Dawn of the Tank — 15 September 1916

The Canadians at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette by Daniel James Murphy & Glenn Warner

Infantrymen curiously eye the new British Army weapon – a Mark I ‘tank’ – before its debut in the Battle of Flers-
Courcelette on 15 September 1916. Here, a ‘C’ Company ‘Male’ tank, with 6-pounder naval gun in each side sponson,
prepares for action with a British unit. (Photo: IWM-Q 5574)

Prologue:

Sir Douglas Haig portrait by William Orpen in 1917. (Source: IWM)

The Battle of the Somme in 1916 cost the British Armies some 60,000 casualties including 20,000 dead, outright, on the
first day. (See article on Newfoundland’s Memorial Day.) General Douglas Haig’s dream – to puncture the German trench
system and march all the way Berlin – was itself punctured by his plan’s epic failure. The Somme devolved into a
stagnation the Germans dubbed “Das Blutbad” (The Bloodbath).
A Game-Changing Weapon

On 1 August 1916, a month after the opening of the Somme campaign on 1 July, a direct missive came from a backbencher
in British parliament:

“In four weeks we have progressed less than 1 mile. The open country towards which we are struggling by inches is
capable of entrenched defence at every step, and is utterly devoid of military significance. There is no question of breaking
the line, or ‘letting loose the cavalry in the open country behind’. With twenty times the shell and five times the guns, and
more than double the losses, the gains have but little succeeded those of Loos. And how was Loos viewed in retrospect?”

In his scathing appraisal of the conduct on the Somme, Winston Churchill was suggesting General Haig be sacked, as had
the former commander-in-chief Field Marshall French, who was responsible for the Battle of Loos, a September 1915
catastrophe. Churchill was obviously horrified and appalled at the conduct of the Battle of the Somme, with its ‘war
winning’ promise, having devolved into a ‘wearing out’ battle that no one seemed to know how to win.

But Sir Douglas Haig HAD a plan – and a new game-changing weapon. A new machine of war would break the stalemate
to enable his most treasured arm of the BEF to finally ‘roll up’ the German flank, force them to ‘retire’ and maybe even
surrender in a few days time. Yes, this really would be the CAVALRY’s time to shine. So it is no coincidence that 15
September 1916 would also be the historic battlefield debut of the new tracked armoured fighting vehicle known as the
‘tank’. (‘Cistern’ and ‘landship’ didn’t fly.) The tank had only recently been developed and engineered by a British war
cabinet committee headed by Churchill. But for Douglas Haig, tanks were only an adjunct of war that would clear the way
for that most fearsome weapon on the first World War battlefield – the horse and mounted rifleman.

September 15th would also be the debut of the Canadian Corps in a truly offensive capacity. The Corps had defended the
Ypres salient and had been applied piecemeal in previous British offences, but here in The Somme Valley, the Canadian
Corps would be attacking with two available divisions – 2nd and 3rd – and 2nd Division would be supplied with the new
tanks.

The British offensive was to involve 11 divisions (including the two Canadian) on a frontage of 12,000 yards primarily
against the German-occupied French towns of Flers and Courcelette. The lion’s share of the attacking divisions would be
from General Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army. Rawlinson was chiefly responsible for the planning and conduct of the
battle (though the idea of a massive cavalry breakout to victory was the brainchild of the inexplicably ever-optimistic Haig).
At this point the Canadians were part of the Reserve Army, commanded by Hubert Gough – a commander so reviled that
in 1917, Canadian Corps commander Arthur Currie would refuse to operate in the same army!
Pozières lies astride the Albert-Bapaume Road in the Somme, with Albert to the SW and Bapaume to the NE. Just off the
Albert-Bapaume Road to the north is the town of Courcelette. The blue line is the German front line on 15 September 1916,
while red represents the Allied line. Courcelette is approximately 2kms from Pozières as the crow flies. Tinted contours
represent 120m, 135m, 150m above sea level. (© Maple Leaf Up)

On the far left of the British offensive, the Canadian 2nd Division (with 6 tanks) was to attack in an easterly direction (along
the Albert-Bapaume road) and then swing north to capture the fortified village of Courcelette. The 3rd Canadian Division
(without tanks) would make a subsidiary attack north and westward, toward the much feared and heavily contested
Mouquet Farm (“Mucky” Farm in the parlance of a wry trench soldier). This attack was designed mainly to cover the left
flank of 2nd Division’s advance.

