S&S Quarterly, Inc.

Guilford Press

Divide and Rule: British Policy in Indian History

Author(s): Neil Stewart
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter, 1951), pp. 49-57
Published by: Guilford Press
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COMMUNICATIONS

DIVIDE AND RULE: BRITISH POLICY IN INDIAN HISTORY

The Indian Mutinyof 1857 resultedin the transformation of British

policy in India. It meant the end of the annexationistpolicy, and the
supportof the Indian princesas the bulwarkof Britishinterestsagainst
the tide of nationalism.Towards the people and the armyit meant an
emphasis on differences of caste and creed in order to prevent,as Sir
John Stracheyonce wrote, "the growthof any dangerous identityof
feelingfromcommunityof race, religion,caste or local feeling/'It was
realized that "the existenceside by side of the hostile creeds is one of
the strongestpoints in our political position in India."1
The policy of divide and rule, most fullycomprehendedby Sir John
Lawrence and his associatesin the Punjab, was applied in practicein the
Indian army;firstly in the re-organizationof the Bengal armyafterthe
Mutiny, and later in the Bombay and Madras armies. The discussions
thatled up to the application of divide and rule in the Bengal armyhave
been preservedfor us in the pages of the Peel Report on army re-
organization,published in 1859 along with the testimonyof witnesses,
appendicesand supplementarypapers fromIndia.2
All of the expert evidence beforethe Royal Commissionwhich pre-
pared the report favored a re-organizationof the Indian army rather
than its abolition. The armycould not be abolished because it was im-
possible to raise a sufficient body of white troops,and the Europeans
were not able to withstandthe climate as well as the Indians. Also, a
white soldier cost eight timesmore than an Indian one. The continued
existenceof the Indian army,therefore, was an essentialto Britishrule.
Brigadier-General Sir John Jacob, who raised the famous Sindh
IrregularCavalry, said:

1 Sir John Strachey,India (London, 1888), p. 225.

2 Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, 1859, î>ess. Il, Vol. 8. Unless stated
otherwise,the subsequent referencesin this paper are to sectionsof this report.
•19

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50 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
Without the existence of a large number of native troops, an army of Europeans
could not move or subsist in the field; the enemy would only have to keep a little out
of the way at first,to leave the Englishmen to follow their own strange devices and
theywould all die, aided by knapsacks,crossbeltsand pipeclay. The sun and the climate
would do the business most efficiently. (SupplementaryPapers, p. 97.)

A reportby the Punjab Commissioners, included in theSupplementary

Papers, expressedthe same opinion, and concluded that:
As a mere question of securitya large European forceis essential; but to administer
the countrya still larger number of natives is indispensable. The countrycan neither
be workedor held by Europeans alone. (SupplementaryPapers, p. 4.)

On the question of the size of the Britishforcein India, therewas

general agreementthat it should be considerablygreater than in the
past. The 40,000 European troopsof pre-Mutinydays were not enough
to keep the countrysafe fromrebellion. The Commissionerssuggested
a figureof 80,000. The pre-Mutinyproportion of British to Indian
and
soldiershad been about one to seven; this was quite unsatisfactory,
the Commissionerssuggesteda ratio of one to two in Bengal and one to
three in the rest of India. The British force was stabilized at about
65,000to 70,000men,and the Indian armyat just over twicethatnumber.
The increased fire-powerfollowing the introductionof breechloading
weapons, and the greatermobilityof the troopsafterthe spread of rail-
ways permitteda safe reduction in numbers.But the Indian armylost
the representativecharacterit possessedunder the rule of the Company,
and became a smaller and more select body, and in feelingsfar more
apart fromthe civil population than in the past.
Some witnessessuggestedthat British and Indian troops should be
mixed togetherin regimentsin order to maintain a more strictcontrol
over the sepoys.This was consideredimpractical.It was feltthatby mix-
ing two Indian and one Britishbattalion in a brigade a betterway of
counter-balancingthe forceswould be achieved.While the Indians were
usually quiet and well behaved, the European troops,drawn fromthe
more demoralizedstrataof the population, were far fromwell behaved.
Their close contact with the sepoys would destroythe prestigeof the
white man. General Sir Patrick Grant wrote:

My opinion is stronglyadverse to the permanent association in quarters of the

natives with Europeans. ... I think it most undesirable that the native soldiers
should have the opportunitieswhich close and permanent association would give him
of seeing the European soldier in the degrading state and position in which, unhap-
pily, the latter too often exhibits himselfin quarters. (Appendix 66.)
Sir James Outram, the "Bayard of India," also felt that contact be-

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 COMMUNICATIONS 51
tween Indians and white soldierswas dangerous to the prestigeof the
Europeans. He wrote:
... a close and intimate association of the natives with 'the European soldiery,except
in the field,should be avoided as much as possible; the closer the association with the
lower classes of our countrymen,the less respect is inspired by the latter; the closer
the association with officersand educated Englishmen,on the contrary,the greater is
the respectreceived. (Appendix 60.)

