David vs Macapagal-Arroyo

FACTS:

- February 24, 2006 (20th anniversary of People Power I): President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, and General
Order No. 5, to implement it.

• These are due to the circumstances surrounding the said celebration, allegedly with plots to
assassinate the President during the Alumni Homecoming in Baguio and several Cabinet
members and destabilize the government.

- By midnight of February 23, 2006, it was announced that “warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can already be implemented.”

- February 25, 2006, the Daily Tribune offices were raided and was confiscated of news stories,
documents, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.

- A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the
premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

- The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor,  is “meant to show a ‘strong
presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in
bringing down this government.”

- The police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran.  The police showed a warrant for his arrest
dated 1985.

- On March 3, 2006, the state of national emergency was declared to have ceased.
- These proclamations effectively hindered such plots from taking place, but apparently at the
expense of the rights of the citizens, hence the 7 consolidated petitions for certioriari alleging the
unconstitutionality of the said executive statutes.

ISSUES + RULING:

A. Procedural

1. Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Even if it is, there are several issues that
can contend with forgoing the resolution of a specific case just because of
mootness:

1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution

a. Present case: the allegations of the violation of the Constitution

by the petitioners

2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public

interest involved

a. Present Case: involves the people’s rights to freedom of

expression, of assembly and the press
 3. When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public

a. Present case: situation presents opportunity to educate bench,

bar, military and police the extent of the protection given by the
constitutional guarantee

4. the case is capable of repetition yet avoiding review

a. Present case: said proclamations can be passed again, and

potentially be abused, if the right safeguards aren’t placed in the
law

2. Whether the petitioners have legal standing

- the concept of locus standi: real-parties-in-interest- meaning the person needs to show
that he has sustained direct injury due to the sued action, general interest of the public
being insufficient grounds to sue; however, the court also considered transcendental
importance- far-reaching implications of said action

You may sue as a citizen if

a. a case involves constitutional issues

b. for taxpayers, a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or tax measure is

unconstitutional

c. for voters, validity of the election law in question

d. for concerned citizens, transcendental importance

e. for legislators, claim that the official action complained infringes on prerogatives
as lawmakers

With standing:

David and Llamas, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Congressmen, Alternative Law
Groups, Including Kilusang Mayo Uno

Without standing:

Cadiz, et al (Integrated Bar of the Philippines- duty to preserve the Law does not fall under any
categories), Loren Legarda (being ex-senator without rights to e)

B. Substantive

1. Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017- The court has
the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their
constitutional sufficiency.

a. Was there a factual basis?

- According to the petitioners, the President acted arbitrarily

 - The court said that to satisfy the condition, the President, regardless of having
acted correctly or not, must NOT have acted arbitrarily.

- With regard to the events culminating in the said executive proclamations, the
petitioners failed to support their assertion that the President’s calling out for
power was bereft of factual basis

2. Whether PP 1017 and GO No. 5 are unconstitutional

a. Facial challenge

Overbreadth doctrine used merely for First Amendment (Freedom of Speech) suits,
not applicable to current suit because it is not primarily speech-related

b. Constitutional Basis:

• Section 18, Article VII

- he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
- The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
- The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof
- A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
• Section 17, Article XII In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
- According to Judge Mendoza: PP 1107 is NOT a declaration of Martial Law, no more than a call
by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot
be used to justify acts (arrests and seizures without warrants, ban on public assemblies, take-
over of news media and press censorship ONLY valid under Martial Law) that only under a valid
Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a PERVERSION of its nature and
scope, beyond legal power (ultra vires).

- Pres. Arroyo has no power to issue decrees, she can only order the military as Commander-in-
Chief to suppress lawless violence. PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants Pres. Arroyo
the authority to promulgate laws.

- The Congress, being the repository of emergency powers, can grant said powers to President
only under the ff conditions:

1. In times of war or other national emergencies—existence of conditions suddenly

intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being: economic, natural disaster,
national security
 2. Limited period of delegation of power

3. Limited scope of power

4. Must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress

Therefore, without authority from the Congress, even in times of emergencies he cannot take over
or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

c. As Applied Challenge

NOTE: Courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and may
afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute is to be
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case. PP 1017 aims to stop rebellion, and it has achieved so. The fact that
the officers implementing it acted arbitrarily DOES NOT make it unconstitutional.

However, the fact that acts of terrorism is undefined in GO No. 5 makes the law unconstitutional,
for vagueness and possible misapplication, termed definitional predicament.

Moreover, the acts committed by military and police beyond what is necessary and appropriate to
suppress and prevent lawless violence are illegal. Example:

a. David- violation of Sec 2, Art III- Arrest without Warrant

b. KMU- Right to Assembly, Arrest without Warrant

c. Tribune- Freedom of the Press, Search without Warrant

DISPOSITION: Regardless of being academic of PP 1017 due to lifting, it was tried due to
contentions of mootness. Petitions partially granted.

Constitutional:

• PP 1017 being a call for AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence

• Declaration of National Emergency under Sec 17, Art VII- However, this does not authorize
take-overs of private business

• GO No, 5 providing standards, appropriate actions and measures to implement PP 1017

Unconstitutional:

• Provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws NOT related to lawless violence
• PP 1017 authorizing the President to promulgate decrees
• Non-definition of ‘acts of terrorism’ in GO No. 5
• Warrantless searches and arrests, dispersals of assembly, restraint on the press

Dissenting Opinion:
Tinga, J.:
“The majority imprudently placed the court in the business of defanging paper tigers.”

Some points have merit but others are non-justiciable – based on fears that have not materialized.

The calling out power is not only based on the commander-in-chief clause (Sec. 17 Art. VII) but
from the Power of the President as chief executive (Sec.1 Art VII) and the power of exclusive
control (Sec 18 Art VII), so the police can be commanded to execute all laws without distinction ( in
contrast to laws relating only to suppressing “all forms of violence”).

The proclamation falls within the proper function of the president as defender of the Constitution,
especially in the presence of looming threats. It is not unconstitutional as it does not call for or put
into operation the suspension or withdrawal of constitutional rights.

Declaration of a state of national emergency under PP1017 does not authorize warrantless arrests,
searches or seizures; nor the infringement of constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and
peacable assembly. Nonetheless, any public officer who does extra-constitutional or illegal acts in
the name of PP1017 may be subject to the appropriate liability.

Difference between PP1081 (Martial Law) and PP1017

PP 1081 placed the Philippines under Martial Law (substituted civilian government with military
authority; signifies the imposition of a condition)
PP1017 declared he existence of a state of rebellion (acknowledge the existence of a particular
condition)

It is fundamentally sound to construe Art XII, Sec 17 as requiring congressional approval before the
takeover may be affected, but the fact that the section is ambivalent as to whether approval is
required leads me to conclude that exceptions may be recognized – extreme situations wherein
obtaining congressional authority is impossible or impracticable. The Court’s pronouncement re
Sec 17 Art VII is obiter, merely an opinion. It is not a justiciable issue.

Terrorism already has a widely-accepted meaning. Even without an operative definition of

“terrorism”, the State already has the power to suppress and punish acts of terrorism. Such acts
are already punishable in our external general penal laws.

Supreme Court is not the proper avenue for trials as trifle as the illegal acts of policemen.

“The function of this Court is to make legal pronouncements not based on “obvious” facts, but on
proven facts.“