DHARMASHASTRA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY

Environmental Law

Impact of Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Submitted To: Submitted By:

Dr. Veena Roshan Jose Aditya Puri
(Assistant Professor of Law) Bal/08/2018
Ms. Areena Parveen Ansari IV Semester
(Assistant Professor of Law)
 Acknowledgement

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to our Vice Chancellor Mr. Balraj Singh
Chauhan, our HOD Mr. VS Gigimon as well as our subject teacher Dr. Veena Roshan Jose and
Ms. Areena Parveen Ansari who gave me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on
Impact of Bhopal Gas Tragedy in the given format which helped me in doing a lot of Research
and I came to know about so many new things. I am really thankful to them.

Secondly I would also like to thank my colleagues and partners in this project who helped in
finalizing this project within this frame.
 Contents

CHAPTER-1 .................................................................................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER-2 .................................................................................................................................................... 6
INTRODUCING THE FFM REPORT ON THE LEGAL ISSUES ARISING ........................................................... 6
OUT OF THE BHOPAL GAS LEAK DISASTER................................................................................................ 6
CHAPTER-3 .................................................................................................................................................... 9
Environmental Aspects of the Tragedy ..................................................................................................... 9
CHAPTER-4 .................................................................................................................................................. 11
LESSON LEARNT ...................................................................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................... 13
REFRENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 13
 CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident on the
night of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant
in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. It is considered to be the world's worst industrial
disaster. Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas. The highly toxic
substance made its way into and around the small towns located near the plant.

Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259. In 2008,
the government of Madhya Pradesh had paid compensation to the family members of 3,787
victims killed in the gas release, and to 574,366 injured victims. A government affidavit in 2006
stated that the leak caused 558,125 injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and
approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries. Others estimate that 8,000
died within two weeks, and another 8,000 or more have since died from gas-related diseases.
The cause of the disaster remains under debate. The Indian government and local activists argue
that slack management and deferred maintenance created a situation where routine pipe
maintenance caused a backflow of water into a MIC tank, triggering the disaster. Union Carbide
Corporation (UCC) argues water entered the tank through an act of sabotage.
The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by UCC, with Indian Government-
controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470
million (equivalent to $845 million in 2018) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In
1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which
subsequently merged with McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. Eveready ended clean-up on the site in
1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state
government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen
years after the disaster.

Civil and criminal cases filed in the United States against UCC and Warren Anderson, UCC
CEO at the time of the disaster, were dismissed and redirected to Indian courts on multiple
occasions between 1986 and 2012, as the US courts focused on UCIL being a standalone entity
of India. Civil and criminal cases were also filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving
UCC, UCIL and UCC CEO Anderson. In June 2010, seven Indian nationals who were UCIL
employees in 1984, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing
death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each,
the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law. All were released on bail shortly after the
verdict. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was
passed.
 CHAPTER-2

INTRODUCING THE FFM REPORT ON THE LEGAL ISSUES ARISING

OUT OF THE BHOPAL GAS LEAK DISASTER

The Bhopal gas leak triggered many a litigation disaster. Almost every strand of litigation
concerning the event has been a disaster for the victim. Bhopal could well symbolise the failure
of the legal system in general and the failure of the system to respond to the disaster in particular.
The twenty years of engagement with the law and the justice system holds many lessons for the
future. It is time for introspection and assessment. Law may not have all the answers to the
problems that Bhopals generate, but it has the potential to do harm. Also, law is used by the State
and the corporation/industry in a variety of ways that actually result in negation of justice to
those within their control.

The cases concerning award of compensation

The Supreme Court which approved on February 14/ 15, 1989 the settlement by which
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was to pay 470 million US dollars as full and final settlement
of all civil and criminal claims by the victims, justified it saying: “this court, considered it
a compelling duty, both judicial and humane, to secure immediate relief to the victims.” Twenty
years after the settlement, neither has the relief to the victim been adequate nor immediate. The
assumptions on which the settlement is approved was that the number of deaths was 3,000 and
the number injured in the range of 1,00,000. In March 2003, the official figures of the awarded
death claims stood at 15,180 and awarded injury claims at 5,53,015. The underestimation was
slightly above 5 times. The range of compensation which was assumed in the settlement order
would be payable was Rs.1 to 3 lakhs for a death claim, Rs.25,000/- to Rs.1 lakh for temporary
disablement and Rs.50,000/- to Rs.2 lakhs for permanent disablement. Each death claim has been
awarded not more than Rs.1 lakh and on an average an injury claim has been settled for as little
as Rs.25,000/-.There have been failures in acknowledging the victims of the disaster by the
devices of exclusion, arbitrary categorization and arbitrary re-categorisation. Further, the costs
and losses arising out of the Bhopal gas leak disaster have had to be borne by the victim.
The failure to develop a jurisprudence to deal with the legal issues arising out of a mass disaster
is clearly inexcusable particularly when the status of risk and safety in Indian industry is
no better than it was in 1984. Developing a law is only part of the solution, implementing
it effectively would be an even greater challenge.

The situation as of March 31, 2003 was as under:

The number of claims for injuries registered with the Office of the Welfare Commissioner was
10,01,723 of which 5,53,015 cases were awarded a total sum of Rs.1,442.11 Crores. The number
of claims for deaths registered was 22,149 of which 15,180 were awarded by the Office of the
Welfare Commissioner. The arithmetic of how much each victim would have possibly received
under both the categories of death claims (04) and injury claims (01) is explained thus:

 Total No. of Claims filed: 10,29,515

 No. of Claims decided: 10,29, 342
 No. of claims awarded: 5, 68, 971
 No. of claims rejected: 4,60 ,371
Of the awarded cases, Death claims (04) 15,180 claims were awarded a total sum of Rs.86.85
crores. However, about 60% of these got converted into injury cases and were awarded on that
basis. Around 40%, i.e. 6,328 claims were awarded as death cases and these were awarded Rs. 1
lakh each. Depending on the number of dependants per deceased, the amount would get further
divided among each of them.