There were some who advocated placing British non-commissioned

in chargeof sepoys.The Punjab commissionerspointed out that
officers
this was not practical:
It is almost impossible, however, to get native officersand European non-commis-
sioned officersto work together.The Europeans should not be commanded by natives
as a matterof policy,nor a respectablenative officerby a drunken sergeant,as a matter
of both policy and justice. (SupplementaryPapers, p. 26.)

In view of the importantpart that the artilleryhad played in the

Mutiny the matterof whetherthe Indians should be trainedwith guns
was much discussed. It was finallydecided, in agreementwith almost
everywitness,that guns were weapons too dangerous to place in the
hands of a subject people. Lord Ellenboroughwrote:
The natives have a genius for casting and workingguns and we should not afford
them the means of indulging it. ... The natives die at their guns. Their practice in
this war is allowed to have been at least as good as our own. (Appendix 2.)

This was also the opinion of Lord Elphinstone:

I agree with those who think that it is not judicious to train any natives of India
in the use of guns. They make excellent artillerymen and they attach great value and
importance to guns; but these verycircumstancesmake it dangerous to place them in
their hands. (Appendix 67.)

The Punjab Commissionersconsideredthat to deprive the army of

artillerywould be a sound way of preventingany furthermutiny:
The value of artillery is perhaps greater in Asia than in any other part of the
world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the natives of India, and for that reason
become objects of attachmentand worship to the Indian gunners. A small European
force with a powerfulartilleryshould be irresistible,and no mutinyof a native army
withoutguns could hope to be successful.

A certainnumberof guns were needed on the Frontier,and here the

climate could not be supportedby Europeans. "Many officers, for these
reasons,would to
object any artillery at all being leftin the hands of the
natives,but in practice it is not to
expedient go to this extreme. The
Frontier must be excepted." (SupplementaryPapers, p. 6.)

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52 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
The Governor-General,Lord Canning, was also of this view, and
quoted a letterfromMajor-GeneralSir SydneyCotton in supportof it:
. . . in no way should 'the natives of the countrybe trustedwith British artillery,nor
should any native of India be instructedin the use of such weapons; the native drivers
are good horsemen,and the gunners most excellent, but they cannot be trusted; they
have a religious venerationfor theirguns; and, in proportionas theyare most valuable
to the governmentthey serve, so they are more formidable when they choose to be
rebellious. (Appendix 54.)
In a furtherletter to Colonel Durand, Cotton enlarged upon this
thesis:
Some officersargue that natives make efficientartillerymenand excellent drivers,
and thereforerecommend the continuance of the native artillery;but I mention that
is the very source of danger to be guarded against, and it forms,
their great efficiency
therefore,the most cogent reason for discouraging the employment of natives with
guns
A retrospectiveof the Mutiny clearly shows that no native force is actually formi-
dable unless supported by artillery.Had the mutineersnot been armed with a power-
ful artillery,well manned by native golundaz [gunners], there is every reason to
believe «the mutiny would have been curbed in the beginning; for the mutineers,
howevernumerous,have never stood up in the fieldunless backed up by guns. (Supple-
mentaryPapers, p. 136.)
The resultwas thatthe Indian artillerywas not re-formeduntil 1935,
when one regimentof fieldartillerywas established.Up to that period
the only Indian gunnerswere the few,but excellent,Indian Mountain
Batteries formed for service on the North West Frontier,where the
Europeans were unable to stand the climate.
In the past the Bengal army had been recruited from Moslems,
Brahmins and Rajputs of Oude and Bihar. The internal organization
of nearlyall regimentswas on the "general mixture"system,where all
men, whatevertheirreligion,were indiscriminately mixed in the ranks.
The Bombay and Madras armieshad the same organization,except that
theyrecruitedmore "low caste" men and even Indian Christiansand
Jews.3
Afterthe conquest of the Punjab, Dalhousie, then Governor-General,
introduceda few Sikhs into the Bengal regimentsin order to break the
great unityof feelingthat had developed among the sepoys.The Sikhs
were unpopular with the commandingofficer because of theirlong and

3 Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, hero of the Central India Campaign, and later
Commander-in-Chief, wrote: "It is just towards the Jews to state that they are uni-
versally allowed to be good, intelligent and faithful soldiers; the only regret ex-
respectingthem is that «theyare too few." (SupplementaryPapers,
pressed by officers
p. 71.)

