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philippines-corporation-v-ca-g-r-no-102881/

Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. CA (G

Facts:
This case involves a boundary dispute between petitioner Toyota Motor Phil. Corporation (Toyota)
and private respondent Sun Valley Manufacturing and Development Corporation (Sun Valley). Both
Toyota and Sun Valley are the registered owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land which they
purchased from the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). The properties in question formerly belonged to
Delta Motors Corporation (DMC) which were foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
later transferred to the national government through the APT for disposition. APT then proceeded to
classify the DMC properties, called the GC III-Delta Motors Corporation, and divided into Delta I, Delta
II, and Delta III. Further subdivisions for the separate catalogues were made for each division e.g.
Delta I into Lots 1, 2 and 3. After this classification, APT parcelled out and catalogued the properties
for bidding and sale.

Part of the duly parcelled Delta I property (Lot 2) was sold to Toyota through public bidding. After its
purchase, Toyota constructed a concrete hollow block (CHB) perimeter fence around its alleged
property. Another part of the parcelled Delta I (Lot 1) was purchased by Sun Valley from APT.
Petitioner then filed a case against APT for the reformation of the Deed of Sale executed between
them alleging that the instrument failed to reflect the true intention of the parties as the title failed to
include 723 square meters strip of land. On the other hand, Sun Valley, filed a case for recovery of
possession of the disputed 723 square meters relying upon the title description of its property and the
surveys it has commissioned. Through legal maneuverings, the parties have succeeded in muddling up
the vital issues of the case and getting the lower courts embroiled in numerous appeals over
technicalities. Hence, the three appellate decisions/resolutions before the Court for review and
conflicting orders issued by lower courts as a result of the separate cases filed by the parties.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Tensuan had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case for reformation of
instrument.
Ruling:
Attention must first be brought to the fact that the contract of sale executed between APT and Toyota
provides an arbitration clause which states that:
In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract, the parties hereby undertake to submit
the matter for determination by a committee of experts, acting as arbitrators, the composition of
which shall be as follows: a) One member to be appointed by the VENDOR; b) One member to be
appointed by the VENDEE; c) One member, who shall be a lawyer, to be appointed by both of the
aforesaid parties;
The contention that the arbitration clause has become dysfunctional because of the presence of third
parties is untenable.
Toyota filed an action for reformation of its contract with APT, the purpose of which is to look into the
real intentions/agreement of the parties to the contract and to determine if there was really a
mistake in the designation of the boundaries of the property as alleged by Toyota. Such questions can
only be answered by the parties to the contract themselves. This is a controversy which clearly arose
from the contract entered into by APT and Toyota. Inasmuch as this concerns more importantly the
parties APT and Toyota themselves, the arbitration committee is therefore the proper and convenient
forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in the deed of sale. Having been apprised of the
presence of the arbitration clause in the motion to dismiss filed by APT, Judge Tensuan should have at
least suspended the proceedings and directed the parties to settle their dispute by arbitration. Judge
Tensuan should have not taken cognizance of the case.
ADR CASES

Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. vs. Laperal Realty Corporation, et al.,

320 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 135362, December 13, 1999

Facts:
Salas Jr. was the registered owner of a vast tract of land in Lipa City,
Batangas spanning 1,484,354 square meters. On May 15, 1987, he entered into
an Owner-Contractor Agreement with respondent Laperal Realty Corporation to
render and provide complete (horizontal) construction services on his land. On
September 23, 1988, Salas, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
respondent Laperal Realty to exercise general control, supervision and
management of the sale of his land, for cash or on installment basis. On June 10,
1989, Salas, Jr. left his home in the morning for a business trip to Nueva Ecija. He
never returned. After 7 years, Teresita Diaz Salas filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband, Salas, Jr., who had then been missing for more than seven (7) years. It
was granted on December 12, 1996.
Meantime, respondent Laperal Realty subdivided the land of Salas, Jr. and
sold subdivided portions thereof to respondents Rockway Real Estate Corporation
and South Ridge Village, Inc.; to respondent spouses Abrajano and Lava and Oscar
Dacillo; and to respondents Eduardo Vacuna, Florante de la Cruz and Jesus Vicente
Capalan (all of whom are hereinafter referred to as respondent lot buyers).
On February 3, 1998, petitioners as heirs of Salas, Jr. filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Lipa City a Complaint 6 for declaration of nullity of sale,
reconveyance, cancellation of contract, accounting and damages against herein
respondents which was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0047. On April 24, 1998,
respondent Laperal Realty filed a Motion toDismiss on the ground that petitioners
failed to submit their grievance to arbitration as required under Article VI of the
Agreement of their arbitration clause.

