Borders, Boundaries, Ceasefire Lines and de facto Borders:

The Impact of Mobility Policies

Giulia PRELZ OLTRAMONTI1

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the de facto borders of, and within, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and their evolution between the onset of the ceasefire agreements (1992 in the case
of South Ossetia, 1994 in the case of Abkhazia) and the resumption of conflict in August 2008. After
reviewing the nature of boundaries, borders and ceasefire lines, it examines the complex dynamism
of the de facto borders. It then argues that ‘mobility policies’ are one of the main mechanisms
various actors have used to harden or soften the de facto borders. Mobility policies include formal
and informal policies aimed at allowing or limiting the movement of people and goods across
dividing lines. Through the prism of mobility, this paper analyses how various actors have
influenced the dividing lines. These actors include the regional powers, namely Georgia and the
Russian Federation, local stakeholders, including de facto authorities and borderlands’
populations and entrepreneurs, and external actors.

Keywords: borders, boundaries, mobility, Georgia, de facto states

Introduction
The two separatist conflicts that took place in the early 1990s between Georgia on one
side, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, resulted in dividing lines that lasted until
August 2008, when the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia changed those boundaries and
the way in which they were managed. This is not to say, however, that the permeability of the
boundaries between the separatist entities and the motherland had remained unaltered throughout
the stalemate that characterised most of the 1990s and 2000s. On the contrary, the boundaries were
subject to processes of hardening and softening, influenced by state and non-state actors.
This paper examines the influences of regional and local actors on the evolution of
boundaries, borders and de facto borders of, and within, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The analysis
also includes Georgia and the Russian Federation. It argues that mobility policies, in particular,
have significantly affected the weakening or strengthening of dividing lines. Acknowledging,
ultimately, that many variables contribute to border transformations, this paper focuses specifically
on the effect of policies aimed at enhancing or reducing the movement of goods and people. These
are referred to throughout the paper as “mobility policies.” The paper initially clarifies the
distinction between borders, boundaries, ceasefire lines and de facto borders, to contextualize the
dividing lines that separate the de facto states from Georgia. It then examines the state-of-the art on
mobility policies in conflict situations, which mostly focuses on trade sanctions and trade
incentives. It argues that mobility policies and concepts need to expand to include both formal and
informal policies promoted by state and non-state actors. A broader definition of mobility policies
is therefore proposed before approaching the case studies under consideration. Each case is then
analysed by examining first, the policies of the regional actors, namely Georgia and the Russian
Federation, and then those of local actors.

Borders and boundaries, ceasefire lines and de facto borders

The issue of borders and boundaries in conflict areas has been recently undergoing
renewed scrutiny. While not abandoned, the institutional perspective is now one among many
frameworks through which borders and boundaries are considered. Social, economic and
anthropologic perspectives have enriched our understanding of how dividing lines evolve and how
they affect and are affected by violent conflict.

1
Université Libre de Bruxelles, CEVIPOL.
158
As borders and boundaries are terms currently used in everyday language (as well as their
synonyms e.g., frontier), here, they shall be briefly defined for clarity. State borders typically refer
to dividing lines around “fixed, legal, geopolitical entities”2. During conflict, however, the
permanence, legality and geopolitics of those lines may be tested by the course of the events, by
changes in international law or its interpretation, by differences in the parties’ interpretations of the
lines, or by geopolitical factors. Additionally, the permanence and the legality of the borders may
not be coterminous. Boundaries, on the other hand, do not carry the weight of permanence, legality
and geopolitics – though they do not exclude them either. Boundaries are the dividing lines at
which something - rules of behaviour - changes.3 The characteristic that most distinguishes
boundaries (from borders) is their greater potential to change and evolve. In cases of conflict, in
fact, boundaries can be hardened or softened to suit various interests, a process referred to as
“boundary activation”.4 Different entities – including states and non-state actors - can be involved
in hardening or softening boundaries.
As defined above, these two terms fail to entirely describe the status of the dividing lines
of the two cases considered in this paper. While the dividing lines between the Russian Federation
on one side, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other, have remained undisputed borders in the
timeframe considered here, dividing lines between the de facto states and Georgia are less inviolate
and more ambiguous. The ceasefire lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained fixed entities,
patrolled respectively by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force
stationed under the observation of a small United Nations Military Observer Mission, and a
peacekeeping force composed jointly of Ossetians, Russians and Georgians, monitored by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) mission.
The term “ceasefire line” does not adequately convey the complexities that shape the
relations between two neighbours, beyond simply implying that armed hostilities have halted.
Ceasefire agreements usually lead to peace accords or resumption of conflict. In some cases,
however, ceasefire agreements can regulate a situation for prolonged periods of time. Ceasefire
lines can evolve into demilitarised and highly securitised zones, as occurred with Korea and
Nagarno-Karabakh, or into semi-permeable boundaries with low levels of violence, as it happened
in Transdniestria. During prolonged stalemates, ceasefire lines tend to assume the character of
borders, except that they lack the imprimatur of international law. In several cases, ceasefire
agreements have led to the creation of de facto states, such as Somaliland and Northern Cyprus.
These entities might be regarded as states under the 1933 Montevideo Convention. If, however, one
considers the domain of “relations with other states”, however, to include not just diplomatic but
also commercial exchanges, a more restrictive definition might apply, as it specifies: “The state as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population; a
defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states”5. The
concept of statehood, moreover, has been customarily linked to recognition by the international
community; accordingly, such entities are regarded as de facto states. Their borders shall therefore
be called de facto borders.

