MARCELINO AGNE ET. AL. vs DIRECTOR OF LANDS G.R. No.

L-40399 February 6, 1990

FACTS:
 Respondent Precentacion Agapon inherited from her father Herminigildo Agpoon Gascon the
parcel of land in question which was originally covered by a Free Patent on which basis an
Original Certificate of Title was issued to Herminigildo.
 Respondents claim that they are the owner of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Bantog,
Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners;
 Petitioners contend that the land in question was formerly a part of the river bed of the Agno-
Chico River;
 Sometime in 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river to change its course and
abandon its original bed;
 Citing of Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code, petitioners claim that they became the owners by
accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed bordering their properties
and from then on, they were in OCEN possession of the property to the exclusion of
Herminigildo Agpoon and introduced improvements thereon.
 Pets filed a complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon with the
former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or
action to clear title to a parcel of land
 RTC ordered the reconveyance of the subject some portion of the property in favor of
petitioners.
 Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the same with IAC which affirmed in toto the CFI decision.

ISSUE: Who, as between the riparian owner presently in possession and the registered owner by virtue
of a free patent, has a better right over the abandoned river bed in dispute.

HELD:
We rule in favor of petitioners. The old Civil Code, the law then in force, which provides:

The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally
changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the
abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at
equal distance therefrom.

Once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian owners become the owners of the abandoned bed
to the extent provided by this article. The acquisition of ownership is automatic. There need be no act
on the part of the riparian owners to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject
thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the need of any
formal act of acquisition. Such abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of
the riparian land even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be
considered as a trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the accessory, as it is
a mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion. Since the accessory follows
the nature of the principal, there need not be any tendency to the thing or manifestation of the purpose
to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition
becomes evident.
The right of the owner of land to additions thereto by accretion has been said to rest in the law of
nature, and to be analogous to the right of the owner of a tree to its fruits, and the owner of flocks and
herds to their natural increase.
The failure of herein petitioners to register the accretion in their names and declare it for purposes of
taxation did not divest it of its character as a private property. Although we take cognizance of the rule
that an accretion to registered land is not automatically registered and therefore not entitled or subject
to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. The
said rule is not applicable to this case since the title claimed by private respondents is not based on
acquisitive prescription but is anchored on a public grant from the Government, which presupposes that
it was inceptively a public land. Ownership over the accession is governed by the Civil Code.
Imprescriptibility of registered land is a concern of the Land Registration Act.
G.R. No. 179754 November 21, 2012

JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, JR., PAZ ROYERAZ-SOLER, and MANSUETO MACEDA, Petitioners,

vs.
JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON, (deceased), substituted by his sisters namely: TEOTIMA M. BOURBON,
EMMA M. MILLAN, EUGENIA M. RAMA and ROSARIO M. CABALLES; CLARINDA REGIS-SCHMITZ and
MARIA LINA MALMISA, Respondents.

FACTS:
 Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are descendants of
Rafael Mondragon by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia, while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon
is Rafael’s descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos.
 Andrea Baldos, owned a parcel of land located at Macrohon, Southern Leyte which was later on
registered in the names of her heirs.
 In 1954, Andrea conveyed a portion thereof to one Crispina Gloria de Cano via a document
written in the vernacular wherein she categorically stated that she inherited the land from her
father and she was the true and exclusive owner of the land;
 When Andrea died in 1955, her son Fortunato Mondragon took over, paying taxes thereon
religiously; and when Fortunato died, his son Jack Daniel (herein respondent) came into
possession and enjoyment thereof.
 On August 18, 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the land to his co-
respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).
 On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that the sale to Regis
Schmitz created a cloud upon their title, petitioners filed Civil Case, with a prayer that Jack
Daniel be declared without right to sell the land or a portion thereof; .
 RTC denied the motion. Ruled that Jack is a co-owner of the land which forms part of Andrea’s
estate, and thus possesses the right to dispose of his undivided share therein.
 CA affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have a equitable title over the property disputed.

HELD:
NEGATIVE. PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE ANY LEGAL OR COLORABLE TITLE OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.

The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to prove only two things,
namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or
at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds
its validity or efficacy.

It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafael’s
second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT. With
greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafael’s children by
his first wife Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood – such fact is not borne out by
the record – they could not be heirs to each other. And if indeed Eleuteria and Andrea were blood
relatives, then petitioners would have so revealed at the very first opportunity. Moreover, the fact that
Rafael died ahead of Andrea, and that he is not even named in the title, give the impression that the
land belonged solely to the heirs of Andrea, to the exclusion of Rafael. If this were not true, then the
title should have as registered owners the "Heirs of Rafael and Andrea Mondragon", in which case the
petitioners certainly would possess equitable title, they being descendants-heirs of Rafael. Yet, not so
written.
Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. A different view would have
been taken if they were.
G.R. No. 169272, July 11, 2012
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the Philippines, petitioner vs Alfredo Pascual, respondent

FACTS:

