. This is experimentally clear. So the blood-
less animals, when they do not breathe in, might have some
Translation 189
sense beyond those mentioned. But this is impossible since they
sense an odour. For the sensing of the odorous is also the
smelling of the agreeably and unpleasantly scented. Also they
are seen to be impaired by the same strong smells as is man,
such as that of bitumen, sulphur and the like. So it must be that
they smell, but not by breathing in. It seems that for humans
the sense-organ is different from that of other living things as
their eyes are from those with hard eyes. For human eyes have
lids as a barrier and sort of cover, and unless these are moved
and drawn up they do not see. But hard-eyed creatures have
nothing of the sort, but see immediately what is occurring in the
transparent medium. So, similarly, also the organ of the sense
of smell in some animals has no cover, like the eye, while those
that take in air have some covering which is removed when they
breathe in as the veins and the pores are distended. That is why
breathing animals do not smell in a wet element; for they have
to smell by breathing in, and it is impossible to do this in water.]
The names ‘sweet’, ‘bitter’ and the like have been transferred from
flavours to smells. But not idly – for why not from objects of touch or
sounds? Rather it is because, as was said,170 there is an affinity of 30
smells to tastes also with relation to their bearers, because of the
solution of the flavoured in the compounded moisture of air and
water. Why then does a sweet smell not always follow on a sweet
flavour? It is because sometimes the flavoured matter, as it dissolves,
changes its character, and the change of character turns it into
something of the same kind or into just the privation of the bearer.
‘The sweet from saffron and honey’: in the case of honey the taste goes 35
together with the sweet smell, but not in the case of saffron, for its
quite different taste is in discord with its sweet smell. The fact that 154,1
the names are transferred and not primarily applied to objects of
smell shows that they are not used in a proper sense. For who would
say that a smell was sweet or sharp in the proper sense, unless
through reduction to objects of taste? It is obvious that the sense of
smell wholly detects171 the odourless just by sensing nothing, and also 5
detects not just the strong smelling but the weak as well. But it is
also very clear that it is by something external in between that
conveys the activity of the object of smell to the sense, and that doing
this, which we call smell-transmission,172 is common to air and water.
For fishes also smell in water as they rush to the bait, just as beings
in air do. For there are bloodless creatures not only in water, molluscs 10
among them, but also in air, such as insects which also smell without
breathing. Man, however, and other creatures that breathe, though
of a nature to smell, do not do so when they do not breathe in but
either breathe out or hold their breath. How then do those who are
not of a nature to breathe? For it might seem that if they do not
15 breathe in they do not smell but detect odours by some other sense.
For it is obvious that they do detect them, since bees visit honey even
from a distance <and, again, flee>173 when there is a fire; but also they
<seem>174 to be destroyed by bad or heavy odours. But if they sense,
it is clear that it is by a sense of smell. For smelling just is that – the
20 sense which detects odours. These too use air for smell-transmission
which conveys the activity of the object of smell, not by breathing it
in but by the transmitter approaching right up to the sense-organ of
smell. For we too smell by using the air in that way, using it as a
smell-transmitter to bring it close to the sense-organ. But we, in order
that it may bring it close, wish to open up what then obstructs the
25 conveyance,175 and to open it up we use the air that is breathed in.
But they have no need of this since they have no obstruction. In the
same way the eyes of hard-eyed creatures without eyelids see straight
away without making any change. It is clear also that animals that
breathe cannot smell in water, since they cannot even breathe in.
422a6 Odour is of dry things as flavour is of the fluid [and the

sense-organ of smell is potentially such.]
30 For the flavoured dry matter, by being freed in the transmitting
medium, creates the object of smell, as he will say in On Sense-
Perception.176 But the object of taste, even if it be dry, does not become
sensible to taste by its flavour unless it be made fluid, as he will soon
say.177 The sense of smell is potentially like its object, standing still
at its form in its activity, just as all sensation does in relation to its
35 proper object. But before being active it does so potentially.
CHAPTER 10
422a8 The object of taste is a kind of object of touch. [That is the

reason why it is not perceptible through an interposed foreign
body; nor is touch.178 Also the body in which there is the flavour,
the object of taste, is in the fluid as its matter. That is a kind of
object of touch.]
Not as such but as regards its substrate. For flavour is the object of
155,1 taste as such. But the quality of flavour must be present in the
substrate if it is going to become actually tasteable. Therefore what
is tasted is also tangible in its substrate; for fluidity is tangible. But
nothing tangible stimulates touch through some external medium,
for if through some medium it will be its own. So that the object of
5 taste does not either; for it stimulates with the fluid and the fluid is
Translation 191
tangible. ‘Nor is touch’ connects with ‘through an interposed foreign
body’. ‘Also the body in which there is the flavour, the object of taste,
is in the fluid as its matter.’ The text must be construed as follows:
also the body which is the substrate to the flavorous quality, which
is tasteable and which invariably occurs in the fluid, underlies it as
its matter.179 For it is not in the way that the transparent receives not 10
the colours but the activity from them that the fluid receives the
activity of the flavour, but it receives the flavour itself as matter
receives form, being analogous only through its receptive support180
of the things which it is said to receive, since clearly in one way the
flavour is in the fluid as an accident, as being based in it, in another
way as forms are in matter as upholding it and fixing it in them- 15
selves.181
422a11 Therefore even if we had lived in water we should have

perceived something sweet thrown in. [Our perception would
not have been through the medium but through its being mixed
with water as in a drink.]
It is not that the water transmits the activity of the sweet, as air does
that of colours, but that it itself takes on the sweetness and acts on
the sense-organ as sweet. So it is not like perceiving through a 20
medium.
422a14 But colour is not thus perceived, by mixture, [nor by

emanations.]
The mixture of something with something exhibits a passive partici-
pation,182 but the colour is present in the air unmixed and in act. For
the air is not given a colour and thus acts on the sense-organ. Nor
indeed is the coloured object seen by bodily emanation from itself 25
travelling to the sense-organ.
422a15 There is nothing that functions as a medium, [but as

the visible is colour, so the tasted is flavour. But nothing pro-
duces a sensation of flavour without fluidity, but it must have
either actual or potential fluidity, as does the salty. For it is
easily dissolved itself and is capable of moistening the tongue.]
In the case of colours and sight there is a medium different from both,
the transparent. However, in the case of taste there is no external
medium. But as colour is to sight, so is flavour to taste. The flavour 30
becomes tasteable either by already actually being in the fluid, like
the sweet taste of honey, or by being capable of being made fluid when
it becomes so either by itself, being dissolved by the warmth of the
mouth like juices or by being mixed with the warmth of the mouth
like pepper. But salts are themselves dissolved by the warmth in the
mouth and are made fluid and, by moistening the tongue as well, are
35 mixed with still more fluid that surrounds it.
156,1 422a20 Just as sight is of the visible and the invisible, [(for
darkness is invisible but sight distinguishes it also) and also of
the excessively bright, (for this also is invisible, but in a different
way from darkness) so is hearing of sound and silence, of which
one is audible, the other not, and of a great noise in the way that
sight is of the very bright, (for as a small sound is inaudible, so
in a way is one that is great and violent) and as one thing is said
to be totally invisible like the impossible in other contexts,
another that is by nature visible but is not so, or poorly so like
the footless and the pipless, so also taste is of the tasty and
tasteless, and this as having either a slight or poor flavour or
one destructive of taste.]
It has often been said to be obvious that each sense which primarily
and by apprehension recognises its proper sensible object, if it does
not perceive it when it tries, and by the very fact of not apprehending
5 it, is also aware of the privation of its proper object. This object is
imperceptible because of deficiency since a perceptible183 form is not
present in the substrate. But the sense recognises also the incompa-
tibly excessive sensible object, which is reasonably said to be imper-
ceptible in another way than as privation; for on the contrary it is
through the excessive presence of a perceptible form. For the sense
cannot adjust itself to it as being excessive, and, once again, by the
10 very failure to adjust it recognises it as imperceptible. So sight
recognises the excessively bright, hearing the over-loud thunder and
taste that which destroys it and weakens its activity by its impact. So
whenever we talk about imperceptibility through privation, as when
we say of a substrate which is also the support of that which is
perceptible by apprehension, that it is imperceptible when it lacks
15 the form, although of a nature to have it, or has it only weakly, as we
sometimes say of things that have them only vestigially that they
have no foot or no pip, that sort of imperceptible is recognised by the
relevant sense of each. But when we talk about imperceptible as
equivalent to a negation, as when we say of the voice that it is
invisible, that sort of [perceptible] is absolutely not perceived by the
relevant sense, since the negation is also applied to things not falling
20 under the form [of that sense]. Therefore he also drew attention to
the variety of meanings of the one word ‘invisible’, in order that we
might see what sort of invisibility is recognised by sight and what not.
For sight does not observe what is not possibly seen, as is the case
Translation 193
with voice, but it recognises what is of a nature to be seen, even if not
actually visible, or poorly. Either the faintly visible or the harmfully
so through excess is poorly so. ‘So also taste is of the tasty and the 25
tasteless’, but clearly not of what is impossible to taste. So that is
omitted, but what is tasteless though falling under [the sense of taste]
is divided into ‘what has a slight or poor flavour or one destructive of
taste’. He said ‘slight’ either as equivalent to ‘not at all’ in the Attic
idiom, of what has the nature to have a taste but has it not, or he
omits this as being well known because it was often said, and calls 30
‘slight’ what has a faint taste, and by ‘poor’184 he does not refer to the
same thing pleonastically but, I think, to what makes the taste
unpleasant, which also lacks taste in a way, since the sense of taste
shrinks back from it. In addition to this there is also what is destruc-
tive.
422a31 The basic distinction seems to be of the drinkable from

the undrinkable. [For taste is in a way of both. But of the latter
the taste is poor and destructive, of the other natural.]
The form of the tasteable is flavour. But since this is either actually
or potentially fluid if it is to be perceptible, and actuality is prior to 35
potentiality, and the actually fluid is drinkable, that, reasonably, is
basic.185 Now he is calling drinkable a flavoured watery fluid with a
mild and obvious flavour. Hence, as is clear from what he himself
said, the undrinkable will be a watery fluid that is flavourless, or has
a weak or unpleasant flavour, or is destructive of the sense of taste.
For it would not be basic if not fluid. ‘Poor’ is clearly used to comprise 157,1
what is neither altogether tasty and what is weakly so and unpleas-
antly so. For it is also called destructive.
422a33 The drinkable is common to both touch and taste.

Now he refers not only to the [drinkable] that we have distinguished 5
above from the undrinkable, but to what is common to both. For what
was there undrinkable is common to touch as fluid and to taste as
being untasteable by privation, either through weakness or through
excess.
422a34 Since the object of taste is fluid, its sense-organ must

neither be actually fluid nor incapable of becoming fluid. [For 10
taste is affected in some way by the tasteable qua tasteable. So
the sense-organ of taste must be capable of becoming fluid
without being destroyed, but not be fluid. A sign is that the
tongue senses nothing if it is perfectly dry or too fluid. For that
becomes touching186 of the first moist thing, as when, having
first tasted a strong flavour, one tastes something else, and as
for the sick everything seems bitter through sensing with a
tongue that is full of such fluidity.]
That the sense-organ of taste must lack flavour is clear, since flavour
is the proper sensible of taste. So in order that a flavour present
within may not impede discrimination187 of others it must be without
flavour but capable of becoming affected by flavours – not by becoming
different in substance but so that remaining the same thing it may
15 share in the quality. Aristotle will not even allow it to be fluid, since,
even if taste is not the reception of the fluid qua fluid, it is not without
fluidity. But dryness of the tongue is thought to be an illness, and
therefore it must naturally possess a certain fluidity, even if flavour-
less or of a quantity so as to not to impede its activity by diluting the
20 flavoured fluid that enters. But also dryness fights against the fluid
that enters and does not permit the affection and, by the affection,
the judgement by the sense-organ of the flavour in the fluid. Hence
the tongue senses well when it is neither totally dry nor too fluid,
especially if its fluidity has a flavour, as in the case of people with
jaundice or who have previously tasted something else with a flavour.
25 ‘For that becomes touching of the first fluid thing,’ since the tongue
is affected by the thing tasted, not through some medium but by
contact, if the fluidity about it be more copious than of the latter, as
it is proximate of which there is touch. Hence ‘first’ may refer to the
proximate fluid thing or also to the previously present flavoured
fluidity, as in the case of those who have previously tasted something
flavoured.
30 422b10 The forms of flavours, [as in the case of colours, are

simple when opposite – the sweet and the bitter – while the
succulent borders on the one, the salty on the other. Between
these are the pungent, the dry, the sour and the sharp. For these
seem approximately to be the varieties of flavours. So the sense
of taste is what is potentially such, the object of taste is what
makes such a flavour actual.]
As of colours the extremes are white and black, the others in between
these, so in taste the extremes are the sweet and the bitter, the rest
in between. All extremes are simple, as unmixed with each other,
while those between are mixed from the extremes, not as being mixed
up together with them, since they themselves exist simply but are
35 sometimes said to be mixed and derived from each other because of
158,1 what they have in common with the extremes. The others are differ-
ent from each other in form, but the sour seems to be an excess of
Translation 195
dryness. So the forms of flavours are not to be circumscribed, but
people try to reduce them all to those that are most obvious. So he
did well to say ‘these seem approximately to be the varieties of
flavours’. Having stated what the object of taste is he says that the 5
sense of taste,188 which was also an object of the enquiry, is what is
potentially such, since actual knowledge is defined by what is known
and has its status according to the form of that. Clearly the organ is
affected, and the thing tasted makes it to be affected by acting on the
organ in some way.
CHAPTER 11
422b17 About touch and the tangible there is the same account.
Because, as in the case of the other senses he studied the correspond- 10
ing knowledge from the object of knowledge, so now also he deter-
mines what touch is from the object of touch. He sets out two problems
about it. One is whether the sense of touch is one or many, because
objects of touch are also many and seemingly of different sorts, and
contain very many oppositions; the other is whether its sense-organ,
i.e. the organ primarily underlying the sense of touch, is flesh in living 15
things with blood and what is analogous to flesh in bloodless ones, or
whether these are a medium as air is in the case of the first three
senses, while the sense-organ is another thing.189 Thus he himself
apparently judges that the primary sense-organ of touch is not flesh
or its analogue, but, as he says in On Sense-Perception,190 that of touch
and taste is in the region of the heart, the flesh and the sinews being 20
sensitive, but not primarily. In this inquiry he depicts the flesh as not
sensitive but analogous to the media, air and water. At least he makes
it clear in concluding the discussion, saying191 both that ‘the differ-
ences of the body qua body are tangible and their sense-organ192 is
that of touch’ and that ‘that in which the sense called touch primarily 25
resides is the part which is potentially such’. He adds ‘primarily’193 to
make it clear where the sense-organ of touch, about which he was
inquiring, should be placed. Seeing this, he would not allow that flesh
was the sense-organ, since the heart was the primary sense-organ of
touch and taste, while flesh had the role of a medium in relation to 30
it, but was itself sensitive, even if secondarily. He himself makes this
clear, holding that the medium must be naturally conjoined [with the
organ] and not foreign to it. A medium that is naturally conjoined and
not of a different nature communicates in the life that is related to
the ruling principle194 [of the soul]. But why would one not say that
bones are sensitive, although they are naturally conjoined [with the
organ]? Because, I shall say, they do not retain the role of a medium
35 towards sensation, being by nature attached to vegetative life. That
is the way in which he decides the second problem. The first problem
was whether the senses of what are counted as tangible are not many,
since they contain many oppositions. For even if one sense-organ is
159,1 common to all, whether it be the primary one or the naturally
conjoined medium, that is not sufficient to establish that there is a
single sense, since the tongue is common to touch and taste, even
though they are not one. However, he lays it down that the sense of
touch is one, with a fine demonstration that each of the other senses
admits a plurality of oppositions. He again inquires correctly, since
5 even if there are many oppositions, there must be some single com-
mon nature for each sense to which the plurality is related, e.g. light
in the case of sight; for colour is visible as a sort of light. Also sound
in the case of hearing, in smelling scent, which is the flavoured
substance released in the shared moisture of air and water, flavour
in taste. So he rightly investigates what is common in the case of
touch, even if it has no name, and lays down that it is that which is
10 distinctive of bodies qua bodies, of which the four elements are the
principles, i.e. of those bodies that come to be and perish. For there
is a common defining form195 of the bodies as becoming, a form which
has its consequent specific properties; with regard to position, weight
and lightness and the inclinations between these;196 with regard to
their mutual interaction, heat and cold, dryness and fluidity, and
15 qualities woven out of these such as smoothness and roughness,
hardness and softness and the like.197 In this way he has handed down
to us the single common genus of objects of touch, at least the fact,
even if it has been given no common name. But we must turn to the
text. He says that the same argument holds for both touch and its
object.
422b17 For if touch is not a single sense but many, then

20 necessarily objects of touch will be of many kinds. [It is problem-
atic whether there are many senses or one, what is the sense-
organ of the tangible, whether it be flesh and, in other kinds,
the equivalent, or not so, but that is a medium ]
The converse is also true that, if what is touched is many kinds of
sensible objects, then the sense of touch is also many kinds of senses.
But since the central discussion now is about the sense of touch he
starts from that, so that, having shown that the objects of touch are
not many kinds of sensible objects, he will have it accepted by the
antithetical converse198 that the sense of touch is also one. Having
25 raised the problem whether it is one sense or many, he adds on to it
the other problem, what the sense-organ of the object of touch is,
‘whether it is flesh and the equivalent in other kinds, or not so’, by
Translation 197
‘other kinds’ meaning bloodless animals. He at once reveals his
opinion that ‘that is a medium’. He suggests in what sense it is a
medium by adding:
422b22  and the primary sense-organ is something else 30

within, [For every sense seems to be concerned with a single
opposition; e.g. sight with white and black, hearing with high
and low, taste with bitter and sweet. But the object of touch
contains many oppositions – hot and cold, dry and moist, hard
and soft, and others similar.]
[‘Primary’] since flesh also is an organ of sense, but secondary.
Otherwise the other would not have been a primary sense-organ but
simply a sense-organ. It is like the moisture in the eye and the air in
the ears. For there the external air or water was not the intermediate
sense-organ.199 Next he elaborates the first problem arising from the
fact that it seems that each of the other senses is concerned with a 35
single opposition, but this one with many.
422b27 But there is some solution at least of that problem, [that 160,1
in the case of the other senses also there are many oppositions,
e.g. in voice not only high and low but big and small, smoothness
and roughness of voice and others similar. There are also other
similar differences concerning colour.]
He well says ‘some solution’ and that it is directed only to the problem
arising from a plurality of oppositions. He will add another solution
also on the same issue, whether it is one or many, arising from the
fact that there is no apparent common genus of objects of touch.200
The present solution does not meet this, but only that from the 5
plurality of oppositions, so, reasonably, is not a solution without
qualification but ‘some’. What then is the solution? ‘That in the case
of the other senses also there are many oppositions’. For it is clear
that hearing will recognise sound in all its proper characters, includ-
ing the opposite ones that it may exhibit, such as being great and
small, smooth and rough. He is not referring to the features of masses, 10
so as to obtrude unnecessarily the common sensibles, as Alexander
thought,201 but to the specific features of sounds, which hearing alone
recognises. That is why ‘in voice’ is included, as Plutarch also well
observed.202 ‘There are also other similar differences concerning col-
our’, such as greatness in the case of a glittering colour and in general
of that thing which is more quickly seen and strikes the sight more 15
strongly, like the colour of gold and silver, and smallness in the case
of that which needs more light in order to be seen and which stimu-
lates the sight more weakly, such as that of lead. There is also
smoothness in the case of things that are soft to sight, like that of
flowers, as there is roughness in the case of things fragmented. But,
20 even if light is common to all things seen, you may find very many
differences between bright things that shine and those that do not
but are seen in darkness, and among shining objects in relation to
each other, and in things seen in darkness. The difference is greatest
among transparent things, which shine more obviously or more
weakly, either because of the difference of shining objects or of the
transparent or in addition of both. So it is not to be wondered at if
also in relation to the single nature of objects of touch many differ-
25 ences should arise. So the problem arising from the plurality of
opposites has been solved and he now investigates the next:
422b32 But it is not perspicuous what the single substrate is for

touch, as sound is for hearing. [Whether the sense-organ is
within or not, but is the flesh immediately ]
For the problem is put forward not because of the nature of things
30 but because of our ignorance. That is why he did not say that it is not
‘single’ but that ‘it is not perspicuous’ [what the single is]; perhaps
because the concept of the nature of the thing deserts us because there
is no common name; but sometimes vice versa because the thing
which characterises generally generated things as such is difficult to
hunt out, when the name of it also is lacking. The Philosopher has
35 raised the problem of what the common feature is. Before stating
what this seems to be he inquires what the sense-organ of touch is.
This is in order to strengthen now by this inquiry the problem about
touch, that it is not one, by attacking the seeming proof of its being
one from the fact that its sense-organ is one. For if flesh is not the
primary sense-organ, it is extremely unclear whether the primary are
161,1 not many. But even if it is one, it is still not obvious that touch is the
one sense of all the objects. For, just as while the tongue is the
common organ basic to both touch and taste, these are not one, so nor
are all the perceptions of things called tangible one, even if there is a
common sense-organ for them all. This is in order that he may show
5 that through its sense-organ touch is more corporeal than the other
senses and more subject to affection, and thereby find the object of
sensation conjoined with it, which is what characterises bodies sub-
ject to affection.203 So he shows how touch is corporeal and passive
from its primary sense-organ. But even this sense-organ does not at
once and immediately approach the sensible object, nor does any
organ of the other senses, lest strong affects should impede the
10 activity of judgement; neither will this organ be capable of grasping
the sensible object through foreign media, but it requires a medium
naturally conjoined with it, being vitally affected by the sensible
Translation 199
object and already, even if weakly and secondarily, displaying an
activity of judgement, and then stimulating the sense-organ that is
primarily and more clearly maintaining that activity. Since the
primary sense-organ of touch requires a more active source of stimu-
lation – for taste also is a kind of touch and is not well roused to its 15
proper activity unless it be stimulated by what is vital and already
sensitive – the form of life which determines it, is probably not as
separate [from the bodily organ] as are the other senses,204 and
because of its lesser independence, it will not stretch out also to
foreign objects.
423a1  the fact that sensation occurs immediately on contact 20

seems to be no indication. [For, even as things are, if one were
to stretch something round the flesh, making a sort of mem-
brane, this would similarly signal a sensation immediately
when touched. It is however clear that the sense-organ would
not be in this membrane. But if it were also to become fused with
the body the sensation would come through even more quickly.
Thus such a portion of the body seems to be in such a state ]
Since because it is more corporeal and more subject to affection it also
raises the suspicion that the primary sense-organ is immediately
present to the sensible object. To this Aristotle first objects that flesh
is not the primary sense-organ, even if we sense immediately on 25
contact with it. For even if a membrane were stretched around the
finger, sense would be simultaneous with contact, and even faster if
it were to become fused with the finger, but certainly it is not for that
reason sharing vitally in the life of sensation. For it would be faster
for that reason, but still the primary sense-organ would not be in the
membrane, not even in the one fused. Why then would there not be
touch through a foreign medium, since we sense both through a 30
membrane and through water when the finger is wetted? Perhaps
this is not through a medium as in sight, as he himself will make clear
by the illustration involving the shield.205
423a7  as if air had been naturally joined in a circle round us;

[for we would have seemed to have perceived sound, colour and
smell with one single sense, and sight, hearing and smell would
have seemed to be one single sense. But now, because the
medium through which the stimuli come is differentiated, the
sense-organs mentioned are clearly distinct. But this is now
unclear in the case of touch.]
By such a supposition he simultaneously shows that it is not neces-
sary for that which is naturally fused to us and in immediate contact 35
with the sensible object to be the primary sense-organ, and that it is
not necessary that because there is a single medium the perceptions
through its stimulation should be one, thus extending the first prob-
162,1 lem. But now, when the media are distinct and the sense-organs for
the first three senses are plain, their plurality is plain to see. ‘But this
is now unclear in the case of touch’ – what the primary sense-organ
is and whether the tactile senses are one or many.
5 423a12 For the animate body cannot be composed of air or of

water. [For there must be something solid. It remains that it is
a mixture of earth and these, which is what flesh and the like
presumably is.]
By this he wishes to give the explanation why the primary sense-
organ is unclear in the case of touch. That is why he uses the
explanatory connective ‘For’. At the same time he clarifies what sort
of thing the medium is in the case of touch. So what is the explanation
of the unclarity? Because in the case of touch, just because it is touch,
10 the object perceived must approach the living sensitive body. But the
living body of things generated and perishable cannot be composed of
air or water, so that it could have been like to the foreign media
intervening in the case of the other senses, but it must be hard and
therefore mixed from earth and the other elements.
423a15 So that it is necessary that the body also should be the