Mobility policies
In the context of conflicts, mobility policies have traditionally been analysed in terms of
formal arrangements that regulate the flow of goods; namely trade sanctions (embargoes) and,
increasingly, trade incentives. The two most common options are sanctions and incentives of

2
Goodhand, Jonathan, ‘War, peace and the places in between: Why borderlands are central.’ in Whose peace?
Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding, (Basingstoke [England] and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
3
Migdal, Joel S. Boundaries and belonging: states and societies in the struggle to shape identities and local
practices, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
4
Tilly, Charles, The Politics of Collective Violence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
5
The Avalon Project, “Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American); December 26, 1933”,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp
 159
various kinds;6 a combination of the two can also be devised, and has been hailed as the most
effective method.7 Since the early 1990s, support for all-encompassing economic sanctions
weakened because they were generally deemed ineffective in bringing about major changes in
policy.8 Targeted sanctions, on the other hand, are intended to damage elites’ interests, while
avoiding negative impacts on vulnerable populations. The difficulty of such approach rests in the
interconnectedness of actors and economic networks. The appropriateness of using embargoes was
questioned because of their potential impact on civilian livelihoods and concerns that they might
fostering criminal behaviour.9 In some cases, all-encompassing sanctions not only proved
ineffective, but also counterproductive, generating a “rally ‘round the flag” effect.10 In the Abkhaz
case, they reinforced a siege mentality;11 the impact of trade restrictions on South Ossetia in 2004,
discussed later, also illustrates the point. On the other hand, sometimes sanctions can facilitate
internal oppositions, as has happened in the case of Transdniestria in 2006. These varying reactions
to commercial restrictions depend on the varying nature, implementation and framework of
changes in customs regulation.
While it is extremely difficult to quantify the results of sanctions, their degree of success
depends “on what goals they are measured against”.12 Sanctions are more amenable to certain kinds
of goals or desired outcomes than others; the fit is essential. Goals have been classified in three
main categories, namely behaviour change, containment and regime change.13 Targeted sanctions
have not been equally effective across all three categories. Nevertheless, policy makers often assess
the effectiveness of sanctions simply by gauging the degree of economic pain they inflicted. A
preference for incentives over negative sanctions has emerged in the last decade.14 As with
sanctions, however, the effectiveness of inducement strategies depends on sender’s objectives,
nature of recipient regime, political dynamics between sender and recipient and, crucially, the
presence or absence of exogenous incentives.15 Two additional factors nearly always shape the
effectiveness of both sanctions and incentives. The first is the fit – or lack of fit – between
intentions and perceptions. Receivers may perceive economic pressure differently from the way in
which the sender intended it. The second is implementation. Whether sanctions and incentives
work depend – in part – on whether states are able to effectively monitor financial and commercial
flows. This partly depends on their own state capacity, but the impact of neighbouring countries
and of regional powers should not be underestimated. Sanctions that are poorly implemented are

6
For an analysis of power relations in sanctions see David Baldwin, ‘The Power of Positive Sanctions’, World
Politics, Vol. 24, No.1 (1971).
7
Gitty Amini, A Larger Role for Positive Sanctions in Cases of Compellence?, Working Paper No. 12, (Los
Angeles: Center for International Relations, University of California, 1997).
8
Cary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Scott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and
Current Policy, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 94.
9
Karen Ballentine, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed
Conflict’, in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine
and Jake Sherman, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 279.
10
David Cortright, ‘The Economic Tools of Peacemaking’, in Peacemaking in International Conflict, Methods
and Techniques, ed. I. William Zartman, Revised Edition, (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press,
2007), 392.
11
Anna Matveeva, ‘Georgia: Peace Remains Elusive in Ethnic Patchwork’, in Searching for Peace in Europe
and Eurasia, eds. Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven, (London: Lynne Rienner,
2002), 419.
12
Alan Dowty, ‘Sanctionning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order’, The Washington Quarterly, No.17,
Issue 3 (1994), 192.
13
Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewed Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
14
Randall Newham, ‘More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkages in German Ostpolitik from
Bismark to Kohl’, International Studies Quarterly, No.44, Issue 1 (2000), 8.
15
David Cortright, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, (Lanham MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 272-290; Rock, Stephen, Appeasement in International Politics, (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 2000).
160
likely to be less effective and may, in fact, undermine the legitimacy of the sender.16 The
sanctions/incentives approach, however, reflects the actions of a very limited pool of actors,
namely governments and international bodies, and fails to consider boundary dynamics. Sanctions
and incentives may indirectly impact borders and boundaries, as their main target is not the
dividing line itself, but the economic entity on the other side.
A broader view of mobility policies is needed to reflect the variety of actors, whether
formal or informal, and methods affecting the de facto borders considered here. In the framework
of this paper, mobility policies include: formal policies aimed at allowing or limiting the movement
of people and goods; planning of infrastructure to facilitate or hamper the movement of people and
goods; and commercial policies between de facto states and other regional actors. The framework
also includes unofficial policies, such as: facilitating or impeding unsanctioned trade; influencing
peacekeeping operations; and promoting or reining in non-state violence in the borderlands. The
need to examine mobility policies as a factor driving border and boundary changes is borne from
the recognition that neither borders nor boundaries are ever static17. States and non-state actors can
– and do - use a variety of methods to harden or soften borders and boundaries to further their
particular interests.
Mobility policies emerge prominently in nearly any analysis of borderland political
economies during conflict. The counterintuitive argument has convincingly been made that even in
conflict settings borders not only separate entities, but also create opportunities.18 For the residents of
the borderlands, commerce through dividing lines often represents one of the few ways to make a
living. For the private sector, borders tend to function dually as (logistic and economic) barriers, and
as conduits to enhanced revenue (from additional services). For administrations and law enforcement
agencies, borders are the lines along which taxation can be applied, whether officially or unofficially
(i.e. bribes). Understanding mobility policies – rules aimed at facilitating or limiting the movement
of people and goods - is essential for understanding boundaries and borders. An analysis of
mobility policies shows clearly which actors attempted to harden and which actors attempted to
soften which borders and boundaries, why and how. The approach described here expands the
concept of mobility policies, from its traditional focus on sanctions and incentives to a broader
array of factors and processes that harden and soften borders.

