FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018 ]

EDEN ETINO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

We resolve this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the August 29, 2012 Decision[1] and the March 11, 2013 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00896. The CA affirmed with modification the January 14, 2008
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Iloilo City, which found petitioner
Eden Etino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide, in that the CA
ordered petitioner to pay the victim P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as temperate
damages.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information[4] dated June 19,
2003 which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of November 2001, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with an unlicensed firearm of unknown caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
JESSIEREL LEYBLE with said unlicensed firearm he was then provided at the time, hitting and
inflicting upon the victim gunshot wounds on the different parts of ills body, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to the said Jessierel Leyble which
prevented his death.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.[5] Trial thereafter ensued.

The Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution's evidence consists mainly of the testimonies of complainant Jessierel Leyble
(Leyble), Isidro Maldecir (Maldecir), and Nida Villarete Sonza (Sonza), the Administrative and
Medical Officer of the West Visayas State University Medical Center (WVSUMC).

During the trial, Leyble testified that, "at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of November 5,
2001, while he and his companions[,] Isidro Maldecir and Richard Magno[,] were walking on
their way home to Bgy. [sic] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he was shot with a 12 gauge shotgun by the
[petitioner,] Eden Etino[,] hitting the back portion of his right shoulder and other parts of his
body."[6]

Leyble's testimony was corroborated by Maldecir who categorically stated that Leyble was shot
by petitioner from behind, and was thereafter brought to the Don Benito Lopez Memorial
Hospital (now known as the WVSUMC) for treatment.[7]

To prove the injuries suffered by Leyble, the prosecution presented Sonza "in her capacity as
[the officer] in-charge of the security of all the medical records of the patients [in the
WVSUMC] for the reason that Dr. Rodney Jun Garcia, then Chief Resident, Surgery
Department, [WVSUMC], who treated [Leyble was] unable to testify as he is now based in
General Santos City."[8]

In compliance with the Subpoena Duces Tecum[9] issued by the RTC on February 22, 2005,
Sonza brought the medical records of Leyble to court which included: a) Medical Certificate[10]
dated December 20, 2001, b) Trauma Sheet[11] dated November 5, 2001, c) Admission and
[Discharge] Record[12] and d) Operative Records[13] dated November 16, 2001, and certified the
same to be true and faithful reproductions of the original documents.[14]

The Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented the testimonies of Bautista Etino, Wenifred Besares, Joeseryl Masiado
and of petitioner himself to prove his alibi.[15]

The witnesses testit1ed that, "at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 5, 2001, [petitioner]
was with Bgy. [sic] Captain Manuel Bomejan, Wenifredo Besares and [Bautista Etino at] the
house of the latter which was situated about one kilometer away from where they heard shots
that afternoon."[16] They also alleged that the filing of the criminal complaint was precipitated by
a pending Comelec[17] gun-ban case before the RTC filed against Leyble, wherein petitioner was
the witness.[18]

The Regional Trial Court Ruling

In its January 14, 2008 Decision,[19] the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of frustrated homicide. It ruled that petitioner was positively identified as the
perpetrator of the crime charged against him, especially so, when the complainant, Leyble, was
alive to tell what actually happened.[20]

Accordingly, the RTC sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Notably, it did not award any damages in favor
of Leyble, as it found that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of presenting
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.[21]

The Court of Appeals Ruling

On appellate review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision in that, it ordered
petitioner to pay Leyble the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
temperate damages.[22]

The CA ruled that "the trial court did not err in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Evaluation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses amply
[showed] that Jessierel Leyble succinctly but clearly narrated how he was shot and he also
categorically identified [petitioner] as his assailant."[23]

In addition, the CA held that the mere delay in the filing of the complaint did not necessarily
undermine the credibility of witnesses; and in this case, the fear of reprisal explained why it took
some time for Leyble to file the complaint and to finally reveal the identity of his assailant.[24]

TI1e CA also rejected petitioner's claim that Leyble filed the case against him because he
testified against the latter in the Comelec gun-ban case. It explained that "[e]ven assuming that
there was a grudge between Leyble and [petitioner], that [did] not automatically render the
testimony of Leyble unbelievable. Moreover, considering that Leyble had positively identified
[petitioner], whom he [knew] from childhood, as his assailant, motive [was] no longer essential
or relevant."[25]

Finally, the CA held that Leyble was entitled to moral damages, as it was clear from his
testimony that he sustained gunshot wounds on his shoulder; and to temperate damages for the
medical treatment he received but for which no documentary evidence was presented to prove
the actual costs thereof.[26]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution[27] dated
March 11, 2013. As a consequence, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court, assailing the CA's August 29, 2012 Decision[28] and the March 11, 2013
Resolution.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues tor the Court's consideration:

First, whether the CA erred in holding that his guilt for the charged crime of frustrated homicide
was proven beyond reasonable doubt, since the physician who examined the victim was not
presented in court;

Second, whether the CA erred when it found the testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses to be
incredible and unbelievable; and,

Third, whether the CA erred when it disregarded petitioner's defenses, i.e., the lapse of
unreasonable time for Leyble to file the complaint against him, the failure of Leyble to positively
identify him as the assailant, and Leyble's motive in filing the case against him.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, we clarify that questions of fact, as a rule, cannot be entertained in a Rule 45
petition, where the Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law that
might have been committed by the lower courts.[29] Nevertheless, when it appears that the
assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, and the findings of the lower courts
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based,[30] as in this case,
the Court may probe questions of fact in a Rule 45 proceeding.

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages of a felony as follows:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. (Emphasis supplied)
In Palaganas v. People,[31] the Court outlined the distinctions between a frustrated and an
attempted felony:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own
spontaneous desistance.

In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused intended to
kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if
the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime
committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on
the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime
committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in order to determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated parricide,
murder or homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider are: a)
whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on
the part of the accused.[33]

No proof of the extent of injury sustained by the victim

It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if
not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful," and such doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused.[34]

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would
have died from his wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate[35] alone,
absent the testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for
that matter,[36] is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. This is especially true,
given that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim's period of confinement at the
hospital, the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of
healing.[37]

Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained enters the
realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.[38]

The intent to kill was not sufficiently established

"The assailant's intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries
from the crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven."[39]
The intent to kill must be proven "in a clear and evident manner [so as] to exclude every possible
doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor."[40]

In Rivera v. People,[41] the Court ruled that "[i]ntent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence",[42] which may consist of:
[a)] the means used by the malefactors;
[b)] the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
[c)] the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim;
[(d)] the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and,
[e)] the motives of the accused.[43]
Moreover, the Court held in Rivera that intent to kill is only presumed if the victim dies as a
result of a deliberate act of the malefactors.[44]

Although it was sufficiently shown that petitioner fired a 12 gauge shotgun at the victim, there
was simply no other evidence on record that tended to prove that petitioner had animus
interficendi or intent to kill the victim. On the contrary, none of the prosecution's witnesses
testified that petitioner had indeed aimed and fired the shotgun to kill the victim.

It is to be noted, likewise, that petitioner only fired a single shot[45] at closerange,[46] but did not
hit any vital part of the victims body - the victim's wounds, based on his Medical Certificate,
were located at the right deltoid (through and through) and the left shoulder[47] - and he
immediately fled the scene right after the shooting.[48] These acts certainly do not suggest that
petitioner had intended to kill the victim; for if he did, he could have fired multiple shots to
ensure the latter's demise.
Besides, by the victim's own narration of events, it appears that he did not sustain any fatal injury
as a result of the shooting considering that he and his companions even went in pursuit of
petitioner after the incident, viz.:
[ASST. PROV. PROS. GUALBERTO BALLA]
Q: After Eden Etino shot you, what happened afterwards?
A: I shouted to my companion to help me because I have injuries.
Q: Did they help you at that particular instance?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How about Eden Etino, what did he do Mr. Witness?
A: When we ran to the hilly portion, they were no longer there.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Under these circumstances, we cannot reasonably conclude that petitioner's use of a firearm was
sufficient proof that he bad intended to kill the victim. After all, it is settled that "[i]ntent to kill
cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life."[50]
Rather, "[a]nimus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt."[51]

This is not to say that petitioner is without any criminal liability. When the intent to kill is
lacking, but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon the victim, as in this case, the crime
is not frustrated or attempted homicide but physical injuries only.[52] Since the victim's
period of incapacity and healing of his injuries was more than 30 days - he was confined at the
hospital from November 5 to 25, 2001, or for 20 days, and his period of healing was "two (2) to
four (4) weeks barring complications"[53] - the crime committed is serious physical injuries
under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[54]

Petitioner's Defenses

We reject petitioner's contention that the prosecution failed to identify him as the victim's
assailant, given that he "was not identified and never mentioned [in the police blotter] as the one
who shot the victim" even though it was the victim himself who personally reported the incident
to the authorities.[55]

Based on the Police Blotter dated January 18, 2002, the victim had identified petitioner and his
companions as his assailants during the November 5, 2001 shooting incident, viz.:
9:20 AM - (Shooting Incident) Jessirel Leyble y Subade, 25 years old, single, and a resident of
Brgy[.] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo reported personally to this Office alleging that last November 5,
2001 at around 4:30 P.M. while he was on their [sic] way home at Brgy[.] Pispis, this
Municipality[,] was waylaid and shot with a firearms [sic] by the group of Eden Etino,
Bautista Etino, Joeserel Masiado, Alfredo Jabadan, Wiliam Besarcs and Wenefredo
Besares, all resident [sic] of the same place. As a result, he sustained gunshot wounds on the
back portion of his body and was confined at West Visayas State University Hospital, Jaro, Iloilo
City.[56]
In addition, the prosecution's witnesses never wavered in their positive identification of
petitioner as the victim's assailant. The pertinent portion of the victim's testimony is quoted
below:
[ASST. PROV. PROS. GUALBERTO BALLA]
Q: Do you know the accused Eden Etino?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is inside the courtroom[,] can you point to him?
A: There.
Court Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a person inside the courtroom who, when asked[,] answered to the
name Eden Etino.
PROS. BALLA
Q: For how long have you known the accused in this case?
A: Since childhood.
xxxx
Q: Who shot you Mr. Witness?
A: Eden Etino[.][57] (Emphasis supplied)
We also consider the following pieces of evidence which amply support petitioner's positive
identification as the assailant in this case: first, the manner of attack was done at close-range,[58]
and the victim was able to turn around right after the shot was fired;[59] second, the shooting
incident happened in broad daylight (at around 4:30 in the afternoon)[60] in an open field,[61] so the
assailant could clearly be seen; and third, the victim could readily identify petitioner as his
assailant because they had known each other since childhood.[62]

Given these circumstances, we find petitioner's identification as the victim's assailant to be

positive and conclusive. As a result, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioner must
necessarily fail. After all, "[a]libi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed
aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.
And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony."[63]

We likewise reject petitioner's claim that the delay in the filing of the complaint against him
generates doubt as to his guilt. It is settled that the failure to file a complaint to the proper
authorities would not impair the credibility of the complainant if such delay was satisfactorily
explained.[64] In this case, the victim testified that he filed the case after noticing that petitioner
was still after him:
[ATTY. EDGAR SUMIDO]
Q: This incident happened on November 5, 2001 and it was only filed March 6, 2003?
A: At first, I did not intend to file a case against him because I thought they will settle the
case, but later I noticed that he was after me.
Q: What do you mean by the word that the accused is after you, Mr. Witness?
A: Because when I met him, he waylaid me.
xxxx
Q: But you stated before that the reason you filed this case [was] because the accused is after
you?
The reason that you filed this case [was] because you thought that the accused [was] after
you?
A: Because last month, he even intended to do something against me.[65] (Emphasis supplied)
The victim's initial reluctance to file the complaint is not uncommon, considering "the natural
reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case."[66] Fear of reprisal, too, is deemed as
a valid excuse for the temporary silence of a prosecution witness (or in this case, the victim) and
has been judicially declared to not have any effect on his credibility.[67]

Finally, we find no sufficient evidence on record to support petitioner's claim that the victim had
ill motives to falsely institute the complaint and testify against him. Even assuming arguendo
that the victim held a grudge against petitioner for having testified against him in another case,[68]
the existence of such grudge would not automatically render his testimony in this case false and
unreliable.[69] "In the absence of any showing that a witness was actuated by malice or other
improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under a solemn
oath deserve full faith and credence."[70]

The Proper Penalty

Under Article 263, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, "[a]ny person who shall wound, beat, or
assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer" "[t]he
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period [which ranges from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months], if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of
the injured person for more than thirty days."[71]

"Under the Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall
be taken, in view of the attending circumst1nces that could be properly imposed under the rules
of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code."[72]

In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
in this case shall be taken within the medium period[73] of the penalty prescribed under Article
263, par. 4, or one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional. The minimum term shall be taken within the range of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods[74] or from one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months.

The Civil Liabilities

Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be awarded in criminal cases
resulting in physical injuries,[75] as in this case. Although the victim did not testily on the moral
damages that he suffered, his Medical Certificate[76] constitutes sufficient basis to award moral
damages, since "ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds
inflicted on [him] would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock,
and similar injury."[77] Thus, we affirm the CA's award of moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 in the victim's favor.

