A.C. No.

12062, July 2, 2018

Unite Vs. Atty. Guzman
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Florentino S. Unite filed an administrative case for disbarment before the IBP
against respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, his oath as a lawyer, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.

Complainant alleged that respondent notarized a Deed of Self Adjudication with

Sale executed by Jose Unite Torrices claiming to be the sole heir of Herminigildo, in
favor of Francisco U. Tamayo, of a parcel of land in Cagayan and covered by a title
under Herminigildo's name. The Deed was executed with only Torrices's CTC as
evidence of identity. As a result of respondent's acts, the Deed was recorded in the
Registry of Deeds, which caused the cancellation of his father's title and the issuance of a
new one in the name of Tamayo .

Respondent denied the charges against him and claimed that he complied with the
requirements of the Notarial Rules. The case was referred to the IBP for proper
investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman is liable for violation of the
Notarial Rules.
2. Whether or not Respondent Atty. Raymund Guzman violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

1. YES. Respondent Atty. Guzman clearly violated the Notarial Rules failed to
faithfully observe when he failed to confirm the identity of Torrices through the
competent evidence of identity required by the Rules. Torrices presented only his
CTC when he appeared before respondent. Jurisprudence provides that a
community tax certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and
competent evidence of identity because it is not included in the list of competent
evidence of identity under the Notarial Rules.
2. YES. Under Rule 1.01 of the CPR- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent's failure to properly perform
his duty as a notary public damaged the integrity of the office of a notary public
 and in degrading the function of notarization. He should thus be held liable for
such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Raymund P. Guzman

GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby: SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a
notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 Dimayuga Vs. Atty. Rubia
A.C. No. 8854, July 03, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

FACTS:

Julieta Dimayuga filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Atty. Vivian G.
Rubia for violation of lawyer’s oath, gross negligence and misrepresentation. In 2002,
Dimayuga and her family engaged respondent's legal services for the transfer of their
deceased father's property to them. Respondent prepared an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Waiver of Rights. However, the transfer did not happen, complainant learned
that respondent paid the transfer tax and donor’s tax were only paid in 2007, likewise
respondent only entered the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of
Rights with the RD of Davao del Sur also belatedly.Complainant also sought respondent's
legal services for the purchase of a real property in Digos City. However, the title was not
transferred to them because the TCT of land is covered CLOA wherein it shall not be
sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the
Government, or to the Land Bank of the Philippines, or to other qualified beneficiaries
for a period of ten (10) years.

Complainant prayed that respondent be administratively disciplined for her

actions.
The Court issued a Resolution requiring the respondent to comment on the complaint
within 10 days from notice. However, despite repeated notice from the court respondent
still failed to file her comment to the Complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Rubia is guilty of gross negligence,

misrepresentation and violated the lawyer’s oath.

RULING:

YES. ."A Court's Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."

The Court considered the failure to comply with the court's order, resolution, or directive
as constitutive of gross misconduct and insubordination.
The insubordination of respondent is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment pursuant to Section 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such attitude
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. CANON 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws, and promote respect for law and legal processes.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is found

GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, CANON 1 and Rule
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years effective
immediately with a STERN WARNING that future infractions shall be dealt with more
severely.

She is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a

period of three (3) years and her notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby
REVOKED.
 Taday VS. Atty. Apoya, Jr.,
A.C. No. 11981, July 03, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Leah B Taday filed before the IBP a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent Atty.
Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in authoring
a fake decision of a court. Sometime in 2011, Leah B. Taday, an OFW staying in
Norway, through her parents seek legal services for the nullification of her marriage.
Complainant's parents contracted the legal services of respondent with an Acceptance fee
of P140,000.00 to be paid on installment.

Respondent was informed by the complainant that she was staying in Norway.
Respondent drafted a Petition for Annulment of Marriage which he sent to complainant
for her signature and filed the complaint before the RTC of Caloocan City.

Complainant went to the Philippines for vacation and paid respondent his legal
fees. Respondent delivered a Decision which granted the annulment of complainant’s
marriage. The said Decision was promulgated by a certain Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon-
Angeles of RTC Branch 162. Complainant became suspicious as the said decision came
from a different branch presided by a different judge where the case was originally filed.

Complainant discovered that both Branch 162 and Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon-
Angeles do not exist in the RTC. Thus, complainant through her parents sought the
withdrawal of respondent as her counsel from the case. However, instead of withdrawing
as counsel, respondent filed an urgent motion to withdraw the Petition.

Respondent denied being informed that complainant was an OFW and claimed
that he was made to believe that she was merely in the Bicol province. Likewise,
respondent denied delivering any decision of the annulment case of complainant. He
asserted that the said decision was only a product of her imagination. Respondent
likewise denied that he filed an urgent motion to withdraw the petition in the RTC
Branch 131. He claimed that he merely drafted the said motion and gave it to
complainant's parents but he never signed it. The case was referred to the IBP-CBD for
investigation.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

The court finds that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. RULE 1.01 A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent notarized the petition even though the affiant was not present which clear
violation of the Notarial Rules.

SECTION 2. Prohibitions.
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document –
1. is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
2. is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Respondent authored a fake decision and delivered it to his client

Aside from improperly notarizing a petition, respondent committed an even graver
transgression by drafting a fake decision and delivering it to his client. Respondent
committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct, and lessened the
confidence of the public in the legal system.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines Board of Govenwrs and finds Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
 De Borja VS. Atty. Mendez, Jr.,
A.C. No. 11185, July 04, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Jaime S. De Borja filed a complaint for disciplinary action against respondent

Atty. Ramon R. Mendez before the IBP.

Sometime in 2004, Jaime, as representative of the Heirs of Deceased Augusto De

Borja, engaged the services of Atty. Mendez for the reconveyance of a parcel of land.
Atty. Mendez demanded P300,000.00 for the titling of a property situated in Pateros.
Jaime submitted a copy of the receipt of said amount received by the
respondent.However, the complaint for reconveyance was dismissed, thus, Atty. Mendez
filed a notice of appeal.

The CA ordered the Heirs of De Borja to file their Appellant's Brief within 45
days from receipt of the notice. When Jaime received the notice he inquired with Atty.
Mendez about the letter and the latter committed that he will file the Appellant's Brief as
soon as he receives a copy of the notice. However, the CA dismissed the appealed case
for failure to file Appellant's Brief.. Jaime asked Atty. Mendez the reason why they
weren't able to file the required pleading, and he was told that the firm did not receive a
copy of the notice which ordered them to file the appellant's brief.

Jaime went to the CA and the Postal Office of Caloocan and discovered that the
notice to file appellant's brief was received by Jennifer Lastimosa, a secretary of the firm
R.R. Mendez & Associates Law Offices. Jaime presented a copy of the Certification
issued by the Caloocan Central Post Office showing that Lastimosa received the notice
from the CA.

Jaime terminated the services of Atty. Mendez, and demanded the return of the
Php300,000.00. but respondent failed to return said amount. Hence, the instant
administrative complaint against him for incompetence and malpractice.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states that "A
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 thereof stresses:

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the instant case, Atty. Mendez' guilt as to his failure to do his duty to his client
is undisputed. His conduct relative to the non-filing of the appellant's brief falls below the
standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client's cause. An
attorney is bound to protect his clients' interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. Failure to file the brief within the reglementary period despite notice certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the failure resulted in the dismissal of the
appeal.

Canon 16 of the Code requires a lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 of the Code obligates a lawyer
to deliver the client's funds and property when due or upon demand.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY. RAMON R. MENDEZ, JR. is

found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Atty. Mendez is, likewise, ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Jaime S. De Borja the
remaining balance of P160,000.00 with legal interest, if it is still unpaid, within ninety
(90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with this directive will
merit the imposition of the more severe penalty, which this Court shall impose based on
the complainant's motion with notice duly furnished to Atty. Mendez.
 Gubaton VS. Atty. Amador
A.C. No. 8962, July 09, 201
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Jildo Gubaton filed an affidavit-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Augustus

Serafin D. Amador on the ground of gross immoral conduct and/or immorality.
Respondent, a former Assistant Prosecutor in OCP Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was
having an illicit romantic relationship with his wife, Ma. Bernadette Tenorio-Gubaton
since 2005. He averred It was early part of 2008 while working in the USA when he
discovered the illicit relationship.

In 2009, complainant returned to the Philippines. Bernadette refused to lie and

sleep with him. Complainant likewise discovered some birth control pills and condoms in
their house, in Bernadette’s dental clinic and in her handbag but when confronted she
merely denied ownership of the same. Likewise, Bernadette wrote love letters to
respondent and one of these letters had word “Fiscal” on it. Further, he also personally
saw respondent and Bernadette together in various places in Malaybalay City. He saw
them kissing while inside a vehicle but when he approached to confront respondent ran
away.

The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette was known to other people as well,
such as complainant’s sister, Chief Barangay Public Safety Office in Poblacion
Malayabalay and an employee of BIR and executed their respective affidavits relative to
the case.

However, respondent denied all the allegations against him. The case was referred
to the IBP-CBD for proper investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct.

RULING:
 YES. In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that
respondent had illicit affairs with Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of
gross immorality.

The Court is inclined to believe that complainant's imputations against respondent

are credible, considering that he had no ill motive to accuse respondent of such a serious
charge – much more a personal scandal involving his own wife – unless the same were
indeed true.
Jurisprudence provides that- extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as
offensive to the sanctity of marriage, the family, and the community. When lawyers are
engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual
recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
This is because possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the
legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross

immorality. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the
Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
where he has entered his appearance as counsel.
 PHENINAH D.F. WASHINGTON, v. ATTY. DICEN,
A.C. No. 12137, July 09, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

The instant case aroused when herein ATTY. SAMUEL D. DICEN, respondent,
in his pleading mentioned an oppressive language against the adverse party
[Washington], wherein he alleged that “It is the observation of the respondent that
complainant is no longer thinking on her own but has become fixated on her illicit and
immoral, if not adulterous relationship with her ex-husband, Martin Vince, (while current
husband is in the [United States] reportedly recuperating from a surgery), a foreigner who
by the latter's manipulation, caused her to be estranged from the entire Flores-Dicen Clan.

ISSUE:

Is Atty. Dicen should be held administratively liable for violating Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his use of intemperate
language in his pleadings?

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled, "The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers
who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."

Canon 8 of the CPR in particular, instructs that a lawyer's arguments in his

pleadings should be gracious to both the court and his opposing counsel, and must be of
such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. "The language
vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."

Indeed, Atty. Dicen could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to
complainant's allegations against him, explained his participation (or the lack of it) in the
latter's arrest and detention, and refrained from resorting to name-calling and personal
attacks in order to get his point across. After all, "Though a lawyer's language may be
forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum."

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel D. Dicen is found GUILTY of violating Rule

8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED
to refrain from using language that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper in his
pleadings, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
JERRY M. PALENCIA, v. ATTY. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, ATTY. GERARD M.
LINSANGAN, AND ATTY. GLENDA M. LINSANGAN-BINOYA,
A.C. No. 10557 (Formerly CBD Case No. 07-1962), July 10, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

This instant case aroused when herein complainant JERRY M. PALENCIA filed
an administrative complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) against herein respondents ATTY. PEDRO L.
LINSANGAN, ATTY. GERARD M. LINSANGAN, and ATTY. GLENDA M.
LINSANGAN-BINOYA for disciplinary action. In his complaint forwarded before such
office, he requested that an investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary
action be imposed upon respondents for committing the following unethical acts: (1)
refusing to remit the amount collected in the Singapore case worth US$95,000.00, and in
offering only US$20,756.05; (2) depositing complainant's money into their own account;
and (3) engaging in "ambulance chasing" by deploying their agents to convince
complainant to hire respondents' services while the former was still bedridden in the
hospital.

