2. Republic v.

De Castellvi
G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued
that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of
the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2)
for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it
to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way
as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.

3. Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp.

292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998

Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution
by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave
authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules,
which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise
eminent domain.

Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminentdomain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.

Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as
the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power ofeminent domain if there is an
ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the
latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local
Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an
administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
 4. Manosca v. CA
G.R. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners
as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to
appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public
purpose.

Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.

Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a
public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the
Philippines.
 5. Filstream International Incorporated v. CA
284 SCRA 716, January 23, 1998

Facts: Filstream filed ejectment suit before MTC against occupants on the grounds of
termination of contact and non-payment of rentals. MTC decided in favor of Filstream. This
was appealed in RTC and CA and both upheld existing decision. During the pendency of
ejectment proceedings, City of Manila approved Ordinance 7813 authorizing Mayor Lim to
initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means
certain parcels of land that covers properties of Filstream. City of Manila filed complaint for
eminent domain to expropriate Filstream properties. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for eminent domain as well as a motion to quash the writ of possession on the
ground of no valid cause of action, the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public
use and maneuver to circumvent the ejectment suit, violation of the constitutional
guarantee against non-impairment, price offered was too low violating just compensation.
RTC denied the petition and declared the property condemned in favor of City of Manila.

Issue: Whether or not Filstream was deprived of due process on the ground of non-
compliance with priority in expropriation?

Decision: There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor
of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties.
The City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within
its jurisdiction specifically in pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program.
Very clear from the provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in
acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire
the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing.
In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes
of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed
mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private
property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
RA 7279 Uran Development Housing Act of 1992
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and
( f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government
units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.
 6. City of Manila v. Estrada
G.R. No. 7749, September 9, 1913 - PDF

7.NPC v. CA
G.R. No. 113194, March 11, 1996- PDF

8. Republic v. Sps. Salvador

G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017- PDF

9. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform- G.R. No. 78742, July 14,1989

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No.
228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as
it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the
interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike
the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of
just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of

compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power
for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking
under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain
 10. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco
G.R. No. 140160, January 13, 2004 - PDF

11. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hababag

G.R. No. 172352, September 16, 2015- PDF

12. NPC v. Sps. Bernardo

G. R. No. 189127, April 25, 2012- Di ko makita

13. Land Bank v. Lajom

G.R. No. 184982, August 20, 2014- Di ko makita

14. EPZA v. Dulay

G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987

Fact: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811,
reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less,
for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land which includes, four
(4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned by the private
respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the
respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of
the property. The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu for expropriation with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent for the purpose of
establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. The respondent judge issued a writ of
possession, order of condemnation and order to appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated. The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the
grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on
the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
P.D. No. 1533 which states “Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property
acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not
exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in
the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code,
whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government office to acquire the property.” valid and constitutional?

Held: No, the method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still
have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under the Rules of Court. The
determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less
can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation.

15. Republic v. Lim

G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005

FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug,
Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The
said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic
deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the
CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as
just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948.
An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6,
1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the
lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons·
successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of
the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and
Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to
acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable
market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding
that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the
Republic·s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to
execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are
still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession
of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had
the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the
petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is
the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner
including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision
dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This is contrary to the
rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for
the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just"...”
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain
as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the
judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived
of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is
taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic
disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules of fair
play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes
the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a
reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of
the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is tantamount
to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to
the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the
exigency of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the
government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to
compensate the owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the
Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just
compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of
just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken."
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to
pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to
recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment
of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also
the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just."

16. MIAA and Air Transportation Office v. Lozada

G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010- PDF

17. Republic v. Heirs of Borbon

G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015

Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order
to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon
owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial
Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a
portion of the property.

The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them
before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent;
nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just
compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property
whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.

During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an
amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary
for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed
on the respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which such property
would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer
continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that
the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed

pending appeal.

Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is
proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and
equitable.

Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of eminent
domain. The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial
sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two
mandatory requirements should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the concept has
expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public. “Public
use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and “public
convenience.”

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the
proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained
in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation
filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will
be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and
the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness and equity.

It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for
public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands,
under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it
appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the
action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot
be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be
true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for
example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the satisfaction
of the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the
obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the
appeal, if it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the
expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty and the obligation of the
appellate court to dismiss it.

Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation
proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings
despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the
rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element of public use.

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings subject to the
conditions to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of the property to the
respondents. Having said that, we must point out that NAPOCOR entered the property
without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents.
Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is
explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just compensation before
depriving any person of his or her property for public use. Considering that in the process of
installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without
payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land
as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property
inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the
time of restoration of the possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to
the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property
would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore,
NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights
from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them
actual or other compensatory damages.

This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a
result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value
of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the
transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a
development occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for
damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings. The court of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for
damages.

18. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free

print space of not less than ½ page for use as “Comelec Space” from 06March1995 to
06May1995. COMELEC Commisssioner sent letters to publishers informing them of the
same. PPI seek to declare the resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking
private property w/o just compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen argues that even if the
questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the
same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. COMELEC
Chair stated that they will clarify the resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and
not to compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of deprivation of use w/o
compensation of newspaper?

Decision: To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking”

of private personal property for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers
whether in cities or in non-urban areas.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric
of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a
lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the
necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of
necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been
suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. It has not been suggested that Comelec has been granted the
power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of
election laws by Comelec must be shown.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of “just compensation.”
 19. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 132922, April 21, 1998

FACTS: Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,
the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television
broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking
which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1)
hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that radio
and television stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC
Time.

ISSUE#1: Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional question
on the assailed provision?

HELD#1: YES.
[W]e have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears
to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of §92
of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free airtime to
the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free
airtime is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.

ISSUE#2: Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and unlawful taking
of private property for public use without just compensation?

HELD#2: NO.
Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in
accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . .
shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires.”
 20. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon
City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate
the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground
of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in
the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation
of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph
1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the
state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision
that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the
City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license
fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised
in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The
ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a
city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and
the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which
are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed
with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of
the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by

Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes
the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made
to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
court is affirmed.
 21. NPC v. Maria Mendoza San Pedro
G.R. No. 170945 September 26, 2006- Cannot See

22. US v. Causby
328 U.S. 256, May 27, 1946

Facts of the case

Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm
was located near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to
Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the
deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to
abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership
extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby
sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes
in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without
compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United
States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay
compensation.

Question
Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion
Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court
concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world."
Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common
sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and
below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner
is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated
that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to
"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the
damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined
that the government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
(Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson took no part in
the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)
 23. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,
670 SCRA392 (2012)
THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the
petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC
revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot
validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application
of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice,
after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot,
signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development
Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable
to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through
the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to
sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for
the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified
FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents

PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby
RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed
immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid
or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or
recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the
SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the
Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were
they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered
moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.
The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent
grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this
should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too
restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the
land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily
result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders
its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded
per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the
proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and
considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and
enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter
which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion
of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita
Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot
acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale
of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be
distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise,
these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution
scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is
akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the
contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after
PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just
compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the
cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases
do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing
that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC
acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right
to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has
NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell
their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10
years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of
land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued
to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even
started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the
placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be
immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all
efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these
lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain
control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The
Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus,
even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders,
which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares.
Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute
the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one
[1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC
substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]
 24. Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Tecson,
700 SCRA 243 (2013) and Resolution dated 21 April 2015, – SCRA – (G.R.No. 179334, 21 April
2015)- PDF

25. National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

656 SCRA60 (2011)

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power
Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.

On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for
just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer
grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact
by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an
indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to
pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that
the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual
physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement
practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes
destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value