We also agree with the CA that the victim is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P10,000.00, as it is clear from the records that the victim received medical treatment at the
WVSUMC and was, in fact, confined at the hospital for twenty days,[78] although no
documentary evidence was presented to prove the cost thereof.[79]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The August 29, 2012
Decision and the March 11, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00896
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that, petitioner Eden Etino is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,* and Tijam, JJ., concur.

*
Designated as additional member per September 25, 2017 raffle vice J. Jardeleza who recused
due to prior action as Solicitor General.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 27-37; penned by Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang and concurred in by
Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Gabriel T. Ingles.
[2]
Id. at 23-24; penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate
Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.
[3]
Id. at 38-44; penned by Judge Gloria G. Madero.
[4]
Records, p. 1.
[5]
See Order dated August 14, 2003, id. at 55; penned by Judge Rene B. Honrado.
[6]
Rollo, p. 39. See also TSN, July 22, 2004, pp. 4-6.
[7]
Rollo, p. 40. See also TSN, December 16, 2004, pp. 5-9.
[8]
Rollo, p. 39.
[9]
Records, p. 124.
[10]
Id. at 126.
[11]
Id. at 127.
[12]
Id. at 128.
[13]
Id. at 129.
[14]
TSN, April 21, 2005, pp. 4-6.
[15]
Rollo, p. 40.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Commission on Elections
[18]
Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[19]
Id. at 38-44.
[20]
Id. at 43.
[21]
Id. at 43-44.
[22]
Id. at 35-36.
[23]
Id. at 31-32.
[24]
Id. at 34.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id. at 35-36.
[27]
Id. at 23-24.
[28]
Id. at 27-37.
[29]
See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 770 (2013)
citing Remalante v. Tibe, 241 Phil. 930 (1988).
[30]
See The Insular Life Assurance Company. Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 472 Phil. 11, 22-23
(2004).
[31]
533 Phil. 169 (2006).
[32]
Id. at 193.
[33]
See also Aquino, Ramon C., THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Volume II, 1997 Edition, p.
626.
[34]
Epifanio v. People, 552 Phil. 620, 631 (2007). Emphasis supplied.
[35]
Records, p. 126.
[36]
See People v. Bernaldez, 355 Phil. 740, 757 (1998), where the Court held that "[h]owever,
since [the Medical Certificate] involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it be presented
in court to show his qualifications. Her, a distinction must be made between admissibility of
evidence and probative value thereof."
[37]
Records, p. 126.
[38]
See Serrano v. People, 637 Phil. 319, 336 (2010).
[39]
Id. at 333. Italics supplied.
[40]
Engr. Pentecostes, Jr. v. People, 631 Phil. 500, 512 (2010).
[41]
515 Phil. 824 (2006).
[42]
Id. at 832.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id.
[45]
Both Leyble and Maldecir testified that petitioner fired a single shot. See TSN, July 22, 2004,
p. 7, and also TSN, December 16, 2004, p. 12.
[46]
By Maldecir's testimony, petitioner was close to the victim when he fired the shot, at "around
three (3) arm's length" away. See TSN, December 16, 2004, p. 7.
[47]
Records, p. 126.
[48]
See TSN, July 22, 2004, p. 7, and also TSN, December 16, 2004, p. 9.
[49]
TSN, July 22, 2004, pp. 19-20.
[50]
Dado v. People, 440 Phil. 521, 538 (2002); citing People v. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488, 491
(1928). Italics supplied.
[51]
Id.
[52]
See Engr. Pentecostes, Jr. v. People, supra note 40 at 512-513.
[53]
Records, p. 126.
[54]
See People v. Oraza, 83 Phil. 633, 635-636 (1949), where the Court held that "it is sufficient
that the [present case] came under the provisions of [A]rticle 263, paragraph 4, of the [C]ode
inasmuch as the period of incapacity and healing of the injuries was more than thirty days
but not more than ninety days." Emphasis supplied.
[55]
Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[56]
See Certification dated January 19, 2002, records, p. 9.
[57]
TSN, July 22, 2004, pp. 3-5.
[58]
By Maldecir's testimony, petitioner was close to the victim when he fired the shot, at around
three (3) arm's length" away. See TSN, December 16, 2004, p. 7.
[59]
TSN, July 22, 2004, p. 6.
[60]
Id. at 4-5.
[61]
TSN, December 16, 2004, p. 6.
[62]
TSN, July 22, 2004, p. 4.
[63]
Vidar v. People, 625 Phil. 57, 73 (2010).
[64]
People v. Ramirez, Jr., 454 Phil. 693, 702 (2003).
[65]
TSN, July 22, 2004, pp. 13-15.
[66]
People v. PO3 Pelopero, 459 Phil. 811, 827 (2003).
[67]
People v. Dorio, 437 Phil. 201, 209-210 (2002).
[68]
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[69]
People v. Medina, 479 Phil. 530, 541 (2004).
[70]
People v. Dorio, supra note 67 at 210.
[71]
Emphasis supplied.
[72]
See Serrano v. People, supra note 38 at 337.
[73]
See REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 64(1).
[74]
See Reyes, Luis B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book 2, 17th Edition, 2008, pp. 1072-
1073.
[75]
CIVIL CODE, Article 2219(1).
[76]
Records, p. 126.
[77]
See People v. Ibañez, 455 Phil. 133, 167-168 (2003).
[78]
Records, p. 126.
[79]
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 36, 56 (2003). See also CIVIL CODE, Article 2224.