Issue: Whether or not rescission is an arbitrable?

Rulings:
Yes
The petitioners' contention is without merit. For while rescission, as a
general rule, is an arbitrable issue, they impleaded in the suit for rescission the
respondent lot buyers who are neither parties to the Agreement nor the latter's
assigns or heirs. Consequently, the right to arbitrate as provided in Article VI of
the Agreement was never vested in respondent lot buyers.
Respondent Laperal Realty, as a contracting party to the Agreement, has
the right to compel petitioners to first arbitrate before seeking judicial relief.
However, to split the proceedings into arbitration for respondent Laperal Realty
and trial for the respondent lot buyers, or to hold trial in abeyance pending
arbitration between petitioners and respondent Laperal Realty, would in effect

result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. On the

other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the
complaint against all herein respondents and adjudicates petitioners' rights as
against theirs in a single and complete proceeding.

Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company v. CA (G.R. No. 115412)

Facts:
Victor Tancuan issued Petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company a check
while Eugene Arriesgado issued Private Respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company three checks; both checks totaling the amount of P25,250,000.00. Tancuan
and Arriesgado exchanged each other’s checks and deposited them with their
respective banks for collection. When FEBTC presented Tancuan’s HBSTC check for
clearing, it was dishonored for being DAIF. Meanwhile, HBSTC sent Arriesgado’s 3
FEBTC checks through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) to
FEBTC but was returned for being DAIF. HBSTC receive the notice of dishonor but
refused to accept the checks and returned them to FEBTC through the PCHC for the
reason “Beyond Reglementary Period,” implying that HBSTC already treated the 3
checks as cleared and allowed the proceeds thereof to be withdrawn. FEBTC
demanded reimbursement for the returned checks and inquired from HBSTC whether
it had permitted any withdrawal of funds against the unfunded checks. HBSTC,
however refused to make any reimbursement and to provide FEBTC with the needed
information. Thus, FEBTC submitted the dispute for arbitration before the PCHC
Arbitration Committee, under its Supplementary Rules on Regional Clearing to which
FEBTC and HBSTC are bound as participants in the regional clearing operations
administered by the PCHC. While the arbitration proceeding was still pending,
FEBTC filed an action for sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment
against HBSTC. HBSTC moved to dismiss on the ground that there is no cause of
action and because it seeks to enforce an arbitral award which as yet does not exist.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with respondent CA to which it had
dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent which commenced an arbitration proceeding under
the auspices of the PCHC may subsequently file a separate case in court over the
same subject matter despite the pendency of that arbitration, simply to obtain the
provisional remedy of attachment against the adverse party in the arbitration
proceeding.

