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Target Reliability Levels for Design and Assessment of Onshore Natural Gas
Pipelines

Article  in  Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology · December 2009

DOI: 10.1115/1.3110017

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 Maher Nessim
e-mail: m.nessim@cfertech.com
Wenxing Zhou
e-mail: w.zhou@cfertech.com
C-FER Technologies,
200 Karl Clark Road,
Edmonton, AL, T6N 1H2, Canada
Joe Zhou
TransCanada Pipelines Limited,
450-1 Street Southwest,
Calgary, AL, T2P 5H1, Canada
e-mail: joe_zhou@transcanada.com
Brian Rothwell
Brian Rothwell Consulting Inc.,
100 Hamptons Link Northwest,
Calgary, AL, T3A 5V9, Canada
e-mail: brian.rothwell@shaw.ca
Target Reliability Levels for
Design and Assessment of
Onshore Natural Gas Pipelines
This paper proposes a set of reliability targets that can be used in the design and
assessment of onshore natural gas pipelines. The targets were developed as part of a
PRCI-sponsored project that aims to establish reliability-based methods as a viable al-
ternative for pipeline design and assessment. The proposed targets are calibrated to meet
risk levels that are considered widely acceptable. The proposed criteria are based on a
detailed consideration of both societal and individual risk criteria. Two societal risk
criteria were considered: the first based on a fixed expectation of the number of fatalities
and the second based on a risk aversion function as characterized by a F / N relationship.
Societal risk criteria were calibrated to match or exceed the average safety levels implied
by current codes. Individual risk criteria were based on published tolerable levels. The
target reliability levels corresponding to the three criteria are presented and a recom-
mended set of targets is presented. 关DOI: 10.1115/1.3110017兴

1 Introduction The purpose of this paper is to describe the aforementioned

In the last 30 years, reliability-based design principles have
been used to develop limit states design codes in many industries
共e.g., nuclear containments, bridges, and buildings兲. These meth-
ods, which are still not used for pipelines, have been shown to
have significant benefits over allowable stress design methods,
including improved safety, cost savings, and an ability to address
unique design situations. To establish reliability-based methods as
a viable design alternative for the design and assessment of pipe-
lines, the Pipeline Research Council International 共PRCI兲 spon-
sored a multiyear project to develop the required technical infor-
mation, communicate the approach to the industry and regulators,
and facilitate its incorporation into relevant pipeline standards.
The first step of this process was a technical project that was
carried out by C-FER Technologies to develop a set of guidelines
for reliability-based design and assessment 共RBDA兲 of onshore
natural gas pipelines. The reliability-based design and assessment
process adopted in these guidelines was described in Ref. 关1兴
The implementation of RBDA hinges on the definition of a
suitable set of reliability targets. A set of preliminary ultimate
limit state 共ULS兲 reliability targets for onshore natural gas pipe-
lines were developed by C-FER in a joint project funded by BP
Exploration Operating Co. Ltd. and TransCanada PipeLines Ltd.
For natural gas pipelines, a ULS is defined as a failure that results
in significant loss of containment leading to a potential safety
hazard 共i.e., a large leak or rupture兲. These targets were published
by Zimmerman et al. 关2兴. An updated version of the preliminary
targets was later developed based on more up-to-date models and
data. These targets have been adopted in an RBDA Annex to the
2007 version of the Canadian Standard Association’s 共CSA兲 pipe-
line standard Z662 关3兴. They have also been included as an ex-
ample in the International Standard Association’s 共ISO兲 pipeline
standard 16708 关4兴 and are being considered for inclusion in the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASME pipeline stan-
dard B31.8 关5兴.
Contributed by the Pressure Vessel and Piping Division of ASME for publication
in the JOURNAL OF PRESSURE VESSEL TECHNOLOGY. Manuscript received March 14,
2008; final manuscript received July 16, 2008; published online September 23, 2009.
Review conducted by Shawn Kenny. Paper presented at the International Pipeline
Conference, Calgary, 2004.
ULS reliability targets and to explain the approach used in devel-
oping them. The targets were designed to achieve an acceptable
and consistent level of safety for all pipelines 共i.e., of different
diameters, grades, pressures, and in different locations兲. To
achieve this, a risk-based approach was used, which considers the
key societal and individual risk measures currently in use in the
pipeline industry. The targets are based solely on human safety
considerations. Environmental risks were not considered because
they are insignificant in comparison to safety risks for natural gas
pipelines. Economic considerations are left up to the users of the
targets, who may wish to carry out optimization studies to identify
minimum cost solutions that meet the targets or to exceed the
targets for economic reasons.
2 Risk-Based Reliability Targets
2.1 Approach. A risk-based approach was used to define the
maximum permissible failure probability for a given pipeline seg-
ment. The approach follows from the basic definition of risk r as
r=p⫻c 共1兲
where p is the probability of failure per km year of pipeline and c
is a measure of the failure consequences. For example, c can be
measured by the expected number of fatalities given a failure, in
which case r is measured in expected number of fatalities per
km year. Based on Eq. 共1兲, the maximum permissible failure prob-
ability pmax can be defined as
pmax = rmax/c 共2兲
Since reliability RT is defined as the annual probability that the
pipeline will not fail, it can be calculated as
RT = 1 − pmax = 1 − rmax/c 共3兲
Equations 共2兲 and 共3兲 indicate that the maximum permissible
failure rate 共and consequently the target reliability兲 is a function of
the failure consequences c and the maximum tolerable level of
risk rmax. The key to defining a set of reliability targets is therefore
to develop an appropriate consequence model and an acceptable
set of tolerable risk criteria.

