A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which
complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney
Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's
irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration
of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its
subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the
following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and
without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time
(sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for
the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit
from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in
connection with pending official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register
of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of
the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There
was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or
deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment.
Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax
payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent
Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending
compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them,
which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket
from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in
lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or
GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would
act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would
execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket
for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000)
was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane
fare, respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up
with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a
letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications
for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer
of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds
of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject
matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration
of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a
period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than
2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and
uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual
Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C.
have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the
Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In
a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled
that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's
opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with
assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the
NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case
No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio
directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative
disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further
asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be
heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of
extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself
in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator
Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney
Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties
submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the
charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of
neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the
documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit
from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of
a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or
material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended
to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found
guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on
documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a
repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found
respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate
that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's
findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents
presented to him for registration and, notwithstanding
representations by the parties interested for expeditious action
on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally
denied the registration of the documents involved; that he
himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied
the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in
favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and
that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the
respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded
from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the
respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the
money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the
circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him
the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in
the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills.
The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to
countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September
1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
 ... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in
office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should
have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules
and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in
the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be
disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
SO ORDERED.

Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that

Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service, effective immediately.

As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the

Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the
respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).

Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the
NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a
disbarment complaint against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent

register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his
malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a
public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is

designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair,
speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of
the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in
his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities
of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility—
all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public

service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is
the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he
has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal
Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials
and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5,
subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having
a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by
the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of
Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or
interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on

his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and
reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA
293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the
practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269,
278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron

committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice
the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA
632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He
should therefore be disbarred.
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007 Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
(Formerly, CBD 382) deceitful conduct.

DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
vs.
received for or from a client.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows
RESOLUTION
or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
PER CURIAM: counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R.
Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent
Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses
Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's
fees but the latter issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only. 3
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law
for three years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant
the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt. 21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD
that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's
failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months. 22

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases

The Court's Ruling
against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the
courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out
after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court,
respondent charged her ₱350.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants
Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent who owe utmost fidelity to public service.24
never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact
employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 5
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to
public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is
Respondent's Defense prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the
government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and
complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and
as counsel for the complainant's daughter.6 transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for
damages against the Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and xxx xxx xxx
aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public
Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. 9 Atty. Ungson, however,
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with
the acceptance fee agreed upon.10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal,
the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the xxx xxx xxx
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.11
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their
official function.25
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated
receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they
she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping. 12 Because the
are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective
complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
offices.
1992.13

In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later
issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO.
or in September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private
relationship.26Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the
practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he
complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant. 15
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
Recommendation of the IBP government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private
practice of profession.
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees.
received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to
submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. 16 indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when
respondent was still with the PAO.18 It also noted that respondent Sec. 14. xxx
described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that
respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending
complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would
free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28
issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.19 It found
respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers
from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from
salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees
other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. 30 This undertaking includes

the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private
practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases

and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the
complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses
(which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and
asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never
took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's
oath not to do any falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government
lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of
social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.321avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating

Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not
hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his
attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant
(such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment
obligation in favor of the client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific
purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s

oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of
₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days
from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of

respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment 1 affirming
his conviction for violation of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential
Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February
9, 1994,2petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled
"SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new
trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly
discovered evidence and excusible (sic) negligence, and
shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation
who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former
officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the
Corporation that employed petitioner), which
actually exercised control over the affairs of
Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert
innocence for the first time and explain why he
was unable to do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things,
granted the substitution but denied the motion for leave to file
motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied
on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT
ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND
SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994.6 The Court thereafter
required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and
manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
September 7, 1994.7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the
Court,8 the Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be
entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain
Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission
against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal
liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit"9 reads:
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the
residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro Manila,
after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was
the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective
majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP
together with its affiliated companies, organized a
number of wholly-owned service corporations. One
of these was Ultra International Trading Corporation,
whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs of
CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value
goods and using Ultra's financial resources.
4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees
of CDCP, and received the instructions directly from
me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto
M. Cuenca was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra
through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These
materials were received by CDCP and are covered by
the trust receipts which are the subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and
consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the delivery
of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr.
Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted as agent for CDCP.
As such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees
needed to persuade China Bank to issue the said trust
receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with
informal assurances issued by CDCP to China Bank
that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for
and on behalf of CDCP and CDCP Mining Corporation,
Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which
included the trust receipts subject of this case.
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to
cause the payment of said trust receipts because the
common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and
Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under my control and I
did not allow her to make the appropriate payments.
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the
amounts corresponding to the materials covered by
the trust receipts subject of this case.
9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust
receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto
Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation
and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra
Corporation to pay.
10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept
personal responsibility for the trust receipts subject
of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of
the criminal charges which he has asked this
Honorable Court to review.
11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil
obligations arising from the subject trust receipts.
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO M. CUENCA
Affiant
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new
trial.
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a
declaration against his own interests under Section
38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts
doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto
Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession
of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.
The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish
the genuineness and due execution of his brother's
affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who
represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal
case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the
accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01
of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged
in public prosecution is not to convict but to see
that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above duty is well founded on the instruction of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign
"whose obligation to govern impartially is compelling
 as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein
in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on
p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis
supplied.)10

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty
(20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
discovered evidence the rationale of which being:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as

to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to
entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are
involved therein.

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in

subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People"11 and "People v.
Amparado".12

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the
opposition of the Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted
accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of
persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly
circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be
denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the
circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection
to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially
commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of
impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let

the case be RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of origin for
reception of petitioner's evidence.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali
Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the
position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the
administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In
said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in
the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu,
Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli
Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears
from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The
investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges
brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only
failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all against
respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered,
it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and
in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and
infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent
guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821
and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law
instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As
a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's
dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by
Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government
service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order
before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the President did not have the
authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents6 in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and
that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority
to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for
failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order."7Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now
before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that
it has become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be
further entrusted with the duties of an attorney"8 and that he poses a
"serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular
with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus.
According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence support his stance that it
was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on
applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents
presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the
documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was
duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of
criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly
committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants.
Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the
two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who
required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He
further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of
Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties.
Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the
case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred this matter
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the
investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of
venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and
respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing
to have the reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP
Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records
of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate
action.12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution
approving Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of
venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao
Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct
the investigation, report, and recommendation.13The IBP Resolution
states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-
entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor
George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to
conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar
Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor
George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter
to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and
recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato
Chapter15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the
investigating panel16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent
for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices.
The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for
the transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur
Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as
Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's motion. 17 Complying with
this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion
for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25
September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this
case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This
order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution
provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the above-
entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate
the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors.20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08
October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. 21 Respondent insists that
the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the
authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-
96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly
vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover,
he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating
panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due
process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of
laches. According to complainant, the report and recommendation
submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was
duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet
despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims
that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he
was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi
City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of
respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the
matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process
which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed
IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings
conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the
position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000,
Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel,
furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated
4 August 1997.24Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663
issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt
was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,
Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate
the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This
directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its
Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor
C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled
case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation,
re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from receipt of notice.25
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her
father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father
passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic
brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. 26
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP
CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for
Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur
Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case. 27 This motion was
effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July
2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special
attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter,
the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the
undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be
able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the
Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of
Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The
undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date
hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the
findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the
Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case
No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent
was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation
of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of
Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the
instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the
issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of
manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-
squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondent's
relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President
in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial
evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the
Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of
Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the
President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a
very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct
of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for
amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and
Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the
period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier
recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the
IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been
endorsed to this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may
be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ
of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath
a member of the legal profession.32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered
the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from
government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared –
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which
is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair,
speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the
court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his
every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have
been compendiously described as moral character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court
found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct
perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the
Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the
Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with
his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had
clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a
civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in
the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the
legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies
of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to
practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter,
requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably
act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."37 As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac
v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless

of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not
in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED

and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the
Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo
(complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule
6.032 and Rule 1.013of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel
of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig.
The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that
was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No.
172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by
then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on
Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation
on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition.
The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as
the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the
respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his
position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards
when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application
because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant
alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the
complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo
to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s
alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that
the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between
Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the
respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the
complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given
due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed
areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The
complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct
Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a
result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met
with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the
land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the
respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando
Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of
Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct
considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a
qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant
averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of
his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation
of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2)
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice
of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a
lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee
on Awards.
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the
third malicious charge filed against him by the complainant. The first one
was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now
pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section
3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different
version of the antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the
subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the
DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between
Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the
complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR
found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application
over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized
that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the
Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo
told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued
that this allegation was without corroboration and was
debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo,
the complainant’s sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the
complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land and that he (the
respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on
Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The
respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the
subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a
witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter asserted his
rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the
truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that
the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land for the
medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his
daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the
money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between
Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the
payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel
Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what
his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said
Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his
father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-
beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the
transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in
favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his
father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s
application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had
pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land
was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the
complainant had no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as
Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included
in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their
conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before
the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over
the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending
of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR. application for visas before his office.18

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the
government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law
practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice
of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active
practice of law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his
third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he
represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene
in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to
the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of
the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as
a lawyer.10
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s
actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the
respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official,
but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was
previously connected with.
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney
of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded
and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before
this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence
of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner
defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application
was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s
own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990
before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales
application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of
the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently,
of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2,
2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its
decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and
membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way
promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his official
duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the
Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no
sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the
complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the
DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated"
respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative
the efforts to get the subject land does not specify how the orchestration
complaint.
was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003, 20 categorically
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither
was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land.
In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find
continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government
it to be in the respondent’s favor.
lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard
of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a
lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant
conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. presented to support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure
and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to
the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon
12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not
lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards for
contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the
constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also
respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the
bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor
proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely
of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere
acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our
with the discharge of their official functions.11
mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to
another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At
Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
government lawyer: dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are
contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel
had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation -
backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of the transaction in
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public
which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca
position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or
Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21,
(3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums
previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who
of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their
use their public offices to promote their private interests. 12
medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May
25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private
respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement was limited to being paid
interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the
the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph
interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with
Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan
public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge
would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and
of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives. 15
the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the
subject land.26
In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the
Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money from persons with
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary
applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of
evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money were extended by
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the
the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October
same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee
17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance 27 over the subject
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of
land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money
the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing
were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These
pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that
Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans
he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing
medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of
law after his separation from the government service, the complainant
presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel
and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally
represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the
foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was
a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in
and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated
with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in
private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32we specifically described private practice of
law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition
of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show
that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards,
or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any
uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or
deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down the
complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim
that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) 33 of Memorandum No. 119
when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The
matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in
the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3,
2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the
subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the
Office of the President, the Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per
our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our
Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant
to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation
to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of
what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been
proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.39

xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case
of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the
respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case
for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private

practice of their profession during their incumbency. 29 By way of
exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. 30 The last
paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under
subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition
is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction

and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously
interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence
the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have
accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his
public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome
of the proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent

previously interfered with the sales application covering Manuel’s land
when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was
engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by
the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document.
A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006
GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against
respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected
with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three
sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that
in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID
they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year
which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was
indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six
different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he
received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her
copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant
demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that
said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum
deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a
member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of
the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release
the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his
promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In
response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March
1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of
deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and
20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When
complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same
were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same.
Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999,
explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave
complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks
would be honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on
their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent.
After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the
deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent
two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline,
required3 respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt
thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the
allegations in the complaint claiming that having never physically received
the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or
pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services
rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent
explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise
a friend of the complainant, the latter was introduced to me at
my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons,
one of which is already of major age while the two others were
still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they have
been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as
holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend
their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the
government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such
for ten (10) years after which they could no longer extend their
said status and have to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them
that they better secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of the
Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and
thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in
obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must
have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son
Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the
same amount of show money separate of her money as he would
be issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be
included as her dependents in her said visa application. I
advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further
requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their
application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her
family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the
said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished and the
corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the
complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given
an independent permanent visa while the other two were made
as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of
the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I
became the intermediary between complainant and their
counsel so much that every amount that the latter would
request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which
request were then transmitted to the complainant and every
amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel
were coursed thru me which is the very reason why my
signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-
affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to
be huge for services of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder
why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and
inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts
were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her
show money from the bank is not really her money
but money of World Mission for Jesus, which
therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration
Law as there was a misrepresentation. This fact was
confirmed later when the said entity sent their
demand letter to the undersigned affiant and which is
attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the
complainant, was the very same amount used by her
son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate
permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and
her son could have been a ground for deportation and
likewise constitute criminal offense under the
Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code. These
could have been the possible reason why
complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her
family became very close to undersigned and my family that I
was even invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return
of their money given and surprisingly they want to recover the
same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer
around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now
being hidden and that the amount of money is now being sought
to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I
know the consequences of having signed the same and therefore
I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed
but up to the present my standby loan application has not been
released and was informed that the same would only be
forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been
released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition.
The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has now
become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003,
and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s
evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the
instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend
to his client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for
the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear,
despite due notice and without just cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
submitted her report5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. She
justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent
received the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent
himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of
complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant.
Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for
himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza.
This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the
documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March
1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex
H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit
but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing would happen that way.
Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of
then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the
needed papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all on
the first week of January this year, that all the said papers were recovered,
hence, the process of the release just started though some important
papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We
are just going through the normal standard operating procedure and there
is no day since January that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress
of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated
thus:
vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that
it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID.
Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed
the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID. 11 Such
defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the
matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present
the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent
in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate,
is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar,
respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he
was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the
evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any
plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for
reception of his evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is
settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be
buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial
is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he
deposited by your good self in connection with the procurement of your
indirectly admitted the charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the
permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time
following letters of respondent to complainant:
before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers
are being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late
Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart 1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:
attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is
forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal money
was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at
However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued the office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic)
by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and from the Bureau or from my own personal money.
official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why
would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the
inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount
complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also deposited by your goodself in connection with the procurement of your
be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. permanent visa and that of your family.
Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one
correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund
complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she
as some other pertinent papers are still being compiled and are being
never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your
visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a
advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau bureaucratic delay.
of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has
caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted
xxxx
that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one
dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso
with his public duties."
equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated
them to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.
Investigating Commissioner’s report with modification, thus:
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
done my very best for the early return of your money but the return is
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and
I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that
considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED
that I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The issue
from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal
should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me
interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be
financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action. I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one
last Saturday the releases of which are on the following:
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be
severely sanctioned. May 4, 1999- 200,000

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the May 11, 1999 -200,000
discharge of their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in
private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned
May 20, 1999-200,000
in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.7

June 4, 1999-200,000
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000
from complainant as shown by his signatures in the petty cash
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral. subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension
and disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which
law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
I assure you will be sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my
such privilege.24
aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these checks,
is returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against
me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not
only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
first check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all other checks that members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in
are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of the
I issued to you. Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government
lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public
trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be
returning the other checks I requested for stop payment - instead honored
magnified in the public eye.26
them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to
me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to
cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash
which I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not
entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer
place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts:
you to immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
would be honored this time. immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6)
violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of
without authority to do so.27
appropriating the money of another. As correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his
personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer
is an admission of misconduct. who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher
Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v.
Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of
Barcelona,29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor
the latter’s pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the
Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of
Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar
Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a
from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
certain person.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code which
bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest.
Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith
which may be affected by the functions of his office. 19 Respondent’s of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate
conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30
from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A
lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received from the
citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal
complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let
perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
went on committing another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
compounding his case.
SO ORDERED.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct,20 as the effect "transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing
Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals."21

Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check

knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the
letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly,
he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all
times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant
Philippine National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo,
former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with
complainant bank in which respondent during his employment with
aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he
participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-
M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted"
the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of
Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man
Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction
between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an
administrative case filed by complainant bank against his former
subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty,
respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by
the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of
complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of
the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with
complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil
action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a
result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm
"Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the
Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared
as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending
appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the
litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the
Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for
them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled
only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into
a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers
named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law
firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one
office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles
their own cases independently and individually receives the revenues
therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation,
report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that
respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00
in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon.
Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared
as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo
Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were
fully substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the
case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant
consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty.
Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case,
respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although
he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer
what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of
the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent
impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of
record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is
true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records and
information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all
times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of
respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former
borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the
legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said
clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate
sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he
expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on
October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation
in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October
25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP
Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another
"Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for
Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration
the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion
appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the
representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal
Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the
investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on
acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court,
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no
reason to disagree with him, that even if respondent
did not use against his client any information or
evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be
denied that he did become privy to information
regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which
was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was
the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling
incident which gave rise to the criminal action for
physical injuries. This Court's remarks inHilado vs.
David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in
a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant,
secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of
what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested
would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of
other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not
respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity,
the mere fact of their previous relationship should
have precluded him from appearing as counsel for
the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case
of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This
stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded
on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind,
it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to
keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force
and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of
complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the
opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in
violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse
influence and conflicting interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,

except by express conflicting consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.

TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS,
effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989 What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign
conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
PER CURIAM:
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989),
alternates) and proclaimed as officers:
were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics"
allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates:
Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly
NAME POSITION "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."
Atty. Violeta Drilon President
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit
far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
Atty. Renato F. Secretary, House of Delegates campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant
Ronquillo vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary
Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the
office of the Labor Secretary.
Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
Atty. Justiniano Governor & Vice-President for Northern mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
Cortes Luzon conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and
comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price
Luzon of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and,
on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
Manila
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
Atty. Jose Aguilar Governor & Vice-President for Southern judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by
Grapilon Luzon closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy
in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center
where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Atty. Teodoro Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia
Almine
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
Atty. Porfirio Governor & Vice-President for Eastern
Siyangco Visayas
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western
Visayas Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP
Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
Mindanao p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
Atty. Simeon Governor & Vice-President for Western approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to
Datumanong Mindanao the fundamental principles of the IBP.

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the
voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted
by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to
be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards
to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning
in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note
that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors
and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on
reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP
positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one
hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the
IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and
the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted
their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National
Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the
charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win
the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify
on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the
convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly
campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they
said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who
claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press
Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and
analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived
to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court,
after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-
political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is
strictly non-political, and every activity tending to
impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and
shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office
in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election
or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar
or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer
or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or
employee of any Chapter thereof shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of
the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for
any elective public office or accepts appointment to
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the
prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to
elections. — The following acts and practices relative
to election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar
or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any
form or manner, by himself or through another
person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election
campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
material other than a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size
sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such
statement to be done by persons other than those
authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or
combinations of candidates, as well as the
advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a
member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against
a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food,
drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of
value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be
made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the
above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and
practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the
Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from
office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition
of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and
in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47)
where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of
IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms
to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He
started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989
after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House
of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S.
Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F.
Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and
Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on
the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14
votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is
that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June
29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit
C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the
Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a
plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet
Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio
Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo
Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony
Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that
she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n.,
July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain
booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to
Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client.
While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on
an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he
would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity
brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride
on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to
Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company
talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and
asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR
Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit
the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with
the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga,
Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente
Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez
(Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V.
Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon),
Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas),
Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western
Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu
for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon
(Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo
(Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit
M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar
G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles
was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he
Badelles said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be
committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n.,
July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real,
Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-
2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-
3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to
be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills
of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno
Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth
Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A.
Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime
Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon,
Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used
as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked
40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine
Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements
with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms,
food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance
of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone
conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working
sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down
payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law 10,000
Office)
(d) Jay Castro 10,000
(e) Danny Deen 20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law 10,000
Office)
 testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP
(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000 convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group
admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300 so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about
the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than
the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the
husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy
contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time,
Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the
they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal
progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of
aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total
whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from
room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however,
his room.
that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs.
Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta,
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad BY-Laws).
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza,
Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary
Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans.
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
sigma rhoan.

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members
of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He
made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000
(t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34). On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to
be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as
wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention,
their tickets and bio-data.
by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000.
22, 29, 39). They were printed by his own printing shop.

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a
contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-
floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager,
respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-
Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for
those who committed themselves to his candidacy.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other
than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b],
IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign
materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more
campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in
previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July
6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's
ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law
firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo,
Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo,
Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre
Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a
candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E.
Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged
him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and
to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July
3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in
Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in
the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of
Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she
met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys.
Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty.
Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room
would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support
during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for
governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was
offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay).
When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an
IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused
to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but
my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs.
Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna,
who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an
assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar,
Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room
had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp.
102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels:
Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He
mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in
Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-
104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his
two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their
own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three
weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of
which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The
Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon
City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the
provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and
Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does
not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months
before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned
with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of
written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled
up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big
hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane
by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing
and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case
of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment
of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the
giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her
group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort
them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied
them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by
inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some
rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law
and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that
the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of
the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials
and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties
had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired
among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from
it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the
1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why
the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the
lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent
in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it
is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP
and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine
By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the
Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board
of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors
president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the
of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec.
national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3
47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency
as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it
present themselves as candidate for any position.
is hereby restored.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President
the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that
shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board
the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not
run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until SO ORDERED.
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have
been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of

the Philippines shall have a President and Executive
Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors,
as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The
governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary
and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the

IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
House of Delegates.'

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-

Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The

Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by
a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9)
Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different
Chapters in the region.

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors

at least one (1) month before the national convention
the delegates from each region shall elect the
governor for their region, the choice of which shall as
much as possible be rotated among the chapters in
the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following

provision as part of the first paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the

general membership shall be held prior to any
election in an election year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the

Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that
are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos.
and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated
December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224,
QC.
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated
November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259
(not 257), Parañaque, MM.
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time
to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17,
1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of
an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas,
as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin.
Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in
SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached
copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1,
1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's
signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal
259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995,
issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his
conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997,
by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R.
Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint
within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for
using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the
Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in
good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an
admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled
to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was
no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28,
1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14,
1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision
was set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted
from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of
Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case
No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still
pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the
decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light
felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had
been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal
occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes,
income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly
believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law,
but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In
fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and
be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by
the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner
wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with
such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is
ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated
for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues
despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22,
1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case
is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's
suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-
indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint,
more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."
 The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However,
respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991." in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically
his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas'
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished
xxx xxx xxx
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.1âwphi1.nêt
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present
case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice
SO ORDERED.
of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have
publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4
of Respondent's Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues

to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has

misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and
therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum
did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law
practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a
"limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from
the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar

shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the

provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice

of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
"limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that
their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby

misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues
to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent

to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
B.M. No. 1222 February 4, 2004
Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in
Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the
examination on the subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug
reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the
subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. On
23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice
Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to
hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at eight o’clock in the
evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle
University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution was issued without
prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the matter.
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous
petitions and motions from the Philippine Association of Law Schools and
various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the
nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong
reservations against the holding of another examination on the subject.
Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these
reasons being the physical, emotional and financial difficulties that would
be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the subject
were to be held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court
included the spreading out of the weight of Mercantile Law among the
remaining seven bar subjects, i.e., to determine and gauge the results of the
examinations on the basis only of the performance of the examinees in the
seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court,
finding merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled
examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to allocate the
fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the
same resolution, the Court further resolved to create a Committee
composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a
thorough investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003
resolution.
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the
source of leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might have
benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have
been responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in
question and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the
integrity of the bar examinations.
On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and
recommendation to the Court, herein reproduced in full; thus -
"In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar
examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle
University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since
1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in
the said examination.1
"Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own,
Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee,
reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the
examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation
of the leakage be undertaken.
"Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a
resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in
mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject
on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight o’clock in the evening (being the
earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because
numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed
against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court
cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen
(15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar
examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).
"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an
Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the
Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings
and recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.

