11. Valdez v. Dabon AC No.

7353 November 16, 2015 (En Banc)

Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez (Nelson) against Atty. Antolin Allyson M.
Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon) anchored on the ground of grossly immoral and indecent conduct which transgressed the
high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.

Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with
gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia),
which was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.

Nelson was married to Sonia who was employed as Court Stenographer of the CA. She admitted to have had an
adulterous and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon from 2000-2006. Nelson only found out about said illicit
relationship in 2006 after receiving an anonymous text message hinting/stating about the existence of the illicit affair.
A message from Atty. Joy, wife of Atty. Dabon about their annulment made Sonia admit to the affair.

Sonia alleged in her affidavit that the extramarital affair was acceded by sexual assaults and maintained through
intimidation and threats of exposure, humiliation and embarrassment. That on November 13, 2000, Atty. Dabon lured
her to what appeared to be a mere friendly lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug into her food or drink
causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her to Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested
her while she was asleep; that she opted to keep silent about the incident for fear of its adverse repercussions of
shame and embarrassment to her and her family; that she pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget what had
happened, but the respondent instead taunted her by laughing at her misery; that since then, Atty. Dabon succeeded
in having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or twice a week through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon
threatened her that he would tell everyone that she had been playing around with him, if she would not yield to his
lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in silence for years and submitted herself to the bestial desires of Atty.
Dabon, until she even thought that she was in love with him.

She further claimed that after calling it quits in 2006, Atty. Dabon could not let her go and continued to threaten and
pester her to continue their affair. Sonia continued to reject Atty Dabon which led to him threatening to divulge their
illicit relateonship to her husband. Sonia immediately told Atty Joy that an employee in the CA was being harassed by
her husband. Then Atty. Dabon sent the anonymous text to Nelson.

Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and
unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his
reputation.

The court referred the case to the IBP. It found that the charge against Atty. Dabon had been sufficiently proven,
recommending that he be found guilt of gross immoral conduct and, accordingly, be disbarred and dropped from the
Roll of Attorneys. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the same.

ISSUE:

HELD:

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the Bar's integrity,16 and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit18 that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any errant behavior
of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.19
In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence showing that Atty.
Dabon did have an illicit relationship with Nelson's legal wife.

To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether or
not he would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty.
Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly
admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also
observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct
and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely
deny the affair itself.

In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial
facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is
admitted.20 It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit
relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.

More telling of the existence of a romantic relationship are the notes and cards21 that Sonia sent to Atty. Dabon
containing personal and intimate messages in her own handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's affection towards
him as she even referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also gifts she gave him on special occasions such as
signature shoes, watch and shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently visited him in his office either to bring him
food, fruits and other goodies or to invite him to lunch which apparently displayed her emotional attachment to him.
Curiously, the foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "ego-boosting admissions"22 of Atty. Dabon indeed proved
that a consensual relationship between him and Sonia existed.

the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained
through threat and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a sexually abused woman could not be expected to lavish
her oppressor with expensive gifts or pay him affectionate compliments or words of endearment. The natural reaction
of a victim of a sexual molestation would be to avoid her ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that Sonia
continually remained in the company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting him for lunch-outs and
frequenting his office to bring food whenever the latter was preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with
her to eat. Verily, Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of one who
had been repeatedly sexually abused.

Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged sexual abuse to the police, if such was the
truth. She could have placed the respondent behind bars and put an end to her claimed misery. Also, the Court cannot
lend credence to Sonia's claim that she merely succumbed to the respondent's sexual advances because of his
continuous threats of public exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that Atty. Dabon would be in a much more
precarious situation if he would carry out such threats, as this would exposed himself to countless criminal and
administrative charges. The Court believes that Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults and continuing threat and
intimidation was not established by clear preponderant evidence. The Court is left with the most logical conclusion
that Sonia freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any threat and
intimidation.
12. Ricafort v. Medina AC No. 5179 May 31, 2016 (En Banc)

FACTS:

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina.
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida
Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped
at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa ako?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left.

Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's car.5 Complainant
later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene O. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del
Norte.6chanrobleslaw
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."7 Respondent's act showed arrogance and
disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct.

In his Comment,15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the incident happened while he was
bringing his 10-year-old son to school.16 He further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's
tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car.17 When respondent alighted from his car to check the damage,
complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner.18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself.19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his son and himself, respondent asked
complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer.20 Both parties agreed that
they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch.21 No traffic officer was present during
the incident.

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio programs by the
Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.23 He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was
caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to
complainant.

According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the incident during
the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao City.26 During
the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a
weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent
to check if there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand
any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.

Tje case was referred to the IBP. Only the respondent appeared before the Mandatory Conference. The commissioner
supposed that the settlement could be the reason for the complainants absence. It was recommended that
respondent be suspended for 60 days for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR. IBP Board of
governors opted and approved with modifications: Suspended for 30 days.