Ruling:
We find no merit in the petition. Section 14 of Republic Act 876, otherwise known as
the Arbitration Law, allows any party to the arbitration proceeding to petition the
court to take measures to safeguard and/or conserve any matter which is the subject of
the dispute in arbitration.
Petitioner’s exposition of the foregoing provision deserves scant consideration.
Section 14 simply grants an arbitrator the power to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum at any time before rendering the award. The exercise of such
power is without prejudice to the right of a party to file a petition in court to safeguard
any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration. In the case at bar, private
respondent filed an action for a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Undoubtedly, such action involved the same subject matter as that in
arbitration, i.e., the sum of P25,200,000.00 which was allegedly deprived from private
respondent in what is known in banking as a “kiting scheme.” However, the civil
action was not a simple case of a money claim since private respondent has included a
prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, which is sanctioned by section 14 of the
Arbitration Law.
Simply put, participants in the regional clearing operations of the Philippine Clearing
House Corporation cannot bypass the arbitration process laid out by the body and
seek relief directly from the courts. In the case at bar, undeniably, private respondent
has initiated arbitration proceedings as required by the PCHC rules and regulations,
and pending arbitration has sought relief from the trial court for measures to safeguard
and/or conserve the subject of the dispute under arbitration, as sanctioned by section
14 of the Arbitration Law, and otherwise not shown to be contrary to the PCHC rules
and regulations.
At this point, we emphasize that arbitration, as an alternative method of dispute
resolution, is encouraged by this Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it
also hastens solutions especially of commercial disputes. The Court looks with favor
upon such amicable arrangement and will only interfere with great reluctance to
anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator. Wherefore, premises considered, the
petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the court a quo is affirmed.

Chung Fu Industries v. CA (G.R. No. 96283)

Facts:
Petitioner Chung Fu Industries (Philippines) and private respondent Roblecor
Philippines, Inc. forged a construction agreement whereby respondent contractor
committed to construct and finish petitioner corporation’s industrial/factory complex.
In the event of disputes arising from the performance of subject contract, it was
stipulated therein that the issue(s) shall be submitted for resolution before a single
arbitrator chosen by both parties. Roblecor filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before respondent RTC to claim the
unsatisfied account and unpaid progress billings. Chung Fu moved to dismiss the
petition and further prayed for the quashing of the restraining order. Subsequent
negotiations between the parties eventually led to the formulation of an arbitration
agreement which, among others, provides: The parties mutually agree that the
decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable. Therefore, there shall be no
further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the
arbitrator’s award. Respondent RTC approved the arbitration agreement and
thereafter, Engr. Willardo Asuncion was appointed as the sole arbitrator. Arbitrator
Asuncion ordered petitioner to immediately pay respondent contractor and further
declared the award as final and unappealable. Roblecor then moved for the
confirmation of said award which was accordingly confirmed and a writ of execution
granted to it. Meanwhile, Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing and
asked for a reconsideration of the judgment award claiming that Arbitrator Asuncion
committed twelve (12) instances of grave error by disregarding the provisions of the
parties’ contract. Chung Fu’s Motion was denied and similarly its motion for
reconsiderationn. Chung Fu elevated the case via a petition for certiorari to
respondent CA. The respondent appellate court concurred with the findings and
conclusions of respondent trial court. A motion for reconsideration of said resolution
was filed by petitioner, but was similarly denied.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are estopped from questioning the arbitration award
allegedly in view of the stipulations in the parties’ arbitration agreement that “the
decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable” and that “there shall be no
further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the
arbitrator’s award.”

Ruling:
We rule in the negative. It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that
the finality of the arbitrators’ award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the
conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises
and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may be annulled or rescinded.
Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for
vacating, modifying or rescinding an arbitrator’s award. Thus, if and when the factual
circumstances referred to in the above-cited provisions are present, judicial review of
the award is properly warranted.
This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. It is to be borne in mind, however, that this action will lie only where a grave
abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. It should be stressed, too, that voluntary
arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-judicial capacity. It stands to
reason, therefore, that their decisions should not be beyond the scope of the power of
judicial review of this Court.
In the case at bar, petitioners assailed the arbitral award on the following grounds,
most of which allege error on the part of the arbitrator in granting compensation for
various items which apparently are disputed by said petitioners. After closely studying
the list of errors, as well as petitioners’ discussion of the same in their Motion to
Remand Case For Further Hearing and Reconsideration and Opposition to Motion for
Confirmation of Award, we find that petitioners have amply made out a case where
the voluntary arbitrator failed to apply the terms and provisions of the Construction
Agreement which forms part of the law applicable as between the parties, thus
committing a grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, in granting unjustified extra
compensation to respondent for several items, he exceeded his powers — all of which
would have constituted ground for vacating the award under Section 24 (d) of the
Arbitration Law.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Resolutions of the CA as well as the Orders of
respondent RTC are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to
the court of origin for further hearing on this matter. All incidents arising therefrom
are reverted to the status quo ante until such time as the trial court shall have passed
upon the merits of this case.

Adamson v. CA?

National Steel Corp. v. RTC of Lanao del Norte

Facts:
Respondent Edward Willkom Enterprises Inc. (EWEI) and Ramiro Construction
executed a contract with petitioner National Steel Corporation (NSC) whereby the
former jointly undertook the Contract for Site Development for the latter’s Integrated
Iron and Steel Mills Complex. Sometime in 1983, the services of Ramiro
Construction was terminated and EWEI took over the contractual obligation. Due to
this and to other causes deemed sufficient by EWEI, extensions of time for the
termination of the project were granted by NSC. Differences later arose, EWEI filed a
case before the RTC praying essentially for payments with interest from the time of
delay; the price adjustment as provided by PD 1594; and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. NSC filed an answer with counterclaim to plaintiffs complaints. The
court upon joint motion of both parties had issued an order dismissing the said
complaint and counterclaim in view of the desire of both parties to implement Sec. 19
of the contract, providing for a resolution of any conflict by arbitration. In accordance
with the aforesaid order and pursuant to Sec. 19 of the Contract, herein parties
constituted an Arbitration Board after which of a series of hearings, rendered the
decision directing NSC to pay EWEI. The RTC affirmed and confirmed the award of
the arbitrators. NSC’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence has come to this
court via the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in not vacating
the arbitrator’s award.

Ruling:
Thus, in a Petition to Vacate Arbitrator’s Decision before the trial court, regularity in
the performance of official functions is presumed and the complaining party has the
burden of proving the existence of any of the grounds for vacating the award, as
provided for by Sections 24 of the Arbitration Law, to wit: (a) The award was
procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (b) That there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators of any of them; or  (c) That the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; that
one or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section nine
hereof, and wilfully refrained from disclosing such disqualification or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (d)
That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not
made. . . .
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner were the following (a) That there was
evident partiality in the assailed decision of the Arbitrators in favor of the respondent;
and (b) That there was mistaken appreciation of the facts and application of the law
by the Arbitrators.
Petitioner’s allegation that there was evident partiality is untenable. It is anemic of
evidentiary support. In the case of Adamson vs. Court of Appeals, in upholding the
decision of the Board of Arbitrators, this Court ruled that the fact that a party was
disadvantaged by the decision of the Arbitration Committee does not prove evident
partiality. Proofs other than mere inference are needed to establish evident partiality.
Here, petitioner merely averred evident partiality without any proof to back it up.
Petitioner was never deprived of the right to present evidence nor was there any
showing that the Board showed signs of any bias in favor of EWEI.
Parentethically, and in the light of the record above-mentioned, this Court hereby
holds that the Board of Arbitrators did not commit any “evident partiality” imputed by
petitioner NSC. Above all, this Court must sustain the said decision for it is a well-
settled rule that the actual findings of an administrative body should be affirmed if
there is substantial evidence to support them and the conclusions stated in the decision
are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence, similar to the instant case,
Henceforth, every reasonable intendment will be indulged to give effect such
proceedings and in favor of the regulatory and integrity of the arbitrators act. Indeed,
the allegation of evident partiality is not well-taken because the petitioner failed to
substantiate the same.
WHEREFORE, the awards made by the Board of Arbitrators which the trial court
adopted in its decision are modified.

