CONSTI II REQUISITES FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF

POLICE POWER:
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER – It is the sovereign power to
promote and protect the general welfare.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN – the right of
the state to acquire private property for public
use upon payment of just compensation.
1. The interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
should justify the interference of the State; and
2. The means employed are necessary.
SCOPE AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
- Most pervasive, least limiting and most demanding.

POWER OF TAXATION – is the power of the LIMITATIONS ON THE VALID EXERCISE OF POLIC
State to raise revenues to defray the expenses of POWER:
government or for any public purpose. 1. Lawful Subject – public interest
2. Lawful Means – means employed are
SIMILARITIES: reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
1. Interference of the State with private rights; the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on
2. Inherent in the State and may be exercised individual.
without need of express constitutional
grant; ORTIGAS & CO. VS. CA, GR. NO. 126102, DEC. 4,
3. Necessary and indispensable; 2000
4. With equivalent compensation; and Facts:
5. Exercised primarily by the legislature. Ortigas & Co. sold to Hermosa a parcel of land
located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with
DISTINCTIONS: restrictions in the contract that said lot be used
POLICE EMINENT exclusively for residential purposes, until December
POWER DOMAIN TAXATION 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by
Nature of Intangible More Correspon MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as
Compens altruistic concrete ding commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III)
ation feeling that protection leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a
one has and public building for Greenhills Autohaus Inc. as car sales
contributed improvem company. Ortigas & Co. filed a complaint against
to the ents for Hermoso which sought the demolition of the
general the taxes constructed car sales company as it violated the
welfare paid. terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court
ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the
Nature of Destruction Taking is Taking is issue to the Court of Appeals from which he sought
Property and for public for public favorable ruling. Ortigas appealed to the Supreme
confiscation use use Court.
of property
Issue:
Exercise Exercised May be Exercised Whether the zoning ordinance may impair
of Power only by the exercised by the contracts entered prior to its effectivity.
government by private governme
entities nt only Held:
upon valid Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of
delegation police power may be given effect over any standing
contract. A law enacted in the exercise of police
Regulatio Liberty and Private Liberty power to regulate or govern certain activities or
n Property Rights only and transactions could be given retroactive effect and
Property, may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts.
Private Police power legislation is applicable not only to
Rights future contracts, but equally to those already in
Only existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested
rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and
It is the power of promoting public welfare by legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
restraining and regulating the use and promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
enjoyment of liberty and property; order, safety and general welfare of the people.
Moreover, statues in exercise of valid police power
It is the power to prescribe regulations to must be read into every contract.
promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL VS. JAC
LINER G.R NO. 148339, FEB. 23, 2005
Facts:
The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which
provides that all buses, mini-buses and out-of-
town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited
from entering the city and are hereby directed
to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-
up and/or dropping off their passengers; and
(b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena
are hereby declared inoperable starting from
the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides
that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall
use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC
Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as
unconstitutional on the ground that the same
constituted an invalid exercise of police power,
an undue taking of private property, and a
violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance satisfies the requisite of
valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
No. The local government may be considered as
having properly exercised its police power only
if the following requisites are met: lawful
subject and lawful method. The questioned
ordinances having been enacted with the
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, they involve public interest
warranting interference of the State. The first
requisite for the proper exercise of police power
is thus present. This leaves for determination
the issue of whether the means employed by the
Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its
professed objective were reasonably necessary
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond
what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use
of the terminal operated by petitioner would
subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as
correctly found in the appellate court.
CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUIO, GR
118127, APRIL 12, 2005
Facts:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and
lodging houses. It built a opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with DOT as a hotel.
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance
prohibiting the establishment or operation of
businesses providing certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities in the Ermita-Manila area and
prescribing penalties for violation thereof.
Hence, MTDC filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or TRO impleading defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim and
the members of the City Council of Manila for being
unconstitutional with Judge Laguio of RTC Manila
granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional.
Held:
YES. The lower court is correct in holding the
ordinance ultra vires and therefore null and void.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements:
(1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
(2) Must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) Must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) Must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
(6) Must not be unreasonable.
Petitioners cannot order the closure of the
enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business.
The ordinance also violates equal protection
clause as there are no substantial distinctions
between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments.
By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other
services for the public.
The Ordinance is repugnant to the general laws; it is
ultra vires. It is in contravention of the LGC (Sec.
458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of
the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The
code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. VS. DSWD, ET.
AL, GR NO. 166494, JUNE 29, 2007
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
Section 4 (a) of RA 9257 (Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003, which was amended by R.A
7432, granting senior citizens twenty 20%
discount from all establishments in utilization of
services in hotels and lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for
the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens.
The establishment may claim the discounts
granted to senior citizens as tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods cold or
services rendered as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, that the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value added tax if applicable, shall be included
in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Hence, the Drug Stores Association of the
Philippine wanted a clarification of the meaning
of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a
tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on
discounts was subtracted from Net Sales
together with other deductions which are
considered as operating expenses before the
Tax Due was computed based on the Net
Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax
credit scheme, the amount of discounts which
the tax credit item, was deducted directly from
the tax due amount. Drug store owners assail
the law with the contention that granting the
discount would result to loss of profit and
capital especially that such law failed to provide
a scheme to justly compensate the discount.
Held:
No. The permanent reduction in their total
revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to
the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This is compensable taking for which
petitioners would become entitled to a just
compensation. As a form or reimbursement,
business establishments extending the 20%
discount to senior citizens may claim it as a tax
deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power has been described as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable
of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs. It is the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and the
subjects of the same.
ALFREDO S. LIM, G.R. NO. 18736 AND 187916
NOV. 25, 2014
Facts:
In 2001, a MOA was entered into by all companies
and DOE for creation of Master Plan to address and
minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by
the oil terminals in the community without affecting
security and reliability of supply and distribution of
petroleum products. A month after, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted an ordinance reclassifying the
land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana and its adjoining
areas from industrial to commercial. Owners and
operators of the businesses affected were given six
months from date of effectivity to stop the operation
of their businesses. Hence, the petition filed by those
affected which was however, denied by the Supreme
Court. In 2009, during Lim’s term, the SP enacted
Ord. 8187 the industrial zone was limited to Light
Industrial Zone, thus in effect allowing petroleum
refineries and oil depots. Hence, petition filed by
Social Justice Society Officers.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance 8187 is unconstitutional in
relation to Pandacan terminals.
Ruling:
Yes. Ordinance 8027 was enacted for the purposes
of promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to
take measures to protect the residents of Manila
from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist
attack on the Pandacan terminals. Towards this
object, the SP reclassified the area defined in the
ordinance from industrial to commercial. The
continued stay of the oil depot placed the residents
of Manila in danger of being a terrorist target.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN OR POWER OF
EXPROPRIATION
It is the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can
be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation.
It is the inherent right for the State to condemn
private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation.
WHO MAY EXERCISE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN
Congress and by delegation the President,
administrative bodies, local government units and
even private enterprises performing public services.
Local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain, may be exercised only when
expressly authorized by the legislature.
REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF
POWER EMINENT DOMAIN:
1. Necessity
2. Private Property
3. Taking in the constitutional sense
4. Public Use
5. Just Compensation
NECESSITY – genuine necessity that must be of
public character.
PRIVATE PROPERTY – private property
already devoted to public use cannot be
expropriated.
TAKING IN CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE –
material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary use for
which the property was intended.
PUBLIC USE – not confined to actual use by the
public; synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare and public convenience.
JUST COMPENSATION – full and fair equivalent
of the property taken; the fair market value of
the property.
THE DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION IS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE.
Compensation is determined as the date of the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, but
where the filing of the complaint occurs after
the actual taking of the property and the owner
would be given undue incremental advantages
arising from the use to which the government
devotes the property expropriated, just
compensation is determined as of the date of
the taking.
The value of the property must be determined
either as of the date of the taking or the filing of
the complaint, “whichever comes first.”
PERSONS ENTITLED TO JUST
COMPENSATION:
“Owner”, and all those who have lawful interest
in the property to be expropriated including a
mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession
under an executor contract.
Title does not pass until payment of just
compensation.
Non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of expropriated lots but only to
demand payment of the fair market value of the
property. However, where the government fails
to pay just compensation within five years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their
property.
The issuance of writ of possession becomes
ministerial upon the (1) filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and
(2) upon deposit made by the government of the
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property sought to be expropriated per current tax
declaration.
The determination of whether the taking of a
property is for a public purpose is not a condition
precedent before the court may issue writ of
possession.
EXPROPRIATION OF THE STATE UNDER SECTION
18, ARTICLE XII
“The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital industries and,
upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government”
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SECTION 17, ARTICLE
XII
“In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.”
The temporary takeover by the government extends
only to the operation of the business and not the
ownership thereof. As such, the government is not
required to compensate the private entity-owner of
the said business as there is no transfer of
ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The
private entity-owner affected by the temporary
takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation
for the use of said business and its properties, as the
temporary takeover by the government is in
exercise of the police power and not the power of
eminent domain.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK VS. SECRETARY,
DSWD, G.R. 175356, DEC. 3, 2013
Facts:
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law,
granting senior citizens the following privileges:
SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the grant of 20%
discount from all establishments relative to
utilization of transportation services, hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers and purchase of medicine
anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit; and
by a minimum of 20% discount on admission fees
charged by theaters, cinema houses, concert halls,
circuses, carnivals and other similar places of
culture, leisure, and amusement.
Petitioners argue that the discount given to
senior citizens under RA 7432, as amended by
RA 9257, will force establishments to raise their
prices in order to compensate for its impact on
overall profits or income/gross sales. The
general public, or those not belonging to the
senior class, are, thus, made to effectively
shoulder the subsidy for senior citizens which
according to petitioners is unfair.
Issue:
Whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can
impose upon private establishments the burden
or party subsidizing a government program.