ISSUE: W/N Atty Medina should be held administratively liable

HELD: There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened.48 He stresses complainant's seeming
disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is politically
motivated.

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with
baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of misconduct
are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the
presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.

Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of

evidence,53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other.”

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

During the fact-finding investigation, the Commissioner found that the slapping incident actually occurred.

The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized
Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide present
during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number.

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by
the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act
of slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted
this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to
respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility
and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects
the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED.
Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.

13. Vazquez v. Lim AC No. 9492 July 11, 2016

FACTS:

This case for disbarment was filed by complainant Plutarco E. Vazquez (Vazquez) against respondent Atty. David Lim
Queco Kho (Atty. Kho). In his verified Complaint1 filed with this Court on 11 July 2012, Vazquez alleges that Atty. Kho
violated the lawyer's oath that he "will do no falsehood.2" He further claims that respondent transgressed Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Vazquez and Atty. Kho were both members of the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines
(Coalition), an accredited party-list group that participated in the national elections of 10 May 2010. The Complaint
arose from an allegedly false statement made in respondent's Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination for the
Coalition. Complainant contested the truth of the statement made under oath that Atty. Kho was a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

In his Complaint, Vazquez asserted that respondent was a Chinese national. He reasoned that when Atty. Kho was
born on 29 April 1947 to a Chinese father (William Kho) and a Filipina mother (Juana Lim Queco), respondent's
citizenship followed that of his Chinese father pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. Moreover, Vazquez argued that
since respondent has elected Filipino citizenship, the act presupposed that the person electing was either an alien, of
doubtful status, or a national of two countries.

Atty. Kho countered that when he was born on 29 April 1947, his Filipina mother was not yet married to his Chinese
father, and that his parents only got married on 8 February 1977 or some 30 years after his birth. He then averred
that according to the 1935 Constitution, his citizenship followed that of his Filipina mother, and thus he was a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

On the matter of his electing Filipino citizenship, respondent explained that since he was already a natural-born
Filipino, his subsequent election of Philippine citizenship on 25 February 1970 was superfluous and had no effect on
his citizenship. Having established his natural-born status, he concluded that he had not committed any falsehood in
his Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination, and that complainant had no cause of action to have him disbarred.

In answer to respondent's Comment, Vazquez filed with the Court a Reply to Comment where He claimed therein that
at the time of election of Philippine citizenship by respondent on 25 February 1970, the latter's mother was already a
Chinese national by virtue of her marriage to respondent's father who was Chinese. Complainant also opposed
respondent's assertion that the latter's parents were not yet married when he was born on 29 April
1947.14 Complainant further cited respondent's Certificate of Live Birth, which stated that the latter's parents were
married at the time he was born.

That being so, complainant averred that at the time Atty. Kho was born, his mother was already a Chinese national.
Thus, complainant concluded that respondent's election of Filipino citizenship was fatally defective, since the latter's
parents were both Chinese at the time of his election.16 Furthermore, complainant alleged that the marriage of
respondent's parents on 8 February 1977 was just a ploy to put a semblance of legitimacy to his prior election of
Filipino citizenship.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation: Atty. Kho is innocent of the charges and the case should be dismissed for utter
lack of merit. Upon weighing the evidence presented by both parties, Commissioner Trinidad found no merit to the
allegation that respondent had committed dishonesty and deceitfulness when he indicated in his verified Certificate
of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-born citizen.

ISSUE:

HELD: We adopt and approve the IBP Report and Recommendation and dismiss the instant
administrative case against respondent for lack of merit.

This disbarment case centers on whether Atty. Kho violated his lawyer's oath that he shall do no falsehood and that
he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. According to complainant, a violation
occurred when respondent declared in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Although the question of one's citizenship is not open to collateral attack,28 the Court
acknowledges the IBP-CBD's pronouncement that it had to make a limited finding thereon, since the alleged
dishonesty hinged on this issue.

We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity.29 A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For the
lack of any ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this disbarment case loses its only leg to stand
on and, hence, must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant Administrative Complaint for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility filed against Atty. David Lim Queco Kho is hereby DISMISSED.
14. Dumanlag v. Blanco AC No. 8825 August 3, 2016

FACTS:

Administrative Complaint for Disbarment against respondent Atty. Jaime M. Blanco for rejecting complainant's claim
over a parcel of land based on a Spanish Title.

Under the TCT, El Mavic Investment and Development Co, Inc. appears to be the registered owner of the land in
Samapaloc.

Complainants Dumanlag sent a letter to EMIDCI’s President Chung claiming to be an agent of the heirs of Don Mariano
San Pedro based on an SPA. He asserted that the heirs of San Pedro, and not EMIDICI, owned the Sampaloc Property
based on a Spanish title. He stated in the letter that the heirs of San Pedro were selling the said property and offered
EMIDCI to buy it.

Atty Blanco, EMIDCI’s counsel, rejected the claim. He explained that the SC declared the Spanish title null and void.
Complainant sent another letter alleging that the intestate estate excluded the heirs of san pedro from the
enumeration of person prohibited from selling land covered by the title, including the Sampaloc property. This was
likewise rejected by Atty. Blanco reasoning that the SC held that the heirs were specifically prohibited from exercising
any act of ownership over the lands covered by the Spanish TItle.

Hence, this disbarment case, alleging that Mr. Chung was a squatter on the Sampaloc Property and Atty. Blanco had
unjustly prevented the exercise of complainant’s rights over the same.

IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation: dismiss case for lack of merit. Complaint was patently frivolous and
was intended to harass respondent. Adopted and approved by the Board of Governors.

ISSUE: w/n

RULING:

Complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.

We relied on Presidential Decree No. 892, which abolished the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law and directed all holders of Spanish Titles to cause their lands to be registered under the Land Registration Act
within six months from date of effectivity of the law or until 16 August 1976. The Heirs of San Pedro failed to adduce
a certificate of title under the Torrens system that would show that T.P. 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D.
892.Given the nullity of T.P. 4136, the claim of the Heirs of San Pedro against EMIDCI has no legal basis. On the other
hand, the records reveal that the Sampaloc property is registered in the name of EMIDCI as TCT 79146 under the
Torrens system. As such, the TCT enjoys a conclusive presumption of validity.

Hence, complainant had a baseless claim, which Atty. Blanco correctly resisted. In writing the two letters rejecting
complainant's claim, he merely acted in defense of the rights of his client. In doing so, he performed his duty to EMIDCI
within the bounds of law.

Consequently, there was no misconduct to speak of on the part of Atty. Blanco. In fact, he should even be commended
as he remained steadfast, in maintaining the cause of his client even as he was subjected to harassment. As will be
discussed below, complainant, in his second demand letter, threatened Atty. Blanco with the filing of a disbarment
case.

Complainant maliciously filed the complaint.

As a rule, a complainant should not be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate.21 But the rule applies only if
the right is exercised in good faith.22 When a groundless complaint is filed in bad faith, the Court has ' to step in and
penalize the erring complainant.

The policy of insulation from intimidation and harassment encourages lawyers to stay their course
and perform their duties without fear.24 They are better able to function properly and ultimately
contributes "to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice."25cralawred On the other
hand, failure to shield lawyers from baseless suits serves "only to disrupt, rather than promote, the
orderly administration of justice.”

In this case, complainant knew fully well that his complaint was totally unfounded. We note that he acknowledged
the existence of Our ruling in Intestate Estate, in his second letter to Chung. Complainant unquestionably knew of
the nullity of the Spanish title in favor of his principals; yet, he insisted on his unfounded claim by sending a second
demand letter to Chung.

The Complaint filed against respondent is nothing but an attempt to intimidate, harass and coerce him into acceding
to the demands of complainant. This is the only logical conclusion that can be derived from the filing of a Complaint
for Disbarment that is baseless — a fact that complainant was very much aware of.

Complainant even admitted during the mandatory conference before the investigating commissioner that he had
attached the draft of the administrative complaint against respondent to his second letter to Mr.
Chung.27 Undoubtedly, the attachment of the draft complaint to the letter was meant to intimidate Atty. Blanco. It
was a threat should he reject the demand of Dumanlag.

Considering the circumstances present in this case, complainant appears to be devious, persistent and incorrigible,
such that mere censure as penalty would not suffice. He has trifled with the Court, using the judicial process as an
instrument to willfully pursue a nefarious scheme. The imposition of a P5,000 fine is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to: (a) DISMISS the administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Jaime M. Blanco for utter lack of merit; (b) IMPOSE a FINE of P5,000 on complainant Budencio Dumanlag for filing
a malicious complaint; and (c) DIRECT complainant to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt

15. Cruz v. Reyes AC No. 9090 August 31, 2016

Disbarment case filed by Atty. Teodoro Cruz charging Atty. Join G. Reyes with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly
handling a case involving conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly alleging untruths in pleadings and unethical
conduct.

Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or the suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the said administrative penalties28 and the burden
of proof rests upon the complaint.29 “

Preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
compared to the presented contrary evidence."30 In the case at bar, complainant failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence in support of his claim that respondent "knowingly" handled a case involving conflict of
interest, "knowingly" alleged untruths in pleadings, and that he "intentionally" committed misrepresentation and
falsification.

In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged that respondent perpetrated acts constituting intentional
misrepresentation and knowingly handling a case involving conflict of interest when he appeared as counsel for Mayor
Velarde in the COMELEC case. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts." Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of this rule is present in a
given case, to wit:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the
same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.31 (Emphasis omitted)

Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous lawyer-client relationship in order for the liability to attach.
Clearly, respondent cannot be held liable under any of the three aforementioned tests because he was never a counsel
for either party in the COMELEC case prior to the filing of the said action. Complainant, however, would have us
believe that respondent is the "furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so as to justify his accusation that
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Complainant, however, failed to present sufficient evidence
in support of his allegation. The mere fact that respondent agreed to handle a case for Atty. Bello does not - alone -
prove that they are indeed partners. This Court is inclined to give more weight and credence to the explanation
proffered by respondent: that is, he accepted the case without being fully aware of the real facts and circumstances
surrounding it. His narration is straightforward enough to be worthy of belief, especially considering that he withdrew
from the case after he realized its true nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal as Counsel"32 he filed before the
COMELEC.

With respect to the charge of intentional misrepresentation, complainant failed to specify which act of respondent
constituted the alleged offense. If the alleged misrepresentation pertains to the act of respondent of signing the
pleading prepared by Atty. Bello, we do not agree with complainant and the same cannot be considered as
misrepresentation since respondent specified in his Comment that he read the pleading before he affixed his signature
thereto. He was, therefore, aware of the statements contained in the pleading and his act of signing the same signifies
that he agreed to the allegations therein contained. On the other hand, if the misrepresentation alleged by
complainant refers to the allegations in the pleading filed by respondent before the COMELEC, again, it cannot be said
that there was "intentional" misrepresentation on the part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent and as
complainant himself asserted, the allegations therein contained were supplied by Atty. Bello, which allegations, at
that time the pleading was signed, respondent did not know were inaccurate. As pointed out above, as soon as the
true nature of the situation revealed itself, respondent withdrew from the case.

Regarding the second incident, complainant claimed that, in connection with the petition to declare Marita as a
nuisance candidate, respondent committed falsification and knowingly alleged untruths, not only in Marita's Verified
Answer to the disqualification case against her, but during the hearing of the case, as well. As with the first incident,
respondent maintained that he accepted the case without being fully aware of the circumstances relative thereto,
this time because of the insistence and urgency with which Atty. Bello made the request.

We earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his cause. His candidness about the events leading to this
administrative complaint against him is demonstrated by the following declarations he made: (1) having agreed to
have his name signed in the pleading on his behalf, he cannot now deny the signature above his printed name;33 (2)
he believed the assurances of his fellow lawyers (counsels for herein complainant) that whatever may have been said
in confidence between them will not be revealed to anybody for whatever reason;34 and (3) he failed to seasonably
object to the line of questioning relative to his signature on Marita's Answer, thereby incriminating himself and making
him an unwilling witness for the opposing party, because of his insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a
result of his lack of the traits of a scheming lawyer.35 These straightforward statements, coupled with the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proven,36 keep us from treating
respondent's proffered explanation as an indication of mendacity.37 This Court is, therefore, compelled to give him
the benefit of the doubt and apply in his favor the presumption that he acted in good faith, especially considering the
failure of complainant to present clear and convincing evidence in support of his allegations.

Thus, with respect to the charge that respondent "knowingly" alleged untruths in the supposed Verified Answer of
Marita, he admitted that Marita's Answer was prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent likewise authorized to sign
his name on the pleading on his behalf. This statement was corroborated by complainant himself when he alleged in
his petition for disbarment that "Atty. John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of then candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr. x
x x that the Answer was merely passed to him by Atty. Bello already signed and notarized." Consequently, respondent
cannot be held liable for "knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple reason that the allegations in the Answer were
not supplied by him.

Neither can respondent be held guilty of falsification in connection with the forged signature of Marita. "The basic
rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence."38 Complainant merely alleged that Marita's signature in the Answer
"was forged either by Attorney Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and that respondent falsified or caused the
falsification of the signature because "he is the one who presented the same to the COMELEC, hence, presumed to
be the one who falsified the same."40 Other than this presumption and bare allegation, complainant has not adduced
any proof in support thereof. As a result, this Court cannot give any merit to his accusation.

The same is true in connection with complainant's allegation that respondent falsely testified and made
misrepresentations during the nuisance candidate case hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is the lawyer of
Marita, that the allegations in the Answer were supplied by Marita and that Marita was in his office when she signed
the Answer's verification. Apart from his allegations, complainant has not presented any evidence, as for instance, the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the proceedings, to prove that respondent indeed made the statements
attributed to him and to enable this Court to properly evaluate the transgressions ascribed to respondent.

It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes [his] case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. x x x When the pieces of
evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence,
the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden of proof.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be said that respondent has no liability at all under the circumstances. His
folly, though, consists in his negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully apprised of and
evaluating the circumstances surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree with respondent that such negligence is not
of contumacious proportions as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension. This Court find the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year earlier imposed on respondent too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed.
"The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or
suspension be imposed as a penalty."42 The penalty to be meted out on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion taking into consideration the facts surrounding each case.

In this connection, the following circumstances should be taken into consideration in order to mitigate respondent's
responsibility: first respondent exhibited enough candor to admit that he was negligent and remiss in his duties as a
lawyer when he accommodated the request of another lawyer to handle a case without being first apprised of the
details and acquainted with the circumstances relative thereto; and second, since this is his first offense, respondent
"is entitled to some measure of forbearance.”

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Court dated 22 August 2012 is hereby modified in that respondent Atty, John G. Reyes
is REPRIMANDED for his failure to exercise the necessary prudence required in the practice of the legal profession.
He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
16. Reyes v Nieva AC No. 8560 September 6, 2016 (En Banc)

FACTS:

Reyes filed a case against Atty. Ramon Nieva, praying that the latter be disbarred for sexually harassing her.

Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) as an
Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October 2004. Sometime in January 2009, she was reassigned at the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision of respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board
Secretary. During complainant's stint under respondent, she would notice that during office hours, respondent would
often watch "pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic films.
Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her hand and would sometimes
give it a kiss. During these instances, complainant would remove her hands and tell him to desist. According to
complainant, respondent even offered her a cellular phone together with the necessary load to serve as means for
their private communication, but she refused the said offer, insisting that she already has her own cellular phone and
does not need another one.

Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called her on her cellular phone,
asked if she received his text message, and told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at the office. At about
9:30 in the morning of even date, respondent asked complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to dictate.
Suddenly, respondent placed his hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and started caressing the latter's
torso. Complainant immediately moved away from respondent and told him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead
of asking for an apology, respondent told complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocket and even gave her a note stating "just bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy," referring to
complainant's mother who was also working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while
complainant and respondent were left alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed the door, grabbed
complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted to kiss complainant. This prompted
complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm, raised her voice in order to invite help, and exclaimed
"wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may asawa ako." After respondent let her go,
complainant immediately left the office to ask assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an
administrative case4 against respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI).

Finally, complainant alleged that after her ordeal with respondent, she was traumatized and was even diagnosed by
a psychiatrist to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression.6 Eventually,
complainant filed the instant complaint.

In his defense,7 respondent denied all of complainant's allegations. He maintained that as a 79-year old retiree who
only took a position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do the acts imputed against
him, especially in a very small office space allotted for him and his staff. Respondent then pointed out that the
administrative case filed against him before the CODI was already dismissed for lack of basis and that complainant
was only being used by other CAAP employees who were agitated by the reforms he helped implement upon his
assumption as CAAP consultant and eventually as Acting Corporate Board Secretary.

IBP Report and Recommendation: dismissal pf the administrative complaint against respondent. This is due to the
failure of complainant to substantiate her allegations against respondent, as opposed to respondent’s defences which
are ably supported by evidence.

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. As such,
respondent was found guilty of committing sexual advances, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for three (3) months.
The IBP-CBD National Director, acting on respondent’s MR, recommended that the current IBP Board adhere to the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the evidence on record; on the
other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP Board is bereft of any factual and legal bases, and should therefore,
be set aside.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)

HELD:

After due consideration, the Court reverses the findings and recommendations of the IBP, and finds respondent
administratively liable for violations of the CPR.

Good moral character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as "what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality."24 Such requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect the
public; (b) to protect the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective clients; and (d) to protect errant lawyers
from themselves.

The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives
in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also behave
himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards."
Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends
to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment.

The evidence submitted by respondent, taken as a whole, did not actually refute complainant's allegation that at
around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, respondent closed the door, grabbed complainant's right arm,
uttered the words "let's seal it with a kiss" and attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter's resistance.

A careful perusal of the Transcript shows that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, there was a
time that complainant and respondent were indeed left alone in the office as complainant's officemates were all out
on errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to hastily conclude from the testimonies of complainant's
officemates who were interviewed by the CODI that nothing out of the ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a
position to confirm or refute complainant's allegations as they were not physically in the office so as to make a credible
testimony as to the events that transpired therein during that time.

Neither can the testimonies of those in the CAAP Operations Center be used to conclude that respondent did not do
anything to complainant, considering that they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone, busy with
their coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that while their office is indeed separated from the CAAP Office of
the Board Secretary only by glass panels, they could not see what was happening there as they covered the glass
panels with white cartolina. In light of their preoccupation from their official duties as well as the fact that the glass
panels were covered, it is very unlikely for them to have noticed any commotion happening in the adjacent CAAP
Office of the Board Secretary.

Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches pornographic materials in his office-
issued laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his staff.
Obviously, the Court cannot countenance such audacious display of depravity on respondent's part not only because
his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the government agency he works for - the CAAP where he was engaged
at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a
lawyer in the government service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties with
the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty.42 However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to showcase these standards, and instead,
displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the government position he was entrusted to hold. His
flimsy excuse that he only does so by himself and that he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone would
pass by or come near his table is of no moment, because the lewdness of his actions, within the setting of this case,
remains. The legal profession - much more an engagement in the public service should always be
held in high esteem, and those who belong within its ranks should be unwavering exemplars of
integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers, such as respondent, are burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those
who have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and
the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this case.43

In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the
quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was preponderance of
evidence. Preponderance of evidence "means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it."44 Generally, under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary
threshold applies to civil cases:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining
where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
(Emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon45 cited by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence in disbarment
proceedings is upon the complainant.46 These rulings appear to conflict with other jurisprudence on the matter which
contrarily hold that substantial evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in administrative cases against
lawyers.47 The latter standard was applied in administrative cases such as Foster v. Agtang,48 wherein the Court had,
in fact, illumined that:

[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required
in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is "a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." In administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively
liable.49 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco,52 which was promulgated just this
June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.53
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the
proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence - is more in
keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law
elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.”54
With the proper application of the substantial evidence threshold having been clarified, the Court finds that the
present charges against respondent have been adequately proven by this standard. Complainant has established her
claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion - that is,
that respondent had harassed her and committed despicable acts which are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine,
respondent should be held administratively liable and therefore, penalized.

Respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual watching of pornographic materials while in the
office and his acts of sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court
deems it proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

17. Flores-Salado v. Villanueva AC No. 11099 September 27, 2016 (En Banc)

Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents should not be the occasion to establish
the falsification or forgery. Such bases should first be duly and competently established either in criminal or civil
proceedings appropriate for that purpose.

FACTS:

This is a disbarment complaint lodged against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a public document
concerning realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment as state prosecutor.

Complainants presented their adverse claim on the parcel of land in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte registered under the
names of SPS Atty. Roman Villanueva and Rosario Alipao. Annotated to the TCT was their adverse claim as well as a
waiver/withdrawal appearing to be signed by them. The same TCT was canceled and the Register of Deeds issued 2
new TCTs in the name of respondent.

Later, complainants lodged their complaint with the IBP charging respondent with grows dishonest on the basis of
their assertion therein that they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal. They thereby further charged him
with dishonesty for concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in 2006 as a state prosecutor. They
avered that he was disqualified for the position because he had already been 70 years old at the time of his
appointment

The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the complainants in filing the disbarment complaint
against him.15 He contended that the complainants did not present sufficient proof showing that he had falsified the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal; and asserted that the basis for the partition of the contested property had been the
compromise agreement entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca, the complainants' mother;16 and
that he had been born on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth certificate.

IBP Report and Recommendation: Finds respondent liable for gross misconduct in relation to the forged the affidavit
of waiver/withdrawal, and recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of law. Commissioner Fernandez
dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because his birth certificate prevailed over the
documents submitted by the complainants..

IBP Board of Governors adopted the above report and recommendation.

The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration but granted that of the complainants
increasing the penalty imposed on Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) years.

ISSUE: Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and gross dishonesty?

HELD:

We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors considering that the charges were not
competently substantiated.

I. Falsification must be proved in the appropriate criminal or civil proceeding, not in the disbarment proceeding

A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole
issue to be addressed and determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be
an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.26 Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether or not the
respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior
determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.

The complainants bore the burden of proof in this disbarment proceeding against the respondent.
They must establish their charges of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and satisfactory
proof.34 Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of finding his culpability.35 The foregoing disquisitions on
the falsification show that the complainants did not discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did not
convincingly establish that the respondent had willfully adjusted his true age to secure his appointment as a state
prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment happened on February 22, 200636 but his late registration of his birth occurred
on July 3, 2006.37 If the intention for the late registration was to make it appear that he still met the age requirement
for public prosecutors, he should have effected the late registration prior to the appointment, not several months
subsequently. In addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification" showing him to be a registered voter of Balagtas
(Bigaa), Bulacan on September 20, 2003, and to have been born on November 29, 1943.38 Under the circumstances,
that he had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable himself to meet the age requirement for the position of
state prosecutor three years later became plainly improbable.

II. Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers in the public service involving their qualifications should be
initially investigated by the agencies or offices having administrative supervision over them

The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought
against a lawyer employed in the government service whether or not the complaint pertained to an act or conduct
unrelated to the discharge of his official functions,39 the investigation should be carried out by the agency or office
having administrative supervision over him or her when the allegations of the complaint relate to the qualifications of
the respondent to be appointed to the public office.

Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed as a state
prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice who had administrative supervision over him
under the law,40 and not to this Court in the guise of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for
disbarment is sui generis, and the proceeding thereon should focus only on the qualification and
fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for lack of
factual and legal merit.

18. Arsenio v. Tabuzo AC No. 8658 April 24, 2017

Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by Francis C. Arsenio, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo
for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Arsenio before the POEA against JS Contractor, a
recruitment agency.2 During a scheduled hearing on May 10, 2000, Atty. Tabuzo, the Overseas Employment
Adjudicator who was assigned to hear the case, asked him to sign three blank sheets of paper to which Arsenio
complied.

A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason why he was made to sign blank sheets of
paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said, "Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya pagdating ng kalaban
mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio called up the office of Senator Rene Cayetano who advised him to make a clarification
regarding the signed sheets of blank paper. Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but the latter again shouted at him
saying, "Bwiset! Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty.
Tabuzo further said, "Sabihin mo sa Cayetano mo at abogado mo na baka masampal ko sa mga mukha nila
ang pinirmahan mong blanko! Sabihin mo na ang pangalan ko ay Atty. Romeo Tabuzo at kung hindi ka
bumalik bukas ay mawawala ang kaso mo!’’3

Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS Contractor was dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty.
Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. “. He was later on however acquitted.

Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-Affidavit before this Court. In a Resolutio to this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6 Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him, claiming that the
alleged unethical acts are baseless. He averred that he had never acted in any conduct unbecoming of a public officer
or uttered invectives and other alleged acts. To support his claim, he attached the Affidavits7 of two (2) Overseas
Employment Adjudicators (OEA) who occupied the tables immediately adjacent to him in the Recruitment Regulations
Branch. In said Affidavits, the OEAs attested to the effect that no such incident or any untoward event that called for
attention transpired. Atty. Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due process was violated since he was not
notified of the case against him before the Office of the Ombudsman as he was never served nor had personally
received Orders from such Office.

Resolution of the IBP CBG: Atty. Tabuzo violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 8.019 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, suspended Atty. Tabuzo from the practice of law for three months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.

HELD: DISMISSED.

A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case,
but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public
and the courts.11

Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.12 In the recent case of Reyes v. Nieva,13 this Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper
evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.

In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD in recommending reprimand against Atty.
Tabuzo is its consideration of the: (1) Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which states that there was
probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA 3019; and (2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that
Atty. Tabuzo made offensive statements.

However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree of proof indispensable in a disbarment
case was not met.

Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is predicated on the fact that the allegations of Arsenio
were uncontroverted; hence, the Office of the Ombudsman concluded that such allegations were true. However,
there was a seeming discrepancy as to the name of Atty. Tabuzo when a case against him was filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman. Undisputedly, the case before said Office was filed against a certain Atty. Romeo Tabuso, when
the name of herein respondent is Atty. Johan Tabuzo. As such, the respondent claimed that he failed to controvert
Arsenio's claims because he never received any notice or order from the Office of the Ombudsman. In fact, the said
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was made on the basis of the complaint of Arsenio alone since Atty.
Tabuzo failed to file his answer.14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision reveals that Arsenio was able to verify the
identity of Atty. Johan Tabuzo, not as Atty. Romeo Tabuso, even before he filed his complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is confusing, therefore, why there was discrepancy as to the name of herein respondent when a
clarification was already made. Nevertheless, Atty. Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case filed against him on the
basis of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one
administratively.16 Thus, it is proper to deal with the other evidence presented by Arsenio.

The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio failed to discharge the necessary burden of proof. In his
Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no other evidence was
presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.

While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is not persuaded to
exercise its disciplinary authority over Atty. Tabuzo.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolved to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against Atty. Johan
A. Tabuzo.
19. Fuji v. de la Cruz AC No. 11043 March 8, 2017

Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the alien's
wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative liability.
FACTS:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his family, against Bureau of Immigration
Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of a
Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.

In a Summary Deportation Order, Fuji, a Chinese national, was ordered deported for overstaying. Special Pros. Dela
Cruz brought the charge against Fuji after a finding that Fuji’s work visa had expired, overstaying for 1 year and 6
months. Her investigation was triggered by a complaint affidavit of a certain Virgilio Manalo alleging that Fuji and
another person had defrauded him.

Fuji was arrested and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility in Taguig. Thereafter, the Board of
Commissioners dismissed the deportation charge against Fuji on the ground that the records show that Fuji has a
working visa valid until April 2016. Fuji was then ordered to be released.

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was not afforded any
hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was issued against him.20 Fuji further
alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties because a simple initial review of
the Bureau of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not overstaying because his work visa was valid
until April 30, 2016.

Respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any grave misconduct. She claimed that Fuji was
accorded due process during the summary deportation proceedings.24 He was directed to submit his Counter-
Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for reconsideration and verified
petition to reopen the case.26

Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duties.28 She had no intention to violate any law and did not commit any flagrant disregard of the rules, or unlawfully
used her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.29 Respondent pointed out that the
Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the complainant's charges against her.30 She added that Fuji stated in his March
29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that he had mistakenly signed some documents including the administrative
complaint.31

ISSUE: w/n respondent is administratively liable for hr negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before levying
the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying.

HELD: YES. Administratively liable.

I.
Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government service
arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to the proper administrative body that
has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee or the Ombudsman.

This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show that
the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the pendency of his
Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and considered the case closed.38

The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his release. However,
it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.

Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and the
apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this Court
considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40
Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to
dismiss this administrative complaint. This Court has previously held that proceedings of this nature
cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."41
The primary object of disciplinary proceedings is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is
conducted solely for the public welfare,42 and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What will be decisive
are the facts borne out by the evidence presented by the parties.

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice.

II.
Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should
exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in reviewing the immigration records, whenever the legal status and
documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a
person.51

Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-
MIS, especially as it may ultimately result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of her duties as a government official.52 However, if said misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.
Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration, she is the representative, not of any private party, but
of the State. Her task was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a ground for deportation exists, and if
further administrative action — in the form of a formal charge — should be taken against an alien.

Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's
application, which would negate her finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji was deprived of his liberty
for almost eight (8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.

Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give attention to a task due to carelessness or indifference.54 In this
case, respondent's negligence shows her indifference to the fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to
due process and to the consequences of her actions.

Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent with the
time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards under the Code of Professional
Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added duty to abide
by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in public service.56 In
this case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high standards of public
service and the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.

20. Chua v. Tan-Sollano et al. AC No. 11533 June 6, 2017 (En Banc)

For resolution is the administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Greta and Spouses Chua against
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa Belinda G. Tan-Sollano (SACP Tan-Sollano), Deputy City Prosecutor Maria Gene
Z. Julianda-Sarmiento (DCP Julianda-Sarmiento), Senior Deputy City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla (SDCP Sulla), SACP
Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales (SACP Ofrecio-Gonzales), and DCP Joselito D.R. Obejas (DCP Obejas) (collectively, the
respondents) for grave abuse of discretion, ignorance of the law, abuse of power or authority, and gross misconduct.

FACTS:

Spouses Chua alleged before the OCP of Manila that Talusan deliberately and wilfully committed perjury when she
narrated in her Complaint-Affidavits that Spouses Chua issued 11 post-dated checks in favor of Chain Glass
Enterprises, Inc. (CGEI), with an amount of P112,521.00 each, as payment for assorted glass and aluminum products.
According to Spouses Chua, however, the said statement is not true because the said 11 post-dated checks were
actually issued on February 23, 2009 by Greta in replacement of their previous bounced checks. Likewise, Atty. Tasarra
and the members of the Board of Directors of CGEI were likewise impleaded therein for offering Talusan's testimony.

In a Resolution, SACP Tan-Sollano recommended the dismissal of the charges against therein respondents for lack of
probable cause. The same was recommended for approval by DCP Julianda-Sarmiento and SDCP Sulla.

An MR was filed by Spouses Chua but the same was denied in a Resolutionissued by SACP Ofrecio-Gonzales and
approved by DCP Obejas after finding no cogent reason to reverse the Resolution of SACP Tan-Sollano.

Aggrieved with such findings, Spouses Chua instituted the instant case and averred that the dismissal was
inappropriate and highly irregular considering that the prosecution offered an "airtight case/evidence.”7

HELD:

After a careful review of the records of the present case, the Court finds that Spouses Chua failed to attribute clear
and preponderant proof to show that the respondents committed infractions in contravention with the standards
provided for by the CPR which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions against them.

"In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial evidence the allegations in
the complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.”8

Here, considering that Spouses Chua failed to present substantial proof to show the prosecutors' culpability, the Court
cannot rule out the possibility that the instant administrative case was ill motivated being retaliatory in nature and
aimed at striking back at them for having participated in the dismissal of XV-07-INV-15J-05513, either as investigating
prosecutor or approving officer. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
prosecutors involved herein have regularly performed their official duties.

Moreover, in Maquiran v. Judge Grageda,9 the Court held that alleged error committed by judges in the exercise
of their adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed
through judicial remedies.10 Here, the same principle applies to prosecutors who exercise adjudicative functions in
the determination of the existence of probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court.

Verily, an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.11 In the present case, as narrated by Spouses Chua,
XV-07-INV-151-05513 is still pending and active. As such, Spouses Chua still has remedies to contest said ruling.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondents Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa
Belinda G. Tan-Sollano, Deputy City Prosecutor Maria Gene Z. Julianda-Sarmiento, Senior Deputy City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Suwerte L. Ofrecio-Gonzales, and Deputy City Prosecutor Joselito
D.R. Obejas is DISMISSED and this case is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED. SO ORDERED.