The main British attack, to the south-east of the Canadians – where the cavalry was waiting to win the war – was carried
out by III Corps made up of 8 British divisions and the New Zealand Division.

*****
 

Such a new weapon was the tank that the men who commanded, drove, and manned the guns didn’t even have a proper
unit that bore the name ‘Tank’ or ‘Armoured’. At this early stage, tankers were part of the Machine Gun Corps, then more
specifically, as of May 1916, the ‘Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps’, wearing the familiar crossed Vickers guns as their cap
badges. To say the tank had been rushed into production would be an understatement – the very first prototype trundled
out of the factory on 13 January 1916.  Eight months later a force of 47 tanks (a pitifully small number according to most)
would take part in this historic Battle of Flers-Courcelette.
The Mark I tank came in two variants – ‘Male’ and ‘Female’. The Male tank’s armament was two quick-firing 6-pounder
naval guns mounted in a sponson on each side of the hull, and 4 Hotchkiss machine guns. The tank weighed in at 28 tons.
The Female carried 5 Vickers and 1 Hotchkiss machine guns and weighed a svelte 27 tons. The 105hp Daimler engine could
propel the beasts at (as listed) 4 mph over unbroken ground but given the pockmarked visage of the Somme, it would be
more like 1.5 or 2 mph – at best. In other words, the Mark I trundled much slower across the battlefield than an infantry
soldier in full kit attacking across no-man’s-land.

Infantry moves off with armour for the first time in history in what would become known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette.
Notice the awkward steering aid wheels attached to the rear of the Mark I tank. The cage on top was to prevent grenades
from being tossed on top of the tank. Notice the open hatch behind the 6-pounder sponson. (Photo: IWM Q5575)

The Canadian allotment for the Battle of Flers-Courcelette was 6 tanks, to be used only as part of the initial assault. There
is a report that had the number of tanks at 7 (one in reserve, which would be VERY odd) but the number 6 seems more
likely. The 6 rhomboid-shaped behemoths of No. 1 Section, C Company, HSMGC were all given names of refined French
drinks that began with the letter C – Champagne, Cognac, Chartreuse, Chablis, Crème de Menthe and Cordon Rouge. The 6
went into action with the 2nd Canadian Division in two groups of three. The first group – Champagne (Male), Cognac
(Female) and Cordon Rouge (Female) – were assigned to the 6th Brigade on the division’s northern flank. As part of 4th
Brigade, the second group – Crème de Menthe (Male), Chartreuse (Male) and Chablis (Female) – were to attack, one on,
and the other two astride, the Albert-Bapaume road.

In the northern sector it was decided that the 3 tanks attached to 6th Brigade would move off with the infantry, under the
cover of the standard artillery creeping barrage, adopted as necessary for ANY advance to have a chance of succeeding.
Since they were slower than a foot soldier, the tanks were to ‘mop up’ any pockets of resistance the infantry had
bypassed, a role at this stage in their development to which they were ideally suited.

On the 4th Brigade front, the 3 tanks moved off before the infantry. Even though they were slower than an advancing
infantryman, 100-meter wide artillery-free ‘lanes’ were left in the creeping barrage for fear of stray shrapnel striking the
new tanks – which they would have no doubt survived. Thus, the creeping barrage – the one weapon BEST SUITED to
protect the infantry who would be advancing in the wake of the tanks – was denied the infantry in the hope that this
untried tracked weapon of questionable reliability would be an adequate substitute. As Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson so
bluntly put it, “The arrival of the tank was now causing confusion where none had existed before”.
To say that tactics involving armoured vehicles were ‘somewhat unevolved’ would also state the obvious. Though the
Army Commanders (Rawlinson and Gough) had seen ‘displays’ of the tanks in France, and it was assumed that they had
read the few pages on suggested implementation of tanks in combat by Lt. Col. E.D Swinton (the ‘Father” of the tank) and
had impressed their Corps Commanders to do the same, this may not have been the case. Addressing this issue, historian
Trevor Pidgeon writes, “These men knew next to nothing about the new weapon, its technical characteristics and
limitations, and were unable to contribute significantly to the debate. Pulteney’s (III Corps commander) decision to send
the tanks through High Wood was a display of arrogance born of ignorance.” Add to this that much of the time tank crews
should have been training with the infantry (and working on basic co-ordination with the artillery), instead was spent
parading before staff officers, curious about the new weapon. Many of the tanks that showed up for battle were worn out
and their crews dead beat. One veteran later recalled, “… if only we had been able to reconnoiter… if only there had been
some proper practice over ground that was like the Somme: and if only we had had a little more sleep and a little less
showing off, what a marvelous story this Somme battle might have been.”

