Cordora v.

Comelec
 
FACTS: 
 
Cordora accused Tambunting of an election offense violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. To disprove
Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American:
upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17
June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
 
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother
and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The
certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him
through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he
acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is
not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225. 
 
ISSUE: 
 
W/N Tambunting is a natural-born Filipino
 
HELD: 
 
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he
deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his
father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both
Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.
 
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only
served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed
that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not
disqualify him from running for public office.
 
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states
 
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition.
 
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
 
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made
false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his
innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be
elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
 
 
Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec
 
FACTS: 
 
Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed
before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of Reyes on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically: 
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;
 
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas
which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P.
Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House
of Representatives;
  
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July
1959 or 3 July 1960;
 
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant4 of the United States of America; and 
 
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. 
 
In her answer, Reyes countered that while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Mandanas, there is no valid and binding marriage between them. As to her date of birth, the Certificate
of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly, petitioner
notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of
America is not supported by evidence.
 
During the course of the proceedings, Tan filed a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended list of exhibits   among others: 
 
1. A copy of an article published on the internet entitled “Seeking and Finding the Truth About Regina O.
Reyes with affidavit of identification and authenticity of document which provides database record of
the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Reyes is an American Citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; 
2. (2) a Certification of Travel Records of the petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification
and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport
in her various travels abroad.
 
Comelec First Division canceled Reyes’ COC. 
 
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status
by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the
COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is
a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted in dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still,
petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public. 
 
COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
 
Four days thereafter, Reyes was proclaimed the winner of the elections. COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and
executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. Petitioner has yet to assume
office. 
 
ISSUE: 
 
W/N Reyes is a Filipino citizen and therefore allowed to run as a candidate of the House of
Representatives. 
 
HELD: 
 
NO. The Court herein ruled that Reyes was not a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy. To be a candidate of the House of Representatives, an individual should be a Filipino citizen
at the time of his or her filing of the COC and must be resident thereof (of the municipality he or she will
be representing) for not less than 1 year. In the case at bar, petitioner Reyes failed to prove that she had
already renounced her American citizenship. Her contention that she already renounced the same
cannot
be entertained. She stated that she already took her oath of allegiance when she was appointed as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque. However, the said oath taking was not in accordance with
present laws. For a former citizen to be considered as a Filipino citizen again, he or she must conform to
the rules stated in RA 9225. In this case, petitioner Reyes did not comply with the said requirements.
Moreover, her residency issue was also barring her candidacy. She failed to prove that she had intent to
establish her domicile in the Philippines. Her actions prove that she has no intention of leaving her
domicile in the United States. PETITION IS DISMISSED.
 
 
David v. Agbay
 
Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they built their house
is public land and part of the salvage zone.
 
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
 
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
 
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
 
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
 
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest
was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and
admitted to have been committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC
concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The
petition was denied.
 
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225.
 
RULING:
 
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
 
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into
force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens
as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
 
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
 
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship
status is concerned. The MTC, therefore, did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
 
 
Olaguer v. Purugganan
 
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer who is an activist against the Marcos administration was the owner of
60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation with a total par value of P600,000.00. Anticipating
the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and detained by the
 
Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifeña had an unwritten agreement that, in the event,
that petitioner was arrested, they would support the petitioner’s family by the continued
payment of his salary. Oleguer executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 May 1979,appointing
as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioner’s
shares of stock with Businessday. The parties acknowledged the SPAbefore respondent Emilio
Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary
public for Quezon City. On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by virtue
of an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly committing arson.
In view of petitioner’s previous instructions, for such price and under such terms and conditions that the
agents may deem proper. When the petitioner was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioner’s
shares, but nobody wantedto buy them. Petitioner’s reputation as an oppositionist resulted in the poor
financial condition of Businessday and discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock. Respondent
Locsin decided to buy the shares himself.
 
Although the capital deficiency suffered by Businessday caused value of the shares to plummet below
par value, respondent Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value. The RTC found that
petitioner consented to have respondent Locsinbuy the shares himself, through his wife received from
respondent Locsin the amount of P600,000.00 as payment for the shares of stock.
 