15 naturally attached medium of the sense of touch 
He is referring to the body of living things. This must necessarily be
the naturally attached medium between the sense of touch and its
object. The conclusion that the medium must be naturally attached
to the sense of touch, does not necessarily follow from what has now
been said; rather it is taken from the fact that universally there exists
20 something that transmits, which will later be recalled, and the fact
that, in the case of touch, the stimulus does not occur through
something external, but the body must be affected by the sensible
object itself. From this it necessarily follows that our body (that is
made clear by ‘naturally attached’) has the role of that ‘through
which’. And one must understand the text in this way: ‘so that it is
necessary that the naturally attached body should be the medium of
25 the sense of touch’,206 which is the primary sense-organ, and clearly
also of the object of touch, since, in the case of touch, there must be
something that transmits, without being external. He explains the
medium which, as it were, transmits, that it is animate and hard and
mixed from earth and the other elements. For the medium must be
vitally affected in order better to stimulate the primary organ of
Translation 201
touch, which is more inactive than the other sense-organs, because
of the more corporeal character of the tactile life,207 and it must be 30
mixed, since the composition of the animate body must be such as
that of the generated living thing. But:
423a16  through which the perceptions occur, which are

multiple. [That they are multiple is made clear by touch in the
case of the tongue. For it senses all sorts of objects of touch
through the same part as it senses flavour. So, if other flesh had
also sensed flavour, taste and touch would have seemed to be
one and the same sense. But as things are they are two because
they are not convertible.]
He spoke in this problematic way because the tongue also, as he
himself points out, is the organ of two senses,208 being sensitive to
both flavours and objects of touch in the same portion, so that the two 35
would have seemed to be one if also the other flesh had recognised 163,1
flavours. But since it recognises only objects of touch, so that their
functions are not convertible, but the one that is of flavour also
recognises objects of touch, while what is of touch does absolutely not
recognise flavours, the difference is clear.
423a21 One might raise this problem: if every body has depth, 5
and this is the third dimension of magnitude, [and if there is
some body between two bodies, these cannot touch each other;
now neither the fluid nor the damp is without body, but must
either be water or contain it; things touching each other in water
whose surfaces are not dry, must have water between them with
which the extremities are covered; and if this be true, things
cannot touch each other in water, nor in air (for air has the same
relation to things in it as water has to things in water, though
this escapes us more easily, as it escapes animals in water that
a damp thing touches a damp one); if so, is sensation of all things
alike or differently of different things, just as now taste and
touch seem to be by contact, the other senses from afar? But this
is not the case, but we perceive both the hard and the soft
through other things, as we do the sounding, the visible and the
odorous. But these we receive from afar, the others from near,
which is why it escapes us. For we really receive everything
through a medium, though it escapes us in these cases (i.e. touch
and taste). However, as we also said earlier,209 even if we were
to perceive everything tangible through some membrane which
escaped us as intervening, we should still be as we are now both
in water and in air. For we now believe that we touch the objects
themselves and that there is nothing in between.]
For body has three dimensions. He has already taken it that in the
case of touch the medium is not external but is naturally attached,
and has said that, even if a membrane is stretched around, touch still
occurs, which makes it seem to be through a foreign medium.210 Now
10 he wishes to demonstrate by these, the difference of touch from the
three senses, not only when a membrane is stretched around but also
whenever some medium is placed between the sense of touch and its
object, as when both are wet with water and the water is present
between them, which is a body and therefore also has depth and
prevents an immediate conjunction of the things that touch each
15 other. And perhaps even in the case of things in air some body
composed of air intervenes, if air as well as water has an adhesive211
character. So there is not always a medium, for not even one composed
of air or water itself. And even in the cases where there is a medium
which does not hinder the sense of touch, it does not transmit the
activity as in the case of the three, but it is affected together with the
20 flesh, as he clearly confirms by the illustration of the shield. So much
is clear. In the text ‘must either be water or contain it’, being water
applies to the fluid, containing it to the damp. In ‘things cannot touch
each other in water’ ‘immediately’ must be understood. Next he gives
support, lest the other senses would be like the three because in their
25 case some medium may intervene, and makes a distinction on this
basis:
423b12 But the tangible differs from the visible and the audible.
[We perceive the latter because the medium affects us, but we
perceive the tangible not by the agency of the medium but
together with it, like somebody struck through his shield being
struck. For it is not that the shield was struck and then passed
on the blow, but it happened that both were struck at once.]212
So since in the case of touch and taste nothing external has the
function of transmission, but there needs to be something in their
30 case also that transmits so that the primary sense-organ, as has
already been said,213 should not be immediately affected by its proper
sensible object and blunted in its activity of judgement, in their case
also what transmits, is required, even if it is not foreign, but naturally
attached, being animate as was said, through the sensitive soul. In
that way it would be naturally attached to the primary sense-organ.
For the primary must also be affected in some way by the sensible
35 object, as the excesses that reveal the affection show, but enough to
be stimulated to activity, while the excessive affection hinders it.
Translation 203
There is excess when the action of the sensible object on the primary
sense-organ is immediate. What, then, is it that transmits in the case
of taste and touch? He says that it is the tongue in the case of taste, 164,1
but the whole flesh in the case of touch. He distinguishes these in
what follows, writing:
423b17 In general it seems that just as air and water are to

sight, hearing and smell, so are the flesh and the tongue to their
sense-organ as each of those is. [For neither here nor there 5
would there be perception if the sense-organ itself were touched,
for example if someone put something white upon the surface of
the eye. In this way it is clear that the sense-organ of touch is
inside. In that way what happened would be the same as in the
case of the other senses. For it does not perceive things placed
upon the sense-organ, but it does perceive things placed upon
the flesh. So the medium of the sense of touch is flesh.]
He said ‘each of these’, though he has mentioned before two, air and
water, either because he said that these serve for three senses or
because ‘these’ are not to be understood to be air and water, but
simply the transparent which convey sound and smell.214 These are
three and are not found only in air and water, but in other things as 10
well. Flesh and the tongue are similarly situated as these in so far as
they too are media and have the function of transmission. For clearly,
in so far as these are naturally attached, whereas the others are
foreign, there is not a similar analogy. Therefore we are not in a
position to say that flesh is altogether insensitive, as is water. For the
likeness is not of that sort, but qua being transmitters, and this as in
relation to the primary and sensitive. ‘In this way it is clear that the
sense-organ of touch is inside’; for it is in the heart, as is said 15
elsewhere.215
423b26 These216 then are the differences of the body qua body.
[I mean the differences which distinguish the elements, hot and
cold, dry and moist, about which we spoke earlier in the books
on the elements.]
‘These’, of which he said that they become perceptible when placed
on the flesh. Through these, as we have already said, the single genus
of the nature of tangible things is determined, that which charac- 20
terises bodies qua bodies, not absolutely, but such as he exhibited
through the distinctive differences of the elements; thus [these fea-
tures that characterise] bodies qua passive, which are generated and
perishable. For their principles are the four elements, and their
differences are first the passive qualities. He says that he has spoken
25 of them in ‘the books on the elements’, so called On Coming to be and
Passing away.217
423b29 Their sense-organ is that of touch, and that in which the

sense called touch primarily resides is the part which is poten-
tially such. [For to perceive is to be affected in some way, so that
what is in act makes that which is potentially so such as it itself
is. Therefore we do not perceive what is similarly hot and cold
or hard and soft, but their excesses, since the sense is a kind of
mean state between the opposites in things perceived. It judges
sensible objects in that way. For the mean is capable of judg-
ment.]
Having determined the genus of tangible objects, he now determines
30 from them the sense of touch. For it is that which is potentially like
what is tangible, because the actively cognitive always is in a state
corresponding to the form of what it knows.218 But the sensitive is
stimulated by the object sensed, being insufficient in itself. Therefore
also ‘to perceive is to be affected in some way’, but not as being
destroyed but as being perfected. Therefore it is not ‘affected’ abso-
lutely, but ‘in some way’; in short, it is so affected as to receive its
165,1 perfection from elsewhere. The sense of touch is in potency, not in act;
for it is in act when touching. Through the agency of the body
perceived the sense becomes actually such as that body is because of
the appearance219 of the form which comes into the sense-organ from
it, since the activity of judgement and the perfect state corresponding
to the form is from within and according to the concepts of the
perceptible things which are inherent in the substance [of the soul]220
5 – for knowledge and the determination of knowledge is not imposed
from without like a seal or mould221 – but the sense-organ must be
affected by the object sensed. For affected is what is potentially such
but not what is actually so. How, then, is it possible for the sense-
organ, being liable to affection, not also actually to share in affective
qualities itself? And if it already shares in them how will it be affected
10 in regard to them? But, he says, ‘it is not the similarly hot etc. that it
will perceive’, but the excessive, and in this way it is affected by the
dissimilar, ‘since the sense is a kind of mean state’. Either he is using
‘the sense’ as equivalent to ‘the sense-organ’, or, if it is the sensitive
substance itself, it is not so absolutely but some sort of mean because
it uses the mean tempering of the sense-organ as its substrate.
15 424a6 For it becomes in relation to each of them the other

extreme. [And just as what is about to perceive white and black
must be neither of them in actuality but potentially both (and
Translation 205
similarly in the case of the other senses), so in the case of touch
it must be neither hot nor cold. Further, as sight is in a way of
the visible and the invisible, and similarly the other senses are
of opposites ]
[‘For it becomes’ that is] the intermediate which becomes like the cold
in relation222 to the excessively hot. So when he claims again that the
sense of touch is neither hot nor cold he does not mean that it is totally
without a share in them, but is a moderate mixture of both.
424a12  so touch is also of the tangible and intangible.

[Intangible includes that which has only to a small degree the
special character of tangibles, which is the condition of air, and
the excesses of tangibility, as with things destructive of touch.]
For in cold weather we perceive by touch that the air is not hot, [and 20
we perceive both] that which has a slight heat and that which has it
in excess.
424a15 So an account has been given of each of the senses in

outline.
For he makes a more articulate examination of the sensible objects
in a work specifically about them.223
CHAPTER 12
424a17 It must be accepted universally concerning all sense- 25

perception 
Having made a study separately about each sense, he resumes the
common account of it all. He gives the defining form224 of perception
qua perception, and the characteristic present unqualified in the
sense-organ of any sense whatsoever.
424a17  that sense is that which is receptive of the form of

things sensed without matter, [as wax receives the device on a 30
ring without the iron and the gold, and accepts the golden or
bronze device, but not qua gold or bronze.]
It is evident that a sense is a receptive substance. But since there are
many other things of that sort, he now gives the specific feature of
the sensitive substance, that it is affected by something external and 166,1
is not altogether aroused of itself to actual contemplation, as are
intellect and scientific knowledge and opinion and already imagina-
tion itself.225 But, while every actual cognition is defined by the form
of its object, not being affected by it but being active, and active not
5 creatively but with judgement and understanding,226 the other cogni-
tive activities obtain their perfection from their own being and project
the form of their object of themselves, but that of sensation requires
also the object sensed which lies outside in order to project actively
the form of that object. That is why it is said to be both subject to
affection and receptive of forms which, as it were, enter from else-
10 where, and to be perfected by other things. An indication thereof is
the fact that, being the lowest form [of cognition], sense-perception
must use an organ, and in such a way that it neither is itself strong
enough to be self-sufficient in its use nor has an organ sufficient for
the life that uses it, but one that needs first to be affected227 in some
way by the sensible object, the vital activity being aroused simulta-
neously with the external affection. So the organ, being a body, has
in the life of sensation an activity that is affective,228 but the sense
15 that uses it is active without affection, projecting from within the
concepts of the objects perceived in correspondence with the affective
activity of the organ, by which concepts, as has been said, it under-
stands and judges actively. It is consequently said to be receptive of
forms and to be affected by what has colour or flavour or sound
because its organ needs to be affected by these, having received an
20 appearance of the forms in them. For as the activity in the agent is
akin to the form that is produced in its effect, so the affection
according to the forms makes clear the kinship with the agent; and,
by the appearance of the form which enters the sense-organ by the
agency of the sensible object both the life in [the sense-organ] becomes
active and the life that uses it229 projects its activity of judgement pure
according to the concepts which are akin to the affective activity in
25 the sense-organ; [and its activity is pure], since it is not affected nor
receives the forms from outside. For the cognition is from within, and
so also the state corresponding to the object of knowledge. But the
sense is said to be affected and to become the forms because the
sense-organ receives the formal appearances from outside, and not
without activity; for it receives the forms without matter, since every
30 sensible object is not a form but enformed. As it exists through form,
so the sense names it through its form and it is recognised through
it. So the sense-organ receives the appearance of the form and the
sense, being in a state corresponding to the form, recognises the
sensible object. So it is as the wax receives the device of the golden
ring, but does not take in the gold and is not affected by the gold, but
receives only the mould and is affected by what is moulded.230
Translation 207
424a21 And similarly the sense of each [sensible] is affected by 35

that which has colour or flavour or sound, but not as each of
these is named, but as of a certain kind and according to a
ratio.231
The sense is affected by being aroused to its proper activity while the
sense-organ is primarily affected. Also, the sense is affected by the
composite thing,232 and ‘not as each of these is named’. For the 167,1
composite thing also is active according to its form, and the sense
receives the formal activity, not by being determined, e.g. being
whitened or sounding or being sweetened or being heated, nor being
so affected, but as being cognitively active with regard to the white 5
object or the sound or any of the others, and it is said to be affected
because, when the sense-organ receives the activity from outside, it
is then itself aroused. For even if the body grows hot, the reception of
the form does not consist in becoming hot but in cognitive activity233
according to the form of heat, since, as being heated, the organ
becomes something sensible, but not sensitive. So that even if the
sense of sight is segregated by a white object,234 it is not by being so 10
affected that it makes its judgement, but by its activity according to
the form of whiteness.
424a24 The primary sense-organ is that in which this power

resides.
The sense-organ of each sense is different. But that in which is the
common feature of all sensation, about which the present discussion
is, is ‘the primary’ – which is probably the vital breath (pneuma) –, 15
‘in which this power resides’, i.e. the common sense that includes
them all and is not some sense but simply sense, since it is active with
them all and encompasses them all.235
424a25 These are the same thing but their essence is different.
[For what senses must be a magnitude, but neither being
sensitive nor sense is a magnitude but some ratio (logos) and
power of the former.]
As we have seen, there is on the one hand the soul of the vital organ
which characterises it as such and is related to it as a form towards 20
the being informed by it, and there is also the soul which uses the
body as an instrument.236 For this soul also is an actualisation of the
body through its inclination237 towards it and is determined by the
use of it. As the user and the organ become one because of their joint
activity, so one and the same thing comes to be from both, but they
differ and are distinguished from each other in essence. Especially 25
[distinguished from each other] are the user and the sense-organ,
which is what senses, but also the sensitive principle itself [is distin-
guished from the bodily organ], since it has a double cause, one
material as a magnitude and as a body, the other formal, through the
sensitive life which characterises it as a living organ.238 For neither
is the life itself a magnitude, still less the user soul, but it is ‘some
30 logos and power of the former’: one sort of soul is this insofar it
determines the organ itself, the other, because its being consists in
using it, and this soul is properly called a logos and not a form. For
the form is indivisible whereas the logos239 is an unfolded essence,
and such is the life of the soul.240 Since there are many rational
principles (logoi) both vital and natural, the sensitive life is rightly
said to be ‘some logos’, but also ‘the power’ of the sense-organ, the one
35 as that through which it is moved vitally, the other as what initiates
the motion. For motion is the actualisation of the potential.241 And
thus there is a power both in the thing moved and in what initiates
motion. Those distinctions about power are made in Metaphysics,
Book 5.242
168,1 424a28 From these considerations it is clear also why some-

times excesses in sensible objects damage the sense-organ; [for
if the stimulation of the sense-organ be too strong the ratio
(logos), which is sense, is destroyed ].
For the sensitive life itself, which recognises the forms at both
extremes and is similarly related to both, is a mean, not by being
determined by both but as active with both, and it comes to be in its
5 own organ which is receptive equally of the appearances from both.
So the organ itself is in a mean, not as projective but as receptive, and
not of pure activity but such as is mixed with affection. So if the
affection destroys the constitutive mean243 through excess at either
extreme, the sense organ is destroyed qua sense-organ, and, he says
10 ‘the logos is destroyed’, this being sensation.244 For when the receptive
organ is destroyed through its asymmetry, of necessity the particular
life which forms the organ is also destroyed because its being consists
in determining the organ, as is also that life which uses the organ, if
its being consists solely in using an organ. For if it does not, but it
either has separate activities, as does the master of a boat qua man,
15 or exists primarily in an eternal body,245 it is broken up insofar as it
is no longer using the organ, but not absolutely.
424a31  as are concord and pitch when the strings are vio-
lently plucked.
Sometimes when they are even broken, when the concord is totally
Translation 209
destroyed, sometimes when the concord activity is merely246 impeded
through the violence of the stroke. The illustration is very well suited 20
to the corporeal symmetry of the organ, but not to the sensitive life.
For the life is not itself a concord but flourishes upon the concord.
424a32 And why is it that plants are not sensitive, since they
have a certain psychic element and are affected by objects of
touch? [For they are both heated and chilled. The explanation
is that they have no mean state, nor such a principle as to receive
the forms of sensible objects ]
The inquiry is plainly stated and also the discovery of the explanation 25
in terms of the corporeal property as material and life as formal. For
‘they have no mean state’ has to be understood to refer to the corporeal
symmetry between the extremes, ‘such a principle as to receive the
forms of sensible objects’ to refer to the life of sensation, about which
how ‘receptive’ has to be understood has already been set out.247
424b2  but they are affected together with their matter. 30

That is to say, they are determined by their qualities and charac-
terised accordingly, but they are not also aroused to cognitive activity
in relation to them. And as the activity is in accordance with and
together with the form, so the affection is with the matter. For if a 169,1
composite thing is pre-eminently determined by heat in being heated,
so also is the matter of the composite, and as the matter is primarily
determined by the forms which give it its essence, so are the compos-
ites by the qualities.248
424b3 But one might raise the problem whether anything would
be affected by an odour if incapable of smelling, [or by a colour 5
if incapable of seeing, and so in the case of the rest. But if what
is smelt is an odour, the effect it produces, if anything, is
smelling. So that nothing incapable of smelling can be affected
by an odour, and similarly in the case of the rest. Nor indeed can
things capable of sensing except in the way that they are
sensitive.]
He has said that some insensitive things are affected, and of these
some are affected together with their matter, like things being heated
or cooled, some without their matter, as is the wax which receives the
device on the ring without the gold or the iron; he has also called
sensation an affection.249 By the problems before us and their solution 10
he distinguishes the different sorts of affections and agencies which
bring about the affections. For some of these agencies (1) work by
altering and modifying what receives them, and it is clear that what
receives them is affected as it is altered, as things being painted are
affected by being coloured and things which receive an agreeable
smell from things near them and things that are sweetened and those
heated and also things becoming more audible like a string that is
15 relaxed and tightened. But other things (2) are active with regard
only to the form, and come to transmit to the receiver some form
without affection, in the way that I said that wax shares in the
device.250 Still more clearly the air shares in light and in general what
is intermediate between the sense-organ and the sensible object
transmits the activity of the sensible object.251 For in that way
20 transparent media transmit the activity of colour and the resonant
that of what sounds and the conductor that of what smells. If the
tongue and flesh are also media, we should have in the case both of
flavours and tangible objects such things as receive the activities as
transmitters, but in these cases as at once also secondarily sensitive.
Finally (3), some agencies concern sensible objects as such, when the
25 receptive is sensitive, if these are related to each other and interact,
the sensitive being sensitive to the sensible object, the sensible object
being sensible to the sensitive. Hence the sensible object acts qua
sensible on what senses it, but as colour and as sound [on the
medium], the one on the transparent, the other on the resonant, even
if there is nothing that sees or hears. In the latter case, it is not by
some activity, but by receiving the activity of the others that the
30 medium becomes in actuality transparent or resonant; but the sensi-
tive becomes actual also through its own activity, since it has the
activity of judgment. So affecting and being affected have three forms,
one by the alteration and modification of the receptor, one by the
transfer252 of formal activity by the agent and the receptor’s partici-
pation therein, this also being called an affection because it is accom-
plished from outside, and one, in addition to reception from outside,
35 being determined by its own activity, this also being an affection since
the reception is from outside. Here only there is sensation. Therefore
not all things have sensitive affection.253 So in distinguishing these
the Philosopher raises the problem whether the odorous or colour act
on non-sensitive things. And now he takes the line that they do not,
since, he says, ‘what is smelt is an odour, but an odour acts on the
170,1 sense of smell’ and the sense of smell is a particular sense. He
concludes that things without a sense of smell are not affected by
odours. He says ‘and similarly in the case of the rest’ since nothing is
affected by colours except the sighted. He adds ‘nor indeed can things
capable of sense, except in the way they are sensitive’. For even if a
5 being with hearing can sense, still it will not be affected by colour but
in the way that it is sensitive, by sound, and that being with a sense
of taste by flavour. It is clear that the statements are true, so long as
Translation 211
the thought and statement is not merely of colour or of smell as such,
but of sensible objects as such. For nor are things without sense
affected by sensible objects as such.
424b9 It is at the same time clear also as follows: neither light

and darkness nor sound nor smell affects bodies, but that in 10
which they are, [as it is air accompanied by thunder that splits
wood.]
This argument also has the same tendency as that previously stated,
that the forms of sensible objects clearly have as such no effect on
bodies qua bodies, but through their substrates. Thus thunder some-
times breaks up timber not by its sound but because the blast of air
in which the sound is blows hard and strikes the timber. For not only 15
do sensible objects have no effect qua sensible objects, but nor as such
do they provide a share in their activity, but in some other way, as,
if something coloured lying on top of something were to push it down
with it, it would clearly not be through its colour but through its
weight, and, if something heats, through its heat. So its action then
would be neither as sensible object nor as colour.
424b12 But things tangible and flavours do affect them; [if they 20
did not by what would inanimate things be affected and altered?
So do the objects of the other senses affect them? Or is not every
body affected by smell and sound, and are not those that are
affected indefinite and impermanent, like air – for it smells as
though having been affected?]
He seems to support the contrary, that sensible objects act on things
lacking sense also, but by both the arguments he makes plain the
truth, that the forms of sensible objects sometimes have an effect as
sensible objects, as when254 they act upon the sensitive, and also not
as sensible objects. That is so in two ways: for they act both through
their own forms and through their substrate or accompaniments. 25
That they have an effect is especially obvious in the case of tangible
objects and flavours. For the inanimate also are heated and become
sweet and salty as they are altered, as he himself says, and also being
affected in the way we first mentioned.255
424b16 What then is smelling, apart from being affected?

Apart from being so affected as the air which transfers the activity of 30
what is odorous, each, both the medium and the sensitive being
receiving the formal activity.256
424b17 Or to smell is to perceive.

That is to say, to consist not in the activity from outside alone but
also in its own, if to perceive is to be cognitively active.257
171,1 424b17 But air, when affected quickly, becomes perceptible.

