1
1. G.R. No. 184823               October 6, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI
FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC., 
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a
statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or incentive
in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring
the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both
cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a
refund but also his compliance with the procedural due
process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within
which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would
result in the denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008
Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing,
producing, and processing of steel and its by-products. 3 It is
registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a
Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products, "close
impression die steel forgings" and "tool and dies," are
registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer
status.5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for
refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 in the total amount of ₱3,891,123.82
with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR),
through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7 with
the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT. The
case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled
to the Second Division of the CTA.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, it generated and
recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of
₱131,791,399.00,8 which was paid pursuant to Section
106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it
incurred and paid input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14
from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated
sales;10and that in its application for refund/credit filed with
the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center, it only claimed the amount of
₱3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following
special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to
administrative investigation by the Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input
taxes for the period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export
sales contemplated under Sections 106(A) (2) (a),
and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed
within the two (2) year period prescribed in Section
229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on
the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and
failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for
refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against
the claimant for the same partake of the nature of
exemption from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second
Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting
respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the
Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to
validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997,
as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable
input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not
been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with
the following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales
which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the
taxpayer is VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed within
two years after the close of the taxable quarter when such
sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid
must be attributable to such sales, except the transitional
input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been
applied against the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been
complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by
petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits "II" to "II-
262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that
it is engaged in sales which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The
Certificate of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499
(Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a
registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its
administrative claim for refund on September 30, 2004
(Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for Review on
September 30, 2004, both within the two (2) year
prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made, which is from September 30,
2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there
are some documents and claims of petitioner that are
baseless and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to
a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate representing
unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its
zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the reduced
amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82

Less:  
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45
Less:  
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for
Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent
is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX
CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced
amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100
PESOS (₱3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input
VAT incurred for the months of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED. 14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 15 insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the
two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for
under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned
that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the
claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was
beyond the two-year period, which expired on September
29, 2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil
Code,17 which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it
is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that
the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial
claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the
NIRC.18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an
administrative claim is a "condition precedent"19 before a
judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of
such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact
that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the power
of judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied
petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for lack of
merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En
Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second
Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in
favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for
counting the two-year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
2
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to
were filed beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the disturb the findings and conclusion spelled out in the
honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008
addition, petitioner further contends that respondent's filing Resolution of the CTA Second Division. What the instant
of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and
eliminates the authority of the honorable Court to exercise appreciate the evidence in their own perspective of things,
jurisdiction over the judicial claim. which unfortunately had already been considered and
passed upon.
We are not persuaded.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13,
2008 Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. – No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
respondent" are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added
tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the
amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) SO ORDERED.22
days following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed
for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
[x x x x ]
Issue
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the
five (25) days from the close of each taxable quarter within
issue of whether respondent’s judicial and administrative
which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross
claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year
sales or receipts. In the case at bar, the taxable quarter
prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
involved was for the period of July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent
has until October 25, 2002 within which to file its quarterly the NIRC.24
return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied
when it filed its VAT Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
Petitioner’s Arguments
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and
provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start
judicial claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of
from the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated
Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that
above, respondent filed its VAT Return for the taxable third
pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code, 26 since the year 2004
quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent's
was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which
September 30, 2004 were filed on time because AICHI has
expired on September 29, 2004.27
until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention
applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in determining the start
that the 1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an
of the two-year period as the said provision pertains to the
administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This
compliance requirements in the payment of VAT.28 He
should not be the case as the law does not prohibit the
asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the same
simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims
Code that should apply because it specifically provides for
for refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund
the period within which a claim for tax refund/ credit should
must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
be made.29

Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the
administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial claim with
the CTA were filed on the same day. 30 He opines that the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and the judicial
claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires
the prior filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that
such procedural requirement is based on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the
CTA is an appellate body exercising judicial review over
administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a
refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it
has substantially complied with all the requirements provided
by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En Banc in
applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the
prescriptive period for the claim for tax refund/credit.
Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must
be read together with Section 114(A) of the same Code. 34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and
judicial claims, respondent contends that it first filed an
administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF before it
filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To prove this,
respondent points out that its Claimant Information Sheet
No. 4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third quarter of
2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as
Annexes "M" and "N," respectively, to the Petition for Review
filed with the CTA.38 Respondent further contends that the
non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to
act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not
fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed
within the two-year prescriptive period. 39 In support thereof,
respondent cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f,
however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the claim, and the
period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding
must be started in the [CTA] before the end of the two-year
period without awaiting the decision of the [CIR]."41 Lastly,
respondent argues that even if the period had already
lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity
considering that it is not a jurisdictional requirement. 42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after
the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the Second Division of
the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable
input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not
been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in
the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1),
(2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable
foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further,
That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale
of goods or properties or services, and the amount of
creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and
entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be
allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into
consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC, which
read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added
tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of the
amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25)
days following the close of each taxable quarter prescribed
for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in
accordance with Section 236, shall file a return and pay the
tax due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of
cancellation of registration: Provided, That only one
consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his
principal place of business or head office and all branches.
xxxx
3
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.
–
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a
claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty or sum has
been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after
the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of
the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that
may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon
which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to
have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-
year period for filing a claim for refund/credit of unutilized
input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and
not from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the
two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been
resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A)
of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the
start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of
the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to
instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of
internal revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly
provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT
payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue
tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the
relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT
regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the
CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted
Sec. 112 (A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made and
not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time
the official receipt was issued." Thus, when a zero-rated VAT
taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent

transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for
refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT.
The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter
when the pertinent sales or transaction was made,
regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may,
and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the
period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is
the third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any
claim for unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax credit
for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30,
1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998.
Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on
December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either
Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of
refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year
prescriptive limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs.
204(C) and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise,
Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The Commissioner
may –
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or
penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good
condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or
change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for
use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No
credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless
the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim
for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of
the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed
showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written
claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected.
– No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for
the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority, of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or
4
in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or The administrative claim was timely filed
credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such
suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine
tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
whether the administrative claim was timely filed.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code, 47 which provides that
the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of
a year is equivalent to 365 days, and taking into account the
the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that
fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits
may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
that the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor,
for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon
September 29, 2004.48
which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to
have been erroneously paid.
We do not agree.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year
prescriptive period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property
or penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Group, Inc.,49 we said that as between the Civil Code, which
Notably too, both provisions apply only to instances of provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is
revenue taxes. composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must
prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat
priori.50 Thus:
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
input VAT is an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed
same subject matter – the computation of legal periods.
on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods,
Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
properties, or services of the taxpayer. The fact that the
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the taxpayer
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT,
irrelevant.
albeit the erroneous, illegal, or wrongful payment angle does
not enter the equation.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the
manner of
xxxx
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec.
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that
112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
when the relevant sales or transactions were made
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the
instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to
erroneous payment of taxes. 46 (Emphasis supplied.) Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En
its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24
Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the
calendar months, computed as follows:
NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive period for
claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. To be clear,
Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the Year 1 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should month
be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made.

2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14,
1998
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14,
1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14,
1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December
14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14,
1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14,
1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14,
1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 2 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
month
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14,
1999
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14,
1999
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14,
1999
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December
14, 1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14,
2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14,
2000
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14,
2000
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April
14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period. 51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file
a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004.
Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the
administrative claim, we
are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax
refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section
112(D) of the NIRC, which provides that:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes
shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall
grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable
input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)
hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or
tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to
act on the application within the period prescribed above, the
taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the
expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the
decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has
"120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete
documents in support of the application [for tax
refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In
case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s
recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days
from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the
120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax
refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the
inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
5
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were
simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously,
respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the
lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we find the
filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-
day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long
as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed
within the two-year prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support
respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision
states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such
sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund" refers to
applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to
appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first
paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which
states that the CIR has "120 days from the submission of
complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to
decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would
render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already
provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should
appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second
paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two
scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before
the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is
made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the
taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the
CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing
an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we
find the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in
that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And
as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a
dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the
CTA.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Tax
Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA
Case No. 7065 for having been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 183994               June 30, 2014
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY
PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) are
the April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which
dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the
January 28, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set
aside the Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November
16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 50
of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented
by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner
William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49
of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private
counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9,
2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a
copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her
counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2,
2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the
Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge
of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14,
2004 and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.10 When Co
moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from
handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10,
2005.11The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC
Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City
challenging the revival of the criminal cases.12 It was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005. 13 Co’s
motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on
December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed the
petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16There
being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. 17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the
inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent
Dismissal" on July 13, 2006. 18 Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already
resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19In
spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order
dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion. 20 When the
court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration
on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008,
Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121
acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside
the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16,
2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the
trial of the criminal cases.22 Co then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the
petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in
this petition:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER
ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL
DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH
JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE CRIMINAL
CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF
HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE
CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR
TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS
6
COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF
THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL
DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER
OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS
FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR
TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED CASES AGAINST
PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO
FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION
TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the
ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He reasons
out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the
initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious,
capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of
Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of
1998)24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the entire trial
period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial.
As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the
MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot
reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion
because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally
dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists
that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s
issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the
one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year
period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003
when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that
the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap
year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this
petition were also the meat of the controversy in Co’s
previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed
per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the
first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural
infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any

event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent
court had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon
the finality of Our February 13, 2006 Resolution in G.R. No.
171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata
between the parties. On this ground alone, this petition
should have been dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly
raised in the present petition, Co’s arguments are
nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated
is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that
the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in
the trial was attended with malice or that the same was
made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of
the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy
trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible
concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to
speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in
view of the entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert
it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a
vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case.29 "While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to
a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly
prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which
prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites
of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules,
which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the
prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or
the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal
of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party
is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public
prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent from the
records that there is no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was
served on the private complainant at least three days before
said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co
moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per
records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue
her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the
offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly
explained in People v. Lacson: 34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private
interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or
parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a
priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended
party or the heirs of the victim through the private
prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor
who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the
heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before
the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof
of such service must be shown during the hearing on the
motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will
become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party
or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and
effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid
grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution
and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process;
(b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the
provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent
release of the accused from detention would enable him to
threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution
witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide
opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s
physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the
offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused
by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or
the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment
against his property.35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s
supposition that the dismissal of the cases became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the
Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally
interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy
the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one
case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year
after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the
7
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor
who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case
having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with
a copy of the order of dismissal.36
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is
represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the
reckoning period should commence to run from the time
such private counsel was actually notified of the order of
provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a
counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should
be sent to the latter at his/her given address. 37 Section 2,
Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be
made upon the latter.38
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to
revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made
prior to the expiration of the one-year period is
unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules.
Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the
offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may
wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be
taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges
have to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their
administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be
expected to act at all times on all pending decisions,
incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period of
time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by
ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and
caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to
revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s
categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private
counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order
on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly
filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to
revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the
order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the
reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the
private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court
should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the
one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from
the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by
Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases
against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days

regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a
yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of
days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which
was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,41 thus:
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof
provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and;
"night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is the
"period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one
calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008.42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-year
period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of
dismissal on July2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months,
computed as follows:
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2,
2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2,
2003
4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2,
2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004
10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the
instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As
correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the "Motion
for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein
were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice
of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a
worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose
other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It appears
that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct contravened the Code of
Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to observe
the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to
unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04,
Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients x x x.1âwphi1
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the
need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses
Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, 43 We said:
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers
who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is
the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman
on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter
to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to
8
litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling
and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C.
Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN
LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of
the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces
Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August
27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in
Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100
pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and
in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage.
Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as
follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name
partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna,
Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he
initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice
of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947
and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In
ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)
children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna,
Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio
Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio
Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY.
LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from
each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement
entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975,
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce
decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the
same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as
husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm
named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON)
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA
purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the
6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City,
consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15,
1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of
LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale
over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which
was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
(25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A.
Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married
to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100
share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario
E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on
February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
(50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the
same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716.
The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over
the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture
and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz
who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la
Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture
and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the
subject properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their
joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of
ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting
of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the
net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in
the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY.
LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from
her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed
that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the
subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an
accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining
to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject
9
properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to
pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial
upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is
adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas
Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any
other concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with
respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports found in the condominium unit and
defendants are ordered to deliver them to the
plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements
have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to
the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS

ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF
ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS
NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA
AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID
NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED
BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
10
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still
TO PAY FILING FEE.7 subsisting and valid;
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to (b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right
the trial court, to wit: as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil
THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage)
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
are hereby declared to be the owner of the books
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT Reports found in the condominium unit.
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
No pronouncement as to costs.
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8
SO ORDERED.11
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
modified decision,9 holding and ruling: On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.13
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute Issues
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican
Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review
because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
on certiorarithat:
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
xxxx
that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the approval of the Agreement;
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS
actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase
is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the
of the subjectcondominium unit; and
heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from
the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law
books.14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the
divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and,
secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the
late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September
10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization
was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality
rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna
and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna
and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule,
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did
not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only
upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with
the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia.
Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered
into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the
property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of
the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
11
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains
the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated
for any of various causes of termination enumerated in
Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared
absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified
of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such
creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the

conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions
of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this
Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498
to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in
dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains
between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question
that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action
for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed,
the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were
identical to the grounds raised in the action for
divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of
gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of
their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. 23 A bigamous marriage
is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror
both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried
the burden of proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for
the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court
of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to
substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in
the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
12
the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more
vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives
the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable
relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the
facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the
party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her
actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit
in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting
in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the
loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and
Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such
aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to
almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s
purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further
asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her
a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to
make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna
could not acquire the properties on his own due to the
meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-
ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions through
the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy
the law office condominium and the law books subject matter
in contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article
144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired
by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at
first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way
incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each
other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148

provided that: only the property acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same
rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both
parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception
while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule
whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and
divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as
was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs.
Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA
355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made
an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She
failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented
were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in
the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to
Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977,
which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of
Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on
April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas
in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which
was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19,
1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth
check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17,
1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of
the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply
not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of
₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion
of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found
that the same was acquired through the sole industry of
ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together
with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff
does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna.
The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty.
Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far
East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and
his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show
that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No.
21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to
Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-
owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is
but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm
or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed
to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and
for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was
ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law
books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of
the law firm that he headed. 30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by
the CA both because they were substantiated by the records
and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit
and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming
the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her
mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained.
It should then be justly concluded that the properties in
litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as
of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
13
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and
docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks
to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution 2 of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2,
2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of
private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the
trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule
45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a
suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with
application for support commenced by Rebecca against
Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa
City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution
issued by the RTC in the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On
its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26
years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam,

USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen
Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship
seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996,
initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District
of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while
Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22,
1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage
and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements," but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court
would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's
property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed
on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated
that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from
the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with
the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996,
with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion
to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of
Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094
and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente
Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch
256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed
that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support
for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to
Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
14
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On
for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite. April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal
portion of which reads:
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition,
insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final
valid divorce to speak of. resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case,
enjoining the respondent court from implementing
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case
filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy
in the amount of P250,000.00.
and concubinage.
SO ORDERED.23
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime,
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying
on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance,
granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite,
but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied
disposing as follows:
her motion.
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and
Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
155635.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount
of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as Ruling of the CA
support for the duration of the proceedings relative
to the instant Petition.
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a
Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil
19
SO ORDERED. Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC
issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently
assailed CA Decision reads:
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce
judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
preclude her from receiving legal support. entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for
failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the
above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on
a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a SO ORDERED.26
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion
68187.
to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to
have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union
having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by
the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored
Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she
being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree
was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged
Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown
that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino
citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the
Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of
her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American
citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status
and having made representations to that effect during
momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she
applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage
(Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a
purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows
the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion
about being an American citizen when she secured her
foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed
under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of
errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of
which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in
enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which
would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of
Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the
assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF
THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE
PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS
MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY
BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its
outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the
petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the
outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married
to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the
15
time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce
secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court,
resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of
divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This
Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time
she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was
an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of
an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American
passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit
of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American
citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC
9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate
No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only
on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of
Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of

Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner
Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate
No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially
covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth:     Guam, USA       Date
of Birth:     March 5, 1953
Sex:     female                              Civil
Status:     married       Color of Hair:   The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a
brown
Color of Eyes:     brown               the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under
Distinguishing marks on face:    none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the
Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,
Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of
Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6,
1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated
June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT
VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day
of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following
material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau
Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of
Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8,
2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was
purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment
of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above
certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October
11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required
affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given
for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with
the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary
of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he
was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to
January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition
of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1,
Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide
immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the
admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the
DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship
issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 35 on
Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records
Section shall automatically furnish the Department
of Justice an official copy of its Order of
Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No
Identification Certificate shall be issued before
the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition
shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
(Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her
Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after
16
then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement
confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close
events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized
as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply
that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued
in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002
mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the
1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to
be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is
indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that
Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati
City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of
her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996,
it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than
a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was
no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly,
the only documents appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract
(Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If
indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly
issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect
that this piece of document be appended to form part of the
petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her
case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate
from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached
consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only
through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID
Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had
sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together
with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to
motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos.
362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated,
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument
that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and
shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern
her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally
said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text
of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the
parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of
temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States
nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled
and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine
nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before
this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of
1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the
national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of
Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through
their Agreement38executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil
Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and
duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding
in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as
valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as
it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized
and allowed in any of the States of the Union, 40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree
has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties.
And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce
court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The
same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of
their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do
so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50
of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--
The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a
specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a
person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
17
It is essential that there should be an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was
duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign
divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6,
1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For
as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point
is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and
Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca
are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the
divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage
between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could
no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing
as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements
for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not
belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca,
their citizenship when they wed, and their professed
citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree
No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14,
1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their
property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-
couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home,
thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal
property which they acquired during their
marriage consists onlyof the real property and
all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301
dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the
name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M.
Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was
affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce
decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of
divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are
hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and
every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that
her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang. 48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the
Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of
action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains
the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in
the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying
petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and
18
Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action,
the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. 50 With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie
binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to
be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of
their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he
had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note
that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached
the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months
before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of
back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by
Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support
of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both
Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine
what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes
provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need
to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is,
Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her
entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of
her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094
by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness,
while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. 190755               November 24, 2010

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
ALFREDO ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the October 20, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 entitled
Alfredo Ong v. Land Bank of the Philippines, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17 in
Tabaco City.
The Facts
On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy
secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City in the amount
of PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by three (3)
residential lots, five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse.
Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would
be short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while
the balance of PhP 10 million would be payable in seven (7)
years. The Notice of Loan Approval dated February 22, 1996
contained an acceleration clause wherein any default in
payment of amortizations or other charges would accelerate
the maturity of the loan.1
Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no
longer pay their loan. On December 9, 1996, they sold three
(3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to
Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. The relevant portion of
the document2 is quoted as follows:
WHEREAS, we are no longer in a position to settle our
obligation with the bank;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00)
Philippine Currency, we hereby these presents SELL,
CEDE, TRANSFER and CONVEY, by way of sale unto
ANGELINA GLORIA ONG, also of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Alfredo Ong, and also a resident of Tabaco,
Albay, Philippines, their heirs and assigns, the above-
mentioned debt with the said LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and by reason hereof they can make the
necessary representation with the bank for the proper
restructuring of the loan with the said bank in their favor;
That as soon as our obligation has been duly settled, the
bank is authorized to release the mortgage in favor of the
vendees and for this purpose VENDEES can register this
instrument with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of the
titles already in their names.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our
signatures this 9th day of December 1996 at Tabaco, Albay,
Philippines.
(signed) (signed)
EVANGELINE O. SY JOHNSON B. SY
Vendor Vendor
Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to
Land Bank to inform it about the sale and assumption of
mortgage.3 Atty. Edna Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank
Branch Head, told Alfredo and his counsel Atty. Ireneo de
Lumen that there was nothing wrong with the agreement
with the Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for
the assumption of mortgage. They were also told that
Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed
at PhP 750,000 and to update due or accrued interests on
the promissory notes so that Atty. Hingco could easily
approve the assumption of mortgage. Two weeks later,
Alfredo issued a check for PhP 750,000 and personally gave
it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his payment. He
also submitted the other documents required by Land Bank,
such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995. Atty. Hingco
then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of the
Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never
materialized. No notice of transfer was sent to him.4
Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of
mortgage was not approved by Land Bank. The bank
learned from its credit investigation report that the Ongs had
a real estate mortgage in the amount of PhP 18,300,000 with
another bank that was past due. Alfredo claimed that this
was fully paid later on. Nonetheless, Land Bank foreclosed
the mortgage of the Spouses Sy after several months.
Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the
subject mortgage properties included in a Notice of
Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale at the RTC in
Tabaco, Albay. Alfredo’s other counsel, Atty. Madrilejos,
subsequently talked to Land Bank’s lawyer and was told that
the PhP 750,000 he paid would be returned to him.5
On December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for
recovery of sum of money with damages against Land Bank
in Civil Case No. T-1941, as Alfredo’s payment was not
returned by Land Bank. Alfredo maintained that Land Bank’s
foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his
assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith. He
argued that he was lured into believing that his payment of
PhP 750,000 would cause Land Bank to approve his
assumption of the loan of the Spouses Sy and the transfer of
the mortgaged properties in his and his wife’s name. 6 He
also claimed incurring expenses for attorney’s fees of PhP
19
150,000, filing fee of PhP 15,000, and PhP 250,000 in moral
damages.7
Testifying for Land Bank, Atty. Hingco claimed during trial
that as branch manager she had no authority to approve
loans and could not assure anybody that their assumption of
mortgage would be approved. She testified that the
breakdown of Alfredo’s payment was as follows:
PhP applied to principal
101,409.59
216,246.56 accrued interests
receivable
396,571.77 interests
18,766.10 penalties
16,805.98 accounts receivable
----------------
Total: 750,000.00
According to Atty. Hingco, the bank processes an
assumption of mortgage as a new loan, since the new
borrower is considered a new client. They used character,
capacity, capital, collateral, and conditions in determining
who can qualify to assume a loan. Alfredo’s proposal to
assume the loan, she explained, was referred to a separate
office, the Lending Center. 8
During cross-examination, Atty. Hingco testified that several
months after Alfredo made the tender of payment, she
received word that the Lending Center rejected Alfredo’s
loan application. She stated that it was the Lending Center
and not her that should have informed Alfredo about the
denial of his and his wife’s assumption of mortgage. She
added that although she told Alfredo that the agreement
between the spouses Sy and Alfredo was valid between
them and that the bank would accept payments from him,
Alfredo did not pay any further amount so the foreclosure of
the loan collaterals ensued. She admitted that Alfredo
demanded the return of the PhP 750,000 but said that there
was no written demand before the case against the bank
was filed in court. She said that Alfredo had made the
payment of PhP 750,000 even before he applied for the
assumption of mortgage and that the bank received the said
amount because the subject account was past due and
demandable; and the Deed of Assumption of Mortgage was
not used as the basis for the payment. 9
The Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC held that the contract approving the assumption of
mortgage was not perfected as a result of the credit
investigation conducted on Alfredo. It noted that Alfredo was
not even informed of the disapproval of the assumption of
mortgage but was just told that the accounts of the spouses
Sy had matured and gone unpaid. It ruled that under the
principle of equity and justice, the bank should return the
amount Alfredo had paid with interest at 12% per annum
computed from the filing of the complaint. The RTC further
held that Alfredo was entitled to attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses for being compelled to litigate.10
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is rendered,
ordering defendant bank to pay plaintiff, Alfredo Ong the
amount of P750,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum
computed from Dec. 12, 1997 and attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses of P50,000.00.
Costs against defendant bank.
SO ORDERED.11
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, Land Bank faulted the trial court for (1) holding
that the payment of PhP 750,000 made by Ong was one of
the requirements for the approval of his proposal to assume
the mortgage of the Sy spouses; (2) erroneously ordering
Land Bank to return the amount of PhP 750,000 to Ong on
the ground of its failure to effect novation; and (3)
erroneously affirming the award of PhP 50,000 to Ong as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
12
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.  It held that Alfredo’s
recourse is not against the Sy spouses. According to the
appellate court, the payment of PhP 750,000 was for the
approval of his assumption of mortgage and not for payment
of arrears incurred by the Sy spouses. As such, it ruled that
it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with
no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation under Article
1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not bound
by the Deed between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the
appellate court found that Alfredo and Land Bank’s active
preparations for Alfredo’s assumption of mortgage
essentially novated the agreement.
On January 5, 2010, the CA denied Land Bank’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, Land Bank
appealed to us.
The Issues
I
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not apply and in
finding that there is no novation.
II
Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the
evidence and the law when it affirmed the trial
court decision’s ordering Land Bank to pay Ong
the amount of Php750,000.00 with interest at 12%
annum.
III
Whether the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error when it affirmed the award of
Php50,000.00 to Ong as attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation.
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm with modification the appealed decision.
Recourse is against Land Bank
Land Bank contends that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code backs
their claim that Alfredo should have sought recourse against
the Spouses Sy instead of Land Bank. Art. 1236 provides:
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance
by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor
what he has paid, except that if he paid without the
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover
only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor.1avvphi1
We agree with Land Bank on this point as to the first part of
paragraph 1 of Art. 1236. Land Bank was not bound to
accept Alfredo’s payment, since as far as the former was
concerned, he did not have an interest in the payment of the
loan of the Spouses Sy. However, in the context of the
20
second part of said paragraph, Alfredo was not making
payment to fulfill the obligation of the Spouses Sy. Alfredo
made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage would be
titled in his name. It is clear from the records that Land Bank
required Alfredo to make payment before his assumption of
mortgage would be approved. He was informed that the
certificate of title would be transferred accordingly. He, thus,
made payment not as a debtor but as a prospective
mortgagor. But the trial court stated:
[T]he contract was not perfected or consummated because
of the adverse finding in the credit investigation which led to
the disapproval of the proposed assumption. There was no
evidence presented that plaintiff was informed of the
disapproval. What he received was a letter dated May 22,
1997 informing him that the account of spouses Sy had
matured but there [were] no payments. This was sent even
before the conduct of the credit investigation on June 20,
1997 which led to the disapproval of the proposed
assumption of the loans of spouses Sy.13
Alfredo, as a third person, did not, therefore, have an interest
in the fulfillment of the obligation of the Spouses Sy, since
his interest hinged on Land Bank’s approval of his
application, which was denied. The circumstances of the
instant case show that the second paragraph of Art. 1236
does not apply. As Alfredo made the payment for his own
interest and not on behalf of the Spouses Sy, recourse is not
against the latter. And as Alfredo was not paying for another,
he cannot demand from the debtors, the Spouses Sy, what
he has paid.
Novation of the loan agreement
Land Bank also faults the CA for finding that novation
applies to the instant case. It reasons that a substitution of
debtors was made without its consent; thus, it was not bound
to recognize the substitution under the rules on novation.
On the matter of novation, Spouses Benjamin and Agrifina
Lim v. M.B. Finance Corporation14 provides the following
discussion:
Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or
modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is
terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the
place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the old
obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with
the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results
either by changing the object or principal conditions
(objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor

or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor
(subjective or personal). Under this mode, novation would
have dual functions ─ one to extinguish an existing
obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place ─
requiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous
valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to
a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation;
and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. x x x
In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another
which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so
declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new
obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two
obligations can stand together, each one having its
independent existence. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, Art. 1293 of the Civil Code states:
Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the
place of the original one, may be made even without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the
consent of the creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives
him rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.
We do not agree, then, with the CA in holding that there was
a novation in the contract between the parties. Not all the
elements of novation were present. Novation must be
expressly consented to. Moreover, the conflicting intention
and acts of the parties underscore the absence of any
express disclosure or circumstances with which to deduce a
clear and unequivocal intent by the parties to novate the old
agreement.15 Land Bank is thus correct when it argues that
there was no novation in the following:
[W]hether or not Alfredo Ong has an interest in the obligation
and payment was made with the knowledge or consent of
Spouses Sy, he may still pay the obligation for the reason
that even before he paid the amount of P750,000.00 on
January 31, 1997, the substitution of debtors was already
perfected by and between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
executed by them on December 9, 1996. And since the
substitution of debtors was made without the consent of
Land Bank – a requirement which is indispensable in order
to effect a novation of the obligation, it is therefore not bound
to recognize the substitution of debtors. Land Bank did not
intervene in the contract between Spouses Sy and Spouses
Ong and did not expressly give its consent to this
substitution.16
Unjust enrichment
Land Bank maintains that the trial court erroneously applied
the principle of equity and justice in ordering it to return the
PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo. Alfredo was allegedly in bad
faith and in estoppel. Land Bank contends that it enjoyed the
presumption of regularity and was in good faith when it
accepted Alfredo’s tender of PhP 750,000. It reasons that it
did not unduly enrich itself at Alfredo’s expense during the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its
bid by subtracting PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sy’s
outstanding loan obligation. Alfredo’s recourse then,
according to Land Bank, is to have his payment reimbursed
by the Spouses Sy.
We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP
750,000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Land
Bank is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor
to recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the
fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land Bank is not bound
to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate
mortgage, it is estopped by its action of accepting Alfredo’s
payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize
Alfredo as the new debtor. The elements of estoppel are:
First, the actor who usually must have knowledge, notice or
suspicion of the true facts, communicates something to
another in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or
silence; second, the other in fact relies, and relies
reasonably or justifiably, upon that communication; third, the
other would be harmed materially if the actor is later
permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier
conduct; and fourth, the actor knows, expects or foresees
that the other would act upon the information given or that a
reasonable person in the actor’s position would expect or
foresee such action.17
By accepting Alfredo’s payment and keeping silent on the
status of Alfredo’s application, Land Bank misled Alfredo to
believe that he had for all intents and purposes stepped into
the shoes of the Spouses Sy.
The defense of Land Bank Legazpi City Branch Manager
Atty. Hingco that it was the bank’s Lending Center that
should have notified Alfredo of his assumption of mortgage
disapproval is unavailing. The Lending Center’s lack of
notice of disapproval, the Tabaco Branch’s silence on the
disapproval, and the bank’s subsequent actions show a
failure of the bank as a whole, first, to notify Alfredo that he
is not a recognized debtor in the eyes of the bank; and
second, to apprise him of how and when he could collect on
the payment that the bank no longer had a right to keep.
We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must
return Alfredo’s payment. Unjust enrichment exists "when a
21
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."18 There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of
the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and
(2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another.19
Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions
called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem
verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1)
that the defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff
has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of the defendant
is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has
no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or
quasi-delict.20 The principle of unjust enrichment essentially
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the
person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.21
The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as,
Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified from assuming the
loan, had no duty to pay petitioner bank and the latter had no
right to receive it.
Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that
"[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith." Land Bank,
however, did not even bother to inform Alfredo that it was no
longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sy’s
mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his interest in the loan when
the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his
daughter’s loan had not been paid. 22 Land Bank made
Alfredo believe that with the payment of PhP 750,000, he
would be able to assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy.
The act of receiving payment without returning it when
demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what
is due to him. The outcome of the application would have
been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit
investigation before accepting Alfredo’s payment. He would
have been notified that his assumption of mortgage had
been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile
action of paying PhP 750,000. The procedure Land Bank
took in acting on Alfredo’s application cannot be said to have
been fair and proper.
As to the claim that the trial court erred in applying equity to
Alfredo’s case, we hold that Alfredo had no other remedy to
recover from Land Bank and the lower court properly
exercised its equity jurisdiction in resolving the collection
suit. As we have held in one case:

Equity, as the complement of legal jurisdiction, seeks to
reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than
the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts.23
Another claim made by Land Bank is the presumption of
regularity it enjoys and that it was in good faith when it
accepted Alfredo’s tender of PhP 750,000.
The defense of good faith fails to convince given Land
Bank’s actions. Alfredo was not treated as a mere
prospective borrower. After he had paid PhP 750,000, he
was made to sign bank documents including a promissory
note and real estate mortgage. He was assured by Atty.
Hingco that the titles to the properties covered by the
Spouses Sy’s real estate mortgage would be transferred in
his name, and upon payment of the PhP 750,000, the
account would be considered current and renewed in his
name.24
Land Bank posits as a defense that it did not unduly enrich
itself at Alfredo’s expense during the foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by subtracting
PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sy’s outstanding loan
obligation. It is observed that this is the first time Land Bank
is revealing this defense. However, issues, arguments,
theories, and causes not raised below may no longer be
posed on appeal.25 Land Bank’s contention, thus, cannot be
entertained at this point.1avvphi1
Land Bank further questions the lower court’s decision on
the basis of the inconsistencies made by Alfredo on the
witness stand. It argues that Alfredo was not a credible
witness and his testimony failed to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of regular
duties on the part of Land Bank.
This claim, however, touches on factual findings by the trial
court, and we defer to these findings of the trial court as
sustained by the appellate court. These are generally
binding on us. While there are exceptions to this rule, Land
Bank has not satisfactorily shown that any of them is
applicable to this issue. 26 Hence, the rule that the trial court
is in a unique position to observe the demeanor of witnesses
should be applied and respected27 in the instant case.
In sum, we hold that Land Bank may not keep the PhP
750,000 paid by Alfredo as it had already foreclosed on the
mortgaged lands.
Interest and attorney’s fees
As to the applicable interest rate, we reiterate the guidelines
found in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 28
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the
concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists
in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be
that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall
be 12% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed
at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
on unliquidated claims or damages except when
or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation
of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum
of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12%
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
22
this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
No evidence was presented by Alfredo that he had sent a
written demand to Land Bank before he filed the collection
suit. Only the verbal agreement between the lawyers of the
parties on the return of the payment was
mentioned.29Consequently, the obligation of Land Bank to
return the payment made by Alfredo upon the former’s denial
of the latter’s application for assumption of mortgage must
be reckoned from the date of judicial demand on December
12, 1997, as correctly determined by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court.
The next question is the propriety of the imposition of
interest and the proper imposable rate of applicable interest.
The RTC granted the rate of 12% per annum which was
affirmed by the CA. From the above-quoted guidelines,
however, the proper imposable interest rate is 6% per
annum pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. Sunga-Chan
v. Court of Appeals is illuminating in this regard:
In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., the Court held that the legal
interest at 12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular
No. 416 shall be adjudged only in cases involving the loan or
forbearance of money. And for transactions involving
payment of indemnities in the concept of damages
arising from default in the performance of obligations in
general and/or for money judgment not involving a loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing
provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly
6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently provides:
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a
sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest,
which is six per cent per annum.
The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has
been described as a contractual obligation of a lender or
creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from
requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt
then due and payable.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the
imposition of interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as
follows: The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416
shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or
credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per

annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies "when
the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in
the concept of damage arising from the breach or a
delay in the performance of obligations in general," with
the application of both rates reckoned "from the time the
complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid."
In either instance, the reckoning period for the
commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be
subject to the condition "that the courts are vested with
discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the
award of interest."30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on our ruling above, forbearance of money refers to
the contractual obligation of the lender or creditor to desist
for a fixed period from requiring the borrower or debtor to
repay the loan or debt then due and for which 12% per
annum is imposed as interest in the absence of a stipulated
rate. In the instant case, Alfredo’s conditional payment to
Land Bank does not constitute forbearance of money, since
there was no agreement or obligation for Alfredo to pay Land
Bank the amount of PhP 750,000, and the obligation of Land
Bank to return what Alfredo has conditionally paid is still in
dispute and has not yet been determined. Thus, it cannot be
said that Land Bank’s alleged obligation has become a
forbearance of money.
On the award of attorney’s fees, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation were awarded because Alfredo was
compelled to litigate due to the unjust refusal of Land Bank
to refund the amount he paid. There are instances when it is
just and equitable to award attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation.31 Art. 2208 of the Civil Code pertinently states:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
xxxx
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest.
Given that Alfredo was indeed compelled to litigate against
Land Bank and incur expenses to protect his interest, we
find that the award falls under the exception above and is,
thus, proper given the circumstances.
On a final note. The instant case would not have been
litigated had Land Bank been more circumspect in dealing
with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept payment from
Alfredo even before a credit investigation was underway, a
procedure worsened by the failure to even inform him of his
credit standing’s impact on his assumption of mortgage. It
was, therefore, negligent to a certain degree in handling the
transaction with Alfredo. It should be remembered that the
business of a bank is affected with public interest and it
should observe a higher standard of diligence when dealing
with the public.32
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn
interest at 6% per annum reckoned from December 12,
1997, and the total aggregate monetary awards will in turn
earn 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 152411             September 29, 2004
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44209,
as well as its Resolution2 denying the petitioner’s motion for
the reconsideration thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of Appeals set
aside the Decision3 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the
respondent against the petitioner for sum of money and
damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP)
decided to construct an integrated system of research
organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the
project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased
for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños.
Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF)
came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the
laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave
the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to
accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William
Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH,
23
arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB),
to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to
BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account
of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to
PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory
furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of
the project to FEMF for its approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the
issuance of the purchase order and downpayment for the
office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:
1. Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIO
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or ₱1,173,627.56
2. Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTEC
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tany
Downpayment : 50% or ₱286,687.504
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared
as soon as possible before the issuance of the purchase
orders and the downpayment for the goods, and would be
transmitted to the FEMF as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector
Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of
FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for
copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract 5 for the
project, and that such contract and drawings had to be
finalized before the down payment could be remitted to the
PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to
forward any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and
laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after having been duly
inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive
Assistant Lirio.

On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as
downpayment for the laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH
project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to
FEMF. On October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial
payment of ₱800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter issued
Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in
the form of checks drawn by FEMF and delivered to
PHILAB, through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the
Chancellor of UP Los Baños and FEMF, represented by its
Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed
to grant financial support and donate sums of money to UP
for the construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and
other capitalization for the project, not to exceed
₱29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA
are the following:
ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its
principal objectives of promoting philantrophic and
scientific projects through financial support to such
projects that will contribute to the country’s
economic development, shall grant such financial
support and donate such sums of money to the
RESEARCH COMPLEX as may be necessary for
the construction of buildings, installation of
laboratories, setting up of offices and physical
plants and facilities and other capital investment of
the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its
component Research Institutes not to exceed ₱29
Million. For this purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the
UNIVERSITY the site for the
RESEARCH COMPLEX; and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to
the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-
NINE MILLION PESOS
(₱29,000,000.00) for the construction of
the buildings of the National Institutes of
Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology
(BIOTECH) and the installation of their
laboratories and their physical plants
and other facilities to enable them to
commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject
to the approval of the Board of Trustees of the
FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities
of the RESEARCH COMPLEX by way of recurrent
additional grants and donations for specific
research and development projects which may be
mutually agreed upon and, from time to time,
additional grants and donations of such amounts
as may be necessary to provide the RESEARCH
COMPLEX and/or any of its Research Institutes
with operational flexibility especially with regard to
incentives to staff purchase of equipment/facilities,
travel abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate
staff and such other activities and inputs which are
difficult to obtain under usual government rules
and regulations.6
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on
November 25, 1982.7
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract
for the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by
January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a
Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH reminded
Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could
be submitted to FEMF for its evaluation and
approval.8Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB
submitted to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the
project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment
thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the
project, amounting to ₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of
₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent
(40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983,
Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the progress billing
from PHILAB.10 On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made
another partial payment of ₱836,119.52 representing the
already delivered laboratory and office furniture after the
requisite inspection and verification thereof by
representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB.
The payment was made in the form of a check, for which
PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to FEMF through
Padolina.11
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No.
01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40 for the final payment of
laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH,
PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of
the accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same.
BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18,
1984 for its payment.12 Lirio, in turn, forwarded the invoice to
Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985.
However, the FEMF failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated
its request for payment through a letter on May 9,
1985.13 BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985,
24
requesting the payment of PHILAB’s bill.14It sent another
letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again appealing for
the payment of PHILAB’s bill.15 In a Letter to BIOTECH dated
December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of
₱702,939.40 plus interest thereon of ₱224,940.61. 16 There
was, however, no response from the FEMF. On February 24,
1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH, appealing for the payment
of its bill even on installment basis.17
President Marcos was ousted from office during the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On March 26, 1986,
Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed
assistance for the payment of the balance already due plus
interest of ₱295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of
laboratory furniture.18
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C.
Aquino asking her help to secure the payment of the amount
due from the FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget
Minister Alberto Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP
President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On September
30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los
Baños, wrote then Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting
PHILAB’s claim to be officially entered as "accounts
payable" as soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by
the PCGG.20
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy
of the relevant contract and the MOA for its perusal. 21
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a
copy of the contract executed between PHILAB and FEMF.
In a Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De
Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any
contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money
and damages against UP. In the complaint, PHILAB prayed
that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE &
40/100 (₱702,939.40) plus an additional amount
(as shall be determined during the hearing) to
cover the actual cost of money which at the time of
transaction the value of the peso was eleven to a
dollar (₱11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%)
percent interest on the total amount from August
1982 until fully paid;

(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as
and for attorney’s fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.22
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through
its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM PADOLINA,
Director, asked plaintiff to supply and install
several laboratory furnitures and equipment at
BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein
defendant located at its campus in College,
Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS: TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100
(₱2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and
installation of said laboratory furnitures and
equipment at defendant’s BIOTECH Laboratory,
defendant paid three (3) times on installment
basis:
a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt
No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt
No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;
c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt
No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN
HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (₱702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the
past eight years, defendant arrogantly and
maliciously made plaintiff believe that it was going
to pay the balance aforestated, that was why
plaintiff’s President and General Manager himself,
HECTOR C. NAVASERO, personally went to and
from UP Los Baños to talk with defendant’s
responsible officers in the hope of expecting
payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had
no intention to pay whatsoever right from the start
on a misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of
plaintiff’s demand letters since year 1983 up to the
present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C,
D, E, F, G, and H hereof;
6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil
and unnecessary misrepresentations that it was
going to pay its obligation and asking plaintiff so
many red tapes and requirements to submit,
compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost
eight (8) years to finish, when, in truth and in fact,
defendant had no intention to pay, defendant
should be ordered to pay plaintiff no less than
PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(₱100,000.00) exemplary damages, so that other
government institutions may be warned that they
must not unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the people they serve.23
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB
had no cause of action against it because it was merely the
donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the
BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which funded the project,
was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the
laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to
pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint without prejudice to PHILAB’s
recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit without prejudice to plaintiff's
recourse to the assets of the Marcos Foundation
for the unpaid balance of ₱792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.24
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
alleging that the trial court erred in finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of
subject laboratory furniture and equipment was
between PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation;
and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the
Philippines, is liable to pay the respondent the
balance of the purchase price.25
25
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
held that there was never a contract between FEMF and
PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the
MOA between the FEMF and UP since it was never a party
thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not
bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it
is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: "No one should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the
appellate court’s decision, UP, now the petitioner, filed its
petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON CONTRACTS
BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS
FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS
FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB. 26
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts
may not be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal
is generally restricted to questions of law.27However, this rule
is not absolute. The Court may review the factual findings of
the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial
court.28 Correspondingly, this Court may review findings of
facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a
misapprehension of facts.29
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA
overlooked the evidentiary effect and substance of the
corresponding letters and communications which support the
statements of the witnesses showing affirmatively that an
implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the
FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract
existed between it and the respondent as it could not have
entered into any agreement without the requisite public
bidding and a formal written contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did
not err in not applying the law on contracts between the
respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was
never privy to the MOA entered into between the petitioner
and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF
donated was a sum of money equivalent to ₱29,000,000,

and not the laboratory equipment supplied by it to the
petitioner. The respondent submits that the petitioner, being
the recipient of the laboratory furniture, should not enrich
itself at the expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is
one for sum of money predicated on the alleged promise of
the petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the furniture,
which, despite demands, the petitioner failed to do.
However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner
ever obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied
by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled to its claim
against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the
MOA executed by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not
bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only
between the parties and their assigns.30 A contract cannot be
binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not
a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof. 31 Likewise admitted by the
parties, is the fact that there was no written contract
executed by the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF
relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and
laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to
specifically declare that the petitioner and the respondent
entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory
furniture. The parties are in accord that the FEMF had
remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks
drawn and issued by the FEMF to the respondent, through
Padolina, in the total amount of ₱2,288,573.74 out of the
total cost of the project of ₱2,934,068.90 and that the
respondent received the said checks and issued receipts
therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the
petitioner did not pay a single centavo for the said furniture
delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been
using ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an
implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the
respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one
implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual
intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the
parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact creating
an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of
which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit
words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of
the parties, language used, or things done by them, or other
pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. To create
contracts implied in fact, circumstances must warrant
inference that one expected compensation and the other to
pay.32 An implied-in-fact contract requires the parties’ intent
to enter into a contract; it is a true contract.33 The conduct of
the parties is to be viewed as a reasonable man would view
it, to determine the existence or not of an implied-in-fact
contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties
must be considered to determine their intention. An implied-
in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is
indicated by some intelligent conduct, act or sign.35
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time
Padolina contacted it for the fabrication and supply of the
laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to
fabricate and deliver the furniture to BIOTECH as
beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed,
Padolina asked the respondent to prepare the draft of the
contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the execution of
the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the
respondent failed to prepare one. The respondent knew that
the petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary of the
laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for
the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the
inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of
accounts of the respondent, for which the latter
unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the
FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB
Industries was aware that it was the Marcos
Foundation who would be paying for this particular
transaction for the completion of this particular
transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr.
Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions during
our inspection in Los Baños, at the installation site,
there were occasions, two or three occasions,
when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the
President, I think, or manager of PHILAB, and we
appraised him that it was really between the
foundation and him to which includes (sic) the
construction company constructing the building.
He is fully aware that it is the foundation who (sic)
engaged them and issued the payments.36
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed
the petitioner and sought its assistance for the collection of
the amount due from the FEMF:
26
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance
in the payment of the balance still due us on the
laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two
years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having
these funds as soon as possible to keep up our
operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this
matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking
her assistance for the payment of the amount due, in which
the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her
predecessor, namely, the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the instance of the national government, subject
laboratory furnitures were supplied by our
company to the National Institute of Biotechnology
& Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH), University of
the Philippines, Los Baños, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100
(₱2,939,058.90), the previous administration had
so far paid us the sum of ₱2,236,119.52 thus
leaving a balance of PESOS: ONE MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100
(₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per
annum and 30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this
amount from your predecessor, the latest of which
was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR.
W. PADOLINA, deputy director of BIOTECH. But
this, notwithstanding, our claim has remained
unacted upon up to now. Copy of said invoice is
hereto attached for easy reference.