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA.
 
DECISION:
It is a general rule that a power of attorney must be strictly construed;   will be held to grant only those
powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of
attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and should not be applied to the extent of destroying the
very purpose of the power. If the language willpermit, the construction that should be adopted is that
which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment. Clauses in a power of attorney
that are repugnant to each other should be reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in
accordance with its general intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always
be deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express powers.In the present
case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of
"incapacity" under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating
absurd, if not impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent standards that
would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge. Among the standards the said article
enumerates is that no agent has been appointed toadminister the property. In the present case,
petitioner himself had already authorized agents todo specific acts of administration and thus, no longer
necessitated the appointment of one by the court. Likewise, limiting the construction of "incapacity" to
"minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction," as
provided under Article 38, would render the SPA ineffective.
Petitioner received from respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments for a
total of P600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or complaint. It was only four years
after 1982 when petitioner demanded the return of the shares. The petitioner’s claim that he did not
instruct respondent Locsin to deposit the money to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to prove that
petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since respondent Locsin was authorized, under theSPA, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale including the manner of payment. Moreover, had
respondent Locsin given the proceeds directly to the petitioner, as the latter suggested in this
petition, the proceeds were likely to have been included among petitioner’s properties which were
confiscated by the military. Instead, respondent Locsin deposited the money in the bank accounts of 
petitioner’s in-laws, and consequently, assured that the petitioner’s wife received these amounts
.
Article 1882 of the Civil Code provides that the limits of an agent’s authority shall not
be consideredexceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous to the principal
than that specified by him.
 
 
Umale v. ASB Realty Corporation
 
FACTS: 
 
This case involves a parcel of land located in Amethyst Str., Ortigas Center, Pasig City which was
originally owned by Amethyst Pearl Corporation, a company that is, in turn, wholly-owned by ASB Realty
Corporation.
 
Amethyst Pear executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in favor of ASB
Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearl’s outstanding capital stock from ASB
realty making it the owner of the subject premises. 
 
In 2003, ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Umale. ASB Realty
alleged that it entered into a lease contract with Umale. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a
pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rent of P60,720. Upon the contract’s expiration
on continued occupying the premises and paying rentals. 
 
ASB Realty then served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate and Pay. ASB
Realty stated that it was terminating the lease effective midnight of June 2003. In asserting his right to
remian on the property based on the oral lessee contract with Amethyst Pearl, Umale interposed that
the lease period agreed upon was for a long period of time”. Umale further claimed that when his oral
lease contract with Amethyst Pearl ended, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. They agreed that
Umale did not have to pay with the sale over the property as it has already been perfected between
them. 
 
Umale also challenged ASB Realty's personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB
Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly
appointed. Under  the  Interim  Rules  of Procedure  on  Corporate  Rehabilitation  (Interim Rules),  it  is
the  rehabilitation receiver  that  has  the  power  to  "take  possession,  control  and  custody  of  the
debtor's assets." Since ASB Realty claims that it owns the subject premises, it is its duly-appointed
receiver that should sue to recover possession of the same.
 
ASB Realty replied that it was impossible for  Umale to have entered into a Contract of Lease with
Amethyst Pearl in 1999  because  Amethyst Pearl had been liquidated in 1996. 
 
MTC dismissed ASB Realty's complaint against Umale without prejudice. It held that ASB Realty had no
cause to seek Umale's ouster from the subject property because it was not  Umale's lessor.  MTC  agreed
with  Umale that only the rehabilitation receiver could file  suit to recover  ASB  Realty's property.
Havingbeen placed under receivership, ASB Realty had no more personality to file the complaint for
unlawful detainer.
 