Ruling:
Yes. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted
primarily to maximize the contribution of
senior citizens to nation-building and to grant
benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State
considers them an integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its
basis in the Constitution. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishment extending the twenty percent
discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction. The law is
legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. While the
Constitution protects property rights,
petitioners must accept the realities of business
and the State, in the exercise of police power
can intervene in the operations of a business
which may result in an impairment of property
rights in the process.
SPOUSES CABAHUG VS. NATIONAL POWER
CORP., G.R. NO. 186069; JAN. 30, 2013
Facts:
NPC electrical cables would be installed in the
portions of the province and would traverse the
land owned by the petitioners. In consideration
of the easement fees, petitioners granted NPC a
continuous easement right of way. Two years
thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint before
RTC for payment of just compensation after
having learned that the compensation given by
NPC was very low compared to the appraisal
made by the province of Leyte. RTC rendered
decision in favor of petitioners. However, at the
CA, it was ruled that vested right has already
accrued in favour of NPC, and to allow
petitioners to pursue the case would be a
violation of the contract and an unjust
enrichment in favor of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether NPC may still be held liable to pay for
the full market value of the affected property
despite the fact transfer of title thereto was not
required by the easement.
Ruling:
Yes. The power of Eminent Domain may be
exercised although title is not transferred to the
expropriator in easement of right of way. Just
compensation which should be neither more nor
less than the money equivalent of the property, is
moreover, due where the nature and effect of the
easement is to impose limitations against the use of
the land for an indefinite period and deprive the
landowner of ordinary use.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ESCARILLA
& CO., G.R. 178046, JUNE 13, 2012
Facts:
Respondent is the owner of a parcel of agricultural
land in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur out of which
159.0881 hectares were acquired by the
government in 1995 under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Petitioner initially
valued the subject land at P823,204.08 but
respondent rejected the valuation. Pending
summary administrative proceedings for
determination of just compensation before the DAR,
respondent filed a complaint for determination of
just compensation before the RTC, which constituted
a four-member Board of Commissioners to evaluate
and appraise the just compensation for the subject
property covering 4.4825 hectares. Meanwhile, the
DAR/RARAD rendered a Decision dated Dec. 29,
1998 fixing the just compensation at P823,204.08.
On the other hand, a Commissioners’ Repost was
submitted recommending the amound of
P4,615,194.00.
On October 8, 2002, the RTC, rendered a Decision
fixing the just compensation of the property at
7,927,660.60. In the Decision dated Aug. 18, 2006,
the CA set aside the RTC’s valuation for failure to
give due consideration to the factors enumerated in
Section 17 of R.A No. 6657. While it observed that
LBP considered some factors, not all the factors
were taken into account and substantiated.
Issue:
Whether in determining the proper just
compensation for the subject expropriated property
the trial court considered the factors set forth under
Section 17 of RA 6657.
Ruling:
Yes. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside. For purposes of determining just
compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its
character and price at the time of taking. In the
implementation of R.A No. 6657, Section 17 provides
the manner by which compensation is determined,
thus:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
And the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the Government to
the property as well as the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
The potential use of the expropriated property
is only considered in cases where there is a
great improvement in the general vicinity of the
expropriated property, but should never control
the determination of just compensation.
In the Investigation Report dated Sept. 28, 1994,
both the RTC and CA considered the subject
property’s actual use at the time of appraisal,
and reclassified the property, as follows:
143.5528 hectares of 3rd class corn land and
15.4305 hectares of 3rd class coco land. The RTC
and CA ignored the fact that, at the time of the
ocular inspection in Sept. 1994, a substantial
portion of the subject property was idle and
abandoned, but the farmer-beneficiaries have
already stated to plant corn, bananas and other
crops. Under DAR A.O No. 11, Series of 1994,
“(t)he landowner shall not be compensated
or paid for improvements introduced by
third parties such as the government,
farmer-beneficiaries or others.” Hence, it was
erroneous to reclassify the acquired property
into corn land and coco land. At most, they may
be considered only as economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and farmworkers to
the property in determining its violations
pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
REYES VS NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
G.R. NO. 147511, JAN. 20, 2003.
Facts:
NHA filed several expropriation complaints on
the sugarland located in Dasmariñas, Cavite,
owned by petitioners for the expansion of the
Resettlement Project to accommodate the
squatters who were relocated from Manila. The
RTC ordered the expropriation with payment of
just compensation which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. Petitioners alleged the failure of
respondent to comply with the SC order, so they
filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights
before the RTC, QC. They said that NHA did not
relocate squatters from Manila on the
expropriated ands and thus violates the
reason for public purpose. They prayed that
NHA be enjoined from all alienating the
expropriated properties and that judgment be
rendered forfeiting its rights under the
expropriation judgment. NHA, countered by
saying that they already paid a substantial
amount to the petitioners. The trial court
dismissed the petitioners’ case and which
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue:
Whether the property expropriated is taking for
public purpose.
Ruling:
The decision appealed is modified. The
expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a
lawful right to take petitioners’ properties for
the public use or purpose of expanding the
Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. Public use is
synonymous with public interest, public benefit,
public welfare and public convenience. NHA’s act
is not a deviation from the stated purpose of their
taking. Expropriation of private lands for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to
private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies and other
private concerns. The expropriation of private
property for the purpose of socialized housing fro
the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the
social justice promotion under Section 1, Art. XIII or
the Constitution.
TAXATION POWER
The power by which the sovereign raises revenues
to defray the necessary expenses of government.
REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF POWER
OF TAXATION:
- Must not violate due process;
- Must be uniform and equitable; and
- Must be for public purpose.
WHO MAY EXERCISE
Primarily, the legislature; also local legislative
bodies and to a limited extent the President when
granted tariff powers.
LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE:
- Due process of law - tax should not be
confiscatory
- Equal Protection Clause – taxes should be
uniform and equitable
- Public purpose.
DOUBLE TAXATION
Additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the
same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing
period and for the same purpose. This will not be
allowed if the same will result in a violation of the
equal protection clause.
TAX EXEMPTIONS:
Requisite: No law granting any tax exemption shall
be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of Congress.
EXEMPT FROM TAXATION:
 Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings and improvements, actually, directly
and exclusively use for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.
 All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions used
actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxes and duties;
 Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all
grants, endowments, donations or
contributions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes.
POLICE POWER VS. TAXATION
Taxation – if generation of revenue is the
primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental;
Taxation as Police Power – if regulation is the
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised, it does not make the
imposition a tax as it is an exaction that
involves police power.
LICENSE FEE VS. TAX
1. License fee is a police measure; tax is a
revenue measure;
2. Amount collected for license fee is limited
to the cost of permit and reasonably police
regulation; amount of tax may be unlimited
provided it is not confiscatory.
3. License fee is paid for the privilege of doing
something and may be revoked when
public interest so requires; tax is imposed
on persons or property for revenue.
KINDS OF LICENSE FEE:
- For useful occupations or enterpises
- For non-useful occupations or enterprises –
the amount imposed may be a bit
exorbitant
GEROCHI, ET. AL VS. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY G.R NO. 159796, JULY 17, 2007
Facts:
RA 9136, The Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a
universal charge on all end-user of electricity
for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects,
was enacted and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contend the constitutionality of the
EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the
universal charge on all end-users is oppressive
and confiscatory and amounts to taxation
without representation for not giving the
consumers a chance to be heard and be
represented.
Issue:
Whether the universal charge is a tax.
Ruling:
No. The assailed universal charge imposed by
the ERC is not a tax, but an exaction in the
exercise of the State’s police power. The public
welfare is promoted may be gleaned from
EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the
State regarding electrification.
Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the
universal charge serves and assures the attainment
and perpetuity of the purposes for which the
universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the
viability of the country’s electric power industry),
further boosting the position that the same is an
exaction primarily in pursuit of the State’s police
objectives.
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a
tax, but if a regulation is the primary purpose, the
fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not
make the imposition a tax. The taxing power may be
used as an implement of police power. The theory
behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates
from necessity; without taxes, government cannot
fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare
and well-being of the people.
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND
THE CITY TREASURER, DR. VICTOR B. ENRIGA VS.
BAYANTEL, G.R NO. 162015, MARCH 6, 2006
Facts:
Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under RA
No. 3259 to establish and operate radio stations for
domestic telecommunications, radiophone,
broadcasting which it maintained various
telecommunications facilities. On January 7, 1999,
Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor
seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city
from the roll of taxable real properties but this
request was denied. Bayantel interposed an appeal
with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. On its
firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay
the real property taxes assessed against it by the
Quezon City government. The Quezon City Treasurer
sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount
of P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of
several warrants of levy against Bayantel’s
properties preparatory to their sale at a public
auction set on July 30, 2002.
Issue:
Whether Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City
are exempt from real property taxes under its
legislative franchise.
Held:
Yes. Real properties in Quezon City are exempt from
real property under its legislative franchise. The
power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress,
however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by
local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of
a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article C of the
Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the
power may be subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide which,
however, must be consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy.
The grant of taxing powers to local government
units under the Constitution and LGC does not
affect the power of Congress to grant
exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a
declared national policy. The legal effect of the
constitutional grant to local governments
simply means that in interpreting statutory
provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts
must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations.
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633was enacted
subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that the
LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former
exemption from any realty taxes, Congress
opted to pass RA No. 7633 using, under Section
11 thereof, exactly the same defining phrase
“exclusive of this franchise” which was the basis
for Bayantel’s exemption from realty taxes prior
to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of RA
No. 7633 states that “the grantee, its successors
or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes
on their real estate, buildings and personal
property, exclusive of this franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now or hereafter
may be required by law to pay.” This
subsequent piece of legislation as an express
and real intention on the part of Congress to
once again remove from the LGC’s delegated
taxing power, all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s)
properties that are actually, directly, and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY-LIST, ET AL. VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NO. 168056
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President singed into law
RA 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. The Court
issued a TRO enjoining government from
implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions to certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A No. 9337 is the
common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: “That
the President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of the value-
added tax to 12%, after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
i.) Value-added tax collection as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 and 4/5%); or
ii.) National government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%)”
Petitioners allege that that the grant of stand-by
authority to the President to increase the VAT
rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive
power to tax because such delegation is not
covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI
Constitution.