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Fig. 1 Example F / N curve from IGE/TD/1 †6‡
2.2 Risk Measures. Because of the complex issues associated
with quantifying risk, a number of measures that focus on differ-
ent aspects of risk have been used in the industry. These risk
measures can be classified into two major categories dealing with
societal risk and individual risk. Societal risk represents the risk
level borne by society due to pipeline incidents. Individual risk is
a measure of risk to specific individuals who are exposed to risk
from the pipeline 共or group of pipelines in a given corridor兲. It is
usually measured by the annual probability of fatality due to a
pipeline incident for an exposed person.
There are two approaches to define societal risk. The first ap-
proach will be referred to here as the societal risk with fixed ex-
pectation. In this approach, the pipeline failure consequences are
directly measured by the expected number of fatalities given a
failure. Consequently, the risk is measured by the expected num-
ber of fatalities, which is calculated as the product of the failure
probability and the expected number of fatalities caused by the
failure. This approach implies that the risk associated with a high
probability incident causing a small expected number of fatalities
is equivalent to the risk associated with a lower probability inci-
dent causing a proportionately higher number of fatalities.
Historical evidence indicates that the above-mentioned equiva-
lence does not necessarily hold for large incidents, as society has
a certain degree of added aversion to incidents with a large num-
ber of expected fatalities. This attitude is demonstrated by the
so-called F / N curve, which plots the expected number of fatalities
in a given incident N against the frequency F of incidents causing
N or more fatalities, on a log-log scale. Figure 1 shows a repre-
sentative F / N curve for pipelines designed to the Institute of Gas
Engineers standard IGE/TD/1 关6兴. It can be shown under certain
assumptions that a slope of ⫺1 for the F / N curve implies that the
rate of decrease in failure rate 共or failure probability p兲 is equal to
the rate of increase in the expected number of fatalities in a given
incident N. This means that the expected number of fatalities 共cal-
culated as p ⫻ N兲 will be the same for all incidents, implying the
fixed expectation approach discussed in the previous paragraph. A
slope that is steeper than ⫺1 共as is the case in Fig. 1兲 means that
the failure probability decreases exponentially as a function of N.
This implies that the expected number of fatalities decreases as a
function of N, which is a reflection of risk aversion.
Based on the above, aversion can be incorporated in the risk
measure by defining the consequence measure as N, raised to a
power that equals the slope of the F / N curve 共which is a measure
of the degree of aversion兲. The risk is then calculated by using this
consequence measure in Eq. 共1兲. This approach is referred to as
societal risk with aversion function.
To ensure consideration of all the issues associated with risk
tolerance, the reliability targets proposed in this paper were based
on appropriate criteria for both societal risk 共with and without
aversion兲 and individual risk.
2.3 Tolerable Societal Risk. Tolerable societal risk levels
were generated by calibration to existing codes 共ASME B31.8 in
this paper兲. Since current codes set the standard for acceptable
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pipeline safety, the average level of societal risk implied by a
pipeline network that meets the requirements of current codes can
be considered tolerable. Based on this, the maximum tolerable
societal risk levels were specified to be equal to the average soci-
etal risk for pipelines designed and maintained according to the
ASME B31.8 code 共see Sec. 3兲.
To calculate the average risk level implied by an existing code,
a calibration process was undertaken in which a comprehensive
set of representative design cases were selected and designed ac-
cording to the requirements of the code. For each case, the prob-
ability and consequences of failure were calculated and used to
estimate the associated risk. The average risk level r̄ was then
estimated as the sum of the risk levels for the individual design
cases ri each weighted by a factor wi, representing the correspond-
ing relative length within the existing pipeline network. This leads
to
r̄ = 兺rw
i
i i 共4兲
A total of 240 design cases were analyzed, covering all combi-
nations of three design pressures 共600 psi, 1000 psi, and 1400 psi兲,
four steel grades 共B, X52, X60, and X70兲, and five outside diam-
eters 共8 in., 16 in., 24 in., 30 in., and 42 in.兲 and four location
classes 共1, 2, 3, and 4兲. Note that location class is a designation
given to each section of the pipeline based on the density of ad-
jacent buildings. It is used in design codes such as ASME B31.8
and CSA Z662 as a mechanism to ensure that pipelines in higher
density areas have thicker walls, and consequently, higher safety
levels. The wall thickness for each design case was calculated
based on ASME B31.8, subject to industry-accepted wall thick-
ness and D / t 共diameter to thickness ratio兲 limits.
To determine the relative length associated with each design
case in the current pipeline network, an industry survey was con-
ducted in which pipeline mileage data for approximately 90,000
km of onshore natural gas transmission pipelines were collected
from major pipeline operators in North America. For each seg-
ment of pipe in the database, length, pressure, diameter, grade,
and class location were defined. The data were then grouped in
bins that are centered on the design parameter values for the test
cases and used to estimate the corresponding relative lengths.
These values 共see Table 1兲 were used as weighting factors in
calculating the average risk.
2.4 Tolerable Individual Risk. An individual risk criterion is
required because societal risk criteria could lead to high permis-
sible failure probabilities in sparsely populated areas where the
expected number of fatalities is low. This would imply that the
societal risk, although tolerable, is concentrated in a small number
of individuals who may not be adequately protected. Maximum
tolerable individual risk criteria used in this work were selected
based on information published by the UK Health and Safety
Executive 共HSE兲 关7兴 and the Major Industrial Accident Council of
Canada 共MIACC兲 关8兴. Although these sources do not explicitly
specify target individual risk levels by location class, the informa-
tion they provide was used to select tolerable risk levels of 10−4 in
Class 1, 10−5 in Class 2, and 10−6 in Classes 3 and 4.
3 Failure Probability Calculation
3.1 Approach. The failure probability calculations utilized
the structural reliability approach. Since small leaks do not pose a
significant safety hazard, only large leaks and ruptures were con-
sidered. The hole size resulting from a large leak was assumed to
