7.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC v POEA (1988)

Facts:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the
petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not
an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of
the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and
P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA
pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring
of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National
Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it
had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the
first place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to
the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this
employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment
contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said
circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the
State.

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

Issue: Whether Memo Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power?

Held: No, it is not violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power because Memorandum
Circular No. 2 has a sufficient standard (under the Sufficient Standard Test) guiding the delegate in the
exercise of said authority, which sufficient standard is seen in the creation of POEA mandating it to protect
the rights of the overseas Filipino workers to “fair and equitable employment practices”

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797,
reading as follows:... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself
prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of
the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide
the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in'
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued
by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby
has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the
POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is
a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable
in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42
since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In
addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against
the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen
under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that—

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—

 1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician

c. P130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from,
and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws....

3. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the
seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with
the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class
and the promotion of its interest.

(One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied
due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and
applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two
basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing
rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples
abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its
own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent
Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of
Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an
arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative
of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.)

8. TABLARIN v GUTIERREZ (1987)

DOCTRINE: The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the
reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great
departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes.

Principle of subordinate legislation provides that while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency are necessarily broad and highly abstract.

Facts:

The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education (B.M.E) and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 also known as the “MEDICAL ACT OF 1959”, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled
on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial
court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.

According to the petitioners it is against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power to the BME. Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of RA 2382 is against the constitutional principle which forbids undue
delegation of legislative power to the Board of Medical Education.

Held:

No, the congress grants the Board of Medical Education under R.A 2382the power to promulgate
rules and regulations and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) the
examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of
medicine in the Philippines.

It is only limited to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The general
principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental
rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government,1 must be
applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as
obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day
world.

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.People v. Exconde, 101 Phil 1125
(1957)
 The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. "

Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The
Public Service Commission:2

One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that
is that the maxim of delegatus non potestdelegare or delegate potestas non potestdelegare, adopted
this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press,
1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil.
318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward
the approval of the practice by the courts." 3

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then
Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit
upon the roads. 5

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical
Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act,
the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate
end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
9. VIOLA v ALUNAN III (1997)

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, Section 1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers so far
as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors for the National Liga
ng mga Barangay and its chapters. The provisions in question read:

S1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal, City, Metropolitan and Provincial Chapters shall
directly elect the following officers and directors to constitute their respective Board of
Directors, namely:

1.1 President
1.2 Executive Vice-President
1.3 First Vice-President
1.4 Second Vice-President
1.5 Third Vice-President
1.6 Auditor
1.7 Five (5) Directors

S2. National Liga. The National Liga shall directly elect the following officers and directors to
constitute the National Liga Board of Directors namely:

2.1 President
2.2 Executive Vice-President
2.3 First Vice-President
2.4 Second Vice-President
2.5 Third Vice-President
2.6 Secretary General
2.7 Auditor
2.8 Five (5) Directors

Petitioner's contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those provided in the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), S493 of which mentions as elective positions only those of president,
vice president, and five members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner argues that, in providing for the positions of
first, second and third vice presidents and auditor for each chapter, §§1-2 of the Implementing Rules expand
the number of positions authorized in §493 of the Local Government Code in violation of the principle that
implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to
implement.

Petitioner's contention that the additional positions in question have been created without authority of law is
untenable.

Issue: Whether the creation of additional position granted to the board results to an undue delegation of
legislative power?

Held: No, because the Congress can delegate the power to the board to create such positions.

Under Section 493 of the LGC it provides that:

“S493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, Metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer
and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected form among the members of the national liga
 and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on the national level. The board
shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.”

This provision in fact requires — and not merely authorizes the board of directors to "create such other
positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter" and belies petitioner's claim that
said provision (§493) limits the officers of a chapter to the president, vice president, five members of the
board of directors, secretary, and treasurer. That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such
as these has been settled by our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
President of the Philippines to create, abolish or merge officers in the executive department.2 The question
is whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board of directors of each chapter of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice Cardozo, administrative
discretion may be "canalized within proper banks that keep it from overflowing."3

Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and changes in
government owned or controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and
efficiency"4 in their operations and empowering the Secretary of Education to prescribe minimum standards
of "adequate and efficient instruction" 5 in private schools and colleges have been found to be sufficient for
the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases, we hold that §493 of the Local Government Code,
in directing the board of directors of the liga to "create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for
the management of the chapter[s]," embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of
power by Congress.

Hence, the creation of other elective positions which may be deemed necessary for the management of the
chapter is within the purview of Section 493.