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
exchange of goods and services which cannot be
included within the purview of tariffs under the
exemption delegation since this refers to customs
duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to
the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating tot the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to
republicanism. They insist that accountability,
responsibility and transparency should dictate the
actions of Congress and they should not pass to the
President the decision to impose taxes. They also
argue that the law also effectively nullified the acts
of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by
mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337’s stand-by authority to
the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on
account of the recommendatory power granted to
the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
No. The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently
and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power
which can never be delegated is the authority to
make a complete law - complete as to the time when
it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the
liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which
determines the validity of its delegation. The
exceptions are: (a) delegation of tariff powers to
President under Constitution; (b) delegation of
emergency powers to President under Constitution;
(c) delegation to the people at large; (d) delegation
to local government; and (e) delegation to
administrative bodies.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power
BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is
the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common
proviso. The use of the word SHALL connote a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the
President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a
duty, which cannot be evaded by the President.
It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT
rate when the specified conditions are present.
There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of
the law.
ART. III, BILL OF RIGHTS
It is a sanctuary of protection for all persons,
citizens or non-citizens, against any and all
abuses of power and authority by the
government, or any of its officials and
employees, or even against any unwarranted
violation of such rights by any other person.
PURPOSES:
- To serve as a limitation to the powers of the
State
- To serve as deterrent to further violation of
fundamental liberties
- A leverage, a countervailing shield which
people can use against any form of
injustice.
SECTION 1, DUE PROCESS & EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of
law. Nor shall anyone be denied the equal
protection of laws.
DUE PROCESS is a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.
PURPOSE:
To prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against life, liberty and property
of individuals; protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure.
It can cab invoked when the act of the
government is arbitrary, oppressive, whimsical
or unreasonable. It is often directed against the
acts of execution and legislative department.
WHO ARE PROTECTED –
All persons regardless of race, color, or
nationality. With artificial persons, only insofar
as their property is concerned. The guarantee
extends to aliens and includes the means of
livelihood.
LIFE – right of an individual to his body in its
completeness, free from dismemberment and
extends to the use of God-giving faculties which
make life enjoyable; right to life refers not just to
physical safety but also to the importance of quality
of life.
LIBERTY – right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude; it
includes the right to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; it includes “negative” and “positive”
freedom. Negative Freedom means from or absence
of physical constraints, while Positive Freedom
means freedom to exercise one’s faculties, or the
right to enjoy God-given faculties in all lawful ways
and means.
PROPERTY – anything that can come under the
right of ownership and the subject of contract; it
represents more than the things a person owns, it
includes the right to secure, use and dispose of
the/Personal or real. As a right, it refers to the right
to own, use, possess, alienate, or destroy the thing.
TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS:
1. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS – requires that the
law is valid, fair and reasonable and just; serves as a
restriction on government’s law and rule-making
powers:
REQUISITES:
(a) The interests of the public, in general, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the intervention of the State;
(b) The means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purposes, and not
unduly oppressive on individuals.
2. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS – essentially
requires an opportunity to be heard where every
person is given the chance to defend himself or
explain his side through the protection of general
rules of procedure.
REQUISITES OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS:
1. An impartial or objective court or tribunal with
jurisdiction over the same subject matter.
2. Jurisdiction over the defendant or the property
which is the subject of the proceeding.
3. Defendant given opportunity to be heard (notice
and hearing)
4. Judgment rendered after lawful hearing.
COMMON REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL
PROCESS IN A JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS:
1. Notice
2. Opportunity to be heard.
PROCEDURAL PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS: (SEVEN (7) CARDINAL
PRIMARY RIGHTS):
1. Right to hearing, where a party may present
evidence in support of his case;
2. Tribunal must consider evidence present.
3. Decision is supported by evidence.
4. Evidence must be substantial. (Such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion)
5. Evidence must have been presented at the
hearing or contained in the record and
known to be parties affected.
6. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must
rely on its independent consideration of
evidence, and not merely on
recommendation of a subordinate; and
7. Decision must state the facts and the law in
such a way that parties are apprised of the
issues involved and reasons for the decision.
MIDTERMS
Non-Impairment of Contracts
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code – right of
parties to a contract/enter into any kind of
agreement; the right is not absolute
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy.
Prohibits the passage of any law which impairs
the obligation of contracts; otherwise the law is
null and void.
There is impairment when the law enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner change the intention
of the parties. A law which changes the terms of
a legal contract between the parties, either in
the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those
expressed, authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its
terms, is a law which impairs the obligation of a
contract and is therefore null and void.
Exception: proper exercise of police power. Ex.
Agrarian Reform Program
The legislature cannot bargain away the police
power through the medium of contract.
Examples: a franchise may be revoked when the
legislature finds legal and justifiable reasons to
do so. A zoning resolution, which is an exercise
of police power, is superior to non-impairment
clause.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL, G.R. NO. 138819,
SEPTEMBER 29, 2004
Facts:
On 7/28/86, respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted a resolution granting
petitioner Batangas CATV Inc. a permit to
construct, install and operate a CATV
(Community Antenna Television or Cable
Television) system in Batangas City. The
resolution provides that petitioner is authorized
to charge its subscribers the maximum rates
specified therein provided the increase shall be
subject to the approval of the Sanggunian. In
11/93, petitioner increased it subscriber rates
as a result of which respondent Mayor wrote
petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its
permit unless it secures the approval of the
Sanggunian.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for injunction
alleging that the Sanggunian has no authority to
regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators because under EO 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operations in the
Philippines. Upon the respondents’ appeal, the CA
reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether Resolution No. 10 of the Sanggunian is
valid?
Whether LGUs can grant a franchise to Batangas
CATV to operate a CATV System?
Ruling:
No. Municipal authorities, under a general grant of
power cannot adopt ordinances which infringe
the spirit of the law or repugnant to the general
policy of the State. In every power to pass
ordinances given to a municipality, there is an
implied restriction that the ordinances shall be
consistent with the general law. The Resolution
contravenes EO 205 and 436 insofar as it permits
respondent Sanggunian to usurp a power
exclusively vested in the NTC. The fixing of
subscriber rates is one of the matters within the
NTC’s exclusive domain. There is no law specifically
authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate
CATV system.
Section 4. no shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, expression, or the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress or grievances.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
The right to freely utter and publish whatever the
citizen may please, and to be protected from any
responsibility for so doing, except so far as such
publication, from their blasphemy (act of offense of
speaking sacrilegiously about God or sacred things),
obscenity or scandalous character, may be a
public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice
they may injuriously affect the standing
reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals.
It includes the following: (1) free speech and free
press; (2) freedom of assembly; (3) freedom of
petition; (4) freedom of religion; (5) right of
association or the right to form associations; and (6)
right to religious freedom.
Included in “speech” and expression:
1. They include the right to freely utter, print and
publish any statement without previous
censorship of the government;
2. Right of peaceful picketing;
3. Right to a lawful strike;
4. Right to disseminate information concerning the
fact of a labor dispute;
5. Expression by means of radio, television and
motion picture;
6. Right to express grievances against the
government; to criticize the affairs of the
government;
7. To display poster, notices, flags and banners;
8. Any form of expression, whether oral,
written, taped, text, including any symbol of
speech such as but not limited to wearing
black shirts and blouses to symbolize death
of democracy.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
- Not absolute;
- Subject to some regulation of the State
through police power, premised on (a) the
need to protect society or the community
from injurious exercise of the said freedom
and (b) the need to promote or protect
public welfare, public safety, public morals
and national security.
Examples: censorship of immoral and indecent
pictures is not a violation of the freedom;
seditious speeches are not covered by the
freedom; slanderous words or libelous words
or statement may be penalized because there
are not covered by freedom of expression;
exclusion from the mails or newspapers
containing seditious or libelous articles.
PURPOSE OF PROTECTING FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS:
1. To protect and preserve the right of the
people to information on matters of
public concern;
2. To enable every citizen to bring the
government an any person in authority to
the bar or public opinion;
3. To insure free and general discussion of
public matters.
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG AND
PONCE ENRILE, G.R. NO. 82380; & MCELROY
VS. CAPULONG, G.R. NO. 82398, APRIL 29,
2008
Facts:
Petitioner McElroy an Australian filmmaker of
Ayer Productions, envisioned for commercial
viewing and for local and international release,
the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at
EDSA. The “The Four Day Revolution”, through a
six-hour mini series TV play was endorsed by the
MTRCB following consultations of government
agencies. It is presented in a “docu-drama” style,
creating fictional characters interwoven with
real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background. David Williamson,
Australia’s leading playwright and Professor
McCoy, an American historian wrote the script.
However, Enrile declared that he will not
approve the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that
of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation.
Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the movie. However, a
complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie
productions and making of any reference to plaintiff
or his family and from creating any fictitious
character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is
based on, or bears substantial or marked
resemblance to Enrile. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether freedom of expression is violated.
Held:
Yes. The Court would once more stress that this
freedom includes the freedom to film and produce
motion pictures an to exhibit such motion
pictures in theaters or to diffuse them, through
television. The respondent judge should have
stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte TRO
one day after filing of a complaint by the private
respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction
twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion
picture was yet uncompleted an hence not exhibited
to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial judge knew what the completed
film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no “clear and present danger” of any
violation of any right to privacy that private
respondent could lawfully assert. The subject
matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the
petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to
the individual life and certainly not to the
private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
The extent of the intrusion, as this Court
understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may
be generally described as such intrusion as is
reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
historical account.
Private does not claim that petitioners threatened to
depict in “The Four Day Revolution” any part of the
private life respondent or that of any member of his
family. His participation therein was major in
character; a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role
played by private respondent would be grossly
unhistorical. The right of privacy of a “public
figure” is necessarily narrower than that of any
ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not
retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship. He continues to be a “public figure”.
