Yap-Paras vs. Justo Paras A.C.

# 4947, February 14, 2005

FACTS: Rosa Yap-Paras (Petitioner) filed a case against Atty. Justo Paras (respondent) praying
for the disbarment of the latter, accusing that he committed acts of deceit, malpractice, grave
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter.
The respondent was found guilty by the SC of falsehood and suspended him from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a similar offense committed in the future
will yield a harsher penalty.

The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the court as per his suspension. During its
pendency, petitioner filed a Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment under the ground that Atty.
Paras did not heed the SC’s suspension order and was still practicing his legal profession.
Eventually, the MR was denied by the SC and asked respondent to comment on the current
motion filed against him by the petitioner within 10 days. The respondent filed a Manifestation
with the court after more than a year, stating that he has already complied with the 1-year
suspension. In response, the SC issued another resolution that compels respondent to explain
why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the previous resolution.
Respondent replied by denying the previous allegations made by petitioner that he was engaged
in the practice of law during his suspension.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred for violating the SC’s suspension order
by practicing his legal profession during his suspension period.

(2) Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred by failing to file a comment on time as
demanded by the SC.

HELD:

• (1) NO. The SC found no factual basis on the petitioner’s allegations that the respondent
practiced law during his suspension. Respondent even took the initiative to inform the
lower courts of his one-year suspension from the practice of law, as the SC noted.

• (2) NO. While it is clear that resolutions of the SC are not mere requests that can be
brushed aside or partially complied with and that the SC’s authority should always be
respected and observed, the SC held that the respondent’s failing health and surgical
operations that he underwent are reasonable excuses for him to not be able to file his
comment on time. Moreover, the SC took note that respondent expressed his profound
regret and immeasurable sorrow for not being able to comply with the court’s order. 

Hence, a REPRIMAND with WARNING was deemed sufficient punishment by the SC for
respondent’s failures, coupled with a reminder that a more drastic punishment shall be
meted out accordingly if such offense shall be repeated by the respondent.

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Wilfredo T. Garcia, Complainant, v. Atty.
Beniamino A. Lopez, Respondent | Adm. Case No.
6422 | 28 August 2007

November 12, 2017

Facts:
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina Sarmiento, applicant in
LRC Case No. 05-M-96 which was pending in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15. Sarmiento sought the registration and
confirmation of her title over a 376,397 sq. m. tract of land. This was granted
by the court.
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court and ultimately, the RTC
decision was upheld. The decision became final and executory and the RTC,
in an order dated 21 February 2002, directed the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to issue the decree of registration and certificate of title.
The LRA failed to comply, prompting the complainant to file an urgent
motion to cite the LRA administrator or his representative in contempt of
court. Hearings were scheduled.
On 19 September 2002, respondent, claiming to be the counsel of the heirs of
Sarmiento, filed his entry of appearance and motion for postponement.

Complainant alleged that he was surprised by this, considering that he had

not withdrawn from the case. He contended that respondent should be
sanctioned for misrepresenting to the court that he was the counsel of all the
heirs of Sarmiento and omitting to mention that complainant was the counsel
of record. According to him, his attorney's fee was arranged on a contingent
basis and therefore, the attempt of respondent to enter his appearance at the
final stage of the proceedings was tantamount to unfair harvesting of the fruit
of complainant's labors since 1996.

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It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by the following compulsory heirs:
Gina Jarvia (Angelina's daughter by her common-law husband Victor Jarvia),
Alfredo, Zenaida, Wilson, Jeanette and Geneva, all surnamed Ku (Angelina's
children by her husband prior to her relationship with Victor). Complainant
presented an affidavit executed by Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku wherein they
stated that they did not engage the services of respondent and that they
recognized complainant as their only counsel of record.
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was merely representing Zenaida
and Wilson Ku who sought his help on September 19, 2002 and told him that
they wanted to retain his services. They allegedly did not have a lawyer to
represent them in a hearing scheduled the next day. Because of the scheduled
hearing, he had to immediately file an entry of appearance with motion for
postponement. He asserted that it was an honest mistake not to have listed the
names of his clients. He claimed it was not deliberate and did not prejudice
anyone. He insisted that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself to the
court.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The investigating commissioner,
Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes, in his report and recommendation dated 8 January
2004, found respondent guilty of misrepresentation and violation of Rule
8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to
specify in his entry of appearance the individuals he was representing. He
recommended that respondent be strongly reprimanded for his act with a
reminder that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with
more severely. This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution passed on 27 February 2004.

Issue:
Was the respondent violated the Canons 8 and 10, and Rules 8.02 and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held:

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Yes, the respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the original applicant. Upon her
death, the attorney-client relationship was terminated. However, complainant
was retained as counsel by Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of
appearance with motion of postponement in behalf of the compulsory heirs of
the late Angelita Sarmiento when in truth he was merely representing some of
the heirs but not all of them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation
which could have deceived the court. He had no authorization to represent all
the heirs. He clearly violated his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court.
Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules. He made it appear that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for all the heirs of Sarmiento which
was highly unfair to complainant who had worked on the case from the very
beginning (i.e. since 1996) and who had not been discharged as such. It is
true that without the formal withdrawal of complainant as counsel of record,
respondent would merely be considered as collaborating counsel.
Nevertheless, by being less than candid about whom he was representing,
respondent undeniably encroached upon the legal functions of complainant as
the counsel of record.
The court ordered the respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) month for violating Canons 8 and 10, Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is warned that the commission of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

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 LEDA v. ATTY. TABANG (A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)

FACTS: Evangeline Leda (complainant) challenges Atty. TrebonianTabang’s (respondent) good

moral character in two complaints she filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78
instituted on January 6, 1982 and the case at hand. It appears that complainant and respondent
contracted a marriage in Tigbauan, Iloilo on October 3, 1976 under as one of the exceptional
character under Article 76 of the Civil Code. The parties agreed to keep their marriage a secret
until respondent had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar examinations. Complainant
admits that they have not lived together as husband and wife. After respondent’s law studies and
bar examinations, complainant blocked his oath-taking (by instituting Bar Matter No. 78)
claiming that respondent had acted fraudulently when he filled out his application declaring he
was “single” and is thus unworthy to take the lawyer’s Oath for lack of good moral character.
Respondent filed his explanation claiming that he was “legally married” to complainant but the
marriage was not yet made and declared public so that he may finish his studies as well as take
the bar exams and he therefore believed that he was still single. Respondent also alleged that he
and the complainant has reconciled and prayed that the case be dismissed (on the ground that
complainant confirmed with his explanation as evidence by the affidavit of desistance made by
complainant) which was granted by the Court on August 20, 1982. However, on February 14,
1983, complainant filed an Administrative case and prayed for respondent’s disbarment on the
grounds that: Respondent used his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage; he
mirepresented himself in his application to take the bar exam; lack of good moral character; and
that complainant was deceived into signing the affidavit of desistance and that the only reason
why he reconciled with her is so that she would withdraw the complaint against him.
Complainant also claimed that respondent sent her a letter which proves all of her allegations
where the respondent states that their marriage was actually void form the beginning.
Respondent denied that he had sent such letter. On March 26, 1984, the Bar Confidant’s report
recommended indefinite suspension of respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. TrebonianTabang violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: The court held that Atty. TrebonianTabangis guilty of violating Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is thus suspended from the practice of law until further
notice.The Court held that respondent’s “declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981
Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in
utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the
Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have
disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of
good moral character.”