The transparent receives the activity from the source of light all at
once, the resonant and the conveyer of smell not all at once, since they
seem to receive the activity by having been previously affected, but
5 the affection takes time but quickly. So the affected air either becomes
a conveyer of smell in actuality through previous affection258 or also
receives the activity of the odorous as from something else, and
becomes perceptible. Sometimes it itself is affected and becomes
odorous, but always it conducts the activity of the odorous to the sense
of smell, in both cases not becoming perceptive but perceptible,
10 because it does not also stand still at the form of the sensible object
from within through its own activity.
Notes
1. The Greek term aisthêsis and its cognates can range in their application
between sensation (such as a pain) and sense-perception (whether of a quality or
object, or that something is so). Within the present discussion of sense-perception,
aisthêsis is translated as ‘sense-perception’, ‘perception’, or ‘sense’; aisthanesthai
as ‘to perceive’; to aisthêton as the ‘sensible object’ (which, of course, may be an
instance of a quality); to aisthêtikon as ‘the faculty of sense-perception’; aisthêtikos
‘sensitive’, ‘sentient’, or ‘perceptive’; and, aisthêtêrion as ‘sense-organ’.
2. For a summary of the method to follow see 23,32-24,8.
3. Later, at 146,22, the commentator hopes to get support from Plato for his
claim that the essence of the soul is to be elucidated from its activities, see n. 135.
4. In 415b21ff. Aristotle explains that the soul is the principle of motion (change)
in living things, not only the principle of locomotion (for not all living things have
this), but also the principle of qualitative changes such as growth and alteration
of which sensation is an example. ‘For sensation is thought to be a kind of
alteration.’
5. Correct 117,7 energeiai to energeia (cf. 124,6).
6. Qualitative change is discussed by Aristotle at length in GC 1.4, 319b10-33,
and defined as change in respect of affection (or quality) in Metaph. 12.2, 1069b12;
14.1, 1088a32; Cat. 4, 15b12; Phys. 5.2, 226a26; 7.2, 243a9; GC 1.2, 317a27; 5,
320a14. See also Phys. 6.10, 241a32; 8.7, 260a33. Alloiôsis is connected to pathos
at Phys. 7.3, 246a2-3; 4, 248a13-15. But in the Categories he considers affection
(pathos) and quality (poion, poiotês) as different categories. Furthermore, he never
uses the term peisis and never claims that affection is qualitative change. The
author of the commentary may have derived this notion from Iamblichus who –
according to Simplicius (in Cat. 326,15-18 CAG VIII) – says that qualitative
change, like many other kinds of change, is to be subsumed under affection. Peisis
is a common term for affection in the Neoplatonists, e.g. Priscian, Metaphrasis
6,1.4.6.
7. The author seems to have read eirêtai men instead of eirêkamen: see commen-
tary 117,25.
8. 1.7-9, see also Phys. 3.3, 202a21ff.
9. At 416b34.
10. This may be a reference to Alexander’s commentary on the De Anima, now lost,
or to his Quaest. 82,35-6. For details of his activity see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of
Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation’, ANRW II 36.2, 1176-1243, esp. p. 1186.
There is no such view to be found in his extant works. If ‘the senses’ were equivalent
to the ‘sense-organs’ then we should require the sight to perceive the eyes which are
bodies and made up of the elements, just like all objects of sense-perception.
11. A reference to Plutarch of Athens who founded the Athenian School of the
Neoplatonists and wrote a commentary on the De Anima. Our text is Fonte 21 in
D.P. Taormina, Plutarco di Atene, L’Uno, L’anima, le forme Catania-Roma 1989,
see also her notes on pp. 188-90.
214 Notes to pp. 145-148
12. Empedocles speaks about elements as constituents or organs of the senses
in B 84, 85, 86, 109 DK, and see also Theophrastus’ report in De Sensibus chs.7-11.
13. ‘Permanently active’ translates kat’ energeian hestôsa. ‘Permanence’ does
not necessarily involve temporality because many of its functions are surely
instantaneous. The clause hestêke kata is discussed briefly in n. 46, and see also
Steel’s introductory essay.
14. In this context, logos is translated throughout as ‘concept’. To keep a distance
from the modern notion, we should be aware that these concepts are innate in the
soul and not products of abstraction. They are active and inhere in the essence of
the soul which contains them because of its origin in the Intellect. The internal
concepts are internally projected, so as to perfect the sensory information coming
from outside.
15. See e.g. Phaedo 81B2-3; Timaeus 86B1-87B9; Phaedrus 248A1ff.; Rep. 571D;
Sophist 228A1-D10; Laws 730E1-732E8. The term kakunomenê (‘is made bad’)
occurs at Timaeus 42C1 when Plato examines the wandering of the soul into
another body, and is used many times by Plotinus, cf. III 2.4.23; III 2.8.11; VI 7.6.24;
VI 7.7.1.
Note the distinctive theory of causation (‘blames’ translates aitiatai, literally
‘treats as cause’), which is analogous to occasionalism, except that there is an
intentional aspect, since the soul is aroused concerning (peri), and not merely on
the occasion of the appearance of, the quasi-cause. (Ed.)
16. For self-awareness in Neoplatonism as requiring reversion on oneself, see
Peter Lautner, ‘Rival theories of self-awareness in Late Neoplatonism’, Bulletin of
the Institute of Classical Studies, vol. 39 (new series 1), 1994, pp. 107-16.
17. aisthanesthai, as in all MSS and possibly in Philoponus (in DA 295,31-3).
This is repetitive of 417a9, but the commentator gives an explanation for this
repetition. Ross, following Alexander in Quaestiones 3.3, 83,6 Bruns CAG Suppl.
II,2, reads aisthêton. (J.O.U.)
18. legomen. Ross has legômen – let us talk.
19. 3.2, 201b31-2; see also 8.5, 257b8-9 where we find entelekheia (actuality)
instead of energeia although the meaning may be the same.
20. pathêtikê poiotês. Explained in Categories ch. 8 9a28-10a11. The traditional
translation is ‘passive qualities’. We follow Ackrill’s translation.
21. metabolê; a word which here means change in general, including coming to
be, ceasing to be, alteration or qualitative change, and the locomotion (kinêsis) that
is often also translated as change, because it may have that general meaning.
22. This cannot be a reference to Phys. 4. We propose to correct tetarton to
ogdoon. It is also impossible that this is a reference to Simplicius’ commentary on
the Physics. See Steel’s introductory essay.
23. This unconsciously queries the principle that cause need be altogether like
effect. (Ed.)
24. In Physics 2.3 Aristotle says that the craftsman or the sculptor (as efficient
cause) knows the notion (as formal cause) of the statue before turning to construct
a statue. According to Physics 2.7, 198a24ff. formal, efficient and final causes often
coincide, and in De Anima 2.5, 415b8-27 Aristotle is speaking about the soul
standing to body as cause in all three ways. On productive cause cf. also Physics
2.2, 195b5-8. As regards Plato, we should think of the Demiurge or Creator of the
Timaeus.
25. The commentator appears to read anomoion without the definite article at
121.3.
26. The text differs from that of the MSS and Torstrik and Ross. Simplicius(?)
puts nun gar haplôs legomen, ha legomen peri autôn. The MSS., Ross and Phi-
Notes to pp. 149-153 215
loponus read nun gar haplôs legomen peri autôn. Influenced presumably by the
MSS., the Aldine edition of this commentary omits ha legomen. (J.O.U.)
27. On this doctrine, see Steel’s introductory essay.
28. Phys. 7.3, 247a6-248a1. Aristotle emphasizes (b1ff.) that states of the
thinking part are not alterations for alteration takes place by sensible objects.
29. Reading monon for monou at 122.5.
30. An. Post. 1.12, 77b16-33; 16, 79b23.
31. Ross’s text omits genesis and has a different word-order.
32. See textual note to 123,4 below. Aristotle here plays on the contrast between
alloiôsis (alteration, etymologically: becoming other) and ‘advance to itself’. See
Georges Van Riet, ‘La théorie thomiste de la sensation externe’, Revue Philoso-
phique de Louvain, 51 (1953), pp. 374-408.
33. At 417b1.
34. grammatikê; this is usually translated ‘grammar’; but, as Aristotle’s exam-
ple of recognising the letter A shows, he had not in mind the as yet non-existent
study of grammar. (J.O.U.)
35. For soul and kinêsis see Phaedrus 245C5ff., Timaeus 36C-37C, 43D-44A.
36. Both the MSS and the Aldine-edition put Zeta (Book 6), which has been
emended by Hayduck. His reference is to Physics 7.3 and we may think of
247b1-248a6. Accordingly, learning and other processes of the thinking part of the
soul are not alterations. Alteration pertains to the objects sensed and occurs in the
faculty of sense-perception. (J.O.U.)
37. katastêma, condition, is originally an Epicurean term (cf. Epicurus, Fr. 68
Usener) signifying a constant state or structure of the body. Though very rarely,
it is used also by the Neoplatonists (cf. Porphyry, De Abstinentia IV 6, p.237.21
Nauck; Simplicius’ in Phys. 231,1). Here it does not necessarily refer to the
condition of the body alone, for it is paralleled to change into possession and form.
38. Here we meet the usual, threefold division of universals: (1) the transcen-
dent noêta that provide the universal form for the thing informed, e.g. the form of
horse for the horses, (2) the form which exists only in the individuals and (3) the
universal predicates (katêgoroumena) which are posterior and exist in our mind
when we substract all differences that modify a certain form in the outside world,
see A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1991, 49-53, 62-8 with
reference to Simplicius’ in Cat. 82,35-83,20.
39. ‘only conceptually’ translates kata monên epinoian. For an explanation of
the passage see D.P. Taormina, ‘Anima e realtà del conoscere. Hypostasis e
hyparxis nei commentatori tardoantichi al De Anima’, in F. Romano and D.P.
Taormina (eds.), HYPARXIS e HYPOSTASIS nel Neoplatonismo, Firenze 1994, pp.
101-31, esp. 128.
40. Metaph. 6.1, 1026a29-30.
41. logikê anelixis, rational unfolding, refers to discursivity, as has been
pointed out by C. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later
Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Brussels 1978, pp. 126-
7, 134 n. 65.
42. In the majority of cases (47,21; 61,16; 79,14; 84,21; 99,33; 219,2; 249,29) the
term ‘link’ (sunaphê) refers to a non-physical contact of the soul with the forms or
intellect. There are only two exceptions (76,9; 163,14).
43. The question is whether the concepts or rational forms (logoi) projected from
within are said to be common in the sense of being universal or not. Since these
concepts are not products of abstraction, which are necessarily universals, one
could claim that in order to fit in with the form of the thing sensed they should be
216 Notes to pp. 154-155
somehow particular. But they are called common because, in each sense perception,
we recognise a common sensible character, e.g. ‘blue’ or ‘white’. See also 126,10ff.
44. De Anima. 3.4.
45. The second way of potentiality is like the state of the sleeping geometer who
is able to count though not counting in the moment, while the first way is like the
state of uneducated children who cannot count though they are able to learn it.
46. ‘Stands still’ translates hestêke kata; an expression that signifies how any
cognitive act (be it perception or thought) apprehends in a discrete indivisible
moment its proper object as a whole. Some further passages treating this issue:
4,38; 47,7-8; 51,31; 66,14.23-6.34; 75,30-1; 118,30; 121,32; 128,23-4; 164,31; 189,36;
223,12; 237,27-8. For further references see index under histasthai kata and Steel’s
introductory essay.
47. This characterisation of perception corresponds literally to Priscian’s
Metaphrasis, 1,11ff.. See Bossier-Steel, p. 767 and Steel’s introductory essay.
48. To call perception ‘krisis’ is to call it a judgment of reason in Stoic usage, but
merely a perceptual discrimination in Aristotle’s. The Late Neoplatonist view is
that reason (logos) and intellect are involved, because there is a projection of
concepts (logoi).
49. Despite Aristotle’s use of this analogy at 424a17ff. below, if form were
imposed like a seal on wax, then following Stoic patterns we would have to accept
a materialistic theory of sense-perception, which however cannot be reconciled with
the efforts of our commentator to keep soul and its cognitive activities away from
material components and in this way avoid problems arising from that kind of a
doctrine. Moreover, it is not proper to life because this kind of life or vital process
involves activity but pure reception is said to be passive. See also 165,4-5. At
164,29ff. this theory is replaced with doctrine based on appearances of the form of
the thing sensed; these appearances enable the sense to apprehend the form itself.
50. Because proceeding into depth involves three-dimensionality and bodily
structures. But the commentator aims at keeping cognitive capacities away from
material components as far as possible.
51. The passage has been bracketed by Steel thinking that it explains the
previous clause.
52. Contracted translates apestenômenê, a term used by poets (Theocritus,
22,104) and philosophers (Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Top. 56,3 CAG II,2). It turns
up in this commentary many times (44,37; 61,34; 62,23; 173,26.36; 249,17; 285,26;
307,26) to exhibit the difference between the unity of the individuals in which they
keep their particularity (merika at 61,33-4), as in the case of sets of numbers, and
formal unity in which they gain a common form. The term is used also by Simplicius
(apestenômenê gnôsis at in Phys. 18,4 CAG IX) to express a similar difference.
53. Fitting translates epharmozôn, a term to express the appropriate contact
between the soul and concepts projected by it from within and the forms of the
things sensed. It is used also by Priscian (Metaphrasis 3,1). The term may have
originated in a physical context for Alexander of Aphrodisias (ap. Simplicium in
Phys. 871,2) introduced a second sense of ‘together’ (hama) to escape accepting
interpenetration. This second sense of ‘together’ is called ‘fitting with each other’
(to epharmozon); this does not imply spatial overlap. Alexander himself uses the
verb in his De Anima (63,8-13) and we find it also in Quaestiones 3.9, 97,7-12 which
may indicate that the term had some psychological relevance as well. Since the
theory of the soul was regarded by the Peripatetics as part of natural science, it
may be plausible to suppose that the term was also used in a psychological context.
Simplicius uses the term epharmogê at his in Phys. 587,32-4. For further exami-
Notes to pp. 155-160 217
nation see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Proclus on the criterion of truth’, in P. Huby and G.
Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth, Liverpool 1989, pp. 257-81, esp. 259.
54. Contact (epaphê) is used in a metaphorical sense, as at 31,33; 44,9, referring
to an immediate grasp of the wholeness of the thing known. See also Priscian’s
Metaphrasis 10,10.
55. Common sensibles are not listed in this book. These are size, shape, number,
movement and rest. At De Anima 424a16 unity is also added to the list. In De
Memoria 451a17; 452b7-9, Aristotle adds time.
56. ‘Transference’ translates here metaphora (and metapheromenê at l.32); a
term unique in this context in the late Neoplatonists. Perhaps the commentator
refers to a process whereby smell and taste can perceive ‘shape’ and ‘size’ by
transferring the object they perceive, for example by letting the sweet sugar move
in the mouth, or by transferring the organ of perception, for example moving the
nostrils in different directions.
57. Aristotle appreciates the role of the distance, that is the role of the medium,
when speaking of eyes unable to see things placed upon them, cf. 419a25-7; see
also our text 136,15ff. and, for some modification, 137,11ff. In fact, Aristotle never
explicitly qualifies his claim that perception of the proper sensibles is infallible, as
does the Commentator here.
58. This is contrary to Aristotle, and would imply that animals, since they lack
reason, cannot perceive the common sensibles. But our Late Neoplatonist author
involves logos in sense-perception, as does the Middle Platonist Didaskalikos, ch.
4.
59. The commentator pays attention to only one of the three groups considered
by Aristotle (Cat. 9a28-10a11) as affective qualities. These are (1) qualities pro-
ducing an affection of the senses, such as bitterness, sweetness, heat and cold; (2)
qualities which are brought about by an affection, such as paleness, darkness and
other colourings; (3) qualities of the soul, which are present right from the birth as
a result of some affection, e.g. mad distraction (manikê ekstasis) and irascibility.
He does it because only the qualities belonging to the first group can be perceived
by touch directly. Later, at 322,8-10, he draws attention to Plato who held a similar
view in the Timaeus 31Bff.
60. Cat. 7a6-36.
61. In modern editions Chapter 7 begins here. But the commentator does not
see a natural break.
62. This does not mean that the commentator would think that common
sensibles are derivative in their being. Proper sensibles only enable us to perceive
the common sensibles, e.g., by uniting percepts of touch and sight so that we
apprehend size. Elsewhere (127,12), common sensibles are said to be form-like to
a greater extent and therefore they cannot be brought about by proper sensibles.
63. It is of luminous nature because its activity is linked to the light, see 136,10.
64. Timaeus 67C-68D, where colour is said to be a kind of flame (phlox, 67C6).
65. De Sensu 3, 439b11-12.
66. After the general doctrine (theôria), the commentator now states the detailed
explanation of the text (lexis), repeating as it usual the first lemma.
67. en autôi at 130.13 appears to be quotation. Ross reads en heautôi.
68. The text reads apapalin at 130,12, a misprint for anapalin.
69. De Sensu 3, 439a6-440b25.
70. Active presence translates energetikê parousia. The adjective is added
because parousia in itself is said to refer to possession (hexis) and perfection at
134,29 (cf. also 141,40; 142,2) and the addition is intended to indicate the process
whereby a certain substrate is being informed.
218 Notes to pp. 160-164
71. The reference is wrong. Hayduck thinks of Physics 7.3 and the best reference
may be to 245b9-246a1 and a17-b3.
72. The use of the term pathêtika eidê seems to be unique among the commen-
tators, but Plotinus uses it at III 6,4,31-34, referring to an affective part of the soul
which of course cannot be body or corporeal at all, only a certain form.
73. At 131.13 lêpteon; the received text of Aristotle reads lekteon.
74. Reading proientos not proiontos at 131.20: cf. p. 132,15 proagontos.
75. Along with definition (or determination, horos), perfection (teleiotês) is often
applied to characterise the form, cf. 83,31; 84,29; 194,26; 217,32; 249,15 as well as
159,19 where we find horistikon eidos; for this latter see also n. 195.
76. This is not to say that perception fails to attend to form, since elsewhere we
are told that what the senses grasp is form not matter. The commentator here
claims only that it is the form of the informed thing and not the pure form that we
perceive. Light conceived as pure form is imperceptible in itself, while the things
illuminated are perceived, and this is the way of acquiring indirectly knowledge of
what light is in itself (which is a pure form).
77. The term hôrismenon diaphanes does not occur in Aristotle, but we should
think of De Sensu 3, 239a28-9 where he says that the nature of light is lodged in
the indeterminate transparent in bodies which lack fixed boundaries, while colour
is the surface of the transparent in bodies which possess fixed boundaries.
78. At 133,1 en hôi esti, Ross has en hôi tout’ esti.
79. Aristotle thinks the celestial body is a fifth element distinct from fire, even
if (GA 2.3, 737a1ff.) generative heat in animals is analogous to it. For Plato the
celestial body is fire. Philoponus in his Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World
(fragments translated in this series by Wildberg) backs Plato. Simplicius compro-
mises: there is a fifth element but it consists of the purest fire, in Cael. 12,28-30;
16,20-1; 66,33-67; 85,7-15; 130,31-131,1; 360,33-361,2; 379, 5-6; 435,32-436,1.
80. It is not clear where the commentator took this view from. Philoponus
attacks this doctrine, not in the relevant part of his in DA (341,10-342,16 CAG XV),
but in his De Opificio Mundi and ascribes it to the Manichaeans (II 6, p. 69,13-16)
and seems to be unaware that some of the Athenian Neoplatonists held a similar
view. For further details see É. Evrard,‘Philopon, la ténèbre originelle et la création
du monde’, in Aristotelica. Mélanges offerts à Marcel De Corte, Brussels-Liège 1985,
pp. 177-89, though he does not pay any attention to these Athenian texts. The same
notion of darkness as a positive property of the earth is to be found in Priscian as
well; see Steel’s introductory essay for further references.
81. That the commentator did not necessarily rely on Manichaean sources when
taking this view is indicated by the effort to ascribe some positive mark to other
privative qualities, such as cold and black. This effort might have got some feeble
support from the Physics 5.1, 225b4-5; 2, 226a23ff. where Aristotle says that even
privation can be denoted by affirmative terms, such as naked, white and black.
Simplicius discusses it at length in his in Phys. 827,20ff. where he assigns a certain
presence (parousia) to these qualities, which justifies their affirmative name,
although he does not claim that darkness is positive.
82. Hayduck refers to Tim. 45. Ross says that it is aimed at Empedocles, quoting
De Sensu 437b23 and 438a4.
83. Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. 89 Dillon. In his commentary (Iamblichi Chalcidensis
in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta, ed. with trans. and comm. by J.
Dillon, Leiden 1973, p. 383), Dillon says that Iamblichus may have been giving a
purely physical exegesis at this point and refers to Calcidius’ De Visu (cols.
236-247). There may be another explanation: Iamblichus may have made an
attempt to interpret Timaeus 45B4-C6 in accordance with the doctrine that light
Notes to pp. 164-165 219
is immaterial. We may recognize Iamblichus’ inspiration in the subsequent discus-
sion of light on p. 134,6-20.
84. Simplicius is here referring to an idea found in Syrianus and Proclus that
some bodies are immaterial, in spite of being corporeal, and so can interpenetrate
(see Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, ch. 7, where some of their texts
are translated). Syrianus thinks that the corporeal vehicles which carry our souls
can interpenetrate with our bodies. Proclus distinguishes supracelestial light from
ordinary light, identifies it with place, and allows it to interpenetrate the physical
universe. He thinks the celestial body is also immaterial (simple) in Remp. 2.50.3,
and this is why the light of the sun can penetrate it, as can our psychic vehicles
(2.163, 1-7). Proclus, however, thinks that ordinary light is a body, namely the
purest form of fire (2.8.22-7), and that it is material; On Light quoted by Philoponus
Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World (18,18-19,11). Hence it cannot inter-
penetrate the moon (in Remp. 2.167, 1-7), and as our author tells us, it penetrates
the air only by being chopped up (kermatizesthai). Philoponus attacks the idea of
light penetrating by being an immaterial body (in DA 328,13-21), and argues that
light is not a body (326,39-329,4). Our author evidently agrees with Philoponus
against Proclus in saying that light is not a body.
There is a disagreement between Simplicius and Proclus. According to Sim-
plicius in Phys. (623,11-18) matters can interpenetrate; it is rather qualities which
prevent interpenetration. Simplicius allows the celestial spheres to interpenetrate
other bodies (in Phys. 531,3-9; 616,23-617,2; 623,32-624,2; 643,18-26; 966,3-14).
Although he calls the celestial immaterial (232,4-5) in apparent agreement with
Proclus, his more precise statement is that it has a special kind of matter, capable
only of rotation (133,24-134,9).
There is further disagreement between Syrianus and our author who denies
that the pneumatic of the soul interpenetrates with our body, and even doubts if
we have such a vehicle.
85. The term katakermatizomena (‘are in little pieces’) is used by Plato many
times (Meno 79C3, Rep. 395B, Parm. 144B6, Sophist 225B10, 257C8-9, 258D8, this
latter being cited by Simplicius in Phys. 137,25); see also Plotinus (III 9,2.2; V
1.2.35; VI 2.12.10; VI 2.22.14) and Porphyry (Sent. 35, p. 39.16 Lamberz). It seems
then that Proclus admitted some kind of interpenetration for material entities.
86. ‘Imperceptibly’ translates anepaisthêtôs; a rare term used – also in adjec-
tival form – almost exclusively by later Neoplatonists (one of the few exceptions
being Themistius, in DA, 107,14 CAG V,3); cf. Syrianus, in Metaph. 100,38 CAG
VI,1; Simplicius, in Cat. 309,3 CAG VIII, in Phys. 1198,39 CAG X; Philoponus,
in DA. 8,6; 72,3; 263,2; 332,36; 345,4.6.11. They might have taken it from the
Timaeus Locrus 100B.
87. Our author offers six arguments to deny that light is a body, although the
first argement might only show it was not an enmattered body. Simplicius (in Cael.
16,20-1; 130,31-131,1) comes round to Plato’s view that light is a kind or form
(eidos) of the fire.
88. At 134,24 and 27 ho skotos. In Aristotle (e.g. at 418b18) and elsewhere in
this Commentary (e.g. at 133,12) to skotos.
89. The transparent must be dark, that is colourless, for if it had colour of its
own then this colour would impede reception of other colours. See also Themistius’
in DA, 60,34-8 and Philoponus’ in DA, 345,17-20.
90. kat’ epibolên. The expression denotes an immediate grasping of an object
either by the intellect (intellectual intuition) or by the senses (as in this case). A
possible distinction between the intuitive act of a sense and that of the intellect is
shown by the term haplê epibolê (simple act of intuition) at 131,37-8 with reference
220 Notes to pp. 166-170
to the intellect (noêsis) though here we are dealing also with a taking up of sensible
features by the intellect through sense-perception. Cf. also 9,23-4. It seems then
epibolê is used in this text to denote an act of the intellect which involves
sense-perception and does not pertain to intelligible entities.
91. Correct oude into oun ge at 135,6. The conjunction all’ oun ge often has the
sense: ‘however that may be’.
92. Colour is flame issuing from different bodies, cf. Timaeus 67C7-9.
93. This is Aristotle’s view at De Sensu 3, 439b11-12. According to the commen-
tator’s own view at 137,9, light encompasses colours, and light is the actuality of
the transparent (137,17).
94. For stimulation affectively would mean passive reception; see the same
distinction at 36,14.29-30; 45,25; 120,33-4.
95. The term for transferring this activity is diabibazein or diabibastikos, used
quite often in such a context; see also 136,37; 137,22; 138,18.22.31; 139,2.26;
140,15; 163,18; 169,19.22-3; 179,5.24; Philoponus in DA. 327,21; 340,33; 362,3;
365,14; 366,36; 367,2.4; 398,24; Priscian, Metaphrasis 12,29-30; 14,20-1. It refers
to a physical process whereby the activity or the impact of colour or sound (or of
the blow caused by the sound) is conveyed to the sense (or sense organ) through a
medium. Consequently, there always must be a medium which transfers the
activity and this medium stimulates the sense and must be body (139,30). The exact
way of conveying this activity seems to have nothing to do with more general
physical theories. The term itself is used only once by Simplicius, in his in Phys.
362,21; but that passage concerns the way the soul is transferred from sensible
things towards the intelligibles. In his physical works, Philoponus never uses the
term with this meaning.
96. The passage has been taken by C. Steel and F. Bossier, ‘Priscianus Lydus
en de in De Anima van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 34 (1973),
761-822, esp. p. 763, as a reference to Priscian’s Metaphrasis, p. 12. See Steel’s
introductory essay.
97. The addition has not only spatial but temporal significance as well. For the
immediate transmission enables the sense to apprehend its object instantaneously,
as the commentator says later.
98. The medium is transparent actually when it is seen, while potentiality
implies darkness; see also 133,1ff.
99. Suitability, epitêdeiotês, signifies here a (passive) capacity while elsewhere
(52,23; 63,13.15) an inherent quality of a body; for further references see Sim-
plicius: On Aristotle On the Soul. 1.1-2.4, trans. J.O. Urmson, London-Ithaca, N.Y.
1995, p. 165, n. 105.
100. In his extant works Alexander does not tackle this problem, but he appears
to be aware of it at his Quaestiones 3.7, 92,15-23 Bruns, CAG Suppl. II,2. The
commentator takes sides with Alexander’s defence throughout in this commentary
when emphasising the impact of projecting concepts (logoi) in the course of
sense-perception.
101. The text at 138.8 is corrupt but this may be the sense of the original. Read
ginomenên instead of ginomenês.
102. Ch. 12, 224a17-18, explained at 165,31-166,34.
103. Externally translates exôthen (‘from without’) and refers to a mere recep-
tion of the forms of sensible bodies.
104. Presumably, causation, poiêsis, is used here in the sense of activity,
energeia, see 136,24.37. This may be reinforced by the simile of the lever, to be
found at 136,25 as well.
105. The medium is internal because it is in the body and not between the body
Notes to pp. 170-174 221
and the thing touched or tasted. It is the flesh, see 422b34-423a13, explained at
160,31-162,3, the organ for these senses being for Aristotle in the heart.
106. Ch. 8, 419b18.
107. A term never used by Aristotle, but cf. 154,8.19.21.30; 164,9; 169,21;
171,3.5. See also Etymologicum Magnum 136,23 Gaisford; Alexander of Aph-
rodisias, in de Sensu 89,2 CAG II,1; De Anima 51,20 (he may hint at the Peripatetic
coinage of the term); 53,5 and Mantissa 123,22 CAG Suppl. II,1; Themistius, in DA
62,32 (reference to unnamed commentators); 69,9; 70,18 CAG V,3. Priscian,
Metaphrasis 16.1; Sophonias, in DA 84,14.16; 90,14; 96,18; 97,13. In his in DA
354,14 CAG XV, Philoponus thinks that one of the inventors of the term was
Theophrastus (= Theophrastus 277C FHSG); see also 253,5; 306,24; 352,12-20;
354,10; 358,7; 390,30-1; 391,4-5; 393,13.26; 394,12.
108. See also 145,36; 146,5; 148,24.30; 169,20.28; 171,3. In his extant works
Aristotle makes no use of the term but Arius Didymus (ap. Stobaeum, Ecl. I
489,14-21 Wachsmuth) attributes it to him. See also Priscian, Metaphrasis 10,19;
15,33. Sophonias, in DA, 84,16; 85,19; 87,37; 88,9; 96,18. In his in DA, 354,15 CAG
XV, Philoponus thinks that, along with diosmon, diêkhes was coined also by early
Peripatetics (he names Theophrastus = 277C FHSG), see also 306,23; 340,33-7;
353,8-20; 357,15-22; 358,3-7; 364,22; 368,15; 373,7-11. The term might be a Peri-
patetic coinage; see Alexander of Aphrodisias, in De Sensu 88,18-89,5 CAG III,1;
Themistius, in DA 62,31 CAG V,3.
109. Ch. 9, 421b9-26.
110. Ross reads energeia and dunamis instead of Simplicius’ energeiai and
dunamei. For justification see his Aristotle. De Anima, ed., with intr. and comm.
by Sir David Ross, Oxford 1961, p. 247. (J.O.U.)
111. We find the same argument at 137,16-22.
112. These may be the liquid and crystallised parts in the ear of which
Philoponus was speaking at in his in DA 364,33-4. They are located in front of the
tympanum and block the entering air and thus defend the drum of the ear.
113. Cf. 131,23-30.
114. See the case of javelin, Phys. 8.10, 266b28-267a22, De Caelo 3.2, 301b23-30.
115. Here Alexander clearly states the idea of wave motion. For an earlier
articulation, see Ps.-Aristotle Problems 11.6. The passage quoted here has been
preserved in a different form in Alexander’s De Anima 48,12-20. Some clauses are
literally the same but our commentator had a copy with a longer version for the
lines 25-8 in his commentary are not to be found in Alexander’s text as we have it
now. Alexander’s explanation must have been well known since Philoponus also
quotes it (in DA. 361,5ff. CAG XV). His version is much the same as our commen-
tator’s, the only great difference being that in Philoponus the clause ho edeikhthê
ginomenon kai epi tôn rhiptoumenôn (141,27-8 in our commentary) has been left
out. But this may be an addition by a later hand as well for there is no trace of it
in Alexander’s text either. For further discussion, see P. Donini, ‘Testi e commenti,
manuali e insepramento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età
postellenistica’, ANRW II 36.7, 5027-5100, esp. 5045-56, who thinks that Alexan-
der’s De Anima is a compilation of his own commentary on Aristotle’s work.
116. The commentator’s criticism rests on the assumption that by imparting
affection the solid must be actively present throughout in this process and, being
continuous with the rest, the first pocket of air which is struck cannot transmit the
blow – which is an affection, not activity – onto the next pocket and this one onto
the next, and so on until the vessel. Thus the vessel cannot be affected by air in
the same way as it could be affected by the solid.
222 Notes to pp. 174-179
117. By ‘in a separable manner’ the commentator means only that sound is not
to be fused with blow, see also 142,17.
118. Reading holê instead of holôi at p. 142,17: cf. Priscian, 13,1.
119. There is no reason to bracket merê in 24 as did Hayduck.
120. Concomitant cause is contrasted with cause in a primary and unqualified
sense (haplôs kai kuriôs aitios) at 113,6-11.
121. Changing ta auta at l.31 to tade: cf. l.24.
122. One of the authors referred to is Proclus; see Hupotupôseis 7.14.3, p. 218,18.
The earliest occurrence of this view is in Alexander of Aphrodisias ap. Olympio-
dorum in Meteor. 69,15; 210,16. Olympiodorus discusses it at length at his in
Meteor. 43,14-25; 47,18-48,1; 214,20-8.
123. Air is said to be void by the majority of people; see Simplicius in Phys.
647,17ff.
124. Insofar as it transfers the activity of the thing striking the air onto the
sense-organ or sense and therefore it cannot be called (efficient) cause of hearing,
but only concomitant cause (sunaition); see also n. 92
125. Change in l. 21 ‘ton  ton ’ into ‘to  to ’.
126. Ross’s reading is different: akoêi de sumphuês estin aêr (‘the organ of
hearing has connatural air’). For an explanation and details see his commentary
p. 249 and the apparatus to 420a4.
127. ‘is characterised’ translates eidopoioumenos, which refers to the activity of
auditive and visual lives that give the air and the liquid a special form; cf. 4,16;
20,31; 52,27; 167,28.
128. This remark has been made on the ground of a general distinction according
to which the characterising form is different from the user; see e.g. 4,29-33, and for
further references, n. 22 in J.O. Urmson (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the
Soul 1.1-2.4, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1995, pp. 158-9.
129. alla is not in manuscripts, but added by Torstrik.
130. Supplying psophei with Hayduck at 144,10.
131. kritikê energeia refers to the discriminating activity of the sense itself which
is aroused with regard to the affection in the sense-organ. This discrimination is
not to be confused with opinion here since it belongs to the sense. At 196,20-1 we
are told that the sight discriminates not only the white and the black but also their
difference from each other (hê pros allêla autôn diaphora), and this kind of sensitive
discrimination (aisthêtikê krisis) is not affection, not even a change, but an indivis-
ible activity (198,26-7.33-4, cf. 199,7-8), see also 124,6; 144,21; 152,23; 161,9-10;
163,31; 169,31. For the preliminaries see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human
Morals, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1993, 35-6, 58-9.
132. On the structure of the tympanum see also 140,15ff.
133. Similarly to calling air void, this also may be the common opinion.
134. The commentator interprets hôrismenon in a metaphorical sense: the
internal air is not just bounded or confined, but is characterised through the life
which determinates (horistikon) it as a living organism, cf. 57,4. It is used in the
same sense as kharaktêrizomenos (‘is characterised’) is at 145,30.
135. For this resonant activity see also 142,17-33.
136. The word oxu is translated as ‘high’ in acoustical contexts and refers to
pitch. It can also mean a shrill or piercing sound. It also means ‘sharp’ when
referring to shapes and ‘bitter’ when referring to tastes. Thus ‘high’ and ‘sharp’ are
translations of the same word in what follows. Both J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross use
‘sharp’ and ‘flat’ instead, which is convenient but odd. Trebles may sing flat and
basses may sing sharp. But it is not clear that ‘high’ and ‘low’ are entirely
satisfactory. It sometimes appears that the difference is between being piercing or
Notes to pp. 179-182 223
mild, since high pitch, independently of tone and volume, does not seem especially
to affect the sense of hearing. [J.O.U]
137. Reference to Plato’s Phaedo where the immortality of the essence of the
soul is demonstrated starting from an examination of its activities (cf. 41,31). Cf.
C. Steel, op. cit., p. 16, n. 41 and 42. On the other hand, P. Shorey takes it as a
reference to Rep. 477C1-4, or, perhaps, to Soph. 247E3-4: see his ‘Simplicius, de
Anima 146,21’ in CPh 17 (1922), 143-4.
138. The comment that follows shows that the author interprets epi polu to refer
to distance and to the duration of the sound, and en oligôi khronôi to the period in
which the sensation occurs (‘swiftly for the high, slowly for the low’). ‘Throughout
we must understand that Aristotle is advertently or inadvertently prescinding
from volume. A loud bang, for example, affects the hearing more than a quiet
squeak of a mouse; but if volume and tone be neglected we are no doubt more
affected by higher sounds’ (J.O.U.).
139. Correct aisthêtikên into akoustikên at 147,3.
140. Timaeus 80A2-B9.
141. This is the reading of the codices of Aristotle and is so quoted in the
commentary, though not included in the lemma. But the sharp does penetrate and
the blunt does press. It is surely the high which ‘as it were’ [hoion] penetrates and
the low which as it were presses, and it is they which are to be analogically
explained. The paraphrase of Themistius and Vat. 1339 both read baru, which is
easier to understand. (J.O.U.)
142. ‘Prior perception’ translates prolêpsis, a term usually referring to an
activity of reason; e.g. we must preconceive the definition before grasping the
attributes (Philoponus, in DA 41,30-1). Here however it signifies a purely sensitive
activity which does not involve awareness or consciousness, see also 126,14; 147,10.
143. The commentator had in his Aristotle text a variant reading at 420a31:
houtô dê instead of ou dê.
144. Things come about in an incidental way (sumbainei kata sumbebêkos) when
features (such as ‘fast’) are brought about as by-products of the thing (‘the sharp’)
of which they are the features. It is the sharp that comes about per se, but because
this happens to be fast as well, this quality comes about along with the fast though
incidentally only.
145. As Ross says, the meaning of apotasis, melos and dialektos is disputed.
Contrary to Ross, who thinks that apotasis means ‘volume’, J.O. Urmson thinks
that HA 545a15-20 supports the translation ‘range’ (high and low), which is
confirmed by diastêmatikê phônê in the commentary. In ancient music diastêma
means the same as ‘interval’ in modern music. It is hard to see how volume and its
variation could be thought to mimic voice. Articulation is the individuation of
sounds as in speech or as when a note is repeated on a piano.
146. See e.g. Aristoxenus, El. Harm. I 3,11.15.22; 14,11.15; Archytas B 1.66 D-K;
Porphyry in Ptol. Harm 6.4-25; 86.11-13 (Düring).
147. This is the only occurrence of the phrase phantasia sêmantikê. By accom-
panying voice with this special kind of phantasia the commentator thinks that
voice in itself has significative function; this is why he claims that it requires a
communicative life endowed with articulated phantasia. Cf. 149,6-8; 150,10, and
see the term sêmantikê hormê (significatory purpose) at 150,2. The cue of this
notion may be found in Proclus who uses lektikê phantasia at his in Parm. 1020,10
and in Crat. 19,22 Pasquali, which seems to have a very similar meaning. For the
later passage in Proclus, see A. Sheppard, ‘Phantasia and Analogia in Proclus’, in
D. Innes, H. Hine and C. Pelling (eds.), Ethics and Rhetorics. Classical Essays for
Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday. Oxford 1995, pp. 343-51.
224 Notes to pp. 182-186
148. Imagination is articulated (diêrthrômenê) when it enables the animal to
form clear and distinct images that can be expressed. The higher animals also
possess articulated memory, see 293,27-31.
149. This is the life which enables animals including humans to utter meaning-
ful signals and to communicate.
150. There is no reason to add <epi> in l.35 as did Diels, it may suffice to correct;
eti to epi, corresponding to the first epi in l.33.
151. From this commentary it seems as if the author had in his Aristotle’s text
hen after anankaion in 420b21. There is no trace of this hen in the manuscripts.
However, in his edition Ross thought it necessary to add on after anankaion. Is it
possible that this hen is a corrupt trace of an original on?
152. De Part. Anim. 3.6, 669a16-23; De Resp. 13, 477a14-33.
153. to eu is mentioned as a cause in the Timaeus 68E5-6, and we can think also
of Critias 48B as well. In Aristotle see also Metaph. 12.9, 1075a6; 10, 1075a15; De
Sensu 1, 437a1. But if by ‘Platonic fashion’ we may mean the fashion of the Platonic
tradition, then the reference to Plotinus, II 1.5.20-1 is palpable.
154. To accuse Alexander of failing to make this Neoplatonic point may be
inappropriate. He may explain it as ‘in accordance with the soul’, which is a
reference to the formal cause (elsewhere called ‘in accordance with which’ – to kath’
ho), because Aristotle himself too defined soul as a form.
155. sêmantikê hormê seems to be accompanied with significatory imagination
(see 148,25 and n.147) for to utter a voice requires this kind of imagination, possibly
evoking significatory purpose which in turn leads to articulate and meaningful
voice; cf. also 150,8-10 where – in contrast to voice – cough is treated as not kath’
hormên, that is without (significatory) purpose.
156. De Part. Anim. 3.6, 669a2-5, 20-3.
157. Adding against Ross ê to phôs (cf. Commentary 151,1ff., 35-7).
158. ‘Consciousness’ translates sunaisthêsis. In Stoicism it is treated as a
perceptual, not a rational activity (see Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human
Morals, pp. 86-7), and as it happens, the same may be true here. For the reference
may be to the co-operation of two particular senses which are in our case smell and
taste.
159. This passage on Plutarch of Athens has been registered as Fonte 22 in D.P.
Taormina, op. cit. (her commentary is on pp. 190-3). Plutarch may have relied on
the Timaeus 67A1ff. where Plato claims that the only way we can classify odours
is into the pleasant and the unpleasant. Our commentator’s point is that pleasant
and unpleasant are inevitable accompaniments of every odour but from this we
cannot infer that all odours as such are pleasant or unpleasant, since classification
must be based on the definition.
160. Themistius, in DA 68,4-8 CAG V,3. He posits an analogical connection
between tastes and odours and for this reason the names of the tastes can be
applied to odours as well.
161. By introducing activity of judgement (to kritikôteron) the commentator
avoids classifying odours into pleasant and unpleasant since these evoke liking and
dislike only, while this activity is capable of discriminating the odours to a greater
extent.
162. Timaeus 66D2-67A6.
163. De Sensu 5, 443a8ff., esp. 443a12.
164. The commentator draws on De Sensu 5, 433b20ff.
165. ‘Impressions’ translates peisis; a term used usually parallel to pathos, but
here one need not to think of any Stoic reminiscence in the commentator’s doctrine,
Notes to pp. 187-193 225
cf. his criticism on the seal-theory at 126,2-4 and 165,1-14; ‘recognition’ translates
gnôsis.
166. enallax; if a:b::c:d then a:c::b:d.
167. ‘Temperament’ translates eukrasia signifying the approriate blend of the
ingredients of the body.
168. On the difference between the imagination in human beings and in
irrational animals, and on the different grades of imagination in the ‘ladder’ of
nature, see especially the fine account in the in DA 308,1-39.
169. Reading aretês instead of aristês at 153.24. aretê – virtue – is properly
possible only for humans, not for horses.
170. cf. 153,12-15.
171. The verb antilambanesthai and its cognates signify the process whereby
outer objects are grasped, mostly by the senses (118,18; 175,30; 176,24; 269,24-5),
though it refers to the activity of the whole soul to grasp the intelligible (11,29;
67,14) which is outside of it. See also 110,28.
172. For smell-transmission (diosmon) see n. 105, for conveying the activity of
the object of smell toward the sense, n. 93.
173.This is an addition of Diels, based on Themistius, in DA 69,13 CAG V,3.
174. Addition by Hayduck, based on Themistius, in DA 69,26 CAG V,3.
175. prospelasis is not charted in the LSJ.
176. De Sensu 5, 442b28-443a23.
177. Ch. 10, 422a10-14.
178. oude gar hê haphê. This is the reading of the codices as well as of the
commentator. Ross emends to oude gar têi haphêi. The present translation is based
on the interpretation given in the commentary below.
179. Aristotle’s text has hulêi, while the commentator seems to read the
nominative form and gives hulê when reconstructing Aristotle’s argument. Several
mss. support the nominative form.
180. Receptive support (dektikê hupothesis) refers to the state of the fluid which
is to receive, not the activity from the flavours – as does the transparent in the case
of sight – but the flavours themselves. However the underlying state of the fluid
is analogous to that of the transparent. The reason for this modification is the
immediacy of the sense of taste, cf. 155,20.
181. This would mean that flavour is both accident and form of a certain
substrate – which is the fluid. This identification of form and accident is not too
far away from Aristotle’s view exposed in the Categories where at ch. 5, 3b19-21
we are told that the form (or species) defines the quality as referring to the
substance.
182. Passive participation (pathêtê methexis) means here participation by
means of receiving affection from the thing in which – in our case – the fluid is
supposed to participate. It makes it possess the flavours themselves and in this
way constitutes a mixture. For the term pathêtos, see Ps.-Aristotle, De Mundo
392a33; Plotinus, III 6.6.5, III 6.12.56, IV 4.26.16, VI 1.27.2, VI 4.8.13; Damascius,
in Phaed. 78,5 Westerink; Philoponus, in DA 441,29; 443,15; 596,2.
183. One must correct at 156,6 aisthêtikou into aisthêtou, and so also at 156,8
(cf. also 156,14). The only other reference to aisthêtikon eidos is at 119,37 where
the term clearly has an active sense ‘perceptive’ and not ‘perceptible’.
184. Placing comma after ekhon (30), not after phaulon. This may have some
impact on Aristotle’s text as well; see Ross’ notes in his commentary, op. cit., p.
258.
185. ‘Basic’ translates arkhê (see also 157,1) that usually means principle, which
may be an explanation of why actuality is prior to potentiality.
226 Notes to pp. 194-199
186. The commentator reads hautê gar hê haphê (cf. 157,24), just as Sophonias
(in DA, CAG XXIII,1): Ross corrects hautê into tautê (thus) and drops the article
hê. In his commented edition, however, he gives hautê gar haphêi, and for a short
justification see p. 258.
187. For krisis see 66,29; 69,24 and n. 129. The passage reflects the problem of
how a particular sense is able to apprehend or, indeed, discriminate objects not
proper to it. The commentator examines it at length in 126,19-127,14 and see n.
53. Because of its immediacy the sense of taste evokes the problem of how it is
capable of discriminating other qualities if it has already received the flavour itself.
188. The primary sense-organ of the taste is the heart. The sense of taste is
potentially a certain flavour and actual tasting is determined by the object of taste
and established according to the form of the object of taste, cf. 158,28-9.
189. Reading heteron or heterôs instead of heterois at 158,17.
190. De Sensu 2, 439a1.
191. At 423b26.
192. aisthêtikon, literally what can perceive, usually refers to the faculty of
sense, not the sense-organ, but the lemma referred to reads also aisthêtikon with
reference to the sense-organ, cf. 423b29.
193. At 423b31.
194. Although hêgemonikon is originally a Stoic term, the commentator uses it
in a different sense. At 214,23-4 it refers to the moving principle of the animals,
and in non-rational animals it happens to be the imagination and also in humans
imagination is the ruling principle – though only when the activity of reason is
impeded by sleep or drunkenness.
195. This form is responsible for the elementary characteristics of the body, such
as weight and position. For this reason it is called natural form (86,28) too. The
commentator calls it common defining form (koinon horistikon eidos), which clearly
refers to horos (determination, definition). Furthermore, this form is not privation
but activates privation (energei tên sterêsin, 68,21-2) and is constitutive (huposta-
tikon) of the generated bodies; it is this form according to which bodies gain their
existence; cf. also 86,26-7; 231,33-8 (notice the use of to ti ên einai, essence).
196. Heavy bodies naturally incline to the lowest position, the lightest (fire) to
the highest, air and water to intermediate positions.
197. These further pairs of qualities are derived from hot, cold, fluid and dry at
Aristotle GC 2.2.
198. The antithetical converse is ‘If many senses, many objects’; the simple
antithetical is ‘If not many objects, not many senses’.
199. Put semi-colon after aisthêtêrion at 159,32. We interpret this elliptic phrase
as follows: In seeing and hearing the fluid in the eye and the air in the ears play a
similar role as intermediate sense-organ to that of the flesh in the case of touch.
200. 423b11ff.
201. Reference to the features of masses would contain allusion to their shape
and size; these are however regarded as common sensibles.
202. Fonte 23 in D.P. Taormina, Plutarco di Atene. L’Uno, l’Anima, le forme,
Catania-Roma (1989); see also her notes on pp. 193-5. Plutarch’s point is to
emphasise the similarities between touch and other senses, which is quite in line
with Aristotle’s proposal.
203. For touch as more subject to affection than the other senses see also
127,16-17.
204. The text is corrupt at 161.17. Hayduck’s conjectural emendation is trans-
lated here.
205. At 423b15-17.
Notes to pp. 200-206 227
206. haptikon means literally ‘what is capable of touching’ and is translated as
‘sense of touch’ though it can mean ‘organ of touch’ as well. The commentator seems
to apply such terms without making distinction between these meanings in all
cases.
207. At 162,30 we suggest correcting sômatikês into haptikês.
208. But not the primary organ.
209. 423a2-4.
210. 423a3ff.
211. prospelastikon; not in LSJ, though the corresponding verb is.
212. The Greek lemma reads ‘But the tangible differs from the visible and the
audible and also by what follows’ which again shows that the commentator had no
complete lemmas.
213. 422b2, explained at 159,31-6.
214. Aristotle used hekastos, which is translated here as ‘each’. hekastos refers
to an indefinite plurality. The Greek for ‘each of two’ is hekateros. The point does
not arise in English.
215. De Sensu 2, 439a1-2, though there Aristotle says only that the organ of
touch is near the heart. The commentator repeats this view at 158,28-9 as well.
216. At 164,17 hautai. Ross and most of the codices read haptai while Phi-
loponus puts hapta. Themistius paraphrased the text as ‘its objects’ (in DA 76.32-3)
and thus he may have read hapta in Aristotle’s text. Notice that at 158,23 the
commentator reads haptas in a quotation of this lemma!
217. GC 2.2, 329b2ff., and ch. 3.
218. Actively cognitive is also the sense of touch, not the organ, since it stand
still at the form of things sensed. For the term hestêke kata, see n. 44.
219. ‘Appearance’ translates emphasis and refers to the appearance of the form
in the informed. Elsewhere (56,25-6), the author says that it is the emphasis of the
soul by means of which the soul enables the living matter to receive it, which means
that to receive form the matter has to go through two stages: (1) to receive the
appearance of the form and then (2), by the aid of this, to acquire the form itself.
Appearance makes matter suitable (epitêdeios) for receiving the form. This holds
for the soul as well, being form of the body. Here, until 165,15, we are dealing with
a criticism of the Stoics who were talking about impression (tupôsis, tupos) of the
form into the matter. The rejection of this allegedly physical explanation of
sense-perception is embedded by the commentator into a sketch of his emphasis-
theory. For a detailed exposition of what role appearance plays in sense-perception,
see 165,31-166,34. Cf. also n. 221 in J.O. Urmson (trans.), Simplicius. On Aristotle
On the Soul 1.1-2.4, London-Ithaca N.Y. 1995, p. 174.
220. These concepts are projected from within by the soul, see 124,32ff.
221. This allusion to the Stoic theory is to be found and criticised also at 126,4-5.
Cf. n. 46. The commentator rejects any explanation of the sense-perception which
makes use of physical terms.
222. Inserting pros before to huperballon at 165,16. Cf. pros hekateron in the
lemma.
223. In the De Sensu.
224. On defining form (horistikon eidos) see 52,16-17; 57,11; 67,3; 68,22; 83,28;
84,14-16; 86,19.27.32; 104,25; 159,16, and C. Steel, The Changing Self, Brussels
1978, pp. 125-9, also with reference to kharaktêristikos as a striking part of the
vocabulary of this text.
225. The difference between sense-perception on one hand and intellect, scien-
tific knowledge (epistêmê) and imagination on the other is explained at 208,21-31.
226. The point is that the commentator rejects that the sensitive faculty is
228 Notes to pp. 206-208
passive in the course of sense-perception. It is active though not in a creative way
(by bringing about its objects) but with judgement or understanding (or insight,
sunesis); cf. 138,15; 164,30-1; 167,5. Its activity consists of projecting concepts that
are in accordance with the form of the thing sensed.
227. ‘first to be affected’ translates the term propatheia, which for the Stoics
was a preliminary to emotion. Here, however, the term refers to a previous affection
of the sense-organ by thing sensed. This is however not an application of the
emphasis-theory to sense-perception because in that case it would be the sense
itself that suffered a previous affection from the external objects. At 171,3-5 we are
told that also some media (the resonant and the conveyer of smell) receive the
activity of things sensed by having been previously affected.
228. For affective activity, see 54,4; 102,8; 166,23-4; 190,3-4; 213,31. It is
contrasted not only to pure and intellective activities but also to the activity of
judgement (kritikê energeia, 166,23-5) which belongs to the sense.
229. This is the life which uses and moves the tool (the sense-organ), see 18,24-6;
19,14; 94,8-9; 96,1-15; 105,8-11.
230. Elsewhere the commentator rejected that sense-perception can resemble
reception of the seal into the wax. This passage does not contradict his claim
because he modifies this kind of reception in a way which may be in line with his
view. Here we are not dealing with a physical process but only with a certain, not
necessarily physical impression of the form of the thing into the informed (cf. also
169,7-8).
231. The translation ‘ratio’ represents one interpretation of Aristotle’s logos,
which gets its plausibility from 424a28-32. Our commentator takes it quite differ-
ently.
232. sunamphoteron (or sunolon) usually signifies the thing composed of matter
and form, which is active according to its form.
233. Our commentator here agrees with Philoponus, even terminologically
(gnôstikos being the word for ‘in cognitive activity’). See Richard Sorabji, ‘From
Aristotle to Brentano: the development of the concept of intentionality’, in Henry
Blumenthal and Howard Robinson, eds., Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supp. vol. 1991, pp. 227-59, which translates
parallel texts.
234. cf. Timaeus 67E2ff.
235. This view of the common sense (koinê aisthêsis) according to which it
contains all the particular senses, is to be understood in the way that the common
sense co-ordinates the working of the particular senses. Elsewhere the common
sense is likened to the centre of a circle, the particular senses to points on its
periphery. An examination of this passage as connecting the common sense to the
doctrine of pneuma is to be found in I. Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme
alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978, pp. 184-6.
236. This distinction plays important role in the commentary, see 16,15-19;
17,35-6; 18,24-6; 19,14; 20,32-3; 45,16-17; 51,28ff.; 56,35-8; 58,18-22; 59,37-38;
87,19-20; 94,8-9; 96,1-15; 105,8-11. For further explanation see n. 22 in J.O.
Urmson (trans.), Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.1-2.4, London-Ithaca N.Y.
1995, 158-9.
237. Inclination (neusis) points to the tendency of the human soul toward the
body. The term has been examined by C. Steel, The Changing Self, Brussels 1978,
pp. 61-2.
238. This cause is also the efficient since formal and efficient cause often
coincide.
239. l.32 reading ho de (referring to logos) instead of hê de.
Notes to pp. 208-212 229
240. logos as unfolded essence is identified with the soul also at 194,35-41 with
the remark that this logos is concentrated into the undivided (ameristos) which is
the form. The commentator is talking about unfolding logoi at 249,27 and 262,31-2
(connected to epistêmê). For the unfolding activity as discursivity, the spreading
out of discursive thought in contrast to unitary intuition, see C. Steel, The
Changing Self, pp. 126-7.
241. This definition comes from Aristotle’s Physics 3.1, 201a10-11.
242. Metaph. 5.12, 1019a15-b1.
243. Constitutive means (sustatikê mesotês) may refer, not to the sensitive life
itself, but rather to its mediate position in virtue of which it sustains sense-
perception. At least, the sequence at 11-12 where we read that destruction of the
sense-organ precedes destruction of the sensitive life forming that organ.
244. For every sensation is a logos – as the commentator says at 194,39.
245. ‘Master’ alludes to the intellect, as the eternal and ruling part of the human
soul, ‘eternal body’ to the vehicle (okhêma) of the soul, which is made up of aether.
246. Reading monon instead of monês at 168,19. If the text is followed we have
‘when the projection of the sound alone is impeded’.
247. At 165,31ff.
248. These may be the affective qualities of which the commentator was
speaking in 127,16ff.
249. 2.5, 416b33-4.
250. See 166,32-4, but cf. also 165,6ff.
251. For the transmisson of the activities of the object sensed to the sense-organ,
see n. 93.
252. ‘Transfer’ translates metadosis (see also metadotikos at 136,21; 169,16;
174,25), a term that may have the same meaning as the one that diabibazein and
its cognates have.
253. ‘Sensitive affection’ translates pathê aisthêtikê. The emphasis is on the
‘sensitive’ because this kind of affection involves activity on the part of the thing
affected.
254. In line 23 read hote instead of hôste.
255. At 169,11ff.
256. Formal activity is where the affection of the sense-organ by the object
sensed terminates. This activity is formal because the sensitive soul recognises the
object by projecting concepts and stands still at its form; see 128,26-9.
257. Cognitively active may be related to active with judgement (kritikôs) and
insight (sunetikôs) but opposed to creatively (poiêtikôs) active; see 166,4-5.
258. For ‘previous affection’ (propatheia) see n. 224.
English-Greek Glossary
absence, apousia cognitive, epistêmonikos, gnôstikos