10. ABAKADA vs ERMITA

Facts:

For resolution are the various motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision upholding the
constitutionality of RA No. 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. The motions are filed by petitioners in GR No.
168463, Escudero, et al., in GR No. 168730 by Bataan Governor Garcia and in GR No. 168461 by
petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers Inc. Respondents filed their consolidated comment and
petitioner Garcia filed his reply. Petitioners Escudero, et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee
should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House
Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Escudero, et. al., also contend that
Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills
under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected
with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the Executive
to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power
given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and
evaluation, as well as policy making.

Issue:

Whether there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Executive's standby authority
especially on account of his recommendatory power.
Ruling:

No there is no undue delegation of the legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of
the law.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the
two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by
which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to
gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is
to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions
laid out by Congress is present. Congress granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national government deficit as
a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%). If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to
the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006.
CONGRESS DOES NOT ABDICATE ITS FUNCTIONS OR UNDULY DELEGATE POWER WHEN IT
DESCRIBES WHAT JOB MUST BE DONE, WHO MUST DO IT, AND WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF HIS
AUTHORITY; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the
task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to use the GDP as a
benchmark to determine economic growth is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task
being to interpret the law.

11. BELTRAN v SECRETARY OF HEALTH (2005)

Facts:

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law in 1994. It seeks to
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country.

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides:

“All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of 2 years after the effectivity of this
Act, extendable to a maximum period of 2 years by the Secretary."

Consequently, the Secretary of DOH promulgated the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law. It is
provided in the IRR that the DOH shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of
two 2 years and the decision to extend for another 2 years shall be based on the result of a careful study
and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.
Years prior to the passage of RA 7719, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks
under Republic Act No. 1517. This law allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of
blood banks and blood processing laboratories.

Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when
AIDS was first described in 1979. In response to this, the International Society of Blood Transfusion
formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion.

In 1994, based on a study of the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), it was shown that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that most of the donors of commercial blood banks are paid
donors. On the other hand, blood donors of government-run hospitals are mostly voluntary. The study
further found that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have
infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases like malaria, Hepatitis B and AIDS.

So, when RA 7719 was passed and the subsequent issuance of its IRR by the Secretary of Health, the
petitioners consisting of commercial blood banks and other intervenors challenged the constitutionality of
Section 7 of RA 7719 and it’s IRR. They contend that:

1. The phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an
improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was
incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the
Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions.
2. The law and its IRR violate the equal protection clause because it unduly discriminates against
commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.
3. The phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect their
businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the
Act violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.

Held:

FIRST CONTENTION: NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood
banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary
of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The authority of Secretary of Health to promulgate IRR for the act is clearly defined under Section 11 of RA
7719 which provides that the implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within 60 days from the approval hereof.

SECOND CONTENTION: EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality
shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers
and commercial blood banks.
 1. The act was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons
and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly
encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
2. The classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the
purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity.
3. The Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to
address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing
conditions.
4. The law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

THIRD CONTENTION: NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS

It has be held settled in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, that the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The
right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of
regulation.

Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may
require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.

In the instant case, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power
in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern.

Lastly, it has been found that commercial blood banking is not safe because a donor who expects payment
for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual
promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS.

12. CHIONGBIAN v ORBOS (1995)

Facts:

This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition brought by members of Congress representing the
legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City.
They challenged the validity of a provision of R.A. No. 6734 or Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination
the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region.

Congress passed R.A. No. 6734 pursuant to Art. X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution calling for a
plebiscite to be held in 12 provinces and 8 cities in Mindanao plus the province of Palawan and the city of
Puerto Princessa.
Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanaodel Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

With respect to those that did not vote for the inclusion in Autonomous Region, Art. 19, Section 13 of R.A.
No. 6734 provides that they shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Pursuant to this provision, then President Aquino issued EO 429 which provided for the Reorganization of
the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Thus:

1. Misamis Occidental became part of Region IX.

2. Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City became parts of Region IX.
3. South Cotobato became part of Region XII.
4. General Santos City, became part of Region XII.
5. Lanaodel Norte became part of Region IX.
6. Iligan City and Marawi City became part of Region IX.

Before the petitioners brought the matter to the SC, the first wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No.
429. But it was unheeded.

In their petition to the SC, they contend that:

1. Sec. 13, Art. 19, R.A. 6734 is specific to the point that the provinces and cities which did not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions.

2. The President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include
the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory construction. Moreover,
while this reorganization does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the
same is not valid under Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and ordinance appended to the 1986
Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of Congress to the different
legislative districts in provinces and cities.