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A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, 


vs.

SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

FACTS:

DIAO was admitted to the Bar. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications.

Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of
attorneys

i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College

3. Never obtained a diploma.

DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma

Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious:

i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.

ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949

1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his

school records.

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ISSUE:

WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-
law requirements? NO.

HELD:

STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN

HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.

Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.

Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.

He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully
and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).

ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations

iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.

Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

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[A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS WTF THE FACTS ARE GIBBERISH HAHAHA

Villalon is the family lawyer of ducats. the original title of ducat sr was handed to villalon. The
handing over has two contradictory versions of reason, first because it is given as part of process
to convey the land because of the good services of villalon as villalon claimed, on the other hand,
allegedly because the latter

reasoned that he shall check the measurements of the land subject of title as alleged by ducat jr.
Ducat sr allegedly because of his want to give the land to villalon executed a deed of sale of the
land in favor of villalon. But because it was discovered that the land is registered in the name of
ducat jr,a deed of sale was forged to make it appear that there was one, ducusin was the notary
public there

Issue:

Ruling: villalon is guilty of gross misconduct for being involved in fraudulent notarization and
forgery of signature. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor. 1 yr suspension

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ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant,

vs.

ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.

FACTS:

Roman Maligsa charged the respondent, Atty. Arsenio Cabanting for the conduct of unbecoming
of a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated MAY 5, 1992.

The said DEED of QUITCLAIM was executed by one IRENE MALIGSA, in favor of Juanito
Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Pangasinan. The said document was notarized by
respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against
complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with
prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus
damages

IRENE MALIGSA died in APRIL 21, 1992, (16) days earlier before the execution of the DEED
of QUITCLAIM on MAY 5, 1992. Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because
she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered."

Contention of the Complainant:

It would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have
executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its
authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the same date, affiant having died on
21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance
of the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent must be penalized for his acts in the notarized quitclaim.

9
RULING:

The Court ruled in favor of the complainant. The Court found that Atty. Cabanting is guilty of
grave misconduct on which he is DISBARRED from the profession. Atty Cabanting committed
an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state

Atty. Cabanting was given a graver penalty as he was already given a (6) months suspension in
the practice of law and a warning by the Court as he has committed a previous offense against
the Art II of the Code of Professional Ethics and Art 1491 of the New Civil Code. In the previous
offense, Atty. Cabanting has purchased his client’s property which is still in certiorari
proceeding.

The Court said with regard to the practice of Notary Public:

“Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial
degree and protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and the
administrative offices generally. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a
public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.”

The respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.
Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now
accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of
notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an Acknowledgment.

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer
brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from
doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.

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Dallong-Galicinao v. Castro A.C. No. 6396, 25 October 2005

Facts: Atty. Castro, a private practitioner, went to the office of Atty. Dallong-Galicinao, the clerk
of court of Bambang (Nueva Vizcaya) RTC, to inquire whether the complete records of a civil
case had already been remanded to the court of origin. Atty. Castro was not the counsel of record
of either party in the said civil case. When denied such request, Atty. Castro hurled invectives at
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao which caused the same to file a complaint-affidavit against the former
for unprofessional conduct. Due to Atty. Castro’s public apology, Atty. Dallong-Galicinao
expressed her desire not to appear on the next hearing.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable.

Decision: Yes. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the
parties to represent them, Atty. Castro has no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Although the penalty should be tempered since Atty. Castro apologized and Atty. Dallong-
Galicinao accepted it. This is not to say that Atty. Castro should be absolved of his actuations.
Atty. Castro is ordered fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that any similar
infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

Case Title: Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao vs Atty. Virgil R. Castro

G.R. Number & Date: A.C. No. 6396. October 25, 2005.

Nature of the Case: Administrative Case against Atty. Castro

Petitioners: Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya.

Respondents: Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya
Chapter.

Facts:

o On May 8, 2003: Complainant filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
a complaint-affidavit with supporting documents against Atty. Castro for Unprofessional
Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

o On May 5, 2003: Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the complete
records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano
and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte,
Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in
the said civil case.

o Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified
true copy of the decision of the CA should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal
of records to the court of origin.

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o Respondent retorted scornfully and angrily shouted at the complainant in Ilokano. He then
turned and left the office banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the
door was so loud that it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing
was taking place.

o After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office and still enraged and pointed his finger
at complainant and shouted kinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak
ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire
on me!) The complainant respondent by saying that “Sir, I don’t even know your client.”

o Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of

which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been
tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.

o At the hearing for the administrative complaint, respondent filed a manifestation stating the
reason why he wasn’t able to attend the hearing (he was still recovering from the physical
injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings due to an incident in
which his vehicle was rained with bullets). He also expressed his public apology in his
manifestation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Castro is guilty of unprofessional conduct specifically in violation
of Canons 7 and 8, Rules 7.03 and 8.02 of the CPR?

FALLO: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of

TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of the respondent.

HELD: YES. First of all, Atty. Castro was not even a counsel of record of the said civil case he
was inquiring about with the complainant. Had he been the counsel of record, it would have been
easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the CA. Respondent
had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Through his acts, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of
record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith. Respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering
that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.

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As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco, respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public
behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public
respect for it. These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice
law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably,
fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all
times.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that
respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences
of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done
cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the
consequences of his actions.

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41 - Linsangan v. Tolentino (2009) (stealing clients) Doctrines:

ï A lawyer should not steal another lawyer”s client, nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.

Facts: Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office filed a disbarment
complaint against Atty. Tolentino. He alleged that Tolentino is guilty of solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Linsangan claimed that Tolentino and his paralegal,
Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Linsangan said that Tolentino
promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. Tolentino
apparently called and texted Linsangan”s clients.

To support his allegations, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to convince him to sever his association with Linsangan and employ
Tolentino”s services and even be able to get a loan of P50,000. Linsangan also presented
Labiano”s calling card which specifically states, “w/ financial assistance”.

Tolentino denied knowing Labiano and the printing and circulation of the said calling cared in
his answer. However, he later admitted that he knew her during the mandatory hearing.

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that Tolentino encroached on the
professional practice of Linsangan, violating Rule 8.02. He also contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain. The CBD recommended that Tolentino be reprimanded with a stern
warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

Issues: 1. W/N the Tolentino should be disbarred?