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 COMMUNICATIONS 53
raggedbeards,which theyhad not yetlearned to roll neatlyunder their
chins, and also with the other sepoys, who were well aware of the
significanceof Dalhousie's policy.4
The general opinion among the Europeans was that the widespread
unityof feelingthathad developed among the sepoysof the Bengal army
was responsible for their defalcation. Differencesof creed had been
rubbed away by contact in the ranks,and the armyhad become as one.
It was thereforenatural forit to act togetherand, under the pressureof
the multitudeof factorsthat caused the Indian Mutiny,it revolted.
Policy, therefore,was to preventthat unity ever recurringagain. It
was suggestedby manyof the witnesses,particularlythosewho had been
in India in the years immediatelybefore the Mutiny, that the great
diversityof peoples and creeds in India gave the best opportunityfor
preventingthis recurrence."That which all men now unite in recom-
mending/'wroteJohnLawrenceto Canning,"a greatermixtureof races/'
was the obvious policy for the future.
This was a fundamentalquestion. While the Company'sservantsand
the Crown disagreedover the tactical question of whetherIndia should
be ruled directlyfromWhitehall or whethersome of the autonomypre-
viously allowed to the Company should be kept in the hands of the
new Governmentof India, there was remarkableunanimityover im-
portantstrategicalquestions such as the number of Britishand Indian
troops,the fate of the Indian artillery,and the futurepolicy of recruit-
mentfromdifferent creedsand peoples. The greatmajoritywere in favor
of a policy of "divide and rule."
This was expressedby Lord Ellenborough: "The fewerelementsof
combinationthereare in the native armythe better,and thereforethe
more nationalitiesand castesand religions,the more securewe shall be.
Discipline alone should bind the army together." (Appendix 2.)
An old sepoy General said:
... the strongnecessitywhich exists for so dividing and separating into distinct bodies
the "differentnationalities and castes" the rulers in our Eastern Dominion may deem

4 The failure of the attempt to divide the Bengal army has been told in a letter by
Herbert Edwards: "When, after the annexation of the Punjab, Governmentordered
200 Sikhs to be enlisted in every regimentof the Native army, they (the sepoys)
wheedled their colonels into distributingthem, 20 to each company; by which the
intention of the governmentwas quietly neutralized. Some regiments still went
further,and persuaded their English officersthat these Sikhs were 'dirty/ and
'spoiled the appearance of the old Pultun (Regiment)/ and some how or other the
Sikhs were not enlisted. Insuperable difficultieswere found in procuring them;
never was an order of Government wiser, or worse attended to." (Parliamentary
Papers, House of Commons, 1850, Vol. 18, p. 72.)

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54 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
it safe to entertainin our armies, so as to render them as little dangerous as possible
to the state. . . . The introductionof other elements would be advisable . . . anything,
in short, to divide and so neutralize the strengthof the "castes and nationalities"
which compose our armies in the East. (Memorandum of Major-General H. T. Tucker,
Appendix 4.)

The Chiefof Staff,

India,foundinspirationin themannerin which
the traditional
enmityof the Punjab forthe Kingsof Delhi had been
used to crushthe mutineers:
It was not because 'theyloved us, but because they hated Hindustan and hated the
Bengal army,that the Sikhs have flockedto our standard instead of seizing the oppor-
tunityto strikeagain for their freedom.. . .
In short, we have turned to profitthe esprit de corps of the old Khalsa army of
Runjeet Singh as the means which for a time would most effectively bind the Sikhs to
us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last.
What then, is «thelesson to be learned from the great instances which have been
died?
That we should avoid creating any great centralized army like the one lately dis-
solved, and substitute in its place several local armies, which should remain distinct
and separate from each other, and in each of which an esprit de corps peculiar to
itself should be fosteredby all the means incidental to distinct service and countries
differingin climate, latitude and race.