 December 11, 2000, Bahais filed a complaint with RTC for quieting of title, injunction and other
claims against Silverio Songcuan and/or his heirs, the secretary of DENR and the regional
executive director of DENR of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
 Bahais alleged that it is the lawful and absolute owner of two parcels of land, who acquired
ownership from Marcelina Ordono. The Bahais had been in possession of the land for 30 years.
The cloud exists on its title because of such decision of the Bureau of Lands, which rejected the
sales applications of the Bahais predecessors-in-interest for the lots and ordered all those in
privity to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements. DENR secretary affirmed with this
decision. Recourse to the office of the President had been unavailing, so DENR issued writs of
execution pursuant to the President's decision.
 Pascual moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state cause of action. Saying that the
petitioner had no legal right to file the complaint since the final and executory Bureau of Lands’
decision ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to possess the lots.
 RTC denied the motion to dismiss, Bureau of Lands was not yet final since President's ruling on
the appeal was unavailable. Respondent elevated this case to the CA, questioning the propriety
of the RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss.
 CA set aside the RTC, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for prematurity.

Issue: Whether the land ceased to be a public due to petitioners’ open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession.

Held:

Petitioners have no legal or equitable title or interest on the real property subject of the action.

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, there are two (2) indispensable requisites in an action to
quiet title: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed to be
casting cloud on his title.

From these allegations, we find it clear that the petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or
interest in the lots. The petitioner s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the
final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the
OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the lots.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of
Lands, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, upon finality, have the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.16ςrνll

The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once; that x x x a right or fact [that] has been judicially tried and
determined by a [tribunal or] court of competent jurisdiction x x x should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate[, so long as it remains unreversed].17ςrνll

Accordingly, the petitioner is now barred from challenging the validity of the final and executory Bureau
of Lands December 4, 1985 decision.

Petitioners should have filed for annulment of the final and executor order of the Bureau of Lands. The
action for Quieting of Title is not the proper remedy.
ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO
AVILES, respondents. [G.R. No. 95748. November 21, 1996]

Anastacia Vda. De Aviles: petitioner

CA & Camilo Aviles: respondent

FACTS:
 A dispute over a parcel of land in Pangasinan bounded in the north by Camilo Aviles, east by
the Malawa River, on the south by Anastacio Aviles and on the west by Juana and Apolonio
Joaquin.
 Since 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the property.
 Eduardo mortgaged the property to Rural Bank and BPI, was later foreclosed. Upon auction, the
property was redeemed by petitioner’s mother and was subsequently transferred to his name.
 On 1983, Camilo Aviles constructed a bamboo fence on the property and moved the earthen
dikes which were considered as the boundary from one property to another. Camilo raised the
defense that what he previously occupying was a lot lesser than what was agreed between him
and his siblings.
 Trial court dismissed the action for lack of merit and ordered the parties to employ the
services of the Land Surveyor to determine the extent of boundary limit.
 Upon appeal, CA affirmed in part the decision of the trial court reasoning that the special civil
action quieting of title is NOT the proper remedy for settling boundary dispute. (petitioners
could have filed for ejectment case instead)

HELD:
1) Is quieting of title the proper remedy in settling a boundary dispute?
2) Should the parties’ rights been declared?

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE:
NO, quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling boundary disputes.
The case is clearly a case of boundary dispute and thus not cognizable in the case of quieting of title. In
order to avail of such remedy, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the
owner’s title to or interest in real property.
Although there was a Deed of Partition and a Deed of Sale, these documents in no way constitute a
cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties’ failure
to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

SECOND ISSUE:
NO, the CA did not err in not declaring the rights of the parties.
Since the case is not a quieting of title but one of a boundary dispute, then the CA is not obliged to
declare the rights of each party.
Inasmuch as the enumeration of the causes, grounds or conditions precedent in the first paragraph of
said Sec. 1 of Rule 64 of ROC is exclusive, by parity of reasoning, it follows that similar remedies provided
for in the second paragraph of the same section would also be marked with the same exclusivity as to
bar any other cause possibly clouding one’s title as a ground for such petitions.
MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.
GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.

FACTS:

 The late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children named Marcelino,
Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in Mambaling, Cebu
City identified as Lot No. 2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658.
 Upon the demise of the Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been divided among
their children with each child having a share of 36.50 square meters. However, the estate of the
Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of
Court.
 Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from her
brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a third party
named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property from
Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.
 However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action for
quieting of title and damages.
 RTC ruled in favor of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.
 Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been declared
by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase. The trial court
segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and
Laurencia.

ISSUE: Whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions
thereof to a third party.

HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of
the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons.
Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-
owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such
inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro
indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides:
ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified
in writing of the sale by the vendor.
However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale.
Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-owned property shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
[G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003]
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.