Now that your excellency is the head of our
government, we sincerely hope that payment of
this obligation will soon be made as this is one
project the Republic of the Philippines has use of
and derives benefit from.38
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and
statements of accounts for the payments of the laboratory
furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner,
through Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment.
However, the FEMF failed to pay the last statement of
account of the respondent because of the onset of the EDSA
upheaval. It was only when the respondent lost all hope of
collecting its claim from the government and/or the PCGG
did it file the complaint against the petitioner for the
collection of the payment of its last delivery of laboratory
furniture.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for
the claim of the respondent based on the maxim that no one
should enrich itself at the expense of another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one
party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but
instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched
in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully.39
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the
claimant must unequivocally prove that another party
knowingly received something of value to which he was not
entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be
unjust for the person to keep the benefit. 40 Unjust enrichment
is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits received under
circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation
to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must
confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or
request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of
reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of
the doctrine of restitution.42
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance
by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential
elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been
enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground,
and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary
action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is
an obtainable action under any other institution of positive
law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle
of accion in rem verso will not lie.44
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of
the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case. The
respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action
based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the
payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the
laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is
entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150,
is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 195549               September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,  among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated
February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are
as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company
([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for
damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent
injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products
Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and
27
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street,
Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992,
[respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant
and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made
automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware
items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of
[respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s]
office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent’s]
employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially
its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered
that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the
same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colors but was selling these products at a lower
price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic
in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive
underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer
bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions,
automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from
[respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts.
Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products
all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and
have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and
unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as
of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled
[respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur
expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the
[respondent] except for the following facts: that it is engaged
in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items
made of plastic and metal and that there’s physical proximity
of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that
someof [respondent’s] employees had transferred to
[petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed

familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic
made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can
be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive
parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their
construction and composition merely conforms to the
specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they
intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it
"originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent]
indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it
still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these
as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore,
[respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these
plastic-made automotive parts as there are other
establishments which were already openly selling them to
the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of
respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights
or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and
performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC
further opined that under the circumstances, in order for
respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s
acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts
such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the
sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated
over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the
defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00)
Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages.
The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from
manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those
manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual
property protecting a good belonging to another,the copying
thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair
competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit
consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure
away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points
out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded
in the market and the copying of these can be done by
simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent
registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to
prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that
the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the
instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s
acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying
its products and employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with
modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said
decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest
steps in advancing its business interest against Jesichris,
however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC
of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one
has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was
engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only
revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of
Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As
for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income
statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of
the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but
it does not disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive
parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair
competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced
Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’
rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary
damages is also maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED.
The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual
damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However,
the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a
Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
28
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner
raises the following issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition
under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on
the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition,
should there be moral damages and attorney’s
fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal
damages is proper although no rights have been
established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its
copyright on automotive parts, should it be
considered in the light of the said copyrights were
considered to be void by no less than this
Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue
is: whether or not Jesichris has established
"goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not
petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls
under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and
not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, 7 as the
present suit is a damage suit and the products are not
covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of
patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very
much broader than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended
concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the
term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all
kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s
business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or
not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition
in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be
prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive
others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a
living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and
not competition where the means usedare fair and
legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have
two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a
competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which
are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
"shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in
the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor
factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being
engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive
parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly
"contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having
employed respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately
copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of
selling these products to respondent’s customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that
petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of respondent and
petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of
respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner]
was in bad faith in competing with the business of
[respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s] acts can be
characterized as executed with mischievous subtle
calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the
RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the
production of plastic kitchenware previous to its
manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged
the services of the then mold setter and maintenance
operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was
employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired by [petitioner]
in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic
automotive spare parts were not being made. It baffles the
Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and
maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s]
engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his
experience gained from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a
warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired
because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner].
Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he
applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same
position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of
events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect
too like the situation with De Guzman.11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair
competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his
business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made
automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent
to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade
secrets of the respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of
business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless
of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out
of business so that later on he can take advantage of the
effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton
wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony
of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in
competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
[Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr.,
admitted that it was never engaged in the business of
plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product
Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of
kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr.
Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have
known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you
have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive
products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In
fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with
these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr.
Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products,
in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those sold
by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer
ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.
29
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with
Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas:
Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris
Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it
not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they
transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February,
this year. And the other one, just one month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of
business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s]
witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product
Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this
Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January
2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual even
(sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going
to the market and then I passed by the place where they
were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at
that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you
spotted upon them drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I
was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something,
sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to
you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those
words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo,
dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court
whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?

A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article
28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in
its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in
nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should
concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February
10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 182836               October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN
S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27
February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death
benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on
the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a
member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement
Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees
to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in
case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent
(parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on
the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The
Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In
case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn
child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature
delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week
of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor
due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave
30
and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of
Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits,
the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in
the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties
still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file
a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a
Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union
and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the
sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section
2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties
mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in
amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and
Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the
CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state
that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK
Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental
Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive
death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L.
Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife
also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died
prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity
leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under
the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugan’s child
was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as
opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks
in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and

Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code,
which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and
decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the
express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death
of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It
claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the
Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the
same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus
that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person
at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that
was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent,
since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the
right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA
was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted
definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by
both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA –
the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits –
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the
latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving
the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union
sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of
an unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution 17 ruling
that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay
and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said
benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of
bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as
provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three
(3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is
"death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent";
and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and
accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section
4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable
elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such
death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such
dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death
of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus
had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or
sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during
the labor or delivery. There was also no question that
Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their
dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby
rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to
pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing
his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00)
representing death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with
the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule
31
43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in
granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay
and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s
dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever
stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the
CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not
acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed
out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term
death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined
upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s
entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February
2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to
mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal
sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to
impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement
leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve.
While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not
follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could
never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the
CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief
to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands
in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a
narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a
legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement
leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following
[Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of
"death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this
view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything
less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant
parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits
are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather
than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the
certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly
misses this crucial point.20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of
the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution
dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
21
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].
22
In a Resolution  dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently
argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the
literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only
one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never
acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement
leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death;
(2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse,
child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate
relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites
for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section
4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document
to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of
Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear
and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous,
then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself
admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to
define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other
death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of
the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced.
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when
a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein.
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons,
must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code,
the very first of the general provisions on civil personality,
which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be
lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child
herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as
a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s
death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not
provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil
Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of
life.24 Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent
under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not
able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an
unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child
could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions
in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or
32
sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification,
then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s
status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a
valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful
union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis
ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an
illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now,
there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the
afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case,
it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly
married and that their child was conceived during said
marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to
comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the
death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s
claims for the same should have been granted by
Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death
benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if

possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is
any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time
and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in
case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of
labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions
should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining
v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor
Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of
judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both
sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While
petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation
of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it
insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which
is essentially a contract between private persons. What
petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State,
enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to
uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence
of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v.
NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved
in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming
the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other
death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine
33
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), the merits ensued.
respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Ruling of the RTC
Manufacturing Corporation.
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the
SO ORDERED.
marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
9. G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
vs.
rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
DECISION
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease
MENDOZA, J.:
using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the remains the wife of respondent.
Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
xxxx
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent SO ORDERED.6
Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other
The facts for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of
Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
Register No. 2004-1588.3
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other
for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
null and void ab initio .
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because the
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it
case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an consideration of $2,000.00.
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
reported that she could not make a determination for failure
of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
Ruling of the CA
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA
affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the
parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship,
and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED
FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to
acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to
the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall
within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the
petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to
a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its
arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of
law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine
the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud
for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
United States, marriages where a couple marries only to
achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits,
have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely
for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter
out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration
status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal
validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared
as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early
cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in
order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a
divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a
marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
34
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married
at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no
matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through
indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in
fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is
no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage
at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world and with the understanding that they will put
an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris
v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting
one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent
has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit,
a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to
achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled
that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential

requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that
the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition
of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a
full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent,
the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of
jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form
but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a
marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very
bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would
allow them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter
into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie,
albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all
the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex.
The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for
other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
35
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s
attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the
ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only
the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code
may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a
previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of
evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the
listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the
sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution
of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be
declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in
the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an
in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs
of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September
29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

10. G.R. No. 182438               July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
3 ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was
The presented evidence showed that  Joey Umadac and
Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on
March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza,
refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the
couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse,
Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church
of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church.
They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to
perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for
the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in
the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the
principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac,
Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime
charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere,
testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the
veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the
wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk
down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6She
heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign
the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception,
had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there.
She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by
Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard
the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each
other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she
went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was
given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00
fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the
couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352
of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act
No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44
of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation
of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of
the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment
of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and
provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying
these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the
amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that
the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage
ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more
credence than the petitioner’s negative statements. 13 The
RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be
Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
36
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA
observed that although there is no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law
provides minimum standards in determining whether a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they
take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at
least two witnesses of legal age. 14 According to the CA, the
prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that
the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in
a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent
on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty
under Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since
it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following
grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague
and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage
ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code
and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require
the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as
husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting
parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. 17 The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to
prove that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under
the principle of separation of church and State, the State
cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot
convert the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted
the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in
violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should
preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by
Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not
found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated
thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an
authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize
any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime
are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and
(2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the
present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved
is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the
Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions
were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with
no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code
provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently,
Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed
form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law
sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of
the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and
second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the
parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary
to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating
and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.
It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions
he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to
destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the
judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it
from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and
even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances
of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had
indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take
each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot
overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence.
Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to
testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of
separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony.
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the
requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the
Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and that our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
37
which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional
policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To
this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations,
such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize
the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and
mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the
petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the
minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While
the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the
presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family
Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by
the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential
requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that
he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a
marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the
present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage
ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not
included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against
the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are
Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of
the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or
minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by
the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in
force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or
sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared
illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage
in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states
that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any
provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or
by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit
in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty
imposable in the present case is that covered under Section
44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not
include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the
MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of
the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It
is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of
Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for
any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine
of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
11. Imbong V. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Scra 146 (2014)
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it
is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the
nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and
unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a
problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member
of society. The government continues to tread on a trying
path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the
country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet
of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws
and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while
the executive is closed set to fully implement these
measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions
within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary
then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that
holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the
Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than
the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically
opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by
members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every
38
level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said
law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by
spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann
C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center,
Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for
the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and
several others8 in their personal capacities as
citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force
for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S.
Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution, and several others, 13 in
their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in
his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by
Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities
as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by
the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and

several others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D.
and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by
spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and
Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty.
Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity
as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed
by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and
several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are
members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition, 26 filed by Millennium
Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa,
Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni
Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed
by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in
their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed
by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi
Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty.
Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen
and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited
political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would
authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. 35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the
right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and
other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law
violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for
the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring
religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious
objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1]
to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as,
but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or
rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the
duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the
formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should
not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of
religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH
39
Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and
the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision
on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to
be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of
pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are
covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services
since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that
the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of
the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection
of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them
the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue
that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine
for "any violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law
violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide
what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To
compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to
expound only his own preferred way of family

planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and
operated by religious groups, they are still forced
to refer their patients to another healthcare facility
willing to perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of
one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes
upon their constitutional right to raise their children
in accordance with their beliefs. 49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person
who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and
impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the
same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child
who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle
of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to
the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule
provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy
of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the
local government level and the ARMM, infringes
upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the
ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file
their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, 59 and Atty.
Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4,
2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted
leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the
enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and
arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of
the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference
with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify
the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence
by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13,
and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On
July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further
orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification on
some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has
allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18,
1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to
Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
40
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive
drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner." 65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969,
contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients
or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section
37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product
or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing
conception as classified by the Food and Drug
Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN
Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal
element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation
to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and
effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space
or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be
further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President
Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made
"family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health
care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and
family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's
right to freely choose the method of family planning to be
adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on
Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009,
the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for
Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of
the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in
1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million
in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive
and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted
to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive
health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide
information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure
to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be
declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right
to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the
status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH
Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act
No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless
dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician.
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under
the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is
made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers'
money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the
program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning methods,
devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of
the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to
the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand,
the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises
made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the
RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's
41
ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized
by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied
challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed
law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners,
and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-
regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the
wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers
is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. 81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment
of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes
the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions
and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of
social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the
Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and
specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they
were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus,

while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of
judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be
subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back
to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it
has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has
unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper,
acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v.
Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention -
of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court
does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is
replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions
do not present any actual case or controversy because the
RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that the
questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and
ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing
that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected
by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review
of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
42
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of
an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the
issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed
that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the
fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does
not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not
necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty
of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge
lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,
also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by
the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have
seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has
been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners
to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper
as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of
his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the
rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the
rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the
Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law
may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still,
43
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s
tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny
that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance
with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and
bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of
all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused
deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at
issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint
at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of
either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH
Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its
true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH
Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive
health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health
law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier,
the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to
information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH
Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide
pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the
law, however, covers the dissemination of information and
provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health
care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that
the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed,
remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are
related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As
earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and
post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G
Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of
the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and
guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the
title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act,
or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act."129
44
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the
right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing
access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms
prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization
and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only
"non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion
as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental
human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront
to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law
requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify
that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the
FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133

Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does
not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care
services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be
made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative
determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due
consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the
medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference
and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only
when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the
constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated
considering that various studies of the WHO show that life
begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional
since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives
that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being
enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being
grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or
belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws
of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample
protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To
Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy
and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized
the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved
from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures
promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A.
No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two
cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative
policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that
the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of
the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life
begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should
be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
45
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn
from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason,
it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female
ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the
spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial
Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction
is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as
an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional
meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as
the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote;
the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of
developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term
"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the
male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of
survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal
personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it
was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing
for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect
for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was
referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on
the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which
reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is
when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as
such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological
manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is
the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes,
the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It
begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in
these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies
itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore,
there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has
life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally
categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of
the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23
chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23
chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only -
and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized
ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we
must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its
nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of
conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was
not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather,
because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of
conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler
phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given
ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
46
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient
for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying
"from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view
because according to the Commissioner's own admission,
he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It
is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So
we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a
question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I
was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it
has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does
this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the
right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we
know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that
some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the
ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the
next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the
uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the
provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives
should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then
that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to
Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on
the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the
Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn
child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether
a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive
and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum,
and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US
bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions
of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask
that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually
saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because
contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet.
That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking
more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been
fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some
of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the
1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the
oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation,
vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no
life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes
have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that
effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your
Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical
foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of
pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
47
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female
gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological
Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines,
also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the
moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the
sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a
unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental
stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals
that: "Human development begins after the union of male
and female gametes or germ cells during a process known
as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends
with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a
large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a
human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the
same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under
ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23
chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is
restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association
came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at
the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that
conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying
those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported
good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical,

legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote
is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of
conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical,
moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the
theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is
only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid
of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only
for convenience by those who had population control in
mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to
the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this
position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly
legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It
would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes -
abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers
was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the
unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-
abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this
intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has
opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As
pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to
the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime
under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act,
the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full
range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
48
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of
individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and
timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to
have the information and means to do so; and to attain the
highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health:
Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws
against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order,
rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent
in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of
the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must
be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices
that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device
that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court
finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug
or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces
the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not
intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the
way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After
all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it
affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which
kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under
Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or
to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as
empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot
fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be
used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to
safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however,
the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded,
should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be
used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with
the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not
purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive
pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such
purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors
of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines
"abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of
the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient"
as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be
defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
49
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
[Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is
redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and
scientifically proven modern family planning method, device,
or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents
pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the
mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows
"contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those
that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice
Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the
insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if
its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the
prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would
permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification
by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient
under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy
against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will
not only be those contraceptives that do not have the

primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action
of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting
abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained,
the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent
with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and
G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no
abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to
health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and
the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the
risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as
compared to women who never use them. They point out
that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is
discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of
combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a
threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a
twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an
indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given
the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to
ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex
lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of
the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if
it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger
to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to
health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the
States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an
effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for
disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of
society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade
malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
50
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
–
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered
self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status
quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they
are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained. 185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this
regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good
law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent
Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed
physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of
contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used
without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs

and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards
of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other
Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the
provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by
RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether
for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or
device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug,
chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for
the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female
ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument,
device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary
purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less
than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section
25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and
devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed,
sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or
hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in
the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of
the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless. 186 [Emphases in the
Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with
Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning
Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole
country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement
and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments
shall be based on, among others, the current levels and
projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and
couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of
method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement,
distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs
and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs
and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public
health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed
out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden
are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any
injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single
contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to
51
the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it
being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines
available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack
on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to
the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress
cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first
sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA,
not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third
sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or
removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There
must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and
tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious
education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some
of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that
their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but
also the willing participation and cooperation in all things
dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that

"contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is
contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the
reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and
denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of
Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom
since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law
attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional
guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer
the patient seeking reproductive health services to another
medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing
he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's
duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is
afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and
(2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health
procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public
health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in
Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to
in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners
meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter
to another health care service provider is still considered a
compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers.
They add that compelling them to do the act against their will
violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14
and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard
the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives
with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory
pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach
upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a
conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector
to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a
serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act
on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show
compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat
that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the
rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights,
sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the
demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or
are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH
Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a
certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision
forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the
RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As
the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it
runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH
Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither
imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest
by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive
health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line
with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice
health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the
law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that
the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice,
which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to
violate his religion against his free will.199
52
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural
family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious
freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking
the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning
methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that
the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise
between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that
of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of
her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3)
is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of
others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious
freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under
Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to
have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that
those who object to any information received on account of
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept information given to them. They are completely
free to reject any information they do not agree with and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the
notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing
various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the
benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse

ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds.
History has shown us that our government, in law and in
practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the
religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a
deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they
call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God "
manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence
of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating
provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious instructions in public
schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong
barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs
of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of
Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6
of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State
cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the
other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should
ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic
sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to
provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the
following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom
provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State
from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in
affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is
the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
53
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the
Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for
the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship
of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153),
but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed
to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to
live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid,
even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965,
83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not
designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a
single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs
and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with
penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were
intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is
the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and
without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however
strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom
of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause
and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the
Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated
"that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case,
it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to
these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation
is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion." 216 "What is sought under the
theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption
from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the
legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom,
the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise
is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to
determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the
Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not
employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then
pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom
is whether it violates the established institutions of society
and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and
grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of
general applicability may burden religious exercise provided
the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal
of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went
back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden
case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the
cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or
"grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases
on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona
and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not
prevail over established institutions of society and law.
Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German
has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave
and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case
that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to
the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican
Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent
with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate
in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different
effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-
reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state
in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of
the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and
sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This
right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause
is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the
Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As
held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
54
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead,
only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the
state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do
otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially
the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest
and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to
the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used
in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not
be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court
to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief.
For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only
in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while
the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and
respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to
violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law
respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of
all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information,
and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural

beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is
the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall
defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and
access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which have
been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards such as those registered and
approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern
natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors
and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable
individuals and couples to have the number of children they
desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and affordable to them
and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their
religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and
choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into
consideration the State's obligations under various human
rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs
will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the
marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a
parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between
parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to
their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted
allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle
of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts
what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They
can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious
beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that
one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote
reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same
conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23
and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that
a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a
person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.
55
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly
burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal
of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to
religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest
in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been
burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense
tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side
coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment
of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean
conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose
religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law
promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed
by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of
a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he
has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an
act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do
directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty
if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily
intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn
includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that
should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to

provide freedom of choice through informed consent,
freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or
burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral
convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law.
If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of
the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood
v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the
midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House
stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to
whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly'
this would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the
applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced
to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or
will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must
be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.
56
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid
v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed: views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
petition, and freedom of association. 229
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it
is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of The discriminatory provision is void not only because no
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any
common good."10 conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided
by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set Justice Mendoza:
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction,
a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a
Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete
law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer
with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you
a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive
have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of
health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
the RH Bill?
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
Congressman Lagman:
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long
IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
provisions.
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial,
Justice Mendoza:
city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue
of their office are specifically charged with the duty to I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal
health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection
specifically charged with the duty to implement the
clause. The conscientious objection clause should be
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
equally protective of the religious belief of public health
considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with
officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should
this?
not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The
protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should
equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction Congressman Lagman:
whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken
off even if one acquires employment in the government.
Justice Mendoza:
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place
inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral health professionals cannot be considered conscientious

objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the
law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on
whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling
state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their
choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of
proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents'
submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously
silent in the establishment of a more compelling state
interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious
objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his
religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of
the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to
refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad.
What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the
standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary
health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free
speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a
regulation by the State of the relationship between medical
doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest
which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. 232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to
believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated
when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to
the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the
timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children
refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not
the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product,
method or supply given to her or whether she even decides
to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden
placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify
the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which
could limit or override a person's fundamental right to
religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented
any government effort exerted to show that the means it
takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of
referring would only be momentary, considering that the act
of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action
being contested as violative of religious freedom, it
behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other
means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
57
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness
and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of
the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by
the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4
729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply
cater to the needs of women in relation to health services
and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in
fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive
Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive
health services and programs covering all stages of a
woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of
women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the
provision for comprehensive health services, due respect
shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the
rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and
post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and
effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in
youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their
children;