act (to act), dran, energein, poiein collision, prosptôsis
active, drastikos, energein colour, khrôma
activity, energeia, energêma coming to be, genesis
actuality, energeia, entelekheia communicative, koinônikos
adventitious, epitkêtos community, oikeiotês
affect, apotelesma concept, logos
affected (to be affected): paskhein concomitant cause, sunaition
affection, pathê, pathos, peisis concord, sumphônia
affective, pathêtikos condition, diathesis
agency, poiêsis consciousness, sunaisthêsis
air, aêr constitutive, sustatikos
alteration, alloiôsis contact, epaphê, thixis
analogy, analogia contemplation, theôria
animal, zôon continuity, sunekheia
animate, empsukhos controls, kurios
appearance, emphasis converse, antistrophos
apprehend (to apprehend), corporeal, sômatikos, sômatoeidês
antilambanesthai, epiballein cough, bêx
argument, epikheirêma, logos
arouse (to arouse), egeirein dark, darkness, skotos
articulated, diêrthrômenê deflection, diaklasis
ascend (to ascend), anienai demonstrate (to demonstrate),
asymmetry, asummetria deiknunai
attribute, sumbebêkos desire, orexis
awareness, sunaisthêsis destruction, phthora
determinate, horismenos
beginning, arkhê determination, horos
blow, plêgê determine (to determine), aphorizein,
body, sôma diorizein, horizein
development, anelixis
capacity, dunamis difference, diaphora, heterotês
causation, poiêsis dimension, diastasis
cause, aitia/aition diosmon, diosmon
change, metabasis, metabolê, kinêsis discovery, heuresis
change (to change), kinein, metaballein disposition, hexis
character, emphasis distance, diastasis, diastêma
characterise (to characterise), divide (to divide), diairein
eidopoiein, horistikos, horizein, divided, meristos
kharaktêristikos, kharaktêrizein
coexist (to coexist), sunuparkhein ear, ous
cognition, gnôsis earth, gê
echo, êkhô intuition, epibolê
efficient, kinêtikos
efficient cause, to huph hou judge (to judge), enkrinein, krinein
element, stoikheion juxtaposition, parathesis
emanation, aporrhoia
end, telos know (to know), ginôskein
essence, ousia, to einai knowledge, epistêmê, gnôsis
eternal, aidios
example, paradeigma language, dialektos, hermêneia
excess, huperbolê learning, mathêsis
excite (to excite), diegeirein life, zôê
eye, omma, ophthalmos light, phôs
limit, peras
faculty of sense-perception, aisthêtikon liquid, hugros
flavour, khumos local motion, phora
flavoured, enkhumos luminous, lampros
flesh, sarx lyre, lura
form, eidos, idea
formal, eidêtikos magnitude, megethos
function, ergon material, enulos, hulikos
matter, hulê
general, katholou, koinos meaning, ennoia
genus, genos medium, meson, mesotês, to metaxu
grasp (to grasp), antilambanesthai membrane, humên
memory, mnêmê
hear (to hear), akouein mix (to mix), kerannunai, mignunai
hearing, akoê moisture, hugros, hugrotês
heat, thermon, thermotês
human being, anthrôpos nature, phusis
negation, apophasis
ignorance, agnoia
illuminate (to illuminate), object, to pros ho
katalampein, phôtizein odorous, osphrantos
imagination, phantasia opinion, to dokoun, doxa
imitate (to imitate), mimeisthai opposite, antithesis, enantios
immediate, prosekhês organ, organon
immediately, amesôs
imperfect, atelês, atelôs part, meros, morion
imperceptible, anaisthêtos, partake (to partake), metalankhanein
apenaisthêtos participation, metalêpsis, methexis
inanimate, apsukhos particular, merikos
inclination, neusis, rhopê passive, pathêtos
incommensurability, asummetron perceive (to perceive), aisthanesthai
incorporeal, asômatos perception, aisthêsis
independence, akhôriston perfection, teleiotês
indeterminate, aoristos pleasure, hêdonê
individual, atomos pore, poros
indivisible, ameristos possession, hexis
intellect, nous potentiality, dunamis
intellection, noêsis practical, praktikos
interpret (to interpret), diermêneuein, presence, parousia
exêgeisthai
232 Indexes to On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12
present (to be present), enuparkhein, scientific, epistêmonikos
huparkhein, pareinai see, horan
principle, arkhê self-aroused, aph’heautês egeireisthai
prior perception, prolêpsis self-initiated, aph’heautês egeiromenê
privation, sterêsis self-perfecting, autotelês
problem, aporia, aporon self-sufficient, autarkhês, autotelês
productive, drastêrios, poiêtikos sensation, aisthêsis
progression, proodos sense, aisthêsis; to sense,
project (to project), proballein aisthanesthai
projection, probolê sense-object, aisthêtos
projective, problêtikos sense-organ, aisthêtêrion
property, idiotês sensible, aisthêtos
proof, apodeixis sensible object, aisthêtos
pure, katharos sensitive, aisthêtikos
purpose, hormê, telos sensitive principle, aisthêtikon
separate, khôristos
quality, poiotês separate (to separate), khôrizein
quantity, poson shape, morphê; to be shaped,
suneidopoieisthai
raise a problem, aporein share (to share), metalankhanein,
rational, logikos metekhein
ray, aktis sight, horasis, opsis
reason, logos sign, sêmeion
rebound, aphallesthai signifies, sêmantikê; significatory,
receive, dekhesthai, eisdokhê, sêmantikos
katadokhê similarity, homoiotês
receptacle, hupodokhê simple, haplous
reception, analêpsis sinew, neuron
receptive, dektikos size, megethos
recognition, gnôsis skill, tekhnê
recognise (to recognise), ginôskein, smell, osmê, osphrêsis
gnôrizein smell transmission, diosmon
reduction, anaphora smooth, leios; smoothness, leiotês
reflection, anaklasis solid, stereos
relation, pros ti; in relation, ekhein soul, psukhê
pros sound, êkhê, êkhos, psophos;
remain (to remain), menein, soundless, apsophos
diamenein, emmenein, spatial, kata topon
hupomenein species, eidos
resistance, antitupia stand still at, histasthai kata
resonance, diêkhes, êkhôs start, arkhesthai
resonant, diêkhês, êkhêtikon steersman, kubernêtês
repositioning, metastasis stimulate, kinein, kinêsis; stimulation,
respiratory, anapneustikos kinêsis
rest, êremia, monê strike, plêttein
rest (to rest), êremein substance, ousia
result, apotelesma substrate, hupokeimenon
reversion, epistrophê suitable, epitêdeios; suitability,
revert (to revert), epistrephein epitêdeiotês
ruling principle, hêgemonikon to be superimposed, epikeisthai
support, hupothesis
science, epistêmê surface, epiphaneia
sympathise, sumpaskhein; unaffected, apathês
sympathetically receive, unbroken, athruptos
sumpaskhein unchanging, akinêtos
underlie, hupokeisthai
tangible, haptos undispersed, athruptos
taste, geusis, khumos; tasteable, unfold, anelittein
geustos unified, heis
temperament, eukrasia unit, hen
tempering, eukrasia unity, henôsis
term, onoma, horos universal, katholou
terminate, apoteleutan use, khrêsis; to use, khrêsthai
text, lexis
theoretical, theôrêtikos various, diaphoros
theory, theôria vegetative, phutikos
thing, to on, pragma vessel, angeion
time, khronos; timeless, akhronos vibrate, seiesthai
tongue, glotta view, doxa
tool, organon virtue, aretê
touch, haphê; to touch, haptesthai visible, horatos; visual, horatikos
trace, ikhnos vital, zôtikos; vitally, zôtikôs
transfer, diabibazein voice, phônê
transference, metaphora void, kenon
transformation, metabolê, tropê
transition, metastasis water, hudôr
transmission, diadosis wax, kêros
transmit, diabibazein; transmitter, way, tropos
diabibastikos white, leukos
transparency, to diaphanes without qualification, haplôs
transparent, diaphanês whole, holos
transport, kinein windpipe, artêria
travel, phora word, onoma
truth, alêtheia world of becoming, ta en genesei
tympanum, tumpanon, mêninx
Greek-English Index
adêlia, unclarity, 162,9 156,3; 164,32; 165,10.20;