Held/Ratio:

1. NO. HOWEVER, the SC held that he should be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

Rule 8.02 requires that “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer”. Tolentino violated such canon. The means employed by
Tolentino in furtherance of such misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical
rules. A lawyer should not steal another lawyer”s client, nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Tolentino never denied
having Linsangan”s clients in his own client list. He also did not deny Labiano”s connection to
his office. Hence, Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep in another”s legal
practice.

The SC also noted that Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, 16.04 and Canon 3 of the CPR, and
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The SC also reminded lawyers what professional
cards should contain: (1) lawyer”s name, (2) name of firm with which he is connected, (3)
address, (4) telephone number, and (5) special branch of law practiced.

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39 - Camacho v. Pangulayan (2000)

Doctrine: ï Canon 9 provides that “A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the
subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a
party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.”

Facts: Atty. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers of the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices (Attys. Pangulayan, Balmores, Laurel, Bustos). Camacho, counsel of some expelled
students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), charged that the Pangulayan lawyers, as
counsel for AMACC, procured separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise
agreements (“Re-Admission Agreements”) with 4 of his clients which, in effect, required them to
waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, terminating all civil, criminal
and administrative proceedings filed against it.

The students were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE and caused to be published
some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal
was immediately convened found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and
unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The erring students were then expelled.

Atty. Pangulayan stated that none of his co-respondents had taken part in the various Re-
Admission Agreements and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan
and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements had nothing to do with the dismissal
of the civil case and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving the 9 students of AMACC who were expelled.

After being furnished with execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements,
Judge Lopez dismissed the case.

Issue: 1. W/N Atty. Pangulayan acted in accordance with ethical standards for procuring said
agreements

Held/Ratio: 1. NO. It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were formalized, Camacho was by then already the retained counsel for
the students in the civil case. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel,
Pangulayan proceeded to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer who was counsel of record. The failure of Pangulayan,
whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of
professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. He fell short of the
demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The Court concurred with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in
their findings but found the recommended 6-month suspension too harsh a penalty and shortened
it to 3-months. The case against the other respondents is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

15
CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN

VITUG; March 22, 2000

(kiyo miura)

NATURE

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional

Ethics

FACTS

- 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of
DATALINE, allegedly published certain objectionable features

- the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were expelled

- the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case
calling for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their
counsel and Pangulayan and associates representing the defendant, AMACC

- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements were separately
executed by and/or in behalf of the students by their parents

- following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among other things,
that 4 of the students had acknowledged their guilt and agreed to terminate all proceedings

- apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission agreements through

negotiations with said students and their parents without communicating with Camacho

ISSUE: WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics

HELD

YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states:

“A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and
he should not undertake to advise him as to law.”

- respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague

- the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and
dismissed the case against the other respondents since they took no part in it

- the court concurred with IBP’s findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months

16
MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.

Facts : Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special
Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over her minor brothers. Upon qualifying
as such, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common with the
wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umañgay. The request
was granted by Judge Villamor. A deed of sale was prepared and notarized by Atty. Fernandez
which was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umañgay for the sum of P1, 000.
This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952.

The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo
Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay by Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the
guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay
were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000,
P200.00 was paid to Atty. Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee of the
credit in favor of Maximiano Umañgay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given to
said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of
the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments were
authorized by the court.

Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show
cause why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and
money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea Perreyras, the court issued another order
exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that
made to Atty. Fernandez, and requiring him and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why they
should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same
order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with the guardian and
having taken money from her without previous approval of the court.

Issue : Whether or not Atty. Fernandez erroneous act disqualifies him from claiming his
Attorney’s fee.

Held : As a lawyer, the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of
the wards are under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and
expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money taken was to pay
the debt of the father of the wards. Petitioner deserves the reprimand for mistakes he committed
however, the mistake is not a sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully
earned and which his client could not pay before his death.

The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also
their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Thus, it is justifiable for Atty.
Fernandez to claim such amount.

17
The judge in this case also desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be
stricken out for employing strong language. The court believes that said strong language must
have been impelled by the same language used by the presiding judge in characterizing the act of
the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee
"through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any one is to blame for the
language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his
orders, which must have provoked petitioner, and the presiding judge has nothing to blame but
himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he
who sows the wind will reap a storm

18
CASE 16: Yared v. Ilarde

FACTS: Estrella Yared, substituted by Carmen Tiongco because the former is now dead, and
Jose Tiongco were opposing parties to a property in litigation. Carmen directly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Supreme Court because Judge Ilarde of the RTC ordered the cancellation
of annotation of notices of lis pendens. The Supreme Court noticed and commented that Carmen
has failed to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy and that she should have filed the
petition in the CA first.

However, the Supreme Court also noticed the improper and unethical language employed by
Jose Tiangco, who was also a counsel for the private respondents, in his pleadings and motions
filed both in SC and lower court. He described the counsel of the petitioner, Atty. Marciana
Deguma, ―a rambunctious wreastler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not
red, and who stampedes into the court room like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to
conceal her faulty grammar.ǁ Jose Tiongco alleged that Atty. Deguma does that ―to please and
tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available Carmelo Tiongco, an unmarried
mestizo who lives with Carmen.ǁ He further described Atty. Deguma as ―an unmarried maiden
of certain ageǁ and a ―love-crazed female Apache who is ready to skin the defendant alive for
not being a bastardǁ and a ―horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an
Amazon.ǁ He also stated that Atty. Deguma is using PAO as a ―marriage bureau for her own
benefit.ǁ

ISSUE/S: W/N Jose Tiongco, being also one of the counsels of the defendants, violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility

HELD: Yes. With the language that he employed, he obviously violated Canon 8-A Rule 8.01
which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive,
offensive, or otherwise improper. He also violated Rule 11.03 which says that a lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language before the courts. The SC also cited
Romero vs Valle, ―although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in furtherance of the
cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to
another.ǁ Jose Tiongco was merely warned.

Note: In the first part of the case, even the title of the case, it was not mentioned whether Jose
Tiongco is a lawyer or not. Then, there‘s one sentence which addressed him ―Atty. Jose
Tiongco.ǁ

19
 Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente

Petitioner’s claim: Noe-Lacsamana alleged that she was the counsel for the plaintiff in a civil
case while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of the said civil case was
annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case where Busmente appeared as counsel.
Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel.
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa)
would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she
represented Ulaso as Busmente’scollaborating counsel which
recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. The
IBP Board of Governors, in its resolution, adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD

Respondent’s claim: Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal
assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in
2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of
Regine Macasieb(Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer presented as proof
by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

ISSUE: Wether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law

RULING:

YES. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284
and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove
that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD,
that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

(yung sa contents ng counter- affidavit)

Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came
to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its
status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and
Eddie B. Bides stating that:

20
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond.
Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by
IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES
for Ejectmentdocketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of San Juan, Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-
Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court
records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith
that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic),
she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which
she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not present,
to wit:

1.That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

2.There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not
so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her
whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been
unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us
paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

21
 RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA vs.

ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

Facts:

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.

The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When
Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his
name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an
affidavit to attest to such fact.

The Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of
the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted
Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document
for insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for dishonesty was also dismissed for lack
of substantial evidence.

Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only
one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the PNP Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-
complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in

22
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable

Ruling:

Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A
LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law
is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed
to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, the court finds Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.

MERCADO v. DE VERA (A.C. No. 5859, November 23, 2010)

23
FACTS: Rosario P. Mercado, complainant hires the respondent Atty. Eduardo De Vera as her
legal counsel. The respondent garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over
the proceeds to Rosario claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the
balance was his, as attorney’s fees. The refusal to return the money prompted Rosario to file an
administrative case for disbarment against the respondent. On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution holding the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and
handling of client’s funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the
practice of law. As a result, the respondent filed a total of 12 cases against the people involved
for his suspension from the practice of law including his former client. In addition to the 12 cases
filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously been dismissed. Complainants
allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems,
and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits
against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.
They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-
year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. In his
defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the respondent in filing numerous cases against his former
client constitute a violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes, the Court ruled that act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge
and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary
complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a client’s funds. Further, the respondent not
only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of the court in
aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client to whom he
owes loyalty and fidelity. It is a clear violation of Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated” and “A lawyer shall not,
to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall
he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto” respectively. The cases filed by the respondent
against his former client involved matters and information acquired by the respondent during the
time when he was still Rosario’s counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the
family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in
support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired
through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation
of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court. Thus, the respondent is disbarred from the
practice of law.

CASE 33: Five J Taxi v. NLRC

24
FACTS: In 1983, petitioner Juan Armamento, the owner and operator of Five J Taxi, hired
private respondents Dominador Sibayan and Jose Salcedo as taxi drivers where they both earned
an average of P4,500 per month along with a P10 a day as contribution for the maintainance of
the taxis. Sometime in August 1988, private respondents were terminated from employment and
their accumulated deposits were not returned. Thus, both the respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of the said P10 from their
salaries. On October 24, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered decision in private respondents‘ favor
ordering the then respondent to reinstate the complainants to their former positions along with
backwages.

Herein petitioner Juan Armamento opposed the computation report of the Research and
Information Unit regarding the rewards due the private respondents amounting to P79, 260. He
alleged that as early as December 13, 1988, he filed a written manifestation before the Labor
Arbiter stating inter alia that: ―I am unconditionally accepting complainants back to work and
they can report to work anytime during office hours.ǁ He further alleged that the run of private
respondent‘s backwages should have stopped on the date of issuance of said manifestation. The
Labor Arbiter then referred the case to the Research and Information Unit for review and
possible recomputation. The latter made a computation report, which was completely adopted by
the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also affirmed the same computation report which was again
opposed by the petitioner for the same reason (manifestation). Subsequent MRs were also denied
for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S: WON the manifestation issued by petitioner has merit.

HELD: No.

RATIO: The petitioners' position on the cut-off period for the reckoning of private respondents'
backwages had thoroughly been passed upon and consistently been rejected by the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiter after repeated reviews of the case. There was no hard or solid proof that
respondents had indeed made an unconditional offer or reinstatement. The court finds no
supervening event nor any meritorious reason to disturb the amount of backwages awarded to the
private respondents, which have repeatedly been computed by the Research Unit of the Labor
Arbiter. Well settled is the rule that findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and
binding upon the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case

CASE 36: Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et. al

25
FACTS: Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu, known to be a
government scholar. She was appointed by then Pres. Estrada on Dec 21, 1999 as a student
regent, to serve a one-year term (Jan 1, 2000-Dec 31, 2000). Serana discussed with President
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. On September 4, 2000, Serana,
with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC of the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). It was one of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Hall. President gave P15 M to OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Bugayong, and De Guzman,
Secretary General of the alliance of student councils within UP, consequently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the
information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Sheclaimed that R.A. No. 3019,
as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), in which estafa is not included.As a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to
the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent. Moreover, she also argued that
it was President Estrada and not the government that was duped. Assuming that she received the
P15M, it came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.She had no power or
authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR)
as a whole.

The Ombudsman opposed the motion. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606
clearly contains the catch-all phrase ―in relation to office,ǁ thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against her. Serana was a public officer. As a member of the BOR,
she had the general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Compensation has been interpreted to
include allowances. Serana was compensated. Serana filed a motion for reconsideration, but was
denied.

26
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction in not dimissing the case despite the fact that it has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged against Serana

HELD: No. Sandiganbayan has not committed a grave abuse of its discretion in not dismissing
the case against Serana.

RATIO: Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D.1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019 that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D.1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on
the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
people. P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D.1606 promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. P.D. No. 1606 was later amended
by P.D.1861. Then, R.A.7975 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as it now stands.

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. the two statutes
differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and
provides for their penalties.

We urge Serana‘s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that ―a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.ǁ

We admonish Serana‘s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer‘s
conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. The administration of
justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.

27
 RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS AGAINST SOLICITOR
GENERAL AGNES VST. DEVANADERA, ATTY. ROLANDO FALLER,

AND ATTY. SANTIAGO VARELA.

556 SCRA 522 (2008)

An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an
unknown author and must be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

The Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) received on September 5, 2007 an unverified letter-
complaint dated August 26, 2007 written by “Concerned Citizens” and addressed to Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. The letter contained a complaint for disbarment/disciplinary action against
former Government Corporate Counsel (GCC), now Solicitor General Agnes Vst. Devanadera
and Alberto C. Agra and other lawyers of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC), for “engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities” during the May 14,
2007 national and local elections, and for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Solicitor General et al. filed their separate comments, praying for the outright dismissal of
the complaint for being anonymous and contrary to the intent of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which provides.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an anonymous complaint can be dismissed outrightly

HELD :

The Court will not thus shirk from its responsibility to mete out proper disciplinary punishment
to lawyers who are shown to have failed to live up to their sworn duties; but neither will it
hesitate to extend its protective arm to those the accusation against whom is not indubitably
proven. For a lawyer’s good name is, in the ultimate analysis, his most important possession.

An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an
unknown author. However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal
for being baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easy of verification and may, without
much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

A reading of the letter-complaint shows that the allegations are vague. And the attachments
thereto are mere photocopies, not to mention the plaint of the Solicitor General et al. that they
were not furnished copies of the annexes to the August 6, 2007 complaint. The Court is thus
inclined to, as it does, dismiss the complaint.