In their answer, respondents explained that complainant retained respondents and

Gurbani & Co.'s services in 2004 for purposes of filing a claim against the ship owner, its
agents and principals. This led to the filing of a claim before the Singapore High Court.
They averred that on April 29, 2005, Gurbani & Co. advised respondents of the
settlement of the claim in Singapore for US$95,000.00. On June 20, 2005, respondents
sent a letter to complainant informing him that they already received the settlement
amount and requested him to come to the former's office to get his net share.
Complainant went to respondents' law office on June 28, 2005 where respondents
tendered to the former his net share of US$20,756.05.

After proceedings, the IBP-CBD in its Report and Recommendation ruled that
respondents violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR): ( l) in
soliciting legal business through their agents while complainant was in the hospital; (2) in
failing to account for, and deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand; and (3) in hiring the services of a foreign law firm and another lawyer without
prior knowledge and consent of complainant of the fees and expenses to be incurred. The
IBP-CBD found that all three respondents connived and thus recommended that all
respondents be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. It also
directed respondents to comply with the Decision in the accounting case (Civil Case No.
2401) in favor of complainant.

ISSUE:

Is respondent ATTY. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, ATTY. GERARD M.

LINSANGAN, and ATTY. GLENDA M. LINSANGAN-BINOYA violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility arising from that of unethical conduct in handling
complainants money?

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled, that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business. Lawyers are reminded to avoid at all times any act that would tend to lessen the
confidence of the public in the legal profession as a noble calling, including, among
others, the manner by which he makes known his legal services

A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner.

They are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers. The CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business." Corollary to this
duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive or
interest. Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind of business by
an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed.

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of

which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
Thus, the violation of the lawyer's oath and/or breach of the ethics of the legal profession
embodied in the CPR may, depending on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts, result in the suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar.

While we find respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan and Gerard Linsangan to have
violated Rule 1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03 of the
CPR, the records do not support respondent Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya's
participation in their unethical activities. Complainant himself admits that he only dealt
with respondents Attys. Pedro and Gerard Linsangan. Thus, we hold that the case against
Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya be dismissed.
 Finally, we note that this Court, in G.R. No. 205088, has already affirmed the CA's
ruling as to the issue of how much respondents can collect from complainant as attorney's
fees. This judgment has long attained finality and, in fact, appears to be set for execution.
For this reason, we do not adopt the IBP Board of Governors' recommendation for
respondents to return to complainant 5% of the amount assessed. The principle of
immutability of judgments behooves us from making any further statements on this
particular issue.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, we find respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and Gerard M.

Linsangan GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan
and Gerard Linsangan from the practice of law for TWO YEARS effective upon finality
of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely. The complaint against Atty. Glenda M.
Linsangan-Binoya is DISMISSED.
 RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION DATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R.
No. 237428 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO),
A.M. No. 18-06-01-sc, JULY 17, 2018
TIJAM, J.:

FACTS:

This instant case aroused when herein respondent Atty. Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno was complaint of administratively, in connection with the pending quo warranto
proceedings against her. The Court observed that since the filing of the impeachment
complaint, during the pendency of the quo warranto case, and even after the conclusion
of the quo warranto proceedings, respondent continuously opted to defend herself in
public through speaking engagements before students and faculties in different
universities, several public forums, and interviews on national television, and public
rallies. As the Court noted in its decision in the quo warranto case, respondent initially
refused to participate in the congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint. When
the petition for quo warranto was filed, respondent likewise continuously refused to
recognize this Court's jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the judicial process and
answering the charges against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious resolution of the
matter, respondent opted to proceed to a nationwide campaign, conducting speeches and
accepting interviews, discussing the merits of the case and making comments thereon to
vilify the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the impartiality of the Members of
the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary, and falsely impute ill motives
against the government that it is orchestrating the charges against her. In short, as the
Court stated in the said decision, respondent chose to litigate her case before the public
and the media instead of the Court.

ISSUE:

Is respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements
as regards the quo warranto case against her during its pendency?

RULING:
 Yes, the Supreme Court ruled, that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has
ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not
only a right but a bounden duty as well. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.

Henceforth, respondent is expected to be more circumspect, discerning, and

respectful to the Court in all her utterances and actions. Respondent is reminded that the
practice of law is neither a natural right nor a Constitutional right demandable or
enforceable by law. It is a mere privilege granted by this Court premised on continuing
good behavior and ethical conduct, which privilege can be revoked or cancelled by this
Court for just cause.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

is found guilty of violating CANON 13, Rule 13.02, and CANON 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of CANON 1, Sections 1 and 2 of
CANON 2, Sections 2 and 4 of CANON 3, and Sections 2 and 6 of CANON 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Thereby, after deep reflection
and deliberation, in lieu of suspension, respondent is meted the penalty of REPRIMAND
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense or any offense violative
of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility shall merit a heavier
penalty of a fine and/or suspension or disbarment.

This judgment is final and executory. No further motions for reconsideration or

any further pleadings shall hereafter be entertained.
 THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, v.
HON. ALARAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 62, RTC, MAKATI CITY,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2484, July 23, 2018
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

This instant case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed against
respondent Judges HON. SELMA P. ALARAS, Presiding Judge, Branch 62, Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, in relation to the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Case No. 12-09-
2069 entitled Planters Development Bank v. Spouses Crescenciano M. Pitogo and Nova
Arcayan. In the Affidavit-Complaint averred that respondent judge issued erroneous
Temporary Restraining Order [TRO], they insist that respondent Sheriff should have
consulted his superiors on what he should do with the request of PDB to proceed with the
foreclosure sale, in relation to the TRO issued by Judge Alaras qualified by: the phrase
"until further orders from this Court".

In her Comment, Judge Alaras explained that both her November 13, 2012 Order
and the ensuing Writ of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) plainly indicated that the
TRO was valid and effective only for 20 days; that the last paragraph) preceding the fallo
of her November 13, 2012 Order and the last Whereas clause of the TRO conspicuously
mentioned the 20-day limiting period, and were clear indications that Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court was faithfully observed; that after the release and service of the
twin issuances, the parties appeared to have clearly understood that the TRO was valid
only for 20 days considering that the party enjoined made no motion for clarification; and
that it would have been highly illogical for her to still set the hearing for the application
for the writ of preliminary injunction on November 22, 2012, or nine days after the
issuance of the TRO, if she had intended the TRO's validity to be "indefinite."

Judge Alaras' non-observance of the basic procedural requirement in issuing a

TRO amounts to gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Since there is no showing that
she was motivated by bad faith in rendering the assailed order and TRO and this is her
first offense, a fine of Php10,000.00 is sufficient.

ISSUE:
 Did the respondent Judge traverse the standards defined by the Court as to be
liable for gross ignorance of the law?

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court ruled that, the concept of gross ignorance of the law as an
offense for judges has been expounded in Department of Justice v. Mislang: Gross
ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge
may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only
in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Such, however, is not the case
with Judge Mislang. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A
judge is presumed to have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of
judicial functions. But a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a
statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends this
presumption and subjects the magistrate to corresponding administrative sanctions.

Liability for gross ignorance of the law attaches when the respondent judge is
found to have issued her assailed erroneous order, decision or actuation in the
performance of official duties moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like
motive. Otherwise, her good faith prevails, and she must be absolved.

Judge Alaras issued the TRO to be effective. "within a period of twenty (20) days
from date hereof or until further orders from this Court." The tenor of the TRO obviously
confined its effectivity to the 20-day period provided under Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court. Given the circumstances, the additional phrase "until further orders from
this Court" was an obvious surplusage and clearly unnecessary. Hence, the TRO cannot
be regarded as grossly erroneous. We should consider the phrase a mere oversight on the
part of Judge Alaras in light of her setting the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction for hearing immediately upon her issuance of the TRO. Such hearing negated
the notion that she intended the TRO to be effective for an indefinite period.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for gross ignorance of the law
against respondent JUDGE SELMA P. ALARAS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 62, in Makati City for its lack of merit.
 SPS. ALBERTO AND LILIAN PACHO, v. JUDGE LU, RTC, BRANCH 88,
CAVITE CITY,
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2350 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3507-RTJ), July 23, 2018
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

This instant case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed against herein
respondent Judge Agapito S. Lu, Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, who
made undue delay in the rendition of the judgment in Civil Case No. N-7675 entitled Sps.
Lilian and Alberto S. Pacho v. Sps. Eric and Roselie Manongsong. In the Affidavit-
Complaint, Complainant Sps. Pacho alleges that the complaint for ejectment they filed
against spouses Eric and Roselie Manongsong on 12 February 2004 was raffled to the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cavite City, presided over by Judge Amalia
Samaniego-Cuapiaco. On 9 June 2004, Judge Samaniego-Cuapiaco rendered a Judgment
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Complainant Sps. Pacho appealed the
judgment to the Regional Trial Court, which was raffled to the court of respondent Judge
Lu.

On 30 August 2004, respondent Judge Lu rendered a Decision setting aside the

appealed judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. On 12 August 2005,
Judge Samaniego-Cuapiaco rendered a decision dismissing the case for the second time
for lack of jurisdiction. Complainant Sps. Pacho elevated the decision of the lower court
to the Regional Trial Court, which case was again raffled to respondent Judge Lu.
Although the case was already submitted for decision, the appeal remained unresolved.
Two (2) motions for early resolution, 9 July 2007 and on 21 November 2007,
respectively, and almost weekly follow ¬ups thereafter, remained unacted upon.

In his comment, respondent Judge Lu explained to Mrs. Lilian Pacho that he

cannot give due course to their appeal as the Rules of Court proscribes a second appeal of
the same case. He advised Mrs. Pacho to file an administrative complaint against Judge
Samaniego-Cuapiaco instead. He also told Mrs. Pacho that he would "defer action on her
second appeal because if [he] immediately deny due course to or dismiss the appeal and
the dismissal of the appeal becomes final, she may lose her right and opportunity to seek
judicial relief."
After hearing, the OCA issued its report and recommendation dated April 15, 2011, Hold
Judge Agapito S. Lu of Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, be found GUILTY
for the less serious charge of delay in rendering judgment, for which he should be FINED
P11,000.00

ISSUE:

Is respondent judge committed undue delay in rendering judgement, breach of

which tantamount to a violation of Code of Judicial Conduct?

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled, that Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987
Constitution mandates that the first and second level courts should decide every case
within three months from its submission for decision or resolution. "A case or matter
shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mirrors this constitutional edict by requiring all
judges to administer justice impartially and without delay, and to promptly dispose of
their courts' business and to decide their cases within the required periods. The demand
for impartiality and efficiency is by no means an empty platitude. All too often, the Court
has expounded on the pressing need for judicial efficiency, as it has done in Office of the
Court Administrator v. Reyes, thus:

The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured not only by the fairness and
correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are
resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public
confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the
performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful
observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties.
Thereafter, he should just leave it to the complainants, if they would feel aggrieved by the
judgment he rendered, to choose their remedies in the usual course. Indeed, the delay was
avoidable by him.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in resolving a
case as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.14 Due to his intervening retirement from the
service, it is now appropriate to impose a fine of P11,000.00, the amount recommended
by the OCA, to be charged against the P40,000.00 withheld from his retirement benefits.

FALLO:
 WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent Judge
Agapito S. Lu (retired) GUILTY of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. N-7675; and
IMPOSES a fine amounting to P11,000.00 to be charged against the P40,000.00 withheld
from his retirement benefits.

ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, v. ATTY. GOMOS,

A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018
GESMUNDO, J.:

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Atty.

Archernar B. Tabuzo (complainant) against Atty. Jose Alfoso M. Gomos (respondent),
who was then a Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Complainant
alleged that respondent violated the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission), Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 when he failed to act on her pleadings with dispatch and
for issuing his report and recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days from the
submission of the last pleading.
Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to an inexperienced
lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457;
and that he maliciously cropped and pasted portions of complainant's statement in her
position paper to give the wrong impression before the IBP-Board of Governors (Board)
that the introductory heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby
violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01, 3.02, and 3.04 of Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Complainant asserted that respondent committed
nonfeasance for deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action against a lawyer for
serious violation of duties owed to the Court and the legal profession despite several
notices. She alleged that as early as December 2013, respondent was aware that Atty.
Alan R. Bulawan committed forum shopping and other grave malpractices but respondent
refused to institute disciplinary action reasoning that there should first be a verified
complaint before he could act on it. Complainant claimed that respondent's inaction was a
violation of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Sec. 13 of the IBP's By-
Laws. Lastly, complainant posited that respondent was grossly ignorant of the rules on
privileged communication, on evidence, on the crime of perjury, and on forum shopping
when he failed to dismiss the present administrative case outright because it had no merit
and when he ignored the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.
 In his Answer, respondent denied the allegations and contended that they were not
only false and an unfortunate misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but
also an act of harassment. He countered that it was complainant who caused the delay of
the resolution of the case because of the numerous motions and pleadings she filed. Also,
the report and recommendation was based on facts, law and jurisprudence which was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board. If complainant felt aggrieved by the report and
recommendation, she could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's
January 31, 2015 Resolution.

After due proceeding, the IBP rendered its Report and Recommendation, in its
Report and Recommendation, the Commission recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. It ratiocinated that complainant's allegations while seemingly
couched as acts of misconduct, actually assails the report and recommendation of
respondent as investigating commissioner in CBD Case No. 12-3457. The Commission
stated that it would be irregular and improper to review such findings because it would be
tantamount to reopening matters and issues that have been passed upon and approved by
the IBP Board. The Commission agreed with the respondent that if complainant felt
aggrieved by such findings, her option would have been to file a motion for
reconsideration or some other appropriate remedy, but not an administrative case against
the investigating commissioner.

ISSUE:

Is respondent may be held administratively liable for rendering an alleged adverse

judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of the IBP?

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court ruled that, Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
IBP-CBD provides that "the only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified
answer and verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a resolution." Such
restrictive enumeration is consistent with the summary nature of disciplinary proceedings
as well as the basic tenets of practical expediency encouraged by Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of
the Constitution which mandates this Court to adopt such rules for a "simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." Relatedly, this is also the
reason why a party has to first ask for a leave of court before filing any pleading which is
not expressly sanctioned by applicable rules of procedure. Such practice is intended to
alert litigants that the resolution of unsanctioned motions and other pleadings seeking for
affirmative reliefs is discretionary on the part of the courts (including quasi-judicial
bodies or investigatory administrative agencies). This is because these unsanctioned
pleadings clutter up court (or any administrative quasi-adjudicative or investigative body)
records and tend to impede the speedy disposition of cases.
 The filing of an administrative complaint against an adjudicator is not the proper
remedy for assailing the legal propriety of an adverse decision, order, resolution or
recommendation, in the case of administrative complaints against lawyers. More
importantly, the reckless practice of filing baseless administrative complaints against
fellow lawyers undeniably degrades rather than cleanses the ranks of the legal profession.
Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal profession and even their
non-lawyer adversaries with utmost candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the
primary purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against delinquent lawyers is
to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks of the legal profession from being corrupted by
unscrupulous practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the reason why
lawyers should always set a good example in not using the law and the rules as weapons
or tools of malicious vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility of
the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court AGREES with the
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Committee on Bar
Discipline adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Board of Governors, and
DISMISSES the administrative complaint filed against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.

Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo and her
collaborating counsel Atty. Gaudencio A. Barboza, Jr. to REFRAIN from abusing the
disciplinary proceedings thru filing and maintaining frivolous administrative complaints
against fellow members of the Bar. A repetition of the same or commission of similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
 MARTIN J. SIOSON, v. ATTY. APOYA, JR.
A.C. No. 12044, July 23, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:

Sioson engaged the services of Atty. Apoya, Jr. in handling the petition for review
he had earlier filed before the DOJ, in connection with his complaint for Qualified Theft.
Atty. Apoya, Jr. required the payment of an acceptance fee of P10,000.00, appearance fee
of P2,500.00 per hearing and 15% of whatever amount collected from the case as success
fee. Atty. Apoya, Jr. also told Sioson that he would submit a manifestation before the
DOJ to correct the allegations stated in Sioson's petition.

Sioson issued a Check to pay Atty. Apoya, Jr. P10,000.00 as acceptance fee. Atty.
Apoya, Jr. then deposited the said check to his (BPI) Account. On December 6, 2013,
Sioson sent a text message to Atty. Apoya, Jr. inquiring on the status of his case. Atty.
Apoya, Jr. replied that he would file first a Notice of Entry of Appearance prior to the
filing of the manifestation he and Sioson discussed on November 27, 2013.

On December 11, 2013, Sioson sent another text message to Atty. Apoya, Jr.,
requesting for a status update on the case. Atty. Apoya, Jr. told Sioson to wait for the
order of the DOJ notifying the latter of the Notice of Entry of Appearance he had filed.
Sioson went to the DOJ to follow up on his case. He discovered that Atty. Apoya, Jr. had
not filed an Entry of Appearance in relation to his case. Sioson called Atty. Apoya, Jr. but
the latter's phone could not be reached. Sioson averred that Atty. Apoya, Jr. thereafter
continued to ignore his text messages.

Sioson requested Atty. Apoya, Jr. for a status update on his petition for review but
did not respond to the said letter. Sioson wrote another letter to Atty. Apoya, Jr., he
demanded for Atty. Apoya, Jr. to return the P10,000.00 he had given the latter as
acceptance fee. Likewise, he asked for the return of all the documents he sent pertaining
to his case. Otherwise, he will be constrained to file a Disbarment Case against him
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for violation of "Canon Code" specifically
Canons 16 and 18.

On April 4, 2014, Sioson filed a Verified Complaint before the Commission on

Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (CBD-IBP), praying that Atty.
Apoya, Jr. be disciplined and be disbarred from the practice of law. The CBD-IBP issued
an Order requiring Atty. Apoya, Jr. to submit a duly verified Answer, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the order.

In his Answer dated May 21, 2014, Atty. Apoya, Jr. vehemently denied that
Sioson was his client. He alleged that he does not know Sioson personally.

Respondent respectfully stressed that he never had an occasion to meet herein

complainant. Respondent never received any amount from the complainant representing
as acceptance fee. Respondent likewise never received any documents from the
complainant pertaining to the case Qualified Theft he mentioned in his letter.

That there is absolutely no attorney-client relationship exist between the

respondent and the complainant in this case. Thus, respondent felt a coercion and threat
with respect to the said letter came from the complainant for compelling respondent to
return something which he did not received from the complainant and threatening to
harm and or filing an administrative against the respondent. Consequently, respondent
filed Criminal Complaint GRAVE THREATS and GRAVE COERCION against the
complainant before the office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.

After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Erwin L. Aguilera rendered a

Report and Recommendation13 on November 26, 2014, recommending that Atty. Apoya,
Jr. be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and that he be
ordered to return the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Sioson.

The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution20 denying respondent Atty.

Apoya, Jr.'s Motion for Reconsideration

ISSUE:

Whether or not ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR. violated the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Apoya, Jr.'s refusal
to return Sioson's money upon demand and his failure to respond to Sioson's calls, text
messages and letters asking for a status update on the case filed before the DOJ reveal
Atty. Apoya, Jr.'s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The acts committed by Atty. Apoya, Jr. thus fall squarely within the prohibition of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 16.01 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility CPR.

Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in

defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. LIABLE for violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 18, and Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Atty.
Apoya, Jr. is also ordered to return the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to
complainant Martin J. Sioson within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision.
ANONYMOUS, v. JUDGE BUYUCAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVA VIZCAYA,
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-2719-MTJ), July 24, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

On June 26, 1969, Proclamation No. 573 was signed, which set aside certain lands
of the public domain as permanent forest reserves. Included in the said reservation was a
193-hectare parcel of land located in Sitio Tapaya, Villaros, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, a
portion of which was granted to the Department of Agriculture for research purposes.

As there was a need to clear the Subject Property of informal settlers already
residing therein, the DA filed several criminal and civil cases of Forcible Entry and
Malicious Mischief before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva
Vizcaya (MCTC), which is presided over by respondent Judge Buyucan. The said cases
were eventually dismissed by respondent Judge Buyucan.

A few months later, respondent Judge Buyucan acquired a parcel of land located
within the Subject Property for P150,000.00 from the same respondent in the previously
dismissed cases which was evidenced by a "Waiver of Rights and Improvements.” A
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was then filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
seeking the inhibition of respondent Judge Buyucan as he was also residing within the
very same property involved in the said criminal cases. The OSG alleged that his
continued presence in the Subject Property had "emboldened" the other informal settlers
to continue with their illegal occupation therein. Respondent Judge Buyucan, however,
refused to recuse himself from hearing the said cases.

Suddenly, anonymous text message received by the Ombudsman stating the

actions made by the Judge in the said parcel of land.
 Respondent Judge Buyucan denied knowledge of the DA's ownership of the
Subject Property and instead claimed that the land he was occupying was within the road-
right-of-way of the DPWH beside the Nueva Vizcaya-Isabela National Road. Respondent
Judge Buyucan also claimed that the alleged two (2)-storey house actually belonged to
his nephew and that what he constructed were merely a "temporary Ifugao native house"
and an adjacent shanty. He further stated that he is, in any case, ready to vacate the area if
and when the DPWH needs it.

Judge Flor, together with a representative of this Court, conducted an ocular

inspection of the Subject Property. Judge Buyucan filed a Supplemental
Answer/Comment dated December 16, 2014, denying once again the allegations of his
squatting on the Subject Property, that he did not own a fighting cock farm and insisting
that the land he purchased was within the RRW of the DPWH

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Judge Buyucan is guilty of gross misconduct.

RULING:

Respondent Judge Buyucan is liable.Respondent Judge Buyucan's claim that he

was not occupying a portion of the Subject Property is plainly belied by the verification
plan prepared by the DENR, which forms part of the records of this case. Proceeding
therefrom, the Court so finds that respondent Judge Buyucan was indeed an illegal
occupant of the Subject Property.

Even assuming that respondent Judge Buyucan did not occupy a portion of the
Subject Property, he is still liable due to his admission in his Letter dated December 13,
2013 that he was then occupying a portion of the RRW of the DPWH Nueva Vizcaya-
Isabela National Road.48 As aptly observed in the OCA Memorandum, such act
nevertheless constitutes a violation of P.O. No. 17, which makes it unlawful for any
person to "usurp any portion of a right-of-way, to convert any part of any public highway,
bridge, wharf or trail to his own private use or to obstruct the same in any manner, or to
use any highway ditch for irrigation or other private purposes x x x."

Court also notes that despite repeated demands from the DA, respondent Judge
Buyucan refused to cease his illegal occupation of the Subject Property.

Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the public's confidence in its
agents of justice considering that such act amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the DA's
ownership rights over the Subject Property. Even worse, his continued refusal to vacate
instigated the continued illegal occupation of other informal settlers residing therein.
 Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that the conduct of judges
must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary and that their conduct
must, at the least, be perceived to be above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.
Based on the foregoing acts alone, it is clear the respondent Judge Buyucan fell short of
the required conduct of all members of the bench.

A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously

careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social
or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial
course. He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity.

The Court, finds that respondent Judge Buyucan must likewise be ordered to
immediately vacate the Subject Property.

Judge Bill D. Buyucan is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct for

violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, except accrued leave credits. He is likewise
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment,
including to one in any GOCC. He is likewise ordered to IMMEDIATELY VACATE the
land known as the Department of Agriculture Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research
Outreach Station, REMOVE the structures he introduced thereon, and SUBMIT a report
on his compliance within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. Further, respondent
Bill D. Buyucan is directed to SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten (10) days from notice
why he should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined herein.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, Judge Bill D. Buyucan of the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court, Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, is hereby found GUILTY of Gross
Misconduct for violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, except accrued leave credits.
He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government-controlled
corporations.

He is likewise ordered to IMMEDIATELY VACATE the land known as the

Department of Agriculture Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station,
REMOVE the structures he introduced thereon, and SUBMIT a report on his compliance
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
 Further, respondent Bill D. Buyucan is directed to SHOW CAUSE in writing
within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disbarred for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics as outlined herein.

HDI HOLDINGS PHILIPPINES, INC., v. ATTY. CRUZ

A.C. No. 11724 (Formerly CBD No. 14-4109), July 31, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

HDI is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. Petitioner alleged that they retained the services of Atty. Cruz as its in-house
corporate counsel and corporate secretary. In the beginning, HDI's directors and officers
were pleased with Atty. Cruz's performance, thus, in time, he earned their trust and
confidence that he was eventually tasked to handle the corporation's important and
confidential matters. Ultimately, Atty. Cruz became a friend to most of HDI's directors,
officers and staff members.

However, HDI lamented that Atty. Cruz's seeming friendliness was apparently a
mere facade in order to gain the trust of HDI's officers and directors for his financial gain.
HDI averred that through Atty. Cruz's deception and machinations, he managed to
misappropriate a total of P41,317,167.18. through the following:

a. misappropriation of the cash bid in the total amount of P6,000,000.00 which

remains unpaid;
b. contracting unsecured personal loans with HDI in the total amount of
P8,000,000.00 which remains unpaid;
c. deceiving HDI as to the true selling price of the Q.C. property which resulted in
overpayment in the amount of P1,689,100.00 which remains unpaid;
d. fabricating a fictitious sale by executing a fictitious contract to sell and deed of
sale in order to obtain money in the amount of P21,250,000.00 from HDI which
remains unpaid;
e. collecting rental payments amounting to P4,408,067.18, without authority, and
thereafter, failed to turn over the same to HDI; and
f. executing a fake Secretary’s Certificate appointing himself as the authorized
person to receive the payments of the lease rentals.
 Atty. Cruz has chosen to remain silent despite the severity of the allegations against
him. He was given several opportunities to comment on the charges yet no comment
came. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation
and defend himself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Cruz is guilty of violation of Code of Professional

Responsibility.

RULING:

In the instant case, considering all the above-cited infractions, it is beyond dispute
that Atty. Cruz is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. In several
occasions, he manifested a propensity to lie and deceive his client in order to obtain
money. Obviously, his misrepresentations in order to compel HDI to release money for
cash bids, fictitious purchase of a property, the overpriced purchase price of the Q.C.
property and his misrepresentation that he had authority to collect rentals in behalf of
HDI and CGI, as well as his execution of fictitious documents to give semblance of truth
to his misrepresentations, constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath.
These reprehensible conduct of Atty. Cruz without doubt breached the highly fiduciary
relationship between lawyers and clients.

This Court also sees it fit to note that the CPR strongly condemns Atty. Cruz's
conduct in handling the funds of HDI.

Atty. Cruz's failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.

FALLO:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL

CRUZ, guilty of gross misconduct by violating the Canon of Professional Responsibility
through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, and willful disobedience of lawful
orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is
thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off of the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately.

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AS REPRESENTED BY

REBECCA V. LABRADOR, v. ATTY. ROMANILLOS,
A.C. No. 5580, July 31, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Respondent was administratively charged by complainant San Jose Homeowners

Association, Inc. for representing conflicting interests and for using the title "Judge"
despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct in the consolidated
cases of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.

SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting

interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783. Subsequently, a second disbarment
case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C.
No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although he was
found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.

In a Decision9 dated June 15, 2005, the Court found merit in the complaint, and
thus, held respondent guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, 3.01 and
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment from the
practice of law: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Almost nine (9) years from his disbarment, or on April 21, 2014, respondent filed the
instant Letter once more praying for the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
In a Resolution dated June 25, 2014, the Court referred the aforementioned letter to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation thereon
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

Acting on the Report and Recommendation dated November 18, 2016 submitted
by the OBC, the Court, in a Resolution dated January 10, 2017, directed respondent to
show proof that he is worthy of being reinstated to the Philippine Bar by submitting
pieces of documentary and/or testimonial evidence, including but not limited to letters
and attestations from reputable members of the society, all vouching for his good moral
character. In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 10, 2017, respondent
submitted forty (40) letters from people, all vouching for his good moral character.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Romanillos’ showed convincing evidence that he is again

worthy of membership in the Bar.

RULING:

The Court, denies his petition, the instant appeal is DENIED.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney
before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys' sincere
realization and acknowledgment of guilt. Here, while more than ten (10) years had
already passed since his disbarment on June 15, 2005, respondent's present appeal has
failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first guideline above.

The Court is not persuaded by respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.

While he expressly asks for forgiveness for his transgressions in his letters to the Court,
respondent continues to insist on his honest belief that there was no conflict of interest
notwithstanding the Court's finding to the contrary.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural,

absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character.

The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration
his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application
for reinstatement.

The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers,
being officers of the court, is that judicial "clemency, as an act of mercy removing any
disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the
courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of
reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable."
FALLO:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his

name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered in respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country

EVELYN T. GOOPIO, v. ATTY. MAGLALANG,

A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018
JARDELEZA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner alleged that sometime in 2005, in relation to her need to resolve

property concerns with respect to 12 parcels of land located in Sagay City, Negros
Occidental, she engaged the services of Atty. Maglalang to represent her either through a
court action or through extra-judicial means. Having been employed in Switzerland at the
time, she allegedly likewise executed a General Power of Attorney on June 18, 2006 in
favor of Atty. Maglalang, authorizing him to settle the controversy covering the
properties with the developer, including the filing of a petition for rescission of contract
with damages.

Atty. Maglalang supposedly informed her that the petition for rescission was filed
and pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, and that as payment
of the same, the latter requested and received the total amount of P400,000.00 from her.
Atty. Maglalang presented an official receipt covering the alleged deposit of the
P400,000.00 with the court.

Goopio further contended that Atty. Maglalang rendered legal services in

connection with the petition, including but not limited to, appearances at mediations and
hearings, as well as the preparation of a reply between the months of December 2006 and
April 2007, in relation to which she was supposedly billed a total of P114,000.00,
P84,000.00 of which she paid in full.

Goopio also claimed that she subsequently discovered that no such petition was
filed nor was one pending before the RTC or any tribunal and that the purported inaction
of Atty. Maglalang likewise resulted in the continued accrual of interest payments as well
as other charges on her properties.
 She alleged that Atty. Maglalang admitted to all these when he was confronted by
Goopio's representative and niece, Milogen Canoy, which supposedly resulted in
Goopio's revocation of the General Power of Attorney on May 17, 2007. Goopio finally
alleged that through counsel, she made a formal demand upon Atty. Maglalang for
restitution, which went unheard; hence, the disbarment complaint.

Atty. Maglalang specifically denied Goopio's claims for being based on hearsay,
untrue, and without basis in fact. He submitted that contrary to Goopio's allegations, he
had not met or known her in 2005 or 2006, let alone provided legal services to her as her
attorney-in-fact or counsel, or file any petition at her behest. He specifically denied
acceding to any General Power of Attorney issued in his favor, and likewise submitted
that Goopio was not in the Philippines when the document was purportedly executed. He
further firmly denied receiving P400,000.00 from Goopio, and issuing any receipts. He
also added that he had not received any demand letter.

IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez found that a lawyer-client relationship

existed between complainant Goopio and Atty. Maglalang. Proven by the documentary
evidence submitted by Goopio. Commissioner Fernandez did not give any credibility to
the specific denials of Atty. Maglalang and held that had Atty. Maglalang found the
demand letter suspect and without basis, he should have sent a reply denying the same.

He recommended that Atty. Maglalang be found guilty of violating Section 27,

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
suspended from the practice of law for two years, and ordered to return to Goopio the
amount of P400,000.00, under pains of disbarment. IBP Board affirmed with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez.

Atty. Maglalang filed a motion for reconsideration26 of the IBP Board's

Resolution. In said motion for reconsideration, Atty. Maglalang prayed for full
exoneration on the ground that he was also merely a victim of the manipulations made by
his former client, Consuji, further contending that if any fault could be attributed to him,
it would only be his failure to detect and discover Consuji's deceit until it was too late.
The same motion was denied in a Resolution dated March 22, 2014. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Maglalang is guilty of gross immoral conduct and should be
disbarred.

RULING:

Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang is REPRIMANDED, but the disbarment complaint

against him is nevertheless DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 The court ruled that they cannot find Atty. Maglalang guilty of violating Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as the case levelled against him by Goopio does not
have any evidentiary leg to stand on. The latter's allegations of misrepresentation and
deceit have not been substantiated as required by the applicable probative quantum, and
her failure to present the best evidence to prove the authenticity of the subject documents
places said documents well within the ambit of doubt, on the basis of which no
disciplinary finding may be found.

Her documentary evidence lacked the required probative weight, and her unproven
narrative cannot be held to sustain a finding of suspension or disbarment against Atty.
Maglalang. Hence, the dismissal of the disbarment complaint is in order, without
prejudice to other remedies that Goopio may avail of for any monetary restitution due
her, as the courts may deem proper.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ariel D. Maglalang is hereby REPRIMANDED, but the

disbarment complaint against him is nevertheless DISMISSED for lack of merit. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to his records.
 PABLITO L. MIRANDA, JR., VS. ATTY. ALVAREZ, SR.,
A.C. No. 12196, September 03, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

On January 16, 2012, complainant Pablito L. Miranda, Jr. filed a Complaint-

Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline,
averring that respondent notarized certain documents during the year 2010
notwithstanding that his notarial commission for and within the jurisdiction of San Pedro,
Laguna had already expired way back in December 31, 2005 and has yet to be renewed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna (RTC-San Pedro) where he
resides and conducts his notarial businesses.

Furthermore, complainant claimed that respondent failed to comply with his duties
under the Notarial Rules, particularly: (a) to register one (1) notarial office only; (b) to
keep only one (1) active notarial register at any given time; (c) to file monthly notarial
books, reports, and copies of the documents notarized in any given month; and (d) to
surrender his notarial register and seal upon expiration of his commission.

Also, complainant alleged that respondent authorized unlicensed persons to do

notarial acts for him using his signatures, stamps, offices, and notarial register, and that
he further violated Section 12, Rule II of the Notarial Rules regarding competent
evidence of identity by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, and causing
it to appear that persons have participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate. Because of these acts, complainant asserted that respondent committed
grave violations of the Notarial Rules.

On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IBP-IC) found

respondent administratively liable for violating the Notarial Rules, the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), and the Lawyer's Oath, and accordingly,
recommended that respondent's notarial commission, if existing, be revoked, that he be
barred perpetually as a notary public, and that he be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a warning that any infraction of the canons
or provisions of law in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The IBP Board of Governors partially granted respondent's motion, and

accordingly, modified the 1st Resolution by deleting the penalty of suspension
"considering that respondent’s violation relates to the Notarial Law."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent administratively liable

RULING:

Court has held "that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notary public. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. For this reason, notary public must observe with the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.

The basic requirements a notary public must observe in the performance of his
duties are presently laid down in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The failure to
observe the requirements and/or comply with the duties prescribed therein shall constitute
grounds for the revocation of the notarial commission of, as well as the imposition of the
appropriate administrative sanction/s against, the erring notary public.

In this case, the Court finds that respondent committed the following violations of
the Notarial Rules:

First, respondent performed notarial acts without the proper notarial commission
therefor.

Second, respondent notarized a document that is bereft of any details regarding the
identity of the signatory.
 And third, respondent failed to forward to the Clerk of Court (COC) of the
commissioning court a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original
copy of any instrument acknowledged before him.

Accordingly, in view of respondent's numerous violations of the Notarial Rules,

the Court upholds the IBP's recommendation to revoke his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, as well as to perpetually disqualify him from being commissioned as
a notary public. The Court further suspends respondent from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on the subject matter.