have a typical diameter of 50 mm. For ruptures, a double-ended
release from a hole size equaling the pipeline diameter was
assumed.
To simplify the analysis, explicit failure probability calculations
were only carried out for external corrosion and equipment im-
pact. These two failure causes are relevant for all natural gas
pipelines, accounting for between 60% and 76% 共or approxi-
Transactions of the ASME
 Table 1 Relative length for design cases „%… Table 2 First inspection year and defect repair criteria „ASME
B31.8S…
Diameter
MAOP Repair criterion
Class 共psi兲 Grade 8 in. 16 in. 24 in. 30 in. 42 in.
Remaining wall
Class 1 600 B 1.074 0.605 0.366 0.000 0.000 First inspection 共% of nominal兲 Failure
X52 0.631 1.439 1.012 4.054 0.000 Class year 共%兲 pressure/MAOP
X60 0.050 0.511 0.529 0.676 0.895
X70 0.046 0.058 0.038 0.002 0.090 1 10 50 1.39
1000 B 8.093 0.524 0.019 0.001 0.000 2 13 50 1.39
X52 6.187 9.514 2.060 7.006 0.000 3 15 50 1.39
X60 0.013 2.047 2.257 6.878 3.232 4 15 50 1.7
X70 0.013 0.114 0.075 1.001 4.280
1400 B 0.061 0.071 0.000 0.038 0.000
X52 8.519 4.779 0.000 0.038 0.000
X60 0.034 2.385 0.213 0.255 0.001
X70 0.010 0.007 0.926 1.789 2.455 randomly selected defect. The probability of failure of a randomly
Class 2 600 B 0.190 0.325 0.052 0.000 0.000 selected corrosion defect was calculated using a limit state func-
X52 0.093 0.307 0.130 2.230 0.000
tion that estimates the burst pressure of a corrosion defect with
X60 0.005 0.111 0.074 0.430 0.590
X70 0.005 0.040 0.001 0.018 0.041 known depth and length. Large leaks were distinguished from
1000 B 0.170 0.090 0.004 0.000 0.000 ruptures based on a ductile fracture initiation model for the
X52 0.173 0.818 0.377 0.104 0.000 through-wall defect resulting from the initial burst. Details of the
X60 0.000 0.255 0.350 0.688 0.031 model and input data used can be found in Ref. 关12兴.
X70 0.000 0.019 0.091 0.062 0.051 The failure rate was calculated for an assumed design life of 50
1400 B 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 years. An inspection and repair program based on ASME B31.8S
X52 0.039 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 关13兴 was applied to all design cases. This is based on the assump-
X60 0.000 0.023 0.034 0.028 0.000 tion that, although actual maintenance programs will vary depend-
X70 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.011 0.002
ing on pipeline condition as determined from on-going inspec-
Class 3 600 B 0.085 0.179 0.059 0.013 0.000
X52 0.048 0.297 0.156 1.080 0.000 tions, the level of reliability implicit in ASME B31.8S will be
X60 0.005 0.096 0.094 0.815 0.247 consistently maintained. It was assumed that inspection will be
X70 0.004 0.055 0.003 0.177 0.023 carried out using a high-resolution in-line inspection tool. The
1000 B 0.082 0.029 0.006 0.000 0.000 repair criterion was defined as a minimum required remaining
X52 0.166 0.380 0.103 0.053 0.000 wall thickness and a minimum required ratio between the failure
X60 0.000 0.090 0.125 0.242 0.001 pressure calculated from ASME B31G 关14兴 and the maximum
X70 0.000 0.019 0.052 0.026 0.005 allowable operating pressure 共MAOP兲. The first inspection year
1400 B 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 recommended by ASME B31.8S depends on the design factor,
X52 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000
whereas the interval between subsequent inspections depends on
X60 0.008 0.021 0.006 0.012 0.000
X70 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 the pressure ratio used as a repair criterion. The first inspection
Class 4 600 B 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 year and defect repair criteria used are shown in Table 2. Based on
X52 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 the repair criteria in Table 2, an interval of 10 years was used for
X60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 subsequent inspections.
X70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1000 B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.3 Equipment Impact. The failure probability due to equip-
X52 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 ment impact was calculated using a time-independent reliability
X60 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 calculation model described by Chen et al. 关15兴. The failure prob-
X70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ability was calculated by multiplying the number of hits per
1400 B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 km year of the pipeline by the probability of failure given a hit.
X52 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 The number of hits per unit length was calculated from a fault tree
X60 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 that models equipment hits as a combination of a number of basic
X70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
events representing the occurrence of an excavation project on the
pipeline alignment, the excavation depth being greater than the
burial depth and the failure of damage mitigation measures to
detect and prevent the hit. The activity rate and prevention mea-
sures used were based on standard industry practice and the re-
sults of an industry survey carried out by Chen et al. 关15兴. The
mately 2/3兲 of all large leaks and ruptures 关9,10兴. Of the remaining probability of failure given a hit was calculated using a limit state
failures, about 8% are due to unspecified causes and therefore function that considers two possible failure modes: puncture and
cannot be analyzed explicitly. A further 7–10% is attributed to failure of the dent-gouge defect produced if puncture does not
causes such as ground movement, which are only relevant to a occur. Leak and ruptures were distinguished based on a ductile
limited length of the total pipeline network. To account for failure fracture initiation criterion of the resulting breach 关16兴. Based on
causes that were not considered explicitly, the sum of the failure historical data, it was assumed that 75% of the leaks are large
leaks. Details of the model and input data used are described in
probabilities for corrosion and equipment impact was increased by
Ref. 关12兴.
a factor of 1.5 共the inverse of 2/3 as discussed earlier兲 to obtain The equipment impact model calculates the probability of fail-
the total failure probability. ures that occurs during the impact event 共immediate failures兲. To
3.2 Corrosion. The corrosion failure probability was calcu- account for delayed failures that may result from time-dependent
growth of the gouge caused by the impact event, the calculated
lated using a time-dependent reliability model described by
failure rate was increased by the ratio of total failures 共the sum of
Nessim 关11兴, in which the annual failure probability is defined as immediate and delayed failures兲 to immediate failures. Based on
the product of the average number of significant corrosion defects historical data 关9兴, this ratio was defined as a function of pipeline
per unit length of pipeline and the annual failure probability for a diameter as shown in Table 3.