After a successful political campaign during which
his participation in the EDSA Revolution was
directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio
and television, he sits in a very public place, the
Senate of the Philippines. The line of freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy,
may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful
and historical in its presentation of events.
FOUR ASPECTS OF THE FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS
1. Freedom from Prior Restraint
2. Freedom from Subsequent Punishment
3. Freedom from Access to Information
4. Freedom of Circulation
FREEDOM FROM PRIOR RESTRAINT – prior
restraint or censorship is a curtailment of the
freedom of expression and of the press made
through restrictions or conditions in advance
of actual publication or dissemination. The
exercise of the said freedom or expression or of
the press depends upon the prior approval of the
government.
Ex. Requirement to obtain a speaker’s permit
before one can deliver his speech; requirement to
submit the said speech for approval before it is
delivered; requirement to secure clearance from
a government censor before an article or book is
published.
Any law or official that requires some form of
permission to be had before publication can be
made, commits an infringement of the
constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the
courts.
FREEDOM FROM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT –
freedom from any punishment as a consequence
of or in connection with a speech, utterance or
writing.
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION – this
includes the rights guaranteed in Section 7, Art.
III, namely the right to information on matters of
public concern and right to access to official
records and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for public development.
FREEDOM OF CIRCULATION – the
dissemination of what has been written, whether
this refers to an expression of a view, thought or
ideas, as to any information which complements
the larger right of free discussion and expression.
TESTS ON RESTRICTIONS TO FREE SPEECH
DANGEROUS TENDENCY DOCTRINE – this
permits limitations on speech once a rational
connection has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger contemplated.
BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST – used as a
standard when the courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual
interests and requires a conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interest
observable in a given type of situation.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – speech may
be restrained because there is a substantial danger
that the speech will likely lead to an evil the
government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sough to be
serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.
Prior restrains on speech are invalid.
Exception: Prior restraints which may be permitted
by the constitution:
1. Content-Neutral Regulation – when the speech
restraints tae the form of a content neutral
regulation, only a substantial government
interest is required for its validity.
2. Content-Based Regulation – a government
action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest
security in the light of its inherent and invasive
impact. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger will it
pass constitutional muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presume
constitutionality.
A Government Regulation is Justified –
 If it is within the constitutional power of the
government;
 If it furthers an important or substantial
government interest;
 If the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
 If the incident restriction on alleged freedom of
speech and expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF PRESS FREEDOM
- It is the chief source of information on current
affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps the
most powerful vehicle of opinion on public
questions. It is the instrument by which citizens
keep their government informed of their needs,
their aspirations and their grievances. It is the
sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government
responsible and efficient.
SCOPE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION – nearly all
forms of communication
 Speech, print and assembly regarding secular
as well as political causes, and it is not
confined to any particular filed of human
interest.
 Matters of public interest or concern
embracing all issues, about which information is
needed or appropriate, so as to enable members
of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period.
 The constitutional protection assures the
broadest possible exercise of free speech and
free press for religious, political, economic,
scientific, news or informational ends.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. RAUL M. GONZALES,
ETC., ET. AL, G.R. NO. 168338, FEB. 15, 2008
Facts:
On 6/5/05, Press Secretary Bunye told reporters
that the opposition was planning to destabilize
the administration by releasing an audio-type,
through wire-tapping, of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between President Arroyo
and a high ranking COMELEC official. Later, he
produced two versions of the tape (a complete
version and an altered version). The altered
version allegedly suggested that the President
had instructed the COMELEC official to
manipulate the election results in her favor.
Bunye, who had admitted that the voice was that
of the President, made a retraction. Two days
later, a former counsel of President Estrada
released on allegedly authentic tape that included
purported conversations of the President, FG,
Commissioner Garcillano and Senator Barbers.
On 6/8/05, Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD
and those broadcasting its contents, including
Bunye and Atty. Paguia could be liable under the
Anti-Wire Tapping Law.
The following day, he ordered the NBI to go after
media organizations found to have circulated,
played or printed contents of the tape. On
6/11/05, the NTC issued a press release
warning radio and TV owners and operators
to observe the Anti-Wire Tapping Law and
pertinent circulars on program standards.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition “to annul proceedings and to prevent
the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive
authority by the respondents.” Respondents said
they have not violated the Constitution, and
questioned the legal standing of the petitioner to
file the petition.
Issues:
Whether the acts of the respondents abridge
freedom of speech and of the press; and whether
the official statements made by respondents
(warning the media on airing the alleged
wiretapped conversation between President
Arroyo and other personalities), constitute as
unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling;
1. Yes. Respondent Gonzales made his statements
as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its
statement as the regulatory body of media. Any
act done, such as a speech uttered, for in
behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in
the exercise of official functions. Hence, the press
statements to bar all acts that should be
struck down as they constitute impermissible
forms of prior restraints on the right to free
speech and press.
2. Yes. The Official statements made by respondents
constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Section 7. (1) Right to information on matters of
public concern; and (2) Right to access to official
records and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development.
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R.
NO. L-72119, MAY 29, 1987
Facts:
The fundamental right of the people to information
on matters of public concern is invoked by petitioner
Legaspi against the CSC. The respondent had earlier
denied Legaspi’s request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
These employees, Sibonghanoy and Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligible who passed the civil service examinations of
sanitarians.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has legal access to government
records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent CSC failed to city any provision in
the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner’s right to know who are, and who are not,
civil service eligible. The names of those who pass
the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for
various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one’s civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed.
BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, 133 SCRA 800
Facts:
Assailed in the petition for certiorari prohibition and
mandamus is the validity of the two search warrants
issued by a QC RTC Judge under which the premises
of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”
newspapers, respectively were searched and office
and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher and
editor of the We Forum were seized.
Issue;
Whether the closure of We Forum a case of prior
restraint.

Ruling:
Yes. The premises searched were the business
and printing offices of Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the
search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature
of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial
of petitioners’ freedom to express themselves in
print.
MUTUC VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. L-32717, NOV.
16, 1970
Facts:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to
Constitutional Convention. He filed an action
against COMELEC when he was informed that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but
he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile
units equipped with sound systems and loud
speakers. Petitioner submits that this is violative
of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise
that the Constitutional Convention act provided
that it is unlawful for the candidates to “purchase
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens,
lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandannas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes and the like,
whether of domestic or foreign origin. COMELEC
contended that the jingle or the recorded or
taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a
tangible propaganda material and was, under
above statute, subject to confiscation.
Issue:
Whether the usage of the jingle by the petitioner
form part of the prohibition invoiced by the
COMELEC.
Ruling:
No. The Court held that “the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only
to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to.” The COMELEC’s
contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of
the prohibition, categorized under the phrase
“and the like” could not merit the court’s
approval by principle of ejusdem generis. It is
quite apparent that what was prohibited was the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable
vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
NEW YORK TIMES VS. U.S. 403 U.S. 713
The stoppage of the publication of an article entitled
“History of the US Decision-Making Process on
Vietnam Policy” on the ground that its continuous
publication poses a threat to US security, a violation
of the people’s right to expression and information.
The stoppage of the publication of the article curtails
the right of the people to be informed of matters of
public concern. It amounts to prior censorship.
The United States, which brought these actions to
enjoin the publication in the New York Times and in
the Washington Post of certain classified material,
has not met the “heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such prior
restraint.”
RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
- This right is not subject to any prior restraint.
Its exercise should not be made to depend upon
the issuance of any permit. However, it may be
subject to regulation, not prohibition by the
State, as to when and where it should be held.
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO, 80 PHIL. 71
Facts:
An action was filed by petitioner for the refusal of
respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public
meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances
to the government. The reason given by respondent
is “that there is reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, especially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter an fight, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government and in
the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of
public order.”
Issue:
Whether the freedom of speech/right to assembly
was violated.
Ruling.
Yes. The Mayor’s defense is untenable. Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil
will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent and that is a serious
one. The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is
not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the State.
REYES VS, BAGATSING, 125 SCRA 553
Facts:
Petitioner’s request for a permit to hold a
peaceful march and rally was denied by
respondent mayor due to police intelligence
reports affirming plans of criminal intent to
disrupt the assembly. Respondent recommend
that the permit may be issued if said rally is to be
held at any other enclosed area where safety is
ensured.
Issue:
Whether denial of a permit to rally violates
freedom of speech.
Ruling:
Yes. The sold justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, is the danger of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil
public safety, public morals, or any other
legitimate public interest. Peaceful assemblies
are guaranteed in freedom of speech.
BAYAN KARAPATAN, KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP) VS.
EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 169838,
APRIL 25, 2006
Facts:
In the last quarter of 2005, there were massive
rallies against President Arroyo’s administration.
It was at this time when Executive Ermita issued
a policy via press release. The policy pertains to
the strict implementation of BP Blg. 88 or the
Public Assembly Act of 1985 which provides for
strict enforcement of “no permit no rally policy”
and arrest of all persons violating the laws of the
land and dispersal of unlawful mass actions.
Issue:
Whether BP Blg. 880 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it violates the constitutionally
guaranteed right to peaceful assembly?
Is CPR Policy legal?
Ruling:
No. BP Blg. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedom; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious “maximum
tolerance” is for the benefit of the rallyists, not
the government. The delegation to the mayors of
the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because
it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear
and present danger” standard.
No. CPR Policy is illegal. In view of the maximum
tolerance policy mandated by BP Blg. 880, CPR
serves no valid purpose if it means the same
thing as maximum tolerance, and it illegal if it
means something else.
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Section 8. the right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to from
unions, association or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In Section 8, Art. III of the 1987, it made an emphasis
that the right of association is a right of the people,
including those employees in the public and private
sectors; and included the right to form unions.
Two school of thought on the issue on whether the
right of government employees to organize include
the right to form unions or associations and the right
to strike:
1. Majority View – the right of a government to
organize may include the right to form unions or
associations but is does not include the right to
strike to engage in similar activities (Social
Security System Employees Associations vs. SA, 175
SCRA 686, 7/28/89); reiterated in Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) vs. Laguro, Jr.,
200 SCRA 323, 8/6/91 and again reiterated in
Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of
Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA, 8/3/93)
2. Minority View – Dissenting Opinions of Justices
Isagani Cruz and Hugo Gutierrez – the denial of the
right to strike of government employees is a
“derogation of their freedom of expression and a
violation of the equal protection clause, besides
being contrary to social justice. Government
workers, whatever their category or status, have
as much as right as any person the land to voice
their protest against what they believe to be a
violation of their interests.
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS VS.
MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, 124
SCRA, AUGUST 3, 1993
Facts:
Petitioner is a labor federation of unions of in GOCC
and state schools took collective action to demand
the inclusion of government employees in the
coverage of PD 851 which requires employers to pay
their employees receiving not more than P1,000 a
month a 13th month pay.
Issue:
Whether employees are required to pay their
employees who are receiving not more than one
thousand pesos a month a 13th month pay.
Ruling:
No. It is the legislature, or in proper cases the
administrative heads of government and not the
collective bargaining process nor the concessions
wrung by labor unions from management that
determine how much the workers in government-
owned or controlled corporations may receive in
terms of salaries, 13th month pay, and other
conditions or terms of employment.
What PD 851 intended to cover are only those in
the private sector whose real wages require
protection from worldwide inflation. Further, the
terms and conditions of government employment
are fixed by law, government workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by workers in the
private sector to secure concessions from their
employees.
GSIS VS. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAWA SA
GSIS, GR 170132, DECEMBER 6, 2006
Facts:
On October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS
Investigating Unit issued a memorandum
directing 131 union and non-union members to
show cause why they should not be charged
administratively for their participation in said
rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel Atty. Manuel
Molina, sought consideration of said directive on
the ground, among others, that the subject
employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in
obedience to the return-to-work order thus
issued. The plea for reconsideration was,
however, effectively denied by the filing, on
October 25, 2004, of administrative charges
against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA
against these charges. The CA granted the
petition and enjoined the GSIS from
implementing the issued formal charges and from
issuing other formal charges arising from the
same facts and events.
CA equated the right to form associations with
the right to engage in strike and similar activities
available to workers in the private sector. In the
concrete, the appellate court concluded that in as
much as GSIS employees are not barred from
forming, joining or assisting employees’
organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly
initiate charges against GSIS employees waging
or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of
such mass action.
Issue:
Whether the strike conducted by the GSIS
employees were valid
Held:
No. The 1987 Constitution expressly
guaranteeing, for the first time the right of
government personnel to self-organization to
complement the provision according workers
the right to engage in “peaceful concreted
activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law.”
It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid
provisions on the 1987 constitution that the Court
resolved Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals. In it, we
held citing MPSYA vs. Laguio, Jr. that employees in
the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and authorized stoppage of work; that
the right of the government employees to
organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to
strike.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General
Manger of GSIS, rests the authority and
responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No.
8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or
otherwise disciple GSIS personnel for cause. At
bathroom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing
the filing of administrative charges against the
absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass
action, merely performed a duty expected of him and
enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner
Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his
act can easily be sustained as legally correct and
doubtless within his jurisdiction.
BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION VS. DIONISIO,
G.R. NO. L-38354, JUNE 30, 1989
Facts:
The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject
parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio,
the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect
that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of
Bel-Air Village Association, the respondent, and
must abide by such rule and regulations laid down
by the Association in the interest of the sanitation,
security and the genera welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues
on the following grounds: the questioned
assessment is a property tax outside the corporate
power of the association; the association has no
power to compel the petitioner to pay the
assessment for lace of privity of contract; the
questioned assessment should not be enforced for
being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent
association is exercising governmental powers
which should not be sanctioned.
Issue:
Whether or not the association can lawfully collect
dues.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a
registered land are bound by the annotations found
at the back of the certificate of title covering the
subject parcel of land. The petitioner’s contention
that he has no privity with the respondent
association is not persuasive.
When the petitioner voluntarily bought the
subject parcel of land it was understood that he
took the same free of all encumbrances except
annotations at the back of the certificate of title
among them, that he automatically becomes a
member of the respondent association. One of the
obligations of a member is to pay certain
amounts for the operation and activities of the
association.
The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is
compelled to be a member of the association
against his will because the limitation is imposed
upon his ownership of property. If he does not
desire to comply with the annotation or lien in
question, he can at anytime exercise his
inviolable freedom of disposing of the property
and free himself from the burden of becoming a
member of the association.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
Three Principal Parts:
 Non-establishment clause
 Free exercise clause
 Non-religious test clause
Non-establishment Clause – No law shall be
made respecting the establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. This
requires the State to be neutral.
Free Exercise Clause – the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. A person has the right to
worship according to the dictates of his
conscience or not to worship Him at all.
Non-Religious Clause – no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political
rights. The “no religious test” means that a person
or citizen may exercise civil right or a political
right.
Two Aspects of Religious Freedom:
Freedom to believe – absolute
Freedom to act on one’s belief – not absolute as
this may be regulated if its actualization clashes
with accepted norms of social behavior and
established order of decency.
EBRALINAG VS. DIV. SUPT. OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU,
G.R. NO. 95770, MARCH 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received
complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to
the Jehovah’s Witness and enrolled in various public
and private schools, which refused to sing the
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge. Div. Supt. Susan Cabahug issued a
Memorandum removing from service, after due
process, teachers and school employees and to
deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of
public education, if they do not participate in daily
flag ceremony and does not salute to the flag. These
Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that these activities are
akin to idolatry against their teachings. Also, they
transcend constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious
freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence
of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education (106
Phil 2, August 12, 1959). Gerona doctrine provides
that we are a system of separation of the church
and state and the flag is devoid of religious
significance and it doesn’t involve any religious
ceremony. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean
exception from non-discriminatory laws like the
saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This
exemption disrupts school discipline and
demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and
duties of citizenship.
Issue:
Whether religious freedom has been violated.
Ruling:
Yes. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of
highest priority. The two-fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1) Freedom to believe which is
an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2)
Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and
translated to external acts. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent. The
previous GERONA decision of expelling and
dismissing students and teachers who refuse to obey
RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech
and religious profession and worship. In the case at
bar, the Students expelled were only standing
quietly during ceremonies. By observing the
ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so
evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What
the petitioner’s request is exemption from flag
ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools.
The expulsion of the students by reason of their
religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s
right to free education. The non-observance of
the flag ceremony does not totally constitute
ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness.
Love for country and admiration for national heroes,
civic consciousness and form of government are part
of the school curricula.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA VS. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR, A.M. NO. P-02-1651, JUNE 22, 2006
Facts:
Escritor, a court interpreter since 1999 in RTC
Las Pinas, lived with a man for more than 25
years, not her husband, and out of her live-in
arrangement with said man, they had a child.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while her live-in
partner is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of RTC
to investigate respondent. She was charged with
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the
Revised Administrative Code. Her defenses are as
follows: (a) She asserts that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious
beliefs and has the approval of her congregation,
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Trace Society. In fact, she executed a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness after living
together for ten years. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
She pleaded exemption from the law under which
she was charged and invoked the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause.
Issue:
Whether respondent Escritor is guilty of the
charges.
Ruling:
No. Respondent is merely exercising her right to
freedom of religion. Escritor’s conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized as she has
made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion. The State’s interests must be upheld
in order that freedoms – including religious
freedom – may be enjoyed. In the area of
religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state, and so the state interest
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that
its violation will erode the very fabric of the state
that will also protect the freedom. In the absence
of a showing that such state interest exists, man
must be allowed to subscribe to the infinite.
The free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in
our Constitution. It is fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights – “the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights,” hence, it is not enough to contend
that the state’s interest is important.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, 39
PHIL. 660; G.R. NO. L-14078; MARCH 7, 1919
Facts:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor
of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. The Maguianes are being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said
to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff
in the prison at Calapan for having run away from
the reservation. The provincial governor of Mindoro
and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation
in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by
the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial
board. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of
this section of the Administrative Code.
Issues:
- Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
constitutes undue delegation;
- Whether the Manguianes are being deprived of
their liberty.
Held:
I. No. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was
in a better position to determine whether or not to
execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the
law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to
give discretion to the provincial governor. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact.

II. No. The term “non-Christian” should not be
given a literal meaning or a religious signification,
but that it was intended to relate to degrees of
civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said,
refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were
being reconcentrated in the reservation to
promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic
lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down
where they can adapt to the changing times.
They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law has not been followed. To
go back to our definition of due process of law
and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of
a class.”
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., VS. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-14639 MARCH 25,
1919
Facts:
In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 women of
ill repute, forcibly rounded up, put on a ship and
sent to Davao as laborers. Said women are
inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street in Samapaloc. A writ of habeas
corpus was filed against him. One hundred and
seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without
any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on
board steamers for transportation to regions
unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that
such was not the case is shown by the mere fact
that the presence of the police and the
constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night
to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this
is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.
Issue:
Whether Mayor Lukban has the right to deport
women with ill repute.
Ruling:
No. No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will. There is no law
expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every
other citizen. Their choice of profession should not
be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not
authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race.
These women have been deprived of their liberty by
being exiled to Davao without even being given the
opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse,
without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al. must be severely
punished.
CUENCA VS. SALAZAR, 82 PHIL. 851, L-2690,
JANUARY 1, 1949
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Bartolome Cuenca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern
Employment Bureau, owned by respondent Julia
Salazar. An advanced payment has already been
given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her
to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to
transfer to another residence, which was disallowed
by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The
employment agency wanted that the advance
payment, which was applied to her transportation
expense from the province should be paid by Estelita
before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue:
Whether an employment agency has the right to
restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave.
Ruling:
No. An employment agency has absolutely no power
to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no
physical force has been exerted to keep her in the
house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be
lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence
of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm
if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological
element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice
or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual
effect of such psychological spell is to place a person
at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
The fact that power to control said freedom may
be an effective means of avoiding monetary
losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing
a fundamental human right. The fortunes of
business cannot be controlled by controlling a
fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is
not a merchandise appropriate for commercial
barters or business bargains. Fundamental
freedoms are beyond the province of commerce
or any other business enterprise.
SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, NO. L-53622, APRIL
25, 1980
Facts:
Petitioner is the holder of a Philippine passport
issued on March 3, 1980 and valid up to 1982 and
has urgent medical appointments and official
engagements as the only Filipino member of the
BOT of United Board for Higher Christian
Education in Asia based in NY. With petitioner
having previously established his right to travel
as sanctioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
which duly issued him his passport, petitioner
has cause to complain that he should not be
placed by respondents on their watch list without
benefit of previous notice and hearing so as to be
afforded the opportunity to rebut whatever
adverse information might have been complied
or given in secret against him.
This is not the first time that petitioner came to
the Supreme Court by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a
certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case,
Salonga v. Madella (GR L-49130), the case
became moot and academic as the Office of the
Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition,
stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not
denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted.
Herein, in the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor
General dated 21 April 1980, it was stated that
the certificate of eligibility to travel had been
granted Salonga. A xeroxed copy was enclosed.
Ruling:
The Travel Processing Center should exercise the
utmost care to avoid the impression that certain
citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional
right to travel could be subjected to
inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos before the American Newspaper
Publishers Association on 22 April 1980, he
emphasized anew the respect accorded
constitutional rights. The freedom to travel is
certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with
approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby,
who, as he noted was "partial to the claims of
liberty." Burdick and Willis, both of whom were
equally convinced that there be no erosion to
human rights even in times of martial law,
likewise received from President Marcos the
accolade of his approval. It would appear,
therefore, that in case of doubt of the
Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center,
the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately
be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for
such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the
earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof
and preclude any disclaimer as to the person
desiring to travel being in any way responsible for
any delay.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS, G.R. NO. 88211,
SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
Facts:
Former President Marcos, who was deposed from
the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, while
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred
Marcos from returning due to possible threats &
following supervening events, among others: failed
Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders,
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists, plan of
Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a
chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer,
Honasan’s failed coup, Communist insurgency
movements, secessionist movements in Mindanao
NS devastated economy because of accumulated
foreign debt and plunder of nation by Marcos &
cronies.
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and
prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the
implementation of President Aquino’s decision to
bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his
return in the country. He also questioned the claim
of the President that the decision was made in the
interest of national security, public safety and
health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction. Such act deprives
them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They
also said that it deprives them of their right to travel
which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the
Constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines and
whether the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
Ruling:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not
absolute. Their request cannot be considered in
the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case
law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must
be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of
the President, which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Thus, such request or demand should submit to
the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in
the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that
there are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of
the country & protection of the people. She has to
uphold the Constitution.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Section 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Two Rights Guaranteed
1. Right to information on matters of public
concern
2. Right to access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development.
CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
AND
AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT, G.R. NO.
133250, JULY 9, 2002
Facts:
On February 4, 1977, then President Marcos
issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA which is tasked
"to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.”
President Marcos also issued PD No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Cory Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP with a total area of
1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title, in
the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at
the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding, which was
approved by then President Ramos.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their
report find that: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks
to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee
Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task
Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government
Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the
legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a
taxpayer filed the instant Petition for Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional right to information
includes information on on-going negotiations
BEFORE a final agreement.
Held:
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people's right to information
on matters of public concern. This State policy
is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract
is not a requirement for the exercise of the right
to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated,
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep
the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait
accompli.
However, the right to information does not
compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords
access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the
records, documents and papers at his expense.
The exercise of the right is also subject to
reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of
the public records and to minimize disruption to
government operations, like rules specifying
when and how to conduct the inspection and
copying.
VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE, G.R. NO. 74930,
FEBRUARY 13, 1989
Facts:
Petitioners invoke their right to information and
pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru
the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the
public records for the subject information.
Issue:
Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens
and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady
Imelda Marcos to Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban political parties.
Held:
Yes. Respondent failed to cite any law granting the
GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. The Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS,
a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
Section 3 (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2)
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
This right may be violated in any of the following
circumstances:
1. Upon lawful order of the Court; or
2. When public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.
COVERAGE OF THE GUARANTEE -
Tangible Objects - includes letters, telegrams,
signals, cables, telephone, client’s file and other
documents.
Intangible Objects – Under R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-
Wire Tapping Act) it is illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication, to secretly record such
communication by means of tape recorder.
RA 4200 prohibits any person not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other devise or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept or record the same, or to
communication the content thereof to any person.
The use of the said records may be permitted in the
following instances:
 They may be permitted only in civil or criminal
proceedings involving certain specified offenses
principally affecting national security.
 They may be permitted only upon previous
authorization by the court, which may be issued
under the following conditions: (a) the
constitutional requirements for the issuance of

a warrant should be complied with; and (b) the
said authority shall be effective only for sixty (60)
days.
 Any evidence obtained in violation of the
said law is also not admissible in any
proceedings.
Use of telephone extension is not prohibited as a
tap as it is not among the devises covered by R.A.
4200. There must be a physical interception
through a wire tap or the deliberate installation
of a devise or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept or record spoken words. The use of a
telephone extension line cannot be considered as
tapping because the extension line is installed not
for the purpose of deliberately tapping the line,
but is, an ordinary office or home use, hence,
there is no violation of the privacy of
conversation and correspondence.
The court can authorize war tapping in treason,
espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case
of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping.
People vs. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667
Facts:
The crime is fraud of revenue against the
Government. Pursuant to a search warrant
issued, the officers searched the building
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. In the process, the
authorities seized, among others, an art metal
filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his and
contained some letters, documents and papers
belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging to
Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.
Issue:
Is the search warrant in question valid or not,
taking into consideration the provisions of the
law and of the Constitution relative thereto?
Ruling:
The search and seizure was not valid. It is not
stated in the affidavit that the books, documents
or records referred to therein are being used or
are intended to be used in the commission of
fraud against the Government and,
notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the
warrant avers that they are actually being used
for such purpose.
Also, it assumes that the entire building is
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the only
ground upon which such assumption is based is
the BIR agent's statement which is mere hearsay
(coming from an informant) and when in fact part
thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was not
asked that the things belonging to Atty. Remo and
to others also be searched and seized.
RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
93833, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner
Socorro Ramirez alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and
in a manner offensive to her dignity and
personality.” As evidence, she produced a verbatim
transcript of the event culled from a tape recording
of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event,
private respondent filed a criminal case for violation
of Republic Act 4200, or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information,
which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. On appeal, the
CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void.
Issue:
Whether the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in
recordings by one of the parties in the conversation.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200,” provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a Dictaphone or
dictograph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication.
The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
107383, OCTOBER 16, 1986
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta, the wife of Dr. Alfredo
Martin, while the latter was not in the house, took
157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled
check, greeting cards, passport and photograph of
private respondent and his alleged paramours, by
means of forcibly opening the drawers and
cabinet. Petitioner filed the papers for the
evidence of her case of legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine
against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against
Zulueta, which the Court granted, declaring him
the capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint
and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in
her behalf to a immediately return the properties
to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages
and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed
the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the papers and other materials obtained
from forcible intrusions and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court
regarding marital separation and disqualification
from medical practice.
Ruling:
No. The documents and papers are
inadmissible in evidence. The only exception
to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The intimacies between husband
and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her. The law
insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other.
And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION VS. NLRC, G.R.
NO. 1113271, OCTOBER 16, 1996
Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist
by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc.
Catolico sold drugs to YSP overcharging it by P64
per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable
to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It
was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana,
the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the
envelope and saw that there was a check for P640
for Catolico. Resultantly. Waterous Drug Corp.
ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of
dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence
of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants.
Petitioners In the light of the decision in the People
v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government, appealed the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
Held:
Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true,
as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have
no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary,
and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives
rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this,
the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of
cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment.
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURE
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
THREE RIGHTS GUARANTEED
1. Right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizure of whatever nature and for
any purposes; this is an inviolable right;
2. No search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause;
3. No warrant of arrest shall except upon
probable cause;
All persons, including aliens are protected
under this right, whether accused of a crime or
not. Artificial persons, like corporations, are
also protected but they may be required to
open their books of accounts for examination
by the State in the exercise of the police
power or the power of taxation.
These rights protects (1) the sanctity and
privacy of a person himself; and (2) the
inviolability of a person’s home and his
possessions.
THE RIGHT ON ISSUANCE OF SEARCH
WARRANT AND WARRANT OF ARREST UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE ADMIT THE FOLLOWING
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the
elements of which are:
- A prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
- The evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they are;
- The evidence must be immediately apparent;
and “plain view” justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Probable cause refers to the existence of such
facts and circumstances which should lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection
with the said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to ne searched.
REQUIREMENTS IN DETERMINING THE
EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
1. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine the complainant and the
witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers;
2. The examination must be under oath;
3. The examination must be in writing;
4.The complainant and the witnesses must be
examined on facts personally known to them; and
5. The judge must attach to the record the sworn
statements of the complainant and the witnesses
together with any affidavit submitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDEN DEL
CASTILLO, G.R. NO. 153254, SEPTEMBER 30,
2004
Facts:
The raiding team divided themselves into two
searching groups – the first group searched the
upper portion of the house and found three large
plastic packs of white crystalline substance, while
the second group searched the ground floor and
found 8 medium heat sealed plastic packs of white
crystalline substance, two disposable lighters, one
pair of scissors, one tooter, one puller and an
improvised hacksaw. The search was made on the
house of the appellant’s grandmother. On the basis
of this search, appellant was charged with violation
of R.A. 4625 and was convicted.
Issue:
Whether there was compliance with procedures on
search and seizure.
Ruling:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be
searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the SW is issued, however, there must
be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellant’s control or possession. The evidence of
the prosecution failed to establish by competent
evidence that appellant is the owner or at least
shared the ownership of the house where the shabu
was found. Also, the search of the house must be
done in the presence of the lawful occupants and it is
only in the absence of the former that two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality may be called upon to witness the search.