Regional powers: the two neighbours

Georgia and the Russian Federation had a decisive impact on the borders of the de facto states.
They are the only two countries that share a border, whether de jure or de facto, with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. While the former has an extensive coastline along the Black Sea, but no other territorial
neighbour, the latter is landlocked by its two larger neighbours. Georgia and the Russian Federation
have markedly different views on the nature and operation of the de facto state borders. This
difference originates in the fact that, for Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are matters of
domestic concern, while Russian Federation considers them matters of foreign policy. After the
1991-1992 conflict with South Ossetia and the 1992-1994 conflict with Abkhazia, Georgia lost
control over most of the territory of the two separatist regions. Although ceasefire agreements
generally held, with some resumption of violence, until 2008, no peace agreements were achieved.
Georgia never recognised the independence of the de facto states. Following the principles of
territorial integrity and national sovereignty, Georgia remained explicitly committed to
reintegrating the two regions within the Georgian state. The Georgian authorities decisively
rejected the status quo, and crafted their strategy accordingly.
Russia, however, designed and implemented its mobility policies pertaining to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as part of its neighbourhood policy and, to a greater extent, its foreign policy.
While there is no straightforward interpretation of Russia’s policy towards its near-neighbourhood

16
Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, War Economies in a Regional Context, Challenges of Transformation,
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 227.
17
David Newman and Anssi Paasi, ‘Fences and Neighbours in the Post Modern World: Boundary Narratives
in Political Geography’, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1998).
18
Goodhand, 235.
 161
and the South Caucasus, the key factors that dictated its policy were the attempt to maintain a
strong influence over its own backyard and a drive to securitize its own borderlands.19
In the case of Abkhazia, the CIS-imposed embargo banned CIS members from official
contact with the territory, restricted economic co-operation and prohibited trade of most goods-
except food and medical supplies-without licences from the Georgian central government.20
Notwithstanding the embargo, Georgia and Russia remained Abkhazia’s two main trading partners.
With the added barriers and burdensome bureaucratic procedures for moving goods, the embargo
contributed to a new grey economy.21 Although the embargo was officially upheld by all parties,
from the 1990s onward, it was gradually disregarded. Embargo barriers were circumvented by
trading illegally through the Inguri and Psou Rivers, through Abkhaz seaports, and by bribing low-
waged state officials at checkpoints on the ceasefire line.22
Commercial dynamics along the Psou River largely reflected political shifts in the
relationship between Russia and Georgia, and followed trends of Russian investments. In 1999, the
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, abrogated by decree the Russian commitment to uphold the
embargo, cancelling most restrictions on crossing the Psou River.23 While repeatedly claiming to
uphold the blockade, Putin expressed in 2004 the belief that this commitment did not include
curtailing commercial activities and private investments. By contrast, on the Abkhaz-Georgian
ceasefire line the embargo was always officially upheld, and repeated efforts were made to curtail
smuggling.24 Under Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency, however, the ceasefire line was extremely
permeable to smuggling, thanks to pervasive corruption at all levels of security forces and state
institutions. Smuggling along the Inguri became so substantial in the early 2000s that the ceasefire
line was described as “a competitive market for various Abkhaz and Georgian forces vying for the
spoils of trans-border trade”.25 Commodities smuggled through the ceasefire line included
petroleum products, scrap metal, stolen cars and timber, which entered the Georgian market or
were re-exported through the ports of Batumi and Poti.26 In 2004, the Georgian government
attempted to reduce the flow and subdue the various actors trading across the ceasefire line. These
new policies designed to fortify the Georgian budget, and inhibit Abkhazia’s revenue so that it
might be forced to negotiate. Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili insisted on implementing
trade sanctions with other regional governments, suppressing paramilitary groups, corruption and

19
For an analysis of Russia’s foreign policy and Russia’s policies in the Caucasus, see Dov Lynch, What
Russia Sees, Chaillot Paper, No.74, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005); Paul Baev, Russia’s Policies
in the Caucasus, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
20
Soviet Bezopasnosti SNG, '’Reshenie Soveta Glav Gosudarstv SNG o Merax po Uregulirovaniyu Konflikta
v Abxazii, Gruziya’, Dokument No. 258, January 31, A/51/62 – S/1996/74, in Konfliktyi v Abxazii i
Yuzhno’I Osetii, Dokumentyi 1989-2006, ed. Volxonski’i, M.A., B.A. Zaxarov and N.Yu. Cilaev (Moscow:
MGIMO, 1996), 377-9.
21
Stacy Renee Closson, State Weakness in Perspective: Trans-territorial Energy Networks in Georgia, 1993-
2003, Unpublished thesis submitted for doctoral degree in International Relations, London School of
Economics (2007), 168; David Chkhartishvili, Roman Gotsiridze and Bessarion Kitsmarishvili, ‘Georgia:
Conflict Regions and Economies’, in From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus, eds.
Phil Champlain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova, (International Alert: London, 2004), 134.
22
Closson, 168.
23
Tamaz Diasamidze, ‘The Collection of Political-Legal Acts, Regional Conflict in Georgia – the
Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (1989-2002)’, in Smuggling
Through Abkhazia and Tskinvali Region of Georgia, eds. Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and
Roman Gosiridze, (Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre, 2003).
24
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, (Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre, 2004), 55.
25
Closson, 170.
26
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, ‘Smuggling in Abkhazia and the
Tskhinvali region in 2003-2004’, in Organised crime and corruption in Georgia, eds. Louise Shelley, Erik
R. Scott and Anthony Latta, (London: Routledge, 2007), 77; Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze
and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, 15.
162
smuggling, and limiting trade by sea.27 Nevertheless, smuggling increased slightly, as a result of
shifting trade routes after the Ergneti market was closed in South Ossetia.28 In 2008, Tbilisi
attempted to start a dialogue about economic cooperation, including free customs zones and
investments, but the efforts were thwarted by the conflict in August.29
Until late 2003, the movement of people and goods along the South Ossetian front was
virtually unrestricted. Accompanying Shevardnadze’s presidency, were civil relations and an open
posture toward the South Ossetian-Georgian ceasefire line. In December 2003, however, the newly
elected leadership started anti-smuggling operations along the ceasefire line and subsequently
closed the Ergneti market in May-June 2004. Indeed, the anti-smuggling operation mobilized so
many Georgian security forces, that some worried it was an act of aggression.30 A de facto
economic blockade was imposed, as forces of the interior ministry controlled access roads and
villages in the southern part of the region, and some roads used for contraband were blown up.31 It
was hoped that – if deprived of its revenues- the de facto regime would collapse.32 The Georgian
government publically declared that it would differentiate between the regime and the civilian
population, offering a range of incentives.33 However, armed conflict resumed in August 2004,
when the Georgian military and police retreated sustaining seventeen casualties.
Tbilisi’s policy backfired as it antagonized both the South Ossetian elite and large segments
of the South Ossetian population. As expected, the regime denounced Tbilisi’s humanitarian
initiatives as “a destabilization attempt” and suspended relations with Tbilisi.34 The civilian
population did not respond positively, as had happened in Adjara, and the effort did not contribute to
unsettling the regime of the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity. As South Ossetian separatism was
not merely a criminal phenomenon, the blockade had a boomerang effect, strengthening Kokoity’s
popularity.35 The effort significantly reduced the possibility of employment in trade and the
accessibility of Tbilisi’s markets for small producers.36 Incentives were misaligned with needs.
Resting the railway to Tsinkhvali and supporting farmers by providing fertilizers might have had
long-term benefits. More immediate actions, however, such as a medical mission to distribute
medicines in Tskhinvali, had little reach among the South Ossetian population.37 The provision of aid
was not coordinated with Tskhinvali, ultimately causing the effort was viewed with suspicion, so the
local police barred intended recipients from accepting it. Trading did not stop completely, but it was
considerably curtailed by the closure of the Ergneti market and the enforcement of trade regulations
at roadblocks. It was difficult to estimate the post-2004 trade volume. Small-traders claimed high-
ranking officials were able to use their advantaged positions to operate even after the market was