The writeradded:
I am stronglyof the opinion that Mussulmans should not be in the same company
or troop with Hindus or Sikhs, and that the two lattershould not be mingled together.
I would maintain even in the same regimentall differencesof faith with the greatest
of care. There mightbe rivalryor even hatred between two companies or troops.
The discipline of a native regiment instead of being impaired would gain by it,
as regards the greater question of obedience to the commanding officer.The motto
of the regimentalcommander and thereforeof the commander-in-chief, must for the
futurebe "Divide et Impera." (Minute of Major-General Sir W. R. Mansfield,Appen-
dix 6s.)

The words"divideand rule" had a fascination

formorethanone.
Lord Elphinstonewrote:
But suppose the whole native army to be formed into one grand army, the com-
ponent parts of each regimentbeing as heterogeneousas possible, and suppose some
cause of discontentto arise which affectsall castes alike, the danger would be undoubt-
ably far greater than that which overtook us last year. I have long considered this
subject, and I am convinced that the exact converseof this policy of assimilation is our
only safe militarypolicy in India. Divide et impera was the old Roman motto, and it
should be ours.
The safetyof the great iron steamers,which are adding so much to our military
power, and which are probably destined to add still more to our commercial superior-
ity,is greatlyincreased by building them in compartments.I would ensure the safety

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 COMMUNICATIONS 55
oí our Indian Empire by constructingour native army on «thesame principle; for this
purpose I would avail myselfof those diversitiesof language and race which we find
ready to hand. (Appendix 14.)

BrigadierJohnCoke, whoseexperienceof war on the NorthWest

Frontiermadehis opiniona valuableone,said:
By mixing the castes in one corps they become amalgamated, and make common
cause, which they never do if kept in separate corps. Hindoos and Musselmans are
natural enemies, the same with Sikhs; yet the result of mixing them in one corps has
been to make them all join against the Government,and not only the soldiers but
through them the Hindoo and Musselman zameendars [landowners] were incited to
make common cause, which they would never have done had the races been kept in
distinctcorps.
Our endeavor should be to uphold in full force the (fortunatefor us) separation
which exists between the differentreligions and races, and not to endeavor to amal-
gamate them. Divide et impera should be the principle of Indian Government. (Sup-
plementaryPapers, p. 279.)
The reportof thePunjab commissioners showedthestronginfluence
ofSirJohnLawrence, one of themostinsistentadvocatesof "divideand
rule,"and a man whose reputationstood highin Britainas a resultof
the leadingparthe had playedin the suppressionof the Mutiny.The
report a
unfolded of
policy counterpoise and counterbalance:
... as we cannot do without a large native army in India, our main object is to make
that army safe; and next the grand counterpoise of a sufficientEuropean force,comes
the counterpoiseof natives against natives. At firstsight it might be thought that the
best way to secure this would,be to mix up all the available militaryraces of India in
each and every regimentand to make them all "general service" corps. But excellent
as this theoryseems, it does not bear the test of practice. It is found that different
races mixed togetherdo not long preserve«theirdistinctiveness;their cornersand angles,
and feelingsand prejudices get rubbed off,till at last they assimilate, and the object
of their association is to a large extent lost.
To preservethat distinotivenesswhich is so valuable, and which while it lasts makes
the Mohammedan of one countrydespise, fear or dislike the Mohammedan of another,
to the geographical limits within
corps should in future be provincial, and adhere
which differencesand rivalries are stronglymarked. (SupplementaryPapers, p. 30.)

This, the commissionconsidered,was the best way to preventa

"community of feelingthroughoutthenativearmy."
ColonelDurand,who came Englandto represent
to theviewsof the
government of
of India at themeetings the said,in hisoral
Commission,
whenthepartition
evidence, oftheBengalpresidency beingdiscussed:
was
That presidencymay be divided into two or three great areas, in which the people
arc very distinct,and in which there is a very considerable degree of that sort of
between conterminouspeoples. It is advisable for
jealousy and animositywhich exists
us to »takeadvantage of that sort of feeling.

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56 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
The feelingof the Punjabisand the heartwithwhichtheyservedus, was partly
owingto thissortof nationalor quasi nationalfeelingon the part of the Punjabis
againsttheHindustanipeople; theyhad no compunctionin plunderingtheircities;and
working I woulddivide
againstthem.. . . We musttakeadvantageof that;practically
thatgreat (Bengal)armyin two. (SupplementaryPapers,p. 242.)