The Court finds respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. GUILTY of violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, effective immediately, the Court: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for two (2) years; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and,
perpetually DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr.
(respondent) GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, effective immediately, the Court:
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years; REVOKES his incumbent
commission as a notary public, if any; and, perpetually DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as a notary public. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to
this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine when his
suspension from the practice of law, the revocation of his notarial commission, and his
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect.

Further, respondent is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from
notice why he should not be held in contempt of court and/or further disciplined for
allegedly practicing law despite the suspension therefor as discussed in this Decision.
 NACAR JUDGE DUMLAO, JR. vs. ATTY. CAMACHO
A.C. No. 10498, September 04, 2018
GESMUNDO, J.:

FACTS:

Before this Court is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit1 for Disbarment filed before

the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho (respondent)
for violating Rules 10.01, 11.03, 13.01 and 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) in bribing, attempting to influence complainant, and disrespecting
court officers.
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of the CV Case No. 2004-0181-D , Dagupan City,
Pangasinan, Branch 42 (RTC), where, entitled "Pathways Trading International, Inc. vs.
Univet Agricultural Products, Respondent is Pathways' counsel.

During the pendency of the case, respondent attempted to fraternize with him by
mentioning his closeness to Justices of the Supreme Court and his connection with the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law, where he served as a professor.
Pathways, through respondent, filed a motion for summary judgment. In its Order2 dated
January 30, 2014, the RTC found the said motion meritorious because there was no
genuine issue in the case. Defendants, filed a notice of appeal before the RTC.

Respondent started to call complainant and promised to share a portion of his

attorney's fees accompanied by a threat that if the offer is refused, disbarment case. Will
be file against complainant and through his connections, complainant would surely be
disbarred and the case was closely monitored by the named Supreme Court Justices and
that a portion of the judgment would be donated to the U.P. Law Center. He also stated
that then President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino III) would supposedly
appoint him as a Presidential Legal Consultant.
 Pathways later filed a Motion to Deny Appeal but the RTC denied because it was
filed by Atty. Baniqued, who was not properly substituted as the counsel for defendants.
Complainant was convinced of the abusive and scheming character of respondent to
influence the court.

Later, Sheriff Nabua issued a Notice of Garnishment as per instruction of

respondent to the different bank accounts of defendants. The latter then informed Sheriff
Nabua that they have personal properties in the form of poultry and swine feeds that were
sufficient to cover the obligation stated in the writ of execution, or in the amount of
P16,000,000.00. However, Pathways refused to accept the offer of defendants.

Respondent demanded that he order the court sheriff to sign the Garnishment
Order in favor of Pathways. Complainant, peremptorily dismissed respondent and told
him to talk instead to Sheriff Nabua. Complainant fiercely demanded Sheriff Nabua to
sign the document but Nabua refused to sign

May 22, 2014, respondent barged in the chamber of complainant and required
Sheriff Nabua to sign the garnishment order he prepared, he again gave an impression
that he would be able to dismiss Sheriff Nabua because of his influence with the higher
authorities. He uttered the following statements: "Kapag hindi mo pipirmahan ito,
papatanggal kita ", "Alam ng nasa itaas ito.", "Alam ng dalawang Justices ito," and
"Kung hindi niya pipirmahan ito, tutuluyan ko dismissal nito." Respondent also sent
several text messages to complainant stating that the latter and Sheriff Nabua are guilty of
graft and that they will receive pleadings from the Supreme Court.

Thereafter, complainant made an Incident Report6 stating the events that

transpired on May 22, 2014 when respondent barged into his chambers and threatened
Sheriff Nabua. The said report was submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Hence, this complaint.

In the proceedings before the IBP, only complainant filed his Mandatory
Conference Brief dated December 22, 2015.

IBP found respondent guilty of violating the Code and the Lawyer's Oath violating
various acts of professional misconduct thereby failed to live up to the ethical standards
imposed on members of the bar. Mentioning his alleged connections with Supreme Court
Justices, his prominence, and influence in the legal community constitute a violation of
his duty as an attorney to never mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law. Penalty of disbarment was given because it was not
respondent's first infraction but IBP Board of Governors (Board) reduced the
recommended penalty of disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty in bribing, attempting to influence

complainant, and disrespecting court officers.

RULING:

The Court accepts and adopts the findings of fact but modifies the penalty
imposed upon respondent. Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code. Every lawyer should act in a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
The Court finds that respondent violated the Code and the Lawyer's Oath for
influence peddling, attempted bribery, threatening court officers and disrespecting court
processes.

Peddling the highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge — or a

judge evincing a willingness — to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending
in that judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to
gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of
the Code.17 Canon 13 and Canon 13.01.

Bribery is classified as a serious charge that constitutes malfeasance in office.

Transaction usually done in secret. A lawyer who commits attempted bribery, or
corruption of public officials, against a judge or a court personnel, violates Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 of the Code.

Respondent gave an impression that he was an influence peddler. He tried to

impress complainant with his influence by dropping names of two Justices of the
Supreme Court, who were supposedly his colleagues and close friends.

While the case is pending, respondent declared that the case of Pathways was
closely monitored by the said Supreme Court Justices and stated that then President
Aquino III would supposedly appoint him as the Presidential Legal Consultant.
Respondent consistently applied his influence peddling scheme.

He related to complainant that he would share a portion of his attorney's fees with
complainant in exchange for the issuance of the writ of execution and the denial of the
notice of appeal filed by defendants this constitutes attempted bribery or corruption of
public officers

Respondent barged in the chamber of complainant and required Sheriff Nabua to

sign the garnishment order he prepared, he again gave an impression that he would be
able to dismiss Sheriff Nabua because of his influence with the higher authorities. He
uttered the following statements: "Kapag hindi mo pipirmahan ito, papatanggal kita ",
"Alam ng nasa itaas ito.", "Alam ng dalawang Justices ito," and "Kung hindi niya
pipirmahan ito, tutuluyan ko dismissal nito." Respondent also sent several text messages
to complainant stating that the latter and Sheriff Nabua are guilty of graft and that they
will receive pleadings from the Supreme Court. Clearly, respondent continuously and
unceasingly asserted that he had influence in the Court and that he would be able to
punish complainant and Sheriff Nabua if they do not follow his whims and caprices. At
one point, respondent even attempted to bribe complainant with a share of his attorney's
fees.

By implying that he can influence Supreme Court Justices to advocate for his
cause, shows gross disrespect of the judicial system that he is wanting in moral fiber and
that he lacks integrity in his character. These acts of respondent constitute the height of
arrogance and deceit. Respondent violated Canon 13, Rule 13.01, Canon 10 and Canon
10.01 of the Code.

Under this Rule canon 19, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any
unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed
to secure leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against
the lawyer's client. All lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. Lawyer must not
disrespect the officers of the court. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that
branch of the government to which they belong, as well as to the.

State which has instituted the judicial system.22 It is the duty of a lawyer to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.23 A
lawyer who disrespects the court and its officers violates Canon 11 and Canon 11.03 of
the Code,
The Court finds that the recommended penalty by the IBP Board must be modified to
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Manuel N. Camacho GUILTY of violating

Canons 10, 11, 13, 19 and Rules 10.01, 11.03,13.01 and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years. However, considering that he has already been
previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed. In the event that he should
apply for the lifting of his disbarment in Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, the penalty imposed
in the present case should be considered in the resolution of the same.
 Office of the Court Admin vs. Judge Adalim-White
A.M No. RTJ-15-2440, September 04, 2018
Per Curiam

FACTS:

On May 2, 2002, an administrative complaint for misconduct was filed by Mr.

Lim before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) against respondent Judge Adalim-
White, in connection with an administrative case filed against the latter and his wife
before the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for operating an unlicensed
cable television network.

Mr. Lim averred that Mayor Adalim and Rolando R. Olog (Olog), were operating
Reliance CATV System without a valid permit and franchise from the NTC.[4]As a result
thereof, the NTC en banc issued a Show Cause Order dated December 18, 2001, directing
Mayor Adalim to cease and desist from operating the subject CATV (NTC Order).

Mr. Lim's complaint was grounded on the prohibition against respondent Judge
Adalim-White, being then a PAO lawyer, from engaging in private practice or from
acting as counsel for immediate members of her family and relatives within the 4th civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity without the necessary approval therefor. Ombudsman
found respondent Judge Adalim-White guilty of simple misconduct and meted against
her the penalty of one (1) month suspension without pay.

Judge Adalim-White was administratively liable for representing her brother

without a written authority from the Regional Director of PAO. The Ombudsman found
that she acted as legal counsel of her brother
The Court of Appeals, denied respondent Judge Adalim-White's petition seeking to
reverse the subject Ombudsman Decision. Judge Adalim-White filed a petition before the
Court and was denied.

As such, the OCA recommended that the case filed by Mr Lim be considered as an
administrative complaint against respondent Judge Adalim-White for dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. The Court en banc adopted the recommendations of
the OCA in a Resolution[25] dated October 20, 2015.

Respondent Judge Adalim-White, prayed that the order of suspension against her
be reconsidered for being moot and academic, in light of the findings against her in
another case entitled, "Marc Titus D. Cebreros v. Hon. Juliana Adalim-White, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar" docketed as OCA IPI No.
07-2673-RTJ.
The Court dismissed Cebrero's complaint due to insufficient evidence to prove that
respondent Judge Adalim-White had deliberately omitted to disclose her pending
administrative case

The Court en banc, in a Resolution[29] dated September 6, 2016, thereafter

referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation. The OCA found respondent Judge Adalim-
White's explanation in her Supplemental Comment to be insufficient as this did not erase
the fact that she had made an untruthful claim in her PDS. OCA deemed it sufficient to
impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension from office to commence from notice.
With respect to the service of the penalty of one (1) month suspension meted by the
Ombudsman Decision, the OCA recommended that it be served after the one (1) year
suspension from office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of dishonesty.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the findings and well-reasoned conclusions of the OCA.
However, the Court believes, and so holds, that the penalty should be modified.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee
than a position in the judiciary. The importance of accomplishing a PDS with utmost
honesty cannot be stressed enough.

The accomplishment of a PDS is a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations in connection with employment in the government.[44] The making of
untruthful statements therein is, therefore, connected with such employment.[45] As
such, making a false statement therein amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an
official document. Dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses.

The totality of all these findings underscores the fact that respondent Judge
Adalim-White's actions served to erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
She has been remiss in the fulfillment of the duty imposed on all members of the bench in
order to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the
judiciary.

Time and time again, the Court has stressed that "the behavior of all employees
and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior
clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility."[66] As visible representation of the
law, respondent Judge Adalim-White should have conducted herself in a manner which
would merit the respect of the people to her in particular and to the Judiciary in general.
[67] By her blameworthy conduct, she has tainted the image of the judiciary and no
longer deserves to be a member thereof.
All told, it is the considered opinion of the Court that the appropriate penalty that should
be meted to respondent Judge Adalim-White should be dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Judge Juliana Adalim-White,

Branch 5, Regional Trial Court, Oras, Eastern Samar, is found GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE,with forfeiture
of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations; and the Motion for Execution filed by Mr. Roberto T.
Lim, in his capacity as complainant in OMB-V-A-02-0186-E, seeking the
implementation of the penalty of one (1) month suspension meted against Judge Adalim-
White while she was the District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in
Borongan, Eastern Samar be GRANTED. In lieu of suspension, a FINE equivalent to one
month salary is hereby imposed upon Judge Adalim-White.
 MARIANO, v. ATTY. JOSE N. LAKI,
A.C. No. 11978 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2769], September 25, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Atty. Laki then informed Mariano to prepare the amount of P160,000.00,

representing a package deal for his professional fee, docket fee and expenses for the
preparation and filing of the petition, subject to an advance payment of P50,000.00 for a
petition for annulment of his marriage and assure Mariano for a favorable judgment.

Believing in Atty. Laki's assurances, Mariano paid P50,000.00, to Atty. Laki and
Mariano made the succeeding payments. For almost a year thereafter, Mariano followed
up with Atty. Laki the status of the petition. He then discovered that the petition has yet
to be filed. Atty. Laki told him that the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Tarlac where he
allegedly filed the petition has been dismissed by the Supreme Court, thus, he decided to
withdraw the case since he did not expect the new presiding judge to be "friendly."