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 Table 3 Ratio between total failure rate and immediate failure
rate due to equipment impact
Pipe diameter
共in.兲 Total failure rate/Immediate failure rate
⬍4 1.03
ⱖ4 but ⬍10 1.10
ⱖ10 but ⬍20 1.14
ⱖ20 but ⬍28 1.29
ⱖ28 1.50
3.4 Validation. The rarity of pipeline failures presents a chal-
lenge to the validation of calculated failure probabilities by com-
paring them to historical failure rates. If the validation focuses on
a specific pipeline, for which the design parameters, environmen-
tal conditions, and maintenance history are known, the number of
failures observed will be insufficient to produce a statistically sig-
nificant sample for validation. If a large number of pipelines are
considered to increase the failure sample size, it becomes imprac-
tical to define and model the wide variety of parameters and con-
ditions associated with different pipelines.
Notwithstanding the above issues, model validation is key to
gaining confidence in the calculation results and must be under-
taken based on the best practical approach available. The ap-
proach adopted here was to use the models to calculate the failure
probabilities due to corrosion and equipment impact for all design
cases using inputs that represent average conditions for the indus-
try over the last few decades. The results were then weighted
according to the relative length data in Table 1 to calculate an
industry average failure rate. The model outputs were compared
with observed industry-wide historical failure rates over the same
time period to determine whether the observed and calculated
rates are consistent.
In running the model for the purpose of validation, the same
approach described in Secs. 3.2 and 3.3 was used. Consistent with
pipeline age statistics 关9兴, the average pipeline age was assumed
to be 40 years. Consistent with the history of development of
in-line inspection tools, it was assumed that in-line inspections
were not used prior to 1980. Low-resolution tools were used be-
tween 1980 and 1990 and high-resolution tools were used be-
tween 1990 and 2004. Corrosion repairs were assumed to be
based on B31G combined with a requirement for a minimum re-
maining wall thickness of 50%. The failure rate was then averaged
over the last 20 years of the analysis period, which approximates
the time for which failure statistics are available.
The results were compared with the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation 共DOT兲 failure database for transmission and gathering
pipelines 关9兴. This database covers 6 , 000, 000 km years of pipe-
line over the period between 1985 and 1997. Since the data in-
clude only reportable incidents, which are defined as ones that
cause injury or property damage exceeding $50,000, it can be
reasonably assumed that the great majority of reported incidents
are large leaks and ruptures. The reporting criteria also suggest
that many large leaks may go unreported and therefore the re-
ported large leak and rupture rate is likely to be lower than actual.
This view is supported by European failure statistics as published
by the European Gas pipeline Incident data Group 共EGIG兲 关10兴.
These statistics, which include all incidents for
2 , 100, 000 km years of exposure, indicate that the total failure
rate by large leak and rupture due to equipment impact and cor-
rosion is 1.8⫻ 10−4—approximately three times higher than the
corresponding DOT value.
Table 4 summarizes the results, which show that the calculated
failure rates for equipment impact and corrosion are 2.2 and 1.5
times the corresponding DOT values, and that the total calculated
rate is twice the DOT value. Considering the above-mentioned
potential for missing data in the DOT statistics and the necessarily
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Table 4 Historical and calculated failure rates „per km year…
Failure cause DOT Reportable 共1985–1997兲 Calculated
Equipment impact 4.3⫻ 10−5 9.6⫻ 10−5
External corrosion 1.5⫻ 10−5 2.3⫻ 10−5
Total 5.8⫻ 10−5 11.9⫻ 10−5
approximate nature of the validation process 共see first paragraph
of this section兲, this level of agreement is considered sufficient to
confirm that accuracy of the models is adequate for the current
purpose.
4 Failure Consequence Calculation
The consequences of natural gas pipeline failures are dominated
by the impact of ignited releases on adjacent populations. Failure
consequences can be defined as a function of the expected number
of fatalities N, resulting from exposure to heat emitted from a gas
fire. For a given incident, N is given by
N = p ia h␳ ␶ 共5兲
where pi is the probability of ignition, ah is the size of the hazard
area 共i.e., area within which people would be exposed to a lethal
heat dosage兲, ␳ is the population density, and ␶ is the occupancy
probability 共defined as the probability of an occupant being
present at the time of the incident兲.
The probability of ignition for ruptures, which dominate the
failure consequences because of their severity compared with
leaks, is assumed to be a linear function of pipe diameter 共in
inches兲.
pi = 0.0125D 共6兲
While proprietary historical data indicate that the actual relation-
ship between pi and D may be more complex, sensitivity analyses
showed that the linear assumption is reasonable for the current
study.
The hazard area was calculated using the model developed by
Stephens et al. 关17兴. This model calculates the rate of gas release
from the pipeline as a function of the hole size and line pressure.
For ruptures, an effective release rate of 1/3 the peak initial rate is
used to acknowledge the rapid drop in-line pressure associated
with a full-bore release. The model calculates the hazard area
within which the heat intensity exceeds a certain threshold as