RTC  reversed  decision  of  the  MTC.  It  found  sufficient  evidence  to  support  the conclusion that it
was indeed ASB Realty that entered into a lease contract withUmale.  With  respect  to  ASB  Realty's
personality  to  file  the  unlawful  detainer suit, the RTC ruled that  ASB  Realty retained all its corporate
powers, including the power to sue, despite the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Citing the
Interim  Rules,  the  RTC  noted  that  the  rehabilitation  receiver  was  not  granted therein the power to
file complaints on behalf of the corporation.  Moreover, the retention  of  its  corporate  powers  by  the
corporation  under  rehabilitation  will advance  the  objective  of  corporate  rehabilitation,  which  is  to
conserve  and administer  the  assets  of  the  corporation  in  the  hope  that  it  may  eventually  be able
to go from financial distress to solvency.
 
Umale filed MR while ASB Realty moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, the RTC  denied
reconsideration  of its  Decision and granted  ASB  Realty's Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. 
 
Umale then filed  his  appeal  with  the  CA  insisting that  the  parties  did  not  enter into a lease
contract.
 
Pending  the  resolution  thereof,  Umale died  and  was  substituted  by  his  widow and legal heirs. CA
affirmed RTC decision in toto. 
 
Issues:Can  a  corporate  officer  of  ASB  Realty  (duly  authorized  by  the  Board  of Directors)  file  suit
to  recover  an  unlawfully  detained  corporate  property  despite  the  fact that the corporation had
already been placed under rehabilitation?    
 
The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.There  is  no  denying  that  ASB
Realty,  as  the  owner  of  the  leased  premises,  is  the  real party-in-interest in the unlawful detainer
suit. Real party-in-interest is defined as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
 
What  petitioners  argue  is  that  the  corporate  officer  of  ASB  Realty  is  incapacitated  to  file this  suit
to  recover  a  corporate  property  because  ASB  Realty  has  a  duly-appointed rehabilitation receiver.
Allegedly, this rehabilitation receiver is the only one that can file the instant suit.
 
Corporations, such as ASB Realty, arejuridical entities that exist by operation of law. As a creature of law,
the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or impliedly,  in  the  law.  Among
the  general  powers  granted  by  law  to  a  corporation  is  the power  to  sue  in  its own  name.  This
power  is  granted  to  a  duly-organized  corporation, unless specifically  revoked  by  another  law.  The
question  becomes:  Do  the  laws  on corporate rehabilitation —particularly PD 902-A, as amended and
its corresponding rules of  procedure —forfeit  the  power  to  sue  from  the  corporate  officers  and
Board  of Directors?    
 
Corporate  rehabilitation  is  defined  as  "the  restoration  of  the  debtor  to  a  position  of successful
operation  and  solvency,  if  it  is  shown  that  its  continuance  of  operation  is economically  feasible
and  its  creditors  can  recover  by  way  of  the  present  value  of payments projected in the plan more
if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated." This concept of
preserving the corporation's business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called
debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place.   This   means   that   the   debtor   corporation   (the  
corporation  undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board  of Directors and corporate officers, remains
in control of its business  and  properties,  subject  only  to  the  monitoring  of  the  appointed
rehabilitation receiver. The concept of debtor-in-possession  is carried out more particularly in the SEC
Rules,  the  rule  that  is  relevant  to  the  instant  case.  It  states therein  that  the  interim rehabilitation
receiver  of  the  debtor  corporation  "does  not  take  over  the  control  and management  of  the
debtor  corporation."  Likewise,  the rehabilitation  receiver  that  will replace the interim receiver is
tasked only to monitor the successful implementation of the rehabilitation  plan.  There  is  nothing  in
the  concept  of  corporate  rehabilitation  that  would ipso facto deprive  the  Board  of  Directors  and
corporate  officers  of  a  debtor  corporation, such as  ASB  Realty,  of control  such  that  it  can  no
longer  enforce  its  right  to  recover  its property from an errant lessee.
 
To be sure, corporate rehabilitation imposes several restrictions on the debtor corporation. The rules
enumerate the prohibited corporate actions and transactions 64 (most of which involve  some  kind  of
disposition  or  encumbrance  of  the  corporation's  assets)  during  the pendency  of  the  rehabilitation
proceedings  but  none  of  which  touch  on  the  debtor corporation's right to sue. 
 