28
 JOSE C. SABERON v. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG

561 SCRA 493 (2008)

Utterances, petitions and motions are considered as absolutely privileged, however false or
malicious they may be, only if they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Petitioner Jose C. Saberon charged respondent Atty. Fernando T. Larong of grave misconduct for
allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

The Investigation Commissioner found Larong guilty of grave misconduct, Saberon nevertheless
submits that the recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. On the
other hand, Larong seeks for the Court‘s declaration that the questioned allegations were
privileged communication. He submits that the statements, while opening up a lawyer to
possible administrative sanction for the use of intemperate language under
the Canons of Professional Responsibility, should not be stripped of their privileged nature.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Larong is guilty of grave misconduct

HELD:

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

Respecting Larong’s argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were
privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent
remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their
clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark
or comment.

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have
consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be,
but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Thus, while Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a
grievous character as to merit Larong’s disbarment. In light of Larong’s apologies, the Court
finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered
simple, rather than grave, misconduct.

29
Cesar and Modesta Talento vs Atty. Agustin Paneda

Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by mother and son Modesta Herrera Talento and
Cesar Talento charging Atty. Agustin F. Paneda of violation of his oath as a lawyer and neglect of
duty. Atty. Paneda failed to appear in a pre-trial conference so they were barred in presenting
their evidence and he also failed to file the required Appeal Brief which led to the dismissal of
his clients’ appeal before the CA.

Issue: Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling

petitioners’ case both on trial in the RTC and on appeal in the CA which led to its dismissal
without affording petitioners the opportunity to present their evidence.

Held: Consideration of the records of the instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP in its
findings and conclusion that respondent’s documented acts fall extremely short of the standard of
professional duty that all lawyers are required to faithfully adhere to.

The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

The facts of this case illustrate respondent’s dismal performance of that responsibility, which in
its totality could amount to a reprehensible abandonment of his clients’ cause.

Atty Paneda is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a year

30
Suan vs Gonzales

The filing of the intra-corporate case before the RTC to compel the bank to disclose its
stockholdings, to allow them the inspection of corporate books and records, and the payment
of damages does not amount to forum-shopping notwithstanding the BSP’s investigation on
the bank’s unsafe and unsound business practices

Facts:Gonzales filed a case for Mandamus, Computation of Interests, Enforcement of Inspection,

Dividend and Appraisal Rights, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against the Rural Green Bank of
Caraga, Inc. and the members of its Board of Directors before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
ButuanCity. The petition prayed for, inter alia, that a temporary restraining order be issued
enjoining the conduct of the annual stockholders’ meeting and the holding of the election of the
Board of Directors.The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) conditioned upon
respondent’s posting of a bond.

Thereafter, Gonzales submitted a certification by Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated

(SICI) together with a Certification issued by then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice,
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that, according to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Butuan City, SICI has no pending obligation and/or liability to the government
insofar as confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases are concerned.

Suan also claimed that in the complaint filed by respondent, together with Eduardo, Purisima,
Ruben, and Manuel, all surnamed Tan, before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) against
Ismael E. Andaya and the members of the Board of Directors of the Rural Green Bank of Caraga,
Inc. for alleged gross violation of the principles of good corporate governance, they represented
themselves as the bank’s minority stockholders with a total holdings amounting to more or
less P5 million while the controlling stockholders own approximately 80% of the authorized
capital stock. He also claimed that there was forum shopping as the the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case.

31
Issue: Whether or not there was forum shopping in filing the complaint.

Held: The filing of the intra-corporate case before the RTC does not amount to forum-shopping.
It is a formal demand of respondent’s legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed
by the court or by the law with respect to the controversy involved.The relief sought in the case
is primarily to compel the bank to disclose its stockholdings, to allow them the inspection of
corporate books and records, and the payment of damages. It was also prayed that a TRO be
issued to enjoin the holding of the annual stockholder’s meeting and the election of the members
of the Board, which, only courts of justice can issue.

On the other hand, the complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas was an invocation of
the BSP’s supervisory powers over banking operations which does not amount to a judicial
proceeding. It brought to the attention of the BSP the alleged questionable actions of the bank’s
Board of Directors in violation of the principles of good corporate governance. It prayed for the
conduct of an investigation over the alleged unsafe and unsound business practices of the bank
and to make necessary corrective measures to prevent the collapse of the bank.

32
JUAN PABLO BONDOC v JUDGE DIVINA LUZ AQUINO-SIMBULAN, A.M.No.
RTJ-09-2004 | October 26, 2009 | 604 scra 416

FACTS: This is a case filed by former Representative Bondoc charging Judge Aquino-Simbulan
with partiality, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in the handling of Criminal case
entitled “People v Totaan”. Complainant bewailed: (1) the respondent’s attempt to have the cases
settled in an “off-the-record” huddle with the parties’ lawyers because she did not want the
accused to be administratively suspended; (2) the respondent’s order to “fast track” the cases
because the accused had been suspended upon the motion of the private prosecutors. The
complainant then narrated the instances when his lawyers were alleged given a hard time and
subjected to indignities by the respondent in her desire to fast track the criminal case. On the
other hand, the respondent pointed out that an examination of the complaint would readily show
that it was prepared by the private prosecutors, Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David, who
wove a tale lies and distortions regarding the proceedings to cover up their own shortcomings as
lawyers; had they performed their duty as officers of the court and members of the bar, they
would have informed the complainant that they lost because of their blunders in the prosecution
cases. In the manifestation and motion respondent prayed for the permanent dismissal of the
present administrative matter and requested that her complaint against Attys. Stephen David and
Lanee David be acted upon and given due course. The court resolved to dismiss the
administrative complaint against the respondent and required Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to
show cause why they should not be disciplined or held in contempt.

ISSUE: WON Attys. Stephen and Lanee David guilty of contempt.

RULING: The SC dismissed the administrative complaint filed against the respondent and
resolved the liability of the two Attorneys. The complainant (Bondoc) never appeared in court, it
is reasonable to conclude that the two lawyers crafted the complaint and incorporated therein all
the unfounded accusations against the respondent in order to conceal their inadequacies in the
handling of their client’s case. To say the least, the complaint was most unfair to the respondent
who, as the record shows, was simply keeping faith with her avowed objective of expediting the
proceedings in her court by, among other measures, requiring lawyers to be prepared at all times
and to be fair and candid in their dealings with the court. As the court held in Racines v Judge
Morallos, et al., “a clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice,
oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its
dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.”

Attys. Stephen and Lanee David miserably failed to come up to the standards of these rulings.
They are liable and was held in indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

33
BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN

FACTS

There was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the private prosecutors representing the
government were repeatedly absent or unprepared.

This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/private prosecutor was unhappy with the
dismissal and accused the judge of favoritism and gross ignorance of the law.

The lawyer went to the congressman in their district and through him filed a case against the
judge. this subsequent reached the supreme court.

HELD

The supreme court found the judge innocent and the lawyer was found to be the one behind the
case (against the judge) not the congressman.

The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt and given a stern warning as well as fined for
2500php by the court.

Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file it within the justice system (ie office of the court
administrator / IBP) not with your congressman or other non-judicial people.

34
CASE DIGEST: RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR.
ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al.]

