The Cheshire Ultimatum: Truman’s Message to Stalin in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis J. Portier RosENBERG Mac: HAS BEEN WRITTEN on the subject of the existence or non- existence of an ultimatum issued by Harry S. Truman to Josef Stalin in 1946 over the issue of Soviet troops in Iran. Like the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland, the ultimatum materializes and then vanishes. In a recent issue of this journal, an article ap- peared which sought to resolve this controversy by proving the non- existence of the ultimatum and drawing appropriate conclusions from this resolution.1. While I cannot counter the article’s argu- ment by proving the existence of such an ultimatum, I can shed some new light on the subject, which affects the definitiveness of the argument and the conclusions drawn from it. However, before presenting this new data drawn mainly from archival sources, a data source ignored in Thorpe’s article, we must determine the exact nature of the usage of the term ultimatum in the Iran crisis. Nowhere in the article is the term ultimatum defined although there is the strong implication that it refers to a formal written * The author wishes to thank Alexander George and Fred Greenstein for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. I alone am responsible for any inadequacies and errors that remain. 3 James A. Thorpe, “Truman’s Ultimatum to Stalin on the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis: The Making of a Myth,” Journal of Politics, 40 (February, 1978), 188- 195.934 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VoL. 41, 1979 document, The problem is that there is no agreement on the defini- tion of the term. Most definitions agree that an ultimatum is a final offer or demand which entails behavioral consequences for non- compliance. However, only one of the five definitions consulted refers to a written document.? Another refers to a “formal . . . com- munication”? The other three mention neither the requirement that it be formal nor written.* Nor have all ultimatums been formal written documents, witness Robert Kennedy's “statement of facts” to Dobrynin during the Cuban Missle Crisis.» Therefore, in looking for “The Ultimatum,” we must first determine how Truman was using the term. Truman’s various statements on the message he sent to Stalin are unclear as to whether the message was or was not written. Tru- man never explicitly stated that it was transmitted in written form, although in his 1952 Press Conference, he did imply with such phrases as “in the record” and “can’t release it” that some written account of it existed.’ The phrasing of Truman's later references to 2“Ultimatum. A written communication by one State to another containing the final and categorical terms respecting a dispute, rejection of which may lead to rupture of diplomatic relations or war.” Melquiades J. Gamboa, A Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Publica- tions, Inc., 1973), 260-261. 8“Ultimatum A formal, final communication from one government to an- other, requiring the receiving government to comply in some stated fashion with the wishes of the sender or be prepared to take the consequences, ul- timately war.” Jack C. Plano & Roy Olton, The In-ter-na'tion-al Re-la’tions Dic’tion-ar-y (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 223. 4 Ultimatum “A final proposition or condition; esp. the final propositions, conditions or terms, offered by either of the parties in a diplomatic negotia- tion; the best terms that a negotiator will offer, the rejection of which usually ends negotiations.” Webster's New International Dictionary unabridged, 2nd edition revised (New York: G & C Merriam Co., 1934), 2755. “Ultimatum. The last offer or demand made by a state in an international controversy. If not met, the next step usually has been the beginning of hos- tilities.” Wilbur W. White, White’s Political Dictionary (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1948), 297. “Ultimatum: A final demand made by one nation in a diplomatic negotia- tion, If rejected the next step has usually been the start of hostilities or at least the breaking off of diplomatic relations.” Marjorie Tallman, Dictionary of Civics and Government (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1953), 269. 5 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 86. ® Press Conference, April 24, 1952, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952-1953 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 294.TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO STALIN 935 the message, however, never approached the degree of implication that a written document existed, that Truman had conveyed in his Press Conference. In the 1957 New York Times article cited in the Thorpe article, Truman stated, “I personally saw to it that Stalin was informed.” In his memoirs Truman wrote, “Then I told Bynes to send a blunt message to Premier Stalin.”* In his final public statement on the issue, Truman remarked, “When Stalin refused to move out of Iran at the time agreed, I sent him word I would move the fleet as far as the Persian Gulf.”