ah = ␲c1 PD2/I 共7兲
where P is the pipe pressure, and the coefficient c1 equals
0.1547 kw/ m2 Pa or 2348 Btu/ ft2 h psi.
The probability of fatality in an ignited gas release is 100% at
the source but decreases gradually with the distance from the
source until it reaches 0%. To account for this, two hazard areas
are defined that correspond to the lower and upper heat intensity
thresholds associated with fatal injury 共see Fig. 2兲, where the
Threshold for 100%
Certain chance of fatality
fatality
Threshold for 0%
Possible
chance of fatality
fatality
Fig. 2 Illustration of the approach used in estimating the ex-
pected number of fatalities
Transactions of the ASME
 Table 5 Population density as a function of location class
„Note: 1 hectare= 10, 000 m2 = 2.47 acre…
Pipeline length Average density
Class 共km兲 共people per hectare兲
1 18845 0.04
2 315 3.3
3 37 18
4 0 100 共assumed value兲
lower threshold defines the heat intensity that can be tolerated by
humans with little adverse effect, and the upper threshold defines
the heat intensity that is almost certain to cause fatality. The lower
and upper thresholds adopted are 12.6 kw/ m2 and 31.6 kw/ m2
for outdoor exposure, and 15.8 kw/ m2 and 31.6 kw/ m2 for in-
door exposure. As indicated in Fig. 2, the probability of fatality is
assumed to be 100% within the area bounded by the upper thresh-
old and 0% outside of the area bounded by the lower threshold.
Between these two thresholds, the probability of fatality is as-
sumed to be 50% for outdoor exposure and 25% for indoor expo-
sure.
Based on the foregoing, the expected number of fatalities can
be calculated as a weighted sum for the indoor and outdoor expo-
sure scenarios using
N = p i␳␶关Pi兵ai−100
h + 0.25共ai−0 i−100
h − ah 兲其 + Po兵ao−100
h + 0.5共ao−0
h design case as the sum of failure probabilities by large leaks and
− ao−100 兲其兴 共8兲
h
where Pi and Po are the proportions of time spent indoor and
outdoor, respectively; and the superscripts i and o denote indoor
and outdoor, and 100 and 0 denote the 100% and 0% fatality
thresholds. Assuming an occupancy probability 共␶兲 of 40%, with
90% of the time being spent indoor and 10% outdoor, the ex-
pected number of fatalities given a rupture Nrup can be calculated
by substituting Eqs. 共6兲 and 共7兲 into Eq. 共8兲, leading to
Nrup = 4.4 ⫻ 10−8␳ PD3 共9兲
where ␳ is the population density in people per hectare, P is in psi,
and D is in inches. Equation 共9兲 shows that failure consequences
are proportional to ␳ PD3. Therefore, to maintain a constant toler-
able risk level, the maximum permissible failure rate should be
inversely proportional to ␳ PD3 共see Eq. 共2兲兲.
The expected number of fatalities associated with a leak NL is
calculated using the same approach described above with the ef-
fective flow rate taken as the peak initial flow rate 共based on the
assumption that line pressure will be maintained兲 and the prob-
ability of ignition taken as a fixed value of 0.1 关18兴. This leads to
Fig. 3 Calculated risk levels for ASME B31.8 designs
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NL = 5.2 ⫻ 10−7␳ Pd2h 共10兲
where NL is the expected number of fatalities for a leak, and dh is
the hole diameter 共in inches兲.
The average population density within the hazard area was cal-
culated for each class location using a set of data characterizing
all structures within a few hundred meters of pipelines. The data
represented 19,197 km of pipelines with 98.2%, 1.6%, and 0.2%
the total length located in Classes 1–3, respectively. The average
population density was calculated as the sum of the number of
people in all structures located within a moving square with 400
m sides, divided by the total corresponding area. The square was
centered on the pipeline alignment and moved between the start
and end points of specific class locations. The results of this
analysis are summarized in Table 5. Since Class 4 data were not
available the assumed population density of 100 people per hect-
are for that class was based on estimated population densities for
high-density commercial and residential areas.
5 Reliability Targets
5.1 Societal Risk With Fixed Expectation. According to this
criterion, the target reliability levels are calculated from Eq. 共3兲 by
using a fixed permissible risk level rmax that equals the average
expected number of fatalities implied by ASME B31.8. To calcu-
late the average expected number of fatalities implied by ASME
B31.8, the expected number of fatalities was calculated for each
ruptures each multiplied by the corresponding calculated number
of fatalities from Eqs. 共9兲 and 共10兲. The results of the individual
design cases were then used along with the corresponding weight-
ing factors in Eq. 共4兲 to calculate the average expected number of
fatalities for all design cases. The calculations were carried out for
corrosion and equipment impact and the resulting value was then
multiplied by 1.5 to obtain the expected number of fatalities for all
failure causes, which was used as an estimate of rmax.
Figure 3 shows the calculated risk levels for the design cases
along with the calculated rmax of 1.6⫻ 10−5 per km-year. The fig-
ure shows that the current code leads to a wide range of risk levels
for different pipelines, with risk generally increasing as the loca-
tion class increases. The fixed societal risk criterion maintains
consistent risk for all pipelines by collapsing all points in Fig. 4
onto the line representing rmax. By doing so, better safety is
achieved for cases that have high-risk levels under the current
code, and cost savings are achieved for cases that have exces-
sively conservative risk levels.
Figure 4 shows the resulting reliability targets by location class
based on the population densities in Table 5. The reliability targets