FACTS: On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of
the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.
Justice Jose Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was then designated as Acting Chairman of the Ninth
Division during the absence of Justice Reyes.

On May 29, 2008, officers, directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric Company
(Meralco), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). side from the application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC.

The case was raffled to Justice Vicente Roxas (Justice Roxas). But due to the information from
Atty. Elamparo of GSIS that legal representatives of Meralco allegedly tried to influence Justice
Roxas, GSIS filed an ex-parte motion to have the case re-raffled and for Justice Roxas to be
inhibited from participating in the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco.
The motion was granted.

Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo "received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify
herself but (who) said that she had important information regarding the Meralco case." The
unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that "a TRO was already being prepared and that certain
Meralco lawyers had in fact been talking to Justice Roxas."

Likewise, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from his older brother,
Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and a certain Mr De Borja. Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio)
had been named the "third member" of the division to which the MERALCO¬GSIS case had
been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been "officially informed" about the
matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio
then tried to convince Justice Sabio "of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC," and
asked his brother to help the GSIS, which "represents the interest of the poor people." Justice
Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his] conscience" and that the most that
he could do was "to have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral
arguments," at which the respondents "must be able to convince" him that the TRO indeed had
no legal basis.

Thereafter, Justice Jose Sabio Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth
Division by raffle.

35
Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latter’s signature, the TRO which he
had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency
of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.

Thus, the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal,
issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the
respondents to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten
days from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within which
to file their reply. It also set the hearing for the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Justice Reyes came back from his leave and a question arose as to who should have the records
of the case, is it Justice Sabio (Acting Chairman of 9th Division) or Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio
insisted that the rollo should be with him.

Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter calling the attention of Justice Cruz as to
who between him and Justice Sabio should receive the case. Justice Cruz responded that the
issuance of a TRO is not among the instances where ‘the Justices who participated’ in the case
shall ‘remain’ therein." Hence, Justice Cruz opined that "notwithstanding the issuance of the
TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice
Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return."

Justice Sabio, in turn, opined that "a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or
at least its initial action such that he should be the one to chair the Division." But before
Presiding Justice Vasquez was able to resolve the matter, Justice Reyes went ahead with Justice
Roxas and decided on who should be the chairman over the said case.

Subsequently, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an
"important" matter. Mr. De Borja intended to influence Justice Sabio to side with Meralco. At
that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a "sealed" brown paper bag, which he was handling "as if
something important" was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10
million. De Borja, however denied such allegations and countered instead that it was Justice
Sabio who solicited P50 Million from him.

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought
Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the
Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Division.

Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal "the final decision on
the MERALCO case" bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for
"concurrence/dissent." According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the
"rationale for his conclusion." Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned "with an
expensive looking travelling bag" from where he pulled out the "purported final decision."
Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-

36
Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had
signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day

After "a careful and judicious study" of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision
that day "purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio," who was then on
leave of absence.

ISSUE: WHETHER CERTAIN JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED IMPROPRIETIES AND VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT

HELD: Justice Roxas, for inexcusably failing to act on a number of motions of the parties prior
to the promulgation of the Decision is found to have violated Section 5 of Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Thus, it
has become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending
motions or incidents within the reglementary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes
gross inefficiency. Moreover, Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty. The so-called
"transcript" is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance - when actually
there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among
the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision. His testimony that when he
brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for
her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. Under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the
penalty of dismissal from the service.

Moreover, Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of
Appeals. Lastly, Justice Roxas’ questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his
undue interest therein. Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their
memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8,
2008. His "rush to judgment" was indicative of "undue interest and unseemly haste

Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to his re¬employment in any branch
or service of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations Associate
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., on the other hand, is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without
pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty.

Justice Sabio Jr.’s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate
and indiscreet. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial

37
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: "Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of
judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is
fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence."

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice
Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and
Mr. De Borja even after the latter’s rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows
poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of the dignity
of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.

As for Justice Reyes, he is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and
is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
warrant a more severe penalty.

It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the
Judiciary. Justice Reyes is guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he
repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting
interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the
decision of the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, on the other hand, is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of
the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her
judicial duties. She deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice
Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties’ memoranda and
without the deliberation among members of the Division required by the IRCA. She violated
Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Allowing a fellow justice to induce
her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance
of her judicial duties.

38
 FOODSPHERE, INC. v. ATTY. MAURICIO, JR.

(A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009)

FACTS:

Foodsphere, a corportation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture

of canned goods of “CDO” filed an administrative complaint against Atty.Melanio Mauricio, Jr.
for violation of the code of professional responsibility. The case at hand involved a certain
Alberto Cordero who purportedly found a colony of worms inside the can of liver spread by
CDO and Foodsphere that he bought from the grocery. The Cordero family sued the company for
P150,000 for damages, but the companies did not agree to the demands. The Cordero’s thereafter
threatened to resort to the media, if their demands are not met. Consequently, Atty. Mauricio the
counsel of the Cordero’s, was involved in various media productions such as being a writer/
columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!,
and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a
radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB. Atty. Mauricio, in many cases
utilized these media outlets to place the said company in a bad light by declaring to the masses
the liver spread of worms; even after his receipt of the Order addressed to him to desist from
“further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the
instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its
products”. Even after the parties have performed an agreement, signed by the Cordero’s and
Atty.Mauricio himself – resulting in the dismissal of the Cordero case, Atty.Mauricio still
inexplicably launched a media offensive to the companies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Atty. Mauricio has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes. Atty. Mauricio has violated the code of professional responsibility. His recourse to
the Media, even after being told to desist from such was a clear violation of Rule 13.03 of Canon
13, “A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party”. His action has put not only the company
Foodsphere and CDO in a bad light, but has also degraded the dignity and authority of the legal
system. Besides the above, he has also violated Canon 1.01 by engaging in deceitful conduct
taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his own interests, and Canon 8, when
he used abusive and offensive language in his dealings.

39
GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a
collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other
vehicle, and drove off. Aneyewitness of the incident was able to take down
petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered
amanhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police
station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was
brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such
situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule
113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the
rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition
for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which
however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is
because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no
personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources.
Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was
filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat.
Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal
case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released
upon posting a bail bond.

40
04 - Sabitsana v. Villamor (1991)

Facts:

First Complaint

Atty. Sabitsana charged respondent, Judge Villamor with falsification of his monthly Certificates
of Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the
90-day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948 when actually he had 15 cases undecided. In
an on-the-spot audit of he cases pending before the sala of the Respondent judge, it was found
out that there were indeed 87 cases undecided beyond the 90-day reglementary period

Respondent claimed that he had not violated the 90-day rule. He did not deny, however, that
before said date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule, including those listed
in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. He added that he had no
hand in the preparation of his monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had ordered the
person-in-charge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it appear
that said cases were decided within 90 days from its submission when actually they were not, she
stated that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to sign after
she had prepared them. He shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court who, he claims, was inefficient
in the management of records.