While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover  its
property  and  the  back  rentals  from  Umale,  the necessity  of keeping  the receiver apprised of the
proceedings and its results is not lost upon this Court. Tasked to closely  monitor  the  assets  of  ASB
Realty,  the  rehabilitation  receiver  has  to  be  notified  of the developments in the case, so that these
assets would be managed in accordance with the approved rehabilitation plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales
 
FACTS: 
Dr. Mariano Favis was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had seven children When Capitolina
died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired
one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed
an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D.
Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children. 
 
Dr. Favis died intestate on 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of
Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the
said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an
action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of
property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as
respondents.
 
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. Trial Court
found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his
mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. 
 
Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CA motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made as mandated by Article 151 of FC. 
 
ISSUE: W/N CA gravely and seriously erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise. 
 
HELD: 
 
Yes. 
CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at
a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but
merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. In the case at hand, the proceedings before the
trial court ran the full course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior
motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by
respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made
about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither
was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
 
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable
to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer
to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at
a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio
order the dismissal of petitioners complaint. The correctness of the finding was not touched by the
Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered,
erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands
unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED. Petition for review is 
 
GRANTED.
 
 
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
 
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as
she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner
of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications
for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim
Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jalosjos v. Comelec
 
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he was eight years
old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga,
he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of
citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. 

 
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo,
the barangay captain, opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the application and included
Jalosjos in the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.

 
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010
elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).

 
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a
guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.
Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.
 
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona
fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

 
HELD:

NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian
citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.

 
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year
before the elections.  For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous
with domicile:  i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have
personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

 
The question of residence is a question of intention.  To determine compliance with the
residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

 
  (a)               every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
 

(b)               where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and
(c)               a person can have but one domicile at a time.
 
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he acquired Australian
citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.  On the other hand, when
he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident
that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian
citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia,
clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

 
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has
merely been staying at his brother's house.  A candidate is not required to have a house in order to
establish his residence or domicile in that place.  It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.  To insist that the candidate own the house where
he lives would make property a qualification for public office.  What matters is that Jalosjos has proved
two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in
Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national party mates,
furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC.  The court also noted that Jalosjos
has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.  This, without a
doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Naldoza v. Republic
 
FACTS: 
Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia were married. They begot two children. After a quarrel
between the spouses, Dionesio left the conjugal home and never returned. He allegedly swindled
Congressman Maglana and other persons.
 
The classmates of the two children were allegedly teased about their father being a swindler. Two
criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the
CFI of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from
Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. The trial court dismissed the petition.
 
Zosima appealed to this Court.
 
Issue: WON the children should be allowed to drop the surname of their father and be allowed to use
the mother’s surname?
 
Held: No.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. To allow the change
of
surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the
minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent
with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.
 
As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time must, know
of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for
himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he
should be the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. 
 
 
Yasin V. Sharia District Court
G.R. No. 94986, 23 February 1995
 
FACTS:
On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to
resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was
not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of
petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should
include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but
is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of
her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to
rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of
petitioner’s maiden name and surname.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to
resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
 
 
RULING:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or
divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of
the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's
name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change
her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname
during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive
and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
 
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent
court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former
husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
 
In re: Stephanie Garcia
 
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to
Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under
Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name.
 
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article
365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
 
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law  to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
 
 
Remo v. DFA
 
FACTS: 
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine
passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia”
as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied
for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her
request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has
not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of
Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her
maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband. 
 

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The CA also
affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA
8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the
case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]
 
Issues: 
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to
the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. 
 

Held:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists. 
 

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s
surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when
a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with
this principle. 
 

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden
name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname. 
 
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport,
the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. 
 

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage
to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage. 
 

Yasin case not in point 

 

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose
former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin
did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to
resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage. 
 

Special law prevails over general law 

 

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special
law prevails over a general law. 
 

Implied repeals are disfavored

 

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is
disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as
possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.
This, Remo failed to establish. 
 
State is mandated to protect integrity of passport 
 

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her
present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the
use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which
is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. 
 

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s
constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity
and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains
at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as
it is valid.