JohnHearsay,who had witnessed

Major-General mani-
theveryfirst
of theMutiny,cappedDurand'scomments
festations withthis:
Keep the armiesas separateas possible,as to 'tribesand gradesin them.The
systemand organizationmay be the same; but I would ratherhave themdistinct-
- neverlet themassimilate,if possible. (Supplementary
"Divide et impera" Papers,
P- 177-)
The Reportof thePeel Commission advocatedthatthatarmyshould
be composedof different and castes,mixedindiscriminately
nationalities
in theunits.The recommendation, however, was notcarriedout in prac-
tice.Re-organization wenton along the lines advocatedby JohnLaw-
renceand theotherexpertson thespot.
In 1861unitcommanders wereorderedto sendto Calcuttaan annual
returnof the caste and religiouscompositionof theirregiments. In
1862theexactcomposition of eachregiment was laid downbytheCom-
mander-in-Chief. In viewof the comment it mightarouse,thiswas not
published as an order,but was as
circulated a letterfromtheAdjutant-
Generalto each commanding officer:
intoeffect
In carrying the proposedarrangements forthefuturecomposition of the
nativearmy,as submitted in myletterNo. 277,dated May 1 last,the Commander-in-
Chief would preferthe communication of the decisionof the Government on this
questionin the formof a circularratherthana generalorder,becauseits publication
as a generalorderwould,almostcertainly,call forthecomment of thenative,if notof
the European,press,whichwouldbe prejudicial,in as muchthatit wouldbe impos-
sible to disguisethat the mixed composition recommended to be introducedin the
nativearmyis basedon a policy,thatpolicybeingin factone of mistrustof thenative
character,and to neutralizethe chancesof combinationand conspiracyof Native
soldiersagainstthe Government by meansof a mixturein regiments of antagonistic
racesand castes.5

By 1862thenewBengalarmywasorganized in thefollowing
manner;
therewereeighteen"class"regiments composedof one particularcaste
or religion:twelve"classcompany"regiments of separatecompaniesof
differentcastesor religions;and twelveof the old "generalmixture"
regiments.It was laid down thattherewould be nevermorethanone

5 LetterfromLieutenantColonelE. B. Johnson,officiating io the

Adjutant-General,
Government of India, MilitaryDepartment,
August15, 1862.Parliamentary
Papers,
House of Commons,1877.Vol. 62, p. 108.

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 COMMUNICATIONS 57
seventhof any particulargroup in a "general mixture"regiment.
Over the following thirtyyears the "general mixture" systemwas
eliminated throughoutthe army,and the "class regiment"and "class
company" regimentsystemintroduced.This systemwas the equivalent
of the separate,communal electoral systemin political life and served
the same purpose: that of dividing the peoples of India one against the
other. In the army,however,the powers of discipline remained in the
hands of the Britishofficers,the mutual tensionsbetween the different
communitiescancelled each other out, and the armybecame a weapon
of repressionwhich,up to 1946,apart fromminorincidents,was to prove
faithfulto its masters.
NEIL STEWART

London, England

THE MYTH OF SALVATION AND ANCIENT SLAVE SOCIETY*

In presentingthis paper, as a contributionto the main themeof our

Congress ("The Mythical-RitualPatternin Civilization"), I would like
to call attentionto the need of settlingonce forall the old problemof a
scientificclassificationof religions. Two main obstacles stand here as a
barrier. On the one hand, there is the mythologicalapproach of theo-
logians,who look upon religionas a resultof a revelation (spiritual,his-
torical,or rational) and findin the historyof religionsa major or minor
degree of deteriorationfromtheir own personal construction.And on
the otherhand, thereis the damaging impact of an abstractilluministic
ideology,which sees in religion nothingmore than a problem of ignor-
ance, of superstition,a sort of deception consciouslyor unconsciously
exercisedby various groupsof priests,poets and philosophers.
The historyof religions,on the contrary,mustbe consideredas a real
science,no less than the historyof atoms, of tissues,of life itself. It is
throughreligion that man, still unable to give himselfa satisfactory ex-
planation of nature and society,has tried from the beginning to come
in contactwith the realitythat surroundshim. In otherwords,religion
is the imaginaryreflection,in the minds of men, of the external forces
which have until now dominated theirdaily existence.

•
Excerpts from a paper delivered at the Seventh Congress on the History of Re-
ligion held in Amsterdam,September 4-9, 1950.

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