While appellant and the other occupants of the
house were present during the search, they were not
allowed to actually witness the search of the
premises. The raiding team failed to comply with the
procedures on search and seizure. The detailed
receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful
occupant. The police officers failed to deliver the
seized items to the court, which issued the search
warrant. The inventory receipt was not certified
under oath by any of the members of the raiding
team as required by the rule but was signed only.
PEOPLE VS. HUANG ZHAN HUA, G.R. 139301,
SEPTEMBER 29, 2004
Facts:
An information was received by PARAC (Public
Assistance Reaction Against Crime), DILG that the
accused, both aliens, are engaged in drug
trafficking. Subsequently, PARAC secured search
warrants, which upon implementation, the
policemen found two kilos of shabu,
paraphernalia for its production and machines
and tools apparently used for the protection of
fake credit cards. The operative searched the
master’s bedroom; others went to the other
bedroom where one of the accused is sleeping.
The police woke him up and identified himself as
a policeman. The accused was surprised. The
accused claims that there are certain
irregularities in the issuance and implementation
of the SW such as: the police operatives who
implemented the SW failed to show to her the
said warrant, to inform her of their authority and
to explain their presence in the condominium
unit; they gained entry into the condominium
unit by force while she was sleeping; and articles
and personal effects owned by her and her
companions were taken and confiscated by the
policemen, although not specified in the SW.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure was violated.
Ruling:
NO. Unannounced intrusion into the premises is
permissible in the following circumstances: A
party whose premises or is entitled to the
possession thereof refuses, upon demand to open
it; When such person in the premises already
knew the identity of the officers and of their
authority and persons; When the officers are
justified in the honest belief that there is an
imminent peril of the life or limb; and When
those in the premises, aware of the presence of
someone outside (because, for example, there has
been a knock at the door), are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers to believe that
an escape or the destruction of evidence is being
attempted.
Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified that
the police officers were accompanied by Chuang,
a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that
his companions were police officers and had a
search warrant for the premises, and also
explained to her that the officers were going to
search the condominium unit.
PEOPLE VS. OMAWENG, G.R. NO. 99050,
SEPTEMBER 2, 1992
Facts:
An inspection of the vehicle of accused Omaweng
was conducted in a checkpoint going to Sagada. The
PC constables asked permission to inspect his
vehicle to which he acceded. A bag containing 41
plastic sachets of illegal drugs were confiscated.
Issue:
Whether the accused’s search violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizure.
Ruling:
No. Accused was not subjected to any search, which
may be stigmatized as a violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to
the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. He
waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure. No warrant was necessary for the seizure of
the 41 packages of drugs.
PEOPLE VS. GATWARD, G.R. NO. 119772,
FEBRUARY 7, 1997-
Facts:
The drug courier who was disembarked from his
flight to Amsterdam and whose bag was inspected
and found to contain drugs.
Issue:
Whether Gatward’s suitcase may be searched
without a search warrant.
Ruling:
While no search warrant had been obtained for that
purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his
personal baggage as a passenger of KLM, he thereby
agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance
with customs rules and regulations, an
international practice of strict observance and
waived any objection to a warrantless search. His
subsequent arrest was likewise justified since it was
effected upon discovery and recovery of the heroin
in his bag.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.
170180, NOVEMBER 23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Valdez was found guilty for violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165 after dried marijuana leaves
were found in his possession by three barangay
tanods who made a search on him. He denied
ownership and purported that he just alighted from
the bus when one of the barangay tanods
approached him and requested to see the contents
of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the
three tanods to house of Brgy. Captain Mercano, who
again ordered to have the bag opened. During
which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning,
although for the first time on appeal, that his
warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and
the warrantless search that followed was
likewise contrary to law.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner should be acquitted for
the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and
the search.
Held:
Yes. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c)
when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another. The Court held that none of the
circumstances was attendant at the time of the
arrest. The Court also posed two exceptions to
the said rule, to wit: (1) The person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. Here, none of the
petitioner’s actuations (i.e., his looking around
and alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods)
is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity
to validate the warrantless arrest.
HARVEY VS. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, G.R. NO.
82544, JUNE 28, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien
pedophiles who were apprehended after three
months of close surveillance by the CID agents in
Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension,
17 opted for self deportation, one released for
lack of evidence, one was charged by another
offense, working without a valid working visa.
Thus, three was left to face the deportation
proceedings. Seized during petitioners’
apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and
photos of the suspected child prostitute shown in
salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged
in the sexual act. There were also posters and
other literatures advertising child prostitution.
A Warrant of Arrest was issued by respondent
against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46
of the Immigration Act and Sec. 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether the Philippines’ Immigration Act clothed
the commissioner with any authority to arrest and
detain petitioner pending determination of the
existence of a probable cause.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that there can be no
question that the right against unreasonable search
and seizure is available to all persons, including
aliens, whether accused of a crime or not. One of the
constitutional requirements of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based
upon probable cause. The arrest of petitioners was
based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and
the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and
posters without warrant. Those articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore,
admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records
show that formal deportation charges have been
filed against them, as undesirable aliens. That
petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not
make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found
with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones
with John Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioners had committed
"pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion
involving children."
ROBIN PADILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
121917, MARCH 12, 1997
Facts:
High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were
found in the possession of Robin Padilla, which were
found to be not registered in his name. A second
certification though found three of the firearms as
registered under his name.
Issue:
Whether his arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule.
Ruling:
No. While there is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for his arrest, this per se does not make his
apprehension illegal. This is a warrantless arrest
sanctioned by law under the following instances:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when
an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Petitioner’s vehicle figured in a hit and run – an

offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang,
a private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner. It must be stressed that “presence”
dose not only require that the arresting person
sees the offence, but also when he “hears the
disturbance created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene. Manarang testified that he
heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud,
saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor),
reported the incident to the police and thereafter
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his
motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After
having sent a radio report to the PNP for
assistance, Manarang proceeded to Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen
already positioned near the bridge who effected
the actual arrest of petitioner.

With respect to the firearms and ammunitions

which petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
police, this is a gesture of petitioner indicating a
waiver of his right against alleged search and
seizure. Even assuming that these firearms were
products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of
petitioner, their seizure without warrant
nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. Once the lawful
arrest was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search of the passenger compartment
and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of the
nature of the offense.

Two tiered-test of an incidental search

 the item to be searched (vehicle) was within
the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate
control; and
 the search was contemporaneous with the
arrest.
FINALS
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO AND
HABEAS DATA
Section 15. the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when public safety
requires it.
A. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
- A writ issued by a court directed to a person
detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and
place, with the day and cause of his caption and
detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive
whatever the court of judge awarding the writ
shall consider in his behalf.
When available: (Rule 102, Section 1, Rules of
Court)
1. To restore the liberty of an individual
subjected to physical restraint
2. As a consequence of a judicial proceeding; (a)
there has been deprivation of constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of the person;
(b) the court has no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, since such sentence is void as to the
excess.
3. In cases by which rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.
Grounds for Suspension of the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sec. 18, Article VII,
1987 Constitution)
1. Invasion; or
2. Rebellion;
3. When public safety requires it.
Limitations on the Power of the President to
Suspend the Privilege of Writ of Habeas
Corpus:
1. Not exceed 60 days; after the lapse of 60 days,
Congress may extend the period upon the
initiative of the President, and the period of
extension is to be determined by Congress.
2. Congress may revoke the suspension made by
the President by at least a vote of the majority
of the members of Congress, voting jointly,
which revocation may not be set aside by the
President.
3. Subject to judicial review upon petition of any
citizen, on the factual basis of the
proclamation of the Martial Law or the
suspension of the privilege of WHC or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within 30 days from the
filing.
4. Shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
5. Persons detained or arrested during the
suspension of the privilege of WHC shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise, will
be release.
The old rulings in Barcelona vs. Baker (1905) and
Montenegro vs. Castañeda to the effect that (a) the
executive department has the superior competence
to assess the peace and order condition in the
country; and (b) that the suspension of the privilege
of the WHC is a political question are already
abandoned. The suspension is now subject to
judicial review.
Other Remedy:
Alleged threats of invasion or rebellion can be
sufficiently handled by the President by exercising
the power granted to him, thus, whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
The suspension of the privilege does not suspend
the right to bail.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner, G.R. No. 139789, 5/12/00
Facts:
Potenciano Ilusorio, an 86-year-old lawyer,
possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married to Erlinda Ilusorio (petitioner) for 30 years
and begotten 6 children, but they separated in 1972.
Potenciano lived at Makti when in Manila and at
Baguio Country Club when in Baguio City. Petitioner
lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he
stayed with petitioner for about 5 months in
Antipolo. Two of their children, alleged that during
this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February
1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo instead lived in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband. Allegedly,
the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning.
Issue:
Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be
issued.
Held:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral. Here,
there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that the
latter was 86 years of age and under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern
his actions. With his full mental capacity having
the right of choice, he may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
privacy.
In the Matter of the Petition of Habeas Corpus
of Faustino Ramos, et al. vs. UDMC, G.R. No. L-
51637 October 15, 1979
Petitioners Visitacion Galan Carmona and her
husband Faustino Ramos are allegedly being
detained by respondent UDMC for non-payment
of hospital fees and balance of doctor’s fees
relative to petitioner Faustino.
In the course of their conference before the
Department of Justice, the credit and collection
officer of respondent United Doctors Medical
Center, affirmed that they were in on way
detaining in the hospital premises petitioner’s
husband Faustino Ramos for non-payment of his
bills and that he was free at any time to pack up
his things and to be discharged from the hospital.
In fact, they had stopped charging petitioner’s
husband for his stay in the hospital since June 26,
1979 as of which date his total account amounted
to some P40,791.00 (some P15,000.00 of which
were due to the hospital and the balance was for
doctor’s fees for the three operations performed
on petitioner’s husband. They admitted, however,
requiring petitioners to endorse in their favor all
their rights against the insurance company of the
client of the amount due to the hospital and
doctors, manifesting that petitioner and her
husband had already succeeded in collecting the
sum of P5,000.00, no part of which was ever
applied to their account with the hospital and this
was admitted by petitioner who stated that she
had spend the amount to take care of the needs of
her husband.