are obtained using Eq. 共3兲 with c being the calculated expected
DECEMBER 2009, Vol. 131 / 061701-5
 Fig. 4 Reliability targets by location class based on societal risk with fixed
expectation
number of fatalities associated with ruptures Nrup. This implies the
conservative assumption that large leaks are assumed to have the
same consequences as ruptures. As indicated by Eq. 共3兲, the target
reliability level increases 共or maximum permissible failure rate
decreases兲 in proportion to PD3 and the population density asso-
ciated with the location class.
Figure 5 shows a plot of the target reliability levels against
␳ PD3. Since the failure consequence are also proportional to the
population density ␳, all curves in Fig. 4 collapse to a single line
in Fig. 5. This allows the reliability targets to be calculated di-
rectly from population density.
5.2 Societal Risk With Aversion Function. Following the
same rationale as for societal risk with fixed expectation, the de-
sign cases were used to define an F / N relationship that is repre-
sentative of ASME B31.8. This F / N relationship was used to
construct an appropriate failure consequence function that was
then used to develop a corresponding set of reliability targets.
Since the model used in this study does not consider uncertainty
regarding the expected number of fatalities n for a given pipeline
incident, the F / N curve for each design case is a step function
defined as
Fig. 5 Reliability targets as a function of population density based on so-
cietal risk with fixed expectation
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F共N兲 = 再 p Nⱕn
0 N⬎n
冎 共n ⱖ 1兲 共11兲
where p is the probability 共per km year兲 of an incident causing n
expected fatalities. On a plot of F versus N the step function is
fully defined by the point 共n , p兲. Figure 6 shows a plot of n versus
p for all viable design cases considered in this project. Viable
design cases are defined as design cases that fall within the enve-
lope of cases with a nonzero weighting factor 共see Table 1兲. Cases
that were identified as nonviable include, for example, a 42 in.
1400 psi pipeline in Class 3 or 4 made of grade B steel.
The average risk aversion implied by ASME B31.8 is repre-
sented by the slope of the best-fit line to the data points in Fig. 6.
As shown, the best-fit line has a slope of approximately 1.6. This
implies that the consequences of failure can be quantified by
c = N1.6 共12兲
By defining the failure consequences according to Eq. 共12兲, and
using the results in Eq. 共1兲 to estimate risk, aversion would be
automatically included in the risk estimate. The approach repre-
senting societal risk with fixed expectation can be derived from
Transactions of the ASME
 Fig. 6 F / N plots for all viable design cases
the risk averse approach by setting the slope of the F / N curve to
⫺1, which reduces the consequence measure c to N. Based on
this, the process of calibrating the risk averse societal risk crite-
rion is the same as the one used for fixed expectation, with the
exception of using Eq. 共12兲 to define failure consequences.
Figure 7 shows the resulting reliability targets by location class
based on the population densities in Table 5. Comparison with the
fixed expectation targets shown in Fig. 4 shows that the impact of
risk aversion is to increase the slope of the targets as a function of
PD3 for Classes 3 and 4 and part of Class 2. This implies that
higher targets are required as the expected number of people af-
fected in a single incident increases. This increase in slope does
not apply to Class 1 or to the lower part of Class 2 curves, for
which risk aversion is irrelevant because the expected number of
fatalities per incident 共calculated from Eq. 共5兲兲 is less than 1 for
all design cases. A fractional expected number of fatalities occur if
the population density is so small as to result in a significant
chance that no person will be within the hazard zone at the time of
failure.
Figure 8 shows a plot of the target reliability levels against
␳ PD3, which permits reliability targets to be calculated directly
from population density. For the same reasons explained in the
previous paragraph, the point at which the slope of the target
curve changes corresponds to the transition between cases causing
fractional expected fatalities and cases causing more than one ex-
pected fatality.
Fig. 7 Reliability targets by location class based on societal risk with aver-
sion function
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5.3 Individual Risk. Individual risk 共rid兲, which is defined as
the annual probability of fatality due to a pipeline incident for a
person located within the pipeline hazard zone, can be calculated
as
rid = ppiLir␶ 共13兲
where p is the probability of failure; pi is the probability of igni-
tion; Lir is the interaction length, which is the length of the pipe-
line segment within which an incident would affect the location
under consideration; and ␶ is the occupancy probability.
Similar to the hazard area, the interaction length is a function of
the pipe diameter, pressure, and heat intensity threshold. For an
individual permanently located on the pipeline alignment 共a con-
servative assumption兲, the interaction length for a specific hazard
threshold is equal to the diameter of the hazard area. Considering
the 100% and 0% fatality thresholds and the indoor/outdoor ex-
posure times discussed in Sec. 4, equivalent interaction lengths on
the pipeline alignment for ruptures and leaks Lirrup and LirL 共m兲 are
given by
Lirrup = 0.33D冑P 共14a兲
LirL = 0.40dh冑P 共14b兲
where D and dh are in inches and P is in psi.
DECEMBER 2009, Vol. 131 / 061701-7
 Fig. 8 Reliability targets as a function of population density based on so-
cietal risk with aversion function