adiairetos, undivided, 141,23; 170,32.34; to , sensing, 123,36;
indivisible, 143,29 sensation, 123,34
adioristôs, without distinction, aisthêsis, sensation,
121,11 116,19.25.26.31.35; 117,3.5.13.24;
aêdês, unpleasant, 156,39 118,3.6.19.20.22.23;
aêdizein, to make unpleasant, 156,31 119,18.20.21.23.32; 120,9; 122,8;
aêdôs, unpleasantly, 157,2 124,8.14; 126,16; 128,30.36;
aêr, air, 127,2; 129,6.13; 130,17.18.36; 147,1.3.28; 154,34; 158,35; 165,26;
132,4.10; 133,7; 134,6.8.18.25; 168,10; 169,9.36; perception,
136,7; 138,30; 139,6; 118,17; 123,20; 125,25.37; 126,1;
140,7.10.13.15.16.18.24.26.29; 127,10.12.14; 131,35.37; 136,27;
141,4.8.10.12.20.22.35.36.37.39; 138,10; 144,16; 161,37; 162,32;
142,17.19.21.28.32.33; sense, 117,23.24; 118,2.9.17.20;
143,8.12.14.16.17.18.20.22.26.28. 119,28.29; 126,17.23.34.37.38;
29.31; 144,3.5.7.8.11.15.23.25.32; 127,13.17.23.28; 128,18; 135,1;
145,14.15.26.28.31; 146,1.15; 147,28; 150,35; 151,11.20.32;
148,19.20.22.28; 149,11.13.15.26; 152,1.3.26; 154,7.15.19; 156,2.17;
150,1.2.9.10.13.14.16.30; 151,27; 158,12.15.17.25.35.37;
153,14.31; 154,8.10.11.19.25; 159,5.19.22.25.35; 160,7;
155,19.23; 158,17.22; 159,8.33.34; 161,1.3.5.17.20; 162,2.12.34;
161,4.33; 163,15.16; 164,3.6.8.9; 163,10.18.24; 164,7.27;
165,20; 169,18; 170,30; 171,1.5 165,11.12.22.26.27.28.29.31;
aerios, composed of air, 162,11; 163,15 166,30.31.35.38;
agein, to conduct, 171,8; to bring, 167,2.13.14.15.16; 170,1;
123,32; to convey, 138,1; eis kat’ , perceives, 122,30;
tauton, to equate, 120,17.18 ek , perceptibly, 129,28
ageustos, tasteless, 156,25.26.31; aisthêtêrion, sense-organ,
untasteable, 157,7 117,8.10.14.30; 118,3.15.21;
agnoein, to be unaware, 151,4 119,7.10.15.22.23.26.27.29;
agnoia, ignorance, 122,4; 123,15; 124,3.5.34; 125,24.27.30.32.35;
160,30 128,26.27; 136,19.33; 137,3.4;
aidios, eternal, 168,14 138,11.20.23; 143,33; 144,17;
ainittesthai, to suggest, 159,29 152,10.14.19.23.24.29.38;
aisthanesthai, to sense, 116,30.35; 159,26.30.31.32.33; 160,35.38.39;
119,30.31.33; 120,1.6; 124,31; 161,4.8.14.23.24.35; 162,1.7.25.29;
151,11; 152,9.35; 154,5.18; 163,30.37; 164,5.26;
161,25.31; 167,26; 169,27; 170,4; 165,2.6.8.12.14.28;
to be sensitive, 168,23; to hear, 166,22.23.27.31.38;
145,8; to perceive, 118,25; 124,4; 167,5.12.13.25.34; 168,2.9; 169,18
126,12; 128,2.13; 138,23; aisthêtikon (to), faculty of
144,13.20; 152,28; 153,1; 155,16; sense-perception, 116,33; 118,27;
119,19; sense-organ, 158,24; aition, aitia, cause, 120,3.35;
161,29; 162,3; 163,34; 164,10; 124,10.19.20.22.30; 125,23;
sensitive principle, 167,26; sense, 128,16; 129,5.6; 130,13.15.17;
165,1; sensitive faculty, 131,31; 133,4; 134,9; 135,28.30.32;
123,27.32; 124,33; 140,18; 146,29; 162,6.8; 167,26;
125,13.18.20.25; 137,6 explanation, 151,30; 168,25; is
aisthêtikos, sensitive, 116,21; 117,7; responsible for, 151,20; reason,
118,12; 119,4.37; 122,13; 135,24.25
123,28.30; 124,32.34; 125,17.28; akhôristos, independence, 161,18
128,28; 138,12; 158,20.22.30.34; akhronos, timeless, 132,2; 134,14
161,16.27; 162,10.35; 163,33; akhroun, colourless, 134,32.34
164,14.31; 165,12.32; 167,9.28, 33; akhumos, flavourless, 156,39; 157,18;
168,3.21.29; lacks flavour, 157,11; without
169,23.24.25.26.30.37; 170,4.6; flavour, 157,13
who perceives, 122,32; of akinêtos, unchanging, 124,16.17; not
sensation, 166,7 moved, 144,12; unmoved, 145,5;
aisthêtikôs, in application to inert, 148,34
sensation, 117,18; in sensation, akoê, hearing, 126,30; 140,14;
118,19; 166,14; sensibly, 122,12 143,15.21.28; 144,2.15.28.33;
aisthêtos, sensible object, 117,9; 147,10.13; 151,2; 156,11; 159,7;
124,3.13.31; 125,1.8.21.35.36; 160,8.12.27; 164,4; sense of
126,3.6.14.17.34; 127,26; hearing, 139,22; ear, 140,16
128,12.25.29.30; 135,2; akolouthein, to follow on, 123,22;
138,13.14.15.22.23; 156,3.7; 151,16; 153,32; to be consequent,
159,20.21.22; 161,9.10.11.23.35; 152,12
162,21; 163,31.34.35.37; 165,23; akolouthôs, following, 131,28;
166,29; 168,1.28; consequently, 151,36
169,18.19.24.26.27; akouein, to understand, 123,23;
170,7.8.12.15.19.21.23.24; 171,9; 134,2; 147,38; 151,34; 164,8; to
object, 154,35; 156,5; perceptible, hear, 139,20; 140,13; 142,11;
128,2.7.15.35; 129,3; 138,10; 143,7.8.10.21.22; 144,1.22;
156,6.19.35; 164,18; 165,4; 145,1.11.13.23.24.25.26.28; 169,28
171,1.6; sense object, akoustikos, auditive, 143,24.29;
118,15.16.20; 119,23; 125,18.24; 144,3.27; 145,32; 147,3; with
126,2; object of sensation, 161,6; hearing, 170,5
sensible thing, 124,35; 125,4; akoustos, audible, 139,20; 146,34;
159,20; 167,9; (object) sensed, 147,3; 151,36; sound, 153,29
139,20.21; 152,22; 164,31; 165,6; akribeia, exactness, 152,14; 153,15
166,7; sensible, 118,16; akribês, precise, 151,29.32;
127,12.18.24.25.29; 152,10.13.15.29; articulate,
128,6.8.9.16.17.33; 154,32; 156,8; 165,23; accurate, 153,16; to ,
157,12; 160,1; object of sense, accuracy, 144,16
126,20; 139,14; thing perceived, akribôs, accurately, 122,22; 126,33;
138,15; 165,2; object perceived, 127,4.6.11; 144,13.20; 149,28;
162,10; 166,16; oud’, with exactness, 151,21
imperceptible, 127,26 akros, extreme, 157,32.34.35; 165,15;
aitiasthai, to blame, 119,13; to be an 168,9.27
explanation, 151,33 aktis, ray, 134,12
aitiaton, effect, 120,2.3; (thing) alêthês, true, 128,3.4; 151,28; 159,21;
caused, 124,9; 131,30 170,6; to , truth, 122,5; 170,22
aitiôdôs, causally, 126,10 alloiôsis, alteration, 116,26;
aitiologikos, explanatory, 162,7
117,11.12.13; 121,30.31.34; 147,15; analogue, 158,19;
122,34.35; 123,10.19.21.22; 169,32 equivalent, 159,27
alloiousthai, to be altered, 117,10; analogos, analogous, 153,8; 158,16
122,10; 123,11; 125,13.14; 130,27; anankaios, necessary, 131,15; 149,8
169,11.12; 170,27; to be an passim; to anankaion, necessity,
alteration, 121,31 149,2.6.8
allotrios, external, 145,19.22; anankaiôs, of necessity, 128,20
foreign, 155,6; 158,31; passim
161,10.19.30; 162,12; 163,9.32; anankê, must be, 132,7
164,12; different, 155,27 anapempein, to lead up (to), 120,2;
amblunein, to blunt, 144,18.26 128,21.33
amblus, blunt, 146,35; 147,16.32.35; anaphainesthai, to appear, 131,2
148,4.8 anaphora, reduction, 123,20; 154,3
ameristos, indivisible, 120,13; anapleos, full of, 131,2
124,20; 125,26; 167,32; undivided, anapnein, to breathe, 139,8.9;
121,26 148,18.20.31; 149,11.23.26;
ameristôs, indivisibly, 124,21; 126,1.8 150,1.8.9.10.13.16.17.19.21.23.27.2
amesôs, directly, 150,10.16; 9.34; 154,11.14.20.25.27.28
immediately, 161,8.23; 162,9; anapneustikos, of a nature to
163,23.29 breathe, 154,12; respiratory,
ametokhos, without share, 165,18 149,33
amigôs, without mixture, 137,4 anapnoê, breathing, 149,9.18; 150,28
amiktos, unmixed, 157,33 anaptos, intangible, 165,19
amudrousthai, to become faint, anatolê, rise, 134,19
129,21.23 andriantopoios, sculptor, 127,38
amudrotês, faint, 129,24; faintness, anegeiresthai, to be aroused, 124,28
143,7; weakness, 157,7 anegersis, stimulates, 148,34
amudros, faint, 137,30; 147,11; weak, anekhein, to uphold, 155,15
152,25; 154,5; 156,15.39; anelittein, to unfold, 167,32
160,17.23 anelixis, development, 124,21
amudrôs, faint, 156,30; faintly, anepaisthêtos, imperceptible, 147,22
156,24; 157,2; weakly, 161,12 anepaisthêtôs, imperceptibly, 134,19
anagein, to reduce, 158,3 anexapatêtôs, inerrantly, 126,37
anaimon, bloodless creature, 154,10 angeion, container,
anaimos, bloodless, 158,16; 159,27 141,9.13.17.18.25.28.29
anairein, to destroy, 168,18 anienai, to ascend, 131,31
anaisthêtos, imperceptible, anillesthai, to shrink back, 156,32;
156,5.7.10.13.14.17.18; to anillomenon, repulsion, 151,18
insensitive, 164,13; 169,6; anomoiogenês, of different sort, 158,3
without sense, 170,8 anomoios, dissimilar, 165,11
anaklasis, reflection, 142,27.31.37; anônumos, nameless, 129,2.38;
143,6 135,12; 139,1; no name, 151,9
anaklazein, to reflect, 141,15.18; anosphrantos, odourless, 154,4
142,37; 143,2 antapodidonai, to state the case,
analambanein, to raise, 159,25 139,7
analêpsis, reception, 138,13 anthos, flower, 160,18
analogein, to correspond to, anthrax, charcoal, 135,20
123,32.33; to be analogous, 155,12 anthrôpeios, human, 153,20.23
analogia, analogical relation, 128,38; anthrôpinos, human, 121,17
analogy, 164,12; kata , anthrôpos, human being, 121,16;
analogically, 146,35 man, 124,29; 127,38; 128,1.10;
analogon, analogously, 139,2;
139,6; 151,20.29.38; 153,17; apathôs, without being affected,
154,12; 168,14 130,37; without affection, 166,15
antidiaireisthai, to be in distinction apeikazein, to liken, 146,11
with, 120,8; to be distinguished, apêkhêsis, sound reflected, 143,3;
157,5 echo, 147,22
antidiastolê, contrast, 130,13 aperilêptos, not to be circumscribed,
antikeimenon (to), object, 116,22 158,2
antikeimenos, opposite 142,38; aphallesthai, to rebound, 146,16.18
146,34; 169,9; opposed, 126,19; aphienai, to emit, 135,20; 156,26
contrary, 153,6; contradictory, aphixis, arrival, 122,34
122,5; is at both extremes, 168,3 aphobein, to be fearless, 153,5
antikeimenôs, oppositely, 152,36; on aphobos, non-frightening, 152,33.34;
the contrary, 156,8 153,3.5.6
antilambanesthai, to grasp, 119,21; aphorizein, to determine, 164,19
125,31; 126,32; 127,5.7; 136,28.34; aphôtistos, is without light, 130,24
151,15; 161,11; to pick up, 152,5; apodeixis, proof, 160,37
to apprehend, 126,28; to detect, apodidonai, to be in response,
154,4.15; to be aware of, 156,4; to 117,25; to provide, 129,9.20.29.30;
receive, 137,34; 153,2; to observe, 135,29; to produce, 141,3; to
156,22 deliver, 152,21; to receive,
antilêpsis, to grasp, 137,8 139,29
antilêptikos, receptive, 118,18; apodotikos, gives out, 135,26
119,3.15; 127,16; 153,15; grasps, apoginesthai, to depart, 130,18;
119,15; detects, 154,19; reception, 132,6; to cease, 132,3
157,16 apolambanesthai, to acquire,
antiphrattein (to), interposition, 121,19; to be contained (pass.),
133,12 140,26; to be confined, 140,7; to
antiphraxis, forming a barrier, receive, 123,33
142,22 apolêgein, to fade, 147,12
antirrhêsis, reply, 137,1 apoleipesthai, to fall short of,
antistrephein, to be convertible, 119,39; 121,14.27; to be inferior,
163,2 151,21; to desert (act.), 160,32
antistrophos, converse, 159,21.24 apolimpanein, to leave, 149,11
antitithenai, to oppose, 130,19; apologeisthai, to defend, 118,11;
(pass.) to be in opposition, 133,18 120,11; 138,7
antithesis, opposite, 160,26; sun , apolusis, solution, 153,13.30
antithetical, 159,24 apolutos, separate, 161,18
antitupia, resistance, 118,24; 141,30; apolutôs, in a separable manner,
142,30 142,5.17; unmixed, 155,23
antitupoun, to resist, 134,10 apopallein, to rebound, 146,5.7
aoratos, invisible, 134,35.36; 135,6; apophasis, negation, 156,17.19; kata
156,1.18.20.21 , negative, 122,4
aoristos, indeterminate, 132,28 apophatikôs, as denial, 153,6
apaitein, to require, 163,32 aporein, to set a problem, 118,18; to
apêllotriôsthai, to be of a different raise the problem, 160,34; 163,5;
nature, 158,32 169,4.37
apamblunein, to weaken, 156,12; to aporêtikos, problematic, 162,33
blunt, 163,31 aporia, problem, 117,23.25.27.28;
apantan, to meet, 119,25; 160,5 118,11.29; 119,25; 159,25.34;
apatasthai, to be deceived, 127,22 160,1.3.26.29.37; 161,37; 169,9
apatômenos, mistakenly, 127,8 aporon, problem, 158,12
apathês, unaffected, 123,6 aporrhoia, emanation, 155,24
apospasthai, to be torn away, 131,20 asymmetry, 138,23; is
apostenoun, to contract, 126,9; to non-commensurate, 144,19
compress, 145,8 asummetrôs, incompatibly, 156,6
apotasis, range, 148,13.15 atelês, imperfect, 118,32; 119,1.35.37;
apoteinesthai, to be directed, 118,9; 120,13; 121,12.29; 131,29.31;
to reach out, 118,31; to aim at, 151,24; to , imperfection, 131,2.3
133,32; 147,9 atelôs, imperfect, 131,26
apotelein, to bring about, 120,33.35; athroos, suddenly, 122,2; 131,22;
to cast (shadow), 143,6; to 132,6; all at once, 171,2; sudden,
provide, 137,33; to terminate, 123,18; 134,25; 150,19;
124,7; 128,28; to make perfect, instantaneous, 128,37; to , unit,
130,30; to be effected (pass.), 141,13
166,20; to come about (pass.), athroôs, all of a sudden, 121,32; all at
142,25 once, 131,4; 134,12.20; 137,5;
apotelesma, effect, 146,30 146,13; 171,3; suddenly, 140,2; all
apotelestikos, provides, 137,31 together, 146,16; 149,14; 150,14
apoteleutan, to terminate in, 134,4 athruptos, undispersed, 140,2.8.11;
apôtheisthai, to bounce back, 141,3; unbroken, 141,39;
141,10.32; to rebound back, 141,30 142,7.20.28; 143,17
apotos, undrinkable, 156,33.38; atomos, individual, 124,32; to ,
157,5.6 individual thing, 126,10
apotribein, to clear away, 150,12 Attikos, Attic, 156,28
apousia, cessation, 132,2; absence, aulêtikos, hollowed, 145,10
132,8.12; 133,16; 134,23.28 aulein, to be used as an instrument,
apsophos, soundless, 144,5.7 145,17
apsukhos, inanimate, 119,5; 125,31; aulos, hollow, 148,13
170,26 austêros, dry, 151,4
argos, not easily stimulated, 162,29 autarkês, self-sufficient, 118,31;
arguros, silver, 160,16 129,17.18
aretê, virtue, 153,23.24 autotelês, self-perfecting, 119,21;
arkhê, beginning, 126,1; principle, self-sufficient, 125,16
159,10; 164,22; 168,28; basic,
156,33.36; 157,1; tên arkhên barus, low, 146,26.27.29.30.34;
originally, 119,16; initially, 147,5.9.14.15.17.20.30.31.35;
147,11; ex , initially, 126,20; 148,1.3
142,14; at the beginning, 142,26; barutês, being low, 147,25.29; weight,
originally, 141,11; first, 142,24 159,12; 170,18
arkhesthai, to start, 116,22; 128,36; bathos, depth, 126,5; 147,17; 163,5.13
159,23 bêttein, to cough, 150,5
artêria, windpipe, 149,10.12.15.18; bêx, cough, 150,7.9.11.16
150,1.2.7.9.10.13.15.18.20.25.26.2 biaios, involuntary, 150,8
artos, bread, 119,11 biblion, book, 138,9; work, 165,24
askios, casts no shadow, 143,7 blaptikôs, harmfully, 156,24
asômatos, incorporeal, 124,10; blepein, to see, 134,11; 137,12; to look
128,35; 131,38 at, 137,36
aspis, shield, 161,32; 163,20 blepharon, eyelid, 154,26
asthenôs, weakly, 145,13 boulesthai, to wish (for),
astrôios (phôs), starlight, 134,19 121,23.25.26; 124,27; 145,4;
asummetria, asymmetry, 168,11 154,23; 162,6; 163,10; to allow,
assumetron (to), 57,15; 158,28; to hold, 158,31; to
incommensurability, 137,12; propose, 147,9
bradus, slow,
147,6.15.20.24.31.34.35.36; diakhein, to disperse, 141,6; 142,29
148,1.3.6.8 diaklasis, deflection, 142,39; 143,3
bradutês, slowness, 147,29 diakomizein, to convey, 138,2
brankhion, gill, 150,30 diakonein, to serve for, 164,6
brontê, thunder, 156,11; 170,13 diakrinein, to discuss, 117,17; 121,8;
to segregate, 167,9; to
deiknunai, to show, 131,15; 141,27; distinguish, 147,15; 149,5; 152,13;
159,23; 161,5.7.34; to 165,2; 167,25; 169,10.37
demonstrate, 159,3 dialambanesthai, to intervene,
deiktikos, is shown, 146,5 137,16
dekhesthai, to receive, 126,15; 129,5; dialampein, to shine, 135,21
130,25.29; 131,23; 132,16.29; dialektos, language, 148,16
134,3.33; 138,13; 139,26.29; diamenein, to remain, 142,20
140,3.8; 146,1; 151,25; 155,11; dianistasthai, to achieve, 118,14
166,19.25.27.28.31.33; 157,2.6; dioignunai, to open up, 154,23.24
169,8.11.12.16.23.29; 170,31; di’ hou (to), intermediary, 138,24;
171,2.4.6; to , reception, 121,18 transmission, 163,28; 164,11;
dekhomenos, receptor, 169,32.33 what transmits, 162,19.25.26;
dektikos, receives, 130,33; 163,31; that through which,
131,22.23.25.27.29; 132,4; 140,19; 162,23; transmitter, 164,4
145,36; receptive, 132,8.11; diaphainein, to be transparent,
135,10; 138,10; 140,18.21.22; 132,25
144,6; 155,13.14; 165,29.31; diaphanês, transparent,
166,8.17; 168,5.7.28.29; 169,26; to 129,8.13.16.32;
, receptive organ, 168,10 130,14.16.22.23.25.26.27;
dêlôtikos, means, 147,5; exhibits, 131,5.6.7.16.17.32.34;
149,30; signifying, 153,7; refers 132,1.20.21.22.24.25.26.27.
to, 157,27 28.30.33.36;
dêloun, to denote, 119,32; to signify, 133,3.5.9.22.23.25.27.28.29.31;
144,6; to make plain, 121,24; to 134,1.32.35;
make clear, 140,6; 150,15; 158,31; 135,9.14.16.17.28.33.36;
162,22; to show, 136,33; 143,4; 136,4.9.11.12.13.16.18.20.25.27.31;
146,21; 152,25; 153,4; 154,2; 137,3.10.17.20.25.27.29.37; 138,8;
163,35; to exhibit, 147,23; 149,28; 139,3; 142,1; 144,28.30; 155,10.28;
151,7; 155,22; 164,21 160,22.24; 164,8; 169,20.28.30;
derma, skin, 153,17 171,2; transparent thing, 133,2
despotês, master, 127,38; 128,10 diapherein, to differ, 120,15; 126,35;
diabibastikos, carries, 138,31; 167,24; to be a difference, 124,1
transmitter, 169,22; conveys, diaphora, difference, 144,13; 146,20;
139,2; 140,15; conveying, 143,10 151,3.10; 152,12.32.35; 153,1;
diabibazein, to transfer, 136,24.37; 158,4.24; 160,13.20.22.24.25;
137,22; 170,30; to convey, 164,17.21.23
138,18.22; 139,26.29.30; 154,7.20; diapherontôs, differently, 130,21
to transmit, 155,18; 163,18; 169,19 diaphoros, different, 137,6; 144,17;
diadidonai, to give (further), 158,1; to , difference, 122,33;
141,26.29; to hand on, 142,15 123,15; 130,19; 132,21; 163,10;
diadosis, transmission, 141,32.34; 169,11; different forms, 127,15
146,19; exchange, 146,11 diaphônein, to be in discord, 154,36
diagraptein, to depict, 158,23 diaporein, to be a problem, 158,36
diainein, to wet, 163,12 diarthroun, to discriminate, 151,5
diairein, to distinguish, 121,7; to diarthrôsis, articulate examination,
divide, 156,26; division, 156,26 165,23
diasaphein, to clarify, 125,9 transmitting medium, 154,30;
diaspasthai, to be torn apart, 121,22 cause of smell, 164,9
diastasis, dimension, 126,35; 163,7; dokimazein, to judge, 141,21
distance, 129,21; interval, 148,16 dokoun (to), opinion, 159,28
diastêma, distance, 126,37; 127,23; doxa, opinion, 147,19; 166,2
136,28.32; 146,4.7 doxastikê (gnôsis), opinion, 128,9
diastêmatikos, intervallic, 148,14 dran, to act, 119,11.28.29; 122,20;
diateinein, to extend, 142,6 124,34; 126,27; 155,24; 158,8;
diathesis, condition, 121,9; 131,11; 169,38; 170,19; to have effect,
state, 153,7 170,12.15.23.25; to affect, 128,26;
diatithesthai, to be disposed, 153,1 to work, 169,11; agent (part.),
didaskalia, exposition, 116,22; 166,21
teaching, 123,16 drastêrios, productive, 134,3.31
didaskein, to teach, 126,23 drastikos, active, 161,16
diegeirein, to excite, 152,17 drimus, bitter, 151,4.9.13; 153,28
diegersis, arousal, 125,36 dunamis, potentiality, 121,7;
dieirgein, to prevent, 163,14 133,9.14; potency, 121,15; 128,30;
dieirgon, obstruction, 154,26 capacity, 121,21; 146,32; power,
dieisdunein, to penetrate, 147,17 138,8; 167,12.15.29.34.36.37; kata
diêkhein, to be resonant, 139,31 , potentially, 121,29
diêkhês, resonance, 138,30; resonant, dunamei, potentially, 116,27;
139,4.26; 140,2; 142,3.5; 118,28.32; 121,5.16.18.21;
143,31.32.35; 145,36; 148,24.30; 123,24.25; 125,13.18.19; 130,25;
169,20.28.30; 171,3; cause of 131,6.23.25; 133,1.2.7; 137,37;
sound, 164,8; conveys the sound, 139,12.13.15.16.17.19.20;
143,18 154,33.35; 156,35; 158,5.26;
diermêneuein, to interpret, 117,2 164,27.30; 165,7; potential,
dieron (to), damp, 163,22 116,32.35;
diêrthrômenê, articulated, 148,26; 119,2.3.18.21.31.34.35.38; 120,8;
150,35; 153,22 121,12; in potency, 120,29;
diexodikos, progressive, 132,7 164,34; capable, 143,16; to ,
diexodos, exit, 142,31; passage out, potentiality, 125,21; potential,
150,28 167,35
diienai, to go through, 134,7; to dunasthai (to), potentiality, 128,24;
penetrate, 147,6 to be possible, 131,26
diikneisthai, to extend through, dunatos, has capacity, 121,30; is
142,19 able, 135,29; capable, 125,20;
dioristikos, distinctive, 159,10 144,11; 170,4; can, 121,25
diorizein, to settle, 116,18; to set out, dunaton (to), capacity, 122,16
168,29; to decide, 158,36; to dusdiexodeuton (to), difficulty of
articulate, 148,16; to explain, making a way out, 140,12
120,15; 136,29; to make dusôdês, bad odour, 154,17
distinction, 139,10; 167,37; to dustheôrêtos, difficult to hunt out,
determine, 123,26; 126,16; 160,33
141,34; 158,11; to limit, 141,9;
diôrismenos, distinct, 162,1 ean, to permit, 157,20
diorizousa, distinctive, 141,9 egeirein, to arouse, 117,30;
diosmon, diosmon, 139,2.5.6; 118,13.16.31.34; 119,6.8.10.12;
conductor, 169,21; 124,6; 125,29; 128,9; 166,1.13.39;
smell-transmission, 154,8.19; 167,6; 168,32; to rise, 161,15; to
(smell-) transmitter, 154,21.22; stimulate, 163,35; to be awaken
conveys of smell, 171,3.5; (pass.), 149,25
egeiresthai (to), arousal, 118,30 ekplêttein, to overwhelm, 137,13
eidêtikos, formal, 121,21; 126,10; ekpnein, to expel, 149,13.14; to
127,12; 128,27; 130,15; 131,9; breathe out, 150,22; 154,13
149,30; 166,27; 167,2; 168,26; ekpôma, cup, 140,29
169,32; 170,31 ekteinesthai, to have extension,
eidopoiein, to give form, 139,4; 139,11
142,29; 143,24; 144,4; to ektos (to), external agency, 119,1;
characterise, 139,4; to enform, external, 119,3.7.9.15 passim
166,28; 167,20.28 elenkhein, to refute, 118,10.11
eidos, form, 119,37; 120,35; 122,18; emmenein, to remain in, 131,17; 150,1
123,25; 124,20.24.30; emperiekhesthai, to be contained,
125,2.5.19.24.31.36; 126,3; 137,9
128,23.29.31; 130,31.38; emphainein, to make clear, 166,21;
131,1.3.35.36; 132,9; 133,18.20.32; to make plain, 170,22
138,14; 151,24; 152,2; 154,34; emphasis, character, 122,13;
155,12.14; 156,6.8.15.20.34; appearance, 165,3;
157,30; 158,1.7; 159,11; 164,30; 166,19.22.27.31; 168,6
165,3.4.30; emphrattein, to clog, 140,16
166,3.6.8.9.17.19.20.21.22.25.28. emphusan, to blow into, 145,10
29.30.31; 167,1.7.8.10.20.31; empiptein, to fall into, 150,11; to
168,3.28.33; 169,3.15.16; strike, 170,14
170,12.24; 171,10; species, 148,10; empodizein, to impede, 123,3
153,9; shade, 151,2 empoiein, to produce, 120,31; to bring
eikotôs, reasonably, 117,10; 126,20; about, 169,10; to impart, 142,3; to
128,33; 156,7.36; probably, 167,14 make, 139,22; to introduce, 124,5;
einai (to), being, 128,4; 134,23; 149,5; (pathos), to affect, 130,28
essence, 167,19.24; existence, empsukhomenos, cooled, 148,34
139,3; exist, 149,9 empsukhos, animate, 148,9.12;
eisdekhesthai, to take in, 166,33 150,23; 162,5.27.31; 163,32; to ,
eisdokhê, reception, 167,7; 169,35.36 living being, 150,17.18
eisienai, to enter, 144,25.26.28; empsuxis, cooling, 148,33
149,10 en hôi (to), that in which, 140,21
eispnein, to breathe in, 154,12 enaimos, with blood, 158,15
êkhê, sound, 142,34 enantios, opposite, 121,35; 122,5;
êkhein, to sound, 142,25.26; to make 132,8.11; 133,13; 134,15.21;
a sound, 145,1.11.12 contrary, 122,7.18; 133,18
êkhêtikon, sound-source, 140,5; enantiôsis, opposition, 158,13.37;
145,6; sounding object, 140,8; 159,4.35; 160,3.6.7
resonant, 141,37; 142,17.33; enapolambanein, to confine,
146,9; 148,23 140,2.9.14; to enclose, 143,12; to
êkhô, echo, 141,8.11.15.16; 142,25.35; trap in, 146,5.16
143,6 enapoplunesthai, to dissolve,
êkhos, resonance, 126,30; sound, 153,32; to be freed, 154,30; to be
139,5; 140,15.27; 141,3.33; released, 159,7
142,4.26.29; 143,4.33; 145,8.10.30; enargês, obvious, 128,34.36; 129,28;
146,1.18; 147,10.17.35; 148,16.29; 138,30; 147,38; 148,17; 154,16;
160,11 156,2.37; 158,3; 160,22; 170,26;
êkhoun (to), resonant, 145,23 clear, 131,36; 154,6; evident,
ekleipein, to be lacking, 160,34 165,3; plain, 142,29; 150,7
ekkhein, to spilt, 140,30 enargôs, plainly, 126,30; obviously,
ekpempein, to emit, 135,12 132,9
ekphainein, to display, 135,31
endeês, in need of, 118,32.33.34; 120,6.8.10; 121,14.23; 122,10;
lacking, 119,3 123,4; 125,28; 126,15; 127,28;
endeia, deficiency, 156,5 128,32; 134,10; 154,35; 166,4.22;
endeiknusthai, to reveal, 159,28; to 167,2.5.8.16; 169,15; 170,34; to
demonstrate, 163,10 act, 120,32; 125,34; 126,8; 127,1;
endiaitan, to endow, 148,27.28 136,9; 137,28; 138,15; 144,21;
endidonai, to give to, 131,20; to 155,20; 169,26; to be actual,
impart, 131,27; 132,5; 133,13; 116,32; 125,20.21; to be in act,
136,10.11; 137,4 122,30; to exercise, 122,9.28.32; to
eneinai, to be within, 118,6.7; to be activate, 119,36; 121,20; 131,19;
present in, 118,21 136,22; 142,1.2.14; 143,6; to be
energeia, activity, 116,23; 117,7.15; actively, 166,17; to work, 153,21;
118,2.30.32; 119,6.20.23.33.34.38; to , actuality, 122,27; 123,6;
120,2.4.11.13; 121,2.22; 154,34; 166,28; 169,29; to be
123,4.11.22; 124,1.4.6; actuality, 169,30
125,1.16.33; 126,2.5; 127,11; energêma, activity, 125,34.37
128,27.32.37; 130,37; energêtikos, active, 130,31; 168,5
131,10.18.24; 134,31; energêtikon (to), active nature,
136,10.22.37; 137,4.21; 128,37
138,3.5.12.13.18; 139,4.26.29; energêtikôs, as active, 120,34; 121,1;
140,3.8; 142,4.6.18.23.25.30.38; in activity, 125,22; actively, 128,31
143,34; 144,19.27; 146,10.11.22; enginesthai, to come about, 120,17;
152,21.23; 154,7.20; 155,10.11.18; to come to be in, 168,5; to come
156,12; 161,10.13.15; into, 119,7; 165,2; to inhabit,
163,18.31.36; 165,4; 148,30; to enter, 130,29; 132,6.13;
166,5.13.14.15.20.23.39; 166,21; to be present, 133,26
167,2.6.11; 168,7.14.19.32.33; enidrusthai, to be seated in, 132,15
169,19.22.29.33.35; enistasthai, to attack, 160,37; to
170,16.30.31.34; 171,2.4.5.6.8.9; object, 161,24
active, 121,13; 137,10; actuality, enkatôkodomeisthai, to be confined,
131,28.38; 132,13.33; 133,11.27; 144,12.23
134,4; agency, 165,2; act, 121,15; enkeisthai, to be present within,
kat’energeian, actual, 120,9; 157,12
121,9; 125,25; 129,32; 139,23; enkhumos, flavoured, 151,27;
146,20; 158,6; 166,3; active, 166,1; 153,30.33; 154,30; 156,37;
through activity, 130,37; actively, 157,2.19.23.24.28; 158,8
129,8; 131,4.5. 8; 136,7; actually, enkrinein, to judge, 158,18
129,16; 130,22.23.25; 131,7; ennoia, meaning, 147,37; concept,
136,4.9; in act, 151,35; 155,23 160,31
energeiai, actually, 116,28; 118,27; entelekheia, actuality, 121,7; 122,25;
120,29; 121,5; 125,19; 129,13.17; 123,5; 125,19; 135,16.17; 136,10;
130,27; 131,23.25.29.33; 133,3; 137,13.22; 167,21; 169,29;
137,10.37; 138,8; actualisation, 167,35
139,12.13.15.17.19.20.21.22; entelekheiâi, actually, 135,33;
142,1; 143,17.32; 155,1.10.11.30; 137,20; 157,10
156,34.36; 164,31; 165,3.7.8; in entithenai, to impose, 126,4; 165,5
act, 120,29.30; 128,23; 165,1; in entomon, insect, 152,6; 154,11
actuality, 123,23; actual, enudros, aquatic, 149,23
116,33.34; 117,1; 119,19.31; enulos, material, 132,3; 134,6
active, 120,28.33 enuparkhein, to be present,
energein, to be active, 116,28; 150,13.14
118,1.19; 119,17.18.20.39; epagein, to add, 118,5; 133,31;
136,37; 137,35; 147,19; 148,21; 123,5.15; 124,14; 130,33; scientific
159,29; 160,3; 170,3; to give, knowledge, 124,7; 131,28; 166,2;
123,15; to infer, 124,17; to science, 125,3.7
conclude, 148,6; to follow (pass.), epistêmôn, knows, 119,36; 122,32;
151,36 knower, 121,11.16.29; with
epakolouthein, to be dependent, scientific knowledge, 124,29
119,4; to be consequent, 159,12; to epistêmonikos, scientific, 120,3; of
follow (upon), 132,12; 151,7 knowledge, 122,34; to knowledge,
epanabebêkenai, to be superior, 121,19; cognitive, 121,33; to ,
116,21 cognitive faculty, 124,7
epanalambanein, to resume, 165,26 epistêmonikôs, cognitively, 122,11;
epanthein, to follow, 168,22 scientifically, 124,30
epaphê, contact, 126,13 epistêtos (to), object of scientific
eparkein, to persist, 147,7 knowledge, 124,6.13.14.15
epekteinesthai, to stretch out, 161,18 epistrephesthai, to revert, 119,1
epeisienai, to enter, 134,34; epistrophê, reversion, 119,21
157,19.20; 166,9 episunaptein, to add on to, 159,26
epekhein, to regulate, 149,34; to hold, epitasis, excess, 158,2
154,13 epitattein, to increase, 129,28
epexergazesthai, to elaborate, 159,34 epitêdeios, suitable, 130,30.35.36;
epharmozein, to fit, 126,11 suited to, 139,5
ephistanai, to object to, 138,5; epitêdeiotês, suitability, 121,13;
141,33; to draw attention, 156,21; 138,4; aptitude, 132,31; 133,15
to , objection, 147,38 epiteinein, to strengthen, 160,36; to
epiballein, to apprehend, 156,4 extend, 161,37
epibolê, (direct) intuition, 131,37; epitelein, to bring about, 123,17
134,36; 135,5; apprehension, epitithesthai, to be placed on, 136,15
156,3.14 epokheisthai, to carry, 137,3.5
epidekhesthai, to apply, 145,37 ergazesthai, to produce, 150,2; to
epidosis, advance, 123,3.5 create, 154,31
epiginesthai, to supervene, 122,2; to ergon, function, 148,32; 149,2
come, 130,18; 131,4 errhômenos, vigorous, 145,27
epikeisthai, to be superimposed, eu (einai) (to), well being, 149,4.6
147,18 euaisthêtos, senses well, 157,22
epikheirein, to attempt, 150,12 euarestoun (to), attraction, 151,18
epikheirêma, argument, 170,11 eudioristos, easy to make distinction,
epikourein, to guard, 145,5 150,32; easily distinguished,
epikratein, to be successful, 144,18; 151,31
to prevail, 151,17 euêkhos, well sounding, 140,5;
epiktêtos, adventitious, 132,24.33 audible, 169,14
epiktêtôs, adventitiously, 129,5; eukrasia, good temperament,
132,10.29; adventitious, 129,15; 153,18.20; tempering, 165,14
130,14 eulogon, likely, 118,4; 152,25 passim
epimenein, to remain, 147,4 eumêkhanos, skilful, 153,22
epinoeisthai, to envisage, 141,38 euôdia, agreeable smell, 169,13
epinoian(kath’), conceptually, 124,12 euôdês, fragrant, 126,32
epiphaneia, surface, 134,11; 140,7; eutelôs, vestigially, 156,16
143,11 euthruptos, easily disrupted, 144,7.8
epipolaios, superficial, 147,18 euthus, straight, 127,8; 134,14.15;
episêmainesthai, to acknowledge, 142,21; 143,4; kat’ eutheian at
120,10 right angle, 143,5
epistêmê, knowledge, 122,6.28.31.35; exagein (to), removal, 149,1
exêirêsthai, to transcend, 126,8; to glukazesthai, to be sweetened,
single out, 127,10 167,3; 169,14
exakouesthai, to be heard, 147,6 glukus, sweet, 126,32; 127,28;
exakoustos, heard, 143,5.6; 147,4 151,4.8.13; 153,25.28.31.32.34;
exêgeisthai, to interpret, 118,4; to 154,3; 155,17.18.20.30; 157,32;
clarify, 122,26 170,26
exienai, to exit, 149,10 glukutês, sweetness, 155,19
exisazein, to be equal, 126,35 gnôrimos, becomes known, 131,38;
exô (to), external object, well-known, 156,29
118,6.19.21.30; the external, gnôristikos, recognises, 127,18;
118,34; 119,2.19 160,21; 168,3
exomoioun, to make like, 122,19 gnôrizein, to recognise, 125,1;
exudaroun, to dilute, 157,19 127,7.14; 128,28; 131,23.32;
150,36; 151,2.3;
gê, earth, 118,7.25; 133,6.12; 162,13.27 156,3.6.10.17.21.23; 160,8
genesis, coming to be, 121,12; gnôsis, knowledge, 118,15; 125,27;
122,12.21.22; 125,16; process of 158,6, 11; 165,5; is recognised,
becoming, 131,1; to become, 126,34; recognition, 152,17;
121,20; generation, 123,31; 132,7; cognition, 127,10; 166,3.25
ta en , the world of becoming, gnôstikos, cognitive, 117,29; 118,12;
153,24 119,4.5; 126,5; 164,31; 166,5;
genêtos, comes to be, 159,11; 168,32; cognisant, 118,12; has
generated, 160,33; 162,10.31; knowledge, 126,9
164,22 gnôstikôs, in cognition, 125,23;
gennan, to beget, 123,29.33 cognitively, 128,31; 138,15;
gennêtikos, generating, 129,26 167,5.8; 170,34
genos, species, 121,17; genus, 159,16; gnôstos, known, 125,26; 127,23;
160,4; 164,19.29; kind, 123,10; 158,6; 164,30; to , object of
kata , generic, 151,10 knowledge, 158,10; 166,26; object
geuesthai, to taste, 151,17 of cognition, 166,3.6.7
geusis, taste, 126,31; 149,8; 151,14; gônia, angle, 142,38
153,8.10.11.15.16.35; 154,1.32; grammatikê, writing, 122,8;
155,5.28; knowledge of writing, 122,31
156,11.12.25.27.31.32.39; graphein, to write, 147,8; to read,
157,4.7.16; 158,20.29; 159,2.8; 147,37
161,2.14; 163,28; 164,1.2 gups, vulture, 152,6
geustikos, of taste, 157,11; sense of gupsos, chalk, 132,26
taste, 158,5; 170,6
geustos, objects of taste, 151,8; hallesthai, to bounce, 146,6.11
153,11.12; 154,3.31.36.37; 155,4.7; halsis, leap, 146,12
157,9; 158,5.8; thing tasted, haphê, touch, 126,28; 127,15.18;
153,10; 157,26; bearer of taste, 153,16; 155,3.6; 157,4.6.24.27;
153,30; tasteable, 155,2.8.30; 158,9.11.18.20.25.29;
156,34; tasty, 156,25 159,2.9.18.19.22.23; 160,28.35.36;
ginesthai (to), becoming, 121,18 161,1.2.4.7.14.15.26.29;
ginôskein, to know, 124,24.30; 162,2.6.8.9; 163,8.9.28; 164,1.2.27;
131,34; 146,23.24.30; 151,6; to 165,19.20
recognise, 126,23; 127,11; 131,29; haploikôs, simply, 157,34
166,30.32 haplous, simple, 131,37; 151,25.28;
glôtta, tongue, 150,4.6; 155,34; 157,33
157,17.22.25; 159,2; 161,2; 162,33; haplôs, unqualified, 117,4; 165,28;
164,1.3.10; 169,21 simply, 118,18;20; 120,17; 121,10;
123,30; 127,2; 140,5; 159,32; hexis, disposition, 121,14.19.33;
167,16; as such, 149,6; merely, 122,1.2.7; 123,4.16.25.33; 131,11;
170,7; without qualification, state (of possession), 134,27, 29;
121,6; 130,38; 136,5; 160,6; possession, 122,34; 133,19.21
totally, 168,18; absolute, 119,39; hippos, horse, 153,23
absolutely, 164,20.33; 165,13; histasthai kata, to stand still at,
168,15; in general, 122,31 118,30; 125,21.25.26; 126,3.5;
haptesthai, to touch, 157,25; 128,24.29; 138,14; 154,34; 171,10;
163,14.23; 165,1 to consist in, 170,33; to have its
haptikos, of touch, 158,12.14.25; status according to, 118,7; to
159,3.26; 160,38; 162,21; 163,18; maintain, 161,13; to be
164,26; to , sense of touch, characterised, 151,19; to display,
162,15.17.24; 163,12; 164,29.34; 161,13; to halt at, 121,32; to be
165,17; organ of touch, 162,29; constituted by, 145,31; to be in a
tactile, 162,3 state according/corresponding to,
haptos, tangible, 146,32.33.34; 125,2; 164,31; 166,31
155,2.3; 158,23; 161,3; 163,26; historein, to examine, 117,17
164,19; 165,19; 170,20.25; to , homalos, even, 146,15
tangible object, 164,29; 169,22; homilein, to be in contact, 161,35
object of touch, 151,9; 153,29; homogenês, of the same kind, 153,33
154,36; 155,5; 158,9.11.13; homoios, similar, 116,27.31; 128,26
159,17.18.21.24; 160,4.25; 162,17; passim; like, 117,16; 121,3.5.6;
163,1.2.3.12; 168,24; of touch, 122,24 passim
164,15 homoiôs, likewise, 120,1
hêdesthai, to feel pleasure, homoiotês, similarity, 147,13;
152,19.25; to be pleased, 152,36 likeness, 164,13; similitude,
hêdonê, pleasure, 151,15; like, 148,13; homoiousthai, to become
151,17.19 like, 120,30; 126,14; to be made
hedrazesthai, to be based, 155,14 similar, 125,36
hêdus, pleasant, 151,12.16; horan, to view, 120,3; to regard,
152,10.11.18; to hêdu 149,31; to perceive, 155,21; to see,
pleasantness, 152,13 121,34; 127,6.8; 128,24;
hêgemonikon, ruling principle, 129,5.6.7.11.14.15.16.17.18.21.23.2
158,33 5.33; 130,14.15.17; 131,7.13.14;
hêliakos (phôs), sunlight, 129,14.15; 132,1.20.21.23.25.26; 134,8;
of sun, 133,6 135,2.3.4.5.6.14.15.17.18.19.21.
hêlios, sun, 128,38; 129,21; 134,26 22.24.28.30.32; 136,14.35;
hêliousthai, to be striken by the sun, 137,1.7.8.11.15.18.23.28.36; 138,1;
143,1 139,4.16; 146,25.29; 153,1; 154,27;
helix, spiral, 144,28; 145,5 155,25; 156,21.22; 158,28;
hêmerinos (phôs), daylight, 137,31 160,14.17.19.21.22; 169,28
hêmigenês, hybrid, 151,23 horasis, sight, 144,30.31
henôsis, unity, 126,10 horatikos, visual, 138,8; 143,25; of
hênoun, to unify, 124,21 sight, 138,6; in sight, 161,31;
hepesthai, to follow, 132,8; 162,22; to sighted, 170,3
be consequent, 147,21.24 horatos, visible, 128,38.39;
hepomenôs, consequentially, 147,36 129,1.3.4.5.36.37;
hermêneia, language, 149,7 130,2.5.6.7.11.19.21; 131,5;
hermêneuein, to explain, 162,26 132,18.19.22.30; 135,11.13.27;
hêstos, pleasant, 152,17 136,5.37; 138,6.9; 139,15; 142,2;
heterotês, difference, 163,3 151,37; 156,1; 159,6; 163,26;
heuresis, discovery, 168,25 object of sight, 153,1
hôrismenos, definite, 135,36; huparkhein, to occur, 126,1; to be
determined, 145,24.28.29.31; fact, 150,35; to provide, 149,4; to
determinate, 132,28 belong to, 148,10; to reside in,
horistikos, defining, 132,9; 159,11; 158,25; to be (present),
165,27; forms, 168,11; 127,26.29.30; 130,17; 134,36;
determines, 167,30; 135,36; 154,1; 159,1.3; 163,13;
characterising, 149,31; 164,27; to exist, 142,18; 162,19
characterises, 150,34 huparkhon (to), property, 118,24
horizein, to determine, 125,19; huperairesthai, to be superior,
128,30; 131,28; 142,12; 161,17; 124,13
164,29; 167,2.22; 168,4.12.31; huperairein, to be over-loud, 156,11
169,2.35; to give definition, huperballein, to be excessive,
130,19; to characterise, 131,20; to 156,7.8.9; 163,36; 165,16; to be in
define, 131,29; 158,6; 166,3 excess, 165,21
hormê, purpose, 150,2; kath’ , huperbolê, excess, 148,35; 156,24;
purposive, 150,8.10 157,7; 163,35; 165,10; 168,2.9
horos, term, 121,32; 124,23.24; huperekhein, to be greater, 126,35;
determination, 165,6; definition, to exceed, 153,15
130,11; 131,19; defining form, hupertithesthai, to postpone, 150,20
131,28 huph’ hou (to), efficient cause,
hou heneka, that for which, 149,16.17 118,33; that by which, 140,20.21;
hualos, glass, 130,36 149,29.32
hudatinos, composed of water, 162,11 huphistasthai, to be, 151,26; to
hudatôdês, watery, 157,37.38 exist, 157,35; 168,15
hudôr, water, 130,36; 138,31; 139,6; hupnôi (en), asleep, 122,11
140,13.15.17; 143,2.8; 144,22.26; hupodeigma, example, 163,20;
146,1; 148,21.24; 150,30; 151,27; illustration, 168,20
153,13.14.31; 154,8.9.28; hupodokhê, receives, 125,16; 132,31;
155,16.18; 158,22; 159,8.33.34; receptacle, 125,18; reception,
161,30; 162,4; 163,12.16.21.22.23; 130,30; 139,5; 153,20
164,4.7.8.9.13 hupokeimenon, underlying, 127,31;
hugiazesthai, to be healthy, 131,26 151,7; substrate, 132,13;
hugieia, health, 130,33; 131,25 139,13.18; 154,37; 155,1.2.9;
hugrainein, to moisten, 144,26; 156,6.13.20; 160,27; 165,13;