At 06:20 – Zero Hour, the Canadians of 6th Brigade and their iron-clad British friends were off. For the infantry, the attacks
went very well. The initial barrage had performed wonderfully and the scores of German dead and wounded the
Canadians found in the front line trenches bore witness. The tankers on the other hand, had a different view of the
barrage. The ground was so churned up — over weeks, not just days — by the artillery, getting going was a trial.

C1 (Champagne), attached to Cdn 6 Bde, on battlefield in 1917 where it got stuck in debut. (Photo: IWM 2328)
Champagne and Cognac got stuck shortly after crossing Sugar Trench and their crews abandoned what would have been
sitting ducks, despite their crews’ valiant attempts to extricate the machines from the moonscape. It was here that the
only casualty to any tank crews attached to the Canadians occurred. A shell killed Pte. H. Brotherwood just as
Champagne’s commander, Lt. Wheeler, had told his men to abandon the tank. Brotherwood is buried at Pozières Military
Cemetery.

C6 (Cordon Rouge), after its successful debut, trundles down the Albert-Bapaume road back towards Albert, cheered on.
(Photo: Tank Museum 410)

Cordon Rouge, the last of 6th Brigade’s three tanks, however, was having a much better time of it. The tank made it across
the German front line trench and drove alongside Sugar Trench, silencing several machine gun posts as it went. That done,
it circled southwest, crossing the Brigade boundary, returning down along the Albert-Bapaume Road up which the 4th
Brigade was attacking, taking care of any pockets of resistance left behind by the infantry. The tank’s commander, 2/Lt. J.
Allen was later awarded the Military Cross for his actions on the 15th.

Along the Albert-Bapaume Road the 3 tanks with 4th Brigade had a similar success-failure ratio. Chartreuse had trouble
getting forward because of shell damage to its steering gear. A short time later, the engine seized and the crew was forced
to abandon her. Chablis lost its left track shortly after its start and it too was left on the field. Crème de Menthe had
considerable success however, making it to the Sugar Factory (a considerable strong point, just south of Coucelette and
north of the main road), providing excellent support to the 20th (Central Ontario) and 21st (Eastern Ontario) Battalions
fighting in the ruined factory. The tank’s 6-pounders destroyed walls and dealt with the machine guns behind them. The
commander of this tank, Capt. A. M. Inglis was to receive the Distinguished Service Order for his part in the historic attack.

Historian Trevor Pidgeon has remarked that this photo is tank C5 (Creme de Menthe) advancing to the attack in this still
frame from a film sequence probably taken by British-born cameraman Oscar Bovill. We consider this photo to be a glass
plate negative showing C5 returning from the Sugar Factory, taken by Canadian War Records Office photographer Ivor
Castle.
In July 1916, kinematographer Oscar Bovill was transferred from the Royal Artillery (where he was a driver) to the
Canadian War Records Office where he became official cameraman as a lieutenant. Bovill was with the Canadians in the
front line during the battle for Courcelette, and was even witnessed by the Germans there. With such evidence his film
footage is generally considered the real thing and not staged in a safe location. Creme de Menthe's attack along the Albert-
Bapaume road proved integral to the fighting around the ruined Sugar Factory, helping to ensure good gains by the
Canadian infantry. (Source: IWM 2044)

The 6 tanks attached to 2nd Division played no part in the actual capture of Courcelette, which was to fall later that day to
the Canadians of the 5th Brigade which passed through the 4th and 6th Brigades and swept into the village (with the 7th
Brigade of the 3rd Division on its left flank).