CHINA CHANG JIANG ENERGY CORPORATION vs ROSAL

INFRASTRUCTURE BUILDERS, G.R. No. 125706, September 30, 1996
By: Calatrava, Kim Lorenzo G.
FACTS:
China Chang is the operator of the Binga Hydroelectric Plant in Itogon, Benguet,
which is under a Rehabilitate Operate and Leaseback Contract with the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and was engaged in the rehabilitation of the power
plant, including the construction of check dams.
On February 1994, petitioner China Chang engaged the services of Rosal
Infrastructure Builders for the construction of a Dam in Itogon, Benguet. In this
contract, the parties agreed to submit disputes arising therefrom to arbitration before
the Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.
When a dispute arose between the parties, Rosal filed a complaint before the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) for arbitration. China Chang
filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim and raised therein the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of CIAC. In August 1995, the CIAC considered the question
of jurisdiction merely as a special defense which can be included as part of the issues
of the Terms of Reference. China Chang filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by CIAC in October 1995.
China Chang raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction with the CA. In February 1996,
the CA dismissed the petition. China Chang filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
was denied by the CA. China Chang now questions the validity of Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Resolution 3- 93 amending Section 1,
Article III of CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration
promulgated by the CIAC pursuant to its rule-making power granted under Section 21
of Executive Order No. 1008, which pertinently provides as follows:
Article III Effect of the Agreement to Arbitrate Section 1. Submission to
CIAC Jurisdiction – An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a
submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an
agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to the CIAC
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitral institution or
arbitral body in such contract or submission.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the CIAC has acquired jurisdiction over the dispute.
2. W/N the parties in the case at bar can agree to submit to arbitration their
construction dispute under the CIAC.
HELD:
1. YES.
There is no restriction whatsoever on any party from submitting a dispute for
arbitration to an arbitral body other than the CIAC. On the contrary, the new
rule, as amended merely implements the letter and the spirit of its enabling
law, E.O. No. 1008, which vests jurisdiction upon the CIAC:
Section 4: Jurisdiction - The CIAC shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with,
contracts entered into by the parties involved in the construction in the
Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion
of the contracts, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These
disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to
acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the
same to voluntary arbitration. (Emphasis supplied)
What the law merely requires for a particular construction contract to fall
within the jurisdiction of CIAC is for the parties to agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration.
Now that Section 1, Article III, as amended, is submitted to test in the present
petition, the Supreme Court ruled to uphold its validity with full certainty.
2. YES
However, this should not be understood to mean that the parties may no longer
stipulate to submit their disputes to a different forum or arbitral boy. Parties
may continue to stipulate as regards their preferred forum in case of voluntary
arbitration, but in so doing, they may not divest the CIAC of jurisdiction as
provided by law. Under the elementary principle on the law on contracts that
laws obtaining in a jurisdiction form part of all agreements, when the law
provides that the Board acquires jurisdiction when the parties to the contract
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration, the law in effect,
automatically gives the parties an alternative forum before whom they may
submit their disputes. That alternative forum is the CIAC.

HI-PRECISION STEEL CENTER, INC. vs. LIM KIM STEEL

FACTS
Hi-Precision entered a construction contract with Steel Builders, wherein Steel
Builders would complete a P21M construction project until Oct. 8, 1990. However,
the project's completion date was moved to Nov. 1990. Come Nov. 1990, the
construction was only almost 76% complete. Each party attributed delay to the other.
Hi-Precision undertook the project and completed it February 1991.
Steel builders then filed a request for arbitration with the CIAC, as well as a
complaint for collection of
unpaid progress buildings. The CIAC ordered Hi-Precision to pay Steel Builders.
High Precision now
goes to the SC to set aside the CIAC Arbitrator's award alleging errors of law and
grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CIAC.

ISSUE
Whether or not ther was serious error of law amounting to grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CIAC.

HELD
Petition was dismissed. The matters raised by High Precision are really matters of fact
that are not subject to review of the SC. Based on the objective of voluntary
arbitration in the construction industry, the Court will not assist one or the other or
even both parties in any effort to subvert or defeat that objective for their private
purposes. The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon
the artful allegation that such body had "misapprehended the facts" and will not pass
upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they
might be as "legal questions." The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose
the arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such arbitrators.