(5) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract cancers like breast
and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and
management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women
and children, women and children
victims and survivors shall be provided
with comprehensive health services that
include psychosocial, therapeutic,
medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of
infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond
their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and
intervention of mental health problems
of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and
projects as strategies in the prevention
of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The
State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on
all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due
regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be
brought up in an atmosphere of morality
and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality
that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective
family planning methods including
fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually
replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of
unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He,
however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts
and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health
Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there
was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the
delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women,
they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange
for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a
valid exception set forth in the law. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance
of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life
of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments,
Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced
referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation
of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the
life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting
58
death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the
principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein
intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is
never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save
both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not
necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to
save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the
child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty
of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the
child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother,
procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted
to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed
upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been
more than justified considering the life he would be able to
save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court
finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power
by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners
is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate
the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly
noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled
to accept the information given to them, are completely free
to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain
the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a)
(2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it

cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions
strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In
fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in
the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to
control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It
likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or
had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive
health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground
of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in
the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided,
That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis
supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health
procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their
very nature, should require mutual consent and decision
between the husband and the wife as they affect issues
intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art.
XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend
the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person
cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in
the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual
decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other
spouse from participating in the decision would drive a
wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family,
all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is
a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future
as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or
not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart
their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown
any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they
chart their destiny together as one family.
59
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section
19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal
rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the joint decision on the number and spacing of
their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section
3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between
parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be
allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the
absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive
health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the
protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right
to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where
the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held
that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted
the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights
-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which
made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the
right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts
will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in
cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure,

is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of
the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family
planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except
that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision
making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is
already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs
the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father
when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family.
It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family
as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the
constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to
modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the
right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases
supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to
exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well
affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would
be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the
special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the
exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)
(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family
planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of
Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her
own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect
both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not
prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over
their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept
or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception
must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the
life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for
lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)
(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical
procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first
sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
60
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To
deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to
Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education
under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners,
these provisions effectively force educational institutions to
teach reproductive health education even if they believe that
the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led
to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and
euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity
of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of
this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the
youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it
places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens
patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for
the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also

for values formation; the development of knowledge and
skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse
and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social
and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and
children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10,
Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage
behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal
mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in
the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it
could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that
Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the
RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a
"private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health
care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed
legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern
family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health
information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the
withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information,
but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used
in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in
accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that is, every part of it must be construed together
with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition
of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public
health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public
health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited
and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of
facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public
health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a
nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health
worker who has undergone training programs under any
accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily
renders primarily health care services in the community after
having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated
by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in
Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious
reason that they are used synonymously.
61
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures.
The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of
medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the
RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the
dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice
and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes
failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the
requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to
coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health
and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance
with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health
care service providers are not barred from expressing their
own personal opinions regarding the programs and services
on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the
need to provide public health and safety. The public
deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of
the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases
are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had
the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied
in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality
or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst
itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made
with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this
is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to
a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition
to the number included in the class. It must be of such a
nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out
or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a
certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
62
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only
seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the
RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the
petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge
couples with the duty to have children only if they would
raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its
provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health
care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that
the mere fact that the children of those who are less
fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction
rests between public educational institutions and private
educational institutions, particularly because there is a need
to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and
to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally
infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the
assailed legislation requiring private and non-government
health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours
of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to

involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services
envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care
service providers have the discretion as to the manner and
time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points
out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the
very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades,
even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of
involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed,
however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their
religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress
to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs
List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA
does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It
is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended
by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is
hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH).
Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of
this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the
collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in
connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis
for the preparation of health products standards,
and to recommend standards of identity, purity,
safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with
technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding
operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
63
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable
health products prior to the issuance of
appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders,
distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,
retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of
health products to report to the FDA any incident
that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness
or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any
person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio
or upon verified complaint for health products,
whether or not registered with the FDA Provided,
That for registered health products, the cease and
desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due
process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall,
and/or withdrawal of any health product found to
have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be
imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers
and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make
it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure
public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods."
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy

behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray
v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners
claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be
self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but
are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the
LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities
that have already been devolved upon them from
the national agencies on the aspect of providing
for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects
and other facilities, programs and services funded
by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or
partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases
where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services.
[Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery
of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on
the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be
implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against
it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that
whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or the
training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us
are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as
making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy
of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
64
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover,
Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to
justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions
relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government, which
can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the
State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national
and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and
implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and
plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all
matters of general concern or common interest. 275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates
natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a
law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural
law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent
rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists.
The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the
law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the
past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to
strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very
case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court
is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the
most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to
man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not
sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in
any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information
and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods,
devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.
After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and
State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society
leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace
and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea
does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is
the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the
country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial
issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution
of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will
remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands
of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the
country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are
now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their
economy. These young workers represent a significant
human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now
trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling.
For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by
remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied
workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer
younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go
down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population
problem, but the State should not use coercive measures
(like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy
of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature
has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted
by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what
the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look
into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of
this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature
to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold
neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing
legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine
itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted
by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a
mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive
measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A.
No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family
planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s;
65
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs or
shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in
the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect
the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-
IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March
19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 167746               August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSITA A.
ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February
2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for
the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR
Chapel.4They got married on the same day, 8 December
1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in
Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as
neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent
gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that
after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage,
respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27
October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has
three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays
that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack
of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143,
rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum
of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month
as support for their two (2) children on the first five
(5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the
parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had
not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.
Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a public
document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage
under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the
following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite
the evidence on record that there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of the solemnization
of the marriage.
66
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact
that the same was not identified and offered as
evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage
license number appearing on the face of the
marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling
laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of
Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12
April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage
with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
license because he and respondent just went to the Manila
City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City
Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino
Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a
marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from
Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be
given weight because the certification states that "Marriage
License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in
relation to Article 58 of the same Code. 19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at
the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the
State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license
to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a
ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local
Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage
License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court
held that the certification of "due search and inability to find"
a record or entry as to the purported marriage license,
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of
therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued
on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a
marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties
to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that
a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz
of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage
filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued
in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario
on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs.
Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be
made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as
to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from
67
these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage
license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value
of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we
still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner
and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion
of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the
marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued
to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract
states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway
us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a
typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage
contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1,
such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133
or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come
with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he
now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person.
He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly
and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed
to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-
so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or
suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such
effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage
ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the
same marriage license. There is no claim that he went
through the second wedding ceremony in church under

duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed
without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent,
they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding
ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioner’s testimony as follows—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the
necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to
produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don’t remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage
License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have
already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good
enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de
Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the
same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued
which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a
willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their
civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or
defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared
before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel --
will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony
will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All
the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is
always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is
Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated
14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL
STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
68
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered
no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially
for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims
that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two
marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support
Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order
69
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
present wording, as follows: promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
to remarry under Philippine law.
(other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family national law.26
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
can claim no right under this provision.
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
recognition in this jurisdiction
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that
are to be served.22 this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
states:
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no order is as follows:
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for
the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another
action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a
copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
70
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must
be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall
keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not
only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of
the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO

Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation
of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; 39and that the time
and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as
one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry –
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
71
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs. Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
SO ORDERED.
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
14. G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013 Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL National Statistics Office (NSO).6
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.: A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
The Case immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a
pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated
31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s marriages. –
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition
for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
the wife.
petition.
xxxx
The Facts
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
the petitioner. x x x
contact with each other.
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Fujiki.3
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and
wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family
Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd
because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In
the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-
existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of
the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a
duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to
the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted
that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki
stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own.
Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which
held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately
dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue
under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The
RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks
to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the
RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which
is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence,
this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public
72
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed
that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside"
and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial
period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of

judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain
her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file
a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which
has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew.
It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus,
the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
73
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who
is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or
her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law,
the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family

Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
74
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71 marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment
is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should
be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by
marriage in the civil registry.
the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family III.
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
recognized by law.
Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
country.
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
No. 02-11-10-SC. circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
his marriage.
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither

circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of
a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case
on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce
decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after
the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is
not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already
75
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and
the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
15. A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842               February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V.
ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the
law.1

Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge
Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required
marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of
cohabitation2 and issued them to the contracting parties. 3 He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties’
marriage.4 These "package marriages" are allegedly
common in Bacolod City.5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of
cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were
notarized on the day of the contracting parties’
marriages.6 The affidavits contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at
Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated
Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. 8 Circular No. 1-
90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries
public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected
with their official functions and duties. Rex argues that
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s
official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.9 Thus,
Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on
the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to present
their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by
law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of
the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and elementary to
ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that
Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of Frialyn
Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for
allegedly making false statements in her affidavit of
cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo
to delay Frialyn’s case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of
cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation was connected with his official functions and
duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary14 does not prohibit
judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties
whose marriage they will solemnize.15 Thus, Judge Rojo did
not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a notary public.
Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the
affidavits he notarized.16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the
affidavits with the parties presenting their competent pieces
of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to
the contents of their affidavits, he personally knew them to
be the same persons who executed the affidavit.17 The
parties’ identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and
Talisay City also notarized affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage they solemnized. 19 He pleaded "not
to make him [complainant Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag
and chopping block"20 since other judges also notarized
affidavits of cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court
Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-
90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
Judge Rojo be fined ₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that
repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with municipal
trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary,21 a judge’s duty is to personally
examine the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before
performing the marriage ceremony.22 Nothing in the
Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits
of cohabitation, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of
cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the
law.
76
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code
of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge
Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges
may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in
their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents,
contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of
their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court
(MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of
notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act
No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following
qualifications on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio
in the notarization of documents connected only with the
exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may
not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation
and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and
other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to
the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code
of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict
with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule
5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers
or notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial
jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or
notaries public when notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that
there are still municipalities which have neither lawyers nor
notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned
to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public
may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public,
provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account
of the Government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-
MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be
made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.24

Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also
notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that
lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No.
1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have
complied with all the essential and formal requisites of
marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage
license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to
parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing
the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine
the marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to
marry, they are exempt from the marriage license
requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit
of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must
personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the
parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry
each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn
statement that he personally ascertained the parties’
qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage
by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the
solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of
cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal
ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a)
personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of
the contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together
as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the
absence of any legal impediments to marry each other; and
(c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a)
and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who
notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation
cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’
marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties
have indeed lived together for at least five years without
legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state
that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected
with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize
marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is
inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’
requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer
notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively
examine and review the affidavit’s statements before
performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any
irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation
he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he
solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false
allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of
the parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of
cohabitation are documents not connected with their official
function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized
their marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected
with his official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization
of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not
expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited from notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation.
77
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the
solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of
cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the
requirements have been complied with redundant. As
discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document
he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family Code and the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary assume that "the person
authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the
affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who
performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits
municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private
documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the
performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a marriage
license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of
cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he
notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he notarizes a public
document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until
notarized. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity."35 The affidavit
of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains
a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As
discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to
"eliminate competition between judges and private lawyers in
transacting legal conveyancing business."36 He cited Borre v.
Judge Moya37 where this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty
of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale.
Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular
No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the
context in which this court stated that "[judges] should not
compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in
transacting legal conveyancing business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to
documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business."

So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with
his official functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-
90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this court
fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of candidacy. In
Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court fined Judge Galapon
for notarizing the verification page of an answer filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The
documents involved in these cases were not used to
transact "legal conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this
court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of
violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which
were not connected with his official function and duty to
solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in
Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public
are lacking in the municipality or circuit of the judge’s court
constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriages they solemnized does not make the
practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice
to the contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing
documents if the signatory is not personally known to him.
Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to
present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person
appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the
instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public
does not personally know the signatory, he must require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized,
he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their
affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the
parties were personally known to him or that the parties
presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity.
Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the
affidavits of cohabitation. They personally appeared before
him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also
interviewed them on their qualifications to contract marriage.
Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation need not
present their competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he
interviewed them do not make the parties personally known
to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to
subscribe to their affidavits. To personally know the parties,
the notary public must at least be acquainted with
them.45 Interviewing the contracting parties does not make
the parties personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of
cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge
How46where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations x x
x"47were defenses against gross ignorance of the law
charges. His good faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation
should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in
situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable
legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible
margins of error."49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or
notaries public are lacking in their courts’ territorial
jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know
78
the signatory to the document they will notarize or require
the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo
violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements
nine times is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
integrity,50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer."51 If the law involved is basic,
ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity."52 Violating basic
legal principles and procedure nine times is gross ignorance
of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a serious
charge:53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months;55 or
c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have
been dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the
law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other
judges’ practice of notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in
Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
six (6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the
requirements of the law.1âwphi1 They should act with
caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar
breach of the ethical requirements as in this case will be
dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without
salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His
suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this
resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in
Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and
G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized
by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to
his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to
her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon
a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose
needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released
to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled
him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by
her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly,
he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that
he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s
house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a
copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage
with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the
penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds
that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November
1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual,
as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release
of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have
put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa]
told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic]
purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be
that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a
ride" by [Felisa.]
79
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied
by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when
he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he
discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham
and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of
[Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead
the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
[sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.
The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action
had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered
the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take
any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision
to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the
Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that
the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond

the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals
struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4)
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained
by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party
within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within
four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.
Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within
which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was
only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that
his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not
affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing
officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith
reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.
According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code
did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or
religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718
of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of
the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular,
Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and
SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage
between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling
of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public that two persons
are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
80
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May
2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August
2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS
AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal
by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior
marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in
order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of
nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances
give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between
Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed
by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not
affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was
not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was
legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the
fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their
affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article
76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and
their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as
his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the
Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City,
attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and
wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is
that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage
such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
81
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions
to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail
the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception
in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and
the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that,
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had,
since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite
of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to
be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention
that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall
state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court
of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or