27
Giorgi Sepashvili, ‘CIS Summit Reveals Rift in Russian/Georgian Relations’, Civil Georgia Report, (17
September 2004); Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, Chaillot Paper, No.86, (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies, 2006), 41.
28
Alexander Kupatadze, ‘The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia’, Insight Turkey, Vol.7, Issue 4 (2005), 70.
29
Interview with Gia Jandieri, a founder and the vice-president of the New Economic School of Georgia.
30
ICG, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report, No.159, (Tbilisi and Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2004), 11-2.
31
Civil Georgia, ‘Governor Blows up By-Roads to Prevent Smuggling’, Civil Georgia, 23 December 2003,
available from: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5904&search=
32
Nino Khutsidze, Ajara Boosts Government’s Financial Hopes, Civil Georgia Report, 8 May 2004, available
from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7489&search=
33
Giorgi Sepashvili, ‘Experts Suggest to Focus on Economic Projects in Conflict Resolution’, Civil Georgia
Report, (13 January 2004); Giorgi Sepashvili, ‘Saakashvili Sends Reconciliatory Signs to South Ossetia’,
Civil Georgia Report, (1 June 2004);.Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, 42.
34
Civil Georgia, ‘Tskhinvali Cuts Links with Tbilisi, Demands Compensation’, Civil Georgia, 12 June 2004 ,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7122&search=
35
ICG, 13.
36
Theresa Freese, ‘With All Roads to Tsinkhvali Closed, Zone of Conflict Residents Pray for Saakashvili and
for Peace’, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 30 June 2004, available from:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2235
37
Civil Georgia, ‘Georgian Healthcare Minister Visits Tskhinvali, Delivers Aid’, Civil Georgia, 8 June 2004,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7091&search=
 163
closed.38 In fact, some argued that although Saakashvili effectively clamped down on corruption in
law enforcement agencies, upper levels of government safeguarded their interests and their
connections with South Ossetian businesses and officials.39 Others, on the contrary, pointed out that
small-scale smuggling, conducted between villages, was the only activity that survived the
clampdown, as it was harder to detect and prevent.40 All in all, it is agreed that trade on the
TransCaucasian Highway (TransCam) was reduced to a trickle when compared with pre-2004
volumes.
Trade was diverted initially to the Zemo Larsi checkpoint - the only legal border crossing
between Russia and Georgia,.41 This new route bypassed South Ossetia, depriving its inhabitants of
trade revenues. Moreover, some commodity trading was abandoned entirely, as it was no longer
profitable with the addition of custom taxes. In 2006, the Zemo Larsi route was also suppressed, as
Russia closed the checkpoint for indefinite maintenance.42 This not only paralyzed traffic between
the two states, most severely affecting Armenia and North Ossetia, but also the entire region.43 In
retaliation, Georgia closed the Ergneti checkpoint, which had allowed the transit of people between
2004 and 2006.44

Local stakeholders
From within Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the strengthening and weakening of internal and
external borders and boundaries was closely linked to each entity’s aspirations for state building.
But it was also linked to opportunities for profit that the leaders of the de facto states and of the
neighbouring regions could craft out of boundary activation. Therefore, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia each approached the dividing lines very differently, not only because of their history,
demographics, geographical situation and economic viability, but also because of their divergent
interests. In the case of Abkhazia, the destruction caused by the war and the 1996 CIS-imposed
blockade led to a dramatic decline in socio-economic conditions45. The area’s damaged and looted
infrastructure–including both public assets and private housing- did not receive the necessary
investments for rehabilitation.46 Both agriculture and tourism, the two main pillars of the pre-war
Abkhaz economy, suffered from war-related destruction, isolation, and underinvestment.47
Railways, which had been the primary vehicle for heavy-cargo transportation, fell into despair
during the conflict. Only electric passenger trains and light-cargo trains operated haphazardly
between Ochamchira, Sukhumi and onwards to Sochi. The state-run Russian Railway Company
would need to assume a major role in rehabilitating the railway in 2004; for many, however, their
involvement was provocative.48 The Abkhaz leadership wanted, and need, to restore the