Lansang vs. Garcia, GR No. L-33964, December
11, 1971
Facts:
On August 21, 1971, two grenades were thrown
at the miting de avance of the Liberal Party killing
8 persons and injuring many. Thus, on August 23,
President Marcos issued Proclamation 889
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In light
thereof, petitioners were apprehended by
members of the Philippine Constabulary. The
proclamation implies that the authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension of the writ belongs to the President
and it expressly states that such declaration is
deemed “final and conclusive upon the courts and
all other persons”.
Issue:
Whether the court would adhere to its previous
decision in Barcelona vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castañeda?
Ruling:
The grant of power to suspend the privilege of writ
is neither absolute nor unqualified. The declaration
of a rebellion as argued by the petitioners need not
to be wide-scale event, it may be declared even if it
only involves a small part of the country. The
president’s decision to suspend the writ was by fact
constitutional hence VALID, as he as three available
courses to suppress rebellion. First, to call our the
military, second to suspend the privilege of writ and
lastly to declare martial law.
Padilla-Garcia vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 71388, April 20,
1983
Facts:
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together with 8 others
who were having a conference in a house in
Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the
PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search
warrant duly issued. Josefina, mother of Sabino,
opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of
arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of
arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was
without just cause. Sabino and companions together
with 4 others were later transferred to a facility
unknown only to the PC. Thus, the petition of
issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino, et
al. is valid.
Held:
In a complete turnabout, the SC decision in the
Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelona Case & the Montenegro Case was again
reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
was once again held as discretionary. The
suspension of the writ was a political question to be
resolved solely by the president. Likewise, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of
the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. If the right to bail may be
demanded during the continuance of the rebellion,
and those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would, without
at least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field
thereby jeopardizing the success of government
efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.
Note:
This ruling was abrogated by Sec. 18, Art 7 of the
1987 Constitution which expressly
constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrince. Note as
well that under Art. 3 (Sec. 13) of the Constitution it
is stated that “the right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended.”
SPO2 Manalo vs. PNP Chief Calderon, G.R. No.
178920, October 15, 2007
Facts:
Petitioners, who are police officers of the PNP,
Region 4-A, after they were implicated in the
burning of an elementary school in Taysan,
Batangas at the height of the May 2007 national
and local elections, filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus assailing their
restrictive custody and monitored movements.
The complainant arose from an incident which
happened on May 15, 2007 when five
unidentified men bearing high-powered firearms
suddenly appeared at the Barangay
Pinagbayanan Elementary School in the
Municipality of Taysan, Province of Batangas, a
polling area for the 2007 national and local
elections. The five armed men forcibly entered
Polling Precinct 76-A, and poured gasoline over a
ballot box. The conflagration caused the death of
a school teacher who was then acting as an
election supervisor. A poll watcher in the person
of Leticia (Letty) Ramos also perished while nine
others were reportedly injured as a result of the
fire. Petitioners are all members of the PNP
Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-RSOG),
failed to timely respond to the incident at the
Pinagbayanan Elementary School.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are unlawfully detained or
restrained of their liberty under their restrictive
custody status.
Ruling:
No. The monitoring of their movements cannot,
by any stretch of the imagination, be considered
as a form of curtailment of their freedom
guaranteed under the Constitution. They are not
actually detained or restrained of their liberties
as they are free to go in and out of Camp Vicente
Lim as they please. The only limitation imposed
upon them is that their movements within the
premises of the camp shall be monitored; that
they have to be escorted whenever the
circumstances warrant that they leave the camp;
and that their estimated time of departure and
arrival shall be entered in a logbook. Even
petitioners themselves admit they are not
actually detained or imprisoned. The “restrictive
custody” complained of by petitioners is, at best,
nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus.
Petitioners are merely held to account for their
movements inside and outside the camp’s
premises. They are not required to secure prior
approval before they can move out of the camp,
only that each of them be accompanied by an
escort and their time of departure and arrival noted.
Also, R.A No. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended
by R.A No. 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the
police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. The Chief of the
PNP shall have the authority to place police
personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of a grave administrative case filed against
him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint,
gave in nature, against such police personnel.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Petition of Writ of Amparo – is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation
by any unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearance or threats thereof.
Who may file:
The aggrieved party or by any qualified person
or entity in the following order:
a. Any member of the immediate family, namely:
the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party.
b. Any ascendant or descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
c. Any concerned citizen, organization,
association or institution, if there in no
known member of the immediate family or
relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a
petition by the aggrieved party suspends the
right of all other authorized parties to file
similar petition.
Where and When to File:
- At any day and at any time with the RTC of the
place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred, or
with SB, CA, SC of any justice of such courts. The
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin and Claudine
Margaret Santiago vs. Raffy Tulfo, et al., No.
205039, October 21, 2015
Facts:
Spouses Raymart and Claudine Santiago were in the
airport awaiting for the arrival of their baggage but
were informed that it was offloaded and transferred
to a different flight. While they were lodging a
complaint before the complaint desk, Raymart saw
a man taking photos of his wife. He then
approached him and found out that it was Ramon
“Mon” Tulfo. The confrontation then, escalated to a
brawl, which came to a stop because of the
interference of the airport security personnel.
Days after the expletives together with a threat
that they will retaliate against the Santiagos.
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled,
petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of amparo against respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a
writ of amparo should be granted.
Ruling:
No. While the rule states that the writ is a remedy
to protect the right to life, liberty and security of
the person desiring to avail of it, the same
section’s second paragraph qualifies that the
protection of such rights specifically pertain to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases
that involve protection to the rights to life,
liberty, and security.
Here, it does not allege any case of extrajudicial
killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any
threats thereof, in the sense above-described. The
petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation
of respondents’ purported violation of their right
to life and security, carried out by private
individuals without any showing of direct or
indicated government participation.
Edgardo Navia, et al. vs. Virginia Pardico, G.R.
No. 184467, June 19, 2012
Facts:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies CorporationNo.
(Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore which awakened his sons Enrique and
Ben staying in her house. When she went out to
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarked from the vehicle and immediately
asked her where they could find her son Bong.
Before she could answer, the guard saw Bong and
told him that he and Ben should go with them to
the security office of Asian Land because a
complaint was lodged against them for them of
electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in
the office of the security department of Asian
Land with petitioner Edgardo Navia. After the
investigation, the security guard allowed the
release of Bong but Ben was left in the security
office. According to Lolita, the last time she saw
Ben was when she left him in petitioner’s custody
at the security office. Exasperated with the
mysterious disappearance of Ben, his wife filed a
petition for Writ of Amparo before RTC of
Malolos City, which issued a writ of amparo
directing, among others, the issuances of a writ of
amparo and the production of the body of Ben
before it on June 30, 2008.
Issue:
Whether or not Ben’s disappearance as alleged in
his wife’s petition and proved during the
summary proceedings, fall without the ambit on the
rule of the writ of amparo.
Ruling:
No. it pointed out that in an amparo petition, proof
of disappearance alone is not enough. It is essential
to establish that such disappearance was carried
out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. The
writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances of threats thereof. Enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons means the
arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with
the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the
State or a political organization to give information
on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
- it is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Who may file:
Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the
writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be filed by:
 Any member of the immediate family of the
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
 Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative
of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of
those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
Where to file:
At the RTC where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction of the
place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored, at the option of the
petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the
SC or CA or the SB when the action concerns
public data files of government offices.
Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. G.R.
No. 189155, September 7, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent
and a member of BAYAN-USA. After doing voluntary
work, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly
opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground
face down. The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were
also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
Petitioner was detained for being a member of
the communist party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army. She was interrogated and was
later on released. Seeking sanctuary against the
threat of future harm as well as the suppression
of any existing government files or records
linking her to the communist movement,
petitioner filed a petition for the writs of amparo
and habeas data. She impleaded in her petition
the high-ranking civilian and military authorities
invoking the doctrine of command responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not Writs of Amparo under the
doctrine of command responsibility and/or
Habeas Data may be issued under the
circumstances.
Ruling:
No, the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in
impleading the public respondents in her amparo
petition, is legally inaccurate, if not correct. The
doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by
this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition. Since the application of command
responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a
full-blown criminal or administrative case rather
than in a summary amparo proceeding.
Neither may a writ of habeas data be issued in
this case. The writ of habeas data was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the
right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding himself, particularly in the
instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an
indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty, or security of the victim. This, in the case
at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, et al. G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014 Is
Facts:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school
student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates wearing only their undergarments,
which was reported by their other classmates to
their teacher Escudero. Escudero, through her
students, viewed and downloaded said pictures.
She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-
in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC
found Tan, et al. to have violated the student’s
handbook and banned them from “marching” in
their graduation ceremonies scheduled in
March 202012. Despite the TRO issued by Cebu RTC
in favor of petitioners, STC still barred said students
from the graduation ceremonies.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of one of the
students, and the other mothers filed a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the
school arguing that the privacy setting of their
children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends
Only”. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected. Also, the photos
accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
used ad reproduced without their consent. Escudero,
however, violated their rights by saving digital
copies of the photos and by subsequently showing
them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts
of their children were intruded upon where the
copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory. Thus, they
prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of
the subject data and have such data be declared
illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right
to privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is
proper.
Ruling:
Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
While the petition for writ of habeas data can be
availed even if this is not a case of extralegal killings
or enforced disappearance; and even if STC is not an
entity engaged in the business of “gathering,
collecting, or storing data information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party,” STC did not violate the students’
right to privacy and the manner which the school
gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal.
As it appears, it was the classmates of the students
who showed the picture to their teacher and the
latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it
was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their
students according to the students of the school (to
which the students and their parents agreed to in
the first place because of the fact that they enrolled
their children there).