* The last three references could just as easily have referred to a verbal message, which would account for the absence of an ultimatum document. Therefore, on the basis of the definitions surveyed and Truman’s reference to it, I offer the following definition of the term ultimatum as used in the context of the Iran crisis of 1946. Ultimatum, a written or verbal message which, in effect, draws a line that indicates this far and no further or suffer the consequences. Although others may disagree with the above definition, it is, I believe, closer to what Truman had in mind. Remember that in all the references cited in the Thorpe article and the additional ones that I will pre- sent, only once did Truman ever use the term ultimatum. All other times he used other terms to refer to his communications with Stalin. Earlier, I alluded to the fact that Thorpe’s article contained no archival data. This, in my opinion, is a serious methodological flaw. Had the article included this data source, additional evidence to support its argument could have been presented. Therefore, in the interest of fairness, I feel compelled to present this supporting data before offering evidence which weakens the argument pre- sented in the Thorpe article. Il The article’s argument is based, in part, on a New York Times report that neither Averill Harriman nor George Kennan could re- member such a document. A letter from George Allen, Assistant Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, in March 1946, en- 1 New York Times, August 25, 1957, 23, The article was incorrectly cited in the Thorpe article as being dated August 23. 8 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), 95. ° Harry S. Truman, Truman Speaks (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 71.936 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 41, 1979 larges the number of people who could not remember the document to include Jimmy Byrnes and Allen Dulles.*° Furthermore, a sum- mary of an interview with Truman, upon which the Iran excerpt in Truman’s memoirs was based, differs from the published account in two respects. It states that Admiral William D. Leahy was pres- ent when Truman instructed Byrnes to “send a message to Stalin ‘if he doesn’t get out we'll move in.’”""_ If indeed Leahy was present at such a meeting, it provides an opportunity to cross-check the assertion since Leahy kept a diary of his White House years which is available in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. This diary contains only one reference to Iran dated March 28, 1946. This entry does not refer to an ultimatum, thereby providing indirect but not conclusive support for Thorpe’s argument.* On the other hand, the second difference does not support the argu- ment. In the interview summary, Truman stated that the message was issued “about three weeks after the [March 2] deadline.”** This would place the date of the message at about March 23. In a reference to the message, based on an interview with Truman, Herbert Druks placed its date at March 21.* What is interesting about the period March 21-23 is that a crucial meeting occurred during this period, at which Truman could have delivered the ulti- matum. On March 23, Truman met with the new U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, General Walter Bedell Smith. We know Iran was discussed at this meeting because Truman wrote a note on his ap- pointment calendar, next to the entry of Smith’s appointment, which stated, “Told him to tell Stalin I had always held him to be a man to keep his word. Troops in Iran after Mar. 2 upset that theory.” 10 Alexander George to George V. Allen, May 27, 1969 and Allen to George, June 4, 1969 in the Papers of George V. Allen, Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter HST L). 11 Interview summary, August 23, 1954, “Foreign Policy Notes on Marshall Plan, Iran and Western Union,” Memoirs Files, HST L. Please note that Tru- man refers to a “message” and not an ultimatum. 12 The information on Leahy's diary entry for March 28, 1946 is contained in Broderick to Rosenberg letter, August 2, 1978; John C. Broderick is Chief of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. 33 Interview summary. %4 Herbert Druks, Harry S$. Truman and the Russians (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1966), 125. 15 Presidential Appointment Calendar, March 23, 1946, HST L.TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO STALIN 937 This handwritten note not only tells us that Truman and Smith talked about Iran but also that Truman had instructed Smith to relay to Stalin a personal message from the President. It is possible that Truman issued a statement of facts, to use RFK’s term, to Smith and not Byrnes. Knowing that Smith was to meet with Stalin on his arrival in Russia, Truman could have made the assumption that re- laying the message through Smith was the casiest way to get the message to Stalin. This assumption would also explain why other State Department officials were unaware of this message. This is especially true since the calendar indicates that the meeting with Smith was “off the record,” meaning that no other officials were present, An indication that the message from Truman to Stalin contained more than the remark about being a man of his word is contained in a cable sent by Smith to Secretary of State Byes detailing his meeting with Stalin. The President had asked me to say that both he and Secretary Byrnes had always believed that when the Generalissimo made a statement or a commit- ment he meant to keep it, and the American people hoped that events would confirm that belief, but it would be misinterpreting the character of the United States to assume that because we are basically peaceful and deeply interested in world security, we are either divided, weak or unwilling to face our re- sponsibilities. If the people of the United States were ever to become con- vinced that we are faced with a wave of progressive aggression on the part of any powerful nation or group of nations, we would react exactly as we have in the past.t6 This last remark could be interpreted as being a tacit ultimatum especially when one considers that these are Smith’s words which, in all probability, were more diplomatic than Truman’s original words to Smith. At this point, an objection can be raised that this statement couldn't possibly be the ultimatum because it was delivered to Stalin after March 24, the date of the Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of their troops from Iran. However, Truman's meeting with Smith took place the day BEFORE that announcement, and the Truman notation cited above makes clear that the President had no advance information on the Soviet announcement of the follow- 16 Smith to Sec. State #1053, April 5, 1946, “Russia-Stalin,” PSF Subject File, HST L, 2. It can also be found in U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, VI. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 733.938 ‘THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VoL. 41, 1979 ing day. As far as he knew, the issue had not been resolved nor would it be by the time Smith arrived in Moscow, But it is likely that the intervening Soviet announcement did have an effect on the “message” as it was delivered to Stalin. It is likely that, HAD there been a specific warning on Soviet troops in Iran in the mes- sage, Smith would have changed it to a general warning on future actions. Such a general warning would also have been used to warn Stalin to carry out the provisions of the March 24 announce- ment since Soviet troops did not complete their withdrawal until a month AFTER the Smith/Stalin conversation. How does this explanation square with Truman's statements on the subject? At the 1952 press conference, Truman referred to an “ultimatum” which was “in the record” and said he could not “release it.”!7 This was taken by Thorpe and others to mean a written ultimatum but it could also refer to a written record of a verbal ultimatum such as a report sent by Smith to Byrnes on his meeting with Stalin. At the same press conference, Truman stated that the message had been sent through “regular channels.”* A message relayed through the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow certainly can be considered as regular channels. What about his reference to “a certain day in which to get out?” The March 24 announcement would have eliminated the necessity of relaying such a date to Stalin. Was there an ultimatum? It depends on how one defines the key term. If one defines it as I have, the statement of facts given to Smith by Truman to be relayed to Stalin could be interpreted as a tacit ultimatum. But all this talk about the existence or nonexist- ence of an ultimatum is obiter dictum when discussing what gen- eralizations can be drawn from this issue concerning Truman and the validity of his memoirs as a data source. I The Thorpe article contends, “Truman's persistent refusal either to document or retract his assertion in the face of repeated chal- lenges and contrary evidence discloses a lack of candor and integ- rity.”2° Yet one must remember that of all Truman’s statements on the subject, only once did he use the word “ultimatum.” All other 1 Press Conference, Public Papers, 294. 18 Ibid., 295. 1° Ibid., 296. 20 Thorpe, “Truman's Ultimatum,” 193.TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO STALIN 939 times, including the reference in his memoirs, he referred only to having forced the Russians out through his personal involvement in the situation. The record does indicate an amount of diplomatic pressure through the UN and directly. Therefore, arguing the existence or nonexistence of the ultimatum is to miss Truman’s point that in Iran, as elsewhere, he stood firm against Soviet actions and achieved his objective. The record indicates that Truman pursued a diplomatic policy directed toward the removal of Soviet troops from Iran and that those troops were removed. While it is very important for the scholar to know EXACTLY why the Russians removed their troops, this is not the information Truman wanted to convey and therefore his “integrity and candor” should not be held hostage to the uncertainty surrounding the specific stimulus which led to the Soviet withdrawal. This also calls into question the asser- tion that Truman’s memoirs “are no more trustworthy than those of most presidents and politicians. Indeed, his memoirs may well turn out to be less so.”** If one can not draw the generalization that the Thorpe article drew, then what can one conclude from the ultimatum controversy? It is my belief that one can make two statements about this issue. First, if we allow Truman the same protection of the laws that we allow defendents in our courts, then one must conclude that there is at least a shadow of a doubt, based on the evidence presented above, that Truman was not “lying” about his role in the Iran crisis. Even if the specific action by Truman on March 23 did not affect the outcome of the crisis, which, if one adheres to my argument, one must admit, his general policy did affect the outcome. Therefore, Truman would be correct in claiming the crisis as a personal victory. Second, while one can concede the assertion that there are some historical inaccuracies in Truman’s memoirs and other statements, this concession does not automatically mean admitting that his memoirs are worthless as a data source. Indeed, Truman’s mem- oirs are very important, not as a source of historical data, but rather as a source of psychological data. Early in this century, W. I. Thomas made the observation that a person acts not on the basis of reality but rather on his perception of reality? What better source do we have as a key to those per- ceptions than the memoirs of those individuals involved in whatever 21 Ibid., 195. 22 William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (New York: Dover Press, reissued 1958), passim.940 ‘THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 41, 1979 event is under study. As important as the question, “Was there an ultimatum?” might be, an equally important question is, “Who per- ceived the ultimatum and how did the perception affect the be- havior of that individual?” It is my contention that Truman per- ceived his conversation with Smith, when added to his general policy in the crisis, as having affected the outcome of the crisis, and thus was the Cheshire Ultimatum born. If this contention is true, who is to say that in future crises such as Korea the Cheshire Ultimatum did not reappear in Truman’s mind and influence his de- cisions. If so, then we must conclude that a Cheshire Ultimatum is just as important as a real one.