154,32; 155,31; to wet, 161,30; to 170,13.25; object, 150,36; 151,3
become moist (pass.), 157,10 hupolambanein, to claim, 141,16
hugros, liquid, 140,30; 142,39; hupomenein, to remain, 140,27; 141,6
143,25; 144,30; 155,34.35; 156,38; hupomnêma, commentary, 133,35
moist, 150,12; 153,14; 154,29; huponoia, suspecting, 151,32;
155,5.7.9.11.14; 156,34.36.37; suspicion, 161,23
157,1.6.9.10.15.16.19.21.22.25.26. hupopiptein, to fall under the
28; 163,21; moisture, 151,27; senses, 127,4; 156,26
153,31; 159,8.33 hupostrônnusthai, to be substrate,
hugrotês, moistness, 155,3; 133,10; to underlie, 131,33; 155,9;
157,17.18.20.23; moisture, 159,14 156,14; 158,15; to be basic to,
hulê, matter, 121,19; 131,33; 138,11; 161,2
155,7.12.15; 165,30; 166,28; hupothesis, support, 155,12; ex ,
168,30; 169,1.2.7 hypothetically, 129,28
hulikos, material, 121,17.21; 140,19; hupotithesthai, to suppose, 134,7; to
167,27; 168,26 place, 163,11
humên, membrane, 161,26.28.30; husterizein, to be later, 142,10
163,8.11
idea, form, 158,3 katekhein, to hold, 149,14;
idein, to know, 123,9 150,14.22.25; to occupy, 134,24
idios, proper, 117,9; 126,24.25.26; kath’ hauto, essential, 118,23; as
127,4.9.14; 128,15.16.17.20.21.33; such, 122,22
135,4; 157,12; peculiar, 147,23; kath’ hekaston (to), particular,
within, 145,20; specific, 130,28; 124,8.9.11.12; 125,6
159,12; 160,11; 165,32; special, kath’ ho (to), in accordance with
148,11 which, 149,30.31
idiai, individually, 117,4; separately, katharos, pure, 125,37; 148,27;
141,5; 165,26 152,21; 161,13; 166,24; clear,
idiôs, exclusively, 120,15; properly, 169,17
129,5 katharôs, undisturbed, 144,21
idiotês, property, 126,14; 131,37; katheudein, to be asleep, 123,1
168,26; specific character, 133,12; kathistanai, to establish, 136,30; to
proper character, 160,8; construe, 155,8
characteristic, 147,23 katholou, generally, 117,18;
idiotropôs, in its own way, 126,25 universal, 124,14.16.22; general,
ikhnos, trace, 131,30; 152,7 117,19.21; to , universal,
ikhthus, fish, 150,29; 154,9 124,7.10.18; 125,11
kathormizesthai, to be anchored,
kaiesthai, to burn, 119,24.26 124,23
kakia, badness, 119,12 katokhê, holding, 150,27
kakunesthai, to be made bad, 119,14 kaustikos, kindles, 119,24.26
kalein, to call, 117,21; 123,9; 134,27; kaustos, combustible, 119,24.26
139,2; 142,39; 143,8; 146,35; keklasmenos, bent, 127,8
149,10; 154,8; 156,36; 158,25 kenon (to), void, 137,14.16.20; 138,3;
kamnein, to damage, 144,31.33; to , 139,30; 140,1; 143,7.8;
illness, 145,13 145,23.25.26
kardia, heart, 148,27; 149,17.19.24; kentein, to stab, 147,16; to prick,
158,20.29; 164,15 147,32; 148,4
katadokhê, reception, 130,35 kerannunai, to mix, 165,18
katadusis, sunset, 134,26 keras, horn, 129,10.28; 132,26;
kataginôskein, to condemn, 152,14 145,2.10.17
katakermatizesthai, to be into little keratoeidês, horn-like, 144,29
pieces, 134,7 kêros, wax, 126,4; 139,15; 166,32;
katakhrasthai, to make use, 148,31 169,7.17
katalambanesthai, to be grasped, khalkos, bronze, 140,4.6; 142,2
127,24 kharaktêristikos, characterising,
katalampein, to illuminate, 129,33; 143,30; characterises, 161,6;
133,6; 137,19; to light, 135,31 164,20; 167,19
kataleainesthai, to be soothed, 153,3 kharaktêrizein, to characterise,
katapheresthai, to be faced, 126,30 119,37; 128,24; 131,30; 145,30;
kataplêttesthai, to be disturbed, 168,31; to be characteristic
153,2 (pass.), 165,28
katapsuxis, cooling, 150,31 kheir, hand, 145,7.27; 150,6
katasbennusthai, to quench, 148,35; khitôn, coating, 144,29
katasbesis, quenching, 134,26 khordê, string, 168,17; 169,15
katastêma, condition, 123,25 khôrein, to move on, 116,21; to pass
katathrauesthai, to be disrupted, through, 132,3
143,12 khôristos, separate, 124,16; 168,13;
kataxêros, totally dry, 157,22 separately, 132,14
katêgorein, to predicate, 124,11 khôristôs, separately, 137,4
khôrizein, to separate (off), 124,13; in motion, 143,26.31.32; 144,9;
126,22; 132,15 149,34; 150,19.23; to stimulate,
khrasthai, to use, 116,21; 117,14; 119,2.15.23.28; 125,29; 126,37;
118,4; 120,10.12; 123,13.14; 126,8; 136,7.13.16.18.19.20.21.26.27.30.
142,27; 143,30; 145,32; 148,26; 33.36; 137,3.7.9; 138,2.3.4.7.19.21;
149,32.34; 152,29; 154,20.22.25; 146,1; 147,10.13.28.33; 148,5;
155,13; 166,10.12.15.23; 153,4; 155,2; 160,17; 161,17;
167,21.22.23.25.29.30; 161,16.37; 164,32
168,12.13.15 kineisthai, to be in motion, 120,24;
khreia, is needed, 148,23 142,33; 146,3; to move, 140,11;
khrêsimos, useful, 116,24 145,9.14.15.18.19.21; 167,36
khrêsis, use, 166,11 kinêsis, change, 117,10;
khrôma, colour, 118,26; 127,7; 120,12.13.14.16; 121,31; 123,13;
128,23; 129,1.7.30.36.38; process, 123,8; stimulus, 147,25;
130,2.5.8.9.16.19.20.25; 131,6; 148,3; 162,21; stimulation,
132,23; 133,22.23.24.25; 119,16; 136,13.33; 147,29.30;
135,5.15.17.22.35; motion, 134,13.17; 140,29;
136,2.3.5.8.14.18.20.22.24.26.30. 144,14.17; 145,12.19.20; 146,10;
32.35; 137,1.3.6.7.8.12.20.26; 148,19.28; 150,19.28; 167,35;
139,3; 142,1; 146,25.28.29; 150,34; moving, 136,15; movement, 138,25
151,1.36; 152,27.33.34.35; 153,2; kinêtikos, causes, 119,11; stimulates,
155,10.19.21.27.28; 157,31; 159,6; 162,28; arousing, 129,32; sets in
160,13.14.15; 166,18.36; motion, 143,14.16; activating,
169,20.27.38; 170,3.5.7.17.19 130,16.21; efficient (cause),
khrômatizein, to give colour, 155,23; 149,30; activates, 136,4; initiates
to colour, 169,13 motion, 167,35
khronos, time, 126,1; 132,2; kinoun (to), the cause of motion,
147,1.4.7.27.29.33; 149,14; 171,4 149,28
khrônnunai, to colour, 127,21.22; koilos, hollow, 140,4.9; 141,12.14;
kekhrôsmenos, coloured, 129,18; 142,27
130,10.11.15; 132,20.22.25; koilotês, hollowness, 141,12
133,23.25; 135,34; 136,16.28; koinê, generally, 116,19; 117,3; 126,16
137,16.19; 155,25; 170,17 koinon (to), compound, 153,13
khrusos, gold, 160,15; 166,32.33.34; koinônein, to communicate, 158,32
169,3 koinônia, to have in common, 157,35
khumôdês, of flavour, 155,1; koinônikos, communicative,
flavorous, 155,8 148,11.26; for communication,
khumos, taste, 151,15; flavour, 149,7
153,9.12.25.26.32; 154,29.32; koinos, general, 117,5; 153,22;
155,1.7.11.14.29.30; common, 126,24.26.27.36;
156,27.34.37.39; 127,5.12.24; 128,15.16.18.19.25;
157,12.13.14.30.32; 158,3; 159,8; 157,4.6; 159,2.8.9.11.16;
162,34; 163,1.2.3; 166,18.36; 160,10.33.35; 161,2.4; 165,26;
169,22; 170,6.20.26 167,13.15; common character, 49,2
kinein, to change, 116,25; koinôs, general, 117,25; 151,6;
117,8.10.30; 118,1; 120,6.7.9.14; common, 124,35; 151,9; 154,8;
to move, 116,29; 118,14; 119,5; 158,38; 160,4.19.31.35; shared,
136,25; 141,21; 143,17; 144,16.24; 151,27
145,6; 149,27; 151,7; to activate, kôluein, to impede, 121,24.26; to
130,27; 149,32; to act, 125,34; inhibit, 152,23; there be external
161,14; to make change, 154,27; impediment, 121,25; to hinder,
to initiate motion, 167,36; to set 163,18; to prevent, 137,32;
141,9.29; 142,30; 144,8.10.11.31; 139,14.16; 157,3; 167,4.9; to
149,12 leukon whiteness, 127,6; white
kônos, cone, 133,5 thing, 128,2.13
kouphotês, lightness, 159,13 leukotês, whiteness, 167,10
krinein, to judge, 126,12.31; 127,6; lexis, text, 129,35; 148,4; 155,8;
135,1.2; 152,21; to , judgement, 159,17; 162,23; 163,21; lemma,
157,21 147,37
krisis, judgement, 123,36; 124,5; lignuôdês, dirty, 148,35
126,2; 144,21; 152,1.4.15.21.26; logikos, rational, 124,21; 148,10; to
167,10; discrimination, 157,13 , rational entity, 125,5
kritikos, of judgement, 117,7; 124,6; logos, relation, 158,30; argument,
144,18; 152,23; 161,9.12; 163,31; 117,18; 132,28; 159,18; 170,22;
165,3; 166,24; 169,31; has account, 131,15; 138,16; 145,37;
judgement, 152,2; recognises, 165,27; 166,37; related, 167,20;
163,1.3; to , activity of name, 148,11; concept, 119,9;
judgement, 151,16; judgement, 121,1; 123,19.20.21.34; 124,35;
151,19 126,7.11.15; 128,28; 138,13; 165,4;
kritikôs, in judgement, 124,23; with 166,16.24; function, 163,29;
judgement, 166,5; judges, 166,17 164,11; discussion, 118,20.22.28;
krokos, saffron, 153,34.36 126,22; 158,9.23; 159,22; 167,14;
krouein, to strike, 146,6.12 reason, 127,13; 128,9; 149,8;
kuklô, circular, 134,14 story, 135,24; role, 158,35; 162,23;
kuklos, circle, 161,33 logos, 167,29.31.33; 168,10 logôi,
kuôn, dog, 152,8 rationally, 128,35; verbally, 129,1;
kurios, controls, 140,17.18.21.22; conceptually, 143,20; in account,
143,8.9; responsible for, 145,35; 130,11
146,2.5; principally, 149,17 luein, to solve, 117,27; 118,29; 160,26;
kuris, in a proper sense, 154,2; to break up, 168,15; to destroy,
properly, 167,31; ou , 168,10
improperly, 125,14 lupê, dislike, 151,17.19
lupeisthai, to feel distress, 152,19
lambanein, to grasp, 128,35; 131,2; lupêros, unpleasant, 151,12;
to take, 151,8.11; 162,19 152,9.11.17.18; to lupêron,
lampein, to shine, 135,18; to be unpleasantness, 152,13
luminous, 135,22 lura, lyre, 148,13
lampros, shining, 129,7; bright, lusis, solution, 160,1.2.5.6; 169,10
156,11; 160,20; luminous,
129,18.27.29.38; 130,9.10; makhesthai, to fight, 157,20
135,12.22.27; 136,35; 137,12.21 manos, diluted, 134,25
lamprotês, phosphorescence, 129,9; manthanein, to learn, 131,16
luminousness, 130,8.9; 135,29.32; mastix, whip, 120,31; 140,19; 141,6
luminosity, 137,30 mathêsis, learning, 121,16.30;
leios, smooth, 139,28; 140,4.6; 123,17.19.20.22.33
141,12.14; 142,27; 143,10.11; megethos, magnitude, 118,26; 163,6;
146,6.12.13.15; 147,12 167,27.28; size, 126,28.39;
leiotês, smoothness, 142,28; 160,18; 127,6.24; 128,23; great, 160,9;
smooth, 160,9 greatness, 160,14
leipesthai, to remain, 137,2 melas, black, 133,14; 157,31
leptotês, delicacy, 153,17 meli, honey, 127,28; 153,34.35;
leukainesthai, to become white, 154,16; 155,31
125,22; to whiten, 167,3 melissa, bee, 154,16
leukos, white, 126,11.12; 133,14; melizomenê (phônê), song, 148,15
melos, melody, 148,16 metastasis, transition, 120,24;
menein, to remain, 123,6; 125,24; repositioning, 134,37
130,18; 131,19; metaxu (to), medium, 161,10; 163,8;
141,13.23.27.36.39; 142,6; intermediate, 169,18; 170,31
143,12.17; 146,7; 147,14; 148,34; metekhein, to share, 134,28; 151,21;
to be entrapped, 140,10 161,27; 165,8.9; to have a share,
mêninx, tympanum, 140,14; 144,31 151,30
merikos, particular, 122,1; 124,19; en methais, drunk, 122,11
151,7.10; 168,11 methêmerinon (phôs), daylight,
meristos, divided, 121,21; 125,37; 133,33
142,15; divisible, 124,9.10 methexis, participation, 155,22
meristôs, in a divided manner, 142,15 methistasthai, to change place,
merizesthai, to be divided, 121,23; to 132,16
be fragmented, 160,19 methuein, to be drunk, 123,2
meros, part, 117,1; 142,24; to kata , kata metra (tês pathês),
particular thing, 126,12; ek , proportionally to affection, 142,11
partial, 151,30 metron, standard, 121,28; degree,
meson (to), medium, 163,9; mean, 124,14
165,14.16 mignunai, to mix, 155,32.35; to ,
mesotês, medium, 158,32; mean mixture, 155,21
(state), 165,11.13; 168,4.6.8.27 mikrotês, small, 180,9
metabainein, to be transferred, miktos, mixed, 157,34.35;
146,14 162,13.27.30
metaballein, to change, 120,21; mimeisthai, to imitate, 143,2.6;
122,13.14.18.23.32; 123,3.25; 146,15.16
132,17; 133,20; to become mixis, mixture, 151,26; 155,22
different, 157,14; to vary, 121,35; mnêmê, memory, 123,20; mention,
to , change, 120,18 138,30
metabasis, change, 123,5 mokhlos, lever, 136,14.25; 138,24
metabibazein, to transfer, 142,16; to molis, scarcely, 134,35; 135,4
hand on, 142,20; to convey, 143,34 môlôps, weal, 120,31
metabolê, change, 120,19; 121,9; morion, part, 126,32; 134,10;
122,18.35; 123,1.7.8.17.23.28.32; 142,9.13; 149,16.21.24.26.33;
131,2.3; 132,12; transformation, 158,26; 164,28
151,26; turning, 122,6 mousikos, musician, 148,14; musical,
metadidonai, to provide a share, 148,15
170,16
metadosis, transfer, 169,33 nephos, cloud, 135,20
metadotikos, imparting, 136,21; neuron, sinew, 158,21
transmits, 169,16 neusis, inclination, 167,22
metagein, to transfer, 117,15 nikan, to exceed, 140,28; to overcome,
metalambanesthai, to share in, 140,31.34
136,20; 157,15 noein, to understand, 140,25; 141,3;
metalankhanein, to partake, 128,5; 142,32; 162,23; 168,27.29; to
to share in, 169,17; to receive, think, 124,27
169,13 noêsis, intellection, 131,17.37
metalêpsis, participation, 169,32 noêtikos, intellective, 124,28
metapherein, to transfer, 126,32; noêtos, intelligible, 124,20.23.25.30
153,27; 154,1 nosêma, illness, 157,17
metaphora, transference, 126,33; en nosois, diseased, 122,11
kata , metaphorically, 146,32 nous, intellect, 124,23.26.28; 166,2
nux, night, 137,3; 138,1
oikeios, own, 118,2; 125,1.33; 129,23; 169,4.39; 170,2.7.10; odour,
132,23; 133,7.34; 134,2; 135,31; 154,19.29
137,36; 138,12; 145,18; 155,4; osmôdês, smelling, 154,6
166,5.23; 168,5; 169,35; 170,34; osphrainesthai, to smell, 139,8;
171,9; appropriate, 126,13.15; 151,20.39.40; 154,11.13.22; 169,5;
proper, 154,35; 156,3.5; 161,15; to have sense of smell, 170,1
163,30; 166,39; specific, 128,20; osphrantikos, of smell, 150,35;
akin, 128,32; suited, 168,20 151,3; 152,24; 154,21; to , organ
oikeiôs, in an appropriate way, of smell, 152,16; sense of smell,
124,35; 126,11 154,18.33
oikeiotês, community, 129,34; osphrantos, odorous, 150,32;
kinship, 131,21; 166,21; affinity, 151,1.12.22.24.27.28.31.34.35.37;
153,12.14 152,2.6.9.12; 169,37.39; 171,6.7;
okhleisthai, to be disturbed, 145,4 to , what smells, 169,21; odour,
oikodomein, to build, 123,12 154,15; thing smelt, 153,10; of
oikodomos, builder, 123,12 smell, 153,30; object of smell,
oikos, house, 130,32 154,2.7.20.30.33
omma, eye, 154,26 osphrêsis, smell, 126,31;
onkos, mass, 147,16.31; 160,10 150,13.18.22.29; 151,13.18.22.29;
onoma, word, 146,33; name, 151,6.11; 153,10.11.14.15; 164,4; 169,39;
153,27; 154,2; 159,17; 160,31.34 sense of smell, 154,4; 170,1;
ônomasthai, to have a name, 130,2; 171,8; smelling, 154,19; 159,7
159,9 osteon, bone, 158,33
ophthalmos, eye, 143,24; 159,33 ôthein, to push, 145,7; 147,16.18.33;
opsis, sight, 126,28; 127,2.6.28; to press, 148,5
128,23.36.39; 131,15; 133,33; ouranios, celestial, 133,3.5.28
135,1.2; 136,12.17.23.26.27.36; ouranos, heaven, 134,18
137,9.29; 139,11; 151,2; 155,27.29; ous, ear, 143,5; 144,12.23.27;
156,1.10.21.23; 159,6; 145,5.8.12.16.19.28; 159,33
160,15.17.18; 164,4 ousia, essence, 116,23; 119,31.33.38;
optikos, of sight, 152,30; sight, 153,4; 120,2.4; 121,2.15.22; 126,25;
sense of sight, 167,10 128,18.21.22.33.34; 131,18;
orexis, desire, 119,11 146,22; 167,32; being, 166,6; is
organon, sense-organ, 117,9; 125,16; something, 165,31; substance,
organ, 117,29; 118,6; 122,11; 124,17.20; 125,17;
125,28.29; 126,7; 140,14; 127,14.22.27.32; 128,1.2.3.5.33;
143,23.24.31; 144,2.30; 145,26.32; 131,10; 132,5.9.10; 157,14; 165,13;
148,26; 149,9.31.32.33; 152,16; kat’ , substantial, 120,19
158,7.8.15; 161,2; 162,34; ousiôdês, substantial, 122,12.13;
166,10.11.14.15.18; 125,16.17; gives essence, 169,3;
167,8.19.23.28.30; 168,5.11.21; essential, 128,34; 130,11; in
instrument, 118,4; 148,15; 167,21; substance, 126,14; inherent in
organism, 153,20 substance, 165,4
orthos, straight, 127,8 ousiôdôs, essentially, 121,1;
en têi ôsei, is pressed, 145,12; substantially, 128,32; 131,9
pressure, 145,28 ousiousthai, to have being, 124,21;
osmasthai, to have (sense of) smell, its being consists of, 167,31;
151,20.39.40; 154,9.14.28; to 168,12.13
smell, 170,29.32 oxus, high, 146,25.27.29.30.34;
osmê, smell, 138,16.19; 139,1.2.5; 147,1.3.10.12.13.15.17.20.21.22.26.
150,32.33; 151,31.33.34.35; 152,5; 30.35.38; 148,1.2.4.7; sharp,
153,9.26.27.35.36; 154,3; 159,7; 147,32; 151,5; 154,3
oxutês, being high, 147,24.28 120,5.7.10.14.16.18.23.25;
ozein, to be odorous, 170,30 121,3.5.6.8; 122,12.16.23.24.25;
123,24.26; 125,13.14.32;
pakhumerês, dense, 140,16 128,12.13.26.27; 138,4.14;
pakhumerôs, roughly, 127,7 142,6.15.17; 143,33; 144,17.20;
pakhunein, to condense, 145,4 145,30; 152,22; 153,4.26; 158,7;
pakhunomenos, thick, 127,1 161,12; 162,21.28; 163,30.34;
pakhutês, thickness, 149,13 164,32.33.34; 165,6.9.11;
paraballein, to place, 143,5 166,4.13.17.19.24.26.34.36.38.39;
paradeigma, illustration, 121,11; 167,4.5; 168,24.30; 169,4.6.9;
example, 140,6; 161,32 170,2.3.5.8.28.29.30; 171,4; to be
paradidonai, to set out, 121,11 acted on, 119,22.24.27;
paraginesthai, to come to, 130,32; to 120,27.29.30.33; 124,3; to take on,
come to be, 132,2 155,19; to undergo, 120,32; (to)
parakeimenon, adjacent, 142,24 paskhon, passive, 146,2; affection,
paralambanein, to include, 130,12 157,20
parallêlou (ek), pleonastically, pathainomenôs, affective, 151,17
156,30 pathê, affection, 142,11; 144,21;
parapempesthai, to move through, 152,19.22.25.31; 161,9;
116,23 169,31.33.35.37; kata , is
parapodizein, to impede, 127,1; affected, 125,15
134,10.33; 144,21.27.33; 152,21; pathêma, affection, 125,27.34
157,12.19; 161,9; to prevent, 133,6 pathêtikos, affective, 120,15; 122,14;
parapolauein, to partake, 128,7 127,9.16.17.20; 128,37;
paraskeuazesthai, to develop, 130,27.35.38; 131,1; 164,23; 165,8;
121,17; to be framed, 152,20 166,14; subject to affection,
parastatikos, indicative, 147,28 161,6.21; 166,8; capable of
parateinesthai, to extend, 126,1 becoming affected, 157,13;
parathesis, juxtaposition, 149,20 passive, 161,4.7
paratrepesthai, to change character, pathêtikôs, as being affected, 120,33;
153,32 121,1; 125,22; affectively, 136,8
paratropê, change of character, pathêtos, passive, 155,22; 164,22;
153,33 165,7
pareinai, to be present, 116,33; pathos, affection, 117,14; 119,7.10.16;
118,15.20.21; 119,18.19; 124,33; 122,13; 124,5.7; 125,24.30.33;
125,7; 137,5; 138,2; 141,20.39; 130,27.29.31; 131,8.38; 132,2;
142,5.18; 155,23; 156,6; to be in, 134,4; 138,12; 142,3.4.5.20;
132,14; to appear, 129,12; mê , 144,18.19; 151,40; 152,4;
to be absent, 119,17 163,35.36; 167,10; 168,7.8;
pareisagein, to obtrude, 160,10 169,10.16; 171,4; enginomenon ,
pareisduein, to get into, 144,27 experiencing, 137,29; affect,
parekhesthai, to provide, 135,6 125,1; kata , in an affective
parempiptein, to intervene, manner, 131,21; affectively,
163,15.25 136,10; epi pathei being acted on,
parempodizein, to impede, 168,19 124,34;  empoioun to affect,
paristanai, to confirm, 163,19 130,27
parousia, presence, 130,24; 131,9; peirasthai, to attempt, 135,3.6; to
132,2.12; 133,16; 134,1.3.29; try, 156,4; 158,3
141,40; 142,2; 156,8 peisis, affection, 123,23.25; 166,13.21;
paskhein, to be affected, 168,33; impression, 152,16.18
116,25.27.28.30; pephukos, has natural capacity,
117,16.20.22.26.30; 121,16; naturally related, 128,18;
is of a nature, 154,12.14; phôs, light, 127,10;
156,15.23; has the nature, 156,28; 129,6.9.11.12.13.14.15.17.19.
(+ dat.), inherent, 132,31 23.25.26.27.29.30.33.34;
peras, limit, 129,31; 135,36; 136,33 130,3.15.17.25. 26.34;
periekhein, to surround, 131,7; to 131,5.12.13.14.15.16.17.19.34.36.37;
comprehend, 144,29; to contain, 132,4.11.20.23.24.26.30.31.36;
149,31; 149,15; 150,18; to envelop, 133,4.6.7.8.11.13.16.22.24.25.31.
130,26 32.33; 134,6.13.16.19.21.22.27.31.
perigraphein, to circumscribe, 145,28 35; 135,4.8.10.11.12.14.16.19.20.
perikardios, around the heart, 22.23.26.27.28.29.31.32.33.34.35;
148,33; 150,31 136,6.9.11; 137,7.9.17.23.26.28.
perilambanein, to encompass, 126,2; 29.31.33.34.35.37; 139,3;
to comprehend, 129,36; to 142,36.37.38; 143,1.3.4; 146,24.29;
comprise, 157,2 150,34; 151,1.36; 159,6; 160,16.19;
perilêptikos, encompasses, 126,11; 169,18; 170,9
includes, 167,15 phôtistikos, illuminates, 129,38;
peripephukenai, to be naturally 134,2; source of light, 133,4.28.29
joined around, 161,32 phôtizein, to illuminate, 129,12.24;
peripherês, curved, 127,8 130,22.24.36; 131,5.6.34;
periphora, circular motion, 140,30.31 132,10.21; 133,15; 134,4.8.10.28;
periphragma, barrier, 145,4 135,14; 136,7,8.14.34;
periphrattein, to enclose, 137,24.25.32; 160,20.21.23; to be
144,15.24.25 source of illumination, 141,40; to
peritasis, stretched around, 163,11 be source of light, 137,32; 171,2
periteinein, to stretch around, 163,9 phôtoeidês, form of light, 136,10; to
perittôma, superfluity, 149,1 , luminousness, 128,38
pezon, animal with feet, 149,21.23 phronein, to think, 123,10.11
phainesthai, to appear, 130,1 passim phronêsis, intelligence, 153,21.24
phantasia, imagination, 119,14; phronimos, intelligent, 153,19.21.23
148,25.26; 153,22; 166,2 phthartikos, destructive, 125,15;
pharunx, pharynx, 143,10 156,27.32.39; 157,3; destroys,
pheresthai, to travel, 141,12.15.17; 156,12
155,25; to move, 118,34; to be phthartos, perishes, 159,11;
carried, 142,24 perishable, 162,11; 164,22
philosophia, philosophy, 124,18; phtheirein, to destroy, 148,35;
prôtê , first philosophy, 124,15 154,17; 164,33; 167,8.9.10; to
philosophos, philosopher, 149,28; damage, 168,2.12
160,34; 169,37 phthora, destruction, 122,17; 123,23;
phlegma, phlegm, 150,12 decay, 132,8
phobeisthai, to be frightened, phulattein, to preserve, 120,22;
152,35.36; 153,5 142,28
phoberos, frightening, 152,33.34; phusikos, natural, 167,33
153,3.5.7 phusis, nature, 121,17; 131,25.29;
phônê, voice, 148,9.10.12.16.23.24; 132,23.27.31; 134,22; 135,8.9;
149,4.6.15; 150,2.6.7.15.27; 145,9; 147,23; 148,31; 151,7.17.22;
156,18.22; 160,12 159,5; 160,25.29.32; 164,20;
phônein, to have voice, 148,13.17; to phusei, naturally, 131,31; 143,3.4;
speak, 159,21.26 para , unnatural, 120,20; not in
phônêtikos, voiced, 148,21 natural state, 144,33; kata ,
phora, local motion, 139,32; 146,10; natural, 120,20.23; 123,25;
motion, 140,2.10.26; travel, 128,32; 134,13; naturally, 126,38;
141,20; transport, 142,33 152,24; 157,18; by nature, 143,23
phutikos, vegetative, 116,20; 158,35 127,16.17; 130,28.35.38; 155,1.8;
phuton, plant, 168,23 157,15; 159,12; 164,23; 165,8;
pikros, sharp, 151,9.25; 157,32 168,31; 169,3; kata ,
pistis, to establish, 159,1 qualitatively, 116,25; 123,19;
plagia (eis ta), sideways, 143,3 qualitative, 117,11
Platonikôs, in a Platonic fashion, poioun (to), productive, 120,33;
149,5 agent, 122,24; 166,20; 168,33;
platos, surface, 146,15 active, 146,8
plêgê, blow, 139,26.32; 140,3.9.23.28; poros, pore, 134,12; channel, 140,17
141,1.6.19,22.23.24.26.32.34.36.37; poson (kata), quantitative, 120,19
142,4.17.19; 144,10; potos, drinkable, 156,33.36; 157,4
146,9.10.11.13.18; 149,25; 150,3; pragma, thing, 121,22; 127,27;
stroke, 168,20 146,23.35; 155,13; 160,29.32.33;
plêktikos, striking, 152,16 fact, 159,17; bearer, 153,29.34
plêktikôterôs, more strikingly, 126,26 praktikos, practical, 125,7
pleonektein, to score over, 152,5 proagein, to produce, 125,17; 131,17;
plêroun, to fill, 140,29 to bring forth, 132,15
plêthos, plurality, 160,26; 162,2 proballein, to project, 119,17; 124,35;
plêttein, to hit, 139,25; to strike, 126,6; 166,6.16.24
139,33.34; 140,10.12.25.27; problêma, problem, 158,36
141,4.11.17.18.22.31.34.35.37. problêtikos, projective, 168,6
38.40; 142,3.12.14.16.25; probolê, projection, 119,9; 121,33;
143,11.12.13.33.34; 144,9.16.25; 122,1; 123,19.36; 128,28; 138,14;
145,3.15; 146,7.8.9; 147,17; 166,8
149,14; 150,1.11.15.16; 160,15 prodiorizesthai, to determine first,
plôtêr, master (of boat), 168,14 116,26
pneuma, air, 145,3.9.12.14.17; 150,8; proêgeisthai, to come first, 132,7; to
170,14; breath, 145,11; 154,13; precede, 125,27; 132,12; 142,5
167,15 proêgoumenos, central, 159,22
pneumôn, lung, 149,16.18.19.24; proêgoumenôs, primarily, 117,9;
150,28.31 119,4; 131,35; 135,25.32; 143,9;
poiein, to affect, 116,27; 170,10.20; 146,8; 154,1; 156,2; 166,38;
171,7; to act, 116,32.33; especially, 125,29; pre-eminently,
117,19.20.22.26; 199,13; 120,30; 126,26; 127,4; 128,6; 142,7; 169,1
121,5; 125,23; 151,19; 170,1; to progeuesthai, to taste previously,
reveal, 163,35; to cause, 143,2.10; 157,24.28
to bring about, 118,6; to make, proienai, to proceed, 131,10; 132,35;
117,5; 142,26; 158,8; to produce, 143,4; 148,29; to come from,
120,32; 135,19 148,29
poiêsis, causation, 138,22; action, proienai, to send forth, 131,20
163,37; activity, 157,19; agency, prokeimenon, proposed, 116,24;
169,11.24; interaction, 159,14; propose, 117,1
affecting, 169,31 prokeisthai, to be proposal, 138,7
poiêtikos, what acts, 116,34; causing, prolambanesthai, to discuss in
143,9; efficient (cause), 120,27.35; advance, 116,24; to be first,
125,7.33; 133,4; 146,30; 147,10; to preconceive, 126,6; to
productive, 120,27.35; 125,7; anticipate, 120,35; to gather first,
agent, 124,1.4.6; brings, 120,20; 131,16
creator, 140,18 prolêpsis, prior perception, 147,23;
poiêtikôs, creatively, 138,15; 166,4 preconception, 126,14; proodos,
poion (kata), qualitative, 120,19 progression, 141,25
poiotês, quality, 120,16; 122,14.35;
propaskhein, to be previously prouparkhein, to be present
affected, 171,3 previously, 157,28
propathein, to be affected first, pseudes (to), falsehood, 148,1
166,12; to , previous affection, pseudodoxia, false opinion, 122,6
171,5 pseudos, falsehood, 122,6; 148,1
pros ho (to), object, 118,33 psophein, to have a sound, 139,18; to
pros ti, relationally, 126,29 sound, 141,39; 143,20.27; 167,3;
prosagoreuein, to call, 123,9.26; 170,14; to make sound, 142,36;
145,25; 152,3 145,19.34; 148,28; 150,4
prosballein, to attend, 131,35 psophêtikos, causes sound,
prosbolê, impact, 156,12 143,14.16; sounds, 169,20;
prosdiorizein, to point out also, capacity to make a sound, 146,23;
138,11 audible, 163,26; makes sound,
prosekhês, immediate, 136,32; 146,26
149,17; 157,27; closest, 142,9; psophos, sound, 138,16.19.29.31;
proximate, 145,26 139,12.17.18.20.22.23;
prosekhôs, immediately, 116,20; 140,1.17.18.20; 141,32; 142,3;
136,31; 137,3.7; 144,16.19.24; 143,11; 144,6; 145,20.21.22;
145,3.6; 149,18; immediate, 161,35 146,21.23.24.25.26.28.30;
prosênôs, mild, 156,37 148,9.10.19.20; 150,6.34; 151,2.36;
prosienai, to approach, 139,33 158,7; 160,8.27; 166,18.36; 167,3;
proskeisthai, to be included, 160,12 169,27; 170,6.10.14
proskrouein, to strike on, 145,18; to psukhê, soul, 116,20.25; 118,33;
bang, 150,25 121,31.32; 123,11.21.30;
prospelasis, conveyance, 154,24 124,10.11.12.14.18.24.28.29.34;
prospelastikos, adhesive character, 125,14; 126,7.12.13.14; 128,28;
163,16 132,5; 145,31;
prospelazein, to come into contact, 149,26.27.28.29.30.33; 150,24;
142,21; to approach, 154,21; to 153,21; 163,33; 167,19.21.29
bring close, 154,22.23; to be psukhein, to chill, 144,26; to cool,
adjacent, 162,9; to associate, 169,7
161,9; to be present to, 161,23 psukhikos, of the soul, 119,12;
prospephukenai, to be naturally 167,32; by the soul, 123,36;
attached to, 162,15.16.18 psychic, 123,3; 168,24
prosphuês, naturally attached, psukhos, cold, 165,20
163,8.32.33; 164,11 psukhron, cold, 122,19.20; 133,13;
prospiptein, to fall under perception, 165,16.17
127,9; to fall on, 139,27; 140,7; psukhrotês, cold, 127,18; 159,14
141,2.14; 147,12 pugolampis, glow-worm, 135,20
prosptaiein, to collide, 139,33; to pur, fire, 118,7; 119,27.28; 129,26;
press, 145,9; to hit upon, 145,16; 132,4; 133,26.30.32; 134,1.26.30;
to strike, 146,4; 150,20 136,24; 137,23.30; 138,2
prosptôsis, collision, 139,28; striking, pureios, fiery, 134,6
145,22; falling on, 150,9 purôdês, fiery, 129,19.38; 135,18
prostithenai, to add, 122,22; to speak
of, 122,33; to put, 145,7; to give, rhabdon, rod, 140,19
135,25 rhipizein, to fan, 148,34
prosupakouein, to supply, 137,2; to rhiptein, to throw, 141,20.28
understand, 163,23 rhopê, inclination, 125,28; 159,13
proteinein, to set out, 158,11; 160,30
prothesis, programme, 125,19 saphênizein, to make plain, 122,15;
prôtopathês, first affected, 142,9
to make clear, 161,32; to clarify, 163,5.7.15; 164,17.20.21; 166,14;
162,8; to explain, 130,6 167,7.27; 168,15; 170,10.12
sarx, flesh, 158,15.16.21; 159,20.31; sômatikos, bodily, 122,35;
160,38; 161,25; 163,1.19; 123,1.17.22; 155,24; 162,30;
164,2.3.10.12.18; 169,21 corporeal, 124,9; 127,9; 134,22;
seiesthai, to vibrate, 146,16 168,26
selênaios, moonlike, 129,30 sômatoeidês, corporeal, 125,37;
sêmainein, to mean, 143,21; to 127,10; 128,34; 161,5.7.21; 162,29;
indicate, 145,27; to signify, 168,20.27
148,25; to notice, 166,10 sôron, pile, 140,32; 141,2
sêmantikos, signifies, 130,10; can sôtêria, preservation, 122,21
signify, 148,25; significatory, speudein, to rush, 154,9
150,2; indicates, 146,31; sphaira, ball, 141,10.14.30
signalling, 149,7; meaningful, sphodron (to), strength, 142,12
148,11 sphodrotês, severity, 140,28;
sêmeion, indication, 136,15; 161,20; violence, 168,20
sign, 145,1.11; 150,21; 152,14; sphragis, seal, 126,4; 165,5; device,
device, 169,8.17 166,33
sidêros, iron, 169,8 stasis, state, 165,4; 166,26
skhêma, shape, 126,27.32; 127,7; stenokhôria, small volume, 145,9
130,32; 141,33; 147,32 sterein, to deprive, 122,5
skhêmatizein, to determine the stereos, solid (thing), 129,31;
shape, 141,23.24.27.28.31; to 139,18.27; 140,23.25;
place in shape, 141,35; to shape, 141,4.5.30.37;
142,13 142,2.8.21.22.24.25.27.37;
skia, shadow, 143,2.6 142,8.21.22.24.25.27.37;
sklêrophthalmon, creature with 144,15.24; 145,14.18; 146,13;
hard eyes, 152,27.28.29 150,12; hard, 162,13.27
skopos, aim, 117,1 stereotês, hardness, 149,12
skorpismos, scattering, 140,35; 141,2 sterêsis, privation, 119,35;
skorpizein, to scatter, 140,35 122,18.19.20; 123,23;
skoteinos, dark, 134,35 133,8.18.19.20; 134,23.27; 135,2;
skotizesthai, to darken, 133,15; to be 153,34; 156,4.8.13; 157,7
in darkness, 134,25 stêrizein, to fix, 155,15
skotos, dark, 129,9; 130,1.3.4; 135,1.2; stilbein, to glitter, 160,14
136,1; darkness, 129,11.25; stoikheion, element,
133,1.2.7.9.10.11.12.15.16; 118,7.8.10.16.21; 119,22; 148,27;
134,21.27; 135,8.9.13.18.19.21.31; 151,23; 159,10; 164,21.23.24
136,1; 160,21.22; 170,9 stoma, mouth, 155,32.33
smikrotês, smallness, 160,16 stomion, mouth, 140,30
sôizein, to preserve, 134,9; 142,22.23; strophê, attention, 119,14
to retain, 158,35; (pass.) to sullogizesthai, to reason, 132,1
remain, 157,24 sumbainein, to come about, 117,6;
sôma, body, 116,26; 118,1.13.14; 148,7; to result, 147,34; to be
119,12.14; 123,6.13.14.30; incidental, 129,3.5.10; to arise,
125,18.31; 126,8; 127,1; 129,3.4; 160,25; to happen, 130,22; 150,11
130,32.35; 132,3.4.5; sumbebêkos (to), attribute,
133,3.13.26.30.34; 134,5.24.26; 118,22.24; 128,34; accident,
140,1.15; 142,15.24; 149,32; 155,13; property, 118,25;
153,18; 155,6.7.8; 158,24; incidental, 148,7; accidental,
159,9.10; 160,33; 161,6; 122,14; 147,34; kata ,
162,5.10.11.14.16.22.31; incidentally,
127,22.25.28.31.32.33; 128,1; sunaisthêsis, awareness, 135,7;
kath’ hauta , essential consciousness, 151,6
attribute, 130,12, to kata , sunaition, concomitant cause, 142,31
incidental object, 126,21 sunamphoteron, composite thing,
summetaballesthai, to undergo 166,39; 167,1
changes together with, 132,17 sunanaphainesthai, to appear with,
summetalambanein, to take a 131,3
share, 143,32 sunaphê, link, 124,26; conjunction,
summetria, symmetry, 168,21.28 163,14
summetros, suitable, 126,37; 137,32; sunaptein, to connect, 124,25
with correlation, 127,9; sunartan, to conjoin, 143,23
commensurate, 144,18 sundesmos, connective, 163,7
summetrôs, in correspondence with, suneidopoieisthai, to receive the
166,15 same form, 142,14
summigês, mixed with, 168,8 sunekheia, continuity, 134,9; 136,32;
sumpagês, compact, 133,33 141,25; 142,22; sunekheiâi,
sumpaskhei, sympathetically, 142,13 continuously, 143,14; kata ,
sumpaskhein, to sympathise, 142,8; continuously, 141,25
to share, 146,8; to be affected sunekhês, continuous, 121,31;
together, 163,19 136,19.31; 141,23; 142,7.20; 146,7;
sumpephukenai, is inherent, 122,20 to , continuum, 143,20
sumperainein, to conclude, 116,30; sunektikôs, with understanding,
125,12; 136,1; 158,23 166,5
sumperilambanein, to encompass, sunergein, to aid in, 123,2; to
125,6 co-operate, 136,13.36; to be
sumphônia, concord, 147,9; contributory, 149,9
168,16.18.22 sunergon, contributing factor, 142,26
sumphônos, concordant, 147,11; sunêtheia, common custom, 123,24;
concord, 168,19 idiom, 156,28
sumphuês, is naturally, 129,16; sungeneia, kinship, 129,27.34;
through nature, 130,14; 135,35; affinity, 153,30
becomes/is fused with, 161,26.29; sungenês, akin, 131,14; to , related
naturally fused, 133,25; substance, 153,15
143,22.23.28.30.35; sungenôs (ekhein), akin, 129,26
144,3.15.23.25.29.32; 145,3.26; sungramma, work, 117,21
161,35; naturally conjoined, sunharmozesthai, to adjust itself,
158,31.32.34; 159,1; 161,9 156,9.10
sumphuôs, naturally conjoined, sunhuparkhein, to coexist, 128,7.8
132,16 sunhuparkhon (to),
sumphurein, to sully, 131,1; to accompaniment, 170,25
contaminate, 151,40 sunhuphistasthai, to come into
sumpiptein, to collapse, 149,12; to existence together, 123,31
exhibit, 160,9 sunienai, to understand, 16,17
sumplekein, to bind, 117,14; to sunistasthai, to form, 133,34; to
involve, 123,31; 159,15 collect, 149,1; to be composed of,
sunagein, to join, 122,29; to conclude, 162,4; to be composite, 162,30
170,1; to encompass, 167,17; to sunkhusis, confusion, 152,4
compress, 142,28; (pass.) to be a sunkirnasthai, to be mixed up,
conclusion, 162,18 157,34
sunairesis, conjoining, 125,26 sunôthein, to push with, 170,17
sunaisthanesthai, to be aware of, suntattein, to order, 120,22
135,3 suntaxis, ordering, 120,23
suntelein, to contribute, 129,14; 149,5 thêrion, wild beast, 152,7
sunthetos, composite (thing), 132,7; thermainein, to warm, 132,11; 136,23
145,31; 151,25; 169,1.2.3 thermainesthai, to become hot,
suntrekhein, to contribute, 122,22; to 125,22; 167,8; to grow hot,
go together, 153,35 167,6.7; to be heated, 167,3;
sustatikos, constitutive, 144,8; 168,8 169,2.7.14; 170,18.26
sustellein, to contract, 149,12 thermon, warmth, 122,19; 149,21;
sustoikhos, corresponding, 158,10; hot, 165,10.16.17.20; 167,8; heat,
conjoined, 161,6 133,13; warm (region), 148,33;
sullabê, syllable, 148,16 149,19.24; thermos, warm, 148,26
thermotês, heat, 120,31; 159,14;
takhos (to), speed, 141,22; 165,21; 169,1; 170,18; warmth,
147,24.25.26.27.31 127,18; 155,32
takhus, swift, 147,4; fast, 147,20.31; thesis, is placed, 129,24; position,
148,1.3.6.7 159,12
takhutês, speed, 140,2.28.31; 141,1; thinganein, to be on contact,
142,12; 147,20.21 161,21.25
tattein, to assign, 126,25 thixis, contact, 161,26
teinein, to have a tendency, 170,1 thlipsis, pressure, 147,18
tekhnê, skill, 125,7 threptikôs, of nourishment, 117,18
tekmairesthai, to be guide, 119,34 thripsis, friction, 120,31
teleiopoiein, to fill perfectly, 129,22 thrupsis, dispersal, 140,29; 141,26;
teleios, perfect, 118,30; 119,38; disruption, 146,10
120,13; 121,15.28; 122,2; 126,3; thruptein, to disperse, 141,9; 146,6;
131,32; 139,11; 148,25.29; 149,25; to thruptesthai, disruption,
151,24; 165,3 144,8.10.11
teleiôs, perfectly, 119,10; perfect, timios, valuable, 138,36
131,27; to  perfection, 131,3 topikos, of place, 123,13; in a place,
teleiôsis, is accomplished, 169,34 134,3; spatial, 134,26
teleiotês, perfection, 119,38.39; topôi (en), in a local sense, 134,24
121,14.27; 123,35; 129,16; 130,37; trakhutês, rough, 160,10; roughness,
131,4.9.16.21.24.32; 132,36; 160,18
134,23.28.29; 151,24; perfect trepein, to transform, 130,27; to
state, 128,29 modify, 169,11
teleiôtikos, perfective, 122,23; tropê, transformation,
perfecting, 132,35; is perfection 120,17.18.20.21.26; 121,8; 130,28;
of, 133,27; 134,3 131,8; modification, 169,32
teleioun, complete, 129,8.20 trophê, nourishment, 149,8
telos, end, 126,2; 138,9; purpose, tropos, mode, 116,22; way, 120,11;
149,18; en telei, perfected, 121,27 122,9.15.26.29.31; 136,1; 145,16;
têrein, to preserve, 140,8 146,3; 162,33; 170,28
thaumastos, surprising, 123,11 tunkhanein, to share, 153,24
theasthai, to see, 137,34 tupos, mould, 165,5; 166,34; outline,
theôrein, to contemplate, 121,25.28; 165,22
123,34; to see, 131,22; to exercise tupoun, to mould, 166,34
(knowledge), 122,28; to study, tupsis, beating, 140,34
158,10; to make study, 165,26; to tuptein, to beat, 140,32; to strike,
, contemplation, 125,11 145,34.35.37; 146,2.3.4.14.17;
theôrêtikos, theoretical, 125,5 148,22; 150,14.17.25
theôria, study, 116,20.24; 117,5;
126,20; contemplation, 121,21; xanthos, yellow, 139,15
122,34; 123,1; 166,2
xêros, dry, 151,27; 153,13; 166,12.23; 167,28.34;
154,29.30.32 168,3.11.21.26.29
xêrotês, dryness, 157,17.20; 159,14 zôon, living being, 121,34; 123,31;
132,9; being, 153,24; living thing,
zên, to be alive, 125,32; 126,17; to 124,10; 125,13; 149,9; 158,16;
live, 143,24; 145,6; 162,10.16; 162,31; animal, 144,1.2;
(participle) life, 166,14 148,10.17.35; 151,21.30.38;
zêtein, to be question, 118,5; to 152,2.35; 153,19; 159,27
search, 131,21; to inquire, 146,2; zôoun, to give life, 126,7
158,27; 159,4.8; 160,35; to zôtikos, vital, 117,28; 119,6; 128,35;
investigate, 160,26 144,2; 145,11.30; 149,27.31;
zêtêsis, inquiry, 168,25 161,16; 166,13; 167,14.19.28.33;
zôê, life, 117,7; 118,12; 119,4; 123,30; living, 143,29; characteristic of
128,28.36; 130,32; 131,9; life, 117,31; proper to life, 126,4;
132,5.6.8.9; 138,12; 143,24.29; vitally, 143,30; 161,11.27; 162,28
144,2; 145,32; 148,25.29; 149,25; zôtikôs, in a vital manner, 128,26;
158,33.35; 161,17.28; 162,10.30; vitally, 128,31; 167,35
Index of Names and Subjects
affection formal unity, 126,10

affective qualities, 120,15-16; common defining, 159,11
122,14-15; 127,16-17; 130,28-38;
164,23; 165,8 hearing, 139,10ff.
in hearing, 141,11-142,34
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 118,4; Iamblichus, 133,34
138,5; 141,16.33; 149,29.31; 160,11 imagination
appearance, 165,3; 166,19-31; 168,5-6 signifying, 148,25-7
Aristotle, 120,26.35; 127,3; 129,32; articulated, 153,20-4
132,27; 138,5; 141,11; 147,8.14; aroused from itself, 166,2
151,26; 157,15; 161,24 inclination
awareness of the soul toward body, 167,21-2
consciousness, 135,7; 151,6 intellect
knows the terms (horoi) and forms,
cause 124,23-4
formal, 130,15; 167,26-7 aroused from itself, 166,2
material, 167,27 intellection
productive, 120,35; 125,23; 133,4; remains in the substance which
140,18 produces it, 131,17-18
cognition intuition/apprehension, 131,37;
its corporeal type, 127,10 134,35-135,7; 156,3.14
Democritus, 137,1 judgement, 123,36; 124,5; 126,2-16;

determination of knowledge, 165,5-6 151,40-152,8; 152,15;
development 165,31-166,34
of secondary causes in the soul,
124,20-1 knowledge
as opinion, 128,9
elements
Empedocles’ theory, 118,7-10.15-21 life
lack of sensitive activity, 118,19-21 auditive, 143,16-25.29-30; 144,2-4;
purer elements, 148,27 145,32
Plato’s theory, 151,21-3 of sight, 143,24-5
principles, 159,10; 164,18-25 sensitive, 138,11-15; 161,26-8;
Empedocles, 118,9 167,25-8
light, 131,13 ff.
form
intellective which is the primary object of sense-perception
cause, 127,19-23 common, 126,24-127,14; 128,15ff.
sensitive, 119,37 particular, 126,24-127,14; 128,15ff.
formal activity, 128,27 incidental objects, 127,24-128,15
Index of Names and Subjects 261
Plato, 119,13; 120,34; 123,9; 129,31; form, 156,5-9
135,35; 146,22; 151,22 sight, 129,1ff.
Plutarch of Athens, 118,9; 151,13; smelling, 150,35 ff.
160,12 standing still at the form, 118,30;
Proclus, 134,7 125,1-2.21-7; 126,2-9; 128,23-9;
projection of concepts, 118,29-119,29; 138,11-15; 154,30-5; 164,29-34;
121,32-3; 122,1; 123,18-19.30-7; 166,30-4; 171,2-10
124,32-125,2; 126,5-16; 138,13-14; substance/essence
165,31-167,11 unfolded, 167,32
purpose unmoved and indivisible, 124,17-20
significatory, 150,2 can be known only by reason (logos),
127,12-14.26-7
reversion, 119,1. 21 underlying, 127,31-2
of the sense, 128,17-18
sense-organ active, 128,32-3
its affection, 117,13-15; 119,7-22 can be known from activities,
tempering, 165,12-14 146,22-3
the first sense organ which is the
vital pneuma, 167,13-17 taste, 154,37ff.
of sight, 136,20-137,13; 152,29-31 term, 121,32; 124,23-4
of smell, 152,11-26 Themistius, 151,14
of touch, 159,19-36 Theophrastus, 136,29
sense-perception touch, 158,10ff.
projection of concepts, see above transparent, 132,35ff.
summary of the theory on it,
169,4-170,8 vital principles (logoi), 167,33
sensitive substance, 125,17; 165,13;
177,10-16 wax-model of sense-perception, 126,4;
life, 117,7-11; 168,3-15 166,32; 169,7-19

Priscian - On Theophrastus - On Sense-Perception With Simplicius On Aristotle On The Soul 2.5-12

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Priscian - On Theophrastus - On Sense-Perception With Simplicius On Aristotle On The Soul 2.5-12

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Translated by Pamela Huby

Translated by Carlos Steel

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway

Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in 1997 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

© 2013 Richard Sorabji, Pamela Huby, Carlos Steel, Peter Lautner

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-2752-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The present translations have been made possible by generous

Typeset by Ray Davies

Preface Richard Sorabji vii

Priscian: On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception

‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-12

The translation of ‘Simplicius’ on On the Soul by Carlos Steel is based on

Priscian of Lydia and his works

Han Baltussen, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception, Quaestiones infinitae vol.

1,19 katatetagmenon for katatetamenon.

On sense in general: what is the ‘becoming

The particular senses

Is there always a medium between the

Light and the transparent

The nature of light, sight, and colour

Smell and hearing

The number of the senses: Aristotle’s view

How is ratio the cause of sense-perception?

The common sensibles

How we perceive that we perceive

23,1 Priscian of Lydia the Philosopher

Intellect and the intelligibles

Return to Theophrastus, with Priscian’s comments

Forms with and without matter

Relations between the thinker and the thought

Why are we not always thinking?

be able: dunasthai affected: en pathei

adiairetos, indivisible, undivided, 14,19; 15,26.31; 16,16; 17,12;

References in bold type are to note numbers.

ALCINOUS/ALBINUS 186; 2.9 421b32-422a3, 190; 2.10

The author of the Commentary On the Soul

Whoever studies the commentary ‘On Aristotle On the Soul’ attributed to

I. The Commentary is not a work of Simplicius

e9j tÕ per< tÁj yucÁj tÕ Ólon FilÒponon, {j ka< kre8ttwn, À

This list in fact enumerates the three commentaries on Aristotle’s On

B. Arguments against the traditional attribution

(b) The commentary on the De Anima

2. Language and style

(a) The doctrine of the soul

(b) Logical issues

(c) Some other examples

4. The references to previous works

II. The Commentary is the work of Priscian of Lydia

The transparent can also of itself stimulate sight.

But if the transparent stimulated sight of itself,

P 12,17-30 Just as the thing which illuminates perfects the transparent

S 132,13 <Light> is  activity  present in it [the transparent] in a

It is superfluous to quote more Greek texts. One may still compare P

About the ‘sensibilia communia’ we find similar arguments in P 4,9-5,4

(1) The author of the in DA plagiarizes Priscian. Against this hypothesis,

It is evident, then, that the author of the in DA considers the ‘Epitome