Ironically, the Canadian attack had succeeded where the British attack to the east had not. BEF Commander-in-Chief Haig
would, alas, not be able to ‘push the cavalry through’ to the open country and Berlin beyond. Haig’s old-fangled dreams of
victorious horse-mounted troopers would never again be realized. While the tank’s outing at Flers-Courcelette proved
tactically ineffective, it was seen as an important if awkward first step in the evolution of Combined Arms. It wouldn’t be
for another 14 months that an improved model of British tank would play a pivotal and successful role in an Allied
offensive — at Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Even at Cambrai, Haig clung on to the notion of cavalry as saviour, but
Cambrai was a triumph for the tank and a humiliation for the horse. The vaunted cavalry’s days were numbered.

As for the Canadians, their stay on the Somme would last another 2 months until the offensive was finally ‘closed down’ on
19 November 1916. The Canadian Corps suffered 24,029 casualties during its 60-plus day tenure on that tortured part of
the French countryside. Shortly after that, the Corps headed north to regroup, retrain and rearm on what was, for most of
1916 and the first few months of 1917, a ‘quiet front’ near Arras. This would all change on 9 April 1917.  The Canadians
would see to it.

Daniel James Murphy & Glenn Warner

(Daniel James Murphy & Glenn Warner are Great War enthusiasts, currently working on Blindfold and Alone – a project
about Canadians shot at dawn – and Taking Stock - a project about Great War photography.)

*****

Dawn of the Tank — Other Points of Interest

1) Applying hard lessons learned at Flers-Courcelette, the British assembled 476 tanks (many of them the new Mark IVs) for
the battle of Cambrai, launched 20 November 1917. In addition to this incredible number of fighting vehicles, the infantry
got to train along side them, the ground chosen was infinitely better suited for the machines capabilities and the artillery
barrage was undertaken at the last minute – to preserve the element of surprise AND not chew up the ground so as to
render it impassable.

2) Later on, combined Allied forces (Canadian Corps, Australian Corps, and the French 31st Corps) with 604 tanks of all
types at their disposal, attacked the Germans south-east of Amiens on 8 August 1918 for what became the greatest single-
day advance the Allies would make during the entire war – over 7 miles.

3) The Tank Corps Memorial is situated on the south shoulder of the Albert-Bapaume road, directly across from the
Australian memorial at the site of ‘the Windmill’. It was from near this position on the outskirts of Pozières, that the 3
‘southern’ tanks, attached to the Canadian 4th Brigade, attacked toward the Sugar Factory, south of Courcelette. (See
current View of Tank Corps Memorial on Google Maps.)

4) Not surprisingly, the advent of the tank also saw the advent of the first anti-tank weapon specifically designed for use by
the infantry. The German Mauser 1918 T-Gewehr sported a 13.2 x 92mm armour-piercing round (slightly larger than .50
cal). But the rifle also sported a wicked kick that could dislocate a shoulder and, occasionally break your collarbone.
Tanks Corps badge 1917-24.

5) The tankers that went into battle on 15 September 1916 were members of the Machine Gun Corps (MGC). Part of the
MGC was the Motor Machine Gun Service (MMGS), a unit originally organized to provide mobile machine guns mounted
on motorcycle sidecars, which became obsolete due to the stalemate on The Western Front.

In late 1915 and early 1916 as tanks were being developed, the MMGS became associated with this tracked armoured
fighting vehicle, changing its name to Heavy Section, Machine Gun Corps (HSMGC) in May 1916. In November 1916, after
Flers-Courcelette, its name changed to Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps, and in July 1917, the Heavy Branch was finally
separated from the MGC to become The Tank Corps.

Royal Tanks Corps 1924.

6) After WWI, in 1923, ‘Royal’ was officially added to ‘Tank Corps’ by Colonel-in-Chief King George V and the original Tank
Corps badge was changed in 1924 to the Royal Tank Corps badge

In 1939, months before WW2, the Royal Tank Corps was amalgamated with existing mechanized cavalry regiments to
become the Royal Armoured Corps. The Royal Tank Corps itself then became the Royal Tank Regiment within the RAC.

The RTR kept the RTC badge with the familiar rhomboid-shaped Great War tank. It has only changed from King's Crown to
Queen’s Crown in 1953 with the ascension of Elizabeth II.
The Battle of Flers-Courcelette

The Canadian Corps' first major attack in the Battle of the Somme came on 15 September 1916. Two major tactical
innovations were tested in this battle for the first time: the use of the tank to support infantry in penetrating into enemy
trenches, and the "rolling barrage" which was a moving curtain of shells behind which infantry could traverse No Man's in
relative safety.2

Mark I Tank prepares to advance on 15 September 1916. (Imperial War Museum photo)

The battle was to be fought on a ten mile front between Combles and Thiepval, with Rawlinson's 4th Army delivering the
main attack with three corps, aimed at Flers, Morval, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt - all under the guns of the German Third
Position, a network of defences that had the Germans had begun in February 1916 and completed after the opening of the
Allied July Offensive. There were hopes that a breakthrough here might open the way for a cavalry advance on Bapaume.
The role of the Reserve Army was to protect the left flank, and the Canadian Corps would attack and secure Courcelette and
points of observation over the Third Position. To the left of the Canadian Corps, the 2nd Corps was to exert pressure on the
Germans south of Thiepval.

One other novel feature of the attack on 15 September was that in general (except in the Canadian Corps' sector) it was
planned not as a continuous advance to a final line but in limited bounds to a series of successive objectives. The July
battles had exposed the fallacy of trusting to the preliminary bombardment to wipe out all opposition. No longer army
commanders dared emphasize that "nothing could exist at the conclusion of the bombardment in the area covered by it",
and imply that the infantry would be able to walk over at leisure and take possession. Almost invariably the infantry had
encountered bitter resistance, so that frequently even if the first wave reached its distant goal it had become too exhausted
and reduced by casualties to complete its task; and later waves, following across no man's land at intervals of 100 yards,
had found themselves similarly exposed to deadly fire from the uncaptured position. Official doctrine was not as yet ready
to accept the idea of advancing by small detachments instead of in waves; infiltration was yet unknown. Once the artillery
had done its allotted part the responsibility was the infantry's - and there was supreme faith in numbers. To the end of the
Somme battles unit and formation commanders were to be governed by the training instructions issued by General
Headquarters in May: ".... in many instances experience has shown that to capture a hostile trench a single line of men has
usually failed, two lines have generally failed but sometimes succeeded, three lines have generally succeeded but
sometimes failed, and four or more lines have usually succeeded."
Although limited, the bounds prescribed at Flers-Courcelette were long enough by later standards, amounting to as much
as 1900 yards on the Fourth Army's front. The Canadian Corps, attacking on the Reserve Army's right flank with two
divisions on a 2200-yard front, was to advance in a single bound which from 1000 yards on the right fell away to less than
400 yards on the left. Objectives of the 2nd Division, making the main effort astride the Albert-Bapaume road, were the
defences in front of Courcelette. These included Candy Trench (which ran north-west from Martinpuich), the strongly
fortified ruins of a sugar factory beside the Bapaume road, and some 1500 yards of Sugar Trench, which cut across Candy.
On the left Major-General Lipsett's 3rd Division, its front held by the 8th Brigade, was charged with providing flank
protection.3

Remains of the sugar refinery on the Somme, photographed in September 1917. (LAC photo)

A total of 49 tanks were available for the operation, and the Reserve Army's total allotment of seven were given to General
Turner. The Canadians organized them into two detachments of three vehicles each, with the remaining tank in reserve.
One detachment moved on the right with the 4th Brigade, ordered to advance at top speed through a gap in the barrage
astride the road to Bapaume and tasked to engage German machine guns in Martinpuich and the sugar factory. On the
left, the other detachment supported the 6th Brigade by advancing behind the barrage, assisted in "mopping up" and
attacked machine guns in the sugar factory or Courcelette as needed. Five infantrymen were assigned to every tank to pull
casualties out of their way.