38
Natalia Mirimanova, Corruption and Conflict in the South Caucasus, (London: International Alert, 2006),
22.
39
Ibidem, 27.
40
Kupatadze, Alexander, ‘The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia’, 69.
41
Theresa Freese, ‘With All Roads to Tsinkhvali Closed, Zone of Conflict Residents Pray for Saakashvili and
for Peace’
42
Civil Georgia, ‘Russia Closes Border Checkpoint with Georgia’, Civil Georgia, 8 July 2006, available from:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12991&search=
43
Civil Georgia, ‘Armenia for Reopening of Russo-Georgian Border Checkpoint’, Civil Georgia, 11 July 2006 ,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13011&search=; ICG, 25; Ramilya Alieva, Georgia:
Smuggling Crackdown Hurts Azeris, 17 February 2005, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, available at:
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=crs&l=EN&s=f&o=239869
44
Civil Georgia, ‘Tbilisi Denies Entry to Passengers Coming via Roki Tunnel’, Civil Georgia, 10 July 2006,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13000
45
Closson, 165.
46
UNDP, United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, United Nations (1998), available from:
http://www.unpo.org/content/view/712/236/
47
Gotsiridze, Roman, ‘The Economic Situation in Blockaded Abkhazia’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.
6, 18 (2002)
48
Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, 49; Giorgi Sepashvili, ‘CIS Summit Reveals Rift in Russian/Georgian
Relations’
164
infrastructure between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation, which linked the de facto state’s
hopes for economic viability to its northern neighbour.
Restoring the infrastructure between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation generally- and the
railway, specifically - raised national security concerns.49 The Abkhaz authorities neither sealed the de
facto border, nor facilitated transit. While Russian peacekeeping forces patrolled the ceasefire line,
Abkhaz authorities left the adjacent borderland, traditionally inhabited by ethnic Georgians, to the
control of militia. Instead, Abkhaz militia turned the Gali region borderland into an opportunity zone,
activating the security/insecurity boundary, for economic gain. In the second half of the 1990s and
early 2000s, the militia periodically swept the Gali region, contributing to the movement of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) back and forth across the Inguri River.50 Abkhaz militias and official,
however, were not the only ones to benefit from this boundary activation.
Along the security zone straddling the Inguri River, stakeholders in widespread smuggling
networks included security services (Russian, Abkhaz and Georgian), militias (Abkhaz and
Georgian), officials (Abkhaz and Georgian), peacekeeping forces, suppliers and distributors of
various nationalities.51 In addition, residents of adjacent areas, often returnees to the Gali region or
IDPs from the Gali region living in Sagramelo, carried out small-scale smuggling.52 With the Gali
region in economic despair and landmines still littering the fields previously used for agriculture,
the smuggling trade allowed Abkhazians to make a living and to access to consumer goods in spite
of the embargo.53 Along the ceasefire line, until 2004, the involvement of Georgian security forces
and bureaucracy was crucial to the smuggling networks. Low-waged Georgian officials, earning as
little as 7 USD per month, demanded bribes to supplement their income.54 Local departments of
law enforcement agencies and influential actors in Sagramelo controlled large-scale smuggling,
especially of petroleum products.55 The Abkhaz Government in Exile, the Georgian Tax
Department and MPs from Sagramelo owning petrol stations were singled out as providing support
to groups involved in smuggling.56 Officials within the Ministry of Interior had ties to drug and
weapons smuggling, as well as kidnapping and extortion.57 Senior officers of anti-drug departments
were even known to be involved in trafficking narcotics.58
South Ossetia approached the security/insecurity boundary activation quite differently.
Until 2004, the South Ossetian authorities guaranteed secure passage of goods crossing the de facto
state and maintained a policy of permeable de facto borders from within South Ossetia. They were
no mechanisms for legal trading along the Transcaucasian highway.59 Goods usually bypassed
Russian customs fees and bureaucratic procedures through routine bribes. Nor were the goods
subjected to Georgian customs, as Tbilisi was unable to establish border posts at the Roki tunnel.
The Georgian central government refrained from setting up customs posts along the ceasefire line
between Georgia and South Ossetia, being adamant that the ceasefire line should be treated as an

49
Paul Rimple, ‘Abkhazia and Georgia: Ready to Ride on the Peace Train?’, Eurasianet, 4 August 2005, available
from: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080505.shtml
50
Dodge Billingsley, ‘Security Deteriorates Along the Abkhazia-Georgia Ceasefire Line’, Jane’s Intelligence
Review, (6 September 2001)
51
Closson, 170.
52
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, 6.
53
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, ‘Smuggling in Abkhazia and the
Tskhinvali region in 2003-2004’, 84.
54
Svetlana Korsaia, Mamuka Kuparadze and Mikheil Mirziashvili, Hoping for Peace, Georgia: Conciliation
Resources, 2002.
55
Closson, 168,172-3.
56
Closson,173-4.
57
Interview with Giorgi Baramidze, Saakashvili’s new Minister of the Interior, reported in Ken Stier, ‘Behind
a Desk, Georgian Official Promises War on Corruption’, Eurasianet, 19 December 2003, available from:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav121903.shtml
58
Cornell, Svante E., ‘A Growing Threat to Transnational Organised Crime’, in Dov Lynch, ed., The South
Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers, No. 65, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 33.
59
ICG, 25.
 165
internal administrative boundary.60 Therefore, although unsanctioned, goods continued to flow
freely between Tskhinvali, Ergneti and Tbilisi with the assistance of corrupt Georgian officials. The
Ergneti market itself was partly controlled by Lokha Chibirov, the son of the first de facto
president, and even market access became a profitable enterprise, as protection was provided at a
price.61 Georgian paramilitary groups operated under the umbrella of the Georgian State
Chancellery.62
Only when crossing the territory of South Ossetia, did trade assume the official protection
of the authorities – albeit the de facto ones. Businessmen generally followed South Ossetian norms,
paying an official fee administered by the de facto power ministries. Law enforcement agencies, in
return, prevented other agencies or paramilitary groups from extracting further bribes, and
guaranteed a safe passage from the Roki tunnel to the ceasefire line.63 In the early 2000s, the
European Commission proposed that a joint customs regime be established. As an act of
compensation, it would have contributed to the overhaul of the TransCam itself. The South
Ossetian government rejected the proposal, on the grounds that it would have curtailed its
sovereignty. More realistically, such an agreement would have curtailed the scope of smuggling
and future profits.64 In fact, the stakeholders’ analysis of the South Ossetian stalemate revolves
around the TransCam trade and the evolution of trade regimes. A trans-territorial network
composed of Russians, South Ossetians and Georgians orchestrated the trade. Members of the elite,
bureaucracy, business groups and consumers were its stakeholders.65 IDPs, refugees and residents
of the conflict areas mainly conducted small-scale trade. Although control of the TransCam
smuggling was gradually concentrated in the hands of a few well-connected businessmen and
members of the elite, the trade continued to provide a living to residents of South Ossetia and
adjacent areas in Georgia. It created jobs and lowered the costs for basic goods, as they were
virtually duty-free.66

Conclusion and future research

The hardening and softening of boundaries in the interwar period had economic, social
and political consequences on the borderlands and throughout the region. As demonstrated by the
resurgence of full-scale violence in South Ossetia in 2004, mobility policies affected much more
than the transit of people and goods. While this aspect deserves a separate study, the South
Ossetian experience suggests these policies can affect diplomatic relations between the major
actors at stake; processes of conflict resolution and confidence building between the motherland
and the de facto states; viability of the de facto states; and livelihoods of borderland populations.
Further study would be required, of course, to establish causal links.
In this sense, Russia’s mobility policies cohered with its foreign policy of maintaining a
presence in the South Caucasus. Increasing permeability of the international border between the
Russian Federation and the two de facto state led the two separatist regions to look northward for
trade and economic resources. Russia’s refusal to acknowledge Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s
independence until 2008, however, shows that it took a practical and informal approach to
furthering its goal.Georgia’s mobility policies, on the other hand, were at times far more
inconsistent with its goal of reintegrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its insistence on
implementing the CIS embargo in Abkhazia and its lack of initiative to establish commercial and

60
Kukhianidze, Alexandre, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region in Georgia.
61
Closson, 181.
62
Theresa Freese, ‘A Report from the Field: Georgia’s War against Contraband and its Struggle for Territorial
Integrity’, SAIS Review, 25, no.1 (2005), 110; Kukhianidze, Alexandre, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman
Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, 19.
63
Vakhtang Dzhikaev and Alan Parastaev, ‘Economy and Conflict in South Ossetia’, in From War Economies
to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus, eds. Champain, Phil, Klein, Diana and Mirimanova, Natalia,
(London: International Alert, 2004), 205.
64
OCHA Georgia, South Ossetia Briefing Note 2003, Briefing Note, (Tbilisi: United Nations, 2003), 2.
65
Closson, 180.
66
ICG, 10.
166
transport links across the de facto border only widened the cleavage between motherland and the de
facto states. Its more pragmatic approach in South Ossetia contributed to peaceful relations and
mitigated animosity – at least until early 2004, when the decision to curtail TransCam commercial
flow precipitated the situation. In addition, limiting the movement of goods and people across the
de facto borders (whether explicit or implicitly generated by a lack of legal framework and
infrastructure) severely impacted the livelihoods of borderland populations and residents of the de
facto states. This effect created a siege mentality and undermined confidence in Georgian
sovereignty. This study has shown, however, that an array of state and nonstate actors stood to gain
from boundary activation. In the case of Abkhazia, and in South Ossetia before 2004, the
maintenance of a de facto border, respectively semi-permeable and permeable, suited the interests
of key stakeholders of borderland economies.
A similar variety of actors and interests characterised boundary activation and deactivation
in the de facto states, which which were driven by aspirations for economic viability and state
building. Inevitably, local actors were forced to respond to the Georgian and Russian policies that
hardened and softened the boundaries. The locals contributed to boundary dynamics within the
territories that they controlled, whether by acquiescing to violence as a method for boundary
activation in the Gali region, or by regulating trade and suppressing insecurity on the TranCam.
Finally, this paper fails to tackle the interests of organised crime and transnational
networks in boundary activation and their impact on the de facto borders of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. This is mainly due to the paucity of data and scarcity of established accounts. A
comparative approach with other post-conflict settings, however, leads us to suspect that Georgia
and the adjacent areas were ideal environments for organised crime in the interwar period.
Favourable conditions included porous borders, weak rule of law, poorly paid officials and
pervasive corruption at all levels.67 Moreover, weak governments and institutions, loss of state
control over significant areas of national territory and economic collapse enabled organised crime
to flourish throughout the CIS.68 What is unclear, however, whether – and if so, how – organized
crime affected boundary permeability. While data gathering in this field is likely to be hazardous, a
careful study of the issue would certainly help to illuminate boundary dynamics in the region.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alieva, Ramilya. Georgia: Smuggling Crackdown Hurts Azeris, 17 February 2005, Institute for
War and Peace Reporting, available at:
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=crs&l=EN&s=f&o=239869
(accessed 20 March 2009)
Amini, Gitty. A Larger Role for Positive Sanctions in Cases of Compellence?, Working Paper No.
12, (Los Angeles: Center for International Relations, University of California,
1997)Areshidze, Mamuka (2002), ‘Current Economic Causes of Conflicts in Georgia’, in
Strategic Conflict Assessment. Edited by Tony Vaux. Unpublished report for UK Department
for International Development (DFID).
Baev, Paul (1997), Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus. London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs.
Baldwin, David (1971), “The Power of Positive Sanctions”, in World Politics, Vol.24, No.1: 19-38.
Ballentine, Karen (2003), “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of
Armed Conflict”, in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Beyond Greed and Grievance.
Edited by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman. London: Lynne Rienner.
Billingsley, Dodge. “Security Deteriorates Along the Abkhazia-Georgia Ceasefire Line”, in Jane’s
Intelligence Review, 6 (September 2001).

67
A parallel can be drawn with post-Dayton Bosnia, Timothy Donais, ‘The Political Economy of Stalemate:
Organised Crime, Corruption and Economic Deformation in Post-Dayton Bosnia’, Conflict, Security and
Development, Vol.3, Issue 3 (2003), 368.
68
Cornell, 26.
 167
Chkhartishvili, David, Roman Gotsiridze and Bessarion Kitsmarishvili (2004), “Georgia: Conflict
Regions and Economies”, in From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South
Caucasus. Edited by. Phil Champlain, Diana Klein and Natalia. London: Mirimanova,
International Alert.
Civil Georgia (2003), “Governor Blows up By-Roads to Prevent Smuggling”. in Civil Georgia, 23
December, available from: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5904&search= [accessed 31
July 2009].
Civil Georgia (2004), “Tskhinvali Cuts Links with Tbilisi, Demands Compensation”. in Civil
Georgia, 12 June, available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id= 7122&search=
(accessed 31 July 2009).
Civil Georgia (2004), “Georgian Healthcare Minister Visits Tskhinvali, Delivers Aid”. in Civil
Georgia, 8 June, available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7091 &search=
(accessed 31 July 2009).
Civil Georgia (2006), “Russia Closes Border Checkpoint with Georgia”. in Civil Georgia, 8 July,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12991&search= (accessed 31 July
2009)
Civil Georgia (2006), ‘Tbilisi Denies Entry to Passengers Coming via Roki Tunnel’. in Civil
Georgia, 10 July 2006, available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13000
(accessed 31 July 2009)
Civil Georgia (2006), ‘Armenia for Reopening of Russo-Georgian Border Checkpoint’. in Civil
Georgia, 11 July 2006, available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?
id=13011&search= (accessed 31 July 2009)
Closson, Stacy Renee (2007), State Weakness in Perspective: Trans-territorial Energy Networks in
Georgia, 1993-2003. Unpublished thesis submitted for doctoral degree in International
Relations, London School of Economics.
Cornell, Svante E. (2003), “A Growing Threat to Transnational Organised Crime”. In The South
Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU. Edited by Dov Lynch. Chaillot Papers, No. 65. Paris:
Institute for Security Studies.
Cortright, David (1997), The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention.
Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Cortright, David (2007), “The Economic Tools of Peacemaking”. In I. Peacemaking in
International Conflict, Methods and Techniques. Revised Edition. Edited by William
Zartman. Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
Diasamidze, Tamaz (2003), “The Collection of Political-Legal Acts, Regional Conflict in Georgia
– the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (1989-
2002)”. In Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tskinvali Region of Georgia. Edited by
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze. Tbilisi: Transnational
Crime and Corruption Centre.
Donais, Timothy (2003), “The Political Economy of Stalemate: Organised Crime, Corruption and
Economic Deformation in Post-Dayton Bosnia”. Conflict, Security and Development Vol. 3,
Issue 3 (2003): 359-382.
Dowty, Alan (1994), “Sanctionning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order”. The Washington
Quarterly, No. 17, Issue 3 (1994): 179-198.
Dzhikaev, Vakhtang and Parastaev, Alan (2004), “Economy and Conflict in South Ossetia”. In From
War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus, Edited by Champain, Phil, Klein,
Diana and Mirimanova, Natalia. London: International Alert.
Freese, Theresa (2004), “With All Roads to Tsinkhvali Closed, Zone of Conflict Residents Pray for
Saakashvili and for Peace. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 30 June 2004, available
from: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2235 (accessed 31 July 2009)
Freese, Theresa (2005), “A Report from the Field: Georgia’s War against Contraband and its
Struggle for Territorial Integrity”, SAIS Review, 25, no.1 (2005): 107-121.
Goodhand, Jonathan. “War, peace and the places in between: Why borderlands are central”. In
Whose peace?: Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding. Basingstoke
[England] and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
168
Hufbauer, Cary, Jeffrey Scott and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and
Current Policy, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), Hughes, James
and Gwendolyn Sasse (2001), ‘Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet
Transition States’, Regional & Federal Studies, 11:3.
ICG, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia. Europe Report, No.159. Tbilisi and Brussels:
International Crisis Group, 2004.
Khutsidze, Nino. Ajara Boosts Government’s Financial Hopes. Civil Georgia Report, 8 May 2004.
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7489&search= (accessed 27 July
2009)
Korsaia, Svetlana, Mamuka Kuparadze and Mikheil Mirziashvili (2002), Hoping for Peace.
Georgia: Conciliation Resources.
Kukhianidze, Alexandre, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze (2004), Smuggling through
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region in Georgia. Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption
Centre, available from: http://policy-traccc.gmu.edu/georgia/publications/
kukhianidze/Kukhianidze_Kupatadze_Smuggling_Georgia_Eng._2004.pdf [accessed 26
July 2009]
Kukhianidze, Alexandre, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze (2007), “Smuggling in
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in 2003-2004”. In Organised crime and corruption in
Georgia. Edited by Louise Shelley, Erik R. Scott and Anthony Latta. London: Routledge .
Kupatadze, Alexander (2005), “The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling through
Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. Insight Turkey, Vol.7, Issue 4.
Lynch, Dov (2005), What Russia Sees. Chaillot Paper, No.74. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
Lynch, Dov (2006), Why Georgia Matters. Chaillot Paper, No.86. Paris: Institute for Security
Studies.
Matveeva, Anna (2002), “Georgia: Peace Remains Elusive in Ethnic Patchwork”. In Searching for
Peace in Europe and Eurasia. Edited by Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette
Verhoeven. London: Lynne Rienner .
Migdal, Joel S. (2004), “State Building and the Non-Nation-State”. Journal of International Affairs
58, no. 1.
Migdal, Joel S. (2004), Boundaries and belonging: states and societies in the struggle to shape
identities and local practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mirimanova, Natalia. (2006), Corruption and Conflict in the South Caucasus. London:
International Alert.
Newham, Randall (2000), “More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkages in German
Ostpolitik from Bismark to Kohl”. International Studies Quarterly, No. 44, Issue 1: 73-96.
Newman, David and Anssi Paasi (1998), “Fences and Neighbours in the Post Modern World:
Boundary Narratives in Political Geography”. Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 22, No.
2: 55-79.
Pugh, Michael and Neil Cooper (2004), War Economies in a Regional Context, Challenges of
Transformation. London: Lynne Rienner.
OCHA Georgia (2003), South Ossetia Briefing Note 2003. Briefing Note. Tbilisi: United Nations,
available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/38531a494
ad61212c1256daa003050c2 (accessed 31 July 2009)
O’Sullivan, Meghan (2003), Shrewed Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Rimple, Paul (2005), “Abkhazia and Georgia: Ready to Ride on the Peace Train?”. Eurasianet, 4
August, available from: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/
insight/articles/eav080505.shtml (accessed 1 April 2011)
Rock, Stephen (2000), Appeasement in International Politics. Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press.
Sepashvili, Giorgi (2004), “Experts Suggest to Focus on Economic Projects in Conflict Resolution”.
Civil Georgia Report, 13 January, available from: http://www.civil.ge/
eng/article.php?id=6006&search=Experts%20Suggest%20to%20Focus%20on%20Economic
%20Projects%20in%20Conflict%20Resolution (accessed 31 July 2009)
 169
Sepashvili, Giorgi (2004), “Saakashvili Sends Reconciliatory Signs to South Ossetia”. Civil
Georgia Report, 1 June, available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=7041&search= (accessed 31 July 2009)
Sepashvili, Giorgi (2004), “CIS Summit Reveals Rift in Russian/Georgian Relations”. Civil
Georgia Report, 17 September, available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=7852 [accessed 27 July 2009]
Soviet Bezopasnosti SNG (1996). ‘Reshenie Soveta Glav Gosudarstv SNG o Merax po Uregulirovaniyu
Konflikta v Abxazii, Gruziya’, Dokument No. 258, January 31, A/51/62 – S/1996/74, in
Volxonski’i, M.A., B.A. Zaxarov and N.Yu. Cilaev (eds.), Konfliktyi v Abxazii i Yuzhno’I Osetii,
Dokumentyi 1989-2006, MGIMO, Moscow, 377-9.
Stier, Ken (2003), “Behind a Desk, Georgian Official Promises War on Corruption”. Eurasianet,
19 December. available from: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/
articles/eav121903.shtml (accessed 27 July 2009)
The Avalon Project. “Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American); December 26,
1933”, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp (accessed April 1, 2011)
Tilly, Charles (2003), The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UNDP. United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, United Nations (1998), available
from: http://www.unpo.org/content/view/712/236/ (accessed 26 July 2009)
 217
Ljiljana MANIC is Ph.D. in Cultural Studies and Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Culture and
Media, Megatrend University, Belgrade. Publications: “The Role of the Mass Media in Promoting
Philanthropy”, in: Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media, Megatrend University, Belgrade,
no 3, January, 2011; Типологија и развој непрофитних организација у Србији (Tipology of Non
profit Organizations in Serbia), Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media, Megatrend
University, Belgrade, No.. 2, 2010. E-mail: ljmanic@megatrend.edu.rs
Ludovic NICA has a Master Diploma in “Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations” at
University of Oradea; National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Master
Diploma in “European Policy and Economy”; “Moldova şi perspectiva aderării la UE”, European
Union: poartă spre noi membri, Oradea: University of Oradea, 2010, 113-120;
nik_28rx@yahoo.com.
Anca OLTEAN is research assistant at the Institute for Euroregional Studies within the University
of Oradea and Ph.D candidate in History. “Israel in the European neighbourhood policy” in Ioan
Horga, Grigore Silaşi, Istvan Suli-Zakar, Stanislaw Sagan (ed.), Intercultural dialogue and
European Neighbourhood Policy, University of Oradea Press, 2009, p. 261-269. E-mail:
olteananca@hotmail.com
Monica OPROIU is Ph.D candidate in Political Sciences at the NSPSPA, with a thesis focusing on
the European Union and conflict resolution in its wider neighbourhood. She is working also as a
researcher at the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in Bucharest. Publications:
Monica Oproiu, Iulian Chifu (eds). “The Russian-Georgian War. The decision-makers’ reactions
during the crisis” (Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2010). E-mail: oproiu.monica@gmail.com
Philippe PERCHOC est docteur en science politique de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris
(CERI). Assistant académique au Collège d'Europe, Bruges, et Président et rédacteur en chef du
group de debats Nouvelle Europe. Ouvrages recentes: « Le compromis mémoriel européen. Une
étude balte », dans BONNARD, P. & MINK, G., L'Europe et ses gisements mémoriels (Paris :
Houdiard, 2010); „L’identité européenne par les frontières”, in: Alexandravicius, P., L’Europe en
tant que puissance mondiale, Presses de l’Université Romeris, Vilnius, pp. 137-148. Translated in
Lithuanian, Europos galia pasaulyje: kolektyvin÷ monografija. E-mail: p.perchoc@gmail.com
Adriana POPESCU has a Master Diploma in “Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations”
at University of Oradea; National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest,
Master Diploma in “European Policy and Economy”. Publications: “Uniunea Europeană – o
comunitate de securitate în formare”, in: European Union: poartă spre noi membri, Oradea:
University of Oradea, 2010, 70-83, unvadi_20@yahoo.com.
REMÉNYI Péter is Lecturer, PhD, Department of Political Geography and Regional
Development, Institute of Geography, Faculty of Sciences, University of Pécs. Publications:
„International institutional co-operations in the border areas of Hungary and Serbia”, in: Megatrend
Review. The international review of applied economics, 7 (1) (2010): 119-140; „Etnikai
homogenizáció a volt Jugoszláviában” (Ethnic homogenization in the former Yugoslavia), in:
Balkán Füzetek Különszám I, (2009): 122-129; REMÉNYI P. and VÉGH A. 2006: „Az ezredforduló
határkérdései, határváltozásai a Nyugat-Balkánon” („Border issues and border changes in the
Western Balkans at the turn of the millennium”.). Földrajzi Értesítı (Hungarian Geographical
Bulletin), LV. évf. 1–2. sz. pp. 195–211. E-mail: remko@gamma.ttk.pte.hu
Giulia PRELZ OLTRAMONTI is a PhD candidate in Political Sciences at Université libre de
Bruxelles and a Visiting fellow at the Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique. She holds a MA degree in
Conflict, Security and Development from King’s College London and a BA degree in European
Social and Political Studies from University College London. Publications: ‘“Engagement Through
Cooperation”: coming too late’, in translation: ‘ « Géorgie: L’engagement par la coopération»: un
train de retard’, Caucaz.com, Tbilisi, April 2011
(http://www.caucaz.com/home/breve_contenu.php?id=614). E-mail: gprelzol@ulb.ac.be)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.