In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation

in the allocation of the fifteen percentage points for Mercantile Law among "The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the
the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit: Supreme Court to compose the Committee:

Original Adjusted Adjusted Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIÑO-AQUINO

Relative
Subject Percentage Percentage Relative
Weight
Weight Weight Weight Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
Political and
International 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Law "The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the
source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and those who
Labor and benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the
Social 10% 11.765% 2 2.35% integrity of the bar examinations.
Legislation
"The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to
Civil law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53% November 7, 2003. The following witnesses appeared and testified at the
investigation:
Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar
Criminal law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35% Examinations Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice
Remedial Vitug
20% 23.529% 4 4.71% 3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;
Law
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos
Legal Ethics
& Perez;
and Practical 5% 5.882% 1 1.18%
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;
Exercises
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex
Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;
100% 20% 9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma
In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the Lambda Fraternity;
following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the 12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems
Investigating Committee: Development for Judicial Application, MlSO;

The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct the
Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino investigation and three times to deliberate on its report.
"ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations
Committee, testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day
after the Bar examination in mercantile or commercial law, upon arriving
in his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary,2 Rose Kawada, informed
him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, told her that
a friend of hers named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from
Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City, who was staying at the Garden
Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the
examination in mercantile law, because previous to the
examination, i.e., on Saturday afternoon, the eve of the examination, she
received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did not pay
attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she
was hard-pressed to finish her review of that subject, using other available
bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from various bar
review centers.
"However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia
noticed that many of them were the same questions that were asked in the
just-concluded-examination.
"Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the
Supreme Court, but Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug
suggested that Marlo and Rose invite Carbajosa to meet them at Robinson’s
Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.
"Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinson’s Place at the appointed time and
showed the test questions to Rose and Marlo. Rose obtained a xerox copy
of the leaked questions and compared them with the bar questions in
mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the
differences she noted between the leaked questions and the bar
examination questions.
"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug
who compared them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law.
He found the leaked questions to be the exact same questions which the
examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared
and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee.
However, not all of those questions were asked in the bar examination.
According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the final bar questions were
questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself,
were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by
Justice Vitug were not among the leaked test questions.
"Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail,
reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano
Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh. B -
B-3), attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet
showing that the source of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed
them to Ronan Garvida on September 17, 2003, four days before the
examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).
"ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the
Committee. She identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from
Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A). She testified that, according to Carbajosa, the
latter received the test questions from one of her co-bar reviewees staying,
like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review
classes at the Lex Review Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas
Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out because the Lex
Review Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees.
"ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the
law firm of BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite
Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, testified that in
November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on the
2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law.
He accepted the assignment and almost immediately began the
preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his personal computer
in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of
test questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3-5,
tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire
in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the
questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003). And, as he did not know how to print
the questionnaire, he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id.,
pp. 14-15). All of this was done inside his office with only him and his
secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy (Id., p. 15). He then
placed the printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an
envelope which he sealed, and called up Justice Vitug to inform him that he
was bringing the questions to the latter’s office that afternoon. However,
as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to
give the sealed envelope to his confidential assistant who had been
instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in the office of Justice Vitug,
he was met by Justice Vitug’s confidential assistant to whom he entrusted
the sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19-26, tsn, Oct. 24,
2003).
"Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer
except to type on it. He does not know how to open and close his own
computer which has a password for that purpose. In fact, he did not know,
as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened
and closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was
Cheryl Palma who devised it (Id., p. 71).
"His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room
which is locked when he is not in the office. He comes to the office every
other day only.
"He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and
that he alone had access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports
of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected
with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30,45). As a
matter of fact, the employees - Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Katly - of
the Court’s Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the
request of Atty. Balgos, were directed by the Investigating Committee to
inspect the computer system in his office, reported that there were 16, not
9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and
one (1) stand-alone computer connected to the internet (Exh. M). Atty.
Balgos’ law partner, former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez, also had a
computer, but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of Justice.
"The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers, connected to Attorney
Balgos’ computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)
2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal
5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
"Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions
prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called
together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except
Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to
know nothing about the bar leakage.
"He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a
second year law student at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and
operating computers. It was he and/or his brother Gregorio who
interconnected the computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos’
computer, without the latter’s knowledge and permission.
"Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar
operations or ‘bar ops’ of the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which
he is a member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of
bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46-47, Oct. 24, 2003).
"The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman,
also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De
Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from
Attorney Balgos’ computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother.
Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the source of the
leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn, p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final
bar questions and his proposed test questions, with marginal markings
made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Ret.), indicating whether the
questions are similar: (S); or different: (D), together with the percentage
points corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative
table and Atty. Balgos’ indications as to which questions were the same or
different from those given in the final questionnaire, Justice Mendoza
computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions.
The proposed questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions.
Attached to this Report as Annex A is the comparative table and the
computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1.
"CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the
past six years, testified that she did not type the test questions. She
admitted, however, that it was she who formatted the questions and
printed one copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos’
testimony regarding her participation in the operation of his personal
computer. She disclosed that what appears in Atty. Balgos’ computer can
be seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open and
not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty.
Balgos’ computer when the latter is open and not in use.
"ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that
on October 16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him ‘72
hours to explain in writing why you should not be terminated for causing
the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of the
leakage aforesaid.’
"On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation ‘effective
immediately.’ He explained that:
‘Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved
condemnation and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of,
my mind. It is just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your
memorandum occurred. Rest assured, though, that I have never been part
of any deliberate scheme to malign the good reputation and integrity of the
firm, its partners and members.’ (Exh. D)
"DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000.
He obtained his LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an
awardee for academic excellence. He passed the 1998 bar examinations
with a grade of 86.4%. In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law
fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State
University). As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar
examinations and participated in the fraternity’s ‘bar ops.’
"He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty.
Balgos’ computer, (which he often did without the owner’s knowledge or
permission), to download materials which he thought might be useful to
save for future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in
mercantile law consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were
quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be preparing. He saved them in
his hard disk.
"He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity ‘brods,’ a
certain Ronan Garvida who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar
examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from FEU. He had taken the
2002 bar examinations, but did not pass.
"On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar
examination, De Guzman faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs.
I, I-1, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was informed by Garvida that
he was retaking the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the
questions with other ‘Betan’ examinees. He allegedly did not charge
anything for the test questions. Later, after the examination was over,
Garvida ‘texted’ (sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De Guzman),
that he did not take the bar examination.
"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to
another fraternity brother named Arlan (surname unknown), through
Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20-28, Oct. 29, 2003). But
he himself faxed the questions to still another ‘brod’ named Erwin Tan who
had helped him during the ‘bar ops’ in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the
bar examinations (Id., p. 28). He obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan
and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by text
message, that they were ‘guide questions,’ not tips, in the mercantile law
examination.
"When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the
examination, (news of the leakage was already in all the newspapers), De
Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed the questions to his
fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions.
"De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that
he received the test questions. However, Erwin informed him that the
questions were ‘kalat na kalat’ (all over the place) even if he did not share
them with others (Tsn, pp. 54-55, Oct. 29, 2003).
"De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies
of the test questions to Betans Randy Iñigo and James Bugain.
"Arlan also ‘texted’ De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in
the examination. Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions
were asked in the examination, ‘pero hindi exacto; mi binago’ (they were
not exactly the same; there were some changes).
"De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.
"De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from
Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, and through self-study, by asking
those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has been using computers
since 1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which
he uses at home.
"REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De
Guzman, submitted her affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her
participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax of the leaked test
questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De
Guzman.
"RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in
compliance with the subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated
from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32 years of age. While still a
student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of
the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal
cord. It is a chronic disabling disease although it may have periods of
remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and staggering gait;
the hands and fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the
eyesight can be impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol.
2, Reader’s Digest Medical Encyclopedia, 1971 Ed., compiled by Benjamin
F. Miller, M.D.). All these symptoms were present when Garvida testified
before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions
regarding his involvement in the leakage of the examiner’s test questions
in mercantile law.
"Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a
member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was
befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior by one and a half
years. Although they had been out of touch since he went home to the
province on account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able
[to] get this cell phone number from his compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De
Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him ‘possible questions in the bar
examination in mercantile law.’ Because the test questions had no answers,
De Guzman stressed that they were not ‘tips’ but only ‘possible test
questions.’
"Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in
the Consortium Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment
fee. However, on his way to the Supreme Court to file his application to take
the bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist - symptoms that his MS
had recurred. His physician advised him to go to the National Orthopedic
Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. This he did.
"He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he
continued to attend the review classes at the Consortium Review Center
because he did not want to waste completely the P10,000-enrollment fee
that he paid for the review course (‘Nahihinayang ako’). That was
presumably why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking the bar
exams and sent him a copy of the test questions in mercantile law.
"Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his ‘brod’ Randy
Iñigo who was reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy
photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity brods. Some of the
brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who has a
high regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were ‘tips.’ Garvida
did not fax the questions to any other person than Randy Iñigo. He
allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. ‘I could not do that to a brod,’
he explained.
"In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh.
H) bore on the left margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials
‘BEA-MLQU,’ indicating that the source of that copy was the Beta Sigma
Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the
Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that
his fraternity conducted ‘Bar Ops’ for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the
biggest activity of the fraternity every year. They start as soon as new
officers of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until the bar
examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from
alumni brods and friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials
for the use of their ‘barristers’ (bar candidates) in the various review
centers, providing meals for their ‘brod’-barristers on examination days;
and to rent a ‘bar site’ or place near De la Salle University where the
examinees and the frat members can convene and take their meals during
the break time. The Betans’ bar site for the 2003 bar examinations was
located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before
[the] start of the examination, Collado’s fraternity distributed bar review
materials for the mercantile law examination to the examinees who came
to the bar site. The test questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from
a brod, Alan Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iñigo.
"Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo
and initials of the fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU
examinees taking the bar exams. Because of time constraints, frat members
were unable to answer the test questions despite the clamor for answers,
so, they were given out ‘as is’ - without answers.
"DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose Rizal University law school in
Mandaluyong City, was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical
Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is operated by the Lex Review &
Seminars Inc., of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned
about the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was
delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal Forms at the Arellano University.
The leaked questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn
Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in
mercantile law because he was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his
last lecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday before the exam. He
denied having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test questions
in Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.
"F I N D I N G S
"The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law
were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had
prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003
Bar Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the
questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of
September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were
not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos.
Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions
before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly,
would have been assured of passing the examination with at least a grade
of 82%!
"The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test
questions prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage
originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar
Examinations Chairman.
"Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him
on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions
was Atty. Balgos’ computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them
from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent,
and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos’ legal assistant,
Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the
Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test
questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity
‘brods,’ namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall),
and Erwin Tan.
"In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iñigo and
James Bugain.
"Randy Iñigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another
Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambda’s]
Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who ordered the printing and
distribution of 30 copies to the MLQU’s 30 bar candidates.
"Attorney Danilo De Guzman’s act of downloading Attorney Balgos’ test
questions in mercantile law from the latter’s computer, without his
knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of
intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of
Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.
"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of
Attorney Balgos’ right to privacy of communication, and to security of his
papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure - rights
zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and
3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).
"He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers’ Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and
legal processes.’
"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some
members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary
profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the
mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by
his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for members of the Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded
the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity.
His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the
integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduate’s
academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.
However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman
was solely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos’ proposed test
questions in the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not
believe that he acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation
of other persons, such as:
"Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos’ private secretary, who, according to Atty.
Balgos himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could
open and close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his
computer was kept. Since a computer may not be accessed or downloaded
unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos’ computer in
order for De Guzman to retrieve the test questions stored therein.
"Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity ‘brod’ of De Guzman, who was
responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos’ computer with the other
computers outside Atty. Balgos’ room or office, and who was the only other
person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of Atty. Balgos’
computer.
"The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed
copies of the leaked test questions, appear to have conspired with him to
steal and profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have
been motivated solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was
widespread (‘kalat na kalat’) according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-
conspirators were:
Ronan Garvida,
Arlan,
Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo,
Ronald Collado, and
Allan Guiapal
"The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law
and risked his job and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma
Lambda fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material
consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy
that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations.
"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions
from Atty. Balgos’ computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had
exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions
which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which
he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to
deep secret the test questions that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly
did not know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to
use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in
a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the
machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally
unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking
as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to
use the typewriter in the use of which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos
should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter,
in the privacy of his home, (instead of his law office), where they would
have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys.
Atty. Balgos’ negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed
test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the
proximate cause of the ‘bar leakage;’ it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he
had taken those simple precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers,
nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The
integrity of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the
scandal. He admitted that ‘Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened’
(43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
"This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June
10, 2002, 383 SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers:
‘Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the
profession.’ In another case, it likewise intoned: ‘We cannot overstress the
duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts, and to his clients.’ (Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574,
February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538). It goes without saying that a lawyer who
violates this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct
which dishonors and diminishes the public’s respect for the legal
profession, should be disciplined.
"After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:
"1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown
that he is morally unfit to continue as a member of the legal
profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal
behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC
APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the Supreme Court for involving
 it in another ‘bar scandal,’ causing the cancellation of the
mercantile law examination, and wreaking havoc upon the
image of this institution.