Attack on Courcelette 15 September 1916

The attack was launched at 6:20 a.m. on 15 September, the din of the rolling barrage joined by a new, unfamiliar sound as
the tanks ground forward. The German 45th Reserve Division put up heavy resistance but their front line nonetheless fell in
just fifteen minutes, falling under the weight of the artillery fire. On the Canadian right, the 4th Brigade's trio of assault
battalions were on their positions by 7:00 a.m. and the 21st Battalion had taken 145 prisoners from the sugar factory. At
7:30 a.m. the 6th Brigade to the left was reporting success as well, holding firm in Sugar Trench. 4 General Byng ordered the
attack pressed forward at 6:00 p.m., the soonest possible time artillery could be arranged. Two battalions of the 5th
Brigade advanced to the far end of Courcelette following a hand-to-hand fight with German outposts, then came under
repeated counter-attack, the 22nd Battalion fighting off seven such assaults during the night, and more again the next
day.5
The first use of the tank had brought mixed results. The Germans had been encouraged to surrender, complaining that
their use was "not war but bloody butchery." All six tanks assigned to the Canadians were put out of action, however,
either becoming mired, breaking down mechanically, or being lost to shellfire. Only one of the six reached the objective,
and one had failed to even reach the start line. Of the 32 tanks on the 4th Army front, only 10 were with the infantry and
able to assist on the objective, and the remained were mired or mechanical failures (due to the heavily cratered ground and
heavy use in demonstrations before the battle) as well as losses to artillery fire. There had been, in fact, little actual study
as to how to best deploy armour tactically, and strategically, the unveiling of this secret weapon seems to have been
mishandled.

It seems a questionable procedure to have distributed the machines piecemeal along the battle front, thereby removing
them from the tank company commanders' control. Properly coordinated action of artillery, tanks and infantry was still to
be learned...Mr. Winston Churchill records that he was shocked when he learned from Mr. Lloyd George of a War Office
this tremendous secret to the enemy upon such a petty scale". He made a fruitless appeal to Mr. Asquith, have the
introduction of tanks into operations postponed until they could be employed in tactically profitable (ways). 6

Detail from Map 6 of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War showing employment of tanks at
Courcelette on 15 September 1916.

Fabeck Graben and Zollern Graben: 15-20 September 1916

On the left the 8th Brigade of the 3rd Division was also successful in its attack attack in front of Mouquet Farm. The 7th
Brigade also had mixed success. The 42nd Battalion reached their new line without trouble, but per Corps orders had
attacked without prior reconnaissance. The P.P.C.L.I. was required to advance on the right through a shattered landscape
in which all landmarks had been destroyed by shellfire. The Patricias managed to reach the Fabeck Graben despite heavy
small arms fire and kept contact with the 5th Brigade in Courcelette. A 200-yard stretch of German trench remained
occupied by Germans while on the far left the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles of the 8th Brigade secured another sector of
the Fabeck Graben despite enfilade fire from Mouquet Farm and heavy shelling. The 49th Battalion bounded forward to
secure chalk pits beyond the Fabeck Graben after 8:00 p.m. though the nearby trench line remained in German hands. The
1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade had provided almost continual cover fire from their Vickers Guns. German counter-attacks
came throughout the night while engineers worked to shore up communications trenches and strongpoints.

The 2nd British Corps to the left of the Canadian Corps managed to gain 400 yards, pushing closer to Thiepval. On the right,
however, the 4th Army managed to break through the German Third Position on a front 4,500 yards wide to take Flers and
Martinpuich, but Morval, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt remained in enemy hands, while farther south the French 6th Army
floundered and made little progress.

The Zollern Graben, a long trench, lay 1,000 yards beyond Mouquet Farm, with the Zollern Redoubt forming its midpoint.
This strongpoint lay on high ground on the crest of the ridge and was one of the major features of the German Second
Position. Zollern Graben climbed the western slope from Thiepval and joined the Fabeck Graben half a mile west of
Courcelette. Troops in the Redoubt could hit adjoining trenches with heavy enfilading machine gun fire. Both Zollern
Graben and the Redoubt were the objective of a surprise attack by the 3rd Canadian Division on 16 September.