The reliability targets based on the individual risk criterion are
obtained using Eq. 共3兲 with rmax being the tolerable individual risk
level 共10−4 for Class 1, 10−5 for Class 2, and 10−6 for Class 3 or 4兲
and c being the product of the probability of ignition and interac-
tion length associated with ruptures. Figure 9 shows the reliability
targets versus PD3 by location class. Figure 10 shows the reliabil-
ity targets versus ␳ PD3. In contrast to Figs. 5 and 8, the reliability
targets in Fig. 10 do not collapse to a single line because the
tolerable individual risk is defined as a step function of population
density 共as implied by location class兲. The final criterion was
based on a line that falls in the middle of single class criteria
共dotted line in Fig. 10兲.

Fig. 9 Reliability targets by location class based on individual risk

Fig. 10 Reliability targets as a function of population density based on

individual risk

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 Fig. 11 Class location-based reliability targets from all three criteria
considered

5.4 Proposed Targets. Figure 11 combines the location class-
based reliability targets for all three criteria considered in the
analysis. The solid lines in the figure give class-specific societal
risk targets, which are defined as the highest of the fixed expec-
tation and risk averse societal targets. The dotted lines give indi-
vidual risk-based targets for annual individual risk levels of 10−4,
10−5, and 10−6 per year. Using the annual individual risk criteria
given in Sec. 2.4, the figure shows that societal risk criteria govern
for all Class 2–4 cases, and for Class 1 cases with PD3 greater
ability target. Since the probability of occupancy is already built
into the targets, the population density must be based on the num-
ber of people in different buildings during their normal use. As the
population density changes constantly along the pipeline, select-
ing the number of segments will be a compromise between detail
and convenience.
Based on Fig. 12, the proposed final target reliability RT can be
obtained from the following equations:

冦 冧
than 2.5⫻ 106. These targets can be used directly in connection 72
1− ␳=0
with the ASME B31.8 location class system. 共PD3兲0.66
Figure 12 shows combined reliability targets as a function of 9
␳ PD3. Similar to Fig. 11, it suggests that the individual risk cri- 1− 0.0 ⬍ ␳ PD3 ⱕ 1.0 ⫻ 105
terion produces the highest target reliability levels for Class 1 共␳ PD3兲0.66
RT =
pipelines with a small value of ␳ PD3. It also shows that societal 450
risk with fixed expectation produces the highest target level for 1− 1.0 ⫻ 105 ⬍ ␳ PD3 ⱕ 6.0 ⫻ 107
␳ PD3
medium values of ␳ PD3, and societal risk with aversion function
produces the highest target for large values of ␳ PD3. In this for- 2.1 ⫻ 107
1− ␳ PD3 ⬎ 6.0 ⫻ 107
mat, the reliability targets can be defined as a unique function of 共␳ PD3兲1.6
␳ PD3. This function was conservatively selected as the upper en- 共15兲
velope of all criteria shown in the figure. These population
density-based targets are independent of the location class system. where ␳ is in people per hectare, P is in psi, and D is in inches.
To utilize them, the pipeline must be divided into segments over The target equation for ␳ = 0 is derived directly from the Class 1
which the population density is reasonably uniform. Each segment curve in Fig. 9. It corresponds to an individual risk level of 10−4,
must then be designed and operated to meet the appropriate reli- which is chosen as a minimum required level of intrinsic safety

