7 ‘The Special Relationship with India Part 1: The Supremacy of the Indian National Congress ‘The Third World country on which the KGB eventually tated most operational effort during the Cold War was india. Stalin, however, India had been regarded a5 an imperialist ‘The Great Soviet Encyclopedia dismissed Mohands Gandhi, who led India to independence in 1947, asa who betrayed the people and helped the imperialists ‘them; aped the ascetics; pretended in a demagogie way supporter of Indian independence and an enemy of the and widely exploited religious prejudice." Despite his Stalinist attacks Jawaharlal Nehra, the frst Prime Minister of pendent India, “had no. doubr that the Soviet revolt advanced human society by a grea leap and had lta bright which could noc be smothered’. Though later eulogized by writers as“ leader of international magnitude’ who ranked! the best minds ofthe twentieth century',* Neheu was well a until Stalin's death in 1955 he, ike Gandhi was reactionary. During the carly years of Indian independence ‘correspondence from Moscow to the Communist Party of (CPI) was frequendy intercepted by the Tntligence in New Delhi (as it had been when the 1B was working British Raj). According to the head of the IB, B.N. the early 19508 ‘every instruction that had issued from had expressed the necessity and importance [for] the Indian ‘munist Party to overthrow the “reactionary” Neh Early in 1951 Malik gave Nehru a copy of the latest from Moscow to the CPI, which contained a warning ‘ust not fall into government hands. Nehru laughed out remarked that Moscow apparently did not know how: Ineligence was’ Neither Nehru nor the IB, however, realized how thoroughly the Indian embassy in Moscow was being penetrated by the KGB, using sts usual varieties of the honey trap. The Indian diplomat PRO- KHOR was recruited, probably inthe early 1950s, with the help ofa {emaleswallow, codenamed NEVEROVA, who presumably seduced him. The KGB was clearly pleased with the material which PRO- KHOR provided, which included on rwo occasionstheembassycode- book and rciphering tables, sine in 1954 i increased his monthly payments from 1,009 t0 4,000 rupees." Another Indian diplomat, RADAR, wasrecruitedin 19 56,als with theassstanceofaswallow, ‘sho on this occasion claimed (probably falsely to be pregnant." A ‘hird KGB swallow persuaded a cipher clerk inthe Indian embassy, ARTUR, t0 go heavily into debt in order to make it easier 10 “compromise im. He was recruited a8 an agent in 1957 after being teapped (probably ine illegal currency dealing) by a KGB officer posing a¢ a black-marketer.” As a result of these and other pen- “erations ofthe embassy, Soviet codebreakers were probably able to ‘kceypt substantial numbers of Indian diplomatic communication As KGB operations in India expanded during the 19508 and ofr, the Centre discovered (and perhaps even exaggerated) the extent ofthe IB’s previous penetration of the CPI. According toa GB report, a investigation into Promode Das Gupta, who later ‘became secretary ofthe Bengal Communist Party, concluded that he had been recruited by the IB in 1947. Further significant 1B Penetrations were reported in the Kerala and Madras parties.” By the 1960s KGB penetration of the Indian intelligence community and other pars ofits ffcial bureaucracy had enabled it to turn the tables on the TB." After the KGB beeame the main conduit for both ‘money and secret communications from Moscow, high-level IB pene- uation of the CPI became much more dificult. As in other Com ‘nist paris, this secret channel was known ony toa smal nner ‘ize within the leadership In 1959 the PCI General Secretary, Ajoy ‘Gosh, agreed with the Delhi esdency on plans to found an impoct— cxpore busines for trade with the Soviet blo, headed by a senior Panty member codenamed DED, whose profits would be creamed. olf for Party funds. Within litle more than a decade its annual Profs had grown o over 3 milion rupees. The Soviet news agency Novosti provided further subsidies by routinely paying the CPL Publishing house ata rate so percent above its normal charges.” as‘Moscow's intrest in Nehru was greatly enhanced by his cence (together with Nasser and Tito) as one of the leaders of Non-Aligned Movement, which hegan to ake shape atthe Conference in 1955. An exchange of oficial vst inthe same bby Nehruand Khrushchev opened new era in Indo-Soviet (On his return fom India in December, Khrushchev reported to Presidium that he had received a warm weleome, but criticized “primitive” portrayal of India in Soviet publiations and fas demonstrated a poor gasp of Indian culture. Khrushchev was, ever, clearly pleased with the intelligence and personal security vided by the KGB during his trip and proposed thatthe ‘concemed be decorated and considered for slary increases." ‘American reliance on Pakistan as a strategic counterwe Soviet influence in Asia encouraged India to turn to the US 1956 Nehru declared that he had never encountered a “grosser ‘of naked aggression’ than the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, failed to condemn the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hi Uprising in the same year. India voted against a UN calling for fee eletions in Hungary and the withdtawal of forces. The Kremlin increasingly valued Indian support as, growing frequency, the Non-Aligned Movement tended t0 the UN with the Soviet ble rather than che West. During the India and the Soviet Union found farther common cause Mao's China” ‘Within Nehru’s Congress Party government the KGB set cultivate its leading left-wing Brcbrand and Nehru’s close adi Krishna Menon, who became Minister of Defence in 1957 spending most of the previous decade as, succesively, Indian Commissioner in London and representative atthe United Nati To the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, ‘twas ‘that [Menon] was personally friendly othe Soviet Union, He say fo me heatedly: “You cannot imagine the hatred the people felt and still fel to the colonialist, the British « ‘methods used by American capital to exploit the backwaed co ‘may be oblique, but they're jus as harsh.” In May 1962 the Soviet Presidium (which under Khrus replaced the Politburo) authorized the KGB residency in New to conduct activemeasures operations designed to st Menon's postion in India and enhance his personal popolast probably in the hope that he would become Nehru’s sucesso.” During Menon’ tenure ofthe Defence Ministry, India’s main source ‘of arms imports switched from the West o the Soviet Union. The Indian decision in the summer of 1962 to purchase MiG-a1s eather ‘han British Lightnings was due chilly to Menon. The British igh ‘Commissioner in New Delhi reported to London, ‘Krishna Menon has from the beginning managed to surround this question with lmost conspiratorial official and ministerial secrecy combined with «skill putting about of stores in favour ofthe MiG and against ‘Western aircraft." Menon’s career, however, was disrupted by the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962. Having failed to take the prospect of invasion seriously unt the eve ofthe attack, Menon found himself made the scapegoat for India’s unpreparedness. Fol- lowing the rout of Indian foees bythe Chinese, Nehru reluctantly dismissed him on 3x October. fortnight late, the Presidium autho rized active measures by the Delhi residency, including secret finance fora newspaper which supported Menon, in a forlo attempt to resuscitate his politcal cree." Though similar active measures by ‘he KGB in Menon’ favour before the 1967 election” also had litle ‘observable effect, seret message to Menon from the CPSU Central ‘Committee (probably sent by its International Department) pressed appreciation for his postive atitude to the Soviet Union, fortunes. Before he ‘became Defence Minister, most of his political career had been spent ‘outside India ~ including twenty-eight years in Britain, where he had served for more than a decade as a Labour cou As a result, despite the personal support of rome ardent disciples within the Congress Party (atleast one of whom received substantial KGB funding), Menon lacked any real popular folowing in India, itself. By the time he returned to India from foreign exile the only language he spoke was English, he could no longer tolerate spicy Indian food and he preferred a tweed jacket and flannel tousers to ‘raditional Indian dres. After failing to be renominated by Congress in his existing Bombay constituency forthe 1967 election, Menon stood unsuccesfllyas.an independent. Two yeas later, with Com ‘unit support, he was elected as an independent in West Bengal. Some ofthe isues on which he eampaigned suggest that he had been ‘nfluenced by KGB active measures as for example, in his demand. ‘hat American troops in Viemam be tied for genocide and his claim asthar they were sling open the wombs of pregnant women to thei unborn babies Wall before his death in 1974, Menon had eased to bean influential voice in Indian poles Following Menon’ politcal elise, Moscow's preferred date wo succeed Nehru afer his deth ia May 1964 was Nanda, Home Minister and number two inthe cabinet The residency was ordered todo al could to frter his a bato switch support to Lal Bahadur Shasta a close ‘of Neh, if Nanda’ campaign filed There sno indication files noted by Mirkin tha the KGB wae in contact with Nanda or Shastri. Moscow's main reason for supporting them almost cerainly, negative rather han pone = to prevent the wing Hindu tadsonalist Mora Desi who began each day drinking a glass of his own urine (a practice extolled in Indian medical treatise) from succeeding Nehru Inthe event, Desai had heen persuaded eo withdraw reluctantly from the Shastri Became Prime Minister with the unanimos backing of ares. Following Shast’s sudden death in January 1966, the ‘of Congress leaders the ‘Syndicate’ chose Nehru’ daughter, Gandhi (codenamed VANO by the KGB), as his successor in mistaken bebe tht she would prove a popular fguchead they could manipulate a will “ The KGB's fse prolonged contact with Indira Gandhi occured daring her fst vist tthe Sovee Union afew months Stalin's death in 2933. As well as keeping her under contin surveillance, the Second Chit Directorate aso surrounded ber handsome, atensve male admizers* Unaware ofthe ohesta ‘of het welcome by the KGB, India was overwhelmed by thea tions lavished on er. Though he did not mention the male a inleers to he father, she wrote thin, Everybody the Rasa havebeensosweettome..-Tam Being eat like everybody's daughter -I shall be horsbiy spoilt by the time leave. Nobody ‘verbeen so nice rome Indira wrote of holiday arranged for ee the Black Sea, Ton think have hadsuch ahold foryars Late in Leningrad, she wd Nebr tha he was “wallowing in Toxo Two years later Indea accompanied her father on bis ist wise the Soviet Union. Like Nebr, she was visibly impressed the apparent successes of Soviet planing and economic moderne ation exhibited to them in careflly sage managed vse 10 R factories. During her trip, Khrushchev presented her with a mink coat which became one of the favourite items in her wardrobe — despite the fact that afew years calie she had criticized the female Indian ambassador in Moscow for accepting a similar gift" Soviet attempts to cultivate Indira Gandhi during the 190s were ‘morivated far more by the desire to inflaence er father than by any awareness of her own political potential. Like both the Congress Syndicate and the CPI, Moscow stil underestimated her when she bbecame Prime Minister. During her early appearance in parliament, Mes Gandhi seemed tongue-tied and unable to think on her feet. “The insulting nickname coined by a socialist MP, ‘Dumb Doll began to stick." Moscow's strategy during, 1966 for the Indian