ABS-CBN v. World Interactive Network Systems (G.R. No. 169332)

Facts:
Petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation entered into a licensing agreement
with respondent World Interactive Network Systems (WINS) Japan Co., Ltd., a
foreign corporation licensed under the laws of Japan, in that the former granted
respondent the exclusive license to distribute and sublicense the distribution of the
television service known as “The Filipino Channel” (TFC) in Japan. By virtue thereof,
petitioner undertook to transmit the TFC programming signals to respondent which
the latter received through its decoders and distributed to its subscribers. A dispute
arose between the parties when petitioner accused respondent of inserting nine
episodes of WINS WEEKLY, a weekly 35-minute community news program for
Filipinos in Japan, into the TFC programming. Petitioner claimed that these were
“unauthorized insertions” constituting a material breach of their agreement.
Consequently, petitioner notified respondent of its intention to terminate the
agreement. Thereafter, respondent filed an arbitration suit pursuant to the arbitration
clause of its agreement with petitioner. The parties appointed Professor Alfredo F.
Tadiar to act as sole arbitrator who then rendered a decision in favor of respondent
holding that petitioner gave its approval for the airing of WINS WEEKLY as shown
by a series of written exchanges between the parties and that petitioner threatened to
terminate the agreement due to its desire to compel respondent to re-negotiate the
terms thereof for higher fees. He then allowed respondent to recover temperate
damages, attorney’s fees and one-half of the amount it paid as arbitrator’s fee.
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court or,
in the alternative, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules, with
application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a petition for confirmation of arbitral award. The
CA rendered the assailed decision dismissing ABS-CBN’s petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue:
The issue before us is whether or not an aggrieved party in a voluntary arbitration
dispute may avail of, directly in the CA, a petition for review under Rule 43 or a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition
to vacate the award in the RTC when the grounds invoked to overturn the arbitrator’s
decision are other than those for a petition to vacate an arbitral award enumerated
under RA 876.

Ruling:

RA 876 itself mandates that it is the Court of First Instance, now the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over questions relating to arbitration, such as a petition to vacate an
arbitral award. As RA 876 did not expressly provide for errors of fact and/or law and
grave abuse of discretion (proper grounds for a petition for review under Rule 43 and
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, respectively) as grounds for maintaining a
petition to vacate an arbitral award in the RTC, it necessarily follows that a party may
not avail of the latter remedy on the grounds of errors of fact and/or law or grave
abuse of discretion to overturn an arbitral award.  Adamson v. Court of Appeals gave
ample warning that a petition to vacate filed in the RTC which is not based on the
grounds enumerated in Section 24 of RA 876 should be dismissed.
In cases not falling under any of the aforementioned grounds to vacate an award, the
Court has already made several pronouncements that a petition for review under Rule
43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of in the CA. Which one
would depend on the grounds relied upon by petitioner.
Nevertheless, although petitioner’s position on the judicial remedies available to it
was correct, we sustain the dismissal of its petition by the CA. The remedy petitioner
availed of, entitled “alternative petition for review under Rule 43 or petition for
certiorari under Rule 65,” was wrong. Time and again, we have ruled that the
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.
A careful reading of the assigned errors reveals that the real issues calling for the
CA’s resolution were less the alleged grave abuse of discretion exercised by the
arbitrator and more about the arbitrator’s appreciation of the issues and evidence
presented by the parties. Therefore, the issues clearly fall under the classification of
errors of fact and law — questions which may be passed upon by the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner cleverly crafted its assignment of errors
in such a way as to straddle both judicial remedies, that is, by alleging serious errors
of fact and law (in which case a petition for review under Rule 43 would be proper)
and grave abuse of discretion (because of which a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
would be permissible).
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied. The decision and resolution of the CA
directing the RTC to proceed with the trial of the petition for confirmation of arbitral
award is affirmed.