FACTS:

 On 12 May 1986, ABEJO instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DE
GUIA, alleging that he is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond
situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
 ABEJO further averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any
contract and without paying rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice and also complained that DE
GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated
demands to do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.
 ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square
meters as well as pay damages.
 DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer on 12 January
1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues concerning the validity of the service of
summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of
action and has prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima
Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to him, ABEJO is
not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to
possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the
FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for
himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he
introduced as a builder in good faith.
 RTC ruled in favor of private respondents Abejo ordering De Guia to return the possession of
property
 CA affirmed RTC

ISSUES: whether an action for recovery of possession and turn-over of the undivided portion of a
common property is proper before partition;

HELD:

Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided
thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the
whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions
owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession.
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also
against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the
property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner
he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the
property.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-
owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership.[24] Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their
respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house
without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners
cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-
owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-
TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents. G.R. No. 78178 April 15, 1988

FACTS:
 The parcel of land involved in this case, OCT in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina
Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio
and Nenita(deceased) are represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda.
Bernabe went to China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then.
 On August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land
consisting to Donato Delgado.
 On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana V. Aresgado
de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the portion of land which the latter
had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio.
 On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, thru SPA by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza,
sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
 It appears that said land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca
Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in
that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the
name of Celestino Afable, Sr. in 1983.
 Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended that
the petitioners were guilty of laches.
 He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a
result of the sale to him of the land
 RTC which held that Celestino Afable as co-owner
 CA AFFIRMED the decision of the lower court insofar as it held that prescription does not go
against plaintiffs-appellees because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the
appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription,
nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz
v.. Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint

ISSUE:
1) May a co-owner sell the whole property co-owned without the consent of the other co-owners
2) May laches bar a co-owner from recovery.

HELD:

1)The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
2)Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary
successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely
the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the part of
the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Agnes Gapacan, Eugenia Gapacan-Kiaki, and Marilyn Gapacan (petitioners) vs. Maria Gapacan Omipet
(Respondent) G.R. No. 148943, Aug. 15, 2002

FACTS:
 Paicat Gapacan is a native Igorot of the Kankanai tribe, and the primitive possessor of an
unregistered land with an area of 1 hectare situated in Abatan, Bauko, Mt. Province. The land
was divided into 3 parcels of rice land and another parcel planted to camote, and declared by
him for taxation purposes for the first time on March 1931. Paicat had two children, Maria and
Antonio.
 Antonio left Abatan during his adulthood to try his luck in the minefields of Mankayan, Benguet.
His sister Maria remained in Abatan to take care of Paicat until his death sometime in WWII, and
she eventually took over the cultivation of their father’s land.
 Antonio married Agnes and begot two daughters, Eugenia and Marilyn. When Antonio retired
from the mines, they returned to Abatan. Antonio executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property in June 1954, making him the legal owner of the property in question. This affidavit
was allegedly thumbmarked by Maria’s husband, Pedro Omipet, in her behalf. Thus, Antonio
registered the questioned property under his name for taxation purposes in 1954. His wife
Agnes and her children occupied the land and cultivated the 3 parcels of Riceland and the
camote-land.
 In April 1992, Maria hired the services of Orlando Boleyley and Gaston Gapacan to clear and
cultivate some portions of the contested land, but they were prevented by the petitioners. The
petitioners even filed a case for forcible entry against Maria’s granddaughter, Gertrude Beguil
and three others before MCTC-Bauko-Sabangan, Mt. Province.
 Petitioners alleged ownership of the disputed agricultural field, which they claimed was covered
by a tax declaration under Antonio’s name, who was already dead.
 MCTC ordered defendants to vacate the land in dispute and restore possession thereof to
plaintiffs.
 Maria Gapacan-Omipet then filed a complaint for Quieting of Title on December 1992 before
RTC
 RTC dismissed the complaint and adjudged the petitioners herein to have the right of possession
 Respondent appealed to the CA, who ruled that the property was common property of both
petitioners and respondents. It ordered equitable partition of the disputed property.
 The CA further opined Antonio is in GROSS bad faith because he knew that his sister was legally
entitled to a share yet, he fraudulently caused the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property and the issuance of his name.

ISSUE: WON respondent’s action for Quieting of Title is proper.

HELD:
YES, action for quieting title is proper.
Art. 476 of the NCC provides that an action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on
the title to real property or any interest therein. It was held that a property owner whose property rights
were being disturbed in any way may ask a competent court for a proper determination of the
respective rights of the claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that is, to require the
one who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property not only
to the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both, with the view of dissipating any cloud of doubt
over the property. It goes without saying that the CA, in resolving the present controversy, is well within
its authority to adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, hence to declare the same as common
property of the litigants. Besides, the respondent instituted the present action for the purpose of asking
the court to pass judgment upon the issue of ownership of the disputed property with the hope that she
will be declared its rightful owner. However, there was also no clear evidence that she was designated
to be the sole owner of the land. The fraudulent claims of ownership by her brother did not merit any
probative value as well. To be sure, “tax declarations to not vest absolute ownership of the property
upon the declarant, nor do declarations of ownership for taxation purposes constitute adequate
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty.” Neither Maria nor Antonio can claim absolute
ownership over the entire property to the prejudice of the other, thus they are entitled to ½ pro indiviso
shares of their father’s estate.