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IRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners, v. HON. DANILO

A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR. 1) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go
to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and
assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not
appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of
other remedies in the ordinary course of law.

Antecedents

Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on appeal, seeking to
reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated on August 31, 20041 and December 21,
2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for certiorari
and prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their petition for certiorari by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, to assail
the denial of their motions to quash the two informations charging them with less serious
physical injuries by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan), and denied their
motion for reconsideration anent such dismissal.
The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18, 2003 outside the house
of the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan Bulacan gave rise
to the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that mauling,
Josefina Guinto Morano,3 Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the petitioners
and one Alfredo Enrile4 in the MTC with frustrated homicide (victim being Rommel) in Criminal
Case No. 03-275; with less serious physical injuries (victim being Josefina) in Criminal Case No.
03-276; and with less serious physical injuries (victim being Perla) in Criminal Case No. 03-277,
all of the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8, 2003 after the parties submitted their
respective affidavits, the MTC issued its joint resolution,5 whereby it found probable cause
against the petitioners for less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 03-276 and
Criminal Case No. 03-277, and set their arraignment on September 8, 2003. On August 19, 2003,
the petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the
complainants had not presented proof of their having been given medical attention lasting 10
days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and
that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case of
frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the  Provincial Prosecutor, should not be
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.6 On November 11, 2003, the MTC denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because the grounds of the motion had already been
discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases
were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for
reconsideration.7 Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a
motion for the deferment of the arraignment.8

On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less
serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the
arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004.9 It explained its denial of the motion to
quash in the following terms, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said motion. A perusal of the
records shows that the grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of  defense that can be
fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.

Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious Physical Injuries are
hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.

The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.

Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as previously scheduled.

SO ORDERED.10

Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but the MTC
denied their motion on March 25, 2004.11

Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order
dated February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash, and the order dated March 25, 2004
denying their motion for reconsideration. The special civil action for certiorari was assigned to
Branch 7, presided by RTC Judge Manalastas.

On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari because: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated February 11, 2004, the issues
raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full
blown trial on the merits.  Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the
private complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein
petitioners by means of competent evidence x x x. On the other hand, this court is likewise not in
a position, not being a trier of fact insofar as the instant petition is concerned, to rule on the issue
as to whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute the petitioners for the alleged  less
physical injuries with which they stand charged. x x x.

All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the subject criminal cases filed against
the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial on the merits. x
x x.12

The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion on July 9,
2004.13

The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
orders issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged the dismissal of
the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.

However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal;
and ruling that they should have filed their notice of appeal on or before August 18, 2004 due to
their receiving the order of July 9, 2004 on August 3, 2004.14

On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.15

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioners submit that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS’

RULING DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE COMPLAINTS
DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR
FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF
LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT PERPETRATED BY THE
PETITIONERS.16

Ruling of the Court

The CA did not commit any reversible errors.

Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of
the petition for certiorari on May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration on
July 9, 2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by
reason of their completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the RTC.17
The proper recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of appeal,18 taken within 15
days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.19

Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently
erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extraordinary reliefs to
address jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that
the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the
denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to
dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants
to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance for them. Indeed, the time
and the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance would only be
at the trial on the merits.

Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea,
challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects apparent on its face.20 Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds
for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows:  (a) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer
who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint
or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the offense.22

By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for lack of one of
the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that the facts
charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to
refer to the law defining the offense charged, which, in this case, is Article 265 of the Revised
Penal Code, which pertinently states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 265.  Less serious physical injuries – Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party  for labor for ten days or more, or
shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

x x x x.

Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely: (1) that
the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries inflicted
either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required medical
assistance for more than 10 days.

Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To answer this query, the
Court refers to the averments of the complaints themselves, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Criminal Case No. 03-276

That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
motivated by anger by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA
GUINTO MORAÑO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical injuries that will require a period
of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of
time attached Medical Certificate (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW.23

Criminal Case No. 03-277

That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused
MOTIVATED by anger did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO
inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15
days barring unforeseen complication as per Medical Certificate hereto attached.
CONTRARY TO LAW.24

The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious physical injuries were
specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the
petitioners “wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one
JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO;” and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the
complainant “that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his
customary labor for the same period of time;” while that in Criminal Case No. 03-277 alleged
that: (a) the petitioners “wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right and give
hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO;” and (b) the
petitioners inflicted upon the complainant “physical injuries [that] will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication.”

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25 the complaints sufficiently charged
cralawred

the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the
ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly
amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for
the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.

In challenging  the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the “complaints do not
provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show that the medical attendance
rendered on private complainants actually and in fact lasted for a period exceeding ten (10)
days;” and the medical certificates attached merely stated that “the probable disability period of
healing is 10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano,  and,  12-15 days,  for Perla B. Morano,  hence,
the findings of  the healing periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures.” They
insist that the “private complainants should have presented medical certificates that would show
the number of days rendered for medication considering that they filed their complaint on  March
15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the alleged incident.”26

The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit.

As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the
duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance  or of their incapacity should take place only
at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v.
Sandiganbayan,27 the preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the
parties’ respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate
allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering whether a person
may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the information.28 It
is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.29 The
scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is
required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused
committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be
removed.30
We further agree with the RTC’s observation that “the issues raised in the motion to quash are
matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits.  Indeed,
proof of actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be
established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent
evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the instant petition for the dismissal of the criminal
cases against them for less serious physical injuries is to prevent the trial court to hear and
receive evidence in connection with said cases and to render judgments thereon. x x x All things
considered, it would be premature to dismiss the subject criminal cases filed against the herein
petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial of the merits.”31

And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by bringing the
special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, the petitioners deliberately disregarded the
fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action for certiorari. These conditions
were, firstly, the petitioners must show that the respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or
exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and,
secondly, because the denial was interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.32

The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their recourse.
To start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or exceeded its
jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would have opened the way to
their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained unopened to them because the denial by
the MTC of the motion to quash was procedurally and substantively correct because the duration
of the physical incapacity or medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the
merits, not at the early stage of dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second
condition, the fact that the denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did
not yet completely terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the
petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision
of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment
and assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33Certiorari was not available
to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
resolutions promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 26-28, penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in
by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (later a Member of the Court/deceased) and  Associate
Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
2
Id. at 30-34.
3
Surname Moraño  was  spelled as Morano in some  documents.
4
At times referred to in various documents as Alfred Enrile.
5
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
6
Id. at 81-85.
7
Id. at 87.
8
Id. at 98.
9
Id. at 35-36.
10
Id. at 36.
11
Id. at 37.
12
Id. at 39.
13
Id. at 40.
14
Id. at 26-28.
15
Id. at 33.
16
Id. at 15.
17
Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, states in its opening paragraph: “An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.”

The Court has explained the character of a final order in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-60036, 27 January 1987, 147 SCRA 334, 339-340, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented on the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants
is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once
it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”
18
Section 2, (a), Rule 41, Rules of Court, specifies: “(a) Ordinary appeal.— The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal
shall be filed and served in like manner.”
19
Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court.
20
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 443, 474.
21
  Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
22
People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573; Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan, G..R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 385.
23
  Rollo, p. 44.
24
  Id. at 45.
25
cralawred Supra note 21.
26
Rollo, pp. 17-18.
27
G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 726.
28
Id. at 735.
29
Tandoc v. Resultas, G. R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43.
30
Trocio v. Manta, L-34834, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 241, 246.
31
Rollo, p. 39.
32
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
33
Lalican v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 518, 529; Socrates  v.
Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 176 (1996); Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754,
February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145, 192.