Second Complaint

Respondent, as Executive Judge of the RTC designated Judge Pitao as Acting Judge of an
MCTC, which was then vacant. Sometime after while Judge Pitao was at his residence, he
received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo
Lipango, the accused in a Criminal Case which had long been pending trial in the MCTC now
under him.

After some time, Judge Pitao sought respondent, regarding his application for LOA. During their
conversation, respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao whether
he had received the note and that he (Pitao) better acquit the accused. Despite this, Judge Pitao
still rendered his decision convicting the accused. This made the Respondent mad and thus,
directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's Court. In addition to this, Respondent
also revoked Judge Pitao’s designation as acting Judge of the MCTC. To make matters worst,
Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo Lipango of the
crime charged. This was done despite the fact that the records of the case disclosed that no notice
had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable them to submit their
respective memoranda.

41
Issues:

1. W/N Judge is guilty of not discharging his administrative responsibilities diligently.

2. W/N guilty of having undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over
which he exercised supervision 


Held/Ratio:

1. Yes. Respondent sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but
that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel.
As the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision,
particularly those pending for more than ninety days. He is supposed to keep his own
record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly and without
delay. He should be more diligent because he could be held accountable for any error or
falsification in his certificates. He need not be reminded of his deadlines by a subordinate
court employee like the clerk of court. Court employees are not the guardians of a judge's
responsibilities. 

Additionally, he was inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve
civil and two criminal cases. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases
assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous
events. 


2. YES. Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with
the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert
the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity
and impartiality.

The clincher came when respondent Judge decided the same case, which was appealed to his
branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to the
parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the precaution and the defense to submit
memoranda. Respondent's excuse was that under the rules, it was (and still is) the duty of the
clerk of court to notify the parties of the fact that the original record of the case, together with the
transcripts and exhibits, had been received. Respondent overlooked, however, that the same rule
provides that the RTC judge shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed

Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as
Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate.

42
A.M. No. 93-10-1296-RTC August 12, 1998

RE: SUSPENSION OF CLERK OF COURT ROGELIO R. JOBOCO, RTC, BRANCH 16

NAVAL, BILIRAN

Facts:

This is a series of complaints and counter-complaints between Judge Bonifacio S. Maceda, then
Acting Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 16, Naval, Biliran (now RTC Judge in
Las Piñas, Metro Manila) and Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco, then Branch Clerk of Court of the same
Regional Trial Court (now Assistant Prosecutor in Samar).

Judge Maceda charges Atty. Joboco of (1) Infidelity in the Custody of Case Records, (2)
Dishonesty, (3) Sabotaging Judicial Reforms, (4) Grave Misconduct, Usurpation of Judicial
Authority, Tampering of Subpoena, (5) Insubordination, (6) Falsification of Accomplishment of
Certificate of Service, and (7) Agitating Workers to go on Mass Leave and Notorious
Undesirability.

Atty. Joboco, on the other hand, alleges (1) Oppression, (2) Continuing Oppression, (3) Gross
Ignorance of the Law, (4) Abuse of Position, (5) Gross Abuse of Discretion Using his Position,
and (6) Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Joboco is guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics?

Held: Although we are inclined to impose the penalty of suspension on Atty. Joboco, his
subsequent appointment as 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor of Calbayog City has made the
aforesaid sanction impracticable. The diversity and multiplicity of Atty. Joboco's transgressions
clearly reflect his defiant demeanor and contumacious character which cannot be countenanced
in the judiciary. Such recalcitrant attitude manifested by Atty. Joboco in his capacity as Branch
Clerk of Court not only diminishes his integrity as an officer of the court but degrades the dignity
of the judicial system as well.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco GUILTY of the
following charges: Infidelity in the Custody of Court Records, Usurpation of Judicial Authority,
Grave Misconduct and Tampering Subpoena in Criminal Case No. 1536, Falsification of
Certificates of Service, Misconduct for attempting to utilize the court employees for the ends of
the local IBP and Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL). He is hereby FINED in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). All other charges against him are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

The charges against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. He
is, however, ADMONISHED for having abused his authority by unjustly refusing to sign the
certificates of service of his Clerk of Court which resulted in the withholding of the latter's
salary. He is likewise ADVISED to exert care and consideration in his dealings with his office
staff in order to avert any future repetition of these administrative misdemeanors.

43
12 - Tan v. Rosete (2004) (Showed copy of draft) Doctrines:

• Canon 1: A judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Also, check the course syllabus for the doctrine/topic your case is under.

• Canon 2: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary

Facts:

Lucila Tan filed a complaint against Judge Maxwell Rosete for Gross Misconduct and
violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.



Tan was the private complainant in two criminal cases which was pending in an MeTC in San
Juan, of which Judge Rosete was the presiding Judge. The criminal cases were both entitled
People v. Alfonso Pe Sy for BP 22 and other deceits.



Tan alleges that a member of Judge Rosete’s staff talked to her and showed her a draft of the
decision dismissing the criminal cases she filed. She claims that the staff member asked for
Php150,000 so that the case will not be dismissed and allowed her to keep a copy of the draft
decision. Tan also asserts that she met with Judge Rosete, who was with 2 other people, in
Sangkalan restaurant where again, they discussed the case. Tan says she did not give the
money because she believed that her evidence was strong.



Judge Rosete denies all these allegations. He contends that it was Tan who in fact approached
him and tried to bribe him so that he will decide in her favor. He says she offered him
Php300,000 for down payment of a car he wanted to buy. Furthermore, he claims that after he
made the decision, he left for New Zealand would therefore have had no opportunity to change
his decision whether bribe money was involved or not. He says that while he was in New
Zealand, he even received a call from then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada who asked him to decide the
case in favor of Tan. 

Judge Rosete decided against Tan and dismissed the criminal cases.

44
Issues:

1. W/N Judge Rosete committed Gross Misconduct and violated the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act

Held/Ratio:

1. YES, Judge Rosete was guilty. Since Tan and Rosete offered directly contradicting versions
of what happened, the SC only had to choose which version was more credible. The SC believed
Tan’s version of events because it was clear and gave full detail. The presentation of the
unsigned decision as evidence bolstered the credibility of her claim because it would have been
impossible to obtain a copy without the participation of the Judge or court staff.

On the other hand, there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses presented by
Judge Rosete. One of his witnesses admitted to being in Sangkalan restaurant with Judge Rosete
and Tan, whereas his other witness denied being there. Also, Judge did not present the complete
records of his trip to New Zealand. He presented his departure dates from the Philippines but did
not present evidence as to when he came back.

In ruling against Judge Rosales, the SC stated that judges must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. A judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.
The strict standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence
in the justice system is founded not only on the legal knowledge of judges, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. Rosete’s act of
sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions,
and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the
standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench.

Judge Rosete was suspended from office without salary and other benefits for 4 months.