Doubtful of Atty. Laki's allegations, Mariano attempted to get a copy of the

petition but the former told him that he still has to locate the copy in his office. Mariano
tried several times to get hold of a copy of the petition but nevertheless failed, it
prompted Mariano to instead demand the return of his money considering that it was
apparent that Atty. Laki failed to fulfill his duty as lawyer to file the petition for
annulment. His demands were left unheeded. Atty. Laki promised Mariano that he would
return the money in installments but failed to make good of his promise. Later, Mariano's
succeeding phone calls were rejected.
 Aggrieved, Mariano filed the instant disbarment complaint against Atty. Laki for
dishonesty, unprofessional conduct and violations of the CPR.

IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) ordered Atty. Laki to submit his

Answer on the complaint against him. A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing
notifying the parties to appear on March 4, 2011 with a warning that non-appearance by
the parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in the proceedings.

On April 15, 2011, Mariano was the only one who appeared before the
Commission, and Atty. Laki was absent, despite notice, without any explanation but On
July 15, 2011, Mariano and Atty. Laki both appeared on the rescheduled mandatory
conference, but the counsel of Mariano was absent, thus, the conference was reset on
August 26, 2011. The Commission also noted that Atty. Laki has still not filed his
Answer to the Complaint.

On February 17, 2012, Mariano filed his Position Paper17 in compliance with the
Order of the Commission. However, Atty. Laid still failed to submit his Answer to the
Complaint. He was eventually declared in default. Thus, the instant case was submitted
for report and recommendation.18

However, on March 28, 2012, Atty. Laki filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Lift the Order of Default as he claimed that his absence during the scheduled
mandatory conference on January 17, 2012 was unintentional and was not meant to delay
the proceedings.19

In its Report and Recommendation dated August 20, 2015, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Atty. Laki be disbarred from the practice of law. It, likewise,
recommended that Atty. Laki be ordered to return to the complainant the amount of
P150,000.00 which he received as professional fee. In Resolution No. XXII-2016-323,21
the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP-CBD's report and
recommendation.

After a review of the records of the case, We resolve to sustain the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Laki shall be disbar violating the code of professional
responsibility.

RULING:
 In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Laki violated his sworn duties under the
CPR. Not only did he fail to file the petition for annulment of marriage despite receipt of
the acceptance fee in the amount of P150,000.00, he also failed to account for the money
he received. He also failed to keep his client abreast with the developments and status of
the case as he actually never provided Mariano a copy of the petition despite demand.

Having received payment for services which were not rendered, Atty. Laki was
unjustified in keeping Mariano's money. His obligation was to immediately return the
said amount. His refusal to do so despite repeated demands constitutes a violation of his
oath where he pledges not to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself
with good fidelity to his clients. His failure to return the money, also gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of, the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics, as it impairs public confidence in the legal
profession.

It must be emphasized anew that the fiduciary nature of the relationship between
the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Laki's failure to render an
accounting, and to return the money if the intended purpose thereof did not materialize,
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the CPR.

But what we find more deplorable was Atty. Laki's act of giving assurance to
Mariano that he can secure a favorable decision without the latter's personal appearance
because the petition will be filed in the.RTC of Tarlac, which is allegedly presided by a
"friendly" judge who is receptive to annulment cases. Atty. Laki's deceitful assurances
give the implication that a favorable decision can be obtained by being in cahoots with a
"friendly" judge. It gives a negative impression that decisions of the courts can be
decided merely on the basis of close ties with the judge and not necessarily on the merits.
Without doubt, Atty. Laki's statements cast doubts on the integrity of the courts in the
eyes of the public. By making false representation to his client, Atty. Laki not only
betrayed his client's trust but he also undermined the trust and faith of the public in the
legal profession.

The misconduct of Atty. Laki is further aggravated by Atty. Laki's non-chalant

attitude on the proceedings before the IBP, as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of
the IBP's directives to file his comment on the complaint and appear during hearings.
Atty. Laki, while astute in filing several motions for postponement of the mandatory
conference, he never filed his answer to the complaint, despite several reminders and
opportunities given by the IBP. He, likewise, offered no justification or any valid reason
as to why he failed to submit his Answer.
 From these actuations, it is undisputed that Atty. Laki wronged his client and the
Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. He disregarded his
duties as a lawyer and betrayed the trust of his client, the IBP, and the courts. The Court,
thus, rules that Atty. Laki deserves the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment.

Finally, we also deem it proper to order the return of the acceptance fee in the
amount of P150,000.00 which Atty. Laki received from Mariano, considering that said
transaction was borne out of their professional relationship.

FALLO:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds respondent ATTY.

JOSE N. LAKI, GUILTY of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders,
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is, thus,
ORDERED DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-off of the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as a notary public. Furthermore, Atty. Laki is ORDERED to RETURN to
complainant Kenneth R. Mariano the total amount of P150,000.00, with legal interest of
six percent (6%) per annum, if it is still unpaid, within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this Decision.

AAA, v. ATTY. ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES,

A.C. No. 10021, September 18, 2018
PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Sometime in February 1997, [AAA] was hired as secretary to [respondent Atty.

De Los Reyes], then Vice-President of the Legal and Administrative Group of [National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation] NHMFC.

[AAA] became a permanent employee with a plantilla position of private secretary

1, pay grade 11, on a co-terminus status with [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]. She later
learned that it was [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who facilitated her rapid promotion
to her position soon after becoming his secretary.

Sometime in the last quarter of 1997, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] offered to
take [AAA] home in his NHMFC issued service vehicle telling her that her residence on
J.P. Rizal Street, Makati was along his route. From then on it became a daily routine
between them, which continued even after [AAA] moved to Mandaluyong City.
 [AAA] began to feel very uncomfortable with the situation when Atty. De Los
Reyes was becoming possessive and she could not refuse his offer to bring her home; her
telephone calls were being monitored He also sent or left her love notes. [AAA] tried to
avoid [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who vacillated between being verbally abusive
toward her, cursing and shouting invectives at her whenever she did, and overly
solicitous the next moment, apparently to placate her. He got angry with her and shouted
"putangina mo." She tried to get away from him but he blocked her path, grabbed her arm
and dragged her to the parking area and pushed her inside his service vehicle.

From then on, she became his sex slave who was at his beck and call at all times
for all kinds of sexual services ranging from hand-jobs in his vehicle to sexual intercourse
in his office. She could not even refuse him without risking physical, verbal and
emotional abuse.

AAA filed another Complaint-Affidavit dated November 19, 2004, with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
alleging that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes still continued to harass her and her
colleagues (Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and Mercedita Lorenzana) who agreed to be her
witnesses in her earlier complaint.

In the Report and Recommendation dated June 6, 2011, the CBD-IBP

Commissioner found respondent Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of one (1) year
suspension.

Respondent has also raised the argument of prescription. While there could be a
prescriptive period under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law, there is no prescriptive
period for grave misconduct in disbarment proceedings and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis.3

In Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Antonio De Los
Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED [INDEFINITELY].4
 Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the IBP consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012
is hereby AFFIRMED.5

ISSUE:

The issue in this case is whether or not respondent Atty. De Los Reyes committed
acts amounting to sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which would warrant his disbarment.

RULING:

After due consideration, we adopt the findings and conclusions of the

Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent
violated canon and canon 7.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good
moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds
from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds
and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

Thus, lawyers are duty-bound to observe the highest degree of morality and
integrity not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their career in order to
safeguard the reputation of the legal profession. Any errant behavior, be it in their public
or private life, may subject them to suspension or disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court expressly states that members of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
for any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of their oath.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes

GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

CABALIDA, v. ATTY. LOBRIDO, JR. AND ATTY. PONDEVILLA,

A.C. No. 7972, October 03, 2018
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, C.J.:

FACTS:

Cabalida avers that he had been wronged by both respondents-lawyers on account

of which he lost a piece of real estate property

Ejectment case was instituted before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of the City of Bacolod, Negros Occidental by Cabalida against Reynaldo Salili (Salili)
and Janeph Alpiere (Alpiere). Australian national, gifted the property to Cabalida by
virtue of their special relationship until they encountered a minor misunderstanding while
Keleher continued living in the property hired by Alpiere as his house help. Kelehenr
died and the Australian Embassy arrange to seel the property for funeral funds. Alpiere
kept the proceeds after selling the property

Cabalida sent a demand letter to Alpiere and Salili, to vacate the property and to
pay the rent. Cabalida availed the legal services of Atty. Lobrido to represent him in an
ejectment case for purposes of representing him against Alpiere and Salili. Lobrido filed
Civil Case for Ejectment with Damages

Alpiere and Salili availed the legal services of Atty. Pondevilla, Alpiere and Salili
stated that Cabalida was merely a dummy of Keleher because the latter cannot register
the property under his name. Alpiere however stole the deed of sale and falsified it by
inserting his name as vendee. Furthermore, it was impossible that Cabalida would have
sold the property to Alpiere for P161,000.00 especially that weeks before the alleged sale,
they were adversaries in the failed mediation with the barangay.

Atty. Lobrido and Atty. Pondevilla (respondents for brevity), met for a possible
amicable settlement at Atty. Pondevilla's office parties agreed that the defendants would
no longer pursue the case in exchange for P150,000.00.10 Atty. Pondevilla conveyed to
Cabalida that his clients decided to increase the amount to P250,000.00. Cabalida on the
other hand signed on the belief that he can sell the property for P1,300,000.00. For the
time being, however, Cabalida considered mortgaging his property and thus hired Lydia
S. Gela (Gela) and Wilma Palacios (Palacios), real estate brokers, to assist him in the
mortgaging process.

Cabalida, again unassisted by Atty. Lobrido, returned to Atty. Pondevilla's office

on July 2, 2006 to finalize his amicable settlement with Salili and Alpiere. Atty.
Pondevilla prepared a new Memorandum of Agreement which contained the same terms
as its earlier version but no longer listed Salili as a party or signatory. Nonetheless,
Cabalida signed the revised Memorandum of Agreement,

In its Decision14 dated August 17, 2006, the MTCC rendered a judgment in accordance
with the terms and conditions that were stipulated in the Memorandum of Agreement
after finding that "the Memorandum of Agreement is not contrary to law, morals and
public policy."

On September 18, 2006, Atty. Lobrido filed an Ex-parte Motion to Withdraw as

Cabalida's counsel stating therein that it was upon Cabalida's request and with his
conformity. Atty. Adrian Arellano (Atty. Arellano) filed his Formal Entry of Appearance
for Cabalida on the same date and filed a Motion to Amend Decision praying that the
order be amended to include Salili as he refused to vacate the property. The pertinent
provisions of the motion thus provides:

The MTCC issued an Order18 on September 25, 2006 stating that the
Memorandum of Agreement did not bind Salili because he was not one of its signatories.
Hence, Civil Case No. 30337 continued only against Salili until it was ultimately
dismissed on January 24, 2008,19 when Cabalida failed to appear on time for the
Preliminary Conference.
 In the meantime, Cabalida was unable to pay off his debt to MLC thus his property
was foreclosed and sold in a public auction.

On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City sent a Notice of
Extrajudicial Sale of Real Estate Mortgage20 to Cabalida, alleging as follows:

To satisfy the outstanding indebtedness of the Mortgagor ANGELITO

CABALIDA of Block 81, Lot 17, Purok Pag-asa, Brgy. Estefania, Bacolod City with the
Mortgagee in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P751,250.00), exclusive of interest and other charges, the
Mortgagee [Metropol Lending Corp.], through this Office, pursuant to Act 3135, as
Amended, will SELL at PUBLIC AUCTION on Nov 08, 2007 at Bacolod City Hall of
Justice, between the hours of 10:00 a.m. until 11:00 a.m., whatever rights, interest and
participation the Mortgagor has in the real estate mortgaged property with all its
improvements.