"2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by

the Court and likewise be required to make a written APOLOGY
to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result
of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and
safeguarding his proposed test questions in mercantile law. As
the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on
account of the ‘leakage’ of Attorney Balgos’ test questions, which
comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty.
Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for
that subject.

"3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl

Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by
the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National
Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as probable co-
conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in
mercantile law.

"With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the

bar examinations and prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said
examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present under study by the
Court’s Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of
proposals for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would
be well-advised to refrain from including in this report what may turn out
to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter." 3

The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the
recommendation, of the Investigating Committee. The Court, certainly will
not countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity
of the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court.

The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R.
Katly, two of its employees assigned to the Management Information
Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to
inspect the computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the
Court’s Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR) database4 was installed
in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported
that the system, which was developed by the MISO, was intended for the
exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof to any external
computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court.
Atty. Velasco informed the two Court employees that the CALR database
was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by Atty.
Balgos. The matter would also need further investigation to determine how
Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Court’s CALR database.

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the

Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to -

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law

effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE

him from receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in
Mercantile Law;

(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake

further investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma,
Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James
Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to
determining their participation and respective accountabilities
in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an investigation
on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the
Supreme Court’s CALR database.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De

Guzman in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated by the Office of the Court Administrator to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005 The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support
of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being
the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine
Bar8 - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in,
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of
the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither
can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of
the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia:
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that
a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he
continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with
of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an it the power to impose such exaction.
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help
in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of
rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his
done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad,
required payment of the annual dues.
so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the
creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of
Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
from payment of the annual dues. remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is
questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could
not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP discontinued.
annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of
derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment
Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under
of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right
inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a
the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay
lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
membership dues to the IBP.
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption
infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the
practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986
and he was working abroad from 1986-2003? This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in
this wise:
We rule in the negative.
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to
under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the public responsibilities.
offending member.5
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP

dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by
the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of
law.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11139, April 19, 2016
PHILCOMSAT* HOLDINGS CORPORATION, DULY REPRESENTED BY
ERLINDA I. BILDNER, Complainant, v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND
ATTY. SIKINI C. LABASTILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated August 20, 2009 filed by
complainant PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, represented by Erlinda
I. Bildner2 (complainant), against respondents Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. (Atty.
Lokin, Jr.) and Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla (Atty. Labastilla; collectively,
respondents) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of respondents for
insinuating that the Sandiganbayan received the amount of P2,000,000.00
in exchange for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The Facts
The Complaint alleged that sometime in June 2007, the Senate, through its
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises,
conducted an investigation concerning the anomalies that plagued the
PHILCOMSAT group of companies, which includes complainant,
particularly in its huge disbursements of monies and/or assets. In the
course of the said investigation, the Senate examined various financial
records and documents of the company, which at that time, were under the
control and management of Atty. Lokin, Jr. and his co-directors. Among the
records examined by the Senate was an entry in complainant's checkbook
stub which reads "Cash for Sandiganbayan, tro, potc-philcomsat case -
P2,000,000"3 (subject checkbook entry). It was then discovered that the
check was issued in connection with complainant's injunction case against
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) before the
Sandiganbayan, which was filed by Atty. Lokin, Jr.'s group, as its
representatives, with Atty. Labastilla as its external counsel (POTC case).
As the investigation was publicized by the media, the Sandiganbayan
learned about the subject checkbook entry and, accordingly, motu
proprio initiated indirect contempt proceedings against respondents,
along several others, which was docketed as Case No. SB-07-SCA-
0054 (indirect contempt case).5
After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution6 dated May 7, 2009, finding respondents guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of indirect contempt and, accordingly, sentenced each of
them to pay a fine in the amount of P30,000.00 and to suffer imprisonment
for a period of six (6) months.7 In finding respondents guilty, the
Sandiganbayan opined that: (a) any person reading the subject checkbook
entry would come to the conclusion that a check in the amount of
P2,000,000.00 was issued to the Sandiganbayan in exchange for the latter's
issuance of a TRO, thereby degrading its integrity and honor; (b) Atty.
Lokin, Jr. caused the creation of the said entry in complainant's checkbook
which as testified upon by complainant's bookkeeper, Desideria D. Casas,
was the proximate cause thereof;8 and (c) circumstantial evidence showed
that Atty. Labastilla conspired with Atty. Lokin, Jr. in causing such
contemptuous entry, considering, inter alia, that the former was the
counsel who applied for a TRO and that he admitted receipt of the proceeds
of the check, although allegedly for legal fees9 and that Sheriffs Manuel
Gregorio Mendoza Torio and Romulo C. Barrozo of the Sandiganbayan
similarly testified that such TRO was only effected/served upon payment
of the corresponding fees.10
Following the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan's May 7, 2009
Resolution, the complainant instituted the instant complaint.
In his defense, Atty. Lokin, Jr. maintained that he did not perform acts
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), insisting that the
Sandiganbayan's findings in the indirect contempt case were erroneous
and contrary to the pertinent evidence and records. He likewise pointed
out that the Sandiganbayan ruling was appealed - albeit not by him but by
Atty. Labastilla - to the Court, i.e., G.R. No. 187699,11 which appeal remains
unresolved. Therefore, it cannot be the basis for his administrative
liability.12
For his part, Atty. Labastilla harped on the fact that an appeal questioning
the Sandiganbayan ruling is still pending before the Court; thus, it was
premature to file an administrative complaint against him. He further
maintained that he had no participation in the creation of the subject
checkbook entry and, even if he had any such participation, there was
nothing contemptuous about it.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation14 dated January 23, 2013, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Lokin, Jr. administratively liable
and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. However, Atty.
Labastilla was absolved from any administrative liability.15
Similar to the Sandiganbayan, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
Atty. Lokin, Jr. responsible for the creation of the subject checkbook entry.
In this relation, it was pointed out that while Atty. Lokin, Jr. offered an
explanation regarding the said entry, such explanation was more in the
nature of an avoidance and confession posturing, and therefore, was not
helpful to his cause as it only served to further implicate him in the making
of the aforesaid entry.16
On the other hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found no evidence
showing that Atty. Labastilla had any participation in the making of the
subject checkbook entry, and as such, could not be reasonably implicated
therein. In absolving Atty. Labastilla, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
stressed that the instant administrative case's concern was only with the
actual making of the subject checkbook entry, and not as to whether Atty.
Labastilla actually participated in the disbursement of the proceeds of the
check and/or in the attempt to bribe any officials and employees of the
Sandiganbayan to obtain a TRO.17
In a Resolution18 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation. Atty.
Lokin, Jr. moved for reconsideration,19 but the same was denied in a
Resolution20 dated June 6, 2015 with modification increasing the
recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to three (3)
years.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents should be
held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
As will be explained hereunder, the Court: (a) concurs with the IBP's
findings as to Atty. Lokin, Jr.'s administrative liability; and (b) disagrees
with the IBP's recommendation to absolve Atty. Labastilla from
administrative liability.
At the outset, the Court notes that the indirect contempt case originally
filed before the Sandiganbayan is in the nature of a criminal
contempt.21 "[C]riminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrespute or disrespect."22 "[C]riminal contempt, being directed
against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against
organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against
public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused,
and the proceedings to punish it are punitive."23
Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot
insist that the filing of an administrative case against them on the basis of
the Sandiganbayan's ruling in the aforesaid case is premature on the
premise that their conviction has not attained finality. It is well-settled that
a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action
filed against a lawyer despite being involved in the same set of facts. Case
law instructs that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the
lawyer's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate them
administratively.24 In Spouses Saunders v. Pagano-Calde:25
[A]dministrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are
attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound
judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will
be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court.26 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To note, while it is undisputed that Atty. Labastilla indeed filed a petition
before the Court questioning the Sandiganbayan ruling, i.e., G.R.. No.
187699, records are bereft of any showing that Atty. Lokin, Jr. joined Atty.
Labastilla in said petition or that he separately filed an appeal on his own.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan ruling had long become deemed final and
executory as to him. Moreover, Atty. Labastilla's appeal before the Court
was already resolved through a Minute Resolution27 dated August 3, 2009
denying the same for failure to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan
committed any reversible error in issuing the challenged ruling. Atty.
Labastilla twice moved for reconsideration, but were denied with finality
in Resolutions dated February 1, 201028 and August 11, 2010.29 In light of
the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan's ruling that respondents committed
contumacious acts which tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity
of such court has become final and executory and, thus, conclusive as to
them, at least in the indirect contempt case.30
In this administrative case, the Court, after a thorough assessment of the
merits of the case, finds itself in agreement with the IBP's finding that the
subject checkbook entry contained a contumacious imputation against the
Sandiganbayan, i.e., that a check in the amount of P2,000,000.00 was issued
and given to the Sandiganbayan in order to secure a favorable TRO in the
POTC case. As the records show, Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one who caused
the making of the subject checkbook entry, considering that: (a) during the
time the said entry was made, complainant's financial records and
documents were under his and his co-directors' control and management;
(b) the complainant's bookkeeper, Desideria D. Casas, categorically
testified that it was Atty. Lokin, Jr. who requested for the issuance and
disbursement of the check in the amount of P2,000,000.00, and that he was
also the one who instructed her to write the subject checkbook entry in the
complainant's checkbook;31 (c) Atty. Lokin, Jr. never denied participation
and knowledge of the issuance of the check and the consequent creation of
the subject checkbook entry;32 and (c) when asked to explain during the
Senate investigation, Atty. Lokin, Jr. failed to give a credible justification for
the making of such entry, and instead, resorted to avoidance and
confession posturing.33 Thus, the IBP correctly concluded that Atty. Lokin,
Jr. caused the making of the subject checkbook entry in complainant's
financial records.
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. and Atty. Sikini C.
Labastilla are found GUILTY of violating Canons 7 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years, while Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be attached to respondents' personal record as
members of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cra

