CITY AND COUNTRYIDE IN MEXICAN HISTORY’ by Davip Kaptan. SUMARIO Este trabajo traza en un amplio bosquejo Ia interrelacién estructural entre la ciudad pre-industrial y sus campos circun- vecinos a través de tres periodos de historia mexicana, comen- zando con la formacién de la economia colonial. Trata, de de- mostrar la continuidad bisica de estructura, la que bajo cam- ios externos en forma politica y econémica ha caracterizado esta relacién hasta el presente dia. Durante el periodo de la Colonia, y por algin tiempo des- pués, la ciudad funcioné primordialmente como la base eco- Igica y social, desde Ia cual, primero la clase conquistadora espafiola y posteriormente la clase de los hacendados, ejercieron su. dominio politico y econémico sobre la regién interior rural. Siendo predominantemente centros administrativos, militares y eclesidsticos, todas las ciudades tendieron a drenar la riqueza de los campos circunyecinos. Dentro de las recientes décadas, una especie de economia dual ha surgido en México, con un segmento, el de la indus- trializacién rapida, desarrollindose a costa de la otra, Ia agrico- la tradicional. Mediando entre los sectores industriales de la economia y Ia serie de economias locales y regionales, estén las ciudades provincianas pre-industriales. Este papel interme: diario econémico, politico y cultural, da cuenta del por qué ‘estas ciudades han sido transformadas desde la Revolucién, en centros de actividades comerciales y actividades de interme- Uiarios. Pero las ciudades regionales no han ocasionado mayo- res cambios estructurales en sus regiones interiores rurales. De hecho, se sugiere que han desarrollado un interés creado en perpetuar el atraso de los campos circunvecinos, ‘This paper has as its major focus the rural peasant community and pre-industrial city as interrelated parts of a single regional socio- cultural complex (cf. Foster 1953; Aguirre Beltran 1955: Marroquin 1956). More precisely, it attempts to broadly delineate some of the structural features which have characterized the relationship between the city and its rural hinterland through three periods of Mexican historical development beginning with the formation of the colonial economy. 1 This is a slightly revised version of paper delivered before the 35th International Congress of Americanists in Mexico Gity in August of 1962. I sem indebted to Professor Robert A , Manners for a critical reading of an earlier draft of this paper. ‘América Indigena.—Vol. XXIV, N* 1.—Enero, 1964. ) |América Indigena i While sharing a common interest in exploiting the wealth of New Spain, it was not long after the Conquest that the colonists and Spanish Crown came into conflict over who was to be the major beneficiary of this wealth. The crux of the conflict had to do with the control over the labor of the Indians, for it was upon this control that the control of the colonial economy itself pivoted, The military entrepeneurs who had carried off the Conquest sought to organize the Indians into a labor force to be used for furthering their own economic interests (Miranda 1947); to this end they pressed the Crown repeatedly for grants of Indians (encomiendas) in perpetuity. The Spanish dynastic state —which was consolidating and cen- tralizing its power now that the Moors had been driven from Spain— viewed with deep misgivings the transplantation of the feudal-like encomienda to New Spain. Only after attempts to abolish the enco- mienda threatened the colony with economic collapse, did the Crown grudgingly consent to its continuation; but at the same time it took measures to curb the political and economic autonomy of the colonists. ‘The New Laws of the mid-sixteenth century struck at the very heart of the colonists’ power by removing their right to the unregulated use of Indian labor. Moreover, steps were taken to convert the colo- nists into city dwellers, with no ties to the Indian communities except through the mediating agency of Crown officials (Kirkpatrick 1915: 97; Zavala 1943: 83-91; Simpson 1950: 129-133). What the Crown hoped to prevent was the emergence of a powerful, independent gentry class which had a firm foothold in both the rural productive sector and the urban political sector. In its campaign to reconquer the colony from the conquistadores, the Crown did indeed enact a great deal of legislation protecting the Indians from exploitation by the colonists as encomenderos and en- trepeneurs; but as Simpson (1950:xi) has commented, at no time did the Crown’s “...conscience probing... carry it to the absurd extreme of destroying the foundation of its wealth in the Indies, namely, the forced labor of the Indians”. ‘The social system which the Crown sought to create in the colony was one that reflected a typically medieval pattern: all socio-econo- mic groups were forcibly incorporated into a series of hierarchically ordered and legally delimited social strata or “estates”, each with its respective political, economic and judicial duties and obligations andCity and Countryside in Mexican History 61 sights (Borah 1943: 71; Mendizabal n.d.:5). The relationship of each secial estate to all the others, as well as to the Crown, was carefully and minutely regulated by royal legislation. The lines of demarcation Between social