The 7th Brigade would strike northwards from Fabeck Graben to Zollern Graben in order to secure a line from which the
9th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. F.W. Hill) might attack the redoubt from the east. But the first phase failed (for the opening
bombardment had overshot the objective) and Brigadier Hill's attack had to be cancelled. In the meantime, bombing
parties from the two battalions of the 7th Brigade on either side of the break in Fabeck  Graben had worked their way
inward on the German stronghold and sealed the gap, taking some sixty prisoners. The end of enemy resistance here was
hastened by the action of Private J.C. Kerr (49th Battalion) who, though wounded, ran alone along the top of the trench,
firing down upon the defenders and killing several; this heroism earned him the Victoria Cross. The 2nd Canadian Mounted
Rifles attacked Mouquet Farm with apparent success. That night troops of the 2nd British Corps began to relieve the
Canadians, the 34th Brigade (11th Division) taking over the farm. It turned out, however, that the German garrison, far
from being annihilated had taken refuge in tunnels. The 34th Brigade finally secured the troublesome position on the 26th. 7

Rain fell over the next few days, restricting activity by both sides. The Germans reinforced the trenches due east of
Courcelette with fresh troops, and an attack on 17 September by the 5th Brigade consequently failed. The 1st Division took
over General Turner's sector the next day, and on the night of 19-20 September fought off two German counter-attacks on
Courcelette. In a dawn raid on 20 September, two battalions of the 3rd Division (43rd and 58th) managed to secure a hold
in the Zollern Graben but were quickly counter-attacked by fresh German troops utilizing a smoke-screen. After a morning-
long battle the Germans regained most of what they had lost, though the eastern stretch of trenches remained in Canadian
control. The 1st Battalion managed to advanced 500 yards on a half-mile front east of Courcelette on 22 September,
capturing front-line trench positions from the Germans there.

In its first major operation at the Somme the Canadian Corps had acquitted itself with credit, though the week's fighting
had cost 7230 casualties. "The result of the fighting of the 15th September and following days", wrote Sir Douglas Haig in
his despatch, "was a gain more considerable than any which had attended our arms in the course of a single operation
since the commencement of the offensive." Breaking through two of the enemy's main defensive systems, Allied troops had
advanced on a front of six miles to an average depth of a mile and captured three large villages which the enemy had
organized for a prolonged resistance. Yet the main objectives were still untaken. The way to Bapaume was blocked by the
strongly defended villages of Monal, Lesboeufs and Gueudecourt, and the enemy still held Combles and Thiepval at either
end of the ridge. Bad weather and a shortage of ammunition for the French artillery postponed a renewal of the offensive
until the 25th. The next phase was to be known as the Battle of Morval on the Fourth Army front, and by the Reserve Army
as the Battle of Thiepval Ridge.8

Morval and Lesboeufs fell on the 25th while Gueudecourt held out an additional day, prompting the Germans to withdraw
from Combles. The Morval battle gained a belt of ground 2,000 yards wide on average, necessitating the capture of
Thiepval to bring the left flank into line and move the Germans off the ridge. The task fell to the Reserve Army.

In all, Flers-Courcelette had been far more successful than any British operation during the previous two months. If the
employment of the newest weapon of war - the tank - had been premature, work was continuing on other weapons and
methods also:

It is clear from the detailed orders and careful training of the assault divisions that tactical lessons from earlier operations
were being incorporated into planning and preparation. Artillery technique was developing, even if Fourth Army's
bombardment was not yet being prepared with the meticulous calculations of shells-per-metre of Sixth Army's gunners. By
mid-September, Fourth Army had received many more heavy guns...The barrage would be twice as concentrated as that of
1 July, although only half as heavy as that of 14 July. Moreover, artillery technique was becoming much more sophisticated,
with high-explosive shells used to cut wire, gas shells (fired by British guns for the first time) for neutralisation of enemy
artillery, long-range interdiction fire, and a creeping shrapnel barrage - at a lower speed and with a greater concentration
of shell - all employed to disrupt the enemy's response and fire the infantry on to their objectives. 9

Battle Honours

The Battle Honour "Flers-Courcelette" was awarded to units for participation in these actions.