However, the Court does not agree with the IBP's finding that Atty.
Labastilla could not reasonably be implicated in the making of the subject
checkbook entry. The Court is more inclined to concur with the
Sandiganbayan's findings in the indirect contempt case that Atty. Labastilla
also had a hand, direct or indirect, in the creation of the subject checkbook
entry in light of the following circumstances: (a) he was complainant's
external counsel who applied for the TRO in the POTC case; (b) he admitted
receipt of the proceeds of the check in the amount of P2,000,000.00,
although allegedly for legal fees but with no supporting evidence
therefor;34 (c) the TRO was only effected/served upon payment of the
corresponding fees per the testimonies of Sheriffs Manuel Gregorio
Mendoza Torio and Romulo C. Barrozo of the Sandiganbayan;35 and (d) the
TRO and the aforesaid check were both dated September 23, 2005, thereby
establishing an unmistakeable connection between the TRO and the
check.36 Moreover, and as correctly pointed out by complainant, while Atty.
Labastilla claims that he received the amount of P2,000,000.00 as payment
for his legal fees, he failed to properly account the aforesaid amount. 37 In
addition, complainant's summary of legal fees paid to Atty. Labastilla did
not reflect the P2,000,000.00 check which he purportedly received as legal
fees.38 Therefore, Atty. Labastilla should also be held administratively
liable for his complicity in the making of the subject checkbook entry.

As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would
tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as the
subject checkbook entry which contumaciously imputed corruption
against the Sandiganbayan. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of
the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations.39This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty
violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held
administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.

Furthermore, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession" for the strength of
the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is
every lawyer's duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by
staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach.40 It must
be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all
lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the good name of the legal
profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige, and reputation
of the judiciary.41 In this case, respondents compromised the integrity of
the judiciary by maliciously imputing corrupt motives against the
Sandiganbayan through the subject checkbook entry. Clearly, respondents
also violated Canon 7 of the CPR and, thus, should be held administratively
liable therefor.

Anent the proper penalty to be meted to respondents, jurisprudence

provides that in similar cases where lawyers perform acts which tend to
erode the public confidence in the courts, put the courts in a bad light, and
bring the justice system into disrepute, the Court imposed upon them the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Baculi v. Battung,42 the
Court meted the aforesaid penalty to a lawyer for his disrespect to the
courts, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the
judicial system itself. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court
imposes upon Atty. Labastilla the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year for his complicity in the making of the
subject checkbook entry. On the other hand, since Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the
one directly responsible for the making of the subject checkbook entry, the
Court deems it appropriate to impose upon him the graver penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as
recommended by the IBP.chanrobleslaw
A.C. No. 4921 March 6, 2003 "2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant
with my child;
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant,
vs. "3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic)
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent. her womb to be my own;

PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre
against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
"4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth,
including his/her personal and medical needs, education,
housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I
will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until
he/she becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her own;

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

"5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional
proof that he/she is my child; however, my failure to sign does
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done
officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 1 Respondent herein;
courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing
himself to be single.2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that started
"6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my
sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.3 During their affair, respondent
part and being a lawyer, I have full knowledge of the
was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997,
consequence of such acknowledgment and recognition."14
he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the
first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was
already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which
her relationship with respondent.5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, states in part:
who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship
with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying
"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your
as his.6 On December 9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha
officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the
Jessa.7 By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing
look like(sic) of your daughter.
the child and giving her any form of support.8

"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter,

Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what
but I cannot promise fix amount for monthly support of your
transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never
daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more
represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was
than P1,000."15
already married and with children;9 complainant is almost 10 years older
than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; 10 the child
borne by complainant it not his, because the complainant was seeing other In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a
men at the time they were having an affair.11 He admits that he signed the judge stated that:
affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save
complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that
". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to
complainant was seeing other men.12
the strict standard of conduct demanded of members of the
profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than
After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo his lawful wife fails to meet these standards."16
Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted
the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer.17
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita
demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to
"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
self-stultification.18
immoral or deceitful conduct."

This Court has repeatedly held:

xxx xxx xxx

"CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar."
xxx xxx xxx
"Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession."
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."19
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with
complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that
"men by nature are polygamous,"20 and that what happened between them
was "nothing but mutual lust and desire."21 The Court is not convinced. In
fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

"x x x that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as

Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection.
to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
Granting arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with him
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must
knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondent's fitness
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency."13
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The
Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a
notary public, he declared explicitly:
"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the
complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding to
"1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my
grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law
officemate;
profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the
courts."22
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was
preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is
unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar
must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar.23 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain
one's good standing in the profession;24 it is a continuing requirement to
the practice of law25 and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude
a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is
because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption
that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.

The Court held:

"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by

the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege
to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived
of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be
heard."26

and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:

"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.

Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance
of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law."27

Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his

wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously
recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent
violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and
should be disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a

lesser punishment could be given.28Records show that from the time he
took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now
lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not
perceive this fact as an indication of respondent's effort to mend his ways
or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of
law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the
circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted out than
disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is
able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in
himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness
required of every member of the profession.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.29