strata were further underscored by sumptuary laws. In accordance with the above policy, the Indians were congre- sated in large nucleated communities, wich were linked politically eco- nomically and ecclesiastically to nearby Spanish cities (Simpson 1950: 32-34; Zavala and Miranda 1954:39-42; 80-83; Aguirre Beltran 1955: 36-37). In point of fact, during the sixteenth century, and for some time thereafter, the term “city” usually referred to both an srban nucleus and its surrounding dependent rural hinterland (Gib- Son 1952: 124). The newly-founded Indian communities were provided with a legal charter, communal lands, and a Spanish-style governmental apparatus (Aguirre Beltran 1952: 278-283: Zavala and Miranda 1954: 70); the deliberations of the Indian government, however, were subject to constant surveillance and intervention by Crown offi- cials (Aguirre Bleltrin 1952: 278-285; Zavala and Miranda 1954: 75-83). Acting as the liaison between the producing Indian estate and the ruling Spanish estate, the main functions of the Indian governing officials were to maintain discipline and order within the community and, most importantly, to see that the necessary work was performed and the tributes delivered to the proper authorities (Aguirre Beltran 1952: 291; Gibson 1955: 591). There is a substantial body of evidence which indicates that during the decades immediately following the Conquest the Indians turned eagerly to Spanish culture, particularly to its technical aspects (Ku- bler 1948, Vol. I: 154-156; Beals 1951: 77). These decades were a period of rapid acculturation during which the basic amalgamation between the aboriginal and Hispanic cultures, that still characterizes such a large part of rural Mexico, was forged. In the closing decades of the sixteenth century, however, there took place a widespread turn- ing away from Spanish culture on the part of the Indians. The pre- cipitous decline in the Indian population, due primarily to a series of devastating epidemics, coupled with the flight of Indians from the confinement of their communities, brought about a serious crisis in the colonial economy (Borah 1951). The Spaniards saw their labor force, upon which the entire economy rested, rapidly vanishing before their very eyes, Heavier economic demands were placed upon the remaining Indian population, demands which they were finding it increasingly difficult to meet. What is more, complaints were heard62 América Indigena that many Indians had become so acculturated that it was no longer possible to distinguish them from Spaniards (Borah 1954: 340), All this led to the enactment of laws —the so-called “Laws of the Cas- tes”— which, as already noted, carefully defined in legal terms the Status of the various socio-economic groups in the colony's. social structure. As far as the Indians were concerned, these laws had the effect of placing greater restrictions on their social and geopraphic mobility. In short, they acted as a brake against further acculturation, thus preserving the Indian communities intact as reservoirs of labor (cf, Humboldt 1811, Vol. I: 189-197; Borah 1943: 40; Beals 1951), By throwing up legal, social and economic barriers around the Indian communities, Spanish policy, in effect, laid the foundation for what were to become “closed corporate communities” (see Wolf 1955a). Urbanization during the colonial period was always an instrument of Spanish imperial policy. By royal edict every adelantado or fron tier commander was required to found at least three cities with a network of satellite Indian communities politically dependent upon them (Kirkpatrick 1915: 96). The location of cities was primarily a function of political, strategic and agricultural considerations, rather than industrial or commercial ones (Morse 1962b: 475). All colo- nists were required to reside in the Spanish cities (Ibid: 97; Simpson 1960-91), presumably where they could be more effectively restrained and kept under Crown control Laid out according to meticulous instructions contained in royal ordinances (Nuttal 1921; Stanislawski 1947), the cities followed the fa- miliar grid pattern, with a spacious plaza in the center, around which ‘were concentrated the residences of the rich and influential, in ad- dition to the most important urban services. Like most pre-industrial cities found in other parts of the world, the colonial cities were com- monly divided into quarters of wards wherein resided various ethnic Socio-economic groups, or specialized artisans organized into guilds (Borah 1943:37). Unlike the typical pre-industrial city, however, the colonial cities were unwalled: but they all featured a stoutly built church which served as a defensive fortress when the need arose, ‘The most important political organ in the city was the town council, unsually dominated by the local aristocracy made up of the conquerors and their sons. In the early years following the Conquest these councils exercised almost sovereign powers: The raised armies, appointed and deposed royal captains and governors, raised funds, prepared campaigns of defense and con- Quest, and administered royal justice. The council of MéxicoCity and Countryside in Mexican History 63 City in its first years granted lands to settlers over the length and breadth of Mexico (Borah 1956:250). The Crown, having broken the independent power of the cities i Spain, naturally found such wide autonomy distasteful, and in Ge with its policy of keeping the colonials in rein, it soon brought these cities within the expanding orbit of the royal bureaucracy. Of course distance was a vital factor. Those cities which were centers of viceregal administration, or close to such centers, suffered the greatest loss of their early power; those cities, on the other hand, which were at some distance from the centers of royal power managed to retain a greater measure of their early autonomy. The upshot was that the cities emerged as the seats of operation of the managerial, non-productive, conquering class - in brief, as ad- ministrative, military and ecclesiastical centers, rather than centers of production (Davis 1960: 44-45; Morse 1962a: 322). In their role as political centers of vanquished areas, all Spanish cities tended to si- phon off the wealth of the surrounding countryside, with the larger, politically more important urban centers growing in size and opulence at the expense of the smaller cities and towns. (Bernstein 1944: 308; Wolf 1955b: 185). The pattern of the colonial economy which finally took shape was that of a series of regional and local economies of varying size, each to a large extent self-sufficient, and each dominated by a Spanish urban center (Bernstein 1944; Wolf 1955b: 182). Holding these regional economies tenuously together was the network of royal bu- reaucrats operating at the state level. The cellular structure of the colonial economy meant that the cities were largely dependent upon their immediate hinderlands for day-to-day provisions. It was for this reason that such a major part of city politics was taken up with the problems of the consumption needs of the urban dwellers, rather than with the needs of the produ- cers. Production in the Indian communities was controlled with a view toward stabilizing the food supply of the cities (Borah 1951: 24-31). The prices of all food items were carefully regulated, sales were res- teicted to legally designated marketplaces, and middlemen were sup- pressed (Ibid: 24-31; Zavala and Miranda 1954: 48; Aguirre Bel- tran 1957: 89). With the founding of new cities, markets were creat- ed, and various politico-legal means were employed to bring the In- dians into the marketplace with their wares (Zavala and Miranda 1954: 48; Aguirre Beltran 1957: 94). Whatever may have been the |64 América Indigena nature of pre-Hispanic markets, under the Spanish they functioned principally as politically controlled mechanisms for serving the con- sumption needs of the cities. Il The establishment of an independent Mexico in the first decades of the 19th century did little to alter the cellular structure of the Mexican economy. Quite the contrary, it was further accentuated, With the royal bureaucracy gone, there were no political or economic bonds strong enough to hold the various regional units together, and the country collapsed into its constituent parts, with military power and judicial authority passing into the hands of local hacendados and caudillos (cf, Wolf 1956: 1068). There was no class in Mexico, nu- merous or powerful enough, with economic interests of a sufficiently supra-regional scope, that could be effectively translated into a stable supra-regional political system. The central government, lacking a solid economic base, was chronically short of funds, politically inef- fective, and easily toppled. The most stable and solvent of the 19th century administrations, the regime of Porfirio Diaz, rested to a large degree upon the ability of Diaz himself to conciliate the local power- holders and play them off one against another. ‘The regional cities, as the seats of power of the local rulers, con- tinued their domination of the countryside, mainly through the insti- tution of the hacienda, Some writers (e.g., Borah 1951: 32-33; Gib- son 1955: 596) have asserted that the haciendas replaced the Indian communities as the primary means of provisioning the cities. Others (eg., Bazant 1960: 236) see the hacienda as basically a capitalist institution, very backward to be sure, but capitalist nevertheless. To view the hacienda as primarily an economic institution, however, is to minimize the very crucial political functions it performed. In fact, I think it might be argued that its significance in the total life of the country was more political than economic. As a political institution, the hacienda was the predominant means by which the rural hinter- land was controlled. As an economic institution, it did not introduce any radically new system of production; it was essentially an organi- zation of Indian labor based, for the most part, upon the existing productive capacity of the Indian communities. I am referring here particularly to the haciendas of the central plateau. Yet even the great sprawling haciendas of the North were geared more to main taining the power-position and style of life of the hacendado (who,City and Countryside in Mexican History incidentally, lived for most of the year in one of the cities), rather than to producing surpluses for a large internal market (cf. Chevalier 1963). All of the characteristic features of the typical hacienda —its labor-intensiveness, its self-sufficiency, the overriding importance of Status considerations in its organization and productive decisions— @re more reminiscent of a manorial estate, than they are of a modern rationally organized agricultural enterprise (see McBride 1923: 38: Tannenbaum 1929: 105-107; Aguirre Beltran 1957: 76). The most immediate effect of the Revolution of 1910-17 was to bring about a realignment of power. The political power of the local hacendados and caudillos was broken and gradually absorbed by the central government. Mexico found itself with the political charter for a nation state, but without the underpinnings of a viable national economy. With effective power once again restored to the state level, the government sought to remedy this situation by embarking upon a program to integrate its sundry regional economies into a national unit and by industrializing the nation. While some progress has been made in this direction, thus far the growth of industrial production has been very uneven in its regional distribution: the major develop- ment has taken place within a few regional enclaves, whereas outside of these sectors the traditional pattern of regional economies with their dominant urban centers and satellite rural communities has per- sisted into modern times. And although the preponderance of goods produced by the industrial sectors of the economy find their major markets in a few large urban complexes, a certain amount of manu- factured items does regularly circulate through the regional econo- mies. The significant thing to be noted, however, is not the cultural items that manage to percolate down to the local level, but the failure of urban culture to bring about the kinds of structural changes in the rural socio-economic organization that social science theory has led one to expect (cf. Caplow 1952: 260). What seems to have emerged in Mexico is a kind of dual economy, with one part, the rapidly industrializing one, developing at the ex- pense of the other, the traditional agricultural one. Governmental ac- tion has inadvertently helped create and perpetuate this dualism by stimulating industrial development in certain urban areas, while in the rural areas it has not only left the traditional communities intact, but in many instances has further strengthened their structure by agricultural policies which have had the effect, however unintended, of encouraging subsistence farming. The mediating social and ecological segments between the indus-: i ; 66 América Indigena trial sectors of the economy and the series of regional economies are the provincial pre-industrial cities (or perhaps more accuartely, non- industrial cities) ; this mediating economic role accounts for why so many of these regional cities have been transformed since the Revo- lution from haleyon, hacendado-dominated centers to bustling centers given over largely to commercial and middleman activities (see Ma- rroquin 1955). To those who view entrepeneurial activity mic and cultural development, all of this may appear as a healthy sign. I would only point out, though, that while the merchant groups in the provincial cities form the connecting links between regional economies, and between these units and the industrial sectors, they have not been responsible for any major changes in the productive structure within the regions themselves - which, for the most part, is still characterized by small household units employing traditional pro- ductive techniques. As a matter of fact, the economic position of these merchants in the Mexican social system is to a great extent dependent upon the total structure of production and distribution remaining esentially unchanged, What I am suggesting here is simply this: that the socio-economic structure of these contemporary pre-industrial cities has emerged as a functional response to the dual nature of the Mexi- can economy; and that, in their role as the mediating units between economies, and between these units and the industrial sectors, they have a vested interest in perpetuating the backwardness of the adjoin- as a leaven for econo- ing countryside. ‘The regional city continues to be heavily dependent upon its im- mediate rural hinterland for everyday provisions, as is evidenced by the continuing importance of local periodic markets. In the exchange between city and countryside, the rural peasant comes off second best; he receives pitifully low prices for the things he sells to the city but must pay high prices for the articles he purchases from the city - some of which have been produced by other rural peasants, One question which has not been adequately explored, and which I am currently working on, is the extent to which various dominant groups in the city’s social structure are able to control production in the rural areas, and thus perpetuate this markedly uneven exchange, through mani- pulation of certain key sectors of the local market or through credit relationships with the surrounding peasant communities. ‘Whatever excess capital accumulates in the provincial cities tends to flow into two channels: first, into urban real estate which has proven to be both profitable and safe, since it has never been the