Fig. 12 Population density-based reliability targets from all three criteria

considered

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 Fig. 13 Relative expected number of fatalities for large leaks and ruptures
共even if there is no population around the pipeline兲. The second of
these equations is individual risk-based, whereas the third and
fourth are societal risk-based. The class location-based targets can
be obtained from Eq. 共15兲 by substituting the appropriate popula-
tion density for each class.
The proposed targets vary from just below 1 – 10−2 to 1 – 10−9
for the range of design cases considered, and could drop below
1 – 10−2 if extrapolated for smaller diameter and lower pressure
pipelines. The low end of this range may be considered unaccept-
able based purely on the implied probability of failure. Although
cases with targets below 1 – 10−3 are governed mostly by mini-
mum wall thickness and maximum D / t requirements, it may be
desirable to impose a voluntary lower threshold 共possibly in the
range of 1 – 10−2 to 1 – 10−3兲 below which target reliability values
are not permitted.
6 Meeting the Targets
The reliability targets are met if the calculated reliability re-
mains above the target value throughout the design life of the
pipeline. Although these targets are intended to apply to the sum
of large leaks and ruptures, they were derived based on the con-
servative assumption that the consequences of rupture 共c in Eq.
共3兲兲 apply to both large leaks and ruptures. A simple approach for
applying these targets is to ensure that the total probability of
large leaks pL and ruptures prup remains below the targets, that is,
pL + prup ⱕ 1 − RT 共16兲
This does not require distinction between large leaks and rup-
tures in the reliability calculations. The failure probability calcu-
lations for corrosion and equipment impact, for example, would
only require consideration of a single limit state representing burst
or puncture; a second limit state describing rupture initiation from
the resulting hole would not be required. This approach is conser-
vative, as it does not take advantage of the relatively small mag-
nitude of leak consequences.
If the reliability calculation model is capable of distinguishing
large leaks from ruptures, a less conservative approach can be
used in which leaks are converted to “equivalent ruptures.” To
produce an equivalent risk level, the probability of the equivalent
ruptures is defined as the probability of leaks multiplied by the
ratio between the consequences of a leak cL and the consequences
of a rupture crup. Based on regression analysis of the leak and
rupture consequences associated with the test cases, the relative
consequences of leaks and ruptures can be calculated from 共see
Fig. 13兲
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45.8
cL/crup = 共17兲
D3
where D is in inches.
In this approach, the target reliability can be achieved by ensur-
ing that the sum of the probabilities for ruptures and “equivalent
ruptures” is less than the maximum permissible failure probabil-
ity, that is,
cL 45.8
pL + prup = pL 3 + prup ⱕ 1 − RT 共18兲
crup D
7 Economic Implications
To examine the implications of the target reliability levels, dif-
ferences between the wall thicknesses required to meet the targets
described in Sec. 5 and those required by ASME B31.8 were
evaluated. For each design case, the wall thickness was selected to
satisfy Eq. 共18兲 for the reliability targets calculated from Eq. 共15兲,
over a 50 year design life. All probability calculations were car-
ried out using the models and inputs described in Sec. 3. An
equivalent design factor equaling PD / 2␴yt was then calculated
for each case. As a practical limit, a minimum required wall thick-
ness corresponding to an equivalent design factor of 0.85 was
imposed for all cases. Appropriate wall thickness and D / t 共diam-
eter to thickness ratio兲 limits were also imposed.
Figure 14 shows the difference between the equivalent design
factor resulting from the reliability-based approach and the ASME
design factor as a percentage of the ASME design factor for all
design cases. Positive values indicate that the equivalent design
factor for the reliability-based approach is greater than the ASME
factor. Figure 15 shows the corresponding difference in steel cost
based on the calculated weight differential and an average steel
cost of $1500/ton. Potential reductions in welding and transporta-
tion costs were not considered.
Figures 14 and 15 show that the reliability-based approach re-
sults in the same or higher design factors 共i.e., same or lower cost兲
for all Class 1 cases, and that the increase is limited in most cases
by the 0.85 upper limit that was imposed on the design factor. For
Classes 2–4 the RBDA approach results in wall thickness in-
creases for smaller diameter lower pressure pipeline and cost re-
ductions for larger diameter higher pressure pipelines. Because
RBDA results in savings for larger pipelines and cost increases for
smaller pipelines, the magnitude of potential savings is generally
higher than the magnitude of cost increases.
The overall impact of using the RBDA approach with the target
reliability levels in Sec. 5 was calculated as the sum of the steel
Transactions of the ASME
 Fig. 14 Comparisons between equivalent design factors for RBDA and ASME B31.8

Fig. 15 Cost comparisons between RBDA and ASME B31.8 designs

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 weight or cost changes for all design cases, each weighted by the
relative length weighting factor from Table 1. The results indicate
an overall weight reduction of 6.6 tons/km and a corresponding
cost reduction of $10,000/km. For the current United States natu-
ral gas pipeline network of approximately 450,000 km, this would
translate into a total saving of $4.5 billion. The reason for this is
that design cases for which RBDA results in savings represent a
great majority of the length of existing pipelines.
The comparisons in this section do not consider the fact that
RBDA permits the use of enhanced maintenance and prevention
to substitute for increased wall thickness. The results should there-
fore be interpreted as a lower bound on the potential economic
benefits of RBDA.
8 Concluding Remarks
A set of reliability targets has been developed as basis for ap-
plying reliability-based design and assessment to natural gas
transmission pipelines. The targets were developed using a ratio-
nal risk-based process in which appropriate criteria for individual
and societal risks were included. The societal risk criteria used
include a limit on the total expectation of fatalities due to pipeline
incidents, as well as a function reflecting aversion to large inci-
dents. The tolerable societal risk levels used as a basis for the
targets were calibrated to meet the average societal risk levels
implied by ASME B31.8 while keeping the risk level consistent
for all pipelines. The individual risk criteria incorporated in the
targets ensure that the risk to individuals in sparsely populated
areas is kept below industry-accepted levels. The proposed targets
are defined as a function of the key parameters influencing risk,
including pipeline pressure, diameter, and population density and
are therefore pipeline-specific.
The key benefits of RBDA include achievement of consistent
safety levels for all pipelines, integration of design and mainte-
nance decisions, and the ability to address new technologies and
unique loading conditions. This paper demonstrates that RBDA
can help achieve these benefits while providing the potential for
significant savings.
Future plans for the current work include development of a
detailed approach for the application of the targets to specific
pipelines. This will address such issues as suitability of the current
location class system as a basis for pipeline segmentation in con-
nection with RBDA, calculation of the population density over
specific pipeline segments as a basis for reliability target selection,
and application to location-specific limit states 共e.g., corrosion
defect at a known location兲. Future plans also include the devel-
opment of reliability targets for small leaks and serviceability fail-
ures.
Work is underway to develop a draft RBDA standard document
that can be used as a basis for incorporating the methodology as
an acceptable design and assessment alternative in natural gas
codes. Finally, a similar effort to develop reliability targets for
liquid pipelines is planned.
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Acknowledgment
This paper is based on a work that was originally funded by BP
and TCPL and further expanded under a PRCI project funded by
GRI. Input, guidance, and assistance from Louis Fenyvesi, Alan
Glover, Rick Gailing, and Keith Leewis are gratefully acknowl-
edged. Data contributions by many pipeline operators in the
United States and Canada are greatly appreciated.
In addition, the authors wish to honor the memory of the late
Martin McLamb who made essential contributions to this work
during his tenure with BP Exploration Co.
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