3. Art. 19, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power
to the President by authorizing him to "merge the existing regions" which provides no standard for
the exercise of the power delegated.

The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 stating that:

1. It is a mere incident of the President’s power of general supervision over local governments and
control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, Section 16 and Art. VII, Section
17.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide
the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them.

3. P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides that the President shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the National Government.
SC Ruling:

The Supreme Court, in resolving the issue, recalled and discussed the nature of administrative regions and
the basis and purpose for their creation.

In 1968, the President was authorized, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the
different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government,
including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it by virtue of R.A. No.
5435. The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government."

Thus, when the President merged and reorganized the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to RA 6734, he merely followed the pattern set in
previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.

Thus, a legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. It does not also
necessary be in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as
that of the challenged legislation.

In the instant case, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in
R.A. No. 5435 which is "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to
pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to
improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Lastly, the contention of the petitioners that
the authority of the President under RA 6734 does not include reorganization is bereft of merit. RA 6734
provides that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means
that while these provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the
Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions
as the exigency of administration may require.
14. ARROYO v DOJ (2013)

Facts:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the
necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by
the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering
real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be
conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 7 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint
Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.

In its Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that petitioner
Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for
conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be
subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that
Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-
2011.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against
petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-
Comelec Case No. 002-2011.

Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject
joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Echoing Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, Mike
Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.

Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by
the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his
earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral sabotage
case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch of the government.

In their Consolidated Comment, respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue that it
does not undermine the independence of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still the
Comelec that ultimately determines probable cause. As to the conduct of the preliminary investigation,
respondents maintain that no rights were violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity to defend herself,
submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence. They, thus, consider GMA’s claim of availing
of the remedial measures as "delaying tactics" employed to thwart the investigation of charges against her
by the Joint Committee.

Issue: Whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws?

Held:

No, because the power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws is also granted
inother prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ. In the case ofBarangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections, it was
quoted that:

“the constitutionality of Section 43 of RA 9369 had already been raised by petitioners therein and
addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment
that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369.”

Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses.

Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such
as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:

x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another
office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases
filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

xxxx

None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves
agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation
was conducted on the basis of two complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint
of Senator Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints
were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we
find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is
especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint
preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the
DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause
for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an
abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

15. PEOPLE v VERA (1937)

Facts:

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the
actuations against respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng andmore particularly the application of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221.

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu
Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs.
Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No.
41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of
Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

Section 11 of Act No. 4221 provides that “This Act shall apply only in those provinces inwhich the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.”

On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution and concludes
that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent by rational doubt "es inocente por dudaracional"
of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court, but denying the latter's petition for probation.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system
of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional
because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its
province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective
provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of
the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine
Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly

In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act
No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: While the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for
that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative
power?

Held:

Yes, because the power to make laws is vested in a unicameral National Assembly by the
Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National
Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestasdelegata non delegarepotestwhich meanswhat has been delegated, cannot be further
delegated.

For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the
agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to
administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here
adopted.

In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary
power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What
standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards
any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the
language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature
does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces
but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words,
the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of
any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.

It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of
details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to
carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient.

The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate
or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to
determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial
boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by
appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what
may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259;
12 C. J., p. 786.)

We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted.
Without any pronouncement regarding costs.

16. ABAKADA v PURISIMA (2008)

Facts:

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless
of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the
excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or
his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her
Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release
of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by
the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the
issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and
issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. Among others, they contend that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates
the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed
upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

Whether the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks sufficient
standard on the matter.

Whether the creation of congressional oversight committee is unconstitutional?

Held: No. 1.

No, because there is sufficient standard present, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue –
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with “public interest”.

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the President to fix
revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the
Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to
Accrue to the Fund

30% or below – 15%

More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for
a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by
the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’
revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in
the case of the BOC. (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President
as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under
which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be
removed from the service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under
this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural
due process except those exemptions provided by law.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for
the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the
application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act;

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.31
In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties,
a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service
laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
The Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with
public interest.

Held: No 2.

Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least
two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed
by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and
therefore cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence,
the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may
be considered moot and academic.

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century,
Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative
agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three
categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its
primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to
conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Art VI.

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny
and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-
making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the
force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of
a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering
the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the
provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional
Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law
but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The
Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under
the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation)
to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design
or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its
legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. In the latter
case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake
of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such,
they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are
set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the
role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the
provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this
Court by the Constitution.

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is
wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the
executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the
executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law. Following this
rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006
in two newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless the
contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in
force and effect.