Cabalida now comes before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
instituting the present administrative complaint with the allegations that respondents
engaged in various unethical acts which caused the loss of his property.

Cabalida asserts in his complaint that respondents colluded to dispossess him of

his property. Atty. Pondevilla was already a member of Lobrido's law firm as early as
their initial meeting for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 30337. In the said
meeting, respondents convinced Cabalida that the best course of action for him was to
obtain a loan in order to come up with P250,000.00 as payment to Alpiere. This was
made even after the respondents learned that Cabalida was in communication with a
prospective buyer who was willing to purchase the property for P1,300,000.00. Atty.
Pondevilla also withheld the possession of TCT No. T-227214 from Cabalida and placed
it in the custody of his office staff until Cabalida's property was mortgaged to MLC. As
for the issuance of the Trust Agreement, Cabalida claims that he did not receive
P250,000.00 in trust from Atty. Pondevilla.

Cabalida also alleges in his complaint that the loan from the mortgage was
distributed as follows: P250,000.00 to Atty. Pondevilla, in view of the Trust Agreement,
P86,000.00 to the brokers, P50,000.00 to Atty. Lobrido, P3,000.00 to Atty. Pondevilla's
office staff, and an unspecified amount for Atty. Lobrido's appearance fee and for the
filing fee.

The complaint also provides that Atty. Lobrido did not assist Cabalida when he
entered into the Memorandum of Agreement on July 2, 2006. Atty. Lobrido also made it
appear that his withdrawal as counsel was due to Cabalida's insistence when it was Atty.
Lobrido himself who advised Cabalida to look for a new counsel as his work was already
over.
 Thus, Cabalida claims that the unethical acts of respondents clearly violated the
Code of Ethics. Respondents took advantage of their knowledge of the law as against him
who was not even a high school graduate. He prays that their actions merit disbarment
and that they be held liable for damages equivalent to the value of the property lost.

In support of his allegations Cabalida submitted, among others, the Trust

Agreement that he entered into with Atty. Pondevilla; the receipt for the cancellation of
the Trust Agreement; the Memorandum of Agreement between Alpiere and Cabalida, and
the Motions to Withdraw of respondents.

In his Comment Atty. Lobrido alleged that Cabalida never declared that the
property costs more than P1,000,000.00. Atty. Lobrido also denies that Atty. Pondevilla
joined his law firm as early as the initial meeting for the amicable settlement

Atty. Lobrido also avers that he was not consulted nor was a privy to the
Memorandum of Agreement. Atty. Pondevilla professes in his Comment, that the idea of
mortgaging the property came from Cabalida and his brokers.

In a Resolution23 dated February 4, 2009, the Court referred the administrative

case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation or decision.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on
April 17, 2009. Flores appeared as a representative of Cabalida stating that Cabalida
cannot appear. May 12, 2009. On the aforementioned date, only respondents were present
when the case was called for mandatory conference. Cabalida arrived, with his legal
counsel Atty. Ma. Agnes Hernando-Cabacungan (Atty. Cabacungan), but only after the
mandatory conference was again reset to June 16, 2009, as per Order25 of Comm. Reyes.

Cabalida, represented by Atty. Cabacungan, and respondents appeared on June 16,

2009. In his Order,26 Comm. Reyes terminated the mandatory conference and stated
therein that the mandatory conference order shall be issued after it has been reviewed and
corrected by the parties. Comm. Reyes also directed the parties to file their respective
verified position papers, attaching thereto certified true copies of documentary exhibits
and affidavits of witnesses. The case was then set for clarificatory hearing on August 14,
2009.

The parties appeared in the clarificatory hearing on August 14, 2009. The
Mandatory Conference Order,27 was furnished to the parties on the same day and it
contained the admissions of Cabalida and the respondents. The admissions of respondents
were limited to the following:
 All the parties were present for the clarificatory hearing on September 17, 2009. In
his Order issued on the said date, Comm. Reyes terminated the clarificatory questioning
between the parties and deemed it submitted for resolution.

Comm. Reyes rendered his Report and Recommendation on January 19, 2010
finding that:

The counsel of the complainant, Atty. Lobrido, advised his client to settle the case
with the respondent in the ejectment case. It would appear that the complainant
negotiated directly with Atty. Danny Pondevilla without the assistance of his counsel
Atty. Lobrido, Jr. and Atty. Pondevilla came out with a Memorandum of Agreement with
the complainant, Angelito Cabalida.

Atty. Lobrido on the other hand confirm[ed] that a settlement was encouraged by
the Court and he told the complainant that he would explore settlement with Atty.
Pondevilla.

However, in Paragraph no. 8 of Atty. Lobrido's answer, [he] admitted to [the]

Court that the respondent ha[d] no participation in the Memorandum of Agreement and
that it came to his knowledge only after it was submitted to the Court for approval.

Clearly on the part of Atty. Lobrido, he did not actively assist his client Angelito
Cabalida in negotiating with Atty. Danny Pondevilla.

After the memorandum of agreement was submitted, both lawyers withdrew as

counsel. An analysis of the memorandum of agreement entered into by Angelito Cabalida
would readily show that his right was not protected due to the following reasons:

Angelito Cabalida will pay the amount of Php250,000.00 but not all defendants to
the complaint signed the agreement. Surprisingly, only Janeph Alpiere signed the
agreement and the other party, the sister of Atty. Pondevilla, was included as party [to]
the agreement. Reynaldo Salili, one of the defendants, was not included in the
memorandum of agreement.

The memorandum of agreement submitted to the Court was designed to fail

because Reynaldo Salili, one of the defendants, was not a party and did not sign the
agreement.

The complainant Angelito Cabalida filed this case for the simple reason that he felt
betrayed by his counsel Atty. Lobrido who was suppose[d] to assist him in the
memorandum of agreement against the other counsel Atty. Pondevilla who after
submitting the memorandum of agreement for approval by the Court, manifested and
moved for his withdrawal as counsel for the other defendant Reynaldo Salili.
 Both respondents would want to make an impression [sic] that it is a mere
coincidence that Atty. Pondevilla joined the Law Office of Atty. Lobrido a few months
after the filing of the memorandum of agreement.

The actuation of Atty. Lobrido of not assisting his client during the negotiation
violates the Code of Professional Responsibility while the action of Atty. Pondevilla of
negotiating with the party who is not assisted by his counsel is [a] blatant violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

The undersigned Commissioner would like to give both the respondents the
benefit of the doubt that there was no collusion in their actions however, individually
both counsels have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The act of Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla of negotiating with the party who was not
assisted by counsel is a blatant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. failed to assist his client during the negotiation
which led to the act of his client in signing the agreement without the assistance of
counsel.

Under Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Atty. Lobrido clearly had the obligation to exert his best effort, [and] best judgment in the
prosecution of litigation entrusted to him. He should have exercise[d] care and diligence
in the application of his knowledge to his client's cause. In the case at bar, Atty. Lobrido
failed to render the proper legal assistance to his client.

It is respectfully recommended that both respondents be meted a penalty of six (6)

months suspension for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.
Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. for failing to assist his client for violation of Canon 18 and for
Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla [for] negotiating [with] a party without assistance of counsel
for violation of Canon 8. But December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG) reversed the findings of Comm. Reyes with the following recommendations:

Cabalida filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Cabalida filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents violated the code of professional responsibility.

RULING:
 At the onset, it bears emphasizing that the IBP Board of Governors' reversal of the
initial recommendation by the Investigating Commissioner was never justified. Cabalida
travelled all the way from the province to secure a copy of the December 29, 2012
resolution only to be informed by the attending staff that the initial recommendation for
respondents' suspension, along with the single page reversal of the same sans any
discussion, constitutes the entire decision of the IBP. Clearly, this is in violation of the
rules governing disbarment and discipline of attorney under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, Section 12(a) of which provides:

"Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of

Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his
report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated
within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board
following the submittal of the Investigator's report."35

After a thorough review of the records, the Court adopts the findings of Comm.
Reyes but modifies the penalty to be imposed on one of the respondents.

Atty. Lobrido's bare denial of knowledge of the negotiations for and the
submission of the Memorandum of Agreement must fail. His failure to represent
Cabalida in the negotiations for the Memorandum of Agreement shows gross neglect and
indifference to his client's cause. Hence, there was abject failure to observe due diligence.
Atty. Lobrido has therefore violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Canon 18.03 which provides:

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Competence is a professional obligation. A member of the legal profession owes

his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. Public interest
demands that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause,
for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice.
Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer's inability to
properly discharge his duty to his client may also mean a violation of his correlative
obligations to the court, to his profession and to the general public.

The Court fully adopts the findings of Comm. Reyes that Atty. Lobrido failed to
render proper legal assistance to his client and imposes upon him six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.
 The uncontroverted facts of the decision of the MTCC dated September 17, 2007
further suggests that Atty. Pondevilla actively participated in the negotiation of the
Memorandum of Agreement:

Atty. Pondevilla's actions violated Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility when he negotiated with Cabalida without consulting Atty. Lobrido.
Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional

employment of another lawyer; however it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.

This failure of Atty. Pondevilla, whether by design or because of oversight, is an

inexcusable violation of a canon of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty
owing to a colleague. Atty. Pondevilla fell short of the demands required of him as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

For these infractions, the Court imposes upon Atty. Pondevilla a penalty of six
months suspension from the practice of law

Atty. Pondevilla's engagement in the unlawful practice of law, through disregard

and apparent ignorance of Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, is a contravention of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty
to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. The Court holds Atty. Pondevilla
administratively liable, even in the absence of further investigation, by reason of his
admissions of facts on record. This here is an application of the principle of res ipsa
loquitur. In several instances, the Court has sanctioned lawyers for their blatant
misconduct even in the absence of a formal charge and investigation because their
admissions are sufficient bases for the determination of their administrative liabilities.49

A penalty of another six months suspension from the practice of law is further
imposed on Atty. Pondevilla, thus bringing his suspension to a period of one year.

FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla is found guilty of
violation of Canon 8, Rule 8.02 and unauthorized practice of law and is ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective
immediately upon receipt of this decision. Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. is also ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for failure to render
proper legal assistance to his client. Respondents are further WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be FORWARDED to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal records as attorneys of Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. and Atty.
Danny L. Pondevilla. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

CARLOS GAUDENCIO M. MAÑALAC, v. HON. EPITO B. GELLADA,

PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 53, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BACOLOD,
CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2535 (formerly OCA IPI No. 16-4583-RTJ), October 08, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Carlos Gaudencio M. Mañalac was the complainant for and on behalf of

Philippine Investment One (SPY-AMC), Inc. (PI One), filed this complaint against
respondent Judge Pepito B. Gellada (Judge Gellada), former Presiding Judge of Branch
53, Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (RTC Bacolod City Branch 53), Negros
Occidental for "(a) gross ignorance of the law and interference with the proceedings of a
co-equal and coordinate court in issuing the nullification of the foreclosure [of] and the
subsequent proceeding[s] taken thereafter; (b) gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse
of discretion in granting relief which has not specifically been sought in the pleadings by
the parties; and (c) gross ignorance of the law when he acted upon the Ex-Parte Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by [Medical Associates Diagnostic Center Inc.]
MADCI on 13 May 2016 and issued an Order on that very day granting the issuance of
the corresponding writ of execution without the required hearing and without prior notice
to PI One.

PI One is a corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
In particular, it was organized as a Special Purpose Vehicle by virtue of Republic Act No.
9182 and is thus "empowered to acquire or purchase assets from banking and financial
institutions".

MADCI obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
secured by a mortgage over a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-200764. MADCI defaulted in its obligations and its loan eventually became past due.
Subsequently, DBP transferred to PI One all its rights, title, and interest on the non-
performing loan of MADCI.

MADCI filed an action for corporate rehabilitation which was raffled to RTC
Bacolod City Branch 53 presided by Judge Gellada. After due proceedings, the RTC
Bacolod City Branch 53 issued on March 19, 2015 an Order4 terminating the
rehabilitation proceedings for failure of MADCI to comply with its obligations under the
rehabilitation plan.