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent

GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in

the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and
all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005
WILSON PO CHAM, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
Wilson Po Cham (complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro
(respondent) for commission of falsehood and misrepresentations in
violation of a lawyer’s oath.
Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned the
filing of the present administrative complaint.
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Cañete (Cañete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio),
and now deceased Mario Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal
Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to him a parcel of land with an
area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of Cad.
Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the
property).
He having expressed interest in the offer, Cañete and Navarro arranged a
meeting between him and respondent at the latter’s residence in Balanga,
Bataan1 where respondent categorically represented to him that the
property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable. 2 Respondent
in fact presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment3 dated July
10, 1995 covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal
Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute
Sale4 dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by the alleged previous
actual occupant of the property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon),
transferring all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of
Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for
an agreed consideration of ₱500,000.00; and 3) Special Power of
Attorney5 dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing
him (respondent) to:
1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is more
particularly described as follows:
AREA: 40 has. more or less
situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6066 PIN #108-08-044-05-126
2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale
of the subject property; and to sign the same.
3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the
corresponding share of each co-owner;
x x x6 (Underscoring supplied)
On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed an Option
to Buy,7 the pertinent portions of which provide:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners
of rights with planted trees (improvements) containing an area of FORTY
THREE (43) hectares, situated in Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong,
Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre), covered by Tax
Declaration 6066.
WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price of
THREE MILLION AND SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic), as follows:
a) Earnest money of ₱10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the
balance of full payment within three (3) weeks from date hereof which
offer the SELLER accepts;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and
the terms and conditions hereunder specified the parties have agreed on
the following:
1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic) of
₱10,000.00 upon signing of this contract, which shall form part of the
contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic) with his obligation to pay
in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the
BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in full on the
scheduled period the ₱10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in favor
of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is automatically cancelled.
2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final
Deed of Sale and shall surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to
the properties subject of sale;
3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the
above stated properties including the trees planted on it as against the
rights of third party except that of the government. 8 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid respondent the
amount of ₱10,000.00 for which respondent issued the corresponding
Receipt9 reading:
Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) from MR.
WILSON CHAM, representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of Cad.
Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:
NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo
SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao
including the trees and improvement situated thereon.
Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date
hereof.10 (Underscoring supplied)
On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 11 over
the property in his favor, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
(₱3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged from the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the SELLERS,
the said SELLERS do by these presents SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY, in
manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said BUYER, his heirs and
assigns, all their rights, interest and participation over that certain real
estate destined for, and in actual use as fruit land, situated at Pook
Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more particularly described
as follows:
Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan
Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing an
area of 392,155 square meters more or less.
Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo
South : National Road, Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao
The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing land
are visible by means of monuments, creeks and trees; that the land
including the permanent improvements existing thereon consist of fruit-
bearing trees assessed for the current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ₱262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration No.
5010; and that the property is presently in the possession of the SELLERS.
The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the absolute
owners of the rights over the said property; that they have the perfect right
to convey the same; that they acquired their rights over the said property
by absolute deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who acquired his rights over
the property from Marianito Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his
right from Pedro de Leon who, in turn, acquired his right from Julian Agujo
who was the original owner who cleared the land and who was in
possession of the same immediately after the Second World War.
The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed real
estate including the trees planted thereon and they undertake to defend
the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and assigns against the claims of any
third person whomsoever.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No.
501013 with Property Index No. 018-08-004-05-126 issued in his
(respondent’s) name and his alleged co-owners, and Real Property Tax
Receipt No. 02520114 dated August 17, 1995 issued in his (respondent’s)
name.
He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing
the purchase price of the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation
Check No. GA06321015 in the amount of ₱168,627.00 payable to
respondent, and Asian Bank Manager’s Check No. 004639GA 16 in the
amount of ₱3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.
He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed
wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard
approached him and informed him that the property could not be fenced
as it was part of the Bataan National Park.17
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or
disposable land susceptible of private ownership. He thus secured a
Certification18 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer
Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:
This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land
claimed by spouses Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio
Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located at Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan.
Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of this
Office, said lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. Map/N.P. Map
No. 34 as certified on December 1, 1945. Under the Public Land Law, lands
within this category are not subject for disposition.19 (Underscoring
supplied)
He also obtained a Letter-directive20 dated August 31, 1995 issued by
Officer-in-Charge Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENR) of Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal
Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:
Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some
forest occupants that are securing land tax declarations from your
office in (sic) the pretext that the area they
occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands.
Presently, this tax declaration is being used in the illegal selling of
right [of] possession within the Bataan Natural Park which is
prohibited under our laws.
xxx
In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of
informing us and in controlling this land rush and massive selling and
buying of rights of possession within prohibited areas as stated
above.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification22 dated March 14, 1996
stating that those named by respondent as prior owners of rights over the
property from whom respondent and his alleged co-owners acquired their
alleged rights were not among those inventoried as occupants per the
PENR’s 1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO) Survey.
Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase
price of the rights over the property.23
In his present complaint24 dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges
respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing
manifest falsehood and evident misrepresentation by employing
fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the property which
property he represented to be disposable and alienable. 25
In his Comment26 dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied having
employed deceit or having pretended to co-own rights over the property
or having represented that it was alienable and disposable. He claimed that
complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase of property,
knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his purchase; 27 and
that despite complainant’s awareness that he was merely "buying rights to
forest land," he just the same voluntarily entered into the transaction
because of the property’s proximity to the Subic Bay Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the
property in the hope that lands belonging to the public domain in Morong
"would be eventually declared alienable and disposable to meet the rising
demand for economic zones."28
By Resolution29 of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from notice.
On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply 30 to
respondent’s Comment, maintaining that the sale of rights over the
property was attended with deceit as respondent deliberately did not
disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National
Park.31 And he denied being engaged in speculation, he claiming that with
his purchase of the property, he would venture into low-cost housing for
the employees of the nearby Subic Bay area.32
To complainant’s Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June 21, 2002. 33
Complainant later filed his Affidavit34 and Position Paper35 on June 21,
2002 and September 17, 2001, respectively, reiterating his assertions in
his previous pleadings.
The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against respondent, Banzon, Zabala, Cañete, Alipio and Navarro in
199936 arising from the questioned sale of rights. The complaint was twice
dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On petition for review,
however, the Department of Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B.
Perez, by Resolution37 of March 6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the
complaint as it found probable cause to indict respondent et al. in court. An
information for estafa was thereupon filed against respondent et al. before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-00-94232.
By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding
respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar to do no
falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the approval of the
members of the Board of Governors. Pertinent portions of the Report and
Recommendation read:
. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of NIPAS ACT38 prohibited the illegal selling of rights or
possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan Natural Park, the
subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO Laurino D.
Mapadanig [illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to the
Municipal Assessor therein and certified on December 1, 1945 that subject
property which is within this category was not subject for disposition; a
fact supposed to be known by the respondent being a resident of Balanga,
Bataan and was in the practice of his profession also in said area.
Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not among
those inventoried occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since
1978 up to the latest census in 1994 from whom respondent allegedly
bought the subject property; the Absolute Deed of Sale executed between
the complainant Wilson Po Cham and the respondent relative to the same
subject property was not notarized which partook the nature of a private
and not official document.
Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents to
prove their rights, interest and possession to the subject
property, respondent and his co-owners failed to show a permit from the
government conferring upon them rights or concessions over the subject
property, which formed part of the Bataan Natural Park classified as public
and not subject to disposition, therefore respondent and his co-owners
have no rights and interests whatsoever over the subject property and
their representations to complainant were simply not true but a falsehood.
Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about the
law took advantage of his versatility in the practice of law and committed
misrepresentations that he and his co-owners have irrevocable rights,
interests and possession over the subject property which convinced
complainant into purchasing subject property unmindful that the same is
not alienable or disposable being a portion of the public domain;
whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as member of the Philippine
Bar for having committed such falsehood and misrepresentations to the
complainant.39 (Underscoring supplied).
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the April 20, 2004 Committee Report
and Recommendation.
The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.40
The IBP findings are well-taken.
The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency
but of honesty and fair dealing.41 Thus, a member should refrain from doing
any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.42
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with
disbarment or suspension.43
Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney on
the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience
to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority.
And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically
enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. "Conduct," as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited
in connection with the performance of professional duties. 44
In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications
from the DENR that the property is part of the public domain and not
disposable as it is within the Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2445 issued on December 1, 1945, all properties of the
public domain therein designated as part of the Bataan National Park were
withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private
rights.
x misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from
the bar."
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v.
Abordo x xx:
"The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the
profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character,
who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him."48 (Italics in the original)
This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino49 and Lao v. Medel.50

To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he exhibited a

On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his
modicum of prudence before entering into the transaction with
documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the
respondent, he would have spared himself from respondent’s sham.
property which he could have conveyed to complainant. E.g., he could have
presented any document issued by the government conferring upon him
and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in- It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment proceeding,
interest, with any such right or interest, but he presented none. He merely it is immaterial that the complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto as
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
R. Monzon in his, Banzon’s and Zabala’s favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and the
of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor courts.51
of complainant.
The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help respondent. His conviction or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as
his cause any as neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are the present administrative case against him is concerned.52
sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless supported
by other effective proof.46 The presentation of a tax declaration must
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
indeed have been a "pretext," as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of x x x criminal
portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor "that the
cases.
area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable land."

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
purchase, for ₱3,372,533.00, non-existent "irrevocable rights, interest and
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
participation" over an inalienable property.
required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
In Lizaso v. Amante47 where therein respondent lawyer enticed the therein administrative proceedings.
complainant to invest in the casino business with the proposition that her
investment would yield her substantial profit, but therein respondent not
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
principal thereof, this Court took occasion to expound on sanctioning
Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
lawyers for committing fraud, deceit or falsehood in their private dealings:
administratively.53 (Emphasis supplied)

It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between

It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal
respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that
case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise,
complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to
this Court will be rendered helpless from vigorously applying the rules on
perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that
admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the
transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent
whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
to any other person.
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. 54

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez the
While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the
principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes
imposition of so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of this
which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. x x x
Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be
exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn oath
"x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. 55
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his
private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts
The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP
sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through
is not, however, commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by
misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional
respondent. This Court finds that respondent’s suspension from the
honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe
practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.
person to manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a
distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney
to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of a WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from
good moral character. the practice of law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.
x x x"
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent
as a member of the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
whether relating to professional or non-professional matters, justifies
circulation to all courts of the country.
suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice
in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:
SO ORDERED.
"As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the
oftentimes intricate matters which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely
more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard of
test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in
the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-
professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be
ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x