45
Dela Cruz vs. Bersamira A.M. No. RTJ-001567. July 24, 2000. 336 SCRA 353

PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago

FACTS: Respondent was charged with the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.The complainant alleges that respondent gravely abused his discretion by issuing
unreasonable orders for postponement to unjustly delay the administration of justice.

HELD: The unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the
norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting magistrate. Indeed, the Court has consistently impressed upon the judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.

46
FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY

Facts:

Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge failed to render

judgment in the case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was transferred,
complainant learned he brought the records of the case to his new station. Hamoy’s excuse was
that his utility aid mixed the records up and because the dockets were congested with so many
family-cases his court being the only family court in the area. He also failed to comply with the
directives of the OCA. Also, he was able to collect his salary when he claimed in his certification
that he had no pending cases.

Held:

Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel.
Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising his court
personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

More importantly, judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On
meritorious grounds, they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their
application for extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his
transfer to another post, respondent Judge should have asked the permission of the Court
Administrator to bring the records of the cases to his new assignment or should have apprised the
parties of his action with respect thereto.

Furthermore, respondent Judge should be held liable for his failure to obey directives from this
Court and the Court Administrator. Needless to say, judges should respect the orders and
decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this Court from which all other courts should take
their bearings

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent Judge
must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded of judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a false
certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting to gross misconduct and deserves the condemnation
of all right thinking men. In view of the primordial role of judges in the administration of justice,
only those with irreproachable integrity and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers.

47
Rallos vs. Gako, Jr.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484(A). Oct. 24, 2000. 344 SCRA 178

PONENTE: Panganiban

FACTS: Complainant alleged that the respondent judge ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of
rice to claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the
Bureau of Customs. It is alleged that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law.

HELD: This act constitutes gross ignorance of the law. However, we have held that to be
punishable as such, it must not only be contradictory to existing law and jurisprudence, but must
also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Respondent was in bad faith
when respondent did not appear for hearing on the dates set for the hearing of which he had
knowledge of.

48
33 - Floride Dawa, et.al v. Judge Armando C. De Asa (1998) (pervert judge) Doctrine:

•The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. More than simply projecting an
image of probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge"; he must also appear to be a
"good person."

•By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people
not only through his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of
his duties and in his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.

Facts 

These are two consolidated complaints of “sexual harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts
of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and for violation of the high standard of morals
demanded by judicial ethics” against Judge Armando C. De Asa of MTC Branch 51, Caloocan
City. The judge was complained of having the tendency to corner female employees of MTC
Branch 51 and kissing them. Among the complainants were Floride Dawa, Noraliz Jorgensen,
Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, Cielito M. Mapue, Jean Marie
Lazaro, Zenaida Reyes and Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz. 


Respondent denied having done the lascivious acts, saying that everything was orchestrated by
Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino because she resented his assignment as Acting Executive Judge. 


Issue 1. W/N respondent is guilty of acts complained of?

Held/Ratio: 1. YES. The SC adopted the findings of the investigating officer, saying that there is
enough evidence and corroborated testimony that respondent committed the acts he is charged
with. Moreover, the complainant’s testimonies were also corroborated by Judge Santiago (the
Executive Judge). Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their
stories. It is highly improbable that the three complainants would perjure themselves only to
accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have had some real or imagined resentment against
respondent. The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to perform
their duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition against loitering and idleness in the
premises of the court is not enough to motivate the three women into exposing themselves to
ridicule and chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories that
would also be derogatory to them.

De Asa is dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government including GOCCs.

49
46 - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge Teh (1997)

Doctrine:

• Decisions of courts need not only be just but must be perceived to be just and completely free
from suspicion or doubt both in its fairness and integrity. Judges, being the visible
representation of the law and, most importantly, of justice, should be the embodiment of
independence, competence, and integrity. A member of the bench must continuously keep
himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and show acquaintance with
statutes, procedural rules, and authorities doctrines.

• When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law,
or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving
of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the
judge’s dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if
every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

Facts: 

Atty. Macalintal had an election case pending in the court of Judge Teh. Judge Teh issued
an adverse resolution to the client of Atty. Macalintal, so Atty, Macalintal filed a certiorari
petition with COMELEC. While the case was pending there, Judge Teh actively participated in
the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, later on, an urgent
manifestation. Atty. Macalintal filed a motion for Judge Teh to inhibit, but instead of acting on
the motion, he hired his own lawyer and filed his answer before his own court. In his answer,
he prayed for the dismissal of the Motion for Inhibition, attorney’s fees, and costs against Atty.
Macalintal. 

The SC ordered Judge Teh to act on the motion. Judge Teh then ruled [remember, this
was before his own court] to dismiss Atty. Macalintal’s Motion to Inhibit, and ordered Macalintal
to pay his attorney’s fees and costs since he had to hire his own lawyer. 

The Court treated the letter-complaint of Macalintal as an administrative complaint
against Judge Teh for showing prima facie Judge Teh’s gross incompetence and ignorance. 

Issue: 1. W/N Judge Teh is guilty

Held/Ratio: 1. YES, Judge Teh was held guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and was dismissed
from service, with forfeiture of benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government.

While a judge or court is joined as a party in a certiorari petition, such judge is merely a nominal
or formal party, and his active participation is not called for unless expressly ordered by the
Court. When the Court ordered him to act on the Motion to Inhibit, instead of either inhibiting
himself or continuing with the case (as are provided in the Rules), he hired his own lawyer and
filed an answer. He either misunderstood or chose to misunderstand the order. Further, Judge Teh
acted both as a party litigant and as a judge before his own court, and even had the gall to rule in
his own favor. [see 2nd doctrine]

50
In Re: Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001

Complainant: Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and Her Children

Respondent: Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos

FACTS: In 1996, complainant, the wife of respondent Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their
children filed a complaint against respondent for his failure to sufficiently support the family and
for having an illicit relationship with a law student. Complainants prayed that all remuneration
due respondent be directly released to them but the complaint was later withdrawn and
dismissed.

In 2000, Chief Justice Hilario Davide recommended for the suspension of respondent after a
scandalous incident during an exclusive Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association
where respondent brought along a woman. When Chief Justice pulled respondent aside to
validate the facts about the latter's illicit relationship with the woman, respondent candidly
admitted that he had been living with the woman named Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already.

During investigation, respondent denied all the allegations. However, the evidences including a
phone bill addressed to the respondent not to their conjugal dwelling but to the address of the
alleged mistress, a birthday card which read “MT cares a lot, you know” and a vehicle and its
insurance policy under the name of both the respondent and his alleged mistress, among others,
proved respondent’s infidelity. The matter of the illicit relationship was even published in the
newspapers.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct

HELD: YES. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that the conduct of a judge
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. The Code dictates that
a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen.

Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess
the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the
confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has
violated the code of Judicial Conduct, which requires every judge to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all
activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent was ordered dismissed from service.

51