Thus of the 15, 180 death claims:

 6,328 claimants got 1 lakh each for a total sum of Rs. 63.28 crores
 8,752 cases of death claims converted to injury caseswould have got on an average Rs.
26,930/- aggregating to Rs. 23.57 crores Injury cases (01) 5,53,015 claims were awarded
a total sum of Rs.1442.11 crores.

Thus, on an average each injury claim was awarded Rs. 26,077/- The strange phenomenon of
conversion of death claims into injury claims requires some explanation. As a result of a general
suspicion that a claim filed could be a fraudulent one, the Welfare Commissioner, exercising
suo-moto powers, would take up any case in which an amount of over Rupees One lakh was
awarded in a death claim, and proceed to re-determine the compensation to be awarded. Where
the death had occurred some years after the date of the disaster. The Welfare Commission would,
without any bases, hold that the death was not as a result of the gas disaster and would proceed to
halve the compensation awarded by treating the claim one for injuries suffered on account of the
Gas Disaster. In one such case, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Welfare
Commissioner and remitted the case for a fresh determination (Madhukar Rao v. Claims
Commissioner (1998) 8 SCC 544). However, due to litigation fatigue, many such unjust orders
remained unchallenged. This explains the wholesale conversion of death claims to injury claims.
What is important is that these are the official figures given by the office of the Welfare
Commissioner and it is therefore clear that admittedly the number of persons injured and whose
claims have been accepted is over 5.50 lakhs and the number of persons who have died as a
result of the gas disaster and for whose deaths claims have been accepted are 15,180. A second
fact that emerges is that the assumptions on which the Supreme Court proceeded for approving
the settlement were totally erroneous. Thus there has been an injustice of a greater magnitude
than perhaps of the disaster itself.
 CHAPTER-3

Environmental Aspects of the Tragedy

Several residual environmental aspects still linger in Bhopal, 17 years after the tragedy.
According to a study conducted by Greenpeace (www.greenpeace.org) the continued
contamination of the groundwater, soil and breast milk present a serious health threat not only to
those currently exposed but also to future generations. According to experts, the evidence
suggests that the toxics have not only moved across various mediums, but tropic transfer of these
chemicals, essentially through the food chain causes these toxics to become part of the body
burden. On one hand, Greenpeace continue to contend that Dow chemicals are lagging in the
cleanup efforts of the Bhopal area, on the other hand Dow Chemicals claim that it has no
responsibility.

Laxmi Murthy (http://www.boloji.com/wfs/wfs0001.htm) claims, “The postBhopal era also saw

worldwide regulation on chemicals and toxicity and a demand by communities to the right to
information and to be participants in the process of industrysiting. Yet, as Tomas Mac Sheoin's
report on the Union Carbide Corporation notes, "It is one of the bitter ironies of Bhopal that its
major reformist effects were felt in Union Carbide's home country." Inspired by the disaster and
the public response to it, the US increased its regulatory activities. One major step forward came
through the setting up of the Toxic Releases Inventory and other freedom of information
measures that greatly increased public access to information on toxic chemical releases.

In India, however, community struggles have little success in gaining the 'right to know' whereby
people can identify any contaminated sites in their areas. ”. The legal system in which the
resident is informed of the problems in that area is still in its infancy. In addition, majority of
people in the catastrophe area are poor and uneducated they are not aware of the problems that
are caused by exposure to toxic remains in the site. Most residents are not aware of the
contamination of ground water in the area. Others, even though aware of the contamination,
continue to consume it because the government has not provided any alternative sources of
potable water.
A recent article by a web news service in India claims that around 700 tons of toxic waste in the
form of corroded metal and other scrap generated by Union Carbide now lie scattered and
exposed in the factory premises and have worsened the sufferings of victims living nearby. A
Greenpeace scientific study in 1999 and some others by government agencies have confirmed
the presence of several life-threatening poisons such as mercury and other heavy metals,
chlorinated pesticides and pollutants in the scattered waste
 CHAPTER-4

LESSON LEARNT

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without
concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences. The disaster
demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are
often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya
Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing
Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the
existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries.
Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have
provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal.

Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring
performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of
pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India. National governments and international agencies
should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident
prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations.
Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety
legislation .Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within
urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to
bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other
necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial
accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a
few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated
human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had
four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no
mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city. Existing public health
infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for
manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate
resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs. Communities that do not
possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents
should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.
 CONCLUSION

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its
aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general
and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves
by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some
protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy
industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant
development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in
environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent
continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of
industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly
been heeded.

REFRENCES

1. Accident Summary, Union Carbide India Ltd., Bhopal, India: December 3, 1984.
Hazardous Installations Directorate. 2004, Health and Safety Executive.
2. Dhara VR, Dhara R: The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal: a review of health effects.
Arch Environ Health. 2002, 57 (5): 391-404.
3. Castleman B PP: Appendix: the Bhopal disaster as a case study in double standards. The
export of hazards: trans-national corporations and environmental control issues. Edited
by: Ives J. 1985, London , Routledge and Kegan Paul, 213-222.
4. Union Carbide: Bhopal Information Center. wwwbhopalcom/ucshtm. 2005.