Complainant alleged that, notwithstanding the termination of the rehabilitation

proceedings, MADCI filed a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Avail of the Provisions of
Rule 2 Sec. 73 of the Financial Rehabilitation Rules of Procedure dated October 5, 2015.
MADCI prayed that it "be given a final opportunity to remedy the breach in the
rehabilitation plan in lieu of the direct termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. In
other words, MADCI prayed that it be allowed to revive or reopen the rehabilitation
proceedings.

On May 5, 2016, Judge Gellada granted MADCI's motion and ordered MADCI to
comply with the provisions of the rehabilitation plan within 15 days; declared null and
void the foreclosure and the proceedings taken after such foreclosure; and ordered PI One
to restore MADCI in possession of the subject property. Judge Gellada denied the
charges against him. In his Comment,16 he asserted that the Order lifting the termination
of the rehabilitation proceedings was not without support.17 He claimed that PI ONE's
motion to terminate the rehabilitation proceedings was anchored on Section 27, Rule 4 of
the old Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of2000 (2000 Rules) which rule later became
the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of 2008 (2008 Rules); that MADCI's
motion to revive the proceedings was grounded on the Financial Rehabilitation and
Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA), Section 75 of which repealed Section 27 of the 2000
Rules and Section 23 of the 2008 Rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Gellada should subject for disciplinary action.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court have repeatedly held that a case where an execution
order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has
the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of

administrative sanctions.38 (Emphasis in the original. Underscoring supplied Citations
omitted.)

Judge Gellada's administrative liability becomes more palpable as MADCI's

Motion to Allow Petitioner to Avail of the Provisions of Rule 2 Sec. 73 of the Financial
Rehabilitation Rules of Procedure did not even pray for the nullification of the
foreclosure proceedings or restoration of possession of the subject property.

The confluence of these infractions showed Judge Gellada's gross ignorance of the
law, "which is classified as a serious charge, [and] punishable by a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00, and suspension from office for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, without salary and other benefits, or dismissal
from service."39 Given the fact that Judge Gellada compulsorily retired on July 28, 2016,
and in the absence of a finding of bad faith, dishonesty, or some other ill motive, a fine of
P21,000.00 would be appropriate under the circumstances.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, Judge Pepito B. Gellada, former Presiding Judge of Branch 53,

Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and is FINED the amount of P21,000.00, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
 FLORA III, v. ATTY. LUNA,
A.C. No. 11486 (Formerly CBD No. 13-3899), October 17, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

On July 22, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar

Discipline (IBP-CBD) received the Complaint-Affidavit executed by herein complainant
alleging that he engaged the legal services of respondent relative to certain criminal cases
for grave threats, grave coercion, grave oral defamation and unjust vexation which he
intended to file against an Indian national; that in connection therewith, respondent
charged complainant P40,000.00 as acceptance fee and P3,500.00 as appearance fee; that
complainant paid respondent a total of P43,500.00; that the criminal cases did not
materialize because these were amicably settled at the barangay level; that, for this
reason, he demanded that respondent return the amount of P43,500.00 because the cases
were settled without the latter's participation, and no complaint was actually filed in
court; but that, instead of heeding his demand, respondent replied in anger and shouted at
him (complainant), saying that the P43,500.00 complainant gave him was not enough for
his services.

ISSUE:

Whether the allegations in the complaint-affidavit established enough ground to

hold respondent administratively liable.

RULING:

Yes. The Court notes that, because of respondent's failure to file an answer and to
attend the mandatory hearings set by the IBP-CBD, the allegations of herein complainant
against him must be deemed to have remained uncontroverted.

The Court has not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar to refrain from
any act or omission which tends to degrade the trust and confidence reposed by the public
in the legal profession. It is imperative that lawyers, at all times, maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency, and devote their undivided attention, skill, and competence to every
case they accept.8 The lawyer-client relationship is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence.9 Clients could thus understandably expect that their attorney would
accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their legal dilemmas.
An overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct is enshrined in Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Accordingly, any specie of refractory behavior by a lawyer in fulfilling his duties

must necessarily subject him to disciplinary action. "While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.

FALLO:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Giovanni A. Luna is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months effective from finality of this Decision for violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is also ordered to RETURN to complainant the
amount of P43,500.00 with 6% legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment
until full payment.17 He is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment
of the amount within ten (10) days from payment. Respondent is also STERNLY
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

PIA MARIE B. GO, v. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI,

A.C. No. 12296, December 04, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that sometime in September 2012, she engaged the services
of respondent to handle the annulment of her marriage with her husband. In connection
therewith, she paid2 respondent on January 17, 2013 the amount of P150,000.00
representing the latter's "package engagement fee" and professional services. Shortly
thereafter, complainant was informed that a petition for annulment was already filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa (RTC), albeit no copy of the petition was
furnished to her despite her request. However, in February 2013, complainant asked
respondent to "hold" her case as she had to deal with various personal problems, to which
the latter responded by "withdrawing" the petition supposedly filed before the RTC.

It was only in February 2015 that complainant decided to push through with the
annulment, thus, she tried contacting respondent, but to no avail. After a few weeks and
with the help of a lawyer friend, complainant was finally able to get in touch with.
respondent and tell her to push through with the annulment case. Thereafter, respondent
asked complainant for another P38,000.00 purportedly for the re-filing 'of the case, which
complainant reluctantly remitted to her. Later on, complainant repeatedly demanded
respondent to furnish her copies of the original and the re-filed petition for annulment and
to issue receipts for the money she remitted, but respondent failed or refused to do so.
Becoming suspicious of respondent's actions, petitioner went to the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC and discovered that there was no petition for annulment filed by
respondent on her behalf.4 This prompted complainant to confront respondent, to which
the latter responded by promising to file the petition. However, respondent continuously
failed to file the same, resulting in complainant losing trust in her and subsequently
demanding that she return complainant's money. Respondent promised to return only half
of the money, which she still failed to do despite complainant's repeated demands. Hence,
complainant was constrained to file the instant complaint.

Eventually, the IBP-CBD required the parties to attend the Mandatory Conference
and submit their respective mandatory conference briefs, to which only complainant
complied. In view of the foregoing, the IBP-CBD deemed respondent's continued failure
to appear before it and comply with its directives to be a waiver on her part to participate
in the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for the acts

complained of.
RULING:

Yes. Records show that sometime in September 2012, complainant secured

respondent's services in order to assist her in filing a petition for the annulment of her
marriage, and in connection therewith, paid the latter a total of P188,000.00. However,
and despite respondent's assurances that the case had already been filed before the RTC,
complainant later on found out through the Certification12 issued by the RTC that no
annulment case was ever filed by respondent on her behalf. Such neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to respondent constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR, which reads:

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Case law exhorts that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as respondent
in this case.

Furthermore, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the
CPR when she failed to return to complainant the total amount of P188,000.00
representing her legal fees despite numerous demands from the latter, viz.:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand x x x.

It bears stressing that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary
and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri is found guilty of violating Rule

1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon her
receipt of this Decision. She is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. She is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine in
the amount of P5,000.00 for failure to comply with the directives of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline.
 ATTY. ROQUE, JR., v. ATTY. BALBIN,
A.C. No. 7088, December 04, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case entitled

FELMAILEM, Inc. v. Felma Mailem, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004-307 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 (MeTC). Shortly after securing a
favorable judgment for his client,herein respondent-as counsel for the defendant, and on
appeal-started intimidating, harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously threatening
complainant into withdrawing the case filed by his client. According to complainant,
respondent would make various telephone calls and send text messages and e-mails not
just to him, but also to his friends and other clients, threatening to file disbarment and/or
criminal suits against him. Further, and in view of complainant's "high profile" stature,
respondent also threatened to publicize such suits in order to besmirch and/or destroy
complainant's name and reputation.

Initially, respondent moved for an extension of time to file his comment, which
was granted by the Court. However, respondent failed to file his comment despite
multiple notices, prompting the Court to repeatedly fine him and even order his arrest. To
date, the orders for respondent's arrest remain unserved and are still standing. Eventually,
the Court dispensed with respondent's comment and forwarded e records to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for the acts

complained of.

RULING:

Lawyers are licensed officers of the court who are empowered to appear,
prosecute, and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. To this end, Canon 8 of the CPR commands, to wit:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.

Case law instructs that "[l]lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other
lawyers with courtesy, dignity [,] and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of
their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren.
Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and
respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations [,]
and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action.

In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in

violation of Canon 8 of the CPR. As aptly pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, instead of availing of remedies to contest the ruling adverse to his client,
respondent resorted to personal attacks against the opposing litigant's counsel, herein
complainant. Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating, harassing,
and blackmailing complainant with purported administrative and criminal cases and
prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience
suffered by his client. His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available
to him and his client, especially considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to
render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.16 More significantly,
the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and despicable behavior towards a
colleague in the legal profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a member
thereof.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon 8,

Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

PSP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY REYNALDO

JESUS B. PASCO, SR., v. . ATTY. ARMA,
A.C. No. 12220 (formerly CBD Case No. 07-1970), November 13, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

PSP Development Corporation (complainant) alleges that it is a domestic

corporation; and, is represented in this suit by its President, Reynaldo Jesus B. Pasco, Sr.
(Pasco).
 According to complainant, in August 2004, Pasco engaged the legal services of
respondent to file a case against a certain Pio Castillo, Jr. and Macatan Apparel, Inc. It
claimed that respondent accepted the engagement and billed it P65,000.00 as professional
fees. It insisted that, despite such payment and its repeated follow-ups, respondent failed
and refused to file the necessary case in court to the prejudice of complainant.

Complainant further averred that, on September 7, 2005, it made its final demand
asking respondent to return the money he received from it but to no avail.

Report and Recommendation of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner

In her Report and Recommendation3 dated April 1, 2016, the Investigating

Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
five (5) years.

The Investigating Commissioner declared that, despite notice, respondent failed to

file his answer to the Complaint. The Investigating Commissioner further stressed that
the notice (to file answer) sent to respondent was returned with the notation "moved with
no forwarding address." She added that complainant never inquired about the status of the
case.

The Investigating Commissioner did not, however, mention whether the case was
set for a mandatory conference. She did not also state whether an order of default was
issued on respondent; or whether she directed the submission of position papers. Neither
did she mention when this case was submitted for resolution.

In her one-paragraph/two-sentence explanation, the Investigating Commissioner

opined that there was sufficient basis to warrant the disciplinary action against respondent
as he refused to return to his client what he had collected for the service which he failed
to render
ISSUE:

Whether respondent committed misconduct and for which reason, he must be

suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

Enshrined in our Bill of Rights is the basic rule that no person shall be deprived of
his or her life without due process of law. In turn, due process in administrative
proceedings relates to the opportunity given to a party to explain one's side, or to seek
reconsideration on the action or adverse judgment against him or her. For as long as such
opportunity is made available before judgment, the required due process is adequately
complied with.

In such instance when a party is declared in default, he or she waives only one's
right to be heard and to present evidence and no other. To ensure due process, it remains
important that, even if a party is in default, any judgment must be anchored on
established facts and applicable law. Definitely, "[a]ny ruling that disposes of an action x
x x must have basis in law, and any ruling so intentioned without legal basis is deemed as
issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the end, a person who is condemned to suffer
loss of property without justifying legal basis is denied due process of law.

There being no other pleading submitted, the recommendation to suspend

respondent was solely pursuant to the Complaint. However, on the basis alone of the
allegations in the Complaint, we find that complainant failed to convince us, much more
discharge the necessary burden to prove by substantial evidence that respondent
committed the accusations against him. Let it be underscored that, other than the attached
photocopy of a final demand letter10 in the Complaint, (allegedly made on respondent
but received by a certain Ely Tagalog), no other evidence was adduced establishing that
respondent accepted money but failed to render any service in favor of complainant.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Atty. Luisito C. Arma is DISMISSED for

lack of evidence.