March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also
cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when
Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual
findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is
already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this
case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity
of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in
Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still
needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa
actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage
will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the
Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law.
The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity
of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of
Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that
Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding
82
Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990,
and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration
of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans
a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule
that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
17. G.R. No. 160172             February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, 
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1)
Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in
1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu
of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13

March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private
practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that
she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged
on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as
his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming
that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract
to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative
prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on
the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could
not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the
rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a
judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate
court declared that the child was born during the subsistence
and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA
testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal
knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s
"forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him
of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein
he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the
child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an
action for support, it was improper for the trial court to
declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
and void in the very same case. There was no participation
of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of
nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the
marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that
can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in
the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial
court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner
to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region,
Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia
A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the
appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant
and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly
annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by
the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage
was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that
the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he
and respondent never lived together as husband and wife.
The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no
need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this
case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not
an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court
had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage
83
since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the
instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be
the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity
to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties.
The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where
the same evidence and parties would be presented would
entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-
consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of
the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the
nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous
denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate
child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file their respective comments on the petition. 13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition
is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their
marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she
pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in
answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and
from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being
subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the
action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it
states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from
petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in
the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the
trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees
with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the
trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for
support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we
held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled
that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim
for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear
from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q     But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not
been living together as husband and wife for the
last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you
signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A     Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as
the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted
that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
84
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA
A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3,
1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings
of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent
with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s
own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his
former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he
used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or
clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to
their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled.
While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2,"
"D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-
1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1"
to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1"
and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture
(Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in
the act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No.
4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLEOF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal
Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.

THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July
1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while
her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to
marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then,
married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-
in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she
should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had
been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was
void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first
wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution.1âwphi1 She
alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the
legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred
that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after
she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married
Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on
the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April
1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner
that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily
duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage,
"her marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage
license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is
an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted
petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused
Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of
six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as
minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her
marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated
without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage
license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their
marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage
license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying
her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused
that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to
pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos,
something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument
would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare
their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction
was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked
the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution
witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of
Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court
simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity
of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA
affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-
accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of
Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must
be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
85
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to
Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage license. She
elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those
marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not
previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at
least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she
married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits
that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule
45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards
her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial
of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent
reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the
conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the
subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements
of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has
been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis
supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,
People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had
knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla
17 likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the
fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which
makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's
first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of
two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of
one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:
18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be
the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when
the second spouse married the accused without being aware of
his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge
of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's
knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown
by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos
was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws,
they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible
for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil
status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent
testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse
or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the present
case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe
firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during
the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court
concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy.
However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the
principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision
correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21
holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is
liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be
married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction
should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor,
which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.
Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an
accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next
lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of
six months and one day to six years. There being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four
months and one day to four years and two months of
imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24
petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be
convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused
wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a
matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial
proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has
consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to
Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the
essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue.
The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of
the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner
to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked
certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now
resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage
between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage
license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained
in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was
celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision
reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
86
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found
no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in
more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of
courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos
had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their
marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was
residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that
sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her
piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos
had only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it
follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least
five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this
demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they
submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of
the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the
Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated
under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw
in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago,
contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they
were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted
of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos
without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2)
falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a
bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal
prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish
an individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and
sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize
that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape

the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's
illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge
her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will
"lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily
become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa
or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall
be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be
denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to
the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative
defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with
Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a
false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were
exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against
illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to
allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an
acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage
lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court
found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa
Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to
issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the
marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of
public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In
contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate
of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as
basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment
of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner
herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the
conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus
accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 173614               September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF SPS.
EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-
MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M.
ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting
reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and
reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio
B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo,
Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents,
namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle
and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26
August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents
averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family
87
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by
said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months
from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which
made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio
lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21
years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from
the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were
born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991,
respectively. She further contended that the marriage
ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action
on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while
living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated
by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by
the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003
provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain
and simple which states that such a petition may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and
unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void
Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring
such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to
them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said
motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006,
reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog,15 which was on
the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse
have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a
void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are
deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is
now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule)
because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal
vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband
or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an
action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such
right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the
death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the
case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In
view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal
vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have
to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage
will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the
heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the
said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it
would be proper that it should solely be the parent who
should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any
rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure
cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs,
then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage
entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to
such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at
all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void
marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will
not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are
still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the
void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the
(sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was
not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary
rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May
2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this
case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC
denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter
was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case
law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of
the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated
route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court
has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective
regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or
certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct
recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek
the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last
resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of
88
dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance
of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants
must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.21However,
it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary
power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. 22 Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this
Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on
a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the
instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal
which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased
person were granted the right to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling
for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The
Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein
is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void
was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to
Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. 24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March
2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is
no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and
application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The
marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26
August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil
expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or
the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by
the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the
court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-
4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita
D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 179922             December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE
CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO
CARLOS II, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital
bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the
Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15,
2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review
on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment 2 of the
89
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare
unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.
They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE
SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of
Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the
Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of
Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan
[LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd.
project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd-
Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island
of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by
Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-
3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-
13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa
Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo.
of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2
to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x
containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND
SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No.
18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con
la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el
SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1
en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50
mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es
un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No.
18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con
la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el
SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50
mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es
un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook
to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred
and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots
are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT
No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
90
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage
Makati City. between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot
was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Teofilo Carlos II.
Deeds of Makati City.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II
subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of
(Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are
title, including the sums received by respondents as
covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively,
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case
expenses, and costs of suit.
No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement.
Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer.
respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691- Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding
square-meter portion of said land. the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II
was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of
another woman.
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
4 jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,  2,331
the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also
square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated
asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary
in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square
damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
The division was incorporated in a supplemental
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved
certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
accordingly.
were designated as parents.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for
in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no
court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)
recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for
money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No.

89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch
255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad
narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with
Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion
between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's
(respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted
and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant
Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized
at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by
the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S.
Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and
restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00
together with the interest thereon at the legal rate
from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully
paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive
owner of the parcel of land, less the portion
adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975,
covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register
of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another
title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and
void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the
complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in
the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title
in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in
the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title
in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of
plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June
7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of
Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed
from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed
summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to
law and public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was
91
appellants who first sought summary judgment
from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof
in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to
recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory
relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic)
to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact
that no genuine issue was presented and the
desire to expedite the disposition of the case
cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The
first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts
or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that
the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the
matter of dissolution of marriages and that the
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein
impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for thirty years and
that the annulment of their marriage is the very
means by which the latter is sought to be deprived
of her participation in the estate left by the former
call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that
the summary nature by which the court a
quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to
the effect that the material facts alleged in the
complaint for annulment of marriage should
always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. - Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the
applicability of the rules on summary judgment to
the case at bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a quo for

appellee would still not be warranted. While it may
be readily conceded that a valid marriage license
is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to
be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license is corroborated by the following statement
in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then
Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned
marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there
was a marriage license issued at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the
said marriage contract executed by
Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval,
but the number of said marriage license
was inadvertently not placed in the
marriage contract for the reason that it
was the Office Clerk who filled up the
blanks in the Marriage Contract who in
turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the
trial court, We are of the considered view that the
veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement
as well as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of the
case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract -
the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that
a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants' non-presentation of the subject
marriage license be taken as proof that the same
was not procured. The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on
the party who disputes the legitimacy of a
particular party, the same may be said of the trial
court's rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father
on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant
92
Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had law or with the applicable decisions of this
effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims Honorable Court;
regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the
2. That in setting aside and reversing the
illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind,
Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering
did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
another remanding the case to the court of origin
said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to
for further proceedings, petitioner most
prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
to inheritance rights as such.
committed a serious reversible error in applying
Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the
Without trial on the merits having been conducted Rules of Court providing for judgment on the
in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased Judgments;
from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support
3. That in reversing and setting aside the
what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the
Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering
rights arising from his putative filiation.
another remanding the case to the court of origin
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
for further proceedings, petitioner most
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
respectfully submits that the Court of
declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on
in the light of the fact that, during the last eight
ground of speculations, surmises, and
years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
conjectures, or otherwise committed
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension
his household. The least that the trial court could
of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial
on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly
resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8 marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment
on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues,
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration
including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing
and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De
the action for nullity of marriage.
Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Our Ruling
Issues
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following
marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the
issues:
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the
Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of
hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F
hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where
Court of Appeals committed a grave an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of admits the material allegations of the adverse
the Civil Code, despite the fact that the party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
circumstances of this case are different from that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
contemplated and intended by law, or has actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
otherwise decided a question of substance not separation, the material facts alleged in the
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has complaint shall always be proved.
decided it in a manner probably not in accord with

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely
within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the
pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the
applicability of the rules on summary judgment to
the case at bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules
on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have
no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has
been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down
by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is
found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall
personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded
actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the
application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save
for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment
is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has
divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in
the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by
the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion
exists between the parties. The State should have been
given the opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the
court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public
prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of
marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.
- (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall
require the public prosecutor to intervene for the
State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.
(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or
the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration
of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule
made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
93
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to
the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On
the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are
the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage.
They are the only ones who can decide when and how to
build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play.
Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a
cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets
forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule
never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs
of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although
the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its
application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy
was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place. 23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring
an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that
any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity
of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in
the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any
person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real
party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
94
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs
is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the
ground of lack of cause of action.27 law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of
Appeals,28 where the Court held:
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
force at the time the respondents were married, or
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse
even in the Family Code, there is no specific
and child, respectively.
provision as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate "proper interest"  can file the Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, heirs, to wit:
like any other actions,  must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
interest  and must be based on a cause of action.
respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog,  the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
father to their stepmother as it affects their and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
successional rights. children and descendants;
xxxx (3) The widow or widower;
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
declare the nullity of marriage cannot be children by legal fiction;
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article
remand of the case to the trial court for reception
287 of the Civil Code.31
of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as
it is proved that a valid divorce decree was a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir,
obtained and the same did not allow respondent he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and
void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
children survive with the widow or widower, the
exemplary damages from P200,000.00
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
children to the other half.
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas ART. 1003. If there are no descendants,
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
same.29 (Underscoring supplied) spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or
not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or
illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to
be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad.
This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother
and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the
direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if
Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to
the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New
Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to
seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject
marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to
the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of
petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent
upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the
ground that he has no successional right to be protected,
hence, does not have proper interest. For although the
marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the
beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because
the presence of descendant, illegitimate, 34 or even an
adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from
inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on
the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a
95
legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo 1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner. Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order.
There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as
to the other causes of action before it. 2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate,
or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late
Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for
ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of
the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically
ASIDE.
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case.36 The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on
the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having
been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is No costs.
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support
SO ORDERED.
its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo
II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court,
such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be
afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty
provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the
status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the
legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed
by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage. 37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner
for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be
so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as
follows: