JOHANNALYN M.

SANCHEZ
JD - 1

G.R. No. L-23825      December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.

THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Statement of the Facts:

The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the

Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129;
creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez,
as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action,
for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.” Respondent
maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all
proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have
been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the
aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the
barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover,
Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did
appear as amici curiae.

Statement of the Case:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November
10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:
 Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the  barrio  in
which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6  Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually
creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices implies  no more  than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include
the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a
consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would
necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which
he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate
above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that
vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than
that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.

PRINCIPLES:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority.
 

G.R. No. 161414            January 17, 2005

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner,


vs.

THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of
FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and
the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND
SENATE), respondents.

Statement of the Facts:

President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating thirty-three

(33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created
by virtue of Executive Order No. 107. After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that
the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by
the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation
of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the
issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the
power of the Chief Executive over local governments. Among the Executive Orders annulled
was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core
issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the
Municipality of Andong.

This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon—
the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that
is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike
in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the
purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab
initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this
insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given
judicial affirmation. 

Statement of the Case:

The issued several Executive Orders creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in

Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 107. After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the
challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente,
Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the
issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the
power of the Chief Executive over local governments. Among the Executive Orders annulled
was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core
issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the
Municipality of Andong.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by executive fiat was
previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute.

(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

RULING:

(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107 establishing Andong
was declared void ab initio (from inception) by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor
General. Further, the Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in
many cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a
Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong
does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order
is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer
be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered
the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the
municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative
district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it
was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality
must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No.
7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.”

PRINCIPLES:

Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that
the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the
Local Government] Code." 

G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ

VS.

HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258. The Pres. Quirino pursuant to
Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code.Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the
technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an
agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental
which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared
the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the
agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban,
which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial
claim.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171,  2  dated November 22, 1988,

Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara
Baja, and Sinara Alto,3 based on the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed
with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the
disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950,
which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area
to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between
the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of
Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), §134.  The Provincial
Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez
seeking reconsideration. On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and  mandamus  in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed
against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the
Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and
the Executive Secretary. On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC, inter
alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even
prior to the  Pelaez  case and exercised corporate powers for forty years before its existence
was questioned; that Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal
existence of Sinacaban by entering into an agreement with it concerning their common
boundary; and that any question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been rendered
moot by §442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). On March 17, 1990,
petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied by the RTC.
Hence this petition raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacaban has legal personality to
file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as the
basis for adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality.

RULING:

Yes. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its
acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the
creation of a municipal corporation:

1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged;

2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating
the municipality; and

3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality,
organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the
Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following factors are present:
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and
yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned.

2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned.

3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a
corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act
complaned of was done or committed.

4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering
into an agreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, etc.

5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the

establishment of MTCs in the country. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that
“municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” Sinacaban has attained de jure
status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of
Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new
municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite
was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied
to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban.

PRINCIPLES:

At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, the
applicable law was §2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:

Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled. — Disputes as to jurisdiction

of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the provincial boards of
the provinces in which such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the
municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal
may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of
the Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute
are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the
provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to
agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose decision
shall be final.

The power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative

nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the
law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in
accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its
amendment. 

G.R. NO. 176951             NOVEMBER 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) REPRESENTED BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG REPRESENTED BY MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, AND JERRY P. TREÑAS IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS TAXPAYER, PETITIONERS,

VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of
the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

During the 11th  Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12th  Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was
to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the
fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House
of Representatives of the 12th  Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the  P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th  Congress. However, the 12th  Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of
Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it
to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which
was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various
dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING:

(1) Yes. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and
other political units must  follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in
the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from  P20
million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Section 450
of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption
from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to
respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted  after  the effectivity of RA 9009,
explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.

(2) Yes. If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the  P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such
exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the
criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the
ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained
in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed
in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely
states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the
income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption
provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we take into account the deliberations
in the 11th  Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from
the  P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal
protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted.

PRINCIPLES:
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VALID CLASSIFICATION
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under
the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class

PROHIBITION OF CONGRESS FROM CREATING PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

EXCEPT BY A GENERAL LAW

(1) Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished

or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

(2) Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII
provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common
good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. NO. 118303             JANUARY 31, 1996

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ


VS.

HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

This Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum
average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
order to be converted into a component city.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed
in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other
sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and
Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the
House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993. On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993,
November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted
by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a
favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993. On December 13, 1993, HB No.
8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to
the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as
the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as
principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had
conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817. On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a
month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said
committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation
that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817
was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners,
indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local
Government. On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994,
the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12,
1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a
plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city

(2) Whether or not the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No.
8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives as required.

RULING:
(1) we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality
to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income
of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. The funds generated
from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the
local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of
spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules
and regulations. Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full import
of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts
realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General
Fund  including the internal revenue allotment and other shares  provided for in Sections 284,
290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids,
grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others" (Emphasis
ours).

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.

(2) Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of
Representa-tives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243,
was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was
filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.The filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate inthe
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.

PRINCIPLES:
THE PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION UNDERLYING THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INTENSIFIED EMPOWERMENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SYSTEM.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,
he local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only
at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and
fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail.
Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground
raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the
holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition
is, therefore, inevitable.

G.R. NO. 118577 MARCH 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. ET AL., PETITIONERS,


VS.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR
BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act
No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati.” G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed
by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie
Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2
of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of
R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3.
Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the
return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000. G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as
senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the
constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

RULING:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on
the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may
or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not
also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
 

PRINCIPLES:

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160). 

Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local

government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services.

G.R. NO. 146342            OCTOBER 26, 2001

BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., PETITIONER,


VS.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

  Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No.8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted
pursuant thereto.On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A.
No. 8806, an"Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.” The   COMELEC a
plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification
proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking  his  right as a president and taxpayer, the
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the
following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required
120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B.
Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite. Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two
municipalities violates Section 450 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires thatonly "a municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city"; and 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2)
subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the(b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill” rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioner contends that under
Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a
municipality or a cluster of  barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No.
8806 has done.

ISSUE:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon
 (3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section
26 (1), Article VI ofthe Constitution

(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

RULING:

(1) Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The
phrase"A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is
not a criterion but simply one of the   modes   by which a city may be created. Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution allows the  merger  of local government units to create a province
city, municipality or   barangay   inaccordance with the criteria established by the Code. the
creation of an entirely new local government unit   through   a  division  or   a  merger  of 
existing   local   government   units   is  recognized  under   theConstitution, provided that such
merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2)   This   argument   goes   into   the   wisdom   of  R.A.   No.   8806,   a   matter 
which   we   are   not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it
clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." In the exercise of judicial power,   we   are   allowed   only   "to   settle   actual 
controversies   involving   rights   which   are   legally demandable and enforceable," and "may
not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.”

(3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of
theCity of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the
creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger.The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The
theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed
careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with   the   fundamental   law.   This   Court, 
however,   may   declare   a   law,   or   portions   thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner
has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely   a   doubtful   or 
argumentative   one.   In   other   words  the  grounds  for   nullity   must   be   beyond
reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear
and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

PRINCIPLES:

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.6 This presumption is
rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.7 The theory is that
every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny
to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law,
or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.9 In other words the
grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,10 for to doubt is to sustain.

ONE TITLE RULE

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

G.R. NO. 209185               OCTOBER 25, 2013

MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS, PETITIONER,


VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES JR.
AND THE PROVINCIAL ELECTION OFFICER OF DAVAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MA.
FEBES BARLAAN, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, filed
with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second legislative district of the same
province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental.
H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of
the Province of Davao Occidental. Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the
holding of a plebiscite. Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created,
as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of
the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter. As
early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the COMELEC
suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations
for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the
COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously
with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses. Cagas filed a petition for
prohibition, contending that the COMELEC is without authority to amend or modify section 46
of RA 10360 by mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus, COMELEC's
act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas cites three
causes of action: 1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION because it is only
CONGRESS who can validly amend, repel [sic] or modify existing laws, thus COMELEC [sic]
act in suspending the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional; 2. COMELEC is without
authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this coming October 28, 2013 for the creation of the
Province of Davao Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 has already
lapsed; and 3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from holding
the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental except
through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction because
COMELEC had already commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay and SK
elections this coming October 28, 2013. On 17 October 2013, we issued a Resolution requiring
respondents COMELEC, represented by its Chairperson, Hon. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., and the
Provincial Election Officer of Davao del Sur, represented by Atty. Ma. Febes Barlaan, to file their
comment to Cagas’ petition not later than 21 October 2013. The respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their comment on 21 October 2013. The OSG raises
the following arguments: 1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite
for the creation of a local government unit; 2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite at a mere two months’ notice; 3. Legislative intent is for R.A.
No. 10360 to be implemented; 4. Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted;
and 5. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to
hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October
2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections.

RULING:
No. The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.” The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections. The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.” The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling
mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into
law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the subsequent
conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution,
rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360. We also take judicial
notice of the COMELEC's burden in the accreditation and registration of candidates for the
Party-List Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to
the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force
majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is
justified, and did not act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to
synchronize it with the Barangay Elections. To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the
plebiscite then, as insisted, petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its tasks for the
National and Local Elections. If COMELEC abandoned any of its tasks or did not strictly follow
the timetable for the accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious jeopardy
the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections. The COMELEC had to focus all its
attention and concentrate all its manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May
2013 National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer
the conduct of all plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.
 

PRINCIPLES:

THE COMELEC’S POWER TO ADMINISTER ELECTIONS

The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.” The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections. The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.”

THE COMELEC’S THE POWER TO SET ELECTIONS TO ANOTHER DATE

Sec. 5. Postponement of election.- When for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon
a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all
interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure
or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the
basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. Thus, a
too literal interpretation of the law that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to —

x x x admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not
in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’ x x x

Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text and
intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.

POLITICS
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically —
not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to
decide complex political questions x x x. There are no ready made formulas for solving public
problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of
good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election
x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that
initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.

G.R. NO. 125646 SEPTEMBER 10, 1999

CITY OF PASIG, PETITIONER,

VS.

THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE
OF RIZAL, RESPONDENTS.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

There are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of
plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig. G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay
Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico.

The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the
Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its
own jurisdiction/territory.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the
City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter
set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for this
purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the
Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and
filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June
19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)3  and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary
dispute.  According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally
decided by the court. In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the
Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be
held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the
two municipalities. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.

 The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition
for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where
the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays

Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments.

RULING:
  The plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality
of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on
March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and
set aside.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by
the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that
portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material
bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite
for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes
and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of
such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we held that —

The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit
of government cannot be over emphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers
of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the people's welfare. Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites,
it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination
of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Pasig. Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had
already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality
of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality
of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial
Court.

PRINCIPLES: