1.

Evolucion del reciente del sitema internacional

a. CHARACTERISTICS FOR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

There are many theories have been created from the past until today. Those theories have
different characteristics, but some share one another characteristics. Moreover, those
theories are popular and well practice in their own period of time. However, those theories
share a common goal. The goal is to explain the interaction between the actors in
international system. More importantly, Realism is the only theory that capable enough to
explain the international relation and international system today. There are four important
beliefs or ways of thinking that Realism has in order to strengthen it capability to explain the
world relation today: state actor, desire for power and national interest, balance of power, and
anarchy international system.

 First, in realist point of view state is the main actor in the system compare to other
actors.
 Second, states in the world today still put more concern on their national interests
and have desire for power. States join into the institutions or sign the bilateral or
multilateral agreements only because states thought that by doing so, they can reach their
national interests.

 Third, the balance of power determines today international relation. Previous point
was talking about the desire of states for power. And balance of power can serve as one
factor that contributes to the desire of power of each state. States never completely
believe on other states that why no states can involve in any states domestic affair due to
the sovereignty.

 Fourth, international system of the world today is anarchy. States desire for power,
never give up their national interest, along with always concerning of the balance of power
lead the international system in the past as well as today to become anarchy. Powerful
states are willing to do anything as long as they can reach their national interest. Less
powerful states or weak states are also willing to do everything as long as they can
maintain their survivor.

In conclusion, Realism is the only one theory that can best explain the international system
today. States are still the main actors and still have the complete power over other actors in
the international system. People still see states as their main mechanism for ensuring their
survival. Today world, states still prioritize their national interests rather than other states
interests. They are willing to throw away other states’ interests rather than their national
interests. Moreover, the desire for power is still the main objective for states. Power is
important factor that contribute to states’ survivor. Therefore, balance of power between
states is another main objective for all states in the current international community. Only
such a thing as balance of power can ensure states security from external influence and
guarantee self-defense. Finally, the status of state as the main actor, desire of state for
power together with national interest, and balance of power caused the world system today to
be an anarchy system. Existing conflicts cannot be solved, and more conflicts are happening.
These facts are all correspond to the characteristic of Realism. So again, Realism is the
theory that best describe the world today.
 b. Geopolítica de la globalización: de la bipolaridad al orden actual.

The end of the Cold War is one of the milestones in the history of international relations. The
bipolar world order disappeared; yet, what has replaced it is up for discussion. Several
different assumptions of the power structure of the post-Cold War international system have
arisen; however, all of them underesti- mated some factors and overestimated some others.
Moreover, there have only been a few attempts to bridge the gap and try to find a consensual
narrative between these assumptions. We argue that the power structure of the post-Cold
War international system has been quite volatile and has changed in the last two decades
several times. The bipolarity of the Cold War was changed into multipolarity due to the lack of
political will of the United States to act on the unipolar moment. In 2001, and with a new
president in office, the structure changed again. This time the G.W. Bush administration was
keen to play the role of a global governor. However, this uni- polar moment only lasted until
2006, when the world gradually transformed into a uni-multipolar structure as a result of the
relative decline of the US’ economic power, and the lack of desired outcomes in the
international affairs that were desired and strived for by the US. The economic and financial
crisis of 2008 further accelerated the tendencies of reducing the relative power of the US in
the international system. Therefore, after 2008 one can observe the world sliding into a non-
polar structure. Due to the ungovernable size of the world and the rise of China, we argue
that the power structure will become bipolar in the near future once more. Furthermore, we
conclude by analysing what would such a structure mean for Euro-Mediterranean region.

From Bipolarity to Multipolarity

At the end of the Cold War there were three ideas present in the academic world about the
new nature of the international system. The three ideas were conceptually quite different and
contradictory to one another, yet, they all found a political manifestation. First was the idea of
a ‘new world order’; power would not play a significant role in international relations, the role
of a state would vanish, and the main actors of international relations would become
international organisations and economic entities. Different names for such concepts were
framed, all of them slightly differ from one to another, however their basis is the same—
power politics and realism will give way to the cooperation and liberal perception of
international relations. This neo-idealist moment (Kegley 1993) is also referred to as ‘neo-
Wilsonian idealism’ (Fukuyama 1992), ‘idealpolitik’ (Kober 1990), and ‘neo-liberalism’ (Nye
1988; Grieco 1990).

Contrary to ‘the optimists’, as it is sometimes referred to by the authors of the ‘new world
order’, the second grand idea, or ‘the pessimists’ arose—the idea of a multipolar world. As
the Soviet Union collapsed, some authors argued that due to the rise of Japan, the EU and
other actors in international affairs, the world would become multipolar. Paul Kennedy (1989,
438–439) introduced the term ‘Imperial Overstretch’ with which he portrayed the nature of the
empire to extend itself beyond its ability to maintain and control its military and economic
commitments. This is what, he argued, is happening to the USA.

The third grand idea is the idea of a unipolar world. Whereas the second big idea stresses
the balance of power, the third stresses hegemony. As the Soviet Union collapsed there was
only one superpower left—the US. Thus, mathematically it would be logical that the world
would be transformed from a bipolar one into a unipolar one. Some Authors proclaimed the
post-Cold War as Pax Americana (Muravchik 1991), and others as American Hegemony
(Layne and Benjamin 19939)

Consequently, the power structure of the international system changed from bipolar (in the
Cold War) to multipolar (post-Cold War). Even if one accepts the argument of the Gulf war as
a sign of unipolarity, the US, still, did not follow up on that action. Such an argument does not
satisfy us. Yet, if we nonetheless take it into consideration, then the unipolar moment was
really just a moment. It was so brief that it lasted only a few months in the transition from
bipolarity to multipolarity, and did not have a relevant impact on the changing of the power
structure of the international system. As we will show, the unipolar momentum of the US
came to fruition 10 years later. Although all three big ideas of the post-Cold War international
system that were present at the time of the collapse of the Eastern bloc received political
attention and experienced political manifestations, it was the pessimistic idea of multipolarity
that prevailed in the 1990s.

Through the military entanglement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the new Security strategy of the
US (2006) and the economic situation in the US, Richard Haass (2008) observed an
increasing distributed power, rather than a concentrated power in the world. Thus, he defined
non-polarity as (Haass 2008): ‘‘The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international
relations is turning out to be non- polarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even
several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of
power./…/ Incontrast to multipolarity—which involves several distinct poles or concentrations
of power—a non-polar international system is characterized by numerous centres with
meaningful power.’

In such a described situation, one can easy make an argument that the contemporary
international system lacks a governor as never before. Never before has the indispensable
need for architecture of international governance been so strongly felt (Dominese 2009, 230).
Bremmer and Roubini (2011) named this world G-0. Washington is too weak to drive the
‘Washington consensus’ alone, however a ‘Beijing consensus’ cannot be developed
(Bremmer and Roubini 2011). Therefore, we argue that in the future international community
will witness a struggle for the position of global governor. As it can be deducted from the
previous chapter, we believe that the contemporary globalized world is too big to be
governed by a single power. Therefore, the future fight for global governance will be an
antagonism between different alliances. Yet, alliances will be only made among the actors
that share similar vision of the global order. Again, as in the Cold War, an ideological rivalry
of a few power centres may be expected. A very compelling case was made in 2007 by Carlo
Pelanda in his book Grand Alliance, where he argues that a new bipolar strife is inevitable.
He argues that the future bipolar fight for global governance will be between the two different
concepts—autocratic and democratic capitalism. The main protagonist of both camps would
be in his scenario the US and China. He continues that in order for democratic capitalism to
prevail and become the global governor, a grand alliance between the US, EU and Russia
has to be forged. If the US begins to perceive China as a competitor, it will focus its foreign
policy resources towards Pacific and Asia. To be specific, with the decision of the Pentagon
to shift 60 % of its navy to Pacific, the geopolitical shift from Atlantic to Pacific already began
to take political shape. Consequently, the EU and the Mediterranean region will be shoved to
the geopolitical brink. This will be the first time in history that Europe will not be in the
geopolitical centre of global politics and governance. Furthermore, focusing exclusively on
China, and not taking into consideration the vision of grand alliance will open a critical blind
side for the US. Namely, as in the Cold War when the Euro-Mediterranean was one of the
key regions for the stability between the two blocks, the Euro-Mediterranean region is re-
emerging today as a crucial shatterbelt of the world. EU debt crisis, instability of Northern
Africa, Arab revolutions, the new alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia to contain Iran,
the ongoing geopolitical challenges of the Middle East, and the Chinese penetration into the
region, should remind us that the struggle for global governance cannot be simply played out
on the Pacific. Thus, if the US wishes for a grand alliance, then they should focus also on
Euro-Mediterranean. The dangers of marginalisation of Euro-Mediterranean were well
presented by Carlo Jean in his 2007 book Geopolitica del Caos. If the US really desires that
democratic capitalism will become the global governor, then they should pay attention what is
going on in the backyard of their crucially—EU. The US should newly engage actively in the
Euro-Mediterranean region to make it prosperous and stable. In the future a Euro-
Mediterranean transatlantic approach would be needed considering it as a geopolitical
macro-region.

c. La emergencia de nuevos actores internacionales: empresas, sociedad civil,

opinión pública y redes sociales.

In international relations, non-state actors (NSAs) are individuals or groups that hold
influence and which are wholly or partly independent of state governments.[1] The interests,
structure, and influence of NSAs vary widely. For example, among NSAs are corporations,
media organizations, business magnates, people's liberation movements, lobby groups,
religious groups, aid agencies, and violent non-state actors such as paramilitary forces. The
proliferation of non-state actors in the post–Cold War era has been one of the factors leading
to the Cobweb Paradigm in international politics.[5] Under this paradigm, the traditional
Westphalian nation-state experiences an erosion of power and sovereignty, and non-state
actors are part of the cause. Facilitated by globalization, NSAs challenge nation-state borders
and sovereignty claims. MNCs are not always sympathetic to national interests, but instead
are loyal to the corporation's interests. NSAs challenge the nation-state's sovereignty over
internal matters through advocacy for societal issues, e.g. human rights and the environment.
[4]

Armed non-state actors operate without state control and are involved in internal and trans-
border conflicts. The activity of such groups in armed conflicts adds layers of complexity to
traditional conflict management and resolution. These conflicts are often fought not only
between non-state actors and states, but also between multiple NSA groups. Interventions in
such conflicts is particularly challenging given the fact that international law and norms
governing the use of force for intervention or peacekeeping purposes was primarily written in
the context of the nation-state

Esther Barbé (2003) describes international actors as "that unit of the international system
(whether entity, group or individual) that has the ability to mobilize resources that allow
achieve its objectives, which has the capacity to exert influence over others actors of the
international system and that enjoys a certain autonomy "(page 135). This definition provides
some fundamental requirements that must be met an international actor, however, leaves
aside some situations that they also become valid in the contemporary international scene.
TO Then, using the definition of Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, will make a brief
enumeration of the requirements that an entity must meet international to be considered as
an international actor

a. It has the ability to mobilize resources that allow him to reach his objectives.
b. It has the capacity to exert influence over other actors in the system international.
c. Enjoys some autonomy with respect to other actors in the system international.
d. Must carry out continuous and meaningful functions that impact the international system.
e. It must be taken into account in the design of the foreign policy of the
State. (Russett and Starr, 1989

After theoretically addressing the conception of international system and international actor
and enumerating the main characteristics and requirements that an international unit must
meet to be considered as an actor of the international system. system, it is worth
emphasizing that globalization has exerted a decisive influence in the consolidation of other
forms of international power that are becoming increasingly valid and that are growing at an
accelerated level of influence in the world. So, thanks to the phenomenon of interrelation
that it will begin to experiment in the international system, it will be possible to see then that
in many occasions these new forces are outside the control of the States and sometimes
also outside the control of the holders of political power. This is how the laws of the market,
the media and public opinion will be increasingly inserted into international political interests,
because in the face of an evident inability to dominate them, there is no alternative but to
understand their operating dynamics and try to counteract the power they will acquire.

2. Globalización

La globalización: la aldea global y la interdependencia de los procesos.

The ‘Global Village’? A village can be defined as a ‘Group of houses situated in a rural area,
self contained district or community within a town or city.’ But when we think of a village we
think of other characteristics; for example, shared values, stability, interdependence, clear
understanding of power and responsibility, ease of communication because of personal
contact and limited distance. Can we apply these ‘local’ characteristics to the ‘global
village’? If we can, why are there such divided views about the value of globalization? The
‘global village’ concept has been brought about by the rapid development of information
technology, the global media, and faster, lower cost travel. We now know about what is
happening on the other side of the world, and we can visit. Events in one state can have
dramatic effects many thousands of miles away. Inter-state trade is not new but the concept
of the ‘global village’ has brought a whole range of other factors into global business
interactions.

Globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon which encompasses economic, social, political,

technological and cultural dimensions. Whether globalization is newly constituted
phenomenon? Answer of this question depends upon how far researcher is ready to
extend the chain of causation which resulted in those social and technological
arrangements that many scholars have associated with globalization. The basis of today’s
technological advancements like supersonic jet planes and computer are based on earlier
inventions like steam engine, cotton ginning, typewriter, telephone and electrical
appliances.. These inventions are further based on some previous inventions like the
invention of wheel, domestication of wild animals & plants and finally migration of
African ancestors at the dawn of human invention Some scholars have deliberately limited
the scope of globalization to the last four decades in order to understand the
contemporary features of globalization. Others are trying to find the linkages of
globalization in the ground breaking developments of 19th century. Even some others are
looking back into the beginning of industrialism and capitalism for understanding
globalization. Finally, few scholars reject the concept of confining globalization in few
decades, rather according to them globalization is a process which has been unfolding
for millennia (Steger, 2003). Above mentioned history of globalization indicates that it is an
ongoing process. Intensity of globalization changes in the times of boom and recession.
Many scholars are talking about the future of globalization (Robb, 2007; Hufbauer &
Suominen, 2010; Muller, 2010). Some are worried about the impact of terrorism on
globalization process. Some others have keen interest in the study of recent financial crisis.
Muller (2010) has suggested a new phase of globalization with an alarming end of
globalization. He also suggested some remedies about securing the process of globalization
from going towards the worst situation. The purpose of this paper is to give a brief history of
globalization along with its dimensions and phases. Finally, the paper tries to predict the
future of globalization in the lights of recent political, social, economic and cultural trends

B globalización de la economía.

Economic Globalization Contemporary economic globalization is a result of gradual

emergence of international economic order which started from economic conference held
at the end of World War II in Bretton Woods, England. Major economic powers of
global North reversed their interwar (1918-1939) policy of protectionism. America and
England played leading role in the success of that conference (Steger, 2003). Other than
reaching towards consensus on increasing international trade, these countries also
agreed on establishing binding rules of international activities. Bretton Wood’s
conference laid foundation for the establishment of other important international
organizations like IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization (Steger, 2003).
International Monetary Fund was established to handle international monetary systems.
Similarly, World Bank was created to facilitate loan facility for the reconstruction of post-
war Europe, its scope was expanded to provide loan for developing countries of the world.
General agreement on tariffs and trade was established to cater the problems of
international trade in 1947 which was converted into World Trade Organization in 1995.
Economic globalization refers to “the intensification and stretching of economic
interrelations across the globe” (Steger, 2003). According to Martin, Schumann &
Camiller 1997, “economic globalization refers to the progressive “networking” of
national market economies into a single, tightly interconnected global political economy
whose accumulation and distribution of resources are increasingly governed by neoliberal
principles-emphasizing the role the market while minimizing governmental involvement in
economic matters”. The economic networking is possible, when concept of
transnational decentralization of services and production markets is materialized which
helps in integrated global market and enable farther, cheaper, faster and more efficient
flow of information, goods, services and people across borders (Katzenstein, et al., 1998).
This process of economic globalization is fueled by government deregulation policies,
international transportation, revolutionary and innovative technological advancement and
ecological forces that asks for integration (Kudrle, 1999). In the area of trade, globalization
means continuous process of openness in goods and services market and high
dependence on international trade as a source of prosperity and income. According to
Milton (2000), “today all countries trade internationally and they trade significant
proportions of their income. Indeed, trade has reached unprecedented level, both
absolutely and proportionate to world output”. In the realm of finance, globalization is
characterized by an increased integration of international financial market, which is,
higher level of foreign investments across borders, capital flow, foreign lending and joint
ventures than before (Hebron & Stack, 2013). Therefore, economic globalization is
manifested by increased capital flows, transnational flow of goods and services, march
towards global market and dismantling of national borders (Hebron & Stack, 2013). Political
Globalization

Global governance

Global governance or world governance is a movement towards political cooperation

among transnational actors, aimed at negotiating responses to problems that affect more
than one state or region. Institutions of global governance—the United Nations,
the International Criminal Court, the World Bank, etc.—tend to have limited or
demarcated power to enforce compliance. The modern question of world governance exists
in the context of globalization and globalizing regimes of power: politically, economically and
culturally. In response to the acceleration of worldwide interdependence, both between
human societies and between humankind and the biosphere, the term "global governance"
may name the process of designating laws, rules, or regulations intended for a global scale.
Global governance is not a singular system. There is no "world government" but the many
different regimes of global governance do have commonalities:
While the contemporary system of global political relations is not integrated, the relation
between the various regimes of global governance is not insignificant, and the system does
have a common dominant organizational form. The dominant mode of organization today is
bureaucratic rational—regularized, codified and rational. It is common to all modern regimes
of political power and frames the transition from classical sovereignty to what David Held
describes as the second regime of sovereignty—liberal international sovereignty.[1]
Definition[edit] The term world governance is broadly used to designate all regulations
intended for organization and centralization of human societies on a global scale. The
Forum for a new World Governance defines world governance simply as "collective
management of the planet".[2]
Traditionally, government has been associated with "governing," or with political authority,
institutions, and, ultimately, control. Governance denotes a process through which
institutions coordinate and control independent social relations, and that have the ability to
enforce, by force, their decisions. However, authors like James Rosenau have also used
"governance" to denote the regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of an
overarching political authority, such as in the international system.[3] Some now speak of
the development of "global public policy".[4]
Adil Najam, a scholar on the subject at the Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston
University has defined global governance simply as "the management of global processes
in the absence of global government."[5] According to Thomas G. Weiss, director of the
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at the Graduate Center (CUNY) and editor
(2000–05) of the journal Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International
Organizations, "'Global governance'—which can be good, bad, or indifferent—refers to
concrete cooperative problem-solving arrangements, many of which increasingly involve not
only the United Nations of states but also 'other UNs,' namely international secretariats and
other non-state actors."[6] In other words, global governance refers to the way in which
global affairs are managed.
The definition is flexible in scope, applying to general subjects such as global security and
order or to specific documents and agreements such as the World Health
Organization's Code on the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes. The definition applies
whether the participation is bilateral (e.g. an agreement to regulate usage of a river flowing
in two countries), function-specific (e.g. a commodity agreement), regional (e.g. the Treaty
of Tlatelolco), or global (e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty).[7] These "cooperative problem-
solving arrangements" may be formal, taking the shape of laws or formally constituted
institutions for a variety of actors (such as state authorities, intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector entities,
other civil societyactors, and individuals) to manage collective affairs.[8] They may also be
informal (as in the case of practices or guidelines) or ad hoc entities (as in the case of
coalitions).[9]
However, a single organization may take the nominal lead on an issue, for example
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in world trade affairs. Therefore, global governance is
thought to be an international process of consensus-forming which generates guidelines
and agreements that affect national governments and international corporations. Examples
of such consensus would include WHO policies on health issues.
In short, global governance may be defined as "the complex of formal and informal
institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states,
markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which
collective interests on the global plane are articulated, Duties, obligations and privileges are
established, and differences are mediated through educated professionals."[10]

Technique[edit]
Global governance can be roughly divided into four stages:[14]
agenda-setting;
policymaking,
implementation and enforcement, and
evaluation, monitoring, and adjudication.
orld authorities including international organizations and corporations achieve deference to
their agenda through different means. Authority can derive
from institutional status, expertise, moral authority, capacity, or perceived competence.[15]
[16]
Themes[edit]

In its initial phase, world governance was able to draw on themes inherited
from geopolitics and the theory of international relations, such as peace,
defense, geostrategy, diplomatic relations, and trade relations. But
as globalization progresses and the number of interdependencies increases, the global
level is also highly relevant to a far wider range of subjects. Following are a number of
examples.

Intergovernmental cooperation is at the centre of the global partnership for development. It

has a vital role to play in the achievement of global development goals, in terms not only of
the resources and technical assistance it can provide, but also in the areas of policy
decision-making and norm-setting. Global governance encompasses the totality of
institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives through which States and their
citizens try to bring more predictability, stability and order to their responses to transnational
challenges. Effective global governance can only be achieved with effective international
cooperation. Neither the existing proposals to strengthen global governance nor the global
rules to support development are fully satisfactory; they have also not received sufficient
attention by the intergovernmental processes addressing the development agenda for the
post-2015 era.

Five principles are critical to guiding the reforms of global governance and global rules:

(i) Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities: This principle calls
for recognizing differences among countries in terms of their contribution and historical
responsibilities in generating common problems, as well as divergences in financial and
technical capacities, in order to address shared challenges. This principle also
acknowledges the diversity of national circumstances and policy approaches—a diversity
which should be embedded in the architecture of global governance as an intrinsic feature
of the global community, not as an exception to general rules.

(ii) Subsidiarity: Issues ought to be addressed at the lowest level capable of addressing
them. This principle implies that some problems can be handled well and efficiently at the
local, national, subregional and regional levels reducing the number of issues that need to
be tackled at the international and supranational level. Subsidiarity suggests an important
role for regional cooperation in addressing issues of mutual concern.

(iii) Inclusiveness, transparency, accountability: Global governance institutions need to be

representative of, and accountable to, the entire global community, while decision-making
procedures need to be democratic, inclusive and transparent. Robust governance implies
mutual accountability, verified by transparent and credible mechanisms and processes to
ensure that agreed commitments and duties are fulfilled.
 (iv) Coherence: Definitions of global rules and processes need to rest on comprehensive
approaches, including the assessment of possible trade-offs, so that actions in different
areas will not undermine or disrupt one another, but instead be mutually reinforcing.
Enhanced coherence is also needed between the international and national spheres of
policymaking. This also requires improved coordination among various stakeholders and
enhanced information sharing.

(v) Responsible sovereignty: This principle recognizes that policy cooperation is the best
way to achieve national interests in the global public domain. It also requires Governments
and States to be fully respectful of the sovereignty of other nations so as to fulfil agreed
policy outcomes. After laying out these core principles, this Note then examines how the
principles could

Scholars have used the term “governance” to denote the regulation of interdependent
relations in the absence of overarching political authority, such as in the international
system. It encompasses the institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives through
which states and their citizens try to bring more predictability, stability, and order to their
responses to transnational challenges. While the importance of global governance has been
acknowledged, we are witnessing the increasing need to manage global problems more
effectively in the face of increased interdependence. Effective global governance cannot be
achieved without effective international cooperation. Besides being a manifestation of
international solidarity, international cooperation is a means to promote common interests
and shared values and to reduce the vulnerabilities generated by increased
interdependence. It is also a legal obligation. Already in 1945, Member States of the United
Nations recognized the centrality of “international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (United Nations , 1945, Article III). With the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the subsequent
international treatises that put the Declaration into effect, there is legal obligation for States
to facilitate the realization of human rights by all individuals through international
cooperation.

D La globalización de los derechos humanos.

The strengthen recognition of human rights around the world as established by several
international treaties and convention and speeches has with the on-going. Globalization
becomes increasingly in danger (2002). Today scholars argue that the condition, which is
the traditional bearer of human rights obligation, has lost control over the globalization
process and those in fact other players such as financial institutions and
international. Corporations are the ones shaping the growth. Clifford explains the
complexity of globalization in regards to human rights by saying. On one hand, fresh
technologies and new international norms may be a benefit for losses and activist,
compulsory the world together and making it harder for tyrannical regime to act with
impunity against its own people. On the other hand, the philosophy of free trade and
the increase of international business corporations may break and pressure and demolish
local control According to Donnelly states and international companies today want to break
away from the expenses imposed by interest’s state guarantee of economic and social
goals. (1995) The resulting market pressure to confine national social welfare policies are
more and more supplemented by pressures from global financial institutions. The state is
view as the main bearer of obligation when it comes to defense globally protected human
rights. In the present global financial system and other actors become important in regards
to the safety or rather the violation of human rights (6-12 March 1995) these actors take in
global financial institutions, global organizations and worldwide corporations. The present
globalization and the policies adhering to it power a number of human rights both civil and
political as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Globalization and the current
economic system and policies can control and power state’s household policy. As a
result, economic combination, free trade, deregulation and privatization have been seen by
many as a challenge to the international protection of human rights and mainly to the
awareness of economic, social and cultural rights Surrounded by his report to the UN
Millennium meeting (2011) Kofi Annan described the world of globalization as a new
background for and a new connectivity among economic actors and activities
throughout the globe. Globalization has been made potential by the progressive
dismantling of barriers to do business and capital mobility, together with fundamental
scientific advances and increasingly declining costs of transport, communication and
computing. Its integrative reason seems inevitable, its thrust mouth-watering. While
globalization is interpreted as internationalization, the term refers to a growth of contact
and interdependence between countries. From this viewpoint, a more global world is one
where more messages, ideas, goods, wealth, investments and people cross borders
between national-state-territorial units. A second common logical dead-end n discussions of
globalization has equated the idea with liberalization. In this container, globalization denotes
a process of removing officially compulsory borders on movements of capital between
countries in order to form an ‘open’ and ‘borderless’ world economy(1982). On this
thoughtful, globalization occurs as powers that be reduce or put an end to regulatory
measures like trade barriers, foreign-exchange boundaries, capital controls, and travel
permit requirements. The growth of human rights law in reply to globalization is not new,
and there is nothing inbuilt in the global organization that would stop further defensive
measures. The resulting movement lead to the formation of the ILO in (1919). Not like all
following global organizations, the ILO busies all the relevant actors in its operations from
the opening. Using a tripartite structure of symbol, the ILO ensured the participation of
business, employment, and governments in developing worker rights and relating shortage
in developing countries to money owing or relating unemployment to privatization, or
relating health decline to the control of medicine patents. “They also detail the aspects of
deteriorations in human rights. in human rights, such as economic failure and lower
standards of living, increasing discrimination, inequity, withdrawal of pleasure of basic
requirements such as food, clean water, housing, and illiteracy.etc. The impact of the
poor penalty of globalization on the pleasure of human rights is multidimensional; all
aspects of human survival are they political, economic, social or cultural, are affected”.
Bhagwati J (2007). HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS Human Rights NGOs play a significant role
both on the nationwide level as well as on the worldwide level and “over the past few
decades a small army of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) advocating, monitoring
and lobbying for human rights, led by bodies such as forgiveness global along with Human
Rights wristwatch, have become grave participants in international relationships. Briyk
(2002).Furthermore, today there are “thousands of working class NGOs in inferior quality
countries, gathering information on particular issues and urgent their governments to
live up to international human rights principles. As NGOs have increased in numbers they
have come to play more important role in law government, and in the past two
decades NGOs have shown their significance on the international sight by playing an
important role in the work of human rights and the growth of international law. Human
Rights NGOs rely on human rights theory for their authority, and they provide
themselves the right to condemn governments based on Household law but also importantly
global human rights treaties. NGOs also use global human rights treaties and norms to give
good reason for and legitimatize their work and events at home and out of the country.
“Human Rights Watch and Global Justice these NGOs over and over again are a part of
human rights networks but also have relations with working class NGOs that provide them
with details and figures. Some have their own experts that visit entities and behavior
does research that later get available at the NGOs and in media. Grassroots NGOs like
those existing in this report work in communities with a program that mostly includes
sensible work with human rights. Their work and services can. Take in providing education
not incomplete to human rights schooling sports, theatre, cinema, Music, art and dance,
health care, accommodation, citizenship classes and services to people whose rights have
been deserted or violated”(Kadragic, A.2006)
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
There is collection of “human rights” in the form of economic rights, labour rights,
cultural rights, social and political rights etc. The globalization is careful to have an impact
on the following rights such as (2013) Pp18-24.  The rights of entry to the WTO of
nations that violate human rights extinguish opportunities for costly sanctions to
depress such violations.  Unlock trade causes creation to move to areas everywhere
ecological standards are negligent and outcome in environmental poverty. Similarly, the
ready for action pressure that result from open deal cause regulator to lose control over
local narrow matters and sudden a race to the bottom over matters such as social benefit
standards, environmental principles, and worker defense legislation.  Open trade
exacerbate inequality in the distribution of income  liberty from brutal, cruel or degrading
treatment,  liberty from servitude, the right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination 
The correct to an enough normal of living (including the right to sufficient food, clothing and
housing),  The right to maintain a high standard of physical and mental health,  The
right to work accompany by the right to just and fair-haired conditions of labour,  Freedom
of association and assembly and the right to collective bargaining have been severely
impaired. Just beginning States are, more over and over again than not, required by the
dynamics of globalization to take measures that negatively impact on the enjoyment of
those rights (Oloka-Onyango & Udagama, 1999). “Globalization has not caused
“developing” countries to catch up with the developed world. Inequality has risen during this
present globalization period.The developed world their intellectuals and policy makers
–view globalization as “providing good opportunities for their countries and their people”
Arafat, S. (2013) p16.
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
If the problems of inequality in Brazil would be resolved I think Brazil Would be one of the
best seats to live in the world (2006). Brazil has been classified as “a middle income
country with a high incidence of Poverty and inequality and belongs to both the developed
and the upward world where modernity and backwardness live side by side. According to
recent figures from the UNDP, the GDP per capita is $7,790, which puts it in the middle of
the center profits countries in the globe. “On the other hand, this number does not signify
the reality in Brazil or Rio de Janeiro very well since one of the most outstanding skins of
Brazilian society is disparity. Brazil together with Sierra Leone has the second most unequal
distribution of income in the world. Brazil has for a long time been in the top five most
unequal countries in the world and is by far the most unequal country in South America.
People continue to go hungry, continue to suffer from deficiency, and continue to walk
kilometers to get water that is dirty, that is foul, and that will kill half of the people of the
village because they don’t have situation of basic sanitation Thus, poverty and human
Rights violations in Brazil go hand in hand and “total communities of the poor are being
mistreated and the poor have become scapegoats of the evils resulting from long-term
social leaving behind it is clear that the main factors at the back most of the human rights
violations are problems of inequalities, lack of public services and equal opportunities as
well as poverty” Nault, M.D. & England, S. L. (Ed.2011).
SUGGESTIONS
A global watch should be recognized to keep an eye on and report the immoral transactions
that take place stuck between the governments of developing nations and global
corporations. The governments of developing nations should not carry on getting wealthy
by selling their factors of manufacture land labour to global corporations” Report of the
Human Rights Committee (1982)  Supplies to become a free trading nation should be
revised. Present requirements eliminate many upward countries. Urbanized countries
need to perform more to support by creation it easier for rising countries to profit from
trade and savings.  Treaty-based device focusing on the household tasks of
multilaterals as well as private actors in defensive human rights is a very significant
step in the current financial atmosphere.  Labours by states to create investments rules
must be subjected to inspection and analyzed through human rights dialogue.

CONCLUSION During a period of globalization, “the fight for human rights has
become more compound and demanding. Realizing human rights particularly financially
viable and community rights are fetching increasingly easier said than done. One of the
most philosophical challenges that we face as a neighbourhood of nations is to know better
the rising socio-economic forces and forms of globalization, to form them to serve our
needs and to respond successfully to their harmful penalty. Human rights can equilibrium
forces of globalisation within a just global legal framework. Maintaining balance between
globalisation and defence of human rights has to be a right of way” Human rights are what
make us human being. They are the main beliefs by which we create the sacred home for
human distinction. Human rights are what reason requires and sense of right and wrong
order
The strengthen recognition of human rights around the world as established
by several international treaties and
convention and speeches has with the on-going. Globalization becomes
increasingly in danger (2002). Today
scholars argue that the condition, which is the traditional bearer of human
rights obligation, has lost control over
the globalization process and those in fact other players such as
financial institutions and international.
Corporations are the ones shaping the growth. Clifford explains the
complexity of globalization in regards to
human rights by saying. On one hand, fresh technologies and new
international norms may be a benefit for losses
and activist, compulsory the world together and making it harder for
tyrannical regime to act with impunity against
its own people. On the other hand, the philosophy of free trade and
the increase of international business
corporations may break and pressure and demolish local control According
to Donnelly states and international
companies today want to break away from the expenses imposed by
interest’s state guarantee of economic and
social goals. (1995) The resulting market pressure to confine national social
welfare policies are more and more
supplemented by pressures from global financial institutions. The state is
view as the main bearer of obligation
when it comes to defense globally protected human rights. In the present
global financial system and other actors
become important in regards to the safety or rather the violation of human
rights (6-12 March 1995) these actors
take in global financial institutions, global organizations and worldwide
corporations. The present globalization
and the policies adhering to it power a number of human rights both civil and
political as well as economic, social
and cultural rights. Globalization and the current economic system and
policies can control and power state’s
household policy. As a result, economic combination, free trade,
deregulation and privatization have been seen by
many as a challenge to the international protection of human rights and
mainly to the awareness of economic,
social and cultural rights
Surrounded by his report to the UN Millennium meeting (2011) Kofi Annan
described the world of globalization
as a new background for and a new connectivity among economic
actors and activities throughout the globe.
Globalization has been made potential by the progressive dismantling
of barriers to do business and capital
mobility, together with fundamental scientific advances and increasingly
declining costs of transport,
communication and computing. Its integrative reason seems inevitable,
its thrust mouth-watering. While
globalization is interpreted as internationalization, the term refers to a
growth of contact and interdependence
between countries. From this viewpoint, a more global world is one where
more messages, ideas, goods, wealth,
investments and people cross borders between national-state-territorial
units. A second common logical dead-end
Surrounded by his report to the UN Millennium meeting (2011) Kofi Annan
described the world of globalization
as a new background for and a new connectivity among economic
actors and activities throughout the globe.
Globalization has been made potential by the progressive dismantling
of barriers to do business and capital
 mobility, together with fundamental scientific advances and increasingly
declining costs of transport,
communication and computing. Its integrative reason seems inevitable,
its thrust mouth-watering. While
globalization is interpreted as internationalization, the term refers to a
growth of contact and interdependence
between countries. From this viewpoint, a more global world is one where
more messages, ideas, goods, wealth,
investments and people cross borders between national-state-territorial
units. A second common logical dead-end

a. El desarrollo tecnológico.

Globalization, digitization, and biotechnologization are integrally connected in this new

millennium. Globalization and technology share a causal relationship, each gaining from
and building on the other. Digitization, the “bones and sinews” of globalization, has taken
our lives out of the temporal and into the imaginary and unseen. Reality is no longer defined
in terms of things we can see, feel, and measure; now reality is defined by ideas and by the
ability of people to generate and communicate ideas. Added to these components is
biotechnologization, an outcome of technology, whose global impact is measured by its
usefulness — and threat. All three factors form a trinity of promising yet potentially
malevolent possibilities.

Introduction
Globalization is here to stay. We are not going to reverse the trend (Roy MacLaren,
Canadian Ambassador, in London, Nov. 5, 1998). Globalization is much more than the
worldwide production and consumption of products [1]. It is not just an economic or cultural
trend but a movement of ideas, lifestyles, and developments that could affect our families,
our employment, and the future of the world. Some view globalization negatively, i.e., as the
force that collapsed one after another of Asia’s economies in quick succession, or as the
force.

that brings uninvited cultural influences into a country newly exposed to foreign media and
the Internet, or as the force that many predict will bring about human annihilation through
accelerated inter-nation conflict in the future. Others tout the benefits of globalization: its
power to enable rescuers to reach flood and earthquake victims hours after a tragedy
occurs, its capability for empowering handicapped citizens, and its potential to create
educational opportunities even for those in the remotest areas. Thus, globalization is neither
a Pandora’s box nor an Aladdin’s lamp but a series of causes and consequences mediated
by human choices.

A number of global trends can be seen as technology continues to expand. Among these
are: greater diffusion, faster development, greater emphasis on commercial value, greater
diversification, and increasing standardization.

Globalization, along with digitization and biotechnologization, could produce catastrophic

and beneficial effects in society over the next 20 years. The ability of governments,
corporations, community groups, and individuals to handle such future trends will be
contingent upon their ability to handle the changes that technology has already thrust into
way at present. Success is not only determined by our ability to handle the present
challenges, but even more so, to correctly foresee and to plan for future ones as well

Global trends in technology

2.1. Greater diffusion
2.1.1. At the national and international levels
Global trade connections will act as a wedge, enabling economic activity in new areas.
Access to new areas will be opened even further through transportation and communication
connections that link every area to the rest of the world.
2.1.2. At the social level
Globalization will enable digital technology and biotechnology to shape society for several
reasons. First, an “open society” will become dominant in many nations. Data and images
transmitted around the world will bring momentous changes in social and cultural structures.
Second, capitalism will drive technology forward. As a fundamental component of
capitalism, competition among producers benefits consumers who seek products and
services that have the highest quality at the lowest Price. Third, stronger global trade
regulations will erode the protective abilities of national trade tariffs, thereby resulting in
more intense competition, especially from mega-corporations with better technology
resources.
2.1.3. At the individual level
Globalization will also cause great diffusion of technology at the personal level, resulting in
greater individualism and self-centeredness. Business has already embraced this trend by
“making the customer king.”
2.2. Faster development Technology will continue to grow at an accelerated rate.
Knowledge is expected to change as much in the next hundred years as it did in the
previous 3,500
2.3. Greater emphasis on commercial value Technological development will occur more
quickly in the private sector than in the public. Increasing numbers of competitors will push
prices down and narrow profit margins.
2.4. Greater diversification As a result of globalization and increased competition,
technology will become centered in two groups: (1) a few large businesses that control
major market share, and (2) many small businesses that will compete by identifying and
quickly adapting themselves to niche markets and developing specialized technologieis.
2.5. Greater integration Globalization will cause states, institutions, and business
organizations to merge into one society. Likewise, technology networks will become
increasingly clustered into a few major groupings and supra-state economic organizations.
2.6. Increasing standardization The number of global-level regulating organizations to
control natural resources, the environment, health care, ethics, and so on will rise. More
stringent international trade standards will be set by the most economically powerful
nations.
3. The impact of technology in our lives Technology is expanding faster than any known
biological entity. Lifestyle and human social behavior are responding much as they did to all
other waves in human history — with great difficulty and, at times, in unexpected ways.
Significant changes are currently shaping human societies.
3.1. A common worldview The expansion of technology has already and will continue to
bring about significant and profound changes in the human perspective. The number of
assumptions that can be designated as worldviews (defined as the dominant perspectives
that people as a collective hold) constantly increases, and they affect our lives in profound
ways.
3.1.1. A more commonly accepted worldview The perspectives of our world’s many
societies will eventually be unified into one global worldview. Information networks and
telecommunication technology will ensure that everyone receives the same images and
influences, thus shaping worldviews by global currents of post-modernism, materialism,
consumerism, individualism, and capitalism, among others.
3.1.2. A worldview created by individuals Worldview affects more than groups and societies;
it shapes the outlooks of individual members of these groups. After all, not all individuals
share the same set of assumptions as the other members of their group, and technology
can color the perspectives of individuals in a variety of ways.
3.1.3. A worldview that allows a multi-dimensional perspective of truth The development of
technology has caused an interesting shift in the global perspective of truth: from an
absolute entity to one that can change with time, circumstance, or new scientific discovery.
Accompanying this degeneration of truth into relative terms came an ethical framework that
was more tenuous in nature; that is, the dividing line between right and wrong became
increasingly blurred.
3.1.4. A worldview that allows greater selection Biotechnology, especially genetic
engineering, may enable people to clone living cells and form genetically identical
organisms.
3.1.5. A worldview that controls rights over life Technology has heightened our awareness
of personal rights. This trend is especially common in the case of biotechnological
innovation.
3.2. New social patterns Digital and communication technologies may mold social
paradigms and influence social stratification in the coming twenty years.
3.2.1. Virtual relationships Digital technology allows people to give efficiency and
convenience a higher priority than before. Face-to-face meetings may be replaced with
digital interfaces.
3.2.2. Deviation from social norms Changes in the dynamics of relationships can be traced
to the extension of technology and information systems to the individual level. Information is
no longer limited to leaders but is, to a large extent, now available to the general populace
3.3. Changes in personal privacy The growth of democracy and the human rights movement
has resulted in greater demand for personal rights and freedoms. Despite this, both the
public and private sectors continue to violate personal rights and freedoms through various
methods used to obtain personal data.

Social problems and conflicts provoked by advanced technologies In his theory of cultural
lag, Ogburn [13] suggested that social institutions need time to adapt to major technological
changes. Today technology is advancing faster than human history has ever experienced.
The possibility that societies will not be able to adjust to these changing technologies is
highly probable. In the future we could see the rise of two types of problems.
4.1. Ethical dilemmas Ethical controversies may continue to surround developments in
biotechnology and genetic engineering. Conception and contra-conception technologies, the
creation of new life forms, and other related issues, will be more present in the public
conscience.
4.1.1. Devaluation of people Advances in digital technology and biotechnology may lead to
placing less value on certain people within future social frameworks. For example, those
whose jobs are replaced by intelligent robots might view themselves as being less valuable
than a machine.
4.1.2. Lost personal identity Using digitized personal identification systems could place a
higher priority on numeric identification instead of name identification. And what happens to
personal identity when the information stored in central databases is lost, stolen, destroyed,
or altered?.
4.1.3. Conflict over personal freedom Science fiction writers describe societies in which
crime is eradicated by the installation of complicated surveillance and tracking devices [14].
However, history has shown that when citizens lose their privacy and personal freedoms,
governments and others often seek to control people’s freedom [17]5 . Thus,
communication networks could become powerful bargaining tools in the future.
4.1.4. Conflict over information and dissemination The installation of wide-bandwidth
technology will bring access to many music, movie, and television channels. A mass media
that is linked to the Internet would, theoretically, have no constraints. Yet, it is important that
the government monitor the media, as it can powerfully direct public opinion. For this
reason, conflicts between the government sector and the media will tend to become more
serious in the future.
4.2. Social disparities New and unforeseen disparities between the wealthy and the poor,
with the potential for added conflict, may appear. Such increasing economic disparity could
be caused by several technological factors, as follows.
4.2.1. Disparities in access to information and IT I believe new technologies could give the
poor greater opportunities and more income. At the same time, technology could also
expand the opportunities and income of the rich. The gap between the poor and the rich
might become even wider as digital technology gives those with access to it more effective
production and marketing systems, thereby resulting in higher personal productivity.
4.2.2. Disparities in access to biotechnology Advances in biotechnology, especially those in
the field of genetic research, will greatly boost yields, crop quality and will lower the need for
chemical solutions in agricultural production. Farmers using biotechnology could have a
greater comparative advantage than those who do not. Thus, farmers in developing
countries lacking access to this technology will not be able to compete with those in the
developed countries.
4.2.3. Disparities in access to employment New digitization will not just deprive many
workers of their jobs; it may leave them stranded in a cyber society.
Conclusion Globalization, along with digitization and biotechnologization, could produce
catastrophic and beneficial effects in society over the next 20 years. The ability of
governments, corporations, community groups, and individuals to handle such future trends
will be contingent upon their ability to handle the changes that technology has already thrust
into way at present. Success is not only determined by our ability to handle the present
challenges, but even more so, to correctly foresee and to plan for future ones as well.

b. Riesgos de la globalización.
Overcoming the Risks and Contradictions of Globalization
Open markets and technological advances have the potential to empower and enrich
everyone, but they present political challenges to governments that require coherent
national and multilateral policy-making.
Today’s global economy appears riven by contradictions. Steady growth in much of the
developing world – enabled by the opening of markets to goods, services, investment and
technology – has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Yet more than 1.2
billion people still live in extreme poverty, and even the better off have profited unevenly
from liberalizing markets. As the global economy prospered between the mid-1990s and the
late 2000s, the median income of the ‘upper middle class’, in countries as diverse as
Argentina, the United States and France, stagnated. The current debates over ‘inequality’
and ‘exclusion’ imply that while the wealthy are able to take full advantage of an ever-
integrating global economy, the majority experience scant returns.

Can governments be confident that it is just a matter of time before a rising tide of global
economic integration lifts all boats? Or are there structural deficiencies in today’s capitalist
model that require more active government intervention to resolve? And how will the world’s
changing demographic profile help or hinder efforts at adjustment?

The contradictions

Two contradictions in the globalized economy stand out in particular. The first concerns the
way in which open markets create both benefits and negative distortions for societies.
Openness to trade and foreign investment can break internal oligopolies and weaken vested
interests. Export markets enable countries to profit from their natural and human
endowments. In both cases, workers have a greater opportunity to move up the value chain
by earning, spending and saving more.

However, without a globally level playing field, market opening can just as easily
disenfranchise domestic producers and threaten the jobs they sustain. Markets continue to
be regulated by governments, which have national priorities and must respond to domestic
pressures. Even as cross-border markets have deepened on many fronts, governments
continue to use product standards, health and safety regulations, tax policies and currency
intervention to provide preferential treatment to their own citizens and companies.

The result is that the winners and losers from globalization are not necessarily determined
by their skill and national endowments. And there appears to be a growing divergence of
opportunity between those – such as bankers and asset managers – who direct global flows
of goods, services and capital and those who are the objects of this globalization. Critics
argue that the first group gets steadily richer in an open global economy, while the second
group – from the blue-collar and office workers of multinational companies to waiters, carers
and taxi-drivers – sees incomes stagnate.

A second major contradiction in the modern global economy concerns the simultaneously
empowering and disrupting effects of technological progress. Technology can raise
productivity and make expensive goods and services cheaper, thus helping economies to
grow and generate wealth. But it can also disrupt traditional forms of manufacturing or
service provision. The question is whether technological disruption principally releases
labour into alternative forms of employment that are more productive and remunerative. If
so, the overall income in an economy will rise.

Yet technology can also open a divide between those at the top, who are technologically
integrated and well paid, and those at the bottom of the economic ladder, stuck in low-
income service provision. Continuing advances in computing power also create the prospect
that many of the technologically literate – even those programming the new internet of
things – will be disenfranchised by self-learning machines or artificial intelligence.

The demographic challenge

Even as governments struggle with the impacts of globalization on their societies, many of
those societies are ageing structurally. And not just in Europe, where the World Bank
expects more than a third of people to be aged over 60 in ‘less than four decades’; or in
Asia, where Japan and South Korea are already experiencing population decline. Emerging
economies, from Mexico to China, are also undergoing a transition from youthful to ageing
societies. Demand for welfare provision will grow in these countries, just as its burden is
already affecting developed economies.

Ageing societies make it difficult to generate economic growth. They consume more and
produce less. If older people remain in or re-enter the workforce (90 per cent of new
employment in the UK in 2008–14 was accounted for by those over 50), their presence can
depress wage growth.

Increasing longevity also makes pensions, health care and other social services costlier.
Unsustainable social welfare commitments have contributed to rising public debt levels in
Europe and the United States. In developing countries, a lack of welfare provision may
prompt societies to save too much, constraining healthy economic growth. China is
grappling with precisely this challenge, as it tries to shift from export- and investment-driven
growth towards a more consumption- and service-led economy.

Options

Three practical options are available to policy-makers to try to mitigate these contradictions
and challenges. First and most important are microeconomic policies. By providing better
education, apprenticeships, career training and less rigid labour markets, policy-makers in
developed economies can help their societies to adapt to the pressures of globalization and
technological advance. Education can also have a catalytic effect on developing economies,
especially where young women are given equal opportunities to young men. Developing-
country governments also need to provide the necessary physical and institutional
infrastructure to unlock growth. This not only means building roads, railways and ports, but
also enforcing the rule of law, tackling corruption and removing economically distorting price
subsidies on staple goods.

Second, investment in technology can open new opportunities for sustainable growth. In the
developed world, new manufacturing technologies are driving an ‘onshoring’ of jobs, as
producers deliver customized products more rapidly while keeping inventories to a
minimum. New technology can replace centralized energy infrastructure with more flexible,
distributed systems that can lower costs while reducing carbon emissions. Technological
innovation also has the potential to reduce health care costs for ageing societies through
self-diagnosis and treatment, and through robotized caring.

In the developing world, technology offers societies the opportunity to leapfrog expensive
traditional energy, educational, medical and communications infrastructures, and to deliver
government services at lower cost and with less scope for corruption. Used effectively,
technology can convert the massive migration of people to urban centres into an engine for
progress rather than a driver of misery. As Mathieu Lefevre argued in the February–March
edition of The World Today, about 400 mid-sized cities (with an average of less than 2
million inhabitants) could generate 40 per cent of global economic growth in the next 15
years.

But however competent and far-sighted governments prove to be, they will still need to
collaborate if they are to draw on the full potential benefits of globalization. This is where the
third policy option comes in. Faced with the growing protectionist instincts of populist
political movements that reject the benefits of globalization, policy-makers need to
coordinate their economic policies at multilateral levels in ways that reflect countries’
economic interdependence. Regional institutions, from the European Union to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are essential components in this process,
given that they can help governments to lower barriers and coordinate standards at a pace
and within a cultural context that will be less disruptive than some multilateral initiatives.

Competent government, acting in partnership and unlocking the potential of rapid

technological advance and deepening regional economic integration, can overcome some
of the growing contradictions of globalization, even as the world enters an uncertain period
of demographic change and a sharpening contest between economic winners and
Share
3. Economía internacional
a. Crisis de la zona euro.
On January 1, 1999, eleven member states of the European Union triumphantly introduced
a single currency, the euro. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) capped 40 years of
efforts to create a single market in which goods, capital, and people could move freely.
With a common currency, that movement was powerfully facilitated. Ten years after its
introduction, the leaders of the Eurozone—now increased to 15 members, with four more
waiting to enter—celebrated what appeared to be the successful launch of a new European
currency. But within a year after the proud celebration of the euro’s tenth anniversary, the
Eurozone was thrown into crisis. And the Eurozone crisis has, over the subsequent years,
turned into one of the gravest crises in the history of European integration, rivaled only by
Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union. It took nine years for the Eurozone simply
to return to precrisis levels of per capita output. Why did this crisis emerge, and why has it
been so difficult to resolve? This article aims to answer these questions. It first analyzes
the causes of the crisis and then focuses on how the responses were shaped by
distributive conflicts at both the international and national levels. The article emphasizes
three main points. First, the Eurozone crisis is just one in a long series of debt and
balance-of-payments (BOP) problems that the world has experienced in the past 200
years. Like all of these crises, the Eurozone crisis has led to stark political conflicts about
its resolution, both between and within states (e.g., Dyson 2014, Frieden 1991, Pepinsky
2009, Simmons 1994, Walter 2013). Debtor and creditor countries fight over the distribution
of responsibility for the accumulated debt; countries with current account surpluses and
deficits fight over who should implement the policies necessary to reduce the current
account imbalances. Within countries, interest groups fight to shift the costs of crisis
resolution away from themselves. The issue at stake, in the Eurozone as so often
elsewhere, has been who would bear the burden of adjustment: who would make the
sacrifices necessary to clean up the mess of accumulated bad debts (Frieden 2015a).
These similarities between the Eurozone crisis and previous crises allow us to analyze its
political economy with tools that have been honed in Latin America, Asia, and other parts
of the world (Copelovitch et al. 2016). Second, for all these similarities, the Eurozone’s
predicament is unique. Not only is this a debt crisis among developed countries, which has
not happened since Germany in the 1930s,1 but this crisis has taken place in the unique
setting of EMU, which involves a wide range of economic and political relations among
members of a single market and a common currency. This strongly constrains the policy
options available to policy makers and vastly increases the interdependence of the euro
crisis countries. At the same time, the centrality of Europe’s monetary union to the
development of the European Union makes a lasting resolution of the Eurozone crisis
crucial to prospects for the future of European integration more generally. Nonetheless,
although there has been more institutional reform at the European level than one would
have thought possible at the outset of the crisis, these reforms have done little to resolve
the Eurozone’s root problems. Third, despite the Eurozone countries’ high level of
interdependence, the political conflicts about sharing the burden of adjustment in the crisis
have played themselves out in unusual ways. One set of countries, the creditor states,
have been exceptionally successful in shifting most of that burden onto the debtor states. It
is not surprising that the Eurozone debt crisis has led to huge bailout programs combined
with strong conditionality that have forced the crisis countries to implement harsh austerity
measures (e.g., spending cuts and tax increases) and pushed those

The Euro crisis is mainly a consequence of the international financial crisis of 2008.
Thereby, the term Euro crisis is misleading as there is no currency crisis. First, the article
shows some of the birth defects of the Euro. Second, it shows that the increase in public
debt was caused by rescue measures for banks and anti-cyclical fiscal policy. Third, we
argue that the Euro crisis is not just one crisis (a sovereign debt crisis) but it is a
combination of several macroeconomic crises including a growth crisis, a labour market
crisis, a public debt crisis, and a current account crisis.

At the very beginning of the subprime crisis (2006), few thought that this had the potential
to plunge the world economy into its worst post-war recession. The situation changed
dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008. The us, Europe
and other regions dealt a body blow since many banks had invested in asset backed
securities. The us financial crisis spilled over into Europe and this led to a recession in the
Eurozone in 2009. However, no one thought that the subprime crisis would result in the
most severe crisis post-war Europe had ever faced. In 2009 the financial crisis in Europe
turned into a crisis of its own, the socalled Euro crisis. The Euro crisis is mainly economic
and political. It is, however, not a crisis of the currency itself. Thus, the label Euro crisis is
misleading. This article aims to work out the main causes of the Euro crisis. As mentioned
above the Euro crisis is to a large extent a result of the financial crisis of 2008.
Furthermore, the article shows that there is actually not only one macroeconomic crisis in
Europe but several. The Euro debt crisis consists of a Gross Domestic Product (gdp)
growth crisis, an unemployment crisis, a sovereign debt crisis, and a balance of payment
crisis. This article is structured as follows: the article starts with an overview of the history
of the Euro and theoretical consideration regarding the currency union. The fourth section
discusses causes of the Euro crisis. The fifth section shows the different components of the
Euro crisis. The last section concludes
History of the Euro

The Euro had two main predecessors.

 The first one was the “currency snake” which was created in 1972/73 by the
European Economic Community (eec) as a new system of exchange rates

 The second predecessor was the European Monetary System (ems) which was
founded in 1979 introducing an artificial currency, the so called European Currency
Unit.

At the same time Jacques Delors published his idea of a common currency in Europe.
Finally, this plan was established by the Maastricht Treaty 1991/1992 which changed the
European Community (ec) substantially.

The treaty had three pillars. Economic and Monetary Union (emu)
The first stage was the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
national central banks were granted (instrument) independence and the European Monetary
Institute (emi) was founded.

Any country that wants to become member of the currency area is required to meet the
Maastricht criteria. These are: first, inflation rates should not be more than 1.5 percentage
points higher than the average of the top three countries. Second, exchange rates have to
remain within the ems bands for two years. Third, average nominal long-term interest rates
should not surmount that of the three best performing countries by more than two
percentage points. Fourth and most importantly, budget deficits must not be higher than 3%
with respect to gdp and the debt-to-gdp ratio must not be higher than 60%.
Optimum currency areas and the Euro zone
The common currency was mainly a political project, not an economic one. This fact
explains the acceptance of countries whose public debt was too high as well as the
establishment of the currency area as a whole There is a broad literature that deals with the
question whether countries should form a currency area. According to the impossible trinity
model, each country has to select from capital mobility, autonomous monetary policy, and
fixed exchange rates. To summarize, the project of a common currency was a political idea.
It was politicians who decided to construct the Euro and to let countries take part that did
not meet all criteria. We should bear in mind that the emu has had some defects by its very
nature. These defects did not cause the crisis, but they did magnify here and there.
Causes of the Euro crisis
Outlining the Euro crisis After discussing the causes of the Euro crisis, the next section will
show that the current crisis has not just one symptom (sovereign debt) but a multiplicity. The
four major crises are the growth crisis, the labour market crisis, the sovereign debt crisis,
and the balance of payment crisis which will be discussed in this chapter.
The growth crisis

The Euro zone is not just in a sovereign debt crisis, it is also in a growth crisis. The financial
crisis led to a recession of the entire Euro zone in 2009. All members were affected by this
crisis.
 The first comes from Keynesian theory. Countries with public debt problems opted for or
were forced to adopt austerity measures. Consequently, public expenditures were cut and
taxes increased. In contradiction to the Ricardian equivalence theorem, government
spending cuts were multiplied, widening and deepening the recession. Recession forced
governments into further austerity measures, which only made matters worse.
Second, inflation and wage increase differentials caused different developments in
competiveness. Southern states with higher inflation rates lost price competiveness against
northern states like Germany, resulting in current account imbalances
Third, some countries economies are struggling with structural problems. For instance,
Portugal was once a textile producing country.

The labour market crisis The deep recession in Europe had a severe impact on labour
markets, too. Increasing unemployment is a typical feature of banking crises.

The labour market crisis The deep recession in Europe had a severe impact on labour
markets, too. Increasing unemployment is a typical feature of banking crises.
According to Brada and Signorelli (2012), differences in labour market performance after
recessions can mainly be explained by the quality of institutions, the flexibility of labour
markets, and structural factors.

The sovereign debt crisis The sovereign debt crisis is sometimes regarded as the main
problem in Europe. It is also used as a synonym for the Euro crisis. Some aspects of this
crisis have already been covered in section “Causes of the Euro Crisis”. In some cases,
public debt was already high before countries introduced the Euro, while in others it
increased as a result of the financial crisis.

The balance of payment crisis Up to now we have only seen problems that are located in
single countries. However, Euro countries trade with each other, leading to mutual
dependencies. This refers to the problem of increased imbalances in current accounts of
Euro member countries.

Conclusions The intention of this article was to demonstrate the causes and the symptoms of
the Euro crisis. However, one can draw valuable conclusions from this case study. The
conclusions are twofold: first, one could ask whether a currency union is a useful idea at all
given that it can lead to severe problems for the member countries. However, there is still
overwhelming evidence for the positive effects of currency unions on trade. In their meta-
analysis of a magnitude of articles discussing the effect of currency unions on trade, Rose
and Stanley (2005) conclude that a common currency increases bilateral trade between two
countries by at least 30%. This increase in trade eventually leads to an increase in income of
the involved countries (Frankel and Rose, 2002). It is still essential which countries form a
currency union or which currency a country adopts as its legal tender. Of course, for Mexico
the predicted positive effect of adopting the US dollar is much stronger than joining the Euro
area (Frankel and Rose, 2002). The effect should be much stronger if a country uses the
currency of one of its major trading partners than otherwise. However, an increase in trade
can also be achieved by dollarization (Yeyati, 2003). Thus, there is no need to join or create
a monetary union in order to achieve positive trade effects. Second, the Euro crisis is a
warning sign to other countries which are considering the establishment of a currency area.
Thus, it is essential to have the Euro zone as an example for do’s and don’ts. There are
some institutions planning currency unions. Among these are the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (asean) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc). First, each case has to be
examined separately. There is some evidence for the usefulness of a monetary union for the
asean given that output shocks are highly correlated among member states and that the
openness of asean countries is high (Ng, 2002). There are also good reasons for introducing
a currency union among gcc countries (Buiter, 2008). However, one conclusion to draw from
the Euro crisis is that a currency union needs effective supranational institutions which
monitor central banks and other institutions. Such supranational bodies are missing in the
case of the gcc (Buiter, 2008). Furthermore, a currency union has to be prepared for the
worst case scenario of a financial crisis (Volz, 2013). This was apparently not the case in the
Euro zone. Although the Euro area aimed at reducing the risk of a sovereign default, there
was no rescue mechanism that would have helped the Euro zone to cope with financial
difficulties of one of its member countries (Buti and Carnot, 2012). The main reason behind
that was that the founders of the emu wanted to prevent moral hazard by high-spending
countries. Whilst this is in general a good intention, it led to disorder when countries came
into trouble. However, the protections in the Euro area did not suffice. Many countries
breached the Maastricht criteria but were not fined. On the other, meeting the criteria was
neither sufficient to prevent a debt crisis (take Spain and Ireland). The eu wants to overcome
this problem with a scoreboard approach which takes into account a lot of indicators of
macroeconomic stability. A final remark is that financial regulation is a major issue for all
countries. Problems in the banking sector in a couple of countries led to a crisis of the whole
Euro area. One obvious conclusion is to tighten banking regulation which will be done by
adopting the Basel III rules. Furthermore, the Euro area is heading towards a banking union
with common banking supervision and a bank resolution mechanism. The idea is that a
supranational institution (in this case the ecb) supervises the major European banks. In case
that a bank is in trouble, the supervisory committee would decide whether to close this bank
or not no matter where this bank comes from. In theory, this should reduce the risk of long
living zombie banks which live off government subsidies. The current crisis showed that the
banking supervision authorities have to act on short notice in order to prevent a long lasting
full-blown financial crisis. However, one should always bear in mind that the Great Recession
is the most severe crisis after the Great Depression. Thus, the Euro crisis is a phenomenon
consisting of many different components. All those individual parts taken together made such
a crisis become reality.

Brexit (/ˈbrɛksɪt/ or /ˈbrɛɡzɪt/), a portmanteau of "Britain exit",[1] is the impending withdrawal

of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). It follows the referendum of 23
June 2016 when 51.9 per cent of those who voted supported withdrawal. Withdrawal has
been advocated by Eurosceptics, both left-wing and right-wing,[2][3][4] while Pro-
Europeanists (or European Unionists), who also span the political spectrum, have
advocated continued membership.

The UK joined the European Communities (EC) in 1973 under the Conservative
government of Edward Heath, with continued membership endorsed by a referendum in
1975. In the 1970s and 1980s, withdrawal from the European Communities was advocated
mainly by the political left, with the Labour Party's 1983 election manifesto advocating
complete withdrawal.[3] In the late 1980s, opposition to the development of the EC into an
increasingly political union grew on the right, with Margaret Thatcher – despite being a key
proponent of the European single market – becoming increasingly ambivalent towards
Europe.[3] From the 1990s, opposition to further European integration came mainly from the
right, and divisions within the Conservative Party led to rebellion over the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992.

The new UK Independence Party (UKIP) was a major advocate of a further referendum on
continued membership of what had now become the European Union, and the party's
growing popularity in the early 2010s resulted in UKIP being the most successful UK party
in the 2014 European Parliament election. The Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron
pledged during the campaign for the 2015 UK General Election to hold a new referendum, a
promise which he fulfilled in 2016 following the pressure from the Eurosceptic wing of his
party. Cameron, who had campaigned to remain, resigned after the result and was
succeeded by Theresa May, his former Home Secretary. She called a snap general election
less than a year later, in which she lost her overall majority. Her minority government is
supported in key votes by the Democratic Unionist Party.

On 29 March 2017, the Government of the United Kingdom invoked Article 50 of the Treaty
on European Union. The UK is due to leave the EU on 29 March 2019 at 11 p.m. UK time,
[5][6] when the period for negotiating a withdrawal agreement will end unless an extension
is agreed.[7] May announced the government's intention not to seek permanent
membership of the European single market or the EU customs union after leaving the EU[8]
[9] and promised to repeal the European Communities Act of 1972 and incorporate existing
European Union law into UK domestic law.[10] A new government department, the
Department for Exiting the European Union, was created in July 2016. Negotiations with the
EU officially started in June 2017, aiming to complete the withdrawal agreement by October
2018. In June 2018, the UK and the EU published a joint progress report outlining
agreement on issues including customs, VAT and Euratom. In July 2018, the British Cabinet
agreed to the Chequers plan, an outline of proposals by the UK Government. In November
2018, the Draft Withdrawal Agreement and Outline Political Declaration, agreed between
the UK Government and the EU, was published.[11]

The broad consensus among economists is that Brexit will likely reduce the UK's real per
capita income in the medium term and long term,[12][13][14] and that the Brexit referendum
itself damaged the economy.[15] Studies on effects since the referendum show annual
losses of £404 for the average UK household from increased inflation, and losses between
2 and 2.5 per cent of UK GDP.[16][17][18] Brexit is likely to reduce immigration from
European Economic Area (EEA) countries to the UK,[19] and poses challenges for UK
higher education and academic research.[20] As of November 2018, the size of the "divorce
bill", the UK's inheritance of existing EU trade agreements, and relations with Ireland and
other EU member states remains uncertain. The precise impact on the UK depends on
whether the process will be a "hard" or "soft" Brexit. Analysis by HM Treasury has found that
no Brexit scenario is expected to improve the UK economic condition.[21] A Treasury
publication of November 2018 on the potential impact of the Chequers proposal estimated
that it would leave the UK economy 3.9% worse off after 15 years compared with staying in
the EU".[22]
b. Brexit.

c. Los países emergentes: Aceleración y desaceleración económica de China. Los

BRICS.
Acceleration and economic slowdown in China.

The role of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) as emerging protagonists
in international development cooperation is significantly and rapidly changing. Over the last
decade, BRICS have increased their financial as well as technical assistance and
established distinct ways and means of economic cooperation, especially through
southsouth-cooperation with Low Income Countries (LIC). BRICS are striving for more
political influence, thereby challenging traditional western donors such as the EU. BRICS
impact on LICs through trade, foreign direct investment and development financing are
significant and these south-south-efforts need to be reflected in EU development strategies.
The high level conferences in Paris, Accra and Monterrey have not appreciated BRICS’ role
as emerging donors, but the Busan Global Partnership strategy has considered obvious
changes in global development architecture more openly. Size, key areas and institutional
settings of foreign assistance are differing among BRICS. The overall focus of development
cooperation lies on neighbouring countries, regional integration and technical assistance.
Economic growth is perceived to be crucial for sustainable development; non-interference
and national sovereignty are guiding principles. Eye-to-eye level dialogue and trilateral
settings of cooperation are means of addressing BRICS as new stakeholder in 21st century
development politics The term BRIC (the South African S would not be incorporated until
later) is coined in 2001 by the analyst of Goldman Sachs consultant Jim O'Neill in his
publication Building Better Global Economic BRICs1 , making a play on words with the
English term brick - brick-, and referring to the four emerging economies of the world with
the acronym: Brazil, Russia, India and China. The concept is developed more deeply in a
publication of the same American firm from 2003, titled Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to
2050 . In general terms, the concept refers to a group of four countries with a series of
shared characteristics and that due to its evolution, around 2050will become a dominant
block of the world economy. The four are countries with one large population - surpassing
Russia and Brazil the 140 million inhabitants and surpassing China and India the 1100
million, conforming among the four 45% of the population world, a vast area of territory -
their territories occupy a quarter of the world territory, which provides them with continental
strategic dimensions - and a great amount of natural resources. On top of all this, the factor
that makes these countries one block to take into account is their rapid economic growth in
terms of Gross Domestic Product. At present, the BRIC countries make up 15% of global
GDP and 12.8% of the planetary commercial volume. Since 2003, these countries are
generating 65% of global growth and have reserves of dollars that make up 40% of the total
reserves of world currencies. According to Goldman Sachs projections, around the year
2040, the BRICs will have surpassed the G6 as a block in terms of GDP. The BRIC thesis
indicates that around 2040, China and India will be world leaders in the field of technology
and services, while Russia and Brazil will be the main suppliers of raw materials
-biodiversity, ethanol, iron, food, oil and gas natural- at a global level
Considering all the above, it is worth asking if the BRICS can consolidate itself as an
alternative model for international relations or if it is simply a conjunctural alliance, with no
other objective than to challenge Western hegemony. On the one hand, it seems clear that
while we are in a process of transition towards a multipolar world in which the hegemony of
the United States is coming to an end, the projections given by the BRICS thesis have not
been fully fulfilled and its growth It has not been as spectacular as anticipated.

There are, as we have seen, enough arguments to doubt the future consolidation of the
BRICS block as Hegemon of international relations. In First, at the military level, despite the
consolidation of important companies and cooperation initiatives between members of the
group, there are also insurmountable differences geopolitics, such as the clear India /
Russia-China antagonism, suggesting that a The military alliance of the bloc is virtually
impossible. Such differences could in fact not only prevent an alliance in the group but give
rise to conflicts within it. In these conflicts, actors outside the group, such as Pakistan,
whose cooperation military with China acts to the detriment of India, or Ukraine, Russia's
rival and it seems have become an important trading partner of China. Secondly, it is a
mainly economic alliance that depends too much of the Chinese economy, which, as we
have seen, far exceeds those of the other members of the group. South Africa is not and
can not be expected that a future is among the most powerful economies in the world, and
their income in the group obeys more to purely geographical, in an exercise of opportunism
of the group to take hold in the African continent. Your permanence in the group in the future
is certainly an unknown, because he probably can not aspire to the same goals as the other
"giants" of the group. Brazil, on the other hand, has been in a certain way the
"disappointment" of the group, stagnating in its growth to stay at 2% per year. In general,
fourteen years after having The theory has been stated, it seems that the expectations are
not being met and Jim himself O'Neill, pioneer of the BRICS thesis, has pointed out that
only China is at the height of what that he himself had predicted. In addition, the impressive
economic growth expected for these countries is not alwaysit will translate into wealth for its
inhabitants. If the projections are fulfilled, the situation that the BRICS are the main
economic block in the world, but hardly They may be considered developed countries. Of all
the bloc's economies, in 2050 only Russia would be among the top ten economies in the
world in terms of GDP per capita capita, and South Africa would not even be in the top
twenty.The existence of other economies such as the Mexican or Korean, so strong or more
than Some of the BRICS block calls into question the very concept of the BRICS, and
makes us ask ourselves to what extent this thesis is a reality and not a mere fiction
geopolitics. Nigeria has long-term growth projections that make it to be even in a better
position than South Africa to fill the position of African BRICS partner. Serve these three
countries as an example of possible future incorporations to the group, perhaps to the
detriment of some of those present.
In addition, the BRICS countries are presented as extremely different societies. If England
and the United States were joined by economic and commercial interests at the time of the
empires, they were also united by a common culture and they were very similar societies.
On the contrary, the BRICS is only united by the interest in playing a role preponderant in
international relations, beyond being growing economies. That said, the achievements of
the group as an institution can not be ignored. The New Development Bank is now a reality,
and has been established with the purpose of transforming the world economic order as we
know it. Nor should the growing magnitude of the group's economies be ignored. The
growing dynamics of globalization, which comes to break with the dominant regionality of
the past, is undoubtedly a favorable scenario for the development of the group. The search
for this new pole of power, which moves away from the traditional regional or continental
groupings, would undoubtedly constitute a unique geopolitical reality, unique in the history of
international relations, with unpredictable consequences. Without doubt there is a long way
to go, but what is clear is that we are facing a new era in which emerging countries will have
much to say.
CRITICISM TO THE BRICS CONCEPT
Having already referred in the previous section to the important geopolitical differences and
in the field of military development within the group, and to the difficulties that these entail
with respect to the real viability of the group, we will now enunciate other criticisms of the
concept of the BRICS as a group. Social, political and cultural differences.
In general, BRICS do not constitute a homogeneous alliance. Their economic and political
position in respect of international development politics and policies should not be
underestimated by EUinstitutions. BRICS are part of the leading group of emerging
economies that are going to – or are already – changing the setting of traditional
development aid. The heterogeneity among BRICS seems to make development
partnerships with BRICS en bloc rather complicated and less attractive. Especially China
and Russia are differing – one being the next superpower, the other a former superpower –
and need to be addressed in different ways. On the other side, agreements with India, Brazil
and South Africa are more feasible (Leal-Arcas 2008: 271). They already have formed a
group of mutual interests and goals (IBSA) and in terms of democracy, federalism, political
norms and values, common grounds with the EU are evident. The impact of BRICS on the
economic development of LICs has increased. However, it did not lead to a push back of
the EU as a partner of these countries. Above all, China is an important trade partner of
many LICs and is influencing growth dynamics through demand of raw materials as well as
manufacturing exports. But also trade, FDI, and development financing of the other four
countries can be regarded as growth drivers for LICs, though trade is considered to be the
most important link (IMF 2011a: 6). Overall, four areas have been analysed and have been
identified as relevant for the dynamics of SSC, LIC’s development and EU cooperation: 
Trade: BRICS’ gain in power has been obvious in trade relations and opposed interests
between EU and BRICS are most likely to occur in issues of international trade. However,
conflicting interests should not be carried out at the expense of LICs. BRICS demand for
resources has been increasing in the past decade due to strong growth of Chinese and
Indian manufacturing industries. Brazil and Russia were able to benefit from high raw
material prices in the past and their expertise can thus be useful to help LICs to escape the
commodity trap. The EU could give support for the transfer of know how and technology to
prevent LICs from being constrained to the role as a supplier of raw materials and to help
establishing diversified economies.  FDI: Worldwide FDI flows from BRICS have increased
more than significantly during the last decade, but BRICS’ share in outward FDI flows to
developing countries in comparison to OECDcountries is still a minor one. A number of
positive impacts of FDI to developing countries can be identified, such as improvement of
infrastructure and energy supply as well as increased trade and general market incentives.
 Financing: BRICS contribution to international development financing has increased
substantially over the past decade, with China playing the predominant role. But again,
BRICS’ share in ODA flows in comparison to OECD-countries is still rather small.
Development financing usually comes within a larger package of grants, concessional and
non-concessional loans and trade and investment arrangements. BRICS pursue SSC in
distinct opposition to traditional donor-recipient-relationships. Thereby, financing is mainly
bilateral regarding China and India, whereas Brazil and South Africa are using multilateral
channels, especially for regional institutions. BRICS’ development financing is focussing on
neighbouring countries but also complies with geostrategic and economic considerations. 
Debt sustainability: Although BRICS financing has rarely created debt sustainability
problems in the past, still it is important to observe social and economic returns and
possible debt sustainability issues in LICs. Thereby, the EU should engage in a political
dialogue with BRICS (and other non-OECD development partners) to agree on needs-
based development financing within a commonly designed debt sustainability framework.
BRICS as donors are not necessarily in competition neither with the DAC as institution nor
with the DAC’s aid model. The OECD should recognize differences instead of aiming to fit
all donors under one umbrella (Walz/Ramachandran 2011: 10). In particular, there is a lack
of incentives for Southern donors to join the DAC and, in addition, the philosophy of
approaching aid varies considerably between emerging and OECD donors
(Walz/Ramachandran 2011: 21). Therefore, new institutional settings of global development
cooperation are required. If one single body is to be promoted at the international level, the
DAC should not be that body, but part of it. The EU has now the chance to initiate and take
its Member States with it on the road for a Global Partnership. At the same time, the parties
of the Global Partnership need to consider other fora at the international level, so that
responsibilities, mandates, and funding are clear and do not overlap. Furthermore, the issue
of global governance is closely linked to the (voting) design of the Bretton Woods and other
global institutions. Indeed, it is a challenge to adapt the international institutional
architecture to the current geopolitical status. However, the EU should try to work in favour
of adapting it. Through trilateral settings, the EU can help developing the potentials of SSC.
BRICS sub-coalitions like IBSA and BASIC are strong bodies to coordinate trilateral south-
south-north-cooperation. Some of their focus areas coincide with priorities defined by the
EU. Thereby, the EU could also build on the Agenda for Change and the Monterrey
Consensus, which foresee “differentiated development partnerships” and the support of
trilateral cooperation (Agenda for Change 2011, § 4, p. 12). Especially Brazil but also other
emerging economies are interested in or are already practicing trilateral cooperation with
OECD donors (John de Sousa 2010: 4). Also the G77 is appreciating triangular cooperation
as a way “to respond to the new realities and opportunities for development”
(Yamoussoukro 2008). However, it is important to avoid double structures and develop
comparative advantages of SSC within trilateral development strategies. In order to reach
these goals it is also necessary to demand more transparency of BRICS’ SSC. BRICS need
to be included in aid effectiveness and development strategy dialogues. The EU should
include BRICS and other emerging donors in an exchange of ideas on basic principles and
effectiveness of development cooperation. Thereby, a certain amount of flexibility and
openness is needed. Individual ideas of BRICS can be included in a constructive way
although the risk remains that some BRICS might use their SSC-strategy to undermine EU
policies. Human rights, democracy and social cohesion are crucial principles of European
development cooperation and these core values cannot be relinquished in the dialogue with
BRICS. Above that, poverty reduction remains the most important goal of EU development
efforts and affects BRICS as donors as well as recipients of aid – high inequality and
widespread poverty are major problems of BRICS themselves (cf. table 1; chapter 2;
chapter 4.1). Alongside BRICS there are other emerging economies such as CIVETS and
the “next eleven”, who are gaining influence in international development politics. However,
among MICs, BRICS are at the forefront of actually using their economic weight to induce
change in the global governance architecture, which directly and indirectly is affecting the
development agenda of the EU. This holds true in particular for the link between good
governance, democracy and human rights on the one side and development financing, aid
effectiveness and trade ties to the developing world on the other side.

China has been, bar none, the country that has changed fastest over the last thirty years.
To take a quarter of the world’s population, there are also analysts say that China is the
world’s growth engine, or at least a country, which contribute a lot to the global growth.
Some experts and markets continue to be bullish about the Chinese economy, expecting
that high rates of growth will continue indefinitely.

Like other rapidly developing Asian economies, China relied on repressed household
consumption to make modernizing investments. But the problem is that focus on numbers
obscures stark realities and the tendency doesn’t show an optimistic future with coming
challenges. Its economic model distorted interest rates, the currency and even legal
structures. And it led to burgeoning debt that is becoming increasingly difficult to finance
(Pettis, 2013). The time has come for China to adjust its model to the new circumstances
success has produced.
The principal challenges facing China today are serious. Many of essential issues covered
in the further discussion embrace the economy, social development, environment, welfare,
demography, employment, resources, science and sustainability. What’s more, China is
often criticized for its political system and institutional structures; it is not, after all, a liberal
democracy It is no doubt that the rise of industrialized China and his resurgence as an
economic powerhouse is a transformative event in the history of the world economy.
However, there now appears to be an emergent consensus that the Chinese economy is
facing a turning point, as a result, this paper looks at the background to today’s China, how
it got where it is, in order to examine the core structural problems and further reflections
regarding to China’s economic growth and slowdown. It seeks to build a general perspective
to argue that whether China has possibilities to solve those issues or move into a new
transition successfully.
Conclusion
China has been growing rapidly for more than three decades. The sharply rise of
industrialized China benefited from the world economy. However, one of the great questions
facing China is whether or not its economy can continue to produce the rapid gains in
wealth for its giant population that the country has witnessed over the past 30 years. To
understand the “Chinese mystery” in a true position, the growth model played in a crucial
role in China’s economic boom and its slowdown also.
 The problem with China’s economy is linked to its growth-model, which has characterized
by the following points:
• The excessive investment driven model with an issue of government-led market economy.
The investment pump catalyzed China’s economic growth over any other considerations,
and which resulted in a system reached the highest savings-rates and investment rates ever
recorded in modern economic history.
• The level of investment and leverage in China is really a sign of an economic system
totally out of control. Regarding the Chinese growth model, it reflected and derived serious
of problems.
• The Chinese model was in the beginning strongly export-oriented, while China has
suffered a demand-deficit since the global crisis of 2008. And the Chinese model has run
out of its original growth drivers with cheap labors and technology adoption.
• The financial system in China was characterized by financial repression by giving a lower
interest rate, which is a political control system to restrain the development of a free market
mechanism in China.

As a result, the core problems which determined by the growth model can analytically be
broken down into four major elements: 1) Institutional structures. The growth model was a
reflection of the fact that China is a limited access society with some insufficiently developed
institutional structure and was held “captured” by its political system with the Chinese
Communist Party, in this way, the civil society is also weak. As a result, almost all major
structural problems are created under the inefficient institutional structures.
2) Structural constraints. These structural restraints will function as a drag on China’s
economy and societal developments. The demographic factor has resulted in a fast
shrinking of the Chinese labor force; the environmental degradation is a drag on growth,
increase the need for hospitals and restrain consumption at the same time; social inequality
has multiple functions that reflected in China’s core problems, and the high level of social
inequality lowers the consumption level, the household of productive capital and the
interpenetration of cognitive institutionalization that are the key to solve the rebalancing
problem.
3) The rebalance of the economy. Since it is unrealistic to assume that export in the future
can remain China’s main demand axis, the imbalance between Supply (extremely high
investment) and demand (low domestic consumption) is the core problems for China’s
economic situation. To get its investment level down, China has to get its savings-level
down. However, the proportions for savings in China is half of China’s savings are
essentially SOE saving. In other words, unless efficiency SOE reforms are carried out, the
saving-levels cannot really get down. On the other hand, households’ savings depends on
the development of national welfare system; the lack of government funds, high level in
social inequality are all drag the process in rebalancing.
4) The transformation to a post-industrial society It has become clear that China has lost its
competitiveness and been running out of old drivers without attain new ones. Since export-
oriented growth no longer feasible with higher labor cost and no low hanging technological
fruits, the productivity issue is related to the question about moving up the value chain; in
this way, the problem can be solved by technological upgrading and become innovative. In
China, it is clear that government-directed and centrally planned mode present the political
repression and weakness of China’s civil society, the transformation seems very difficult or
even impossible to achieve.
Added to all these analysis above, the core boom and slowdown in China comes from its
policies and institutional structures. To re-establish an adequate societal and economic
resource-allocation in China goes to the heart of the question of reform but can’t not take
place without major institutional changes. Related to there are no sufficient reforms and
institutional changes can be performed in a short time, and without reforms, China could not
enhance its human capital to move up the value chain in the speed, the transformation into
a post-industrial society process would move into a dilemma as well. Meanwhile, the
declining productivity and lost competitiveness probably would make China trapped in the
middle-income trap. Until now, the reform plans are highly idealize and flawed to solve the
urgent issues in China thoroughly, moreover, it is extremely important to be aware of the
timedimension in all reforms or transitions; the Chinese economic slowdown is coming with
its investment boom, bad debt, lost of old drivers, etc. The changing needs years of time to
get transformation even China act effective reforms now. China does not have endless time
to solve all the problems. The consensus has it that China’s economy is stagnating or at
least failing to grow as much as expected. In the face of these threats, the principal
challenges facing China today are serious.

d. Política monetaria y comercial de EE.UU. El Acuerdo Trans Pacífico (TPP), Nuevas

perspectivas con el actual Presidente de los Estados Unidos.

Monetary policy concerns the actions of a central bank or other regulatory authorities that
determine the size and rate of growth of the money supply. For example, in the United
States, the Federal Reserve is in charge of monetary policy, and implements it primarily by
performing operations that influence short-term interest rates.

U.S. monetary policy affects all kinds of economic and financial decisions people make in
this country—whether to get a loan to buy a new house or car or to start up a company,
whether to expand a business by investing in a new plant or equipment, and whether to put
savings in a bank, in bonds, or in the stock market, for example. Furthermore, because the
U.S. is the largest economy in the world, its monetary policy also has significant economic
and financial effects on other countries. The object of monetary policy is to influence the
performance of the economy as reflected in such factors as inflation, economic output, and
employment. It works by affecting demand across the economy—that is, people’s and firms’
willingness to spend on goods and services. While most people are familiar with the fiscal
policy tools that affect demand—such as taxes and government spending—many are less
familiar with monetary policy and its tools. Monetary policy is conducted by the Federal
Reserve System, the nation’s central bank, and it influences demand mainly by raising and
lowering short-term interest rates. This booklet provides an introduction to U.S. monetary
policy as it is currently conducted by answering a series of questions: How is the Federal
Reserve structured? What are the goals of U.S. monetary policy? What are the tools of U.S.
monetary policy? How does monetary policy affect the U.S. economy? How does the Fed
decide the appropriate setting for the policy instrument?
How is the Federal Reserve structured? The Federal Reserve System (called the Fed, for
short) is the nation’s central bank. It was established by an Act of Congress in 1913 and
consists of the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., and twelve Federal Reserve
District Banks (see the map; for a discussion of the Fed’s overall responsibilities, see The
Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions). The Congress structured the Fed to be
independent within the government—that is, although the Fed is accountable to the
Congress and its goals are set by law, its conduct of monetary policy is insulated from day-
to-day political pressures. This reflects the conviction that the people who control the
country’s money supply should be independent of the people who frame the government’s
spending decisions.
What makes the Fed independent? Three structural features give the Fed independence in
its conduct of monetary policy: the appointment procedure for Governors, the appointment
procedure for Reserve Bank Presidents, and funding.

Appointment procedure for Governors

Appointment procedure for Reserve Bank Presidents
Funding

How is the Fed “independent within the government”? Even though the Fed is independent
of Congressional appropriations and administrative control, it is ultimately accountable to
Congress and comes under government audit and review. Fed officials report regularly to
the Congress on monetary policy, regulatory policy, and a variety of other issues, and they
meet with senior Administration officials to discuss the Federal Reserve’s and the federal
government’s economic programs. The Fed also reports to Congress on its finances.
What are the goals of U.S. monetary policy? Monetary policy has two basic goals: to
promote “maximum” sustainable output and employment and to promote “stable” prices.
These goals are prescribed in a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act.
What do maximum sustainable output and employment mean? In the long run, the amount
of goods and services the economy produces (output) and the number of jobs it generates
(employment) both depend on factors other than monetary policy. These factors include
technology and people’s preferences for saving, risk, and work effort. So, maximum
sustainable output and employment mean the levels consistent with these factors in the
long run. But the economy goes through business cycles in which output and employment
are above or below their long-run levels. Even though monetary policy can’t affect either
output or employment in the long run, it can affect them in the short run. For example, when
demand weakens and there’s a recession, the Fed can stimulate the economy—
temporarily—and help push it back toward its long-run level of output by lowering interest
rates. That’s why stabilizing the economy—that is, smoothing out the peaks and valleys in
output and employment around their long-run growth paths—is a key short-run objective for
the Fed and many other central banks.
What are the tools of U.S. monetary policy? The Fed can’t control inflation or influence
output and employment directly; instead, it affects them indirectly, mainly by raising or
lowering a short-term interest rate called the “federal funds” rate. Most often, it does this
through open market operations in the market for bank reserves, known as the federal funds
market.
How does monetary policy affect the U.S. economy? The point of implementing policy
through raising or lowering interest rates is to affect people’s and firms’ demand for goods
and services. This section discusses how policy actions affect real interest rates, which in
turn affect demand and ultimately output, employment, and inflation.

Since December 2015, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has been gradually
increasing its target range for the federal funds rate as the economy has continued to make
progress toward the Committee's congressionally mandated objectives of maximum
employment and price stability. In the first half of this year, the Committee continued this
gradual process of scaling back monetary policy accommodation, increasing its target range
for the federal funds rate 1/4 percentage point at its meetings in both March and June. With
these increases, the federal funds rate is currently in the range of 1-3/4 to 2 percent (figure
44).14 The Committee's decisions reflected the continued strengthening of the labor market
and the accumulating evidence that, after many years of running below the Committee's 2
percent longer-run objective, inflation had moved close to 2 percent.
but monetary policy continues to support economic growth
Even after the gradual increases in the federal funds rate over the first half of the year, the
Committee judges that the stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby
supporting strong labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation. In
particular, the federal funds rate remains somewhat below most FOMC participants'
estimates of its longer-run value.

The Committee expects that a gradual approach to increasing the target range for the
federal funds rate will be consistent with a sustained expansion of economic activity, strong
labor market conditions, and inflation near the Committee's symmetric 2 percent objective
over the medium term. Consistent with this outlook, in the most recent Summary of
Economic Projections (SEP), which was compiled at the time of the June FOMC meeting,
the median of participants' assessments for the appropriate level of the target range for the
federal funds rate at year-end rises gradually over the period from 2018 to 2020 and stands
somewhat above the median projection for its longer-run level by the end of 2019 and
through 2020.1
The FOMC has continued to emphasize that, in determining the timing and size of future
adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, it will assess realized and
expected economic conditions relative to its maximum-employment objective and its
symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range
of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation
pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international
developments.
In evaluating the stance of monetary policy, policymakers routinely consult prescriptions
from a variety of policy rules, which can serve as useful benchmarks. However, the use and
interpretation of such prescriptions require, among other considerations, careful judgments
about the choice and measurement of the inputs to these rules such as estimates of the
neutral interest rate, which are highly uncertain (see the box "Complexities of Monetary
Policy Rules").

After wearing market’s patience thin in 2016 with an unexpected and prolonged pause in its
normalization strategy, the Fed regained its footing in 2017. Interest rates were lifted by
25bp three times (in line with the committee’s expectation heading into the year), the
process of unwinding the Balance Sheet was communicated and executed while at the
same time the transition between Yellen and her successor (Powell) was solidified. As a
result, market and consensus expectations are now more closely aligned with a gradual, but
steady increase in interest rates in 2018 and beyond. In fact, the gap that remains relates
more to the terminal level of this tightening cycle than the timing and pace of interest rate
normalization, as markets have now aligned with our baseline of three additional 25bp rate
increases in 2018.
Given that the normalization policy has gained traction, the greatest source of uncertainty
stems from the shifting composition of the FOMC board and the inward rotation of new
regional presidents. This year, the board is likely to have a new chair, at least two new
governors (potentially three more), a new vice chair and head at the NY Fed, and a new
head of regulatory affairs. Assuming all the governors seats are filled with candidates with
similar attitudes towards monetary policy— traditional policy-rule wonks— such as Quarles
and Goodfriend there would be a non-trivial shift in the board’s voting bias from slightly
dovish to hawkish. This hawkish bias will also be reinforced by the rotation of regional
presidents: Cleveland Fed President Mester will be voting in 2018, Kashkari (Minneapolis)
and Evans (Chicago) will not be voting, and the new Richmond Fed President Thomas
Barkin will be a voting for the first time this year. As such, the committee’s tolerance for
higher inflation may be limited In terms of the new Chair, the greatest test will be of Powell’s
leadership style, which will face scrutiny in the early phases of his tenure. Powell will be a
break from the previous two Chairs who had pedigreed economic backgrounds. He does
have political and financial experience, serving as Undersecretary of the Treasury under
George H. W. Bush and as a partner in the private equity firm the Carlyle group. However,
Powell’s main work as a governor has been behind the scenes, working to respond to the
2014 Treasury debt flash crash while also leading the effort to reform the London Interbank
Offered Rate market. As a result, while he is likely to be committed to the Fed’s symmetric
2% inflation goal and believes that the best way to combat the next downturn is to bring
inflation back to 2% he also favors a strong risk management approach and clear
delineation between monetary policy and macroprudential tools. With respect to the political
economy and fiscal policy, he may be more tolerant than the current Chair, but is not likely
sacrifice price stability for short-term growth objectives. Nevertheless, with inflation moving
closer to the Fed’s target and the labor market clearly surpassing levels the committee
would deem to be consistent with the long-run, there is a chance the more conservative
board will devote more attention to financial conditions. Frist, concerns over the inversion of
the yield curve could grow: there are fears from a market signaling perspective— markets
react to inversion signals rather than precede it— and from a leading indicator perspective
— the concern that if the inversion is a reflection of weakening economic growth. The
former would suggest slowing the pace of normalization to allow the term-premium to rise,
the latter would imply a faster pace of normalization in an effort to prepare monetary policy
for the next shock. Second, U.S. equity markets, while not irrationally overbought by some
metrics, have experienced their second longest Bull Market and are poised to surpass the
1990s, which was the longest Bull Market in history. Third, home price pressures continue
to build despite tighter financial conditions and decreasing affordability. Fourth, the dollar
has weakened in spite of the Fed leading the normalization push in developed economies, a
trend that could complicate the inflation outlook. Last, although the Fed’s modus operandi
with respect to tax reform has been that it will mostly affect the supply-side and thus will not
greatly impact their outlook for inflation, there is a chance that some of the more hawkish
appointments begin to exercise their Taylor-like instincts and advocate for a less
acquiesced policy. While the scrutiny surrounding these factors may grow, there is unlikely
to be a major divergence in the normalization notwithstanding a major blow to market’s or
investor’s confidence. Both the change in committee zeitgeist and the fact that the
committee is close to achieving their dual-mandate suggest that the Fed will also start giving
more attention to policy options in the out years. While we do not expect a change in
strategy in the short-term, there could be serious discussions about possible adjustments to
the targets and tools. Possible alternatives to the current framework of inflation targeting
include policies such inflation-level targeting and nominal GDP targeting. Similarly, with the
benefit of hindsight, discussions on the non-traditional monetary policy tools used during the
crisis such as quantitative easing, forward guidance and financial regulation and their
efficacy will surely grow. However, if history serves as precedent the committee and
Congress will be reluctant to expand the scope or approach of monetary policy any time
soon. Our baseline scenario assumes three additional rate increases in 2018 and two more
in 2019. However, with both headline and core measures of inflation rising, market-based
inflation expectations reaching 3-year highs, potential spillovers from weak dollar, a rebound
in commodity prices, expansionary fiscal policy and tightening labor markets, the probability
of four rate moves in 2018 continues increasing.
The Federal Reserve (Central Bank of the United States) is in a process of monetary
normalization. What does it mean and what effects does it have on Peru? Let's do some
history. In September 2008, the US financial crisis broke out with the collapse of investment
bank Lehman Brothers. The FED (Federal Reserve System) put its interest rate at zero.
Having no impact on economic growth, designed economic stimulus programs, called
Quantitative Easing (QEs), which consisted of injecting electronic money to commercial
banks. The idea was that these banks with the money they now have, will increase the
loans and thus reactivate the economy. The QEs, which ended in 2014 in a process called
tapering, have been the subject of extensive discussions regarding their effectiveness.
The FED has two objectives: first, monetary stability, defined as the achievement of annual
inflation of 2%, non-explicit goal, unlike Peru. Second, full employment, understood as an
unemployment rate that is around 5%. For the latter the economy needs to grow.

Since 2016, both objectives have been achieved, but there are fears regarding their
sustainability, as many believe that growth is still weak. In 2015 it grew 2.9%, 1.5% in 2016
and 2.2% is expected in 2017, far from the annual 2.6%, which was the average for the
period 1999-2008.

However, there is already talk of monetary normalization, which means that the interest rate
of the FED returns to the levels it had before 2008. In other words, that the interest rate
goes up. What is not known is the rate at which it would increase.

In this context, Donald Trump has already appointed the successor to Janet Yellen, current
president of the FED; This is Jerome Powell of the Republican Party, which has committed
to continue with a gradual monetary normalization, in the style of Yellen. This means that
slow increases in the interest rate would be expected, although their appointment has
generated uncertainty. The nomination depends on the approval of the Senate and would
take effect from February 1, 2018.

Let's assume a gradual monetary normalization. This would imply slow rises in the interest
rate, but without pause; Analysts expect four increases for 2018, as long as the US
economy grows and inflation is around 2%. In that case, we could expect a stable dollar
with a slight upward trend in Peru, as long as the rest of the factors, such as China, remain
as they are now. In the case of a more accelerated normalization, something unlikely, we
could estimate somewhat more sharp increases in the exchange rate in Peru.

We do not know what the scenario will be, but what is a fact is that the monetary
normalization in the USA is already underway.

The Federal Reserve (Central Bank of the United States) is in a process of monetary
normalization. What does it mean and what effects does it have on Peru?

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), also called the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
is a defunct proposed trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States signed
on 4 February 2016, which was not ratified as required and did not take effect. After the
United States withdrew its signature,[6] the agreement could not enter into force. The
remaining nations negotiated a new trade agreement called Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which incorporates most of the
provisions of the TPP and which entered into force on 30 December 2018.

The TPP began as an expansion of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership

Agreement (TPSEP or P4) signed by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2005.
Beginning in 2008, additional countries joined the discussion for a broader agreement:
Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam, bringing
the negotiating countries to twelve. In January 2017, the United States withdrew from the
agreement.[5][7] The other 11 TPP countries agreed in May 2017 to revive it[8][9] and
reached agreement in January 2018. In March 2018, the 11 countries signed the revised
version of the agreement, called Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership.[10] After ratification by six of them (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand and Singapore), the agreement came into force for those countries on 30
December 2018.

The original TPP contained measures to lower both non-tariff and tariff barriers to trade,[11]
and establish an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism.[12][13] The U.S.
International Trade Commission,[14] the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the
World Bank and the Office of the Chief Economist at Global Affairs Canada found the final
agreement would, if ratified, lead to net positive economic outcomes for all signatories, while
an analysis using an alternative methodology by two Tufts University economists found the
agreement would adversely affect the signatories.[Note 1] Many observers have argued the
trade deal would have served a geopolitical purpose, namely to reduce the signatories'
dependence on Chinese trade and bring the signatories closer to the United States.[24][25]
[26][27]

US TRADE POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION During the campaign,

Donald Trump emphasized three recurring themes in the area of trade policy.5 The first was
the importance of trade balances, including bilateral trade balances. In this view, a major
challenge facing the United States is its $500 billion merchandise trade deficit, around half
of which is with China, with Japan and Korea also contributing. Trump and his advisors
interpret the deficit as a net reduction in aggregate demand that depresses output below
capacity and constrains labor below its full employment level. From Trump’s perspective,
the second and third themes of his campaign, currency manipulation to gain unfair
advantage in trade and “disastrous” trade agreements, provide both the explanation for the
deficit problem and the starting points for a solution. With respect to the former, much of his
focus has been on China. On his campaign website, Trump promised that “On day one of
the Trump administration the U.S. Treasury Department will designate China as a currency
manipulator” and to “begin a process that imposes appropriate countervailing duties on
artificially cheap Chinese products” (emphasis in the original).6 Trump advisors
subsequently criticized Germany as well for currency manipulation. On trade policy, Trump
 lambasted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and indeed pulled the United States out of
TPP negotiations shortly after assuming office. With respect to existing agreements, he
repeatedly called the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) the “worst in history,”
threatened to slap 35 percent tariffs on imports from Mexico, and indicated that he was
prepared to abrogate the pact if it were not renegotiated to his satisfaction.7 Trump
repeatedly called the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) a “job-killer,” asserting
that the deal caused the destruction of 100,000 American jobs.8 He expressed hostility
toward outward foreign direct investment, and this attitude disinclines him toward concluding
the bilateral investment treaty with China, which was left unfinished when President Barack
Obama left office. Since coming into office, the administration has pursued an explicitly
mercantilist trade policy, though thankfully action has not yet risen to the bombastic rhetoric
of the campaign trail. It is unclear whether the relative lack of concrete action reflects the
distance between governing and the political theater of the campaign trail, the biding of time
for the optimal moment to act, the slowness of American governments with their thousands
of political appointments to get organized (and the Trump administration has been unusually
slow to fill positions), or sheer disorganization. It would be a mistake however to interpret
the mixed record of fulfilling campaign pledges as signaling a lack of intent. Although
President Trump did not honor his pledge to declare China a currency manipulator his first
day in office and impose a tariff to offset the advantage of currency undervaluation, he did
withdraw US support for TPP; has issued the Executive Order Regarding the Omnibus
Report on Significant Trade Deficits (March 31, 2017), which could be interpreted as laying
the intellectual and policy groundwork for substantial new protection; issued Executive
Order On Buy American and Hire American, which expanded domestic preferences in
public procurement and tightened immigration rules; initiated the renegotiation of NAFTA
with a threat to abrogate the agreement if results of the renegotiation were not satisfactory
and indicated an interest in terminating or renegotiating KORUS; and has embarked on
intensified contingent or process protection.

e. El debate de la desigualdad y la agenda del desarrollo.

The pursuit of equality and effciency in the framework of environmental sustainability
acquires special urgency in the light of recent international trends, which reflect significant
economic, technological and geopolitical changes. While they open up avenues for
investment and learning, these changes heighten uncertainty and can exacerbate the
region’s technology lag. A. Growing tensions in globalization Nearly a decade after the
global fnancial crisis began, the three large economic blocs (the United States, Europe and
East Asia) are all growing simultaneously for the frst time, albeit at very different paces,
while growth in developing countries has been boosted by the upturn in commodity prices.
Meanwhile, the digital revolution is picking up speed, driven by the development of global
digital platforms and the scale and network effects of extending access to digital services to
nearly two thirds of the world population and the increasing importance of those platforms
across the economy. The combination of different response rates to the crisis, sustained
economic growth in China and the struggle for control of the nerve centres of the digital
economy has led to unexpectedly strong geopolitical tensions. Competition in global
markets has exposed all countries, but particularly the transition economies, to the effects of
globalization, as a result of policies to liberalize international trade and FDI fows, ntensifed
by technological progress, particularly in digital technologies, which helped to reduce
transaction costs and develop global production chains. Globalization and rapid growth in
some developing economies (particularly in China and East Asia) have signifcantly reduced
the income gap among countries. However, not all countries have benefted equally from
globalization. Moreover, income distribution within many countries became more unequal
between the early 1980s and the mid2010s, despite economic growth, heightening
concerns and raising international debate about the concentration of income and wealth.
Although inequality has declined between countries, it has reached its highest level in
decades within the more developed regions, and the Gini index (the most commonly used
measure of inequality) has increased in almost all regions of the world. The coeffcient for
the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was
0.32 in 2014, its highest value since the 1980s; while in China it rose from 28.6 in the 1980s
to 48 in 2012 (according to latest available data). Latin America was the only exception to
this trend, as it has seen income concentration reach an all-time low over the last decade,
albeit it remains the world’s most unequal region.
We have taken advantage of a new comprehensive data set to look at the relationship
between inequality, redistribution, and growth; earlier work on the inequality-growth
relationship has generally confounded the effects of redistribution and inequality. Our focus
has been on the medium and long term, both growth over five-year periods and the duration
of growth spells. Several important conclusions emerge. First, inequality continues to be a
robust and powerful determinant both of the pace of medium-term growth and of the
duration of growth spells, even controlling for the size of redistributive transfers. Thus, the
conclusions from Berg and Ostry (2011) would seem to be robust, even strengthened. It
would still be a mistake to focus on growth and let inequality take care of itself, not only
because inequality may be ethically undesirable but also because the resulting growth may
be low and unsustainable
And second, there is surprisingly little evidence for the growth-destroying effects of fiscal
redistribution at a macroeconomic level. We do find some mixed evidence that very large
redistributions may have direct negative effects on growth duration, such that the overall
effect—including the positive effect on growth through lower inequality—may be roughly
growth-neutral. But for non-extreme redistributions, there is no evidence of any adverse
direct effect. The average redistribution, and the associated reduction in inequality, is thus
associated with higher and more durable growth. We need to be mindful about over-
interpreting these results, especially for policy purposes. It is hard to go from these sorts of
correlations to firm statements about causality. We have not accounted for the possible
effects that redistribution may have on market inequality. We have emphasized the
uncertainty caused by the scarcity of reliable data, particularly about redistribution. Our
measure of redistribution captures only direct taxes and subsidies, for example, so we shed
no direct light on the redistributive effects of in-kind government provision of health and
education which a priori would seem, if anything, to be more growthfriendly than the
measures we account for. Finally, we know from history and first principles that after some
point redistribution will be destructive to growth, and that beyond some point extreme
equality also cannot be conducive to growth. We nonetheless see an important positive
conclusion from our look at the big picture. Extreme caution about redistribution—and thus
inaction—is unlikely to be appropriate in many cases. On average, across countries and
over time, the things that governments have typically done to redistribute do not seem to
have led to bad growth outcomes, unless they were extreme. And the resulting narrowing of
 inequality helped support faster and more durable growth, apart from ethical, political, or
broader social considerations. This leaves a large research and policy agenda. Even given
these results about average effects, it remains important to try to make redistribution as
efficient as possible. And further insight into the mechanisms at play would help sharpen our
understanding and policy recommendations. Our results here highlight the urgency of this
agenda

4. Conflictos internacionales
a. El nuevo escenario de conflicto en la era ge

Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a
means to create terror among masses of people; or fear to achieve a religious or political
aim.[1] It is used in this regard primarily to refer to violence during peacetime or in war
against non-combatants.[2] The terms "terrorist" and "terrorism" originated during the
French Revolution of the late 18th century[3] but gained mainstream popularity during the
U.S. presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981–89) after the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings[4]
and again after the 2001 September 11 attacks[5][4][6] and the 2002 Bali bombings.[4]

There is no commonly accepted definition of "terrorism".[7][8] Being a charged term, with

the connotation of something "morally wrong", it is often used, both by governments and
non-state groups, to abuse or denounce opposing groups.[9][10][4][11][8] Broad categories
of political organisations have been claimed to have been involved in terrorism to further
their objectives, including right-wing and left-wing political organisations, nationalist groups,
religious groups, revolutionaries and ruling governments.[12] Terrorism-related legislation
has been adopted in various states, regarding "terrorism" as a crime.[13][14] There is no
universal agreement as to whether or not "terrorism", in some definition, should be regarded
as a war crime.[14][15]

According to the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the University of Maryland,

College Park, more than 61,000 incidents of non-state terrorism, resulting in at least
140,000 deaths, were recorded between 2000 and 2014.[16]
A fall in the intensity of conflict in the Middle East, the decline of ISIL, and an increase in
counterterrorism activity has meant that the total number of deaths from terrorism declined
for the third consecutive year, falling by 27 per cent to 18,814 deaths in 2017. This
compares to 25,774 the year before. The number of deaths has now fallen 44 per cent from
its peak in 2014. The year on year fall in deaths was mirrored by a fall in the number of
attacks, which fell 23 per cent from 2016 to 2017. Preliminary data for 2018 suggests that
despite the intensification of conflict in some areas, most notably Nigeria, the downward
trend will continue. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) found that the decrease in the impact
of terrorism was spread across many countries, with many more improving than
deteriorating. Ninety-four countries improved their score, compared to only 46 that
deteriorated. Similarly, there was a fall in the number of terrorist attacks in 61 countries,
while 51 countries had a reduction in the total number of deaths from terrorism. The single
greatest improvement occurred in Iraq, where the number of deaths fell from 9,783 in 2016
to 4,271 in 2017, a 56 per cent improvement. This fall in deaths in Iraq meant that the
highest number of deaths from terrorism in 2017 was recorded in Afghanistan, marking only
the third time in the last 15 years that Iraq did not have the highest number of deaths from
terrorism. Figure 1.1 shows the composition of deaths from terrorism by country for 2016
and 2017. Of the countries that experienced the most deaths from terrorism, only Somalia
saw a significant increase, with a small increase also occurring in Afghanistan. Although the
number of deaths from terrorism is now at its lowest level since 2013, it is still a major global
threat. Deaths remain substantially higher than a decade ago, and are still nearly three
times as high as the number recorded in 2001. Terrorism also remains a widespread
problem, with 67 countries experiencing at least one death in 2017, and 19 countries
recording over 100 deaths.
The last decade has seen a significant increase in both the level of conflict and the impact
of terrorism around the world. In 2014, battle-related deaths reached a 25-year high and
deaths from terrorism also peaked. While the impact of terrorism has been increasing slowly
for most of the past 30 years, the number of battle-related deaths has fluctuated with the
onset of different conflicts. Although the number of battle-related deaths has risen in recent
years, it has not come close to the 200,000 deaths per annum recorded in 1985. Figure 2.7
shows the trend in battle deaths and deaths from terrorism over the past 20 years, as well
as an index chart of the change in both variables since 2001. While the total number of
deaths from terrorism is much smaller than the total number of battle deaths, the
percentage change in both has been very similar, particularly from 2011 onwards. From
2011 to 2014, battle-related deaths increased 356 per cent, while deaths from terrorism
increased 353 per cent. The downward trend over the past three years has also been
remarkably similar, with battlerelated deaths falling 34 per cent between 2014 and 2017,
and deaths from terrorism falling just under 44 per cent over the same period. The same
trend can be observed by looking at violent conflict deaths and deaths from terrorism, for
the countries with the highest level of terrorism. The relationship between these two
variables is shown in figure 2.8 for the six countries most affected by terrorism.

International Rel ations Theory and Cyber Security

The opportunities provided by the information and communications technology, with a special
emphasis on the Internet, have become an integral part of life. However, are we sufficiently aware
and prepared as individuals, nations or the international community for the threats coming from
cyberspace or for the denial of the use of that dimension of communication, commerce and even
warfare? Namely, despite the growing number of users, the Internet is still beyond or below
minimum regulation. Those are precisely the conditions for the organization and realization of
hostile action in cyberspace. There are security issues within the cyberspace that represent a
security risk and challenge of modern times. The development and application of the information
and communications technology has created a new battleground. As a special challenge to
international security, cyber terrorism arises. Cyber security will significantly affect international
relations in the 21st century. This paper gives an overview of the concepts and principles of cyber
threats that affect the safety and security in an international context.
Cyber warfare and terrorism do not know borders. Action in cyberspace requires the rejection of
the common assumptions related to time and space because such attacks, by means of modern
information and communications networks, can be performed from anywhere in a very short time.
The processes of globalization did not have the impact only on the achievements of civilization, but
also on the development of new threats to the civilization. It is a fact that terrorism and national
threats changed under the influence of the globalization process and the Internet information
revolution. Strategic advantage no longer lies in the fighting power or geographical location, but in
the information and knowledge. International cooperation and intelligence sharing are essential for
an effective prevention of cyber threats. Even though cyber threats have in the recent years been
specifically emphasized in the modern military doctrines of great powers and NATO, they are still
shrouded in secrecy. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to cyber threats, which
endanger the safety of modern states, organizations and international relations. By combining the
principles of a review and professional research paper, this paper aims to show cyberspace, in terms
of security challenges, as a dimension in which international relations unfold. It is necessary to
distinguish the main subjects of the international cyber security environment, analyze their
intentions and set a paradigm of the multipolarity of cyberspace and analyze its uniqueness and
principles. NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted at the end of 2010 at the Lisbon summit, determines
that cyber-attacks have become more frequent, more organized and more expensive, causing
damage to the government administration, the business sector, economies, and potentially to the
transport and supply. It also states that cyber-attacks can reach the level that threatens the national
and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Foreign military and intelligence services,
organized criminals, terrorists and extremist groups are the potential sources of such attacks. What
is also emphasized in the conclusions of the Lisbon summit is the need to further develop the skills
of prevention, recognition, defense and recovery from cyber-attacks, including the use of the NATO
planning process for the advancement and coordination of the national abilities of cyber protection,
assembling all NATO bodies under a centralized cyber protection, and a better integration of the
NATO cyber awareness, warnings and common response of the member states [1]. It should be
borne in mind that the rapid development and adoption of technologies through their use in
everyday life opens up many opportunities for the attackers, whether they are in the form of states,
terrorists or criminals, because they are always at an advantage in cyberspace. We can therefore
conclude that, a new concept of cyber security in which prevention represents a significant portion
is being created. The initial hypothesis is that cyberspace is a growing security risk and challenge of
modern times. Moreover, cyber security will significantly affect international relations in the 21st
century, while the threats and challenges will exponentially increase. The goal of this paper is the
synthesis and analysis of knowledge based on a review of recent literature and professional and
scientific articles that problematize the challenges of international security in cyberspace. The
scientific work seeks to show cyberspace as an operational dimension of international relations in
terms of the cyber security challenges. With the systematization of the cyber warfare strategy and
the very methods of attack, links with the planned action will be set up through the application of
technical, computing and network systems.
The topic of the paper, cyber threats to international security, stands out merely by its title as an
interesting and challenging area of research. The explanation for it is first and foremost that the
area has not yet been sufficiently explored, especially not in the Croatian context. Due to the
intensive development of international relations in cyberspace, conditioned and supported by the
speed of the development of technologies and their implementation in the relations of states,
organizations and individuals, this area will always be interesting and challenging. That conclusion
arises from the constant change of attitudes and technology. It is precisely that instability which
indicates that from that specific, interdisciplinary field of research, in 5 or 10 years, it will be
possible to draw some new conclusions, and according to them, set some new paradigms and
doctrines. Carr [7] states that cyber-warfare has been present for about a decade, but that it is still
not well defined. There is no valid international agreement which would establish a legal definition
of an act of cyber aggression. In fact, the entire area of international cyber law is still unclear. The
development and availability of information and communications technologies and the ever-present
tensions between politically and ideologically different states have conditioned the international
relations in cyberspace. Strategic domination in cyberspace has not yet been achieved by any of the
entities of international relations. A large number of international entities demonstrated their
presence and willingness to act in cyberspace. That demonstrates a multipolar dimension of
cyberspace in which it is very unlikely that domination or bloc division will occur. The reasons lie in
the mutual mistrust and fear of espionage in the case of linking the defense systems. However, the
nations that are the most influential are the ones that are the most powerful, economically and
militarily, and at the same time are the most dependent of the cyber-infrastructure – the USA,
Russia and China. NATO also plays an active role. We can conclude that in the recent years, a new
concept of cyber security that can be defined as a paradigm of the multipolarity of cyberspace is
being created. Most authors predict an escalation of conflicts and intelligence activities in
cyberspace, which supports the confirmation of the initial hypothesis of this paper. They state that
cyber-attacks are among the biggest threats to the international security. Unlike conventional
conflicts, such attacks will become increasingly common, and they could, as a conventional attack,
cause large-scale destruction, even with fatal consequences. It is therefore essential to establish an
effective defense in which the key role is that of prevention, international cooperation and the
adoption of the internationally recognized, legally binding norms. Due to the increase in cyber-
terrorism and crime, it is necessary to organize systematic education and to strengthen operational
military, intelligence, police and civil centers for the defense from cyber-attacks. If we take into
consideration all that has been stated in the elaboration, and the confirmation of the initial
hypothesis, we can conclude that cyber security has become one of the prerequisites of the
democratic concept of life in the modern society.

The recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the increasing number of European terrorist 'foreign
fighters' highlight the need not only to reinforce the policy measures against radicalisation and
religious fundamentalism but also to understand the processes of these two phenomena in the
European context. Radicalisation is a complex matter that has not been defined uniformly in the
social sciences. It can be seen as a phenomenon of people embracing views which could lead to
terrorism, and is closely connected to the notion of extremism. Religious fundamentalism, a belief
in an absolute religious ideology with no tolerance for differing interpretations, is a contributing
factor to the development of radical opinions. Radicalisation is a dynamic process cutting across
social and demographic strata. Recent studies seeking to understand it suggest of the need to
profile the processes of recruitment, be it online or in places such as schools, mosques and prisons.
The causes of radicalisation are complex, drawing from the continuing conflicts in the Middle East,
the disconnectedness of large Muslim communities living in Western societies and their search for
identity. The process of recruitment occurs by way of extremist propaganda spread by terrorist
organisations with roots abroad, but operating in Europe. Radicalisation is a serious threat to
internal security in EU Member States, who retain the main competence in this matter. The
measures taken at EU level contribute to the fight against radicalisation by offering common
strategies, EU-wide cooperation networks and coordination of Member States' efforts Radicalization
has a long history as a tool used by various movements and even governments throughout history.
While the basis has remained roughly the same, the details have evolved through the ages and even
based on geography. Related to this, there have also been various definitions over time.
Radicalization has been looked at from different fields, though the most dominant ones are
psychology, sociology, political science and security studies. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008)
define radicalization as the change of beliefs, feelings and actions towards inter-group conflicts, yet
within that same article the definition changes to a mechanism of opposition politics as
well(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Meanwhile, Githens-Mazer (2012) recognizes a definition
where radicalization is a form of populism as a result of revolutionary opportunity to declining
power, yet he also recognizes that it is a process of moderates shifting to the extremes. It should be
noted here as well that he established an important difference between radical, radicalism and the
more recent word radicalization. The latter of which, he argues is often used interchangeably with
fundamentalism(Githens-Mazer, 2012). Mandel (2010) however argues that as it stands
radicalization is mostly a hollow concept and that caution must be maintained not to misuse it. The
definition he does relates radicalization to the moral position as velocity is to the physical, in that it
is a movement towards extremism from an original point. While more basic, this definition has a lot
of similarities with ones from the previous authors. As such, while there are many disagreements
about what radicalization is specifically and it has changed over time. There has been a historical
consensus that radicalization is a process from one point to a more extreme other point. This seems
to fall in line with observations made in reality as well, with radicalized individuals often being
considered extremist and the terms radical and extremist being used interchangeably in most
common language. In the next section I first look at the history of radicalization research to this
point, I then shortly discuss so

The last decades of the 20th century saw a continuous rise of radical Islam. The year 1979 marked
the start of a new era with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led to Jihadis joining the
Mujahideen from many Muslim countries around the world. With the establishment of Al Qaeda at
the end of the 1980s, the first terrorist network was created, which no longer limited itself to
attacks in specific countries or regions but developed a global aim. This rise of radical Islam can be
attributed to a multitude of factors. Among them are the search for identity and recognition, the
feeling or experience of marginalization – both politically and economically, opposition to secular
nationalist ideologies, frustration with regimes that are perceived as apostate and corrupt, the
weakness of educational systems, only to name a few. Several war-torn countries, where the state
has lost control of part of the territory, have served as virtual breeding grounds for terrorists, such
as Afghanistan, Somalia, and more recently Iraq and Syria. Terrorist groups have also improved their
mechanisms of propaganda and recruitment. With the recent Arab revolutions, many observers had
hoped that Al Qaeda and its affiliates would lose ground. This was mainly based on the assumption
that many followers would be diverted from the path of radicalism and violence through the
observation that change could be achieved by peaceful means. However, things developed quite to
the contrary. Radical Islam has profited from a dramatic increase in popularity the last few years,
and Al Qaeda and its affiliates like Jabhat al-Nusra as well as its split-offs, namely ISIS, have
witnessed what Mohammad Abu Rumman ably describes as “Al Qaeda Spring”, having undergone a
period of adaptation. The terrorist network has moved from a phase of a single Al Qaeda into one of
multiple Al Qaedas operating independently on numerous fronts. With this volume, we are
publishing several of the papers, which were presented at our 2014 conference on “The Rise of
Religious Radicalism in the Arab World”. The papers present different perspectives on radicalization
in the aftermath of the recent Arab revolutions and crises. Mohammad Abu Rumman describes the
impact of the Arab Spring on radical Islam and analyzes the transformations, which terrorist
organizations such as Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups have undergone since then. Beshir Abdel
Fattah argues that not only did the recent Arab revolution not prove a hindrance to radical Islam but
8 that, quite the contrary, radical Islamist organizations have grown and diversified since then.
Bissan El Cheikh analyzes the environment for extremism in Lebanon against the backdrop of the
Sunni-Shia divide. Hazem al-Amin portrays the case of a young Lebanese man who was involved in
the suicide attack against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut in 2014. Murad Batal al-Shishani addresses
the different phases of the relationship between the Salafi Jihadi groups and the state in Jordan.
Haider Saeed outlines the stages of the rise of ISIS in Iraq. Amr Hashim Rabie examines the rise of
Jihadi movements in Egypt after the fall of President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013. Alaya Allani
explains the spread of terrorist groups and activities in Tunisia following the Arab Spring and
discusses its economic and security implications. ElHakam Sukhni provides a perspective on Muslim
radicalization in Europe by describing the Salafi scene in Europe. The book concludes with a
summary of the conference proceedings, highlighting the most relevant questions and answers
from the discussions. FES Amman has created a line of work dedicated to Political Islam to shed light
on the various streams and trends, and to promote an educated discourse on Islamist movements.
In this context, a publication series was launched in 2007, under which ten books have been
published to date. Through these publications, we aspire to provide information on Islamist
movements, which both satisfies academic standards and is, at the same time, accessible and
understandable to a non-expert readership We wish you an interesting and insightful read, and
thank you for your interest in the events and publications of FES Amma……

The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions

that spread across the Middle East in late 2010. It began in response to oppressive regimes
and a low standard of living, beginning with protests in Tunisia (Noueihed, 2011; Maleki,
2011).[1][2] In the news, social media has been heralded as the driving force behind the swift
spread of revolution throughout the world, as new protests appear in response to success
stories shared from those taking place in other countries (see Howard, 2011)[3]. In many
countries, the governments have also recognized the importance of social media for
organizing and have shut down certain sites or blocked Internet service entirely, especially in
the times preceding a major rally (see The Telegraph, 2011).[4] Governments have also
scrutinized or suppressed discussion in those forums through accusing content creators of
unrelated crimes or shutting down communication on specific sites or groups, such as
through Facebook (Solomon, 2011; Seyid, 2011).[5]
The effects of the Tunisian Revolution spread strongly to five other
countries: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, where either the regime was toppled or
major uprisings and social violence occurred, including riots, civil wars or insurgencies.
Sustained street demonstrations took place in Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Iranian Khuzestan,[citation
needed]
Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan. Minor protests occurred
in Djibouti, Mauritania, the Palestinian National Authority, Saudi Arabia, and the Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara.[6] A major slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world is ash-
shaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām ("the people want to bring down the regime").[7]
The wave of initial revolutions and protests faded by mid-2012, as many Arab Spring
demonstrations were met with violent responses from authorities,[8][9][10] as well as from pro-
government militias, counter-demonstrators and militaries. These attacks were answered with
violence from protestors in some cases.[11][12][13] Large-scale conflicts resulted—the Syrian Civil War,
[14][15]
 Iraqi insurgency and the following civil war,[16] the Egyptian Crisis, coup and subsequent
unrest and insurgency,[17] the Libyan Civil War, and the Yemeni Crisis and following civil war.[18]
A power struggle continued after the immediate response to the Arab Spring. While leadership
changed and regimes were held accountable, power vacuums opened across the Arab world.
Ultimately it came down to a contentious battle between a consolidation of power by religious
elites and the growing support for democracy in many Muslim-majority states.[19] The early hopes
that these popular movements would end corruption, increase political participation, and bring
about greater economic equity quickly collapsed in the wake of the counter-revolutionary moves
by foreign state actors in Yemen and of the Saudi-UAE-linked military deep state in Egypt,[20] the
regional and international military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the destructive civil
wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.[21]
Some have referred to the succeeding and still ongoing conflicts as the Arab Winter.[14][15][16][17][18] As
of May 2018, only the uprising in Tunisia has resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic
governance

The Syrian Civil War (Arabic: ‫الحرب األهلية السورية‬, al-ḥarb al-ʾahlīyah as-sūrīyah) is an ongoing
multi-sided armed conflict in Syria fought between the Ba'athist Syrian Arab Republic led by
President Bashar al-Assad, along with domestic and foreign allies, and various domestic and
foreign forces opposing both the government and each other in varying combinations.[109]
The unrest in Syria, part of a wider wave of the 2011 Arab Spring protests, grew out of discontent
with the Assad government and escalated to an armed conflict after protests calling for his
removal were violently suppressed.[110][111] The war is being fought by several factions:
Ba'athist Syria and Syrian Armed Forces and its international allies, a loose alliance of majorly
Sunni opposition rebel groups (including the Free Syrian Army), the majority-Kurdish Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), Salafi jihadist groups (including al-Nusra Front), and the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), with a number of countries in the region and beyond being either
directly involved or providing support to one or another faction (Iran, Russia, Turkey, the United
States, as well as others).Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah support Ba'athist Syria and the Syrian Armed
with Russia conducting air operations since September 2015. The U.S.-led international coalition,
Forces militarily,
established in 2014 with the declared purpose of countering ISIL, has conducted airstrikes primarily against ISIL as
well as some against government and pro-government targets. Between 2015 and late 2018, the US also
supported the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (Rojava) and its armed wing, the SDF. Turkey, on the
other hand, has become deeply involved against the Syrian government since 2016, actively supporting the Syrian
opposition and occupying large swaths of northwestern Syria. Furthermore, while officially neutral, Israel has
conducted airstrikes against Hezbollah and Iranian forces, whose presence in southwestern Syria it views as a
threat.[112]International organizations have accused the Ba'athist Syrian government, ISIL, opposition rebel
groups, and the U.S.-led coalition[113] of severe human rights violations and of massacres.[114] The conflict has
caused a major refugee crisis. Over the course of the war, a number of peace initiatives have been launched,
including the March 2017 Geneva peace talks on Syria led by the United Nations, but fighting continues.

The last decades of the 20th century saw a continuous rise of radical Islam. The year 1979
marked the start of a new era with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led to Jihadis joining
the Mujahideen from many Muslim countries around the world. With the establishment of Al
Qaeda at the end of the 1980s, the first terrorist network was created, which no longer limited
itself to attacks in specific countries or regions but developed a global aim.
This rise of radical Islam can be attributed to a multitude of factors. Among them are the search
for identity and recognition, the feeling or experience of marginalization – both politically and
economically, opposition to secular nationalist ideologies, frustration with regimes that are
perceived as apostate and corrupt, the weakness of educational systems, only to name a few.
Several war-torn countries, where the state has lost control of part of the territory, have served
as virtual breeding grounds for terrorists, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and more recently Iraq
and Syria. Terrorist groups have also improved their mechanisms of propaganda and
recruitment.
With the recent Arab revolutions, many observers had hoped that Al Qaeda and its affiliates
would lose ground. This was mainly based on the assumption that many followers would be
diverted from the path of radicalism and violence through the observation that change could be
achieved by peaceful means. However, things developed quite to the contrary. Radical Islam has
profited from a dramatic increase in popularity the last few years, and Al Qaeda and its affiliates
like Jabhat al-Nusra as well as its split-offs, namely ISIS, have witnessed what Mohammad Abu
Rumman ably describes as “Al Qaeda Spring”, having undergone a period of adaptation. The
terrorist network has moved from a phase of a single Al Qaeda into one of multiple Al Qaedas
operating independently on numerous fronts.
In contrast to the initial expectations and indications that emerged with the beginning of the
democratic Arab Spring revolutions, the recent years have seen an increase and spread of Al
Qaeda and other organizations that are linked to it and adopt its beliefs and ideology. These
organizations all descend from radical Political Islam, whether they are recognized as part of Al
Qaeda or are simply compatible with its foundations based on ideological Islamic rhetoric, within
what has become known as the Salafi Jihadi movement. This movement became remarkably
strong in the internal Syrian conflict and regained its power and presence in Iraq, as it entered
into a military confrontation with the Iraqi military. Furthermore, it was able to reinforce its
presence in other areas, such as Yemen and Somalia, where it enjoys huge capabilities despite
the strikes it has received over the past years. A similar increasing role for the organization now
seems to be emerging in Libya, as the latter’s political and security situations deteriorate. The
paradox lies in the fact that Al Qaeda itself was seriously concerned when the Arab revolutions
erupted, especially after the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. Al Qaeda’s
organizational and intellectual leadership feared that these revolutions could create a huge
setback for the group, as Arab societies would be adopting democracy and opting for peaceful
change. However, the situation witnessed a complete turnaround. Instead of the fears and
concerns of losing popularity that occupied Al Qaeda members, the organization actually found a
vast space to operate in Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and managed to attract many new members and
supporters. These indicators on the spread and expansion of Al Qaeda raise two questions that
may stand behind this current rise. The first is linked to the factors and reasons that explain this
new rise, while the second is linked to future indicators in light of current developments. Namely,
are we heading toward the “radicalization” of the arena (i.e. the spread and diffusion of the
radical current), or is this rather just a temporary situation and not a hole that Arab societies will
be trapped in in the future? 10 This paper aims to answer the aforementioned questions, as well
as any others that might arise along the way, by addressing and investigating the following
issues: 1. The situation of Al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadi current on the eve of the democratic
Arab revolutions and the articulated changes and shifts they have gone through since the
September 11 events. 2. Al Qaeda immediately after the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions.
3. Regaining popularity and geographic spread. 4. People’s wagers in the face of tricky options.
It is difficult to accurately predict the next phase when relying on the current indicators. If we
rely on what is happening in the current scene and its prospects — such as the continuation of
the internal conflict in Syria, the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the growth of
security chaos in Libya — it will lead us to the one conclusion, namely that the radical Islamic
trend will invade the Arab region in the coming years if it has the right political, social and
economic environment. However, this expected turn of events might be obstructed along the
way and could be either slowed down or even take an exact opposite turn, just as happened in
Iraq when the Sahwa appeared and Al Qaeda clashed with the Sunni community and ended up
shrinking after a phase of rise and growth in previous years. As mentioned previously, Al Qaeda
— or Salafi Jihadi thought in general — is in fact the mirror image of the multi-dimensional crisis
in the Arab world. It is a choice made out of feelings of despair and disappointment amongst a
large number of young Arabs and Muslims, who express these outrageous feelings by joining or
adopting this radical trend as they have no other choice. It is also difficult to imagine the
possibility of Arab nations living with this ideological and behavioral pattern for long, because it
contradicts with all terms of modernity and globalization. Thus, this ideology or movement will
not grow or increase in pluralized democratic regimes where the rule of law and values of good
governance prevail, where people enjoy legal justice and equality and where no social group or
class is marginalized on a religious or sectarian basis. On the other hand, the radical movement
represents one of the supporters of the religiously conservative trend in the Arab world, which
adopts Islamist ideology. Successfully controlling and curbing this radical current lies in the
strengthening of the moderate trend, by merging it in the political equation and pushing it to
commit to the path of democracy and pluralization.
To many observers, it appeared that the Arab revolutions had created an appropriate
atmosphere for the launch of a process to stop the tide of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the
Arab states, in particular Al Qaeda and its various branches and affiliates. This is based on the
consideration that these peaceful revolutions proved beyond any reasonable doubt the failure of
Jihadi and Al Qaeda ideology, after they were able to achieve in a short period of time what
radical Islamist movements had failed to do over a period of 30 years from changing some of the
Arab regimes, something that had eluded the persistent and enduring efforts of these
movements. The likelihood of this proposal's validity is strengthened by the series of powerful
blows directed at Al Qaeda before the Arab revolutions, represented in ideological reviews that
were carried out by a number of Jihadi currents in the Arab region. They began from Egypt at the
hands of Al-Gama’a AlIslamiyya, followed by reviews from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement,
and then various other reviews from radical Jihadi organizations and movements in a number of
other countries. It became clear with time, however, that the situation was not as these
observers had thought. Following the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, there was a large growth
in Al Qaeda's activity in various parts of the Arab world, including: North Africa, through Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen, via Al Qaeda in the Arabia
Peninsula (AQAP); and in the Egyptian Sinai, as manifested in Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis, Ajnad Misr
and other groups. The rise of radical Islam in the Arab states during the second half of the last
century came as a result of a number of chronic factors, most notably: the weakness of political
and civil parties, widespread illiteracy, pervasive economic destitution, a flawed understanding of
the principles of Islam, and the populace’s anxiety at faltering secular ideologies and regimes.
Against the backdrop of the Arab revolutions, other factors were added to the aforementioned
and contributed, in turn, to a growth in the activity and spread of these radical Islamist
organizations and movements. Among the most important such factors are:  the presence of a
favorable environment for terrorism  developing mechanisms of recruiting fighters in radical
organizations  employing radical Islam politically the failure of the process to islamize these
revolutions by undermining the experience of moderate Political Islam in governance, which led
to fuelling confrontations between the authorities and Political Islam.
The rise of radical Islam on the popular Arab revolutions, which led to obstructing the process of
integrating moderate political Islam in the political process and undermined the democratic
transition that was emerging in the Arab world, encouraged many analysts to begin addressing
“post-radical political Islam”. In the 1990s, the world was full of “post” prefixes — from post-
modernism and post-Zionism, to post-colonialism and others. In critical theory, the “post” prefix
fundamentally means criticizing a former period and reviewing and critiquing what comes before
the “post”, paving the way for building or establishing a new stage. This is done through
searching for different options and features. Accordingly, “post-Islamism” refers to the phase in
which Islamist movements have reached a level of intellectual maturity and political tolerance
qualifying them to transition from takfir to beginning to think about undertaking an intellectual
review and practicing self-criticism. This will allow them to relinquish claims that they possess the
absolute truth, therefore authorizing them to renounce violence and accept others who differ
from them religiously, intellectually and politically. They can thus comply with the rules and
foundations of a democratic civil state, based on the idea of citizenship and belonging and loyalty
to the nation state, while abandoning the principles of the global project of political Islam
represented in the “mastering” of the world, the caliphate, the Islamic world, etc. In the same
vein, in a 1996 article titled “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society”, Iranian thinker Asef Bayat
discusses the social orientations and the political and religious perspectives in post-Khomeini
Iran. He argues that “Post-Islamist” means a transformation of the Islamist current as a whole —
on the level of ideology, approaches and practices — from fanaticism and extremism to flexibility
and moderateness. In the same context, Arab thinker Sadiq Jalal Al-Azm defines postIslamism as
the stage at which Islamists renounce the most radical and fundamental Islamism and return to
the “spontaneous” and “popular” Islam, which is more moderate and tolerant. In this sense, we
should closely contemplate what Algeria is witnessing these days in terms of the relationship
between the authorities and radical Islam. After 22 years of being banned, Algerian President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika has begun the process of re-integrating the Islamic Salvation Front into the
political process, through involving it in the current debate about planned constitutional reforms
in the country. Although this approach may infuriate the families of the victims of violence
committed by the Front against their compatriots during the 1990s, it also sends very important
and significant message when talking about “post-radical Islam”.
If there are any conclusions that can be drawn from the above, they are: 1. The Sunni sect does
not have a monopoly on religious radicalism in Lebanon. The Shiite Hezbollah, which was a
unique model in the Arab world until very recently, is a radical Islamic group that has a
combative doctrine and military capabilities that are almost comparable to any local branch of Al
Qaeda. This is not to mention its tremendous capabilities in attracting and recruiting supporters,
as well as imposing Sharia as a substitute for man-made laws. 2. Nationalist and Nasserist parties,
which polarized the public mood and engaged in the Civil War, were a channel for draining
violence, which for years was directed at a foreign enemy: Israel. 3. Following the Civil War, the
Sunnis emerged with political gains and the sect's social environment appeared too fragile and
delicate to produce rigid Al Qaeda models. Sunnis are distributed between two main cities —
Sidon and Tripoli — as well as the agricultural countryside, which is religiously mixed to a large
extent and cut off from the center. There is no doubt that this is a fertile environment for
sprouting individual cases of extremism, but the latter are more akin to crime that is rampant in
neglected regions where misery is widespread. A simple comparison between the number of
youth arrested for misdemeanors and crimes in an area like Tabbaneh, and these “extremists”,
shows that drug offenses and stabbings are more common than calls for Jihad. It appears that
the decision of some to fight in Syria is closer to a retaliatory action and individual choice, which
should be condemned first by the person's family. For example, the father of Qutaiba Al-Satem
went to the security services as soon as he heard that his son had died in a suicide attack to help
match DNA evidence. 4. The structure of Lebanese politics, which has not seen a unilateral leader
nor a concentrated central authority, plays a role in dispersing any potential target for this
tension, unless the target is situational or temporary (Hezbollah/Alawites in Tripoli). Here there is
no place for literature on topics such as “fighting tyrants”, rather they go further. The weakness
of the state and the authorities in general makes this a popular demand, specifically for the
Sunnis. The army is the first refuge for the sect in any external confrontation, and the latest
example of this is what happened in Sidon with Sheikh Al-Assir
Notes and Conclusions I think that it is likely that Ansar al-Sharia is involved in the political
assassinations, but there is a need for research into who is behind these assassinations. Is it a
single party or multiple ones? The classification of Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist organization in
Tunisia and Libya may be a prelude for removing the training centers from Libya, paving the way
for political changes in the future, most notably a re-positioning of the liberal current within civil
society, especially among women’s associations. Ansar al-Sharia was accused of sending these
girls. The radical Islam movements were reinvigorated by the Arab Spring, which raises questions
about the forces that have an interest in this spring. The fact that many Tunisian Jihadis from
Ansar al-Sharia traveled to Syria and fought in the ranks of ISIS raises many questions about the
role they may play when they return home. Will ISIS, which gained notoriety when it occupied
the city of Mosul and other provinces in Iraq on 10 June 2014, serve as an example to be imitated
by Ansar al-Sharia in the seven Arab countries where it is present? The average age of Ansar al-
Sharia members in Tunisia ranges from 18 to 25, and most of them come from the governorates
that face economic and social difficulties, namely the internal governorates (such as Jendouba,
Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, Siliana, and some cities in southern Tunisia like Medenine and Kebili) . 56
However, this group's followers also include members of educated and well-off social classes
from some coastal regions such as Sousse, Monastir, and Mahdia, in particular unemployed
graduates. Finally, I believe that removing the risk of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia is also linked to
developing religious discourse to adopt an enlightened approach, as well as preventing all
mosques from taking on political or partisan functions. This is in addition to improving economic
and social indicators, such as combatting smuggling and the parallel economy, supporting the
independence of the judiciary system and advancing development in marginalized regions,
whether they are border regions or those in the interior. In conclusion, I think that the risk of
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia is decreasing more and more, and some analysts link this to the
absence of moral support that it gained from some of its lobbies in the government. But what
has fundamentally led to the weakening of Ansar al-Sharia is the absence of a broad social base
in Tunisia that adopts Jihadi ideology. The next government is determined to resist terrorism and
prevent the political Islam movement from entering into the structural crisis in a number of Arab
Spring countries. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia is accused of coordinating with AQIM and Jabhat
AlNusra in Syria, both of which are internationally banned organizations. Thus, for some time the
number of resignations in the ranks this organization has increased in Tunisia. Ansar al-Sharia will
not vanish altogether from Tunisia, rather it may in the future regroup under new structures,
since ideological currents weaken but don't die out. Therefore, the stability of the political,
security and economic situation is the only solution to avert the danger of this organization. The
emergence of the phenomenon of “marriage Jihad”, which the minister of interior spoke about
and involved about 155 girls, provoked a strong reaction within civil society, especially among
women’s associations. Ansar al-Sharia was accused of sending these girls. The radical Islam
movements were reinvigorated by the Arab Spring, which raises questions about the forces that
have an interest in this spring. The fact that many Tunisian Jihadis from Ansar al-Sharia traveled
to Syria and fought in the ranks of ISIS raises many questions about the role they may play when
they return home. Will ISIS, which gained notoriety when it occupied the city of Mosul and other
provinces in Iraq on 10 June 2014, serve as an example to be imitated by Ansar al-Sharia in the
seven Arab countries where it is present? The average age of Ansar al-Sharia members in Tunisia
ranges from 18 to 25, and most of them come from the governorates that face economic and
social difficulties, namely the internal governorates (such as Jendouba, Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid,
Siliana, and some cities in southern Tunisia like Medenine and Kebili) . 56 However, this group's
followers also include members of educated and well-off social classes from some coastal regions
such as Sousse, Monastir, and Mahdia, in particular unemployed graduates. Finally, I believe that
removing the risk of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia is also linked to developing religious discourse to
adopt an enlightened approach, as well as preventing all mosques from taking on political or
partisan functions. This is in addition to improving economic and social indicators, such as
combatting smuggling and the parallel economy, supporting the independence of the judiciary
system and advancing development in marginalized regions, whether they are border regions or
those in the interior.
Mohammed Abu Rumman: Today's discussion can be summarized by a set of conclusions that do
not reflect final positions; rather they take the form of openended questions that call for more
in-depth discussion, namely:  Radicalism and moderation are two relative terms, and there is no
consensus on their meaning. While this conference addresses “The rise of religious radicalism”, it
was not intended to address all radical Islam movements, rather the Sunni movements in
particular. This was not done to show bias toward one side, and perhaps there will be other
conferences on Shiite, Jewish or Christian radicalism in the Arab region.  As most of the
conference speakers noted, the real problem lies in the collapse of moral values in Arab and
Islamic societies, and the latter's entrance into a stage of “savagery”. We have witnessed a state
of collapse in terms of the value of the state, moral authority and the middle class, and this has
been expressed through sexual harassment, collective rape, societal violence and drug abuse. As
most speakers also pointed out, the rise of religious radicalism is linked to these collapses (and
the absence of the political horizon), and is not fundamentally connected to ideology.  It has
been said that in the Arab world we spend a lot of time diagnosing phenomena at the expense of
discussing solutions. While this observation is 123 correct, the fact is that the problem lies in the
absence of precise and accurate diagnoses for the phenomena in the Arab world. And this
explains the absence of real and effective solutions. Based on the papers presented at the
conference, the question appears: Can the rise of radical Sunni Islam (Al Qaeda) be attributed to
religious and ideological reasons that produce these movements, as some suggested? But this
question calls for another question, which is: How do we explain the historical line of regression
from the rise of reformist Islam, to revivalist Islam (represented by the Muslim Brotherhood),
and finally reaching Jihadi Islam? Is the reason for this purely socioeconomic, whereby
socioeconomic problems produce religious violence just as they produce other forms of societal
violence? However, there are individual cases to which this socioeconomic standard does not
apply, in terms of radicals who have a high level of education and income, and who graduated
from prominent Western universities, and so on. Is one of the reasons political exclusion,
including the exclusion of moderate Islam? But some argue that the opposite is true, i.e. that the
presence of political Islam in the political game led to disastrous results. Here, too, an opposing
question arises: How do we explain — based on this view — the fact that the situation in Tunisia
was a success, whereas the Egyptian experience was a failure? Alaya Alani argues that the reason
is the presence of a strong civil society, which regulated the moderate political Islam movements.
 Another question emerges: Are radical religious movements on the rise? There is a consensus
that these movements (Al Qaeda and similar ones) are on the rise in the current stage. But the
important question is: Is this rise temporary or will it continue? In other words, is it a rise linked
to the current circumstances or will it continue for years? If the relationship between Al Qaeda
(including its branches) and the social environment was fragile, how do we explain the fact that
these organizations have remained in Raqqa and Fallujah?  Concerning the approach adopted to
face the rise of Al Qaeda, some have returned to emphasize the security approach, through calls
to strengthen the state, laws, and the security services in the face of Al Qaeda. However, is it not
true that this was the “solution” adopted in previous decades in the countries that produced Al
Qaeda, and therefore the latter group is the result of adopting a security approach? Hence, the
question is: Is the alternative to the security solution what was mentioned by Matenia Sirseloudi,
i.e. containing political Islam, alongside the presence of a strong civil society and a strong state
that prevent political Islam movements from dominating power?¡?
The Iraq War[nb 1] was a protracted armed conflict that began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by
a United States-led coalition that overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein. The conflict
continued for much of the next decade as an insurgency emerged to oppose the occupying
forcesand the post-invasion Iraqi government.[52] An estimated 151,000 to 600,000 or more Iraqis
were killed in the first three to four years of conflict. The U.S. became re-involved in 2014 at the
head of a new coalition; the insurgency and many dimensions of the civil armed conflict continue.
The invasion occurred as part of a declared war against international terrorism and its
sponsors under the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush following the September 11
terrorist attacks.
The invasion began on 20 March 2003,[53] when the U.S., joined by the United Kingdom and
several coalition allies, launched a "shock and awe" bombing campaign. Iraqi forces were quickly
overwhelmed as U.S. forces swept through the country. The invasion led to the collapse of
the Ba'athist government; Saddam was captured during Operation Red Dawn in December of that
same year and executed by a military court three years later. However, the power vacuum
following Saddam's demise and the mismanagement of the occupation led to widespread sectarian
violence between Shias and Sunnis, as well as a lengthy insurgency against U.S. and coalition
forces. Many violent insurgent groups were supported by Iran and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The United
States responded with a troop surge in 2007. The winding down of U.S. involvement in Iraq
accelerated under President Barack Obama. The U.S. formally withdrew all combat troops from
Iraq by December 2011.[54]
The Bush administration based its rationale for the warprincipally on the assertion that Iraq, which
had been viewed by the U.S. as a rogue state since the 1990–1991 Gulf War, possessed weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs) and that the Iraqi government posed an immediate threat to the
United States and its coalition allies.[55][56] Select U.S. officials accused Saddam of harbouring and
supporting al-Qaeda,[57] while others cited the desire to end a repressive dictatorship and bring
democracy to the people of Iraq.[58][59] After the invasion, no substantial evidence was found to
verify the initial claims about WMDs, while claims of Iraqi officials collaborating with al-
Qaeda were proven false. The rationale and misrepresentation of U.S. prewar intelligence faced
heavy criticism both domestically and internationally, with President Bush declining from his
record-high approval ratings following 9/11 to become one of the most unpopular presidents in
U.S. history.[60] From 2009 to 2011, the UK conducted a broad inquiry into its decision to go to war
chaired by Sir John Chilcot. The Chilcot Report, published in 2016, concluded military action may
have been necessary but was not the last resort at the time and that the consequences of invasion
were underestimated.[61]
In the aftermath of the invasion, Iraq held multi-party elections in 2005. Nouri al-Maliki became
Prime Minister in 2006 and remained in office until 2014. The al-Maliki government enacted
policies that were widely seen as having the effect of alienating the country's Sunni minority and
worsening sectarian tensions. In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) launched a military offensive in Northern Iraq and declared a worldwide
Islamic caliphate, eliciting another military response from the United States and its allies. The Iraq
War caused over a hundred thousand civilian deaths and tens of thousands of military deaths (see
estimates below). The majority of deaths occurred as a result of the insurgency and civil conflicts
between 2004 and 2007.

A decade after Saddam Hussein’s fall, Iraq still lacks a centralized foreign policy that advances its nation al
interests. Internal divisions, such as those between the Shia-dominated regime in Baghdad and
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil, have given rise to alternative power centers with
their own policy priorities. Iraqi foreign policy will remain disjointed and incoherent until
Baghdad resolves the issues polarizing the country. Key Themes • Iraq’s national interests in
building military capacity, reviving the energy sector, meeting domestic water and energy
demand, and increasing trade and investment have prompted Baghdad to rebuild relations with
regional and global partners. • Iraq’s rapidly growing economy is emerging as an engine of
growth in the Middle East and a key player in international energy markets. • Counterterrorism
cooperation with Washington and multibillion-dollar arms deals with Russia and the United
States have become cornerstones of Iraq’s international security posture. • Contracts with
Western, Chinese, and Russian energy companies have revitalized its oil sector, and Baghdad has
built relations with Iran, Turkey, several Gulf countries, Jordan, and Syria to help meet its energy-
transport, water, and electricity needs. • Erbil and many Sunni Arab opposition leaders have
pursued their own foreign relations and international priorities that often conflict with Baghdad’s
official foreign policies. • Baghdad has moderately supported the Syrian regime while Erbil and
Iraqi Sunnis have sided with the rebels in the ongoing civil war. This has exacerbated Iraq’s
fragmentation by pushing Baghdad closer to Iran, another Damascus supporter, while driving
Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis closer to Turkey and the Gulf countries backing the Syrian opposition.
Implications for Iraq’s Future • Despite its significant economic growth, Iraq will not regain
significant political or strategic influence in the Middle East for some time. • Until Iraq resolves
domestic disagreements over energy, internal borders, and power sharing, Erbil and the Sunnis
will continue advancing their own international agendas and Iraq will lack a coherent foreign
policy. • Developments in Damascus will affect Iraq’s foreign relations. A resurgent Syrian regime
will strengthen Baghdad and its ties to Iran, while opposition victories will empower Iraq’s
alternative power centers and force Baghdad to reconsider its regional alignments. • Any thaw in
Iran’s relations with the West—like the recent nuclear deal between Tehran and several world
powers—will reduce the tensions in Iraq’s foreign policy. • Iraq’s interests are best served by a
centrist foreign policy, not a narrow regional alliance with Iran. Baghdad should continue
pursuing strategic and economic relations with various Middle Eastern and international powers.
[In this paper I argue that the 2003 war on Iraq was illegal, and that this illegality matters. In the
first substantive part of the paper (Part II), I consider three legal justifications that have been
offered, to varying degrees, formally and informally, for the war. These are self-defence (and its
more contentious variants, anticipatory self-defence and preventative war), collective security
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and, finally, the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. None of these provides a secure basis for going to war. The most plausible of these
justifications, based on an interpretation of existing Security Council resolutions, is arcane and
unconvincing. Part III situates the debate over the war in the context of some recent dilemmas
concerning the international order; namely the problem of law in international affairs, the
question of novelty, the claims of equality, the assessment of evidence and the presence of
hyperpower. Part IV ends by reminding readers of the many and varied ways in which
international law does matter in ways that transcend the tedious debates about compliance.]
Our findings thus suggest that ethno-sectarian affinity and geopolitical dynamics can be
significant contributors to the risk of outside intervention in civil warfare. In particular, links
between the civil war rebel group and the governments of neighboring states significantly
increase the risk that neighbors will intervene by sending troops across the border, as do
material power advantages for potential interveners and high levels of combat intensity in the
civil war. Not all factors noted in either the scholarly literature or the policy debate are of
comparable importance, however—in particular, neither alliance links, Middle Eastern political
culture, nor refugee flows had statistically significant effects. The results improve our
understanding of intervention in particular and civil war in general and suggest the importance
both of combining geopolitical and affinity approaches to the study of internal warfare, and of
extending analysis to new explanatory variables outside either tradition. These findings also have
important implications for US foreign policy and the debate over Iraq. In particular, they imply a
meaningful danger that the Iraq war could spread if the United States withdraws and internal
violence in Iraq escalates. Many proponents of prompt withdrawal have argued that the risk of
intervention is exaggerated, and this assessment is often supported by arguments that Iraq’s
neighbors are too weak, or that Middle Eastern states resolve differences by appeasement rather
than invasion. The findings above, however, imply that the unique features of Iraq and its
neighborhood could have the opposite effect—increasing, not decreasing, the risk of
intervention in this war relative to others. Iraq presents an unusually interconnected ethno-
sectarian conflict in a neighborhood with a large number of potential interveners who share the
Sunni majority populations and⁄ or regimes of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency. The neighbors are
relatively weak now, but so is Iraq, and the region’s ongoing arms race stands to increase those
neighbors’ material capacity to intervene over time. Iraq is also a state with a civil war that
reached very high average intensity. These factors are all strongly linked with an elevated risk of
intervention in the data as a whole. And the findings above show no reason to expect that
anything unique to the Middle East region per se should imply any unusual freedom from
danger: whereas Africa, for example, is an especially intervention-prone region, the Middle East
is not significantly different from the rest of the world in this regard. By the same token, these
findings do not suggest that intervention is inevitable, as pessimists sometimes imply, and the
likelihood of immediate intervention is considerably lower than the risk over time. The danger is
real, but should not be exaggerated. And of course the findings above are based on necessarily
imperfect data, and statistical analyses never explain the totality of their variance; a degree of
caution is always in order in drawing policy implications from empirical analysis. It is also possible
that US withdrawal could reduce rather than increase the risk of civil warfare returning to Iraq,
though this is unlikely (Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack 2008). Nor does the empirical analysis
above suggest anything like a guarantee of disaster in the event that Iraqi internal violence does
escalate in the wake of a withdrawal. But the odds of intervention implied by the findings above
 are daunting all the same: it cannot safely be argued that there is only a negligible risk that a
rekindled Iraq war could spread. Perhaps most broadly of all, the results above suggest that
policy debates need not be conducted in isolation from empirical scholarship in international
relations. The theoretical and empirical literature has much to offer if framed appropriately and
extended where necessary to account for the particular issues at stake. Yet such decisions are
often made in the absence of any systematic consideration of the range of evidence and
experience that empirical scholarship can consider. Knowledge is important in its own right. But
where the stakes in public decision-making are as grave as those in war and peace, opportunities
to apply knowledge to inform public debate can be—and should be—exploited more often.

Iran Nuclear Weapons

Iran and its nuclear program is one of the most contentious and debated cases regarding nuclear weapons.
There are a number of questions surrounding the issue of Iran and nuclear weapons. Does Iran want nuclear
weapons? Are they working towards nuclear energy or towards the production of nuclear weapons? What has
been the international response to Iran’s quest for nuclear capabilities? What would be the geopolitical effects
if Iran tests a nuclear weapon? What are current diplomatic attempts to resolve the tension situation regarding
Iran’s nuclear program? Who are the different actors making these decisions? This article will go into detail
answering the different questions and discussion points regarding Iran’s nuclear program (Kerr, 2014).
History of Iran’s Interest in a Nuclear Program
Despite the recent attention to Iran’s interest in a nuclear program, Iran has had a history with regards to
issues of nuclear weapons as it relates to nonproliferation. Beginning in the early 1950, following the Second
World War, Iranian leader Mohamed Reza Shah actually began establishing a nuclear program, with the help
from the United States of America and the Atoms for Peace program. In addition, the Shah had goals to set up
nuclear power plants, a nuclear facility that could enrich uranium (one of the key elements in a nuclear
weapon), as well as facilities that can reprocess spent fuel (NTI, 2014) (which can then be used for nuclear
weapons). However, these plans were short-lived, as the Shah only stayed in power until January 1979, where
the Iranian revolution took place, causing him to step down, and also to leave the country. The new theocratic
regime, under the Supreme Ayatollah Khomeini, spoke out against nuclear weapons, viewing it against the
principles of Islam, thus ending Iran’s nuclear program (NTI, 2014). However, his position only lasted a handful
of years; in 1984, he was recommitted to the nuclear program (NTI, 2014).
In terms of its international commitments regarding nuclear weapons, Iran did signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1970, and agreed to terms with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
regarding safeguards as it relates to nuclear energy. It wasn’t until decades later, in 2002, that the IAEA
started looking in the possibility that Iran was working on illegal nuclear issues, and found that the Iranian state
did indeed violate some of the terms of the safeguards (Kerr, 2014). The reason that states became
suspicious of Iran’s nuclear activities is because “an opposition group revealed secret activity including
construction of a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy-water reactor at Arak (BBC, 2014).  This
period in 2002 was also around time that the United States and Iran relationship continued to worsen, with
President George W. Bush labeling Iran one of the “axis of evil” states, along with North Korea and Iraq (BBC,
2014). It was reported that Iran, with the help of Russia, was building the state’s first nuclear reactor (BBC,
2013). In 2003, the IAEA called for Iran to provide evidence that their nuclear ambitions were not towards
a nuclear weapon. Following Iran’s statement to stop enriching uranium, the IAEA said that there was not
evidence that a nuclear weapons program existed. However, the following year, the IAEA was upset because
of a lack of full cooperation by the Iranian state with regards to the transparency of their nuclear program. In
November of that year, Iran did agree (with the European Union) to stop enriching much of their uranium,
although again, in late August/early September 2005, Iran did again state that their uranium enrichment was
up and going again, but that it was not for nuclear weapons; the IAEA says that Iran is going against the NPT.
Iran further upset the IAEA, when they directly broke IAEA seals at one of the nuclear facilities (BBC, 2013),
leading the IAEA to go to the United Nations in 2006 (BBC, 2013; Kerr, 2014). In turn, the United Nations has
attempted to ensure that Iran is adhering to all necessary safeguard requirements. Furthermore, the IAEA
continued to work with Iran to attempt to satisfy the conditions for the nuclear program, trying to ensure that
Iran agrees with all necessary requirements. In 2008, Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA
at the time, was still concerned that Iran did not provide enough safeguards or information to ensure that they
had no interest or direction towards nuclear weapons (Kerr, 2014). 
However, Iran continued to enrich uranium. And because of this, sanctions continued in 2007 in 2008, and Iran
continues to test missiles in 2008 and 2009. In 2010, Obama supported additional sanctions against Iran for its
lack of halting its nuclear program. In 2012, sanctions against Iran increased significantly, particularly after
“ Iran says its scientists have “tested first nuclear fuel produced from uranium ore deposits inside the country”.
The IAEA confirms that Iran has started enriching uranium at Fordo to purities of 20 per cent” (BBC,
2013). Following threats of sanctions, Iran did not stop operate its nuclear program, thus leading to additional
sanctions in late 2013 (BBC, 2013). However, relations between Iran and other international actors improved
in 2013 when the new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani not only met with the United States and other major
powers, and coming to an initial agreement to limit nuclear activity, and in turn sanctions would be reduced
(BBC, 2013) (For a detailed timeline, see (BBC, 2013)). The recent discussions of a long term deal seem to
hinge on whether Iran will be willing to stop its uranium enrichment, as well as how far along it is from being
able to make a nuclear weapon; some in June of 2014 said Iran was a few months away, whereas Iran argued
that they were much further away (Dahl, 2014). And just this past United Nations General Assembly meeting
produced no agreement between Iran and the negotiating states; there is a deadline of November 24th for a
deal to be reached (NBC, 2014). Interestingly, on September 26th, 2014, during the yearly United Nations
General Assembly meeting in New York, it was reported that “the US is reportedly considering a proposal that
would let Tehran keep half of its centrifuges while reducing its stock of uranium gas so much that a weapon
would take over a year to create” (RT USA, 2014). There are also possibilities also mentioned as possibilities
of approaching the nuclear issue. For example, “[o]ther plans being considered include allowing Iran to have
more than 1,500 centrifuge machines, but removing or destroying much of the equipment like connecting
circuits and pipes needed to feed uranium gas” (RT, 2014). This would be a diplomatic move so that both
sides could claim they held ground on key positions; Iran could still enrich uranium, and the US could tout the
point that these new positions would extend the time it would take for Iran to reach weapons capabilities (RT,
2014).
Iran’s Nuclear Program
As Kerr (2014) explains “Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the
main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at
high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-
enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU),
which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in
certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran also has a uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium oxide
into several compounds, including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its
current and future power reactors” (1). Furthermore, there is also worry by some that Iran has a reactor that
will produce splent fuel that contains plutonium, which is used in nuclear weapons. The issue is whether Iran
will “reprocess” or split the plutonium from the fuel, which would be needed in order to use the plutonium for
nuclear weapons (Kerr, 2014). This is the point of contention; while Iran is assuring the international
community that it will not carry out that step (Kerr, 2014), others are quiet skeptical. Thus, the points of
disagreement hinge both on Iran’s centrifuges, and the ability to enrich uranium
Why Does Iran Want A Nuclear Program?
Scholars have offered a number of explanations regarding Iran’s interest in a nuclear program, and
for those that believe they want a nuclear weapon, why they have an interest in reaching that
objective. And not surprising, different theories in international relations have offered different
explanations for this pursuit. For realists, who emphasize power, survival, and state security,
Iran’s attempt to reach a nuclear weapon (for those who think this is their goal) will help their
protection in the region, as well as the international system, particularly from other states who
have nuclear weapons. Many point out that Iran is worried about a number of surrounding
countries such as India and Pakistan, Israel, as well as its tense history with Iraq (Sagan, Waltz, &
Betts: 2007). Furthermore, some such as Waltz (Sagan, Waltz, & Betts: 2007) have also said that
it does not help Iran’s feeling of safety when President George W. Bush included Iran into the
“axis of evil.” If a state’s fear is the United States, he argues that Iran might not see many other
options save for nuclear weapons to ensure some sort of feeling of security against the United
States.

Liberalism in turn allows for the focus on the domestic political scene, and how political leaders
approach the nuclear issue as it relates to domestic conditions, as well as their own political
careers (Sherrill, 2012). In the case of Iran, there has been concern that different actors have
different interests and political moves on power, thus potentially leading to more destabilizing
domestic situation; the theocratic rulers’ often has veto power in decision making, the president
negotiates international diplomatic positions such as the the nuclear issue, and, as Sagan (2006)
explain, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, a group that has a history of building its own power
outside that of the regime, have a key role in guarding nuclear facilities. Along these these points,
Constructivist international relations theory emphasize issues of state identity in the context of the
international system (Sherrill, 2012).

Acquiring a nuclear program and nuclear weapons is not without risk; while it may help a feeling
of security and deterrence, it is also possible that it may increase hostilities. For example, regional
states may feel threatened by Iran’s nuclear program, and if Iran were to ever acquire nuclear
weapons, it could lead them to also try to acquire nuclear weapons, which may set conditions of
hostility and even more insecurity for Iran (Sherrill, 2012). In fact, in 2011, Prince Turki al-Faisal
of Saudi Arabia said that if Iran was to acquire a nuclear weapon, it “would compel Saudi
Arabia…to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences”
(Burke, 2011). And while what was meant was not directly noted, another Saudi leader said “[w]e
cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don’t. It’s as simple as that…” If
Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit”
(in Burke, 2011). And as many who advocate no nuclear weapons suggest, any additional nuclear
weapons only makes the world less safe and secure. Another concern for Iran could be that a state
who truly believes Iran is very close to a nuclear weapon may want to carry out a pre-emptive
strike against the state before they actually do produce a nuclear weapon (Sherrill, 2012). This
scenario is clearly not outside of the realistic possibilities, particularly given Israel’s strong
statements and actions against Iran in the past. Furthermore, other states that feel more insecure,
even if they themselves do not use nuclear weapons (if they have them), or work to acquire them
(if they currently do not have such weapons), may move towards other states who want to limit
Iran’s nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is always an issue of securing the nuclear weapons
domestically. This is also coupled with the possibility of heavy sanctions by the international
community (Sherrill, 2014).

What Else Could Be Done To Prevent Iran From Producing Nuclear Weapons?
According to Sagan, in his 2006 piece “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran”, the United States and
the international community can find ways to help ensure that Iran does not get nuclear weapons.
They can do so by finding out why Iran really would want nuclear weapons. And if Iran has felt
that they are threatened by outside states such as the United States, then there would need to be
reassurances that the United States would not advocate some sort of regime change (2). Sagan
(2006) argues that the key is Iran’s security; if they have security concerns, the international
community should attempt to alleviate any worries that Iran would have.
One of the other contentious policy positions with regards to Iran’s nuclear program has been
whether outside states should carry out a military strike against Iran. For example, Sagan, writing
in 2006, argued that “[a] U.S. military strike on Iran today should be avoided for the same prudent
reasons that led Eisenhower and Kennedy to choose diplomacy and arms control over preventive
war in their dealings with the Soviet Union and China. Even if U.S. intelligence services were
confident that they had identified all major nuclear-related sites in Iran (they are not) and the
Pentagon could hit all the targets, the United States would expose itself (especially its bases in the
Middle East and U.S troops in Afghanistan and Iraq), and its allies, to the possibility of severe
retaliation” (6). Others, such as Matthew Kroenig, in his 2011 Foreign Affairs article “Time to
Attack Iran,” argued that a military strike on Iran would be “the least bad option,” arguing that
deterrence and sanctions has not worked to halt Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, he argues
that “to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States would need to make a substantial investment of
political and military capital to the Middle East in the midst of an economic crisis and at a time
when it is attempting to shift its forces out of the region. Deterrence would come with enormous
economic and geopolitical costs and would have to remain in place as long as Iran remained
hostile to U.S. interests, which could mean decades or longer. Given the instability of the region,
this effort might still fail, resulting in a war far more costly and destructive than the one that critics
of a preemptive strike on Iran now hope to avoid.” However, as mentioned, Kroenig makes it clear
that a strike would not be without its drawbacks, or is a strike even necessary, just that his
argument is that the other options are worse. He points out that a strike could lead to a wider war,
wider economic implications (particularly if China and Russia respond to US attacks in Iran)
(which could also include oil shipments from the Strait of Hormuz), the possibility that all nuclear
facilities are known or all hit, that an attack would even be successful.

Others have criticized the idea of a military attack on Iran. For example, Stephan Walt criticized
Matthew Kroenig’s Foreign Policy piece with his own article in Foreign Affairs entitled “The
Worst Case for War With Iran“, calling the article “a remarkably poor piece of advocacy,” and
that Kroenig’s piece follows “a simple and time-honored formula for making the case for war,
especially preventive war [(Kroening then responded to Walt, and then Walt responded, both of
which are listed in the references section below)]. First, you portray the supposed threat as dire
and growing, and then try to convince people that if we don’t act now, horrible things will happen
down the road. (Remember Condi Rice’s infamous warnings about Saddam’s “mushroom
cloud”?) All this step requires is a bit of imagination and a willingness to assume the worst.
Second, you have to persuade readers that the costs and risks of going to war aren’t that great. If
you want to sound sophisticated and balanced, you acknowledge that there are counterarguments
and risks involved. But then you do your best to shoot down the objections and emphasize all the
ways that those risks can be minimized. In short: In Step 1 you adopt a relentlessly gloomy view
of the consequences of inaction; in Step 2 you switch to bulletproof optimism about how the war
will play out.” He goes not to say that “Kroenig’s piece follows this blueprint perfectly.” Walt
(2011) points out that Iran would not dare challenge the United States with a nuclear war, knowing
that that is a conflict that they could not win such a fight. Others have also downplayed the need
for a military response, without suggesting that Iran having nuclear weapons would be highly
concerning (Sagan, in Sagan, Waltz, & Betts: 2007). He stresses the concern with the security of
the weapons, as well as how the Revolutionary Guard may act–knowing that they have weapons–
and what this would do in terms of raising tensions between them and the United States (for a
detailed discussion regarding Iran and the possibility of nuclear weapons, see the discussion with
Sagan, Waltz & Betts, 2007).
Others, such as Waltz, have not only said that a military strike would not be the right response, but
he even wrote a piece in 2012 saying that there would be benefits to Iran having a nuclear weapon.
In this Foreign Affairs piece entitled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” he argued that once a state
wants a nuclear weapon, it becomes difficult to move them from that position, and in fact, it could
make matters worse, as their security could feel even more threatened. And while letting them get
to the point just before a weapon may be fine for some states, Israel would not accept such a
position (Waltz, 2012). Thus, Waltz (2013) argues that what might be best is actually if Iran gets a
nuclear weapon, which would then balance Israel’s power in the region, something that has been
at an “imbalance” in the Middle East for years. He also challenges ideas suggesting that Iranian
leaders are “crazy,” instead, saying that they have political objectives like other states, and that
they would not risk a nuclear attack on Israel, knowing the power capabilities that these states
hold. He also argued that states do not need to worry about ideas of increased hostility by Iran, or
worries that Iran won’t be able to protect the bomb from other domestic and international groups.

The debate regarding Iran’s nuclear program is sure to continue, as Iran and the United States,
along with other powers attempt to negotiate an agreement. And as we see, states in the P+1 (the
US, China, the UK, Russia, France, & Germany) as recently as late September, while at the United
Nations, have been trying to come up with a nuclear agreement with Iran, particularly a way for
Iran to keep some uranium centrifuges, but with some restrictions (Tobey, 2014).

Iran Nuclear Deal

In July 14th of 2015, Iran, along with the Permanent 5 countries (of the United Nations Security
Council) (the US, China, France, Germany, Russia, and UK) agreement to a landmark nuclear deal
that not only limits that among of Uranium that Iran can enrich, but the nuclear deal also allows
IAEA inspectors into the country to monitor various reactor sites. Among the conditions for the
agreement include assurance that Iran is not testing uranium at the Arak reactor sight, and also that
Iran is following through on the deal which limits enrichment capabilities to 5060 IR-1 centrifuges
for ten years, and also that Iran ensures overall enrichment of under 3.67 percent for 15 years.
Furthermore, additional centrifuges will be removed and put at the Natanz for international
monitoring (Williams, 2015).

In return for the caps on uranium enrichment, international actors such as the European Union
have removed sanctions on banking, the insurance industry, financial transfers, oil, shipping,
software, as well as removal of visa freezes (Williams, 2015).
While the deal has been highly politicized by both Democrats and Republicans in the United
States, “Experts and analysts broadly agree that the nuclear deal struck between the P5+1 (China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran on July 14 will
effectively and verifiably block Iran’s potential pathways to nuclear weapons for 15 years or more.
Absent the agreement, Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium could rapidly increase and sharply reduce
the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon.
Although several key restrictions on Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity and its stockpile of
enriched uranium will expire after 15 years, the deal—known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA)—establishes several other restrictions and tools that will help constrain and
provide deep insights into Iran’s nuclear program far beyond the first 15-year period”
(Armscontrol.org, 2015). Iran is also barred from carrying out any activities that could be seen as
working towards a nuclear weapon explosive device (Armscontrol.org, 2015).

This last point is also very important since “The NPT does not explicity prohibit research or use of
explosives suitable for nuclear weapons for non-nuclear purposes. Iran has asserted that some of
its past activities with possible military dimensions (PMDs) that the IAEA has been investigating
were for non-nuclear weapons purposes.

Under the deal, however, Iran can no longer make this dubious claim. Iran agreed to forgo
computer modeling to simulate nuclear explosive devices, testing, developing, or acquiring multi-
point explosives and neutron sources, and development and designing of nuclear explosive
diagnostic systems (Annex I Section T).

While some of these activities are relevant for developing conventional explosives and for
activities like drilling, in the future, if caught conducting research in these areas, Iran will not be
able to claim it is undertaking any of these activities for non-nuclear purposes.
At the end of 2013 diplomats from Iran and six world powers called P5+1 (the permanent
members of the UN Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France,
and China plus Germany) agreed to start an interim process towards reaching a deal regarding
Iran’s nuclear program. Initially they decided that the deal should slow down Iran’s capability to
build nuclear weapons. Likewise the international sanctions on Iran’s economy to get lifted. This
was a significant shift in almost 35 years of diplomatic deadlock due to distrust and suspicion.
The Iran nuclear deal framework was a preliminary framework agreement reached in 2015
between Iran and P5+1. According to this framework, Iran would redesign and reduce its nuclear
facilities, and accept the Additional Protocol, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard
agreement, in order to lift all nuclear-related economic sanctions, freeing up tens of billions of
dollars in oil revenue and frozen assets.1 Considering that Iran has been isolated for more than
three decades, the nuclear deal would herald a new chapter in global governance and the
relationship between Iran and US. This study is motivated by the fact that more than a decade of
nuclear gridlock between Iran and the West that seemed to be unchangeable, ended with a
successful agreement. This utilizes the uniqueness of the case and importance to understand
what factors determines when this type of deal is, or is not, agreed upon. Iran had pursued a
nuclear program for decades and the ambition for nuclear energy and weapons had, as a result,
continually challenged the international community. This paper sets out to address the areas
related to Iran’s nuclear preferences and the responses from the international community
together with the views from different scholars on the field of Political Science. It further
presents an overview of what has been written on the topic and what different perspectives and
approaches that exist on the nuclear deal itself and the reasons behind it.
 How can the Iran nuclear deal be explained through the lens of rational choice theory? The study
shows that Iran’s incentive to comply increased as sanctions intensified in 2012, causing Iran’s oil
net exports to fall, and Iran’s incitement to engage in a nuclear agreement with the west
increased further with declining oil revenue in 2012. During the period 2006-2008 generous
proposals were offered as well but did not result in a mutual agreement as rising oil prices, which
incentivized Iran to choose the option of not engaging in an agreement, counteracted sanctions
against Iran. This study concluded that an agreement designed to incentivize all involved actors
to comply has proven insufficient in itself as a strategy for reaching an agreement on Iran’s
nuclear program. By adding the concept of Ripeness this paper explains that a MHS is not ended
until there is a sense of WO as well as a deal design that incentivize all involved parties to accept
the deal. Iranian costs for noncompliance increased enough to incentive Iran to accept the 2013
joint plan for action, fully implemented in 2015. As the modification of Sebenius and Singh model
takes into account both the effects of agreement design and sanction costs, the model provides a
valid estimate of the factors that incentivizes actors to end up in equilibria’s of mutual
agreement.
Hurting costs and deal design with value are elements that mostly changed Iran’s strategic
calculus. Costs reduced the attractiveness of Iran’s no-deal option and new deal design showed
to improve joint benefit and incentives. Creative strategies such as credible sanctions worsened
Iran’s no-deal option and avoided catastrophes like military conflict or a nuclear-armed Iran. A
weakness of the ripeness concept is that ripeness is difficult to measure since ripe moment is
usually detected when a deal has been agreed upon, meaning that up until a deal is sealed,
ripeness can only be measured within a wide range of probability. The same is true for ZOPA
because it can only estimate if a proposal is closer or further way from ZOPA. For example it is
hard to know if 5% enrichment or 4% enrichment would produce a deal or a no deal, but the size
of allowance for enrichment will lead negotiations further away from or closer to the ZOPA-zone.
Further research is needed in order to test the generalizability of the ZOPA-model, which is
highly context dependent, and relies on rough asymmetry of bargaining power. The
understanding of this study is that the combination of the two independent variables would
increase the generalizability and further research can verify this conclusion. Another issue that
could be discussed further is the sustainability of this deal, which itself is a new phenomenon and
the results yet to be seen. Post deal problems of noncompliance highlights the need for further
studies on how sustainable deals can be reached, but the ripeness-conditioned ZOPA-model
provides a valuable tentative estimate of when deals are likely to be agreed upon, hence
providing politicians with a model for how deals should be designed in order to incentive all
involved parties to agree.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Hebrew: ‫פלסטיני‬-‫הסכסוך הישראלי‬, translit. Ha'Sikhsukh Ha'Yisraeli-

Falestini; Arabic: ‫رائيلي‬sss‫طيني اإلس‬sss‫الفلس‬-‫نزاع‬sss‫ال‬, translit. al-Niza'a al-Filastini-al-Israili) is the ongoing
struggle between Israelisand Palestinians that began in the mid-20th century.[3] The origins to the
conflict can be traced back to Jewish immigration, and sectarian conflict in Mandatory
Palestinebetween Jews and Arabs.[4] It has been referred to as the world's "most intractable conflict",
with the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip reaching 52 years.[5][6][7]
Despite a long-term peace process and the general reconciliation of Israel with Egypt and Jordan,
Israelis and Palestinians have failed to reach a final peace agreement. The key issues are: mutual
recognition, borders, security, water rights, control of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements,[8]Palestinian
freedom of movement,[9] and Palestinian right of return. The violence of the conflict, in a region rich
in sites of historic, cultural and religious interest worldwide, has been the object of numerous
international conferences dealing with historic rights, security issues and human rights, and has been
a factor hampering tourism in and general access to areas that are hotly contested.[10]
Many attempts have been made to broker a two-state solution, involving the creation of an
independent Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel (after Israel's establishment in 1948). In
2007, the majority of both Israelis and Palestinians, according to a number of polls, preferred the
two-state solution over any other solution as a means of resolving the conflict.[11] Moreover, a majority
of Jews see the Palestinians' demand for an independent state as just, and thinks Israel can agree to
the establishment of such a state.[12] The majority of Palestinians and Israelis in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip have expressed a preference for a two-state solution.[13][14][unreliable source?] Mutual distrust
and significant disagreements are deep over basic issues, as is the reciprocal scepticism about the
other side's commitment to upholding obligations in an eventual agreement.[15]
Within Israeli and Palestinian society, the conflict generates a wide variety of views and opinions.
This highlights the deep divisions which exist not only between Israelis and Palestinians, but also
within each society. A hallmark of the conflict has been the level of violence witnessed for virtually
its entire duration. Fighting has been conducted by regular armies, paramilitary groups, terror cells,
and individuals. Casualties have not been restricted to the military, with a large number of fatalities
in civilian population on both sides. There are prominent international actors involved in the conflict.
The two parties engaged in direct negotiation are the Israeli government, currently led by Benjamin
Netanyahu, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), currently headed by Mahmoud Abbas.
The official negotiations are mediated by an international contingent known as the Quartet on the
Middle East (the Quartet) represented by a special envoy, that consists of the United States, Russia,
the European Union, and the United Nations. The Arab League is another important actor, which has
proposed an alternative peace plan. Egypt, a founding member of the Arab League, has historically
been a key participant. Jordan, having relinquished its claim to the West Bank in 1988 and holding
a special role in the Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem, has also been a key participant.
Since 2006, the Palestinian side has been fractured by conflict between the two major factions: Fatah,
the traditionally dominant party, and its later electoral challenger, Hamas. After Hamas's electoral
victory in 2006, the Quartet conditioned future foreign assistance to the Palestinian National
Authority (PA) on the future government's commitment to non-violence, recognition of the State of
Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements. Hamas rejected these demands, [16] which resulted in the
Quartet's suspension of its foreign assistance program, and the imposition of economic sanctions by
the Israelis.[17] A year later, following Hamas's seizure of power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the
territory officially recognized as the PA was split between Fatah in the West Bank, and Hamas in
the Gaza Strip. The division of governance between the parties had effectively resulted in the
collapse of bipartisan governance of the PA. However, in 2014, a Palestinian Unity Government,
composed of both Fatah and Hamas, was formed. The latest round of peace negotiations began in
July 2013 and was suspended in 2014.

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign
states within the region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Republic of
China (Taiwan), Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US $5 trillion
worth of global tradepasses through the South China Sea annually[1] and many non-claimant states
want the South China Sea to remain international waters. To promote this, several states, including
the United States, conduct "freedom of navigation" operations.[2]
The disputes include the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea, including
the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. There are further
disputes, including the waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many do not regard as part
of the South China Sea.[3] Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing
areas, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gasin the seabed of various
parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes.
In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China.
[4]
The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not
recognise the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations
with other claimants.[5] However, the tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit
maritime boundaries.[6][7]

The United States and China are currently in disagreement over the South China Sea.[94] This
disagreement is exacerbated by the fact that the US is not a member of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[95] Nevertheless, the US has stood by its
manoeuvres, claiming that "peaceful surveillance activities and other military activities without
permission in a country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),"[96] is allowed under the convention.
Additionally, a South China Sea free to access is in the US's economic and geopolitical interests.[97]
In relation to the dispute, Hillary Clinton, then United States Secretary of State, voiced her support
for fair access by reiterating that freedom of navigation and respect for international law is a matter
of national interest to the United States.[98] Her comments were countered by China's Foreign
Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," who warned the United States against making
the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.[99]

Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which
would strengthen U.S. ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the
area.[100] On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed concern over
this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and
countries outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial
disputes."[101] In July 2012, the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by
Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002
declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to
assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced
operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.[102]

In 2014, President Obama warned China: "We believe that international law must be upheld, that
freedom of navigation must be preserved and commerce must not be impeded."[103]
In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other nations by
saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these
extensive maritime claims."[104] USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American support to
the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.[105] The Chinese Foreign Ministry asked the
United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.[106] In 2014 and 2015, the United States
continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea.[107] Sources closer to
the Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to deploy some more naval assets
within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to this announcement, Beijing issued a
strict warning and said that she would not allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the
name of "Freedom of Navigation".[108] In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned
China to halt its rapid island-building.[109] On 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen
navigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of
"Freedom of Navigation Operations".[110] This is the first time since 2012 that the US has directly
challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit.[111] On 8–9 November 2015, two US B-52
strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were
contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission undeterred.[112]

The United States itself has not signed UNCLOS, but has accepted all but Part XI as customary
international law.[113]

In response to Rex Tillerson's comments on blocking access to man-made islands in the South China
Sea, the Communist Party-controlled Global Times warned of a "large-scale war" between the U.S.
and China, saying: "Unless Washington plans to wage a large-scale war in the South China Sea, any
other approaches to prevent Chinese access to the islands will be foolish.
In early 2018, North and South Korea began a diplomatic rapprochement, and North Korean officials
attended the Opening Ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea. On April 27,
a week after announcing that North Korea would freeze weapons and missile testing, North Korean
Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un stepped across the border into South Korea for a summit with South
Korean President Moon Jae-in. The leaders signed a joint statement pledging to work toward
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and an official end to war between the two countries.

There has also been a marked change in U.S. policy toward North Korea. In March 2018, President
Donald J. Trump accepted an invitation, delivered by South Korean officials, to meet with Kim Jong-
un. The two leaders met in Singapore on June 12, after which they released a joint statement about
denuclearization.

Background

North Korea (officially called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is isolated, impoverished,
and a proclaimed enemy of its southern neighbor, South Korea—an important U.S. ally.

U.S. military involvement in the Korean peninsula has its roots in the Korean War of the early 1950s
during the early stages of the Cold War, in which the United States supported forces in the southern
part of the peninsula against communist forces in the north, who were aided militarily by China and
the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is committed to defending South Korea (also known as
the Republic of Korea) under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and
the Republic of Korea. The United States has nearly 29,000 troops deployed in the Korean peninsula
for that purpose. In addition to U.S. troops, many of South Korea’s 630,000 troops and North Korea’s
1.2 million troops are stationed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), making it one of the most
heavily armed borders in the world.

In violation of UN Security Council resolutions, North Korea continues overt nuclear enrichment and
long-range missile development efforts. Although the scale of North Korea’s uranium enrichment
program remains uncertain, U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that it has enough plutonium to
produce at least six nuclear weapons, and possibly up to sixty.

In September 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test, its most powerful test to
date. As with previous tests in 2016, it again claimed to have developed a hydrogen, or
thermonuclear, bomb, which would represent further advancements in the nuclear program and the
ability to build more powerful, higher-yield nuclear weapons. Since February 2017, North Korea has
conducted sixteen missile tests with a total of twenty-three missiles, including a missile that it says
can carry a nuclear warhead. Four of the missiles failed. In early July 2017, the country conducted its
first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Three weeks later, it tested
another ICBM that experts believe could reach the continental United States. In August 2017, U.S.
intelligence agencies determined that North Korea can miniaturize its nuclear weapons to fit inside a
missile, which North Korea had already claimed it could do in March 2016. In November 2017,
North Korea conducted the first test of a previously unseen missile, reportedly its largest ICBM yet,
the Hwasong-15. However, North Korea has not yet demonstrated that its nuclear warheads can
withstand reentry into Earth’s atmosphere.

In response to the increasing frequency of missile tests, the United States has deployed an anti-
missile system in South Korea. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is
located in the Seongju region of South Korea, one hundred and fifty-five miles from the northern
border.

The United States, South Korea, and Japan have each passed their own unilateral sanctions against
North Korea, targeting companies involved in North Korean missile and nuclear weapons
development, high-ranking individuals, and sources of income for the North Korean government.
Following the second ICBM, in August 2017 the UN Security Council unanimously passed its
harshest sanctions yet on North Korea, targeting some of the most important sources of revenue for
the regime including North Korean exports and banning the country from sending more workers
abroad. In November 2017, the United States placed North Korea back on a list of state sponsors of
terrorism, a move that enables additional sanctions to be placed on the regime.

Kim Jong-un’s willingness to provoke the West with aggressive behavior has exacerbated the threat
from North Korea’s weapons proliferation. These incitements have included firing missiles over
northern Japanese islands, firing rockets across the South Korean border in August 2015, and a
cyberattack on U.S.-based Sony Pictures in December 2014.
Kim has also undertaken efforts to consolidate his power by purging high-ranking officials, including
his own family members. In February 2017, Kim's half-brother was killed using a banned nerve agent
in an airport in Malaysia. North Korea denies responsibility for the attack. There are reportedly
between 80,000 and 120,000 political prisoners detained in North Korea. This consolidation of power
may suggest that Kim, fearing fewer internal challenges to his control, is increasingly unconstrained
domestically in making policy decisions.

Concerns

North Korea is a nuclear power with a complex relationship with China, and preventing both an
interstate Korean war and a North Korean internal collapse are critical U.S. national security
interests. Along with continued weapons and missile tests, small-scale military and cyber
provocations by North Korea pose significant risks as each incident carries with it the potential for
further and potentially uncontrollable escalation. Outright threats from North Korean Supreme
Leader Kim Jong-un are also cause for concern, as he claims that North Korean weapons can now
reach U.S. territories and even the U.S. mainland.

North Korea–United States relations refers to international relations between the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. The political and diplomatic relations
between North Korea and the United States have been historically hostile, developing primarily
during the Korean War. In recent years relations have been largely defined by North Korea's nuclear
program – six tests of nuclear weapons, its development of long-range missiles capable of striking
targets thousands of miles away, and its ongoing threats to strike the United States [1] and South
Korea with nuclear weapons and conventional forces. During his presidency, George W.
Bush referred to North Korea as part of "the Axis of Evil" because of the threat of its nuclear
capabilities.[2][3]

North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un(left) and U.S. President Donald Trump(right), June 2018.

Recently, North Korea and the United States of America have started some formal diplomacy after
the Trump-Kim Summit. Sweden acts as the protecting power of United States interests in North
Korea[4][5] for consular matters. Since the Korean War, the United States has maintained a strong
military presence in South Korea. However, the United States has considered, de jure, South Korea
as the sole legitimate representative of all of Korea.
Support among the American public for US forces to defend South Korea has increased steadily.
While it was at a mere 26% in 1990, it has now nearly tripled to 62%. A majority of the American
public also have a positive view of Moon Jae-In, the South Korean President as of 2017.[6]
In 2015, according to Gallup's annual World Affairs survey, only 9% of Americans have a
favorable view of North Korea, while 87% of Americans have a negative view. [7] According to a
2014 BBC World Service Poll, only 4% of Americans view North Korea's influence positively with
90% expressing a negative view, one of the most negative perceptions of North Korea in the world.
2017 marked a significant rise of tensions and amplified rhetoric from both sides as Donald
Trump took the presidency, after it appeared that North Korea's nuclear weapons program was
developing at a faster rate than previously thought. The increasing rhetoric (as well as Trump's more
aggressive approach to handling North Korea), missile testing and increasing military presence on
the Korean Peninsula sparked speculation of a nuclear conflict.
Despite fears of a massive conflict, a détente began to develop when on March 8, 2018, the White
House confirmed that Trump would accept a meeting invitation from Kim Jong-un. At the time,
they were supposed to meet in May.[8] On May 15, 2018, North Korea cut off talks with South Korea
and threatened to cancel the planned U.S.-North Korea summit, citing military exercises between
the United States and South Korea.[9] This cancellation was quickly reversed when Trump received
an uncharacteristically friendly reply from Kim. On June 12, 2018, Trump and Kim met at the
summit in Singapore, in the first summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries. [10] Over
the course of the summit, the two leaders engaged in several discussions and signed a joint
statement calling for security, stability, and lasting peace.[11]
diversidad conflictual de África.

Contrary to popular belief, Africa's civil wars are not due to its ethnic and religious diversity. Using
recently developed models of the overall prevalence of civil wars in 161 countries between 1960-
1999, we draw lessons with special reference to Africa, showing that the relatively higher
prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but
rather to high levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural
resources. We argue that the best and fastest strategy to reduce the prevalence of civil war in Africa
and prevent future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the
challenges facing Africa's diverse societies. To promote inter-group cooperation in Africa, specially
tailored political governance and economic management institutions are needed and we advance
some hypotheses on the nature of such institutions. We suggest that Africa’s ethnic diversity in fact
helps --it does not impede-- the emergence of stable development as it necessitates inter-group
bargaining processes. These processes can be peaceful if ethnic groups feel adequately represented
by their national political institutions and if the economy provides opportunity for productive
activity
Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries (or about 40 percent of Africa south of the Sahara
(SSA)) have experienced at least one period of civil war. It is estimated that 20% of SSA’s population
now lives in countries which are formally at war and low-intensity conflict has become endemic to
many other African states. This state of affairs has created stereotypes of Africa as a doomed
continent with inescapable ethnic cleavages and violent tribal conflict. The more incidents of
political violence we observe in Africa, the more support for this simplistic and negative perception.
However, careful analysis of the determinants of civil wars in Africa and a systematic comparison to
other regions points to a more complex picture. Deep political and economic development failures
--not tribalism or ethnic hatred-- are the root causes of Africa's problems. The implication is that
political and economic development can effectively reduce or eradicate political violence in Africa.
In this paper, we focus explicitly on such a comparison between Africa and other regions, drawing
on a detailed and more technical empirical analysis of civil war that we have conducted elsewhere.1
Our analysis is based on the concept of prevalence (or amount) of civil war and we try to model its
determinants. The concept of war prevalence is equivalent to the concept of the overall amount of
civil war that one might observe in a given period, regardless of whether or not the war started
during that period or earlier.2 We focus on overall prevalence rather than on war starts so that we
can address the question of the overall amount of civil war in Africa and because it is often difficult
to separate closely spaced war initiations in the same country. Based on the evidence we observe
and analyze, we propose a broad strategy of war prevention. Our empirical analysis is based on
estimating an empirical model of the probability of observing an incident of civil war in any one of
161 countries between 1960-1999. We are able to show that the relatively high prevalence of civil
war in Africa is not due to extreme ethno-linguistic fragmentation, but rather to high levels of
poverty, heavy dependence on resource-based primary exports and, especially, to failed political
institutions. Simulations of the effect of political liberalization and economic development on the
probability of civil war show that the best --and fastest-- strategy to reduce the prevalence of civil
war in Africa is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the socio-cultural diversity
of African societies. We realize that civil wars in socially diverse societies represent an extreme
failure of inter-group cooperation and argue that the best conflict prevention strategy is to build
institutions for political governance and economic management. We assess the extent to which
Africa’s social diversity promotes or impedes this process and consider what type of institutions are
capable of mitigating the potentially negative consequences of diversity. In section 2 we discuss the
causes of civil wars, presenting some stylized facts about their prevalence, intensity and duration as
well as some basic data on related variables in Africa and other regions. We use our Elbadawi and
Sambanis (ES) model (2000a) to explain the high prevalence of civil wars in Africa as compared to
other regions. In section 3, we explore if and by how much improvements in political rights,
standards of living and economic diversification influence the risk of civil war. The evidence from
this exercise provides a basis for developing a strategy to war prevention. In the concluding section,
we use our empirical analysis to make some policy recommendations. We argue that a prevention
strategy would not be complete without a deep understanding of how political and economic
governance institutions interact with social diversity. While we cannot enter into a full discussion of
the nature of peacebuilding institutions, we point to the need for further research on the
relationship between political institutions and violence in Africa Africa has a high prevalence of civil
wars and this is commonly attributed to the ethnic diversity of its countries. This inference seems
self-evident to many, given that African rebel movements almost always are ethnically defined.
Ethnic identities and hatred are thus seen as the cause of violent conflict. However, more
systematic analysis of the causes of civil war suggests that Africa’s civil wars conform to a global
pattern that is better explained by political and economic factors as well as by the extent of ethnic,
cultural and religious diversity in the society.3 Recent studies have found that the risk of civil war is
reduced by the opportunity cost of rebel labor (proxied by indicators of economic development,
such as per capita GDP or educational attainment). Up to a certain range, natural resources are
associated with higher risk of war, though for a substantial natural resource base the relationship is
expected to turn negative. Natural resources provide easily “lootable” assets for “loot-seeking”
rebel movements or convenient sources for sustaining “justice-seeking” movements (Collier and
Hoeffler 2000). However, extremely plentiful resources may also provide sufficient revenues that
the government can use to fund its army and "buy" popular support. The literature on civil wars also
suggests that social diversity can have several offsetting effects that may reduce the risk of large-
scale violent conflict. This may happen because rebel cohesion may be a function of the degree of
ethnic or religious diversity of the society; in highly diverse societies, the government may be more
easily successful in dividing the rebels given that the rebels themselves may have a harder time in
gaining support for their cause across a wider range of ethnic groups with potentially diverse
preferences. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) find that ethnic diversity becomes problematic when it
borders polarization --i.e. when an ethnic group accounts for 60-40% of the population and can
dominate the others. In such polarized societies, it is easier to start and support a rebellion. Given
the above analytical literature, two key questions with profound policy implications could be asked:
What explains the high prevalence of civil wars in Africa? And how effective are economic
development and political reforms in reducing the risk of civil wars? We answer these questions in
the rest of this paper.

Elements of national power A common (if now less fashionable) approach to power, particularly associated with the
ranking of states within a hierarchy, has been to identify the capacities that states or other actors use to exert influence.
In this view, the key elements of national power include the following: ! Military strength. For many commentators,
especially in the realist school, power in international politics boils down to military capacity. Realists, for example, have
traditionally favoured a ‘basic force’ model of power, on the grounds that military capacity both enables a country to
protect its territory and people from external aggression and to pursue its interests abroad through conquest and
expansion. Key factors are therefore the size of the armed forces, their effectiveness in terms of morale, training,
discipline and leadership, and, crucially, their access to the most advanced weaponry and equipment. ! Economic
development: States’ ‘weight’ in international affairs is closely linked to their wealth and economic resources. This
applies, in part, because economic development underpins military capacity, as wealth enables states to develop large
armies, acquire modern weapons and wage costly or sustained wars. Modern technology and an advanced industrial
base also gives states political leverage in relation to trading partners, especially if the national currency is so strong and
stable that it is widely used as a means of international exchange. ! Population. A large population benefits a state both
economically and materially, giving it a sizeable workforce and the potential to develop an extensive army. Level of
literacy, education and skills may be just as important, however. Economic development, and particularly
industrialization, require mass literacy and at least basic levels of work-related skills. As production, distribution and
exchange are increasingly dependent on modern technology, higher-level scientific and ICT skills have become a
requirement for economic success. ! Geography. The primary significance of geographical variables, such as land area,
location, climate, topography and natural resources, has traditionally been stressed by geopolitics (see p. 407).
Beneficial geographical features include access to the sea (for trading and military purposes); a temperate climate away
from earthquake zones and areas where violent tropical storms are frequent; navigable rivers for transport, trade and
energy production (hydroelectric power); arable land for farming; and access to mineral and energy resources (coal, oil
and gas)
POWER AND GLOBAL POLITICS Politics is, in essence, power: the ability to achieve a desired outcome, through whatever
means. This notion was neatly summed up in the title of Harold Lasswell’s book Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?
(1936). But this merely raises another question: what, exactly, is power? How can power, particularly in global politics,
best be understood? Power is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. Joseph Nye (2004) likened power to love
– ‘easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that’. The problem with power is that it is an
essentially contested concept: there is no settled or agreed concept of power, only a series of rival concepts. Power can
be understood in terms of capability; that is, as an attribute, something that states or other actors ‘possess’. Power can
be understood as a relationship; that is, as the exercise of influence over other actors. And power can be understood as
a property of a structure; that is, as the ability to control the political agenda and shape how things are done. To add to
the confusion, there are also debates about the changing nature of power, and in particular about the key factors
through which one actor may influence another.
Power as capability The traditional approach to power in international politics is to treat it in terms of capabilities.
Power is therefore an attribute or possession. Such an approach has, for instance, been reflected in attempts to list the
‘elements’ or ‘components’ of national power (see p. 212). The most significant of these usually include the size and
quality of a state’s armed forces, its per capita wealth and natural resources, the size of its population, its land mass and
geographical position, the size and skills of its population and so on. The advantage of this approach is that it enables
power to be analyzed on the basis of observable, tangible factors, such as military and economic strength, rather than
intangibles, suggesting that power is quantifiable. Over time, nevertheless, greater attention has been paid to less
tangible factors, such as morale and leadership skills. One of the most significant implications of the capabilities’
approach to power has been that it enables states to be classified on the basis of the power or resources they possess,
allowing the international system to be analyzed on a hierarchical basis. States were thus classified as ‘great powers’
(see p. 7), ‘superpowers’ (see p. 38), ‘middling powers’, ‘regional powers’ and so forth. However, the idea that power
can be measured in terms of capabilities has a number of drawbacks, making it an unreliable means of determining the
outcome of events. The often quoted example of the Vietnam War (1959–75) helps to illustrate this. The USA (see p. 46)
failed to prevail in Vietnam despite enjoying massive economic, technological and military advantages over North
Vietnam and its communist ally, the Vietcong. At best, capabilities define potential or latent power rather than actual
power, and translating a capability into a genuine political asset may be difficult and perhaps impossible. This applies for
a number of reasons: ! The relative importance of the attributes of power is a matter of uncertainty and debate. Is a
large population more significant than geographical size? Is economic power now more important than military power?

! Some elements of national power may be less beneficial than they at first appear. For example, a highly educated
population may limit a state’s ability to wage or sustain warfare, and natural resources may impair economic growth, as
in the so-called ‘paradox of plenty’ (see p. 409). ! Subjective factors may be as significant as quantifiable, objective
factors. These include the will and resolve of the armed forces and what can be called national morale. Strategy and
leadership may also be decisive, allowing, for instance, weaker actors to prevail over stronger ones in so-called
asymmetrical wars. Terrorism (see p. 284) and insurrection can thus be examples of ‘the strength of the weak’ (Ignatieff
2004). ! It may only be possible to translate resources or capacities into genuine political efficacy in particular
circumstances. For example, the possession of nuclear weapons may be irrelevant when a state is confronting a terrorist
threat or fighting a guerrilla war, and such weapons are ‘unusable’ in most political circumstances. ! Power is dynamic
and ever-changing, meaning that power relations are never fixed or ‘given’. Power may shift, for example, due to
economic booms or slumps, financial crises, the discovery of new energy resources, the acquisition of new weapons,
natural disaster, an upsurge in ethnic conflict, and so on. Relational Relational power and structural power Most
accounts of power portray it as a relationship. In its classic formulation, power can be said to be exercised whenever A
gets B to get something that B would not otherwise have done. If a concern with capabilities equates power with
‘strength’, a concern with relationships equates power with ‘influence’. Capabilities and relationships are clearly not
distinct, however. Power relations between states or other actors may be taken to reflect the balance of their
respective capabilities. In this case, the relationship model of power suffers from many of the drawbacks outlined
above. For this reason, relational power is often understood in terms of actions and outcomes – that is, the effect one
actor has on another – rather than in terms of contrasting assessments of capabilities. This is particularly the case
because power is about perception. States and other actors deal with one another on the basis of their calculations of
relative power. This may mean, for example, that reputation can sustain national power despite its decline in ‘objective’
terms. Foreign policy decisions may thus be based on under-estimates and over-estimates of the power of other actors,
as well as various kinds of misinterpretation and misperception (see Perception or misperception? p. 133). Furthermore,
especially in military matters, A may exert influence on B in one of two ways: either by getting B to do what B would not
otherwise have done (compellance), or by preventing B from doing what B would otherwise have done (deterrence).
Generally, the former will be riskier and require the use of greater resources than the latter. This can be seen in the
contrast between the 2003 invasion of Iraq (see p. 131) to bring about ‘regime change’ (an example of compellance)
and the previous policy of preventing attacks on the Kurds and Shia Muslims by maintaining ‘no-fly zones’ (an example
of deterrence).

! Relational power: The ability of one actor to influence another actor or actors in a manner not of their choosing. !
Compellance: A tactic or strategy designed to force an adversary to make concessions against its will through war or the
threat of aggression. ! Deterrence: A tactic or strategy designed to prevent aggression by emphasizing the scale of the
likely military response (the cost of an attack would be greater than any benefit it may bring) Whereas the capabilities
and relationship models of power clearly assume the existence of an actor or agent, usually the state, structural power
links the distribution of power to biases within the social structures through which actors relate to one another and
make decisions. A most influential account of structural power was provided by Susan Strange (1996), who defined it as
‘the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to one
another, relate to people or relate to corporate enterprises’. Strange further distinguished between four primary power
structures: ! The knowledge structure, which influences actor’s beliefs, ideas or perceptions ! The financial structure,
which controls access to credit or investment ! The security structure, which shapes defence and strategic issues ! The
production structure, which affects economic development and prosperity Strange insisted that the same state or states
need not dominate each of these structures, but rather that their structural power may vary across the structures. This
analysis of power provides an alternative to state-centrism and highlights the important and growing role played by
regimes (see p. 67) and international organizations (see p. 433). Nevertheless, structural power operates alongside
relational power, providing an alternative way of explaining how outcomes are determined. The issue of structural
power also clearly demonstrates how questions about the nature of power are closely linked to debates about the
shape of world order. During the 1980s, Strange used the theory of structural power to reframe the debate about
hegemonic stability theory (see p. 229) and to challenge the then fashionable notion of US decline (discussed later in the
chapter), which had largely been based on the USA’s economic decline relative, in particular, to Japan and Germany.
Changing nature of power Recent debates about the changing nature of power reflect less on the emergence of
conceptually new forms of power, and more on the changing mechanisms through which relational power is exercised.
Two alleged shifts in this respect have attracted attention. The first is a general shift from military power to economic
power. Military power is the traditional currency of world politics. Realist theorists place a particular emphasis on
military power because, in their view, the international system is structured above all by security and survival. In a self-
help world, states face national disaster unless they have the capacity for self-defence. However, this image of militarily-
based power politics has been challenged by neoliberals who argue that growing trade links and increasing
 interdependence (see p. 8) make inter-state war more costly and so less likely. Military force has thus become a less
reliable and less important policy option. In the modern world, states therefore compete through trade rather than
through the use of force. (The debate about the declining significance of military power is examined on p. 246.) The
second shift is the alleged wider decline of ‘hard’ power, which encompasses both military power and economic power.
Hard power is ‘command power’, the ability to change what others do through the use of inducements (carrots) or
threats (sticks). By contrast, there has been a growth in ‘soft’ power. Soft power is ‘co-optive power’; it rests on the
ability to shape the preferences of others by attraction rather than coercion (Nye 2004). Whereas hard power draws on
resources such as force, sanctions, payments and bribes, soft power operates largely through culture, political ideals
and foreign policies (especially when these are seen to be attractive, legitimate or to possess moral authority). For some
feminists, the hard/soft power distinction highlights deeper factors, linked to the relationship between power and
gender. In this view, the idea of ‘power over’, particularly when it is associated with ‘hard’ strategies such as coercion
and the use of threats and rewards, reflects ‘masculinist’ biases that generally underpin the realist theory of power
politics. Feminists, on the other hand, have emphasized the extent to which, in domestic and transnational social
relations especially, power is exercised through nurturing, cooperation and sharing. Instead of conflictual and capacity
conceptions of power, this suggests the alternative notion of power as collaboration, or ‘power with’. The differences
between hard and soft power are illustrated in Figure 9.1. How has this alleged shift from hard to soft power come
about? The key explanation is that the growth of interdependence and interconnectedness means that people see
more, hear more and know more about what happens around the globe. Increasing cross-border flows of images,
information and ideas make it easier for people to form judgements about the culture and values of other states as well
as about the foreign and domestic policies of their governments. This trend is also aided by generally improving literacy
levels and educational standards worldwide, and by the spread of democracy, particularly as democratic systems
operate largely through soft-power mechanisms (the personalities of leaders, the image and values of political parties
and so on). In such circumstances, a state’s use of hard-power strategies may risk the loss of ‘hearts and minds’. For
example, the Bush administration’s approach to the ‘war on terror’ (see p. 223), and particularly the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, may have been 214 GLOBAL POLITICS ! Hard power: The ability of one actor (usually but not necessarily a state) to
influence another through the use of threats or rewards, typically involving military ‘sticks’ or economic ‘carrots’. ! Soft
power: The ability to influence other actors by persuading them to follow or agree to norms and aspirations that
produce the desired behaviour. Figure 9.1 Hard, soft and smart power Hard Power (Punishment, reward) Compulsion
Inducement Ag

5. Agenda global
a. El multilateralismo en debate y la reforma de la ONU.
http://www.gloobal.net/iepala/gloobal/fichas/ficha.php?
entidad=Textos&id=9689&opcion=documento

The UN does not perform miracles nor is it a full guarantee of peace and security in the
world; The UN is still a dream that has not become a reality at all; it is a utopia still far away
on the horizon. However, the UN is not a useless organization, less a failure that we have to
despise or dismiss ...
Introduction
The Organization of the United Nations was created in 1945 first and foremost, as stated in
its charter, to preserve future generations from the scourge of war and to ensure that their
horrors were never repeated. Sixty years later it is clear that the threats to world security go
beyond the traditional scheme of wars and conflicts, since they have acquired an
unprecedented character and dimension. [1] The so-called new threats to peace and
security include aspects such as poverty, pandemics, the degradation of the environment,
global warming, intra- and inter-state conflicts, the proliferation and threat of the use of
nuclear and radiological weapons, chemical and biological, drug trafficking, terrorism and
transnational organized crime, among others. These threats come from both state and non-
state actors, go beyond national borders and affect states, communities and individuals. [2]
Therefore, the biggest challenge facing the UN today seems to be the deepening of the
process of institutional reform through the promotion of consensus around core issues, such
as the new foundations of security, development and welfare of majorities and the planet ,
on the basis of multilateral cooperation. The aim is to generate strategies that highlight, in
the eyes of the actors involved, the high costs caused by the uncoordinated action of the
world community in practically all levels of international affairs. The challenge is to ensure
that majorities accept the commitments arising from this collective responsibility, in order to
promote agreements in various areas and provide the organization with more effective
instruments and mechanisms to face contemporary challenges.

Thus, for example, the new consensus on security must recognize the indissoluble link
between security and development, as well as starting from the premise that although the
main protagonists of the fight against old and new threats continue to be the As stated by
former Secretary General Kofi Annan, none can face only these transnational and
multidimensional challenges, which is why it is essential to promote collective strategies and
a sense of common responsibility. It is also important that the international community
accept that even when differences in power, wealth, population or geography determine the
perception of societies about what constitutes a threat to survival and well-being, the
multidimensional, interconnected and transnational nature of the Current challenges and
challenges oblige us to construct an equation in which the participation of all the actors in
order to achieve the maintenance of global peace and security is a sine qua non condition.

The United Nations represents the space for multilateral dialogue and negotiation par
excellence; hence the importance of continuing the reform process in order to equip them
with the tools, work methods, strategies, mechanisms and capacities to consolidate them as
a democratic and effective organism in the face of the challenges of the 21st century.

The United Nations: Origin and balance of its capabilities and limitations
The name United Nations was coined by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was used for
the first time on January 1, 1942, during World War II, when representatives of twenty-six
nations approved the United Nations Declaration, under which the attached governments
committed themselves to continue fighting together against the Axis powers (Germany,
Japan and Italy). The Organization of the United Nations was formally established on
October 24, 1945 by the entry into force of the Charter of San Francisco, signed by fifty
countries on June 26 of that year, on the initiative of the winning states in World War II.
(United States, England, France, the USSR and China). [3] The first general secretary of the
UN was the Norwegian Trygvie Lie, elected on February 1, 1946.

In accordance with the San Francisco Charter, member states agree to comply with the
obligations and principles contained in the international treaty, including the maintenance of
international peace and security, and cooperation as a mechanism to resolve conflicts and
promote Respect for human rights. However, the United Nations was created, above all, to
protect future generations from the scourge of war by correcting the institutional
weaknesses of the preceding organization, the League of Nations. , founded in 1919
following the Treaty of Versailles, and whose efforts were not enough to prevent the
outbreak of World War II in 1939.

Among the shortcomings of the League of Nations is that there was no clear division of
responsibilities between its main organs (the Council and the Assembly), which could only
make recommendations and not issue mandatory resolutions for the Member States.
Moreover, the league did not have a mechanism for economic or military coordination to
deal with problems or aggressions, and key countries such as the United States did not
ratify their membership to the institution, which further weakened their legitimacy and
effectiveness.

For its part, the United Nations was created with the main objective of ensuring the
maintenance of international peace and security. When its founders proposed the creation
of a new collective security system they did so in accordance with the traditional military
scheme, namely, a system in which the States committed themselves to consider any
aggression against one of them as an aggression against all and, therefore, , to react
collectively.

Although the UN has achieved important successes in the most diverse spheres of human
activity throughout its history, it is questioned about its ability to face the challenges of the
world community and, even, some voices demand its disappearance [ 4]. However, the
work of the United Nations is positive because of its important contributions to the
maintenance of international peace and security, with the launching of more than fifty peace
operations and the deployment of international observers; the negotiation of around 172
arrangements that have put an end to regional conflicts such as the war between Iran and
Iraq or the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s; the use of discrete diplomacy to avoid
impending wars; the reduction of the threat of nuclear war through the activities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which oversees the use of nuclear material, aid
to victims of conflict through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
the removal of antipersonnel mines that were placed on battlefields. It has also promoted
the self-determination and independence of more than eighty countries; strengthens
international law by signing more than 300 international treaties on the most diverse topics;
contributes to the resolution of international disputes through the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and, more recently, through the prosecution of war criminals through the
International Criminal Court (ICC).

In addition, the UN has participated in the promotion and protection of human rights since
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948, until the recent debates
to consolidate the Human Rights Council, which replaces the Human Rights Commission.
The United Nations has collaborated in the enactment of more than eighty global
agreements on political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights; contributed to the end of
the apartheid regime in South Africa and have participated in the promotion and defense of
the rights of women, children, the elderly and indigenous people, among other vulnerable
groups, through the International Institute for Research and Training for Promotion of
Women (INSTRAW) or of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); This is in addition
to the important work they carry out through the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) in the design and execution of projects related to agriculture, education, culture and
the environment.

This allows us to affirm that the areas of action and the important goals achieved, the
success far exceeds the failures, limitations and defects that are attributed to the
organization. For example, since the 1950s, the UN has contributed to the improvement of
world trade relations through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), as well as the promotion of economic reforms through World Bank programs
and of the International Monetary Fund; to the protection of the environment through the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO). In terms of health and nutrition, it also highlights its work, in relation to alleviating
hunger and rural poverty through the International Fund for Agricultural Development
(IFAD); the supply of drinking water to more than 1300 million people in the last decade and
the eradication of infectious diseases thanks to the efforts of the World Health Organization
(WHO).

Among the most sensitive transformations after the end of the Cold War, the considerable
increase of independent countries [5], the end of the confrontation between the USSR and
the United States; the deepening of the so-called North-South gap; the disintegration of
republics that were part of the Soviet bloc; the recrudescence of intra and interstate
problems; the strengthening of civil society and the activism of various non-governmental
organizations and social networks, without forgetting the rapid development of information
and communication technologies (ICT).

The UN also faces the globalization of problems such as climate change, pollution of the
planet, the extension and deepening of poverty, unemployment, migration, diseases and
epidemics such as HIV / AIDS; drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, the trafficking of
arms and people; as well as the emergence of new international actors, the advancement of
science and technology and the reduction of aid for development, among many others.

However, it can be stated that, without a doubt, one of the main changes that significantly
affect the organization has to do with the transformations in the institutional structure of
world security and the combination of new and old threats, all of which put questioned the
foundations of the traditional collective security scheme of the UN.

As has been pointed out, due to the varied interests of States and international actors,
institutional failures and the inability of the former to reach agreements and solve the
problems of international society during the last years, the organization has been
questioned of political and economic sectors in the United States. Some lobby groups have
criticized the work of the UN and questioned the participation of that country, as well as the
lack of payment of their financial contributions to the organization, particularly in the wake of
the scandals surrounding the Oil for Food program, allegedly destined to alleviate the
privations of the Iraqis resulting from the sanctions regime imposed by the United States
itself and in which the son of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, was involved. [6] Likewise,
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, led by the United States, created an atmosphere of discredit for
the UN because it was unable to get the Security Council, responsible for the maintenance
of international peace and security, to determine the actions and strategies to follow in that
war, initiated by the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. The efforts of the
UN were insufficient in the face of this situation and the outcome was the unilateral
intervention of the United States and its allies in that country, whose negative
consequences are multiplied after more than four years of war.

However, it is necessary to recognize what the UN has achieved in terms of peace and
security. In 2005 alone, 70 percent of its budget, which today amounts to 10 billion dollars a
year, went to peacekeeping operations, given the large number of conflicts around the world
[7]. An objective analysis of their work shows a panorama of contrasts, so the conclusion is
that it is necessary to transform and adapt the organization so that it can fulfill the objectives
of the San Francisco Charter and meet the new challenges, a challenge that the General
Secretariat since 1992, the year in which the institution began its complex exercise of
reform, strengthening and adaptation.

There are many problems to achieve the goals that the founders of the UN proposed.
Among the changes sought include democratization, modernization and adaptation of
working methods and decision-making processes, transparency to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness in fulfilling mandates, financial restructuring of the institutional structure and
the system of collective security, embodied in the Security Council, among others. In
general terms, the reform of the UN can be divided into two fundamental sections:

Structural changes: reform and strengthening of its structure, as well as the democratization
and renewal of its political mandate.
Operational changes: redesign of mandates and actions of the United Nations system, as
well as the strengthening of mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts, the maintenance of
international peace and security in its economic, military, logistical and coercive capacity
( law enforcement).

The reform has been placed as one of the priority issues in the current deliberations of the
organization and as a challenge on which both its future and validity depend, as well as the
prevalence of multilateralism.

Analysis of the UN reform proposals

Historical recount of the reform and strengthening efforts of the UN.

Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations has gone through a process of change that
reflects the balance of power and trends in world politics. In 1947, the United States Senate
recommended carrying out reforms aimed at reducing administrative expenses, cutting
salaries and minimizing duplication of functions among the various UN bodies. In the
decade of the sixties, in the process of decolonization, the notorious increase of members
(from 51 to 114 in 1963) led to amendments to the letter, among which the increase of the
members of the Security Council and the Economic Council stand out. and Social (Ecosoc)
that went from 11 to 15 and from 18 to 27, respectively.

In 1971, in a climate of optimism about the capacity of the United Nations to alleviate the
economic differences between the States, a third amendment was made to the charter to
expand for the second time the Ecosoc, whose membership increased from 27 to 54.
Nevertheless , the eighties were characterized by an economic conservatism that was
reflected in the lack of willingness of the powers, particularly the United States, to undertake
substantial reforms that would democratize the organization and promote the development
agenda within the multilateral framework. An example of this is the so-called North-South
Summit held in Cancún in 1981, during which the industrialized countries opted for the free
market and technology transfer as antidotes to underdevelopment. As a result of this
meeting, measures were taken to freeze the UN budget, which greatly impeded the reform
and strengthening process.

The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 marked a new stage in international relations
and, therefore, in the United Nations. The end of the bipolar era created great expectations
about the future of organization and world order. The disappearance of the Soviet Union
and the disintegration of countries such as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia provoked regional
instability and independence movements and civil wars in different areas of Soviet
influence, all of which generated imbalances that made necessary the intervention of the
UN, materialized through multiple peace operations [8].

The Boutros Boutros-Ghali Peace Program (1992).

The beginning of the reform can be clearly established in 1992, when the then Secretary
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, promoted a series of changes aimed at preserving the
balance between the various organs of the UN in order to achieve the common purposes of
the maintenance of international peace and security, promotion of economic and social
development, disarmament and respect for human rights. In addition, it sought to
consolidate the activities of the organization by simplifying the functions of each of its
agencies.

One of the central arguments for this reform was that the new responsibilities of humanity,
and with them those of the organization, demanded a complete modernization of the
institution that should include aspects such as:

deployment of preventive diplomacy and early warning;

planning and management capacity for peace operations (PMO);
decentralization of headquarters functions to the regional commissions, with greater
emphasis in the field;
unit of purpose and coordination of the Ecosoc with other agencies, organs and programs,
including the Security Council;
appointment of a deputy secretary general;
strengthening of the human rights platform and;
greater participation of civil society.

These proposals were added to the request made in January 1992 by the Security Council
to the General Secretariat to draft a report that seeks to cover the growing expectations of
society regarding the role of the organization in the new millennium, as well as make
recommendations on the means to strengthen it and make it more efficient within the
framework of the provisions of the letter, especially in matters of preventive diplomacy and
peace. This petition was considered an opportunity to promote social progress and raise the
standard of living of all nations.

In 1992, Secretary Boutros-Ghali delivered the document entitled A Program of Peace [9], in
which he recognized the need to renew the United Nations to avoid being overtaken by
world events, as well as underlining the importance of establishing a dialogue with society in
order to move towards the 21st century on the basis of the construction of consensus. In
this report, the inclusion of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding stands out, as well as
the recognition that the situation between the Eastern and Western States provided new
possibilities in terms of peace and security, while at the same time
that humanity must address the underlying causes of the growing gap between the North
and the South. On the other hand, he stressed the importance of the sovereign State as a
fundamental entity of the international community.
With regard to peace and security, the report warned that aspects that transcend military
and inter-State threats should be considered in order to prevent and effectively resolve
conflicts.

In a Peace Program, the expressions preventive diplomacy, establishment and

maintenance of peace were linked in an integral way; accepting that while States were the
cornerstone of the fulfillment of these objectives, it should be recognized that the moment of
absolute and exclusive sovereignty of those entities was a thing of the past, which is why
they had to balance good internal management with the demands of an increasingly
interdependent world.

The issue of development was also included in these reform efforts. In this sense, the
fundamental piece of Boutros-Ghali's management is reflected in the report A development
program, presented in May 1994. In it, development is conceived as a process qualitatively
different from simple economic growth and interconnected with the peace, caring for the
environment, democracy and respect for human rights.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the management of Boutros-Ghali at the head of the UN
took on the challenge of transforming the role, priorities and way of operating of the
institution into a world radically different from the one that gave it life in 1945, for this the
secretary promoted a process anchored in three basic pillars: peace, development and
democracy. The reports prepared by the office under his charge represent a watershed
regarding the role of the organization after the end of the Cold War. In this administration
also stresses that peace management seen as absence of war, Boutros-Ghali added a
number of concrete proposals for prevention, maintenance, establishment and
consolidation. However, the most novel element of the triad is democracy, understood as a
process of participation that is not exhausted in electoral processes. This importance was
given to the democratic system, which came to affirm that it was the imperative of the end of
the millennium.

The reform faced different obstacles that have prevented its full achievement; among them
the financial crisis that the UN lives, the resistance of some powers to change the status
quo and the rules according to which they have operated; as well as the refusal to modify
institutional structures in accordance with the new balance of world power to equip
developing countries and emerging powers with the channels and mechanisms necessary
to influence the formation of collective action strategies in the face of challenges global
Such is the case of nations such as South Africa, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, India and Japan,
among others.

Renewal of the United Nations: a reform program.

After the departure of Boutros-Ghali in 1997, the Ghanaian Kofi Annan took the reins of the
UN and its reform and concentrated, at first, not so much on politically sensitive matters as
the reform of intergovernmental bodies, but on questions of administrative efficiency, budget
and the reduction of secretarial costs. In July 1997, Annan presented to the General
Assembly a broad set of proposals on the restructuring of the institution in his report
Renewing the United Nations: a reform program [10]. According to the secretary, the reform
program would promote a thinner and more profitable structure; a budget allocated to
solvency and development priorities, and a more coordinated and responsible management
of the activities.
From this text it is clear that the fundamental objective of the reform is to reduce the
difference between the aspirations and achievements of the UN, for which it was proposed
to establish a new mentality and management structure that would result in a greater unity
of purpose, coherence of efforts and agility to respond to the pressing needs of the
international community. The report adds that the reform process can not supplant the will
of governments or save the very tangible differences of interest and power among
members. What is in their hands is to maximize institutional efficiency, which will allow the
UN to better fulfill the tasks requested of it and carry forward with more credibility its mission
to promote a progressive transformation in favor of nations and peoples. .

The measures and recommendations of Kofi Annan's report focus on the following aspects:

The establishment of a new management and management structure.

The achievement of financial solvency.
The reorganization of twelve entities and dependencies of the General Secretariat to
convert them into five.
The mo of United Nations officials operating in various countries in order to save resources,
improve operational synergy and project a unified image of the organization.
The renewal of the relations of the United Nations system with the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
The call for corporations to fulfill their responsibilities under the terms of the global pact that
the Secretary General himself proposed, so that the participating companies undertake
activities aimed at promoting the fundamental values of the UN in areas such as human
rights, norms labor and the environment.

On the other hand, among the measures and recommendations proposed by Annan to the
Member States are:

Establish the post of Deputy Secretary General to supervise the coordination of activities
and programs that involve multiple sectors of the organization, among other responsibilities.
Establish a revolving fund of credit for $ 1 trillion dollars to ensure the financial solvency of
the organization.
Refocus the work of the General Assembly on matters of the highest priority.
Establish a special commission on relations with the specialized agencies of the UN.
Improve the rapid reaction capacity of the Security Council and the General Assembly in
matters of peace and security.
Undertake a series of measures to consolidate and strengthen the work of Ecosoc,
including the rationalization of some of its subsidiary systems.
Establish a development account in which funds are deposited from administrative savings.
Initiate a general review of the five regional commissions of the Ecosoc, in order to evaluate
their essential tasks and the perspectives for a greater rationalization and consolidation of
their work.
Promote closer relations between the executive councils of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), to ensure the analysis
of matters of common interest.
On November 12, 1997, the General Assembly issued its resolution on Kofi Annan's report,
through which he recommended some initiatives and approved the actions proposed by the
secretary. In addition to the effort to make the organization more functional, the reform
package raised the level of consultation between the secretariat and the member states,
which sought to promote better functioning.

The Millennium Declaration.

The advent of the new millennium provided Kofi Annan and the international community with
the opportunity to review the progress made by the United Nations, as well as to rethink the
direction to follow based on the proposals in his report: Renewal of the United Nations: a
program of reform, in which he suggested convening in 2000 a General Assembly of the
Millennium [11]. The proposal indicated the importance of encouraging the participation of
heads of State and government in order to articulate visions on the perspectives and
problems of the new millennium and the role of the United Nations. The General Assembly
accepted the proposal, appointed the LV session of the United Nations Assembly dedicated
to the Millennium and decided to hold a Millennium Summit. On September 6, 2000, 147
heads of state and government met in New York and two days later approved a broad set of
global goals, which gave rise to the Millennium Declaration.

This document establishes goals and principles in the following topics [12]:

Peace, security and disarmament.

The development and eradication of poverty.
The protection of the common environment.
Human rights, democracy and good governance.
The protection of vulnerable people
Attention to the special needs of Africa.
The strengthening of the United Nations.

The Millennium Development Goals became points of reference for regional, national and
international social and economic planning, and function as a point of convergence for civil
society, as well as for governments and multilateral agencies. At the International
Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, leaders from
developed and developing countries decided to allocate resources and take concrete
measures to comply with those commitments.

In this regard, it was agreed that the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) should
provide assistance so that these activities continue to focus on the Millennium Development
Goals [13].

It can be said that the world is moving towards these goals, but this progress is gradual and
uneven. Less developed countries need considerable external support, in the same way
that the global community is required to mobilize financial support and political will, reorient
priorities and focus
of development policies and create links with civil society and the private sector in order to
achieve those objectives.

Reform and strengthening of the United Nations.

In September 2002, Secretary Annan announced a new plan for the strengthening of the
United Nations, whose central objective was to improve the capacity to face global
challenges. In the document that he presented to the member states [14], the need for the
organization to be in accordance with the new international order is underlined; to be more
efficient, open and creative and to adjust its activities to the priorities defined in the
Millennium Declaration and the world conferences held during the 1990s. The Secretary
also presented a review of the important changes that have taken place in the United
Nations system since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, among which the
definition of new development objectives, the improvement in the deployment capacity and
the management of complex operations for the maintenance and consolidation of peace;
greater coherence in the work carried out in developing countries; the establishment of new
methods of action based on cooperative associations; and the intensification of the
participation of civil society in the programs promoted by the organization.

Annan proposed changes in the General Secretariat and called for changes to
intergovernmental bodies. In the first instance, he advocated the strengthening of the
General Assembly and, in that regard, he proposed to group in a single niche those issues
that are duplicated, as well as directly linked issues. Likewise, he proposed that the election
of the president of the assembly and of the commissions be made in advance to facilitate
planning. On the other hand, the report indicates that the General Assembly must clarify its
responsibilities regarding the Ecosoc, in particular with regard to the follow-up of
international conferences.

In relation to the Ecosoc, the document points out the need to strengthen the annual
dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO, in
order to make it a global forum that contributes to defining the policies and strategies of the
development of the new millennium.

Regarding the Security Council, the document recognizes that there are improvements in
working methods, which has become more transparent and offers more opportunities for the
rest of the member states to participate in its work. However, he affirms that the Council
must resort to the General Assembly and the Ecosoc in order to integrate a broad approach
with regard to the prevention and resolution of conflicts, as well as the consolidation of a
sustainable peace.

Other aspects highlighted in the report are the reduction in the number of meetings held
under the auspices of the intergovernmental bodies and the United Nations system, as well
as the number of official documents. At the same time, it suggests at least nine topics that
should be included in the renewed work program:

Globalization and its consequences for development. The UN should have greater
possibilities of helping developing countries to take advantage of the opportunities offered
by globalization in the fields of trade and investment; will have to support them in their effort
to develop the corresponding national strategies.
The current dimensions of migration to better understand the causes and their complex
interrelation with development.
The scarcity and contamination of water, as well as the diseases of propagation in this way,
involving the interested parties in order to achieve a coordinated international action,
effective and timely.
Energy.
Natural disasters.
The causes of violent conflicts. Strengthen the capacity of the UN to support countries to
consolidate good governance.
The use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.
The terrorism. Reinforce the role of the UN, in particular, provide advice to member states to
strengthen legislative and administrative frameworks.
Drug trafficking and organized crime. As part of a comprehensive strategy, increase
international measures to combat it.

The text pays special attention to the strengthening of human rights as a fundamental
condition for achieving peace and justice in the world. In this regard, he points out the need
to make the UN body responsible for ensuring respect for these rights more effective and to
strengthen the capacity to support countries to create standards in this area, continue to
modernize the international treaty system and reinforce the potential of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights.

It also proposes suggestions to make changes in the budget and the management of the
organization; as well as to improve the quality of life and reward the person………

Conclusions
The UN remains a pillar of the institutional architecture of the international system. Although
its birth was due to the need for a balance of world power after the end of World War II, the
organization is also a mirror of the international community and its complexities. The
evolution of the UN had consisted of incorporating mechanisms to face challenges not
foreseen in its charter, but since 1992 it has initiated an open process of reform, when
broad sectors of the international community concluded that the world had changed
significantly. The efforts led by Boutros-Ghali, to which were added those of Kofi Annan,
since 1997 have sought to promote institutional change to adapt the rules to the current
players, the new conditions of balance of power and the contour of the system.
international.

The difficulties and inertia that this process has faced are multiple and very complex;
however, important changes and achievements are observed, among which the codification
of international law, particularly in the field of human rights; the deployment of hundreds of
peace operations; the contribution to the social and political reconstruction of some
countries; the eradication of diseases and the awareness of new pandemics; actions in
favor of the care of non-renewable resources of the planet and the environment; the
advance in the improvement of the conditions of women and the protection of vulnerable
groups such as indigenous people, the elderly and children. The UN is immersed in a
process of renewal, redefinition and strengthening that depends on the political will of its
members and on the capacity to generate agreements and incentives that motivate the
cooperation of the States around common interests.

After two terms of office of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN (1997-2006), on 9

October 2006 the Security Council, through its resolution 1715, recommended to the
General Assembly the appointment of the South Korean diplomat Ban Ki-moon as new
Secretary General for the period from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2011, which was
ratified by the General Assembly on October 13 of this year. Ban Ki-moon was the favorite
since the beginning of the consultations between the members. Also personalities were
candidates like Shashi Tharoor, undersecretary-general of the UN; Jayantha Dhanapala,
former deputy secretary general of Disarmament; Surakiart Sathirathai, Deputy Prime
Minister of Thailand, and Goh Chok Tong, former Prime Minister of Singapore. However,
the secret consultation among the members favored the Foreign Minister of South Korea.
The new secretary general has a long diplomatic career and this community considers him
an expert negotiator, as he has proven his abilities in complex situations such as the efforts
to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, critics say that Ban Ki-
moon will focus on the good administration of the UN and doubt that he has the strength to
deepen the reform under way. For his part, the secretary general said that his priority will be
to deploy efforts to stop and reverse climate change, because it puts all humanity at risk.

Ban Ki-moon receives an organization in the process of reform, severely criticized due to
acts of corruption in the exercise of the Oil for Food program with Iraq, for sexual abuse
committed by peace troops deployed in some countries and for the lack of transparency in
the management of financial resources, which receives an annual budget of 10 billion
dollars. As the president of the General Assembly, Haya al Khalifa of Bahrain, mentioned in
2006, the appointment of Ki-moon comes at a time when the UN faces strong challenges in
the fight against extreme poverty and hunger, the prevention of armed conflicts, the spread
of diseases and the proliferation of international terrorism.

On the other hand, the departure of John Bolton from the United States representation
before the UN on December 4, 2006, is combined with the new composition of the House of
Representatives and the Senate of that country after the intermediate elections. The Bolton
relay opens up opportunities for the United States' relationship with the United Nations in a
context in which the former has recognized the need to change the strategy regarding the
occupation of Iraq, as well as to work more closely with other countries in the region.
multilateral framework of the UN to meet the challenges that exceed the capabilities of
States.

On April 23, 2007, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed as the new permanent
representative of the United States to the UN. This official has served in various positions of
importance, as ambassador in Iraq, between 2005 and 2007; ambassador and sent is of the
president in Afghanistan, between 2003 and 2005, and previously as a special advisor to
the National Security Council and director of Islamic affairs and long-term initiatives for
South-West Asia. Dr. Khalilzad has been linked to President Bush for some years; He
headed the transition team of the Department of Defense and was a counselor to then
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Since 1985 he worked in the State Department as
special advisor to the Undersecretary of Political Affairs in matters related to the war
between Iran and Iraq and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the replacement of the Secretary General of the UN and the new
representative of the United States has coincided with the beginning of a new government
in Mexico (2006-2012). President Felipe Calderón has spoken out in favor of the
deployment of an active and measured foreign policy that privileges participation in
multilateral forums such as the UN.

Traditionally, Mexico has led initiatives and efforts in various areas such as disarmament,
development and recently respect for human rights. This new combination of factors is
appropriate for the country to take advantage of the new alignment and better project its
interests and priorities in the multilateral sphere of the UN and in the world. Mexico should
specify its role as a promoter of the reform of the United Nations, as well as the issues on
which its foreign policy will focus. In this regard, it will also require a defined and
coordinated strategy to achieve congruence in the actions carried out in the different
international forums and forums, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral; this will allow
obtaining the best results for the country and will contribute to the welfare of the
international community.

The challenge of continuing to work to make the world a more just, inclusive, stable, safe
and habitable place is the task of each and every member of the international community.
The UN is that forum in which a variety of interests, worldviews and negotiation strategies
coincide. Making this space more efficient, fair and functional is in the hands of its members
and the future of the global society depends on it to a large extent.

The present work has been published in Cuadernos de América del Norte Nº 10, of the
Research Center on North America (CISAN) of the Autonomous University of Mexico, in
August 2007. It is published in Own Thought with the corresponding authorization.

In this regard, it is desirable that the new representative of the United States to the UN
deploy a capacity for dialogue that allows generating consensus among the different groups
as well as balancing the demands and pressures of the United States Congress in the face
of the interests and threats faced by the United States. United in today's world. In short,
your challenge will be to behave like a sensitive diplomat, visionary, negotiator and good
strategist capable of promoting the reform of the organization for the benefit of the United
States and the international community based on a collegial dialogue.

The UN requires the committed participation of its most powerful member to make reform
effective and adapt institutional change to the conditions and challenges of the
contemporary world; this includes the reform of the main bodies, the adequacy of the
representation in them, the consolidation of the administrative reform and the rendering of
accounts; the reform of work methods, decision making and their coercive capacity. The
current scenario demands to undertake this task, the United States has a renewed
Congress and composed of parliamentarians aware of the need to strengthen the United
Nations

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (or Global Goals for Sustainable Development, the
17 Global Goals[1], the Global Goals[2] or simply the Goals[3]) are a collection of 17 global
goals set by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015. The SDGs are part of
Resolution 70/1 of the United Nations General Assembly[4]: "Transforming our World: the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development." That has been shortened to "2030 Agenda."[5]
The goals are broad and interdependent, yet each has a separate list of targets to achieve.
Achieving all 169 targets would signal accomplishing all 17 goals. The SDGs cover social
and economic development issues including poverty, hunger, health, education, global
warming, gender equality, water, sanitation, energy, urbanization, environment and social
justice.[6]

Paragraph 54 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1 of 25

September 2015 contains the goals and targets.[7] The UN-led process involved its 193
Member States and global civil society. The resolution is a broad intergovernmental
agreement that acts as the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The SDGs build on the
principles agreed upon in Resolution A/RES/66/288, entitled "The Future We Want".[8] This
was a non-binding document released as a result of Rio+20 Conference held in 2012.[8]

Implementation as of 2016 is described as "Localizing the SDGs" to highlight the role of

local institutions and local actors.[9] Regional efforts included agreements like the Baltic
2030 Action Plan[10]. Some remain pessimistic about the potential for achieving the SDGs,
especially because of estimates of the cost of achieving all 17.[9] However, progress had
been reported by 2018. For example, fewer African children under the age of 5 are suffering
from stunting and wasting. However, the same study concluded that it is unlikely there will
be an end to malnutrition by 2030.[11]

March 1994. The first train loaded with Ukrainian nuclear weapons leaves for Russia, where
they will be destroyed. March 2014. President Vladimir Putin signs a pompous ceremony in
the Kremlin for the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, hitherto Ukrainian, to the Russian
Federation. In the twenty years that have elapsed between one scene and another,
independent Ukraine has lost all its nuclear weapons and strategic territory. There are many
observers who establish a direct relationship between both facts. The question that many
ask is if Putin had dared to invade the territory of a nuclear power.

After the collapse of the USSR, the new Ukrainian State inherited much of the vast panoply
of atomic weapons from the former Soviet superpower. It is estimated that, with 1,800
nuclear warheads, the Ukrainian arsenal was the third largest on the planet, only behind the
American and Russian. Concerns about this potential geostrategic danger and doubts about
 the ability of the Ukrainian authorities to guarantee the security of such a deadly legacy
encouraged the Western chancelleries and the Kremlin to promote their destruction.

Thus, in 1994 the well-known memorandum of Budapest was signed, signed by Ukraine,
Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. In it, Kiev undertook to facilitate the
destruction of all its weapons and the dismantling of the facilities dedicated to its storage
and production. In exchange, he obtained the promise that none of the signatories would
attempt against their territorial integrity or against their sovereignty, something that,
evidently, Putin has not fulfilled in Crimea.

In reality, nuclear was too heavy a burden for the new Ukraine, as for Belarus and
Kazakhstan, former Soviet republics that also adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in that
process. The then President Leonid Kravchuk knew well that, because of the enormous
costs of its maintenance and the risks involved, his country could not afford it. On the
Ukrainian soil, the Chernobyl tragedy, the worst nuclear accident in history, had occurred in
1986, whose fateful memory must have also weighed in its decision. In June 1996, Ukraine
officially declared denuclearized territory.

Following the outcome of the Crimean case, Félix Arteaga, researcher at the Elcano Royal
Institute, asks: "What is the message that is being sent to the proliferating states? With
none of those who received security guarantees, those guarantees have been met. " The
most flagrant case is that of Libya. The dictator Muammar Gaddafi agreed to eliminate his
weapons of mass destruction after the terrorist attacks of September 11, which earned him
some rehabilitation before the same Western powers that later contributed, including military
operation, to his fall.

The Crimean lesson corroborates the reading that they have already done in other capitals.
North Korea, for example, renounced its international non-proliferation commitments in
2003. Since then, first Kim Jong-il and later his son Kim Jong-un have been able to rule the
country with as much disregard for human rights as impunity. Special mention deserves
Iran, which is now negotiating the renewal of the partial agreement that allowed it to
alleviate the sanctions to which it was subjected and where, sure, the Crimean crisis has
been followed with attention. The list continues with Pakistan and India, two giant neighbors
who have been litigating the Kashmir region for years, but to whom the firepower of both
and the awareness of the devastation that would lead away from an open war.

To these known cases, Arteaga fears that the monarchy of Saudi Arabia will be added soon,
that in recent times it has suffered strong disagreements with its usual American ally and
could be tempted to embrace a new way to immunize its regime.

In the end, Ukraine lives today mutilated and under the double threat of a Russian invasion
and a civil war. Perhaps some strategist there has now remembered the maxim of General
Pierre-Marie Gallois, father of the French program of development of deterrent weapons:
"War is abominable, that's why I defend nuclear proliferation"
b. La agenda del desarrollo 2030 de la ONU. De los Objetivos del Milenio a los
Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible.
c. Cambio Climático. La problemática del calentamiento global. El proceso de las
COP.
Conference of the Parties (COP)
Conference of the Parties (COP)
What is the COP?
The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention. All States that
are Parties to the Convention are represented at the COP, at which they review
the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the
COP adopts and take decisions necessary to promote the effective
implementation of the Convention, including institutional and administrative
arrangements.
 
More Background on the COP
A key task for the COP is to review the national communications and emission
inventories submitted by Parties. Based on this information, the COP assesses
the effects of the measures taken by Parties and the progress made in achieving
the ultimate objective of the Convention.
The COP meets every year, unless the Parties decide otherwise. The first COP
meeting was held in Berlin, Germany in March, 1995. The COP meets in Bonn,
the seat of the secretariat, unless a Party offers to host the session. Just as the
COP Presidency rotates among the five recognized UN regions - that is, Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe and Western
Europe and Others – there is a tendency for the venue of the COP to also shift
among these groups.

Climate change is a change in the statistical distribution of weatherpatterns when that change lasts
for an extended period of time (i.e., decades to millions of years). Climate change may refer to a
change in average weather conditions, or in the time variation of weather within the context of
longer-term average conditions, defined by the World Meteorological Organization as a 30 years or
longer term.[citation needed] Climate change is caused by factors such as biotic processes, variations
in solar radiation received by Earth, plate tectonics, and volcanic eruptions. Certain human activities
have been identified as primary causes of ongoing climate change, often referred to as global
warming.[1] There is no general agreement in scientific, media or policy documents as to the precise
term to be used to refer to anthropogenic forced change; either "global warming" or "climate change"
may be used.[2][3][4]
Scientists actively work to understand past and future climate by using observations and theoretical
models. A climate record—extending deep into the Earth's past—has been assembled, and continues
to be built up, based on geological evidence from borehole temperature profiles, cores removed from
deep accumulations of ice, floral and faunal records, glacial and periglacial processes, stable-isotope
and other analyses of sediment layers, and records of past sea levels. More recent data are provided
by the instrumental record. General circulation models, based on the physical sciences, are often used
in theoretical approaches to match past climate data, make future projections, and link causes and
effects in climate change.
Factors that can shape climate are called climate forcings or "forcing mechanisms".[5] These can be
either "internal" or "external". Internal forcing mechanisms are natural processes within the climate
system itself (e.g., the thermohaline circulation). External forcing mechanisms can be
either anthropogenic—caused by humans—(e.g. increased emissions of greenhouse gases and dust)
or natural (e.g., changes in solar output, the earth's orbit, volcano eruptions).
Physical evidence to observe climate change includes a range of parameters. Global records of
surface temperature are available beginning from the mid-late 19th century. For earlier periods, most
of the evidence is indirect—climatic changes are inferred from changes in proxies, indicators that
reflect climate, such as ice cores,[6] dendrochronology, sea level change, and glacial geology. Other
physical evidence includes arctic sea ice decline, cloud cover and precipitation, vegetation, animals
and historical and archaeological evidence.

Climate Change

Vidar Nordli-Mathisen
The wind farm “Los Granujales” in the South of Spain (Vejer de la
Frontera, Cádiz). Replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy
sources like wind is one of the measures needed to slow down
climate change.
Climate Change is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining moment. From shifting
weather patterns that threaten food production, to rising sea levels that increase the risk of
catastrophic flooding, the impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented in scale.
Without drastic action today, adapting to these impacts in the future will be more difficult and costly.

The Human Fingerprint on Greenhouse Gases

Greenhouse gases occur naturally and are essential to the survival of humans and millions of other
living things, by keeping some of the sun’s warmth from reflecting back into space and making Earth
livable. But after more than a century and a half of industrialization, deforestation, and large scale
agriculture, quantities of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have risen to record levels not seen in
three million years. As populations, economies and standards of living grow, so does the cumulative
level of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions.

There are some basic well-established scientific links:

 The concentration of GHGs in the earth’s atmosphere is directly linked to the
average global temperature on Earth;
 The concentration has been rising steadily, and mean global temperatures along
with it, since the time of the Industrial Revolution;
 The most abundant GHG, accounting for about two-thirds of GHGs, is carbon
dioxide (CO2), is largely the product of burning fossil fuels.
The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up by the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment to provide an objective source of scientific
information. In 2013 the IPCC provided more clarity about the role of human activities in climate
change when it released its Fifth Assessment Report. It is categorical in its conclusion: climate
change is real and human activities are the main cause.

Fifth Assessment Report

The report provides a comprehensive assessment of sea level rise, and its causes, over the past few
decades. It also estimates cumulative CO2 emissions since pre-industrial times and provides a
CO2 budget for future emissions to limit warming to less than 2 °C. About half of this maximum
amount was already emitted by 2011. The report found that:

 From 1880 to 2012, the average global temperature increased by 0.85 °C.
 Oceans have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished and the sea
level has risen. From 1901 to 2010, the global average sea level rose by 19 cm as oceans expanded
due to warming and ice melted. The sea ice extent in the Arctic has shrunk in every successive
decade since 1979, with 1.07 × 106 km² of ice loss per decade.
 Given current concentrations and ongoing emissions of greenhouse gases, it is likely
that the end of this century that global mean temperature will continue to rise above the pre-
industrial leve. The world’s oceans will warm and ice melt will continue. Average sea level rise is
predicted to be 24–30 cm by 2065 and 40–63 cm by 2100 relative to the reference period of 1986–
2005. Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries, even if emissions are stopped.
There is alarming evidence that important tipping points, leading to irreversible changes in major
ecosystems and the planetary climate system, may already have been reached or passed. Ecosystems
as diverse as the Amazon rainforest and the Arctic tundra, may be approaching thresholds of
dramatic change through warming and drying. Mountain glaciers are in alarming retreat and the
downstream effects of reduced water supply in the driest months will have repercussions that
transcend generations.

Global Warming of 1.5°C

In October 2018 the IPPCC issued a special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C,
finding that limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid, farreaching and unprecedented
changes in all aspects of society, the IPCC said in a new assessment. With clear benefits to people
and natural ecosystems, the report found that limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C
could go hand in hand with ensuring a more sustainable and equitable society. While previous
estimates focused on estimating the damage if average temperatures were to rise by 2°C, this report
shows that many of the adverse impacts of climate change will come at the 1.5°C mark.
The report also highlights a number of climate change impacts that could be avoided by limiting
global warming to 1.5ºC compared to 2ºC, or more. For instance, by 2100, global sea level rise would
be 10 cm lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared with 2°C. The likelihood of an Arctic Ocean
free of sea ice in summer would be once per century with global warming of 1.5°C, compared with at
least once per decade with 2°C. Coral reefs would decline by 70-90 percent with global warming of
1.5°C, whereas virtually all (> 99 percent) would be lost with 2ºC.

The report finds that limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require “rapid and far-reaching”
transitions in land, energy, industry, buildings, transport, and cities. Global net human-caused
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) would need to fall by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030,
reaching ‘net zero’ around 2050. This means that any remaining emissions would need to be
balanced by removing CO2 from the air.

United Nations legal instruments

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The UN family is in the forefront of the effort to save our planet. In 1992, its “Earth Summit”
produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a first step in
addressing the climate change problem. Today, it has near-universal membership. The 197 countries
that have ratified the Convention are Parties to the Convention. The ultimate aim of the Convention is
to prevent “dangerous” human interference with the climate system.

Kyoto Protocol
By 1995, countries launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change, and,
two years later, adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol legally binds developed country
Parties to emission reduction targets. The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and
ended in 2012. The second commitment period began on 1 January 2013 and will end in 2020. There
are now 197 Parties to the Convention and 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

Paris Agreement
At the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in 2015, Parties to the UNFCCC reached a landmark
agreement to combat climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments
needed for a sustainable low carbon future. The Paris Agreement builds upon the Convention and –
for the first time – brings all nations into a common cause to undertake take ambitious efforts to
combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries
to do so. As such, it charts a new course in the global climate effort.

The Paris Agreement’s central aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change
by keeping the global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

On Earth Day, 22 April 2016, 175 world leaders signed the Paris Agreement at United Nations
Headquarters in New York. This was by far the largest number of countries ever to sign an
international agreement on a single day. There are now 184 countries that have joined the Paris
Agreement.
 Climate Summit in 2019
In September 2019, Secretary-General António Guterres will convene a Climate Summit to bring
world leaders of governments, the private sector and civil society together to support the multilateral
process and to increase and accelerate climate action and ambition. He has named Luis Alfonso de
Alba, a former Mexican diplomat, as his Special Envoy to lead its preparations. The Summit will
focus on key sector where action can make the most difference—heavy industry, nature-based
solutions, cities, energy, resilience, and climate finance. World leaders will report on what they are
doing, and what more they intend to do when they convene in 2020 for the UN climate conference,
where commitments will be renewed and may be increased.

Nobel Peace Prize

In 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to former United States Vice-President Al Gore
and the IPCC "for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made
climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such
change.

d. El crimen organizado transnacional.

ransnational crimes are crimes that have actual or potential effect across

national borders and crimes that are intrastate but offend fundamental values of the
international community.[1] The term is commonly used in the law
enforcement and academic communities. Transnational organized crime (TOC) refers
specifically to transnational crime carried out by crime organizations.[2]
The word transnational describes crimes that are not only international (that is, crimes that
cross borders between countries), but crimes that by their nature involve cross-border
transference as an essential part of the criminal activity. Transnational crimes also include
crimes that take place in one country, but their consequences significantly affect another
country and transit countries may also be involved. Examples of transnational crimes
include: human trafficking, people smuggling, smuggling/trafficking of goods (such as arms
trafficking and drug trafficking and illegal animal and plant products and other goods
prohibited on environmental grounds (e.g. banned ozone depleting substances), sex
slavery, terrorism offences, torture and apartheid.
Transnational crimes may also be crimes of customary international law or international
crimes when committed in certain circumstances. For example, they may in certain
situations constitute crimes against humanity.
The international community is confronted with an increasing level of transnational crime in
which criminal conduct in one country has an impact in another or even several others. Drug
trafficking, human trafficking, computer crimes, terrorism, and a host of other crimes can
involve actors operating outside the borders of a country which might have a significant
interest in stemming the activity in question and prosecuting the perpetrator. Contemporary
transnational crimes take advantage of globalization, trade liberalization and exploding new
technologies to perpetrate diverse crimes and to move money, goods, services and people
instantaneously for purposes of perpetrating violence for political ends. [3]
Moreover, problems of weakened states and transnational crime create an unholy
confluence that is uniquely challenging. When a criminal operates outside the territory of an
offended state, the offended state might ordinarily appeal to the state from which the
criminal is operating to take some sort of action, such as to prosecute the offender
domestically or extradite the offender so that he or she may face punishment in the
offended state. Nonetheless, in situations in which a government is unable (or unwilling) to
cooperate in the arrest or prosecution of a criminal, the offended state has few options for
recourse
Given the limits on the exercise of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, states have
developed mechanisms to cooperate in transnational criminal matters. The primary
mechanisms used in this regard are extradition, lawful removal, and mutual legal
assistance.[3]
Extradition is the mechanism by which one sovereign requests and obtains custody of a
fugitive located within the jurisdiction and control of another sovereign. It is an ancient
mechanism, dating back to at least the thirteenth century BCE, when an Egyptian Pharaoh
negotiated an extradition treaty with a Hittite King. Through the extradition process, a
sovereign (the requesting state) typically makes a formal request to another sovereign (the
requested state). If the fugitive is found within the territory of the requested state, then the
requested state may arrest the fugitive and subject him or her to its extradition process. The
extradition procedures to which the fugitive will be subjected are dependent on the law and
practice of the requested state.[3]
Aside from mechanisms for the return of fugitives, states have also developed mechanisms
for requesting and obtaining evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions. When
evidence or other forms of legal assistance, such as witness statements or the service of
documents, are needed from a foreign sovereign, states may attempt to cooperate
informally through their respective police agencies or, alternatively, resort to what is typically
referred to as requests for "mutual legal assistance" [3] The practice of mutual legal
assistance developed from the comity-based system of letters rogatory, though it is now far
more common for states to make mutual legal assistance requests directly to the
designated "Central Authorities" within each state. In contemporary practice, such requests
may still be made on the basis of reciprocity but may also be made pursuant to bilateral and
multilateral treaties that obligate countries to provide assistance. Many countries are able to
provide a broad range of mutual legal assistance to other countries even in the absence of a
treaty

he concept of 'transnational crime', from a criminological perspective, originates from the

mid-1970s when the United Nations used the term in order to identify certain criminal
activities which transcend national jurisdictions. In 1995, the United Nations identified
eighteen categories of transnational - and mostly organized - criminality. Transnational
crime was then defined as ‘offences whose inception, prevention and/or direct or indirect
effects involved more than one country.’ (UN Doc. A.CONF. 169/15/Add.1 (1995)). The
crimes listed included, among others, money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and
cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit arms trafficking, aircraft hijacking, sea
piracy, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade
in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal
business, corruption and bribery of public or party officials. Transnational crime has spread
 exponentially with the development of globalization and it is only relatively recent that some
progress has been made by states and international organizations in developing measures
to combat this type of criminality.

This Guide is intended as a starting point for research in the field on Transnational Crime. It
provides the basic legal materials available in the Peace Palace Library, both in print and
electronic format. Handbooks, leading articles, bibliographies, periodicals, serial publications
and documents of interest are presented in the Selective Bibliography section. Links to the
PPL Catalogue are inserted.  The Library's systematic classification → Transnational
crime and keyword Transnational Crime are instrumental for searching through the
Catalogue. Special attention is given to our subscriptions on databases, e-journals, e-books
and other electronic resources. Finally, this Research Guide features links to relevant
websites and other online resources of particular int

e. Las corrientes de migraciones internacionales. El problema de los refugiados.

Refugee crisis can refer to movements of large groups of displaced people, who could be
either internally displaced persons, forced displaced people, refugees or other migrants. It can also refer
to incidents in the country of origin or departure, to large problems whilst on the move or even after
arrival in a safe country that involve large groups of displaced persons, asylum seekers or refugees.
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2017, 65.6 million people were forcibly
displaced worldwide because of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations alone In the past
two years, the world has witnessed a growing refugee crisis. In 2013, for the first time since World War II, the number of
those forcibly displaced from their homes exceeded 50 million. Millions more have since been displaced as a result of
conflict and crises around the globe. More than half of Syria’s population is displaced. Some four million women, men
and children have fled the country and are refugees, making this one of the biggest refugee crises in history. The vast
majority - 95% - are living in the countries neighbouring Syria. In one country - Lebanon - Syrian refugees now account
for one in every five people. Despite the huge influx of refugees, the host countries have received almost no meaningful
international support. The UN’s humanitarian appeal for Syrian refugees was only 23% funded as of the 3 June 2015.
Calls by the UN for the international community to resettle refugees from Syria have largely fallen on deaf ears. The
total number of places offered to refugees from Syria is less than 90,000, only 2.2% of the refugees in the main host
countries. It is clear that the situation in Syria will not allow refugees to go home any time soon. However, Syria’s
neighbours are at breaking point – and some have resorted to deeply troubling measures, including denying desperate
people entry to their countries and pushing people back into the conflict. While Syria is the world’s biggest refugee
crisis, it is by no means the only one. In Africa people fleeing conflict and persecution in countries like South Sudan, the
Central African Republic (CAR), Nigeria and Burundi, have added hundreds of thousands to the longstanding refugee
populations from countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There are an
estimated three million refugees in subSaharan Africa. Kenya is home to Dadaab - the world’s largest refugee camp, set
up in 1991. Yet, the refugee situations in African countries receive little or no global attention - in 2013, less than 15,000
refugees from African countries were resettled and UN humanitarian appeals are severely underfunded. The South
Sudan regional refugee response plan, for example, is only 11% fulfilled. While many African countries have opened
their borders to those fleeing conflict, too many refugees and migrants have faced discrimination and abuse in host
states. The xenophobic attacks that took place in South Africa in April 2015, for example, left thousands of refugees and
migrants displaced in that country. In an effort to escape desperate situations refugees and migrants risk their lives –
one of the starkest examples is the perilous boat journeys in the Mediterranean from North Africa to Europe. In 2014
and the first three months of 2015, the largest number of people recorded attempting to cross the Mediterranean by
boat to reach Southern Europe were Syrians. In April 2015, more than 1,000 people died in the space of ten days while
attempting to cross the Mediterranean. As of 31 May 2015, the number of people who drowned making the boat
journey from North Africa stood at 1,865, compared to 425 deaths recorded during the same period in 2014. The
dramatic increase in the number of lives lost in the Mediterranean in 2015 is partly due to the decision by Italy and the
European Union (EU) to end the Italian navy operation Mare Nostrum at the end of 2014 and replace it with a much
more limited EU operation. In South East Asia in May 2015 the world witnessed harrowing scenes as fishing boats
crammed with refugees and migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh were pushed back to sea by Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia. Desperate children, men and women were left without food, water and medical care for a week, before
the Philippines and later Indonesia and Malaysia offered to take them in. The Mediterranean and South East Asia crises
exposed governments’ willingness to ignore legal obligations and humanitarian imperatives. In situations where lives
were known to be at risk and states had the means to save them, they chose not to act for political reasons. The lives
lost were not a result of a violent conflict or an unavoidable natural disaster – most were entirely preventable deaths In
both Europe and South East Asia, people smugglers and human traffickers have – rightly – been blamed for sending
thousands to their deaths. Effectively combatting the criminals who prey on desperate people is vital, but it does not
absolve governments of their responsibility to provide refugees with protection. The global refugee crisis cannot be re-
cast as a trafficking and smuggling issue by governments desperate to deflect attention from their failures. The global
refugee crisis may be fuelled by conflict and persecution but it is compounded by the neglect of the international
community in the face of this human suffering. In the aftermath of World War II, the international community came
together to create the United Nations Refugee Convention to protect people from being returned to countries were
they risked persecution and human rights abuses. The Refugee Convention has been an important mechanism,
providing a framework for the protection of tens of millions of people. The Refugee Convention also established the
principle of responsibility and burden-sharing - the idea that the international community must work together to
address refugee crises so that no one country, or a small number of countries, has to cope by themselves. This
fundamental principle is now being ignored, with devastating consequences: the international refugee protection
system is broken.  86% of the world’s refugees are in developing countries. Some of these countries host hundreds of
thousands of people. Turkey, Lebanon and Pakistan each host more than one million refugees. There is a clearly
disproportionate burden on a small number of countries;  Nearly one million refugees need resettlement or other
forms of humanitarian admission – whereby the most vulnerable refugees in a country are offered residency in another
county where they would receive better assistance. Yet, global annual resettlement commitments are less than a tenth
of this number;  Although 145 countries have ratified the Refugee Convention, there are regions of the world in which
very few countries have ratified the treaty, including most of the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia. In these
countries refugees generally enjoy limited rights and in some cases can’t even be legally recognized as refugees; 
Xenophobic and racist discourse has been normalised in many countries, with certain media outlets and politicians
blaming refugees and migrants for economic and social problems. The global refugee crisis will not be solved unless the
international community recognizes that it is a global problem and deals with it as such. Refugees are - by definition –
people who no longer enjoy the protection of their state because that state will not or cannot protect them. They are
people who have fled armed conflict, persecution, violence and grave human rights abuses. This briefing paper looks at
the global refugee crisis – from Lebanon to Kenya, the Andaman Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It calls for a global
response to what has become one of the defining challenges of the 21st century. The current approaches to the world’s
many refugee crises are failing – and the toll in lives lost and lives blighted is far higher than many armed conflicts. A
paradigm shift is needed: Amnesty International is setting out a proposal to significantly reinvigorate the system for
refugee protection and burden sharing amongst states. Amnesty International believes that a paradigm shift on refugee
protection must include eight key actions by the international community:  An international summit on the global
refugee crisis focused on increasing international responsibility and burden sharing;  Global ratification of the Refugee
Convention;  Develop robust domestic refugee systems: states must have fair domestic procedures to assess refugee
claims and must guarantee fundamental rights and access to services, such as education and healthcare, to refugees; 
An absolute commitment to saving lives first: states must prioritise saving people in distress over implementing
immigration policies. In situations where people are in danger of death, including – but not limited to – people
attempting sea crossings, states should invest in search and rescue operations and immediately come to the rescue of
people in distress. This imperative should never be trumped by any border control objectives;  Combat trafficking:
states must take effective action to investigate and prosecute trafficking gangs. States should offer protection and
assistance to victims of trafficking and ensure they have access to refugee status determination procedures and/or
resettlement opportunities;  Fulfil all resettlement needs identified by UNHCR: nearly one million resettlement and
humanitarian admission places are required for refugees who need resettlement and this number will increase every
year. Amnesty International estimates that, 300,000 annual resettlement and humanitarian admission places will be
needed every year over the next five years;  Combat xenophobia: governments must refrain from engaging in
xenophobia themselves, for example by implying or directly claiming asylum-seekers and migrants are to blame for
economic and social problems. Governments must also have effective policies to address xenophobic violence; 
Establish a global refugee fund: such a fund should fulfil all UN humanitarian appeals for refugee crises. This fund should
 also provide meaningful financial support to countries hosting large numbers of refugees to help them provide services
to refugees and their host communities. This should be additional to existing development aid. The global refugee crisis
is primarily a result of conflicts and widespread human rights violations. In the aftermath of World War II, the
international community created the United Nations Refugee Convention. Together with other international treaties
and norms, it obligates that states ensure refugees, having lost the protection of their country of origin, are able to
enjoy international protection from their countries of asylum. The Refugee Convention also establishes the principle of
responsibility-sharing - the idea that the international community must work together to address refugee crises so that
no one country, or a small number of countries, has to cope alone. The obligation of individual countries to give
protection and assistance to refugees, coupled with the responsibility of the international community to act collectively
in the case of large refugee crises, is essential to refugee protection. The refugee crisis the world has witnessed in the
past few years has been exacerbated by the failures of individual states, and of the international community as a whole,
to live up to these obligations. Although 145 countries have ratified the Refugee Convention, there are regions of the
world in which very few countries have ratified the treaty, including most of the Middle East, South Asia and South East
Asia. In these regions refugees generally enjoy limited rights and in some cases are not legally recognized as refugees.
The responsibility for coping with the world’s multiple refugee crises lies almost entirely with poorer countries in the
world: 86% of the world’s refugees are in developing countries. 118 Wealthier countries are not doing nearly enough to
share the burden of the global refugee crisis. Humanitarian appeals for refugee crises are consistently – and often
severely – underfunded. Nearly one million refugees need resettlement, yet, globally annual resettlement commitments
are less than a tenth of this number. Only around 30 countries offer any resettlement places at all. In many countries,
political considerations regularly take precedence over the lives of refugees and migrants, leaving thousands to die on
dangerous journeys that could have been avoided. Ultimately, refugee crises end when their root causes are addressed.
Ending conflicts and widespread human rights abuses are objectives that states should pursue, but they are difficult to
achieve. However, individual states and the international community as a whole must recognize that they can lessen the
devastating consequences of the refugee crisis on people. For this, a global approach to the problem is needed.
Individual countries should respect their legal obligations towards refugees and asylumseekers, including allowing them
to enter their territories, providing assistance to those in distress at sea and tackling xenophobia, but there must be a
fundamental change in the international cooperation on refugees. The international community must share the
responsibility for assisting and hosting refugees, including by resettling refugees who need it and adequately funding
humanitarian programmes in other countries.

6. Actualidad regional
a. La situación de la democracia y los derechos humanos.

The word ‘democracy’ does not appear in the United Nations Charter. However, with the opening words of
that document, “We the Peoples of the United Nations”, the founders of the UN directly linked the legitimacy
of this new organisation and its member states to the will of the people. This commitment finds further
expression in the purposes of the United Nations that include promotion of universal respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction. This chapter sets out to present a broad
overview of how human rights operate within and influence the work of the United Nations – and thereby to
provide a context and foundation for the more detailed analysis of human rights standards and processes
contained in subsequent chapters. Section 2 explores the important (and shifting) relationship between
human rights and democracy. Section 3 looks briefly at the human rights system in practice – focusing
particularly on those parts of the system that are of particular relevance to human rights workers in the field.
The evolution of human rights field operations over the past decade is examined in Section 4. It is now widely
accepted that human rights touch upon almost every aspect of the UN’s work: from education to health; from
the provision of humanitarian assistance to the negotiation of peace settlements. The growing relevance of
human rights to those parts of the UN that lie outside the formal human rights system is examined in Section
5. The final part of this chapter contains a number of concluding observations directed towards the nature of
rights, the future of human rights and the role of the UN in that future
The United Nations will always have a critical role to play in promoting and protecting human rights. This is
one of the principal purposes of the UN and, in many senses, the very rationale for its continuing existence.
At the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that individual rights and freedoms will be
protected or violated because of what exists or what is lacking within a given state or society – not because of
what is said or done within the walls of the United Nations. In other words, the ability of a state to effectively
discharge its responsibilities in the area of human rights will depend predominantly on the strength of its
 domestic institutions. It is for this very simple reason that the worth of the United Nations human rights
system should be measured with reference to its ability to encourage and cultivate national implementation
of (and compliance with) international human rights standards. This is the only valid test of that system’s
relevance and effectiveness. Human rights workers in the field should therefore look to the UN generally, and
to the international human rights system in particular, to support their efforts to promote human rights at
the national level. The mechanisms and processes described above have no value in and of themselves. They
are tools for the use of governments, NGOs and individuals in their efforts to build democratic societies
within which human rights can be respected and protected. In concluding this introductory chapter, it is
important to draw attention to two important human rights ‘paradoxes’. The first concerns the legal/political
nature of rights. It is true that human rights are legal entitlements. However, law, in this case, is being used as
a means of distributing power from those who have too much to those who have too little. In most situations,
and in accordance with basic democratic principles, this will translate into a devolution of power from a
government to its people. In other cases, the change in power relations will be much more personal – for
example, the transfer of power from men to women in the name of non-discrimination and equality. No one
gives up power easily and the fight for human rights is therefore more about hearts and minds, politics and
power, than it is about law. The second paradox arises out of the fact that while (in most cases) it is
governments who violate rights, it is only governments that have the capacity, within the current
international system, to protect such rights. Elsewhere, the effects of this paradox have been likened to a fox
building a hen house. The fox may have given up its habit of chasing chickens but will nevertheless leave a
few gaps in the fence in case it gets hungry one day. While this view may be overly pessimistic, it does help to
illustrate and explain the general reluctance, on the part of almost all governments, to close the gap between
rhetoric and practice when it comes to human rights. The first years of the twenty-first century have clearly
and painfully demonstrated the fragility of the international consensus upon which the human rights system
is built. Many countries are openly opposed to any changes that will strengthen the effectiveness of that
system. Even those states that have traditionally been most supportive of international human rights law
have experienced trouble endorsing, in practice, the principle of all human rights for all persons. The UN’s
main human rights mechanisms, most particularly the new Human Rights Council, remain hostage to narrow
national and regional interests that have little to do with protecting human rights. The recognition that
entities other than states (such as transnational corporations and intergovernmental organisations) have a
strong impact on individual rights and freedoms has not yet been accompanied by the legislative and policy
changes that are required to manage this influence for the benefit of human rights. Despite these challenges,
it is important to acknowledge that the international human rights system is stronger today than many would
have ever believed possible, even a few short decades ago. Human rights advocates should understand that
the numerous shortcomings and weaknesses in that system are not fatal to its overall coherence and that
they can sometimes be minimised through effective advocacy and field work. However, the future is another
matter altogether. Ultimately it will be up to the member states to decide how far – and in which direction –
they will take the UN in terms of its human rights work. Notes 1 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna
b. Crimen organizado: terrorismo, narcotráfico, trata de personas, actividades
extractivas ilegales.
c. El proceso de paz en Colombia.
Colombian conflict
The Colombian peace process refers to the peace process between the Colombian
government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC–EP) to bring an end to the Colombian conflict. Negotiations began in
September 2012, and mainly took place in Havana, Cuba. Negotiators announced a final
agreement to end the conflict and build a lasting peace on August 24, 2016. However,
a referendum to ratify the deal on October 2, 2016 was unsuccessful after 50.2% of
voters voted against the agreement with 49.8% voting in favor. Afterward, the Colombian
government and the FARC signed a revised peace deal on November 24 and sent it to
Congress for ratification instead of conducting a second referendum. [1] Both houses of
Congress ratified the revised peace agreement on November 29–30, 2016, thus marking
an end to the conflict
The Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia insurgents are
about to reach a comprehensive peace agreement after almost four years of peace negotiations
in Havana. This agreement is a major milestone in the process of settling one of the world’s most
protracted and violent conflicts. At a time of unprecedented humanitarian crisis, Colombia is
becoming a global reference for identifying political solutions to apparently intractable conflicts.
In their third major attempt in five decades to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict, the
parties to the conflict have taken stock of both their own past failures and lessons learned from
other peace processes. In doing so they have developed innovative frameworks and approaches,
e.g. a clear procedural distinction between peace negotiations and the peace process;
positioning the rights of the victims at the centre of the talks; addressing the structural problem
of rural development; creating a Gender Subcommission; and planning for implementation long
before the agreement is signed. This report describes these innovations and other developments
leading up to the widely predicted peace agreement that might be relevant to peace processes
elsewhere Over the past five decades Colombia has suffered one of the world’s most protracted
and violent conflicts, with more than 200,000 deaths, thousands of forced disappearances and
kidnappings, and almost 7 million people displaced. Peace negotiations in the 1990s led to the
demobilisation of some 5,000 combatants from five guerrilla organisations. In 2006 some 30,000
alleged members of the right-wing United Self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) militia agreed
to cease their activities. The list of politically motivated armed actors is currently headed by the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with some 15,000 combatants, and the
National Liberation Army, a smaller organisation initially linked to liberation theology, which has
recently also agreed to enter formal negotiations with the government. At the same time, major
criminal gangs (bacrim) largely recruited from former paramilitaries have become the main
internal security threat in Colombia. The roots to the armed conflict between the government
and the FARC go back to armed peasant movements of the early 1960s that were initially linked
to the Liberal Party. Following U.S.-backed military pressure from the state, in 1964 the small and
scattered groups joined forces, in alliance with the Communist Party of Colombia, and started a
military confrontation. In 1984 the government and the FARC reached a ceasefire agreement
that allowed the creation of a new leftist political organisation, as a first step in the guerrilla
organisation’s demobilisation. However, in the years that followed more than 3,000 members of
this political organisation – the Patriotic Union – were killed by paramilitary organisations linked
to the AUC, often in collusion with state security forces. The ceasefire broke down in 1987 and
the talks collapsed in 1990. In 1999 the government and the FARC engaged in a second major
series of peace negotiations. The governmen talks were to take place. However, the level of trust
was low, the parties became bogged down in discussions around procedure, and they were
consequently unable to address any of the long list of substantive issues. In 2001 the talks
collapsed and in 2002 a new president, Alvaro Uribe, was voted into power in Colombia on the
promise to wipe out the guerrillas through the use of military force. Eight years of high-intensity
war followed during which the government increased its military capacities and created a force
of some 500,000 well-trained and well-equipped police and military personnel. The signing of a
peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC will signal the completion
of phase two of the peace process. Phase three will focus on the implementation of the
agreement. Political discussions around implementation will inevitably expand the agenda for
change to cover topics that have not been addressed in Havana, notably policies related to the
extraction of natural resources and the future of the security sector. Despite all the positive
developments in the peace process, Colombian public opinion remains largely sceptical. People
simply do not trust the government and the FARC to deliver on their promises. The first major
test for the peace process will therefore be to widen the ownership and ensure broad public
 endorsement of the peace agreement in the plebiscite that will follow the signing of the
agreement. The second test will be for the parties to the conflict to prove their ability to turn
words into deeds. Political will is a fundamental, but insufficient condition for building peace.
Despite all their preparations, after signing the peace agreement the parties will enter
unchartered territory. No peace agreement in the world has ever been fully implemented, and
yet the government and the FARC will feel the national and international pressure to move
forward according to the agreed road map. All sorts of contradictions will surface – between the
signatories, among the signatories, and with other stakeholders. The post-agreement stage is
nothing less than the continuation of the negotiations, but with much more public participation.
After two years of secret talks between the government and the National Liberation Army (ELN),
in March 2016 the two sides agreed to start formal peace negotiations. This is a welcome
development, because peace with only one guerrilla group would have been incomplete.
However, the ELN will join the peace process at the final stage of the Havana talks, and the
government has stated that it will not reopen discussions on issues already agreed with the
FARC. With the ELN keen to frame and take the lead on a separate peace process, the third test
will be the convergence of both peace negotiations in the broader peace process. The most
difficult test might be the cultural transformation of Colombian society. There is a need to
address deeprooted mistrust, fear, resentment and hatred created by decades of violence, as
well as to effect a cultural paradigm shift to challenge violent and individualistic everyday
attitudes. The rehumanisation of the “other” does not only involve combatants, but society at
large. Discussions in Colombian society are dominated by confrontational attitudes where
different opinions compete for supremacy. It will be difficult for Colombian society to progress
until the diversity of the perspectives present in that society is acknowledged as a value instead
of a problem. As the women’s movement has suggested, building peace requires the
acknowledgement that no one possesses access to the absolute truth and, therefore, that the
willingness and capacity to step out of one’s comfort zone constitute an essential step towards
peace (Colectivo de Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad, 2014). This cultural change will take time. Final
thoughts This report is an early assessment of the developments leading up to the widely
predicted Colombian comprehensive peace agreement. In this peace process the government
and the FARC have taken stock of and learned from previous experiences, both in Colombia and
internationally. They have in turn developed and implemented new frameworks and approaches
that could inspire other peace negotiations, both in Colombia and elsewhere. A peace agreement
will not be the end of the peace process in Colombia. It will be, rather, a milestone that indicates
a possible end to the armed conflict and the beginning of a transitional process to address long-
neglected structural problems in an inclusive and constructive way. The post-agreement process
will be at least as challenging as the peace negotiations themselves. The difficulties ahead cannot
be overstated. But because the challenges are not unique to the Colombian peace process, some
of the responses may thus also lead to additional innovations that can contribute to improving
global policy and practice in post-agreement peacebuilding.

e. Venezuela. De Chávez a Maduro.

f. Los procesos Bolivia c. Chile y Chile c. Bolivia iniciados en la Corte Internacional de
Justicia de La Haya.

In the 19th century, Bolivia and Chile got involved in a war known as War of the Pacific. The war’s
outcome was the Chilean annexation of a valuable disputed territory on Pacific coast which former
belonged to Bolivia’s coastline. As a result of such territorial loss, Bolivia became a landlocked
nation. However, Bolivia has never accepted its landlocked nation’s condition and has persistently
tried to enter into direct negotiations with Chile in order to recover sovereignty over its lost
coastline. Despite statements of high Chilean officials declaring willing to dialogue, direct
negotiations proved to be unfruitful. In the face of such circumstances, Bolivia presented a claim
against Chile to the International Court of Justice in April 2013. In its application, Bolivia requests
the ICJ to adjudge and declare (a) that Chile has the obligation to negotiate with Bolivia in order to
reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean; (b) that Chile has
violated this obligations and (c) that Chile must perform the obligation in good faith, promptly,
formally, effectively and within a reasonable time. In this sense, the ICJ judges must decide if Chile
is bound by international law to enter into negotiations regarding Bolivia’s fully sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean and, if so, whether it has failed to fulfill such obligation.
In its origins, the case Bolivia v. Chile, pending before the ICJ since April 2013, constitutes a
territorial dispute that dates back to the 19th century. Before analyzing Bolivia’s claim merit per se
– and evaluating whether Chile has an obligation to negotiate effectively and in good faith in order
to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean –, it must be
assessed how Bolivia has lost its coastline to Chile and how both States are dealing with the issue.
When it comes to understanding how Bolivia has lost its coastline to Chile, it is necessary to
consider three elements: firstly, the uncertainty encompassing boundary delimitation among the
newly independent former Spanish colonies; secondly, the economic importance of natural
resources found at the Atacama Desert in 19th century; and, finally, the armed conflict widely
known as the War of the Pacific (1879 – 1883). Chile and Bolivia achieved their independence from
Spain in 1818 and in 1825, respectively. These new states, grounded on the uti possidetis juris
principle, took possession of the territories that corresponded to their colonial administration (US
Department of State 1966). However, the administrative boundaries of Spanish colonies in Latin
America were not well defined. As a result of this uncertainty, both nations claimed at least partial
ownership over the Atacama Desert by invoking the same principle of uti possidetis (McCray
2005). Uncertainties involving boundary delimitation did not create significant complications until
the mid-1840s. By this time, however, the economic importance of the guano and nitrate deposits
in the Atacama Desert was discovered. Suddenly, the region’s economic relevance refueled
territorial disputes between Bolivia and Chile. In 1942, Chile claimed that its territory extended as
far north as the 23rd parallel. Bolivia, in its turn, claimed that its territory extended as far south as
the 26th parallel. The richest nitrate deposits were located around the 24th parallel – a region that
both countries claimed to own. In 1847, Chile occupied de facto the Mejillones Port, located in the
24th parallel (Fifer 1972, 53). Bolivia endeavored to settle the dispute peacefully, but the Bolivian
National Assembly, on May 27 1863, empowered the chief executive to declare war against Chile if
a pacific settlement to the dispute could not be ……..

Over the course of these negotiations, Bolivian representatives pressured to grant Bolivia an
access to the ocean either in form of a corridor through Chilean territory or by modifying the
Treaty of Ancón in order to cede the provinces of Tacna e Arica to Bolivia. Chile refused to sacrifice
its own territorial continuity and pointed out that it could not relinquish Tacna and Arica because
it did not own them (St. John 1994). As Bolivia continued to insist on an access to the ocean, both
countries signed an indefinite truce pact, pending conclusion of a peace treaty. During the period
of the truce pact, Bolivia accepted that “the Republic of Chile would continue to rule, subject to
the political and administrative regime provided for in Chilean law, the territories that lie between
parallel twenty-three and the mouth of the Loa river in the Pacific [Department of Littoral]” (St.
John 1994). In May 1895, Bolivia and Chile signed three agreements to find a solution for their
pending issues. The most important of these agreements was the Agreement on the Transfer of
Territories between the Republics of Bolivia and Chile. In this agreement, it was stated that, if Chile
acquired the territories of Tacna and Arica through a plebiscite or direct negotiations, it would
transfer them to Bolivia. If Chile was unable to acquire these territories, it would transfer the zone
“from the Cove of Vitor to the Valley of Camarones” or any other similar area to Bolivia (St. John
1994, 16). Peru protested against the terms of the treaty and stated that it would not let go any
part of its territory neither to Bolivia nor to Chile. In October 1904, Bolivia and Chile finally signed
a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, considered as a significant diplomatic victory for Chile, whereby
Bolivia formally recognized Chilean ownership of its former littoral. In return, Chile guaranteed to
Bolivia commercial transit rights and facilities at some Chilean ports. Chile also agreed to
recompense Bolivia over its loss and committed to build a railroad from the port of Arica to La Paz.
This railroad was concluded in 1913 (Farcau 2000). Faced with the uncertainty surrounding the
territorial status of Tacna and Arica, Bolivia proposed to both Peru and Chile that they renounced
their aspirations in its favor, which both states refused to. The Tacna-Arica issue was settled only
after World War I, through the mediation of the President of the United States. The Treaty of Lima,
signed in 1929, stated that Tacna would belong to Peru and Arica would belong to Chile. The
Treaty of Lima also established that neither Peru nor Chile could cede these territories to a third
state without the prior agreement of the other (MCray 2005). Over the next decades, Bolivia
continued asking for a form of sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. In the 1950s, the country
revived the issue and proposed to Chile a new round of direct negotiations about it. Chile agreed
to discuss the issue, but there was no substantial progress on negotiations since then, in spite of
the Bolivian efforts and Chilean public commitments to reach a peaceful and satisfactory
agreement over the Bolivian demand for access to the sea (St. John 1994). After many years of
fruitless negotiations, Bolivia presented its demand before this Court, arguing that Chile has
committed itself through agreements, diplomatic practice and declarations of its highest-level
representatives to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an
agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. 2 STATEMENT OF THE
ISSUE In light of the aforementioned facts, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, on 24 April 2013,
instituted proceedings against the Republic of Chile before the International Court of Justice. 2.1
BOLIVIA’S ALLEGATIONS The Plurinational State of Bolivia claims that the Republic of Chile, by
failing to comply with its statements that recognized Bolivia’s right of access to the Pacific Ocean,
has violated both treaty law and customary international law. 2.1.1 Jurisdiction of the Court As the
basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, the applicant invokes article XXXI of the American Treaty on
Pacific Settlement (“Pact of Bogotá”) of 30 April 1948, to which both States are parties and that
reads as follows: In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other
American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any
special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that
arise among them concerning: a) The interpretation of a treaty; b) Any question of international
law; c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the breach of an
international obligation; d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation (Pact of Bogotá 1948. Article XXXI). Both Bolivia and Chile are parties to
the Pact of Bogotá. Bolivia ratified it on 9 June 2011 and Chile on 21 August 1967. No pertinent
reservation made by either party is in force at the moment. 2.1.2 As to Chile’s duty to negotiate a
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean under treaty law and Chile’s breach of such obligation In its
Application, Bolivia invokes several treaties celebrated between both States whereby Chile has
bound itself to grant the former a form of access to the Pacific Ocean. Firstly, the Applicant recalls
that, through the treaties of 10 August 1866 and the Treaty of 6 August 1874, the boundary
between Bolivia and Chile was established and Chile formally and legally recognized Bolivia’s
sovereignty over the coasts of the Pacific Ocean (ICJ 2013). Among the treaties signed by the
parties to this case on May 18 1895, the Applicant highlights the Special Treaty on the Transfer of
Territories – which, in its preamble, stated that: The Republic of Chile and the Republic of Bolivia,
with the purpose of strengthening increasingly closer ties of friendship to unite the two countries,
and the agreement that a superior need and the future development and commercial property of
Bolivia requires its free and natural access to the sea, have decided to enter into a special treaty
on the transfer of territory for which purpose they have named and appointed their
Plenipotentiaries (…) (Special Treaty on the Transfer of Territories, Preamble) In its Bases I and II,
this treaty also provided that, if through a plebiscite or direct arrangements, Chile were to acquire
control and permanent sovereignty over the territories of Tacna and Arica, it would undertake to
transfer them to the Republic of Bolivia, except for the area from the Quebrada de Camarones to
the Quebrada de Vitor - which would remain under Chilean control.In Base IV of the said treaty, it
was determined that, if Chile were unable to gain such sovereignty “it undertakes to transfer to
Caleta de Vitor up to the Quebrada de Camarones or any other similar area to Bolivia”. Bolivia
then refers to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed with Chile on 20 October 1904, through
which Chile imposed its rule over the occupied Bolivian territories. This treaty did not cancel
previous Chilean declarations and commitments concerning Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea
(Application, 14). Furthermore, Bolivia invokes multiple declarations by which Chile committed
itself to grant sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean to Bolivia. Given the statements released by
Chile on 20 January 1920 (Application, Annex 9), 20 June 1950 (Application, Annex 10), 10 July
1961 (Application, Annex 11), and especially the Joint Declaration of Charanã of 8 February 1975
(Application, Annex 13), the Applicant argues that the Respondent was willing to grant Bolivia an
own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Then, the Applicant asserts that, through a note on
19 December 1975 in the course of the Charaña negotiations, Chile once more declared itself to be
“prepared to negotiate with Bolivia the cession of a strip of land north of Arica up to the Línea de
la Concordía” (Application, 16). Nevertheless, the Respondent rejected Bolivia’s proposals for
granting an appropriate and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean on 9 June 1987, contravening its
own prior declarations (Application, 16). Bolivia also highlights the joint communiqué issued with
Chile and released on 22 February 2000, the second point of which referred to their agreement to
put together a work agenda including, without any exclusion, the essential matters of the bilateral
relationship. The Presidents of both countries confirmed this position on 1 September 2000 and, in
July 2006, the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile agreed on the “Agenda of 13 Points”, which
addressed the “Maritime Issue” in point VI. Both States agreed to meet in November 2010 to start
working on the Maritime Issue, but Chile unilaterally suspended the meeting, and the negotiation
was not resumed. Another attempt at resolving the matter with Chile was, according to the
Applicant, the statement given by the President of Bolivia at the 66th session of the United
Nations General Assembly on 21 September 2011 in the sense that the channels for a bilateral
negotiation with Chile to find a solution for the Bolivian maritime issue remained open. The
response received from the Chilean President was that there are no pending issues between the
two countries. This positioning was confirmed by the State after Bolivia’s public request in
February 2011 for a draft and concrete proposal to remedy the Bolivian confinement, and again
after the statement given by the Bolivian President at the 67th session of the United Nations
 General Assembly in September 20123 . Finally, the Applicant presents several resolutions by
international entities supporting the debate and negotiations between the two States. The
Resolution 426 of the Organization of American States recommended the opening of negotiations
between Bolivia and Chile for the purposes of providing Bolivia with a free and sovereign territorial
connection with the Pacific Ocean (Resolution 426, 1979). Ten other subsequent resolutions
during the following decade were issued by the same organ confirming such Resolution, whereby
it was determined that Bolivia’s maritime problem would be kept permanently on the agenda of
the General Assembly of the Organization of American States until a solution could be reached. In
particular, Resolution 686 of 1983 urges Bolivia and Chile to find a formula to give Bolivia a
sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on the bases that take into account mutual conveniences
and the rights and interest of all parties involved. 2.2 CHILE’S ALLEGATIONS In its defense, the
Republic of Chile argues that it is not bound by any legal obligations whatsoever to negotiate with
the Applicant in order to grant the latter a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and that Bolivia
lacks any legal bases to claim a sovereign right of access. 2.2.1 Jurisdiction of the Court According
to the Respondent, the requirements imposed by article XXI of the American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement of 30 April 1948 (used by Bolivia as the basis for the jurisdiction of this Court over the
present case) have not been met. More specifically, the Respondent argues that there is no
dispute to be settled between the parties, since both have signed the aforementioned treaty of
Peace and Friendship. Chile contends that the said treaty has been observed and implemented by
both parties for over a century, and that Bolivia has been granted the widest possible right of
commercial transit across its territory and ports on the Pacific. Having entered into negotiations
innumerous negotiations with Bolivia over the years, the Respondent claims to have fulfilled every
possible obligation it might have had towards Bolivia in this matter and that, therefore, there is
nothing pending between the two states. Moreover, the Respondent highlights that Bolivia’s
initiative to institute proceedings against Chile before the International Court of Justice goes
against the Chilean territorial integrity and national interests – which are protected by the
essential principles of international law and relations among states, such as the inviolability of
treaties and the stability of bord
The Plurinational State of Bolivia requests this Court to adjudge and declare that: a) Chile has the
obligation to negotiate with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. b) Chile has breached the said obligation. c) Chile must
perform in good faith, promptly, formally, within a reasonable time and effectively, to grant Bolivia
a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The Republic of Chile requests this Court to adjudge
and declare that: a) There is no dispute between Bolivia and Chile, for Chile is not bound by
international law to negotiate with Bolivia in order to grant the latter a fully sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean, and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Alternatively, b) The
Court lacks jurisdiction, for Chile has already fulfilled its obligation, which was an obligation to
negotiate, not to conclude an agreement, and therefore there is no dispute between the two
States.

g. Las relaciones Cuba-EE.UU.

h. La problemática de los migrantes.

The Stunning Scale of Latin America's

Migration Crisis
The images of children being forcibly separated from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico
border are shocking by any standard. At least 2,300 children have been separated from
their parents over the past two months alone, many of them fleeing unspeakable violence in
Mexico and Central America. Their parents have been marched to detention centers where
they languish for weeks. Stories are emerging of breastfeeding babies, toddlers,
adolescents and teenagers penned up in cages. There are another 10,700 unaccompanied
minors also languishing in U.S. custody.

As grim as the domestic situation is, it is just the tip of the international iceberg.

The world is in the grips of a monumental forced migration crisis. More than 68 million
people are on the move, running away from armed conflicts and other forms of persecution
and human rights violations. Over 25 million of them are refugees; the rest are internally
displaced and stateless people. The last time so many humans were on the run was during
World War II. And people are not just fleeing war zones in Africa and the Middle East, but
from organized crime across the Americas.

As the recently introduced zero tolerance immigration policies in the U.S. amply show, there
are signs of growing intolerance for asylum seekers and other migrants. In the U.S., refugee
admissions have fallen by over 85 percent, from more than 200,000 in 1980, when the U.S.
Federal Refugee Resettlement Program was created, to less than 28,000 in 2017. The new
strategy launched by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in April is draconian: virtually all
people arriving illegally are to be apprehended, detained and prosecuted. Some 226,000
immigrants were deported from the U.S. in the 12 months ending September 30, 2017. The
relief organization Doctors Without Borders called the new policy a “death sentence” for
Central Americans fleeing violence.

Europeans are also hardening their attitude toward new arrivals. Some countries are
barricading their borders to prevent migrants from entering and making it harder for those
already there to remain. Italy’s newly elected coalition government says it will deport an
estimated 500,000 to 600,000 undocumented immigrants during its term, despite a sharp
decrease in migration credited to a highly controversial deal between the European Union
and the Libyan government (migrants are being rounded up by the coast guard and
returned to detention centers in their countries of origin).

Western politicians’ complaints about “floods” of refugees and illegal migrants are seldom
backed by evidence. The U.S. accepts no more than 0.6 percent of the world’s refugee
population annually. Europe does marginally better: Germany is the only OECD country that
ranks among the world’s top 10 refugee-hosting nations, accepting 1 percent of all refugees
in 2016. In fact, the vast majority of refugees and migrants are not moving from the poorest
to wealthiest countries but rather moving between one poor country and another. The
burden assumed by countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iran, Uganda,
Ethiopia, Kenya and the Democratic of Republic of the Congo is an order of magnitude
larger than that borne by the U.S. In other words, the daily responsibility to care for and
support the world’s forced migrants falls squarely on the poor.

In the meantime, Latin America is experiencing another, silent, displacement crisis.

Organized crime and violence is forcing hundreds of thousands to flee their homes every
year. At least 17 of the top 20 most homicidal countries in the world are in Latin America
and the Caribbean. And while the region has traditionally been welcoming to new arrivals,
that spirit of solidarity is dissipating in part from the sheer scale of population displacement,
which has overwhelmed response capacity at the national and municipal levels.

Cuba–United States relations are bilateral relations between the Republic of Cuba and the United

States of America. Cuba and the United States restored diplomatic relations on 20 July 2015, which
had been severed in 1961 during the Cold War. U.S. diplomatic representation in Cuba is handled by
the United States Embassy in Havana, and there is a similar Cuban Embassy in Washington,
D.C.The United States, however, continues to maintain its commercial, economic, and
financial embargo, which makes it illegal for U.S. corporations to do business with Cuba. Leaders in
both houses of Congress as well as President Donald Trump support the embargo, although the
Cuban government has called for it to be repealed.
The hold of the Spanish Empire on possessions in the Americas was reduced in the 1820s as a result
of the Spanish American wars of independence; only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish
rule until the Spanish–American War (1898) that resulted from the Cuban War of Independence.
Under the Treaty of Paris, Cuba became a U.S. protectorate; the U.S. gained a position of economic
and political dominance over the island, which persisted after it became formally independent in
1902.
Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959, bilateral relations deteriorated substantially. In 1961, the
U.S. severed diplomatic ties with Cuba and began pursuing covert operations to topple the
Communist regime.[1] Moreover, the U.S. imposed and subsequently tightened a comprehensive set of
restrictions and bans against the Cuban regime as retaliation for the nationalization of U.S.
corporations' property by Cuba. Meanwhile, several organizations, including a nearly
unanimous United Nations General Assembly, have called for "an end to the United States' decades-
long economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba."[2]
On 17 December 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced
the beginning of a process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the U.S., which media sources
have named "the Cuban Thaw". Negotiated in secret in Canada and Vatican City[3] over preceding
months, and with the assistance of Pope Francis, the agreement led to the lifting of some U.S. travel
restrictions, fewer restrictions on remittances, U.S. banks access to the Cuban financial system,[4] and
the establishment of a U.S. embassy in Havana, which closed after Cuba became closely allied with
the USSR in 1961.[5][6] The countries' respective "interests sections" in one another's capitals were
upgraded to embassies on 20 July 2015.[7] On 20 March 2016, President Barack Obama visited Cuba,
becoming the first U.S. President in 88 years to visit the island.[8]
On 16 June 2017 President Donald Trump announced that he was suspending the policy for
unconditional sanctions relief for Cuba, while also leaving the door open for a "better deal" between
the US and Cuba.[9][10]
A 2016 survey shows that 77% of Cubans have a favorable view of the United States, with only 4%
expressing an unfavorable view.[11]
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a trade embargo
on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a
major policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and the
normalization of relations. The policy change included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; the restoration of diplomatic relations in July 2015;
and steps to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In June 2017,
President Trump unveiled his policy on Cuba. The policy leaves most of the Obama-era policy
changes in place but rolls back some efforts to normalize relations, including restrictions on people-
to-people educational travel to Cuba and on financial transactions with companies controlled by the
Cuban military. As anticipated, Raúl Castro stepped down as president on April 19, 2018, and Cuba’s
National Assembly of People’s Power selected First Vice President Miguel Díaz-Canel to succeed
Castro as president. Castro, however, is expected to head the Cuban Communist Party until 2021.
The selection of Díaz-Canel, 58 years old, reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
began several years ago and marks the first time since the 1959 Cuban revolution that a Castro is
not in charge of the government. Díaz-Canel faces two enormous challenges—reforming the
economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. Government-to-Government Engagement.
With the restoration of relations in 2015, government-to-government engagement increased
significantly. U.S. and Cuban officials have held seven Bilateral Commission meetings, the most
recent in June 2018, to coordinate efforts to advance engagement. Officials have negotiated
numerous bilateral agreements, including on such issues as environmental cooperation, direct mail,
civil aviation, maritime navigation, agriculture, health cooperation, counternarcotics cooperation,
federal air marshals, cancer research, seismology, meteorology, wildlife conservation, animal and
plant health, oil-spill preparedness and response, law enforcement cooperation, search and rescue,
and the delimitation of the U.S.-Cuban maritime boundary in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral
dialogues have been held on these and other issues, including counterterrorism, U.S. property
claims, human rights, renewable energy and efficiency, trafficking in persons, migration, and
cybersecurity. President Trump issued a national security presidential memorandum (NSPM) on
Cuba in June 2017 replacing President Obama’s October 2016 presidential policy directive that had
laid out objectives for normalization. The new policy emphasizes that engagement should advance
the interests of the United States and the Cuban people. Travel and Commerce. The Obama
Administration’s policy change of increasing travel, commerce, and the flow of information to and
from Cuba required amendments to U.S. regulations administered by the Department of the
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (Cuban Assets Control Regulations [CACR]; 31 C.F.R. Part
515) and the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (Export Administration
Regulations [EAR]; 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774). To implement the policy, the two agencies issued five
rounds of amendments to the regulations in 2015-2016. The amendments eased restrictions on
travel (for the existing 12 categories of permissible travel, with travel for tourism remaining
prohibited), remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services. Authorized
travelers can bring back Cuban products as accompanied baggage for personal use, including
alcohol and tobacco products. Certain U.S. companies or other entities are authorized to have a
physical presence in Cuba, such as an office, retail outlet, or warehouse. The export of certain
commercial goods and services to Cuba’s private sector is authorized, including buildin materials for
private residential construction, goods for use by private-sector Cuban entrepreneurs, and
agricultural equipment. The export of certain consumer goods sold online or through other means
directly to eligible individuals in Cuba for personal use is authorized. Certain goods produced by
independent Cuban entrepreneurs are eligible to be imported into the United States. Certain
exports to Cuba are subject to a “general policy of approval” by the Commerce Department,
including exports for environmental protection; civil aviation and commercial aircraft safety;
telecommunications; U.S. news bureaus; human rights organizations and nongovernmental
organizations; and agricultural commodities (such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides) that
fall outside the scope of those allowed under a license exception. Licenses for certain exports are
considered on a case-by-case basis, including exports to state-owned entities providing goods and
services for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. The commercial export of certain consumer
communication devices is authorized, as well as the export of items for telecommunications. A
general license authorizes transactions to provide commercial telecommunications services in Cuba
or to link third countries and Cuba. U.S. companies may establish joint ventures with entities in
Cuba to provide telecommunication and Internet-based services and to enter into licensing
agreements.

To implement President Trump’s Cuba policy changes, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
amended the CACR and EAR in November 2017. The amended regulations require people-to-people
travel to be under the auspices of an organization specializing in such travel and prohibit financial
transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services, albeit
with several exceptions. At the same time, the State Department took complementary action by
publishing a list of 179 such entities, including 2 ministries, 5 holding companies and 34 of their sub-
entities (including the Mariel Special Development Zone), 84 hotels, 2 tourist agencies, 5 marinas,
10 stores in Old Havana, and 38 entities serving the defense and security sectors. In November
2018, the State Department added 26 new entities to the list, bringing the total to 205. Change in
U.S. Immigration Policy. In January 2017, the Obama Administration announced the ending of the
socalled wet foot/dry foot policy, under which thousands of undocumented Cuban migrants have
entered the United States in recent years. Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States
illegally and do not qualify for humanitarian relief are now subject to removal. Continued Human
Rights Concerns. Human rights violations in Cuba have remained a fundamental U.S. policy concern
for many years. When President Obama announced the Cuba policy shift, he maintained that the
United States would continue to speak out on human rights issues but stressed that more could be
done through engagement. President Trump’s policy also emphasizes human rights, with the
President linking any changes to the bilateral relationship to an end to the Cuban government’s
abuse of dissidents. On October 15, 2018, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations launched a
campaign to call attention to Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.” In recent years, Cuba has
shifted to using short-term detentions and harassment to repress dissent, with at least 5,155 such
detentions in 2017, according to the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation. In the first 11 months of 2018, there were at least 2,697 short-term detentions
through November, about a 44% drop compared to the same period in 2017. Injuries of U.S.
Embassy Personnel in Havana. According to the Department of State, 26 U.S. Embassy community
members suffered a series of unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues (most
occurred from November 2016 to August 2017, but two incidents occurred in May 2018.) The State
Department maintains that the U.S. investigation has not reached a definitive conclusion regarding
the cause, source, or any kind of technologies that might have been used. In September 2017, the
State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from the U.S. Embassy to
minimize the risk of their exposure to harm; embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In
early October 2017, the State Department ordered the departure of 15 diplomats from the Cuban
Embassy in Washington, DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the action was
taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S. diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the
impact on diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies responsibility for the injuries. The staff
reduction at the U.S. Embassy has affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and has
made bilateral engagement more difficult. Congressional Action. In the 115th Congress, debate over
Cuba policy continued, especially with regard to economic sanctions. The 2018 farm bill, H.R. 2,
which received final congressional approval in December 2018, has a provision permitting funding
for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba, the Market Access Program and the
Foreign Market Development Cooperation Program. Two FY2019 House appropriations bills,
Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258/H.R. 6147), include provisions that would
tighten sanctions. In addition, several freestanding bills were introduced that would have eased or
tightened sanctions. Congress has continued to provide funding for democracy assistance and U.S.-
government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2017, Congress appropriated $20 million in
Cuba democracy funding and $28.1 million for U.S. government-sponsored Cuba broadcasting (P.L.
115-31). For FY2018, Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs and $28.9 million
for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-141; explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). For FY2019, the
Administration requested $10 million in Cuba democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba
broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee’s FY2019 State Department and Foreign
Operations bill, H.R. 6385, would provide $30 million for democracy programs, whereas the Senate
committee’s version, S. 3108, would provide $15 million; both bills would provide $29 million for
Cuba broadcasting. In other action, several measures (P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115- 244, and P.L. 115-245)
have provisions extending a prohibition on the use of funds in FY2019 to close or relinquish control
of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference report to P.L. 115-232 also
requires a report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018, P.L. 115- 254, requires the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress on certain
aspects of C
South America’s displacement crisis

It is neither Syria nor South Sudan that faces the world’s largest displacement crisis, but
Colombia, where there were 7.3 million registered internally displaced people as of early
2017. Another 340,000 Colombian refugees are still abroad, mainly in Ecuador, Venezuela,
Panama and Costa Rica, despite a peace deal in 2016 that effectively ended the war
between FARC guerrillas and the Colombian government. Some would-be returnees are
still wary of reprisal violence and threats from National Liberation Army (ELN) rebels and
rump factions of the FARC who have yet to lay down their weapons.

Right next door, Venezuela’s prolonged political, economic and security crisis has also
created a massive displacement emergency, as over 1.5 million Venezuelans have fled the
country. Roughly one million of them have relocated to Colombian border towns, causing
levels of intolerance and xenophobia to skyrocket. As of March, 146,000 Venezuelans had
filed asylum claims worldwide and another 444,000 had been granted temporary and
permanent residence permits abroad, a 2,000 percent increase from just three years ago.
They are escaping threats of political persecution and criminal violence, but are also in
search of food, medicine and basic services.

Brazil is hardly immune from displacement. Although fewer than 5,000 Brazilians have
requested refugee asylum in other countries since 2014, Brazil is also suffering from a
monumental internal displacement emergency. A combination of development projects (e.g.
hydro-electric dams, mining concessions, federal highways), natural disasters and
organized violence has resulted in the displacement of 7.7 million Brazilians since 2000.
Added to this are close to 10,000 refugees in the country and over 35,000 asylum seekers.
One reason for the spike in new arrivals is the 52,000 Venezuelans who have sought
sanctuary in Brazil since the beginning of 2017, roughly half of whom are seeking asylum.
Despite ongoing humanitarian operations in border areas, most new Venezuelan arrivals
face precarious living conditions, and Brazilians are growing impatient for a solution.

Central America’s displacement nightmare

The Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are experiencing
the most severe displacement crises since their civil wars of the late 20th century. Roughly
130,000 people applied for asylum from these three countries in 2017 – a 1,500 percent
increase since 2011. Most of them are seeking protection in Mexico and the U.S., but the
majority are being denied. Indeed, efforts such as Programa Frontera Sur, a U.S.-backed
plan to militarize Mexico’s southern border, have sought to stem the northward migration of
Central Americans. Those who cannot afford to flee north have been internally displaced,
often repeatedly. Honduras has roughly 190,000 internally displaced people, equivalent to 4
percent of the country’s population. In El Salvador, at least 71,500 people were displaced
due to violence between 2006 and 2016. Similar to their Northern Triangle neighbors, they
face threats of aggression, homicide, targeted assassination, extortion and child recruitment
by gangs.

Complicating matters, the U.S. increased deportations of undocumented immigrants arriving

from Central America and Mexico and tightened restrictions on new would-be asylum
claimants. In fiscal year 2017 alone, the U.S. deported 75,000 nationals from the Northern
Triangle countries. With the end of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) this year for
Salvadorans, nearly 200,000 people risked of deportation; 57,000 Hondurans will face the
same fate in 2020. The mass deportation of illegal migrants and convicted felons from
Mexico and Central America was not started by the current administration, although
President Donald Trump has dramatically ratcheted up those efforts since coming into
office.

Mexico’s spiraling cartel violence and the government’s militarized response have also
triggered unprecedented levels of displacement. The threat of organized crime,
kidnappings, forced recruitment into drug trafficking organizations and gangs, as well as
other forms of intimidation, are forcing people to pack their bags and seek safer ground. At
the end of 2017, an estimated 345,000 Mexicans were internally displaced. Another 64,000
had applied for asylum and more than 10,000 were recognized as refugees, mostly in the
U.S. At the same time, asylum applications by those entering Mexico have soared by 150
percent since 2017, most arriving from Central America and Venezuela.

A regional response is needed

Latin America’s interlocking displacement crises cannot be solved by a single state: they
require a combination of regional and national responses. The good news is that
governments across the region have offered rhetorical support for refugees in the 1984
Cartagena Declaration, the 1994 San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons
and the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action. Most Latin American countries have
ensured that their national legislation is in line with international standards. This means
they’ve introduced policies to facilitate the free movement of people and have taken steps to
promote local integration, including through the formation of emergency assistance
committees and the voluntary relocation of asylum seekers from poorer to wealthier areas.

Even so, the region is struggling to mount a coordinated and collaborative response.
Approaches are fragmented and piecemeal. The development of a comprehensive regional
approach – with support from partners such as the Organization of American States (OAS),
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Bank, among others –
could facilitate more collective action. Given the sheer scale of the displacement crisis, Latin
American governments will need some kind of Pan-American mechanism to set priorities,
pool resources, scale up humanitarian action, and promote local integration measures for
housing, education, health and work for both refugees and internally displaced people. They
could do worse than to double down on the Regional Solidarity Resettlement Program, the
Cities of Solidarity Initiative and the Borders of Solidarity program established over a
decade ago.

Ultimately, the region’s governments, private sector and civil societies will need to take
concrete efforts to tackle the underlying causes of forced migration, rather than responding
to emergencies after the fact. This means tackling long-standing problems related to the
structural inequality, grinding poverty, corrosive impunity and spiraling criminal violence
shaping patterns of forced migration. Such actions should be backed by a regional data
collection and sharing mechanism to help governments and service providers adapt to
rapidly changing migration dynamics on the ground. Some of these priorities are expected
to be addressed in two new global compacts – one for safe, orderly and regular migration
and another for refugees – currently being negotiated in the United Nations. They also
feature prominently in recently agreed-upon Sustainable Development Goals. The task now
is to convert bold intentions into outcomes on the ground.

i. Vigencia de los mecanismos regionales CAN, CELAC, UNASUR, Alianza del

Pacifico.

Integration or consensus? The Latin American integration ideal made full sense and had an
explanation in the past when two processes with mutual feedback converged: on the one hand, the
pursuit and building of the new Latin American identity and personality in the framework of the
recovery of democracy and freedoms in view of the realisation of individual weaknesses and the
sensed potential of the group; on the other, the European Union model, a paradigmatic example of
political movement and a mechanism for integration in building a powerful global actor. Both
processes found the special relations between both areas to be an accelerating factor for both
historical and cultural as well as political and economic reasons. But most analysts have been
pointing out for some years now that the Latin American integration processes, and by extension
the institutions that lead them, are experiencing a serious crisis that has led to a halt, the absence of
results and the stagnation of their structures. This observation is perfectly compatible with the
emergence of new institutions that do not necessarily comprise the previous ones but attempt to
build new spaces in which to operate from political will. The explanation of this paradox should be
sought in the development of the Latin American identity, which has gone from unity to diversity,
from consensus to disagreement, from the affirmation of regional features to the prioritisation of
national characteristics and interests. This shift has furthermore been accompanied by other
elements that have also played a significant role in the integration crisis and continue to do so. The
first is the non-existence of strong, personal or national leaders. As Carlos Malamud has rightly
pointed out,14 ‘following the death of Hugo Chávez nothing is the same in South America’. Chávez
was a leader with a continental influence comparable to that of many others produced by a
continent rich in products of this kind. His death marked the disappearance of a style, a manner of
communication – in short, a leadership that has no successor, at least not for the time being. And as
for countries, Lula’s Brazil is no longer what it was for a host of reasons and no other for the time
being dares to aim to be recognised as the primus inter pares. And this absence of leadership has
highlighted the weaknesses of an integration that lacks the previous support and ability to mobilise
in the diverse and polarised Latin America of the present. At the same time it is spurring the
proliferation of new forums in pursuit, among other things, of new opportunities to exercise an
influence that is now shared by the previously existing ones (for example CELAC as opposed to
UNASUR). Another important aspect is the ambiguity of the goals pursued which, in the absence of
a clearly shared aim, necessarily reveal their weaknesses. And from this angle we can see how the
mechanisms that obeyed a chiefly economic logic (MERCOSUR, CAN, for example) are struggling
owing to lack of political guidance, whereas those based on a chiefly political aim (UNASUR, ALBA)
are losing their integration capabilities in the interests of greater ideological cohesion of their
actions. MERCOSUR These considerations can help understand the difficulties the different
institutions are experiencing. For some time now MERCOSUR has failed to deliver results, either for
its own programmes or in negotiations with the EU. It has practically ground to a halt. The crisis in
Paraguay and the consequent suspension of Paraguay’s membership, the hasty enlargement to take
in Venezuela and that currently under way regarding Bolivia and Ecuador have made the situation
even more delicate. The institution has gone against its own rules owing to political considerations
alien to its aims and commitments and a serious legal-institutional problem has arisen that is
affecting its credibility. At the same time there is significant internal tension over the handling of the
negotiations with the EU, on which there are substantial differences between Brazil and Argentina.
In addition, the beginning of negotiations between the EU and the United States on a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP) has given rise to further difficulties to the extent that Brazil
could be encouraged to explore the possibilities of going solo in negotiations with the EU, without
adhering to the discipline of MERCOSUR. Uruguay’s mediation in recent weeks seems to be yielding
results, but so far they have been limited to delaying important decisions, to waiting and seeing. It is
likely that in the short term the urgency stemming from progress in EU-US negotiations will shake
MERCOSUR out of its lethargy, speed up negotiations with the EU and encourage the organisation
to solve its pending institutional problems. ALBA For its part, the ALBA is harshly feeling the effects
of the loss of President Chávez and is also lacking in guidance. The 12th summit held at Guayaquil –
the first without Chávez – was not attended by Raúl Castro and was both a tribute to the deceased
leader and an exercise in ratifying the ideas of the Alliance, recalling its rejection of imperialism,
neo-colonialism and neoliberalism. It was also the first time major cracks appeared, particularly
regarding the use of non-renewable natural resources (Bolivia and Ecuador). The failure of the
forward-looking Yasuní-ITT initiative has forced Correa to rethink and update his ideas on oil
production, and this holds implications for Bolivia that are difficult to accept in conceptual terms.
The juxtaposition in the Final Declaration of the Summit of the affirmation of the ‘right to use
resources’ and the attribution of responsibility for anti-mining stances ‘to NGOs’ merely underlines
the differences between the two countries. In addition to this theoretical controversy, it is
significant that there is also a dispute over the leadership of the Alliance, a position left vacant by
Chávez’s death. None of the presidents of the alliance’s member countries are in the race for
different reasons with the exception of the Ecuadorian, though nor do any of them seem willing to
formalise the latter’s takeover. The summit also provided new opportunities for clashes with the
International Human Rights System and the young and promising Pacific Alliance. The first – an
inevitable consequence of the Bolivarian approach to human rights and its rejection of what the
OAS is and stands for – is merely strengthening the essentially political nature of the ALBA and,
accordingly, marking the limits of its composition and influence. The second, which has been
seriously discredited, introduces new modes in the hitherto generally respectful relationship
between the different Latin American institutions, by establishing a clear ideological antagonism.
ALBA accuses the AdP of being a strategy that is not only economic but political and military
(Quintana, Bolivian minister of the presidency), part of a conspiracy hatched from the North to
divide UNASUR (Morales), or designed to create consumers, not citizens (Correa). The Pacific
Alliance (AdP) There is no denying that the AdP has stirred up the Latin American integration scene.
In its short three-year existence it has shown great vitality and has attracted the attention not only
of the region but also of its extra-regional partners, as attested to by the growing number of Latin
American, Asian and European observers. Apart from the undeniable economic and demographic
weight of the countries that make it up, the AdP possesses a number of characteristics that make it
particularly significant. The first is the central role it attributes to the economy in the integration
processes as opposed to the chiefly political approach that has characterised the most recent
developments in the other Latin American institutions. And it is furthermore based on a clear
ideology that is fully shared (the free movement of goods, services and people) and on which all its
members have undertaken international commitments. Another that is no less important is the
breaking of the South America-Central/North America dichotomy by including the continent’s
Pacific arc that stretches from Chile to Mexico. The importance of this initiative for the two
outermost areas of the geographical area should not be underestimated. For Mexico it marks the
end of its relative marginalisation in the region caused by Brazilian leadership and the resulting
tactical identification of Latin America as South America; and for Chile, it is a means of recovering its
influence in the economic integration processes in its closest regional environment. Third, in its
short existence it has proven that its goals and the support of its members go beyond political
submission to their respective governments. Although the presidencies of Peru, Mexico and Chile
have changed hands, support for the project has not waned. Finally, it should be stressed that
although this is not its main goal, the countries of the alliance have adopted at least one initiative of
great significance and visibility in terms of political agreement and institutional integration – the
opening of a joint embassy in Ghana – and plan to extend this scheme to Norway and Singapore. If
we compare the swiftness of this measure to the persistent doubts and difficulties of the European
countries in implementing similar measures, we will see that the AdP has a long and promising
future in this field of political consensus.
UNASUR As stated earlier, the success of the AdP contrasts with the stagnation of UNASUR. But
when making this comparison we must not lose sight of the basic difference between the aims of
both institutions. Or forget history. After all UNASUR, a Brazilian construction, is rooted in the
experiences of regional political consensus, such as the Rio Group that originated in turn from the
Contadora Group and its group of friends. The first to fall by the wayside during this journey were
the non-regional friends (strengthening of the Latin American identity and affirmation of its self-
sufficiency) and, as it was a Brazilian initiative, the non-South Americans became observers (Mexico
and Panama); but its basic idea that Latin America’s problems should be addressed from and by
Latin Americans remains unchanged, and these institutions did so with notable success from the
times of the Central American conflict. It is evident that UNASUR is going through a phase of decline
and loss of impetus that basically coincides with the more withdrawn attitude of Brazil, though also
with the absence of initiatives from the most recent pro-tempore presidencies, the lack of a
secretary general with influence, prestige and initiative, and above all the progressive difficulty of
carrying forward effective consensus in political, regional and extra-regional terms apart from the
crises that require specific actions of visibility, such as the espionage of the NSA, the grounding
incident when President Morales was flying back from Russia, and the Paraguayan crisis. The
region’s evident political fragmentation is taking a heavy toll on UNASUR, which has lost its status of
political forum to other more restricted but more homogeneous organisations. The project for
‘building a South American regional identity’ and an all-inclusive ‘space of integration’ enshrined in
UNASUR’s founding texts has fallen badly behind owing to reality and not even the attempt to
establish a powerful bureaucratic apparatus has been capable of closing the gap. Brazil’s
withdrawal, which is coherent with its particular understanding of leadership that does not entail
paying the price of constant wear owing to the progressive polarisation of national positions, has
caused it to lose its former ability to make proposals; it has been gradually reduced to a reactive
mechanism that the ALBA countries, .with the regular support of Argentina, are attempting to
control given the passivity and apparent indifference of the majority, including Brazil. The future of
UNASUR is currently unclear and nor it is easy to guess what line of action it will take to overcome
the crisis in which it is immersed. CELAC Another of the reasons cited by experts and analysts to
explain UNASUR’s crisis is the overlapping of functions with CELAC, the new organi sation that
emerged from a Mexican initiative in response to the exclusion of Central America and the
Caribbean from the UNASUR operation through an institutional merger of the Rio Group and the
CALC. Apart from this different geographical scope, which allows CELAC to be considered an OAS
without the United States or Canada, there are few differences in its aims. Assertion of identity,
integration, sustainable development and political coordination are objectives that both
organisations share. The difference lies only in CELAC’s universal nature whereas UNASUR is South
American. This allows the former to assert both its status of umbrella organisation capable of
bringing together Latin America’s many sectorial and subregional organisations and its supposed
status of main regional negotiating partners with third parties, be they countries or organisations.
This role of regional representative and dialogue partner has been the line of work to which the
latest Chilean and Cuban pro-tempore presidencies have given priority by holding working meetings
with China, South Korea, India, Russia, New Zealand, Norway, Australia and the Gulf Cooperation
Council with the evident aim of making this new global actor known and internationally recognised.
It is not yet clear what substance it can add to its role apart from being the sole recognised dialogue
partner, but it seems evident that recognition in itself opens up many possibilities, though whether
they materialise will depend on its ability to reach consensus with other organisations and to select
issues which Latin America is not only capable of discussing but also of acting on unitarily. SICA A
separate mention should be made of the SICA which, in all modesty, has effectively accompanied
the Central American integration process and has chalked up two important breakthroughs in
recent years. The first is the incorporation of Panama, which had been deliberately absent since the
start of the process and was convinced by the prospects of a Partnership Agreement between
Central America and the European Union without its presence; the second is the completion of this
Agreement, the first the Union has entered into with a Latin American subregional integration
mechanism. Although important in its own right for its content, the agreement is almost more so
because it expressed Europe’s sustained commitment to Central America and is a corollary of the
San José process begun in the 1980s to support the pursuit of peace and development in the
subregion. The SICA and its Integration Secretariat, the SIECA, are exemplary in their functioning
and have played an extremely important role in maintaining political dialogue and sectorial
consensus and integration in the area. Without these institutions Honduras’s crisis of 2009 would
certainly have derailed Central America’s dialogue with Europe and, by extension, the conclusion of
the Partnersh ip Agreement that is ushering in a new stage in relations between the two parties and
is balancing the extra-regional presence in the area. The scenario described poses a not
inconsiderable number of questions on the future of Latin American integration and the institutions
that are championing it. Whereas the past fifty years of Latin American history have revolved
around the ideas of unity and integration, the heterogeneous and fragmented Latin America of the
twenty-first century no longer recognises itself in those paradigms, although it is finding it difficult
to accustom itself and adapt to the new reality, experiencing what is hopefully a temporary
schizophrenia of taking the best of both worlds. But a revision of old ideas will inevitably occur
sooner or later, leading the institutions to adapt to new needs and objectives. Latin america on the
world stage It is no longer as easy as it was to establish Latin America’s external priorities or, at
least, they are not the same for all the countries in the region. Here, as in other aspects examined
earlier, Latin American fragmentation provides different scenarios, though the main partners of the
region as a whole continue to be the United States, Europe and the Asia-Pacific countries,
particularly China and Japan. Relations with Africa are undoubtedly growing, though for the time
being they are limited almost exclusively to Brazil, with the sporadic appearance of other countries.
Conclusions Against the backdrop of a slowdown in growth, in 2014 Latin America faces the
challenges of its political, social and economic development will full confidence in its abilities – a
confidence strengthened by its successful handling of the most serious world crisis of the past
ninety years. In a world that is changing fast, the region’s transformation is characterised by
strengthening of its economic and political sway compatible with the new national focus of policies
and goals that reflects its heterogeneousness and growing differentiation. The maturity of Latin
American societies has left behind the period when the region could be analysed as a whole with
some – a few – reservations. Of course there continues to be a common underpinning of values and
a not inconsiderable number of similarities in the strengths and weaknesses of their social and
political structures, but recent developments show the vitality of the differences and make it
advisable to adopt a differentiated approach, shunning the simplifications that were made until a
decade ago. This heterogeneousness has direct consequences on the regional integration projects
and possibilities of political consensus, and the region’s ability to be considered a global actor and
act accordingly. Integration, with the sole exception of the thriving Pacific Alliance, is going through
a bad patch. The politicisation of the content in some cases and insurmountable asymmetries
between partners in others are rendering futile the efforts to pursue the goals of the past with
inherited institutions that are no longer suited to the realities and needs of the present. The grand
idea of integration, on which much of Latin American history of the end of last century was built, is
undergoing in-depth reconsideration and large ideological gaps are emerging that make the
Bolivarian dream unfeasible. Whatever the case, the outlook is still confusing and Latin America is
experiencing a period of transition in which neither institutions nor priorities have been regionally
reorganised. It is important to stress in this context the appearance of the CELAC, which aims to be
the sole dialogue partner for the region, as this will undoubtedly be detrimental to other
subregional dialogue partners of lesser scope. Also in this context of restructuring, we should note
the coherence of ALBA, whose ties – more political than anything else – give it a unique profile of its
own in the region, displacing other more open and less cohesive consultative mechanisms. All in all,
CELAC, ALBA, AdP and SICA are emerging as the institutions most capable of adapting to the new
realities and of endowing the Latin American goal of integration with a new twenty-first century
content. This ‘renationalisation’ process, required by the greater complexity of the problems and
the demands of societies undergoing restructuring and growth, is accompanied – and most likely
fuelled – by the absence of regional leaders. Chávez’s disappearance from the scene has left a gap
that is proving difficult to fill and leaders are more national than regional, as befits the absence of a
shared regional project. Neither Brazil, with its legitimate vocation of global actor, seems to want to
take on such a role. Mexico’s return to the regional stage further broadens and complicates the
outlook. Finally, the fast rotation established for steering CELAC and the absence of a solid
bureaucratic apparatus in the different institutions is an additional impairment to the emergence of
strong regional leaderships. Together with the consolidation of democracy, social pressure to
achieve more equitable models of coexistence is pushing Latin American leftwards or, at least, to a
progressive version of the political centre that prioritises combating poverty, providing quality
public services, universal education and health, and social and redistributive policies in general.
Most of the election results of 2012–13 are pointing in this direction, from the reformism of the PRI
to the victories of Maduro, Correa and Bachelet. Even in Honduras the traditional conservatism is
expected to be influenced by the rupture of the oligarchic two-party system. Paraguay is the only
country in the region where this model does not apply for the time being, though we will have to
wait and see what programme President Cartes adopts to appreciate to what extent it will deviate
from the overall pattern with such an intensely unequal social structure. Two facts may prove
particularly significant in the immediate future and have extremely positive consequences both for
the countries directly involved and for the region as a whole: the first is the arrival of peace in
Colombia and the consequent eradication of violence as a tool for political action; the second is the
continuation and deepening of economic reforms in Cuba, bringing the island back to normality and
facilitating its full reintegration in the regional environment to which it belongs. These two
processes will undoubtedly feed into each other and should be helped along without preconditions
or prejudices. The new framework of regional foreign relations is also being consolidated, and an
increasingly attentive attitude is being adopted to the Pacific and the Asian partners in which
different sensibilities are involved, such as the openly clashing attitudes of the AdP and the ALBA,
though it is already a basic feature of the landscape. It furthermore has the effect of strengthening
the region’s autonomy in its relations with the traditional partners and diversifying its integration
into the global scene. If the trend continues at the same fast pace it has displayed so far, we cannot
rule out the possibility of it triggering friction owing to the progressive deterioration in the historic
exclusivity of relations with European and North American partners. In short, in view of the
consolidated trends, and assuming Latin America is able to address the social and economic
challenges in a context of a slowdown in growth, everything indicates that the region will carry on
advancing, without sudden shocks, towards greater levels of progress with internal stability and
maintaining realistic and sensible economic policies, which will strengthen its role as global actor
and strategic partner of the western world to which both, they and we, belong.

j. El contexto regional americano de cara a las elecciones de fines de 2017 y 2018.

atin America is approaching one of its most important electoral marathons in recent
decades. Between November 2017 and December 2018, eight countries in the region will
hold presidential elections: two in November 2017 (Chile and Honduras), and six in 2018
(Costa Rica, February 4; Paraguay, April 22; Colombia, May 27; Mexico, July 1; Brazil,
October 7; and possibly Venezuela, at the end of the year).
If we add the six presidential elections to be held in 2019 (Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, El
Salvador, Panama, and Guatemala), 14 Latin American countries (of the 18) will hold their
presidential elections within a two-year period. This does not count the number of important
legislative and gubernatorial races that also serve as bellwethers of the region’s political
mood in this new era of populism and illiberalism.

These elections will be held in an economic context of low growth, with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimating growth rates of 1.7 percent and 1.9 percent in 2017 and
2018 respectively. These projections can be interpreted in two ways. The good news is that
the region could be leaving behind two consecutive years of negative growth (and six of a
steady slowdown). The bad news is that these low growth rates jeopardize the important
social gains achieved over the past decade in terms of employment, inequality, and poverty
reduction.
Moreover, this super electoral cycle occurs at a time when, according to the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), support for democracy has seen a decline in the region (67
percent to 56 percent from 2014 to 2017, a fall of 9 points). This reduction is accompanied
by a low level of confidence in elections and in the institutions of representative democracy,
particularly political parties. TRENDS
From a comparative regional perspective, the eight elections that will be held over the next
14 months occur in the context of a series of trends:

Owing to many current presidents’ low levels of popularity, it is likely that parties currently in
power will lose office. Immediate re-election is a possibility only in the case of Honduras,
where the current president, Juan Orlando Hernández, will seek a second term, and
perhaps in Venezuela (if the election is held, and if Maduro decides to run again). At least
one former president, Sebastián Piñera in Chile, is likely to return to power, while former
president of Brazil Lula da Silva faces an uphill climb in the wake of corruption charges.
These familiar faces will be combined with new faces, in some cases independent
candidates, as could be the case of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (a former military officer with a
strong populist discourse). Colombia has more than 30 parties and independent candidates,
and in Mexico, to date, there are 40 independent candidates pre-registered with the
electoral authority (INE).
While both South American and Central American countries seem to prefer pro-market
candidates, the fate of the two largest economies of the region, Brazil and Mexico, remain
ambiguous. In Mexico, center-left candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (the leader and
founder of the National Regeneration Movement, Morena) is leading in the polls, generating
economic uncertainties.
The bloc of ALBA member countries (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), in
the best case, will maintain their current levels of economic activity, without growth on the
horizon. The 2018 Venezuelan election and the 2019 Bolivian election (in which President
Evo Morales is trying to secure authorization for a fourth successive term) will be key for
measuring the strength of 21st century socialism. It is noteworthy how the current president
of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, has been distancing himself from his predecessor, Rafael
Correa, which could provoke a realignment of Ecuador outside of ALBA and perhaps closer
to the Pacific Alliance.
Half of these eight countries provide for a second round in presidential elections: Chile,
Costa Rica, Colombia, and Brazil. In most of these four cases, it is likely that a second
round will be required to elect the president, with the possibility of the first-round winner
losing in the second round.
In the majority of the eight elections, the high level of fragmentation of the traditional political
parties and the emergence of a larger number of independent candidates no doubt will
mean that the president-elect will not have his or her majority in the Congress, which
suggests governing challenges.
The serious corruption scandals throughout the region, underscored by the Lava Jato (“Car
Wash”) and Odebrecht scandals in Brazil—related to high levels of financing required to run
campaigns, along with high levels of citizen insecurity—are two issues that will be very
present in almost all the election campaigns.
In some of the elections, there is concern about the level of voter participation, especially in
Chile (because of a change in the voting system) and Colombia (historically the country with
the highest levels of abstention in the region).
Because of the abrupt end of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency (removed for “high crimes and
misdemeanors”) and the March 2018 conclusion of President Michelle Bachelet’s term in
Chile, it is possible that, for the first time in many years, there will be no woman president in
Latin America, as of April 2018.
IMPLICATIONS
The result of this electoral marathon will define the characteristics, direction, and intensity of
the political change to be experienced by the region in the next few years. This will have a
major impact not only within the countries but also in the process of regional integration. At
the same time, this set of elections will be key to assessing the quality of democracy and
integrity of these processes in Latin America.

This set of elections will be key to assessing the quality of democracy and integrity of these
processes in Latin America.

These presidential elections are even more relevant given that they will coincide with the
midterm legislative elections in the United States, and with the expected elevation of a new
president in Cuba to replace Raúl Castro.

How strong populist sentiments will be in these elections is not yet clear, though surveys
suggest voters are fed up with the status quo. It seems clear, however, that the middle
classes will play a key role across the board. The middle classes—which have higher levels
of consumption, and are more empowered and more connected through social networks—
have high expectations. Meanwhile, low levels of economic growth beset the region.

The tension between these and other trends will have a major impact on election outcomes
across the region: the new middle class agenda and the sense of frustration and fear of
losing what has been gained, or not being able to continue consuming and progressing at
the same pace as in recent years; dissatisfaction over the poor quality of public services;
high rates of citizen insecurity; serious corruption scandals; and the crisis of representation.
All of these are producing a generalized sense of distrust of elites (political, business, and
union).

k. Cumbre de las Américas.

Convening in Lima, Peru on April 13-14, 2018, the eighth Summit of the Americas approved a final
declaration tackling just one major theme—anti-corruption. This was appropriate: Systemic
corruption in high places threatens to undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions
throughout the region. However, the summit failed to outline a rigorous plan of implementation,
nor did governments pledge new resources for the anti-corruption agenda. Summits of the
Americas assemble not only heads of state and foreign ministries, but also a broad spectrum of
citizenry, including from the corporate world and civil society. These parallel gatherings—well
attended in Lima—signal a deepening of democracy and the community of the Americas. Further,
the Lima summit served as a platform where the larger, more powerful Latin American states
reaffirmed their adherence to liberal democracy and categorically condemned its violation in
Venezuela. President Donald Trump canceled his attendance just a few days prior to the Lima
summit. At the meeting, the United States became just one delegation among many, and an outlier
on some core themes that had characterized previous Summits of the Americas. Well
institutionalized, Summits of the Americas will likely continue to take place every three years or so.
The outcomes of future summits will depend upon effective leadership, diplomatic creativity,
institutional capacities, and the abilities and desires of the governments of the Americas to learn
from previous experiences and to find common ground.

Well institutionalized, Summits of the Americas will and should continue every three years or so.
Hence, it is worth pondering lessons learned from the Lima meeting: ● The Peruvian decision to
reduce the number of issues on the table and to focus on one or a few select themes worked well.
At first blush, tackling the explosive issue of anticorruption seemed like a risky venture, but previous
summits had opened pathways toward consensus. ● Advancing from words to deeds remains a core
challenge. In the case of anti-corruption, the established MESICIC monitoring process provides a
tool for execution, but the Lima summit failed to elicit pledges of additional resources, placing the
entire venture at risk. Future summit organizers should press hard to fulfill prior resource
commitments and identify entities responsible for implementation. ● The plenary proceedings need
to be rethought. Pre-written speeches by each leader eat up all the time, catalyzing little genuine
dialogue. In Lima, extended plenary interventions forced the chair to cancel the private luncheon,
one of the few occasions for leaders to dialogue informally. As a corrective, the 11 small-island
states of the Caribbean should appoint one or two spokespersons. A system of green, yellow, and
red lights could add discipline to leaders’ remarks. The chair could more actively guide discussion
around summit issues. ● To encourage full attendance, nations not represented by heads of state
and government could be denied participation in the plenary’s opening round of remarks. ● The
presentations by social actors to the leaders’ plenary is an important innovation and should be
retained. Ideally, the social actors could be granted access to the SIRG during the drafting of the
summit communiqué, not just at the summit plenary after the communiqué has been finalized, as is
currently the case. In addition, the summit’s follow-up mechanisms could report to the SIRG,
perhaps on an annual basis, on implementation of the social actors’ recommendations ● If the
Cuban delegation to the civil society forum continues to threaten to disrupt the proceedings, the
organizers should negotiate terms of behavior with the Cubans or find ways to circumscribe their
attendance. Currently, Summits of the Americas suffer from a problem that summits themselves
cannot resolve: the shortage of strong leadership in inter-American affairs. For the United States to
resume a leadership role, it would have to alter policies, many deeply offensive to Latin America,
adopted primarily for domestic political advantage and driven by fears of “unfair” international,
especially multilateral, arrangements. This policy transformation seems unlikely in the medium
term. Canada appears poised to lead; in 2021, 20 years after having chaired the successful 2001
summit, Canada could again serve as a broadly acceptable venue. Other acceptable summit hosts
include Costa Rica and Jamaica. Brazil has yet to host a Summit of the Americas. At this writing,
Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia are in the process of electing new leadership, and it is too soon to
foresee the impacts on regional dynamics. The rejectionist governments in Venezuela and
Nicaragua are facing mounting domestic difficulties, as is Cuba.16 Thus, it is unusually difficult to
foresee where the hemisphere will be in 2021, after the next U.S. presidential election, in its
alternating rhythms of policy convergence and discord.17 In these turbulent circumstances, perhaps
coalitions among Latin American governments can best advance specific initiatives, as is already
occurring in international trade accords. In Lima, several Latin American leaders praised regional
trading arrangements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (after Donald Trump boisterously
withdrew, the accord was renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 16 Richard
E. Feinberg, Emily Miller, and Harold Trinkunas, “Better than you think: Reframing inter-American
relations,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Better-Than-You-Think-ReframingInterAmerican-Relations.pdf. 17
Richard E. Feinberg and Javier Corrales, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere:
Power, Interests and Intellectual Traditions,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (March 1999):
1-36. Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the Pacific Alliance; Chilean President Piñera held out the
prospect of stronger ties between the Pacific Alliance and a more open Mercosur. The specter of
China as a major economic challenge could add to renewed interest in Western Hemisphere trading
arrangements that bolster regional competitiveness. At the 2021 summit, the hemisphere will want
to take stock of progress on combatting corruption and in resolving the Venezuelan crisis.
Predictably, new issues will arise to challenge the region. Future successes will depend upon
effective leadership, diplomatic creativity, institutional capacities, and the abilities and desires of
the governments of the Americas to learn from previous experiences and to find common ground.

l. El fenómeno de la corrupción.

Over the past three years, Latin America has seen a dramatic surge in corruption scandals.
These episodes have led to large popular demonstrations, prosecutions of government
officials and business executives at the highest level, and acute political crises. The
resignation of Guatemala’s President Otto PérezMolina in September 2015, which followed
the Guatemalan Congress’ decision to impeach him on corruption charges as well as
months of street demonstrations, was a break with the past in a country long defined by
impunity. Just as remarkable was the Brazilian judicial authorities’ decision to prosecute the
heads of both legislative chambers and the top officials of some of the country’s largest
business conglomerates, among many high profile defendants, on account of the massive
fraud uncovered in the State-owned oil company, Petrobras. These are but two examples
from a litany of graft cases that have made headlines in the region since 2014.
Not all that has transpired over the past three years is unprecedented, not even the
resignation of a sitting president. One only has to recall the fate of former presidents
Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1992), Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela (1993), and
Alberto Fujimori in Peru (2000), all forced to resign in years past as a result of serious
corruption accusations. Of course, evidence of graft and the widespread perception of it
have long been part of the landscape of the majority of political systems in Latin America, a
reality that many have argued digs its roots in the region’s distant colonial past and
extractive mode of development. Yet, the recent wave of corruption scandals is arguably
unprecedented in its scale, in the swiftness and the severity of the institutional response in
at least some countries, and above all in the emergence of large popular movements to
demand accountability. While corruption levels in the region may or may not have changed
much in the recent past, tolerance and fatalism in the face of it appears to be dramatically
diminished. What has changed in Latin America for this to happen and to happen now, in a
way not really seen before?
What plausible explanations are there for the current, unprecedented, anti-corruption
reactions—both social and institutional—seen in Latin America over the past two years?

Latin America are empirically connected to the convergence of five phenomena: • The
widespread perception that political and economic institutions in the region are rigged in
favor of small elites to the detriment of the majority of the population; • The increase in the
transparency levels of public institutions, a trend largely due, in turn, to the adoption of a
wide range of transparency and accountabilityenhancing reforms throughout the region in
the recent past; • The explosive growth of social media, allowing for faster dissemination of
information and lower costs for collective action; • The rapid expansion of middle income
groups, increasingly politically active; and • The region-wide economic downturn of the past
few years.
F or the sake of simplicity, this report will adopt a largely law-based, public sector-geared
definition of corruption as the abuse of public power for private gain, or, in the more
complete formulation of Nye, “behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role
(elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)
wealth or status gains.”2 This kind of definition has the benefit of encompassing the vast
majority of conducts conventionally understood as corrupt across cultures. This includes
conducts such as bribery, embezzlement, influence peddling, money laundering, misuse of
privileged information, nepotism, extortion, fraud, obstruction of justice, and violations of
political finance regulations.
Kaufmann has thus defended a broader, legally neutral definition of corruption as the
“privatization of public policy,” which places the emphasis on the protection of the public
interest, also a highly contested notion.
Regardless of its shapes and nuances, there seems to be widespread recognition of the
deleterious effects of corruption for political and economic development, as well as about
the enormous complexity of its causes.9 Since the 1990s the academic literature on
corruption, its causes and effects, has grown immensely. The field has benefitted from the
development of a wide array of empirical instruments to measure and monitor the incidence
of corruption and the extent of its perception in a majority of countries in the world.10 While
limited in many ways,11 these instruments —from corruption victimization surveys to the
widely disseminated TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)—have allowed for an enormous
body of literature to emerge. Doing justice to the latter is impossible here. Instead, the
following paragraphs will just summarize in broad strokes some of the main findings of this
academic corpus.
This cursory review of an extraordinarily rich corpus of empirical work leaves no room for
doubt about the relevance of this discussion for Latin America, a region where both
economic and democratic development is very much a work in progress, subject to
reversals. It should also offer a warning about the long odds facing any attempt to provide
air-tight explanations not simply about why corruption and perceptions of it are so prevalent
in Latin America, but also about its potent political emergence in a given context. The
empirical links of corruption with other social, political, and economic phenomena are, as
seen above, very complicated and uncertain.
I n order to identify some patterns and lessons from recent corruption scandals in Latin
America we examined six countries in the region that experienced significant societal uproar
over—actual or purported—large-scale acts of public malfeasance in 2014-2015. Our case
studies are based largely on journalistic evidence, updated to mid-2016, and subject mostly
to ongoing legal investigations. As such, they should thus be viewed as a provisional
assessment, rather than a definitive account. In selecting this sample of cases, by no
means an exhaustive one, we strived to balance the region’s most populous countries—
Brazil and Mexico—with smaller nations of varying levels of economic development:
wealthier Chile in the Southern Cone, and three republics in the Central American isthmus,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Here are the stylized facts of the main corruption
scandals in each of these countries.

1. Key corruption problem points. Public procurements contracts were clearly at the heart of
the corruption scandals in Brazil, Mexico, Honduras, and Panama. By contrast, in Chile and
Guatemala the main acts of fraud involved tax evasion. Illicit campaign finance schemes
were discernable in the cases of Brazil, Chile and Honduras, but appear to have had an
impact in other cases as well. 2. Corruption scandals are not a one-shot affair. These are
usually embedded in a broader pattern of illicit behavior, as observed in the cases of
Panama, Guatemala, and Chile. In larger instances of corruption, such as Brazil’s Petrolão,
one can observe various subplots and spin-offs, as in the controversy over the illegal
payments made to the head of the Chamber of Deputies or the arrest of a senator and
banker for attempting to thwart police investigations. Major corruption scandals are like ‘high
peaks’ on a mountain range. A proper analysis must set these ‘peaks’ in their actual context
3. Scandals over acts of corruption are political constructions. They reveal problems of
public malfeasance and the environment that enables this. Quite importantly, though, they
also shed light on the means by which such acts are exposed and rendered into a scandal.
Episodes like these, after all, are not spontaneous occurrences, but rather the upshot of a
political process, one that involves numerous actors, influenced by different dispositions and
capacities, and shaped by the institutional and political context in which they operate. This
political construction explains why some acts of corruption can become a major scandal,
while other instances—comparable in size and scope—do not. Brazil offers a telling
illustration of this. In March 2015, authorities discovered a massive tax evasion scheme that
benefited the country’s biggest firms and several multinationals. Working in collusion with
collection agents at the Finance Ministry, these firms dodged as much as $4.9bn in taxes
over the previous decade.43 This affair, nonetheless, was largely overshadowed by the
Petrolão scandal, and underplayed in the news media. 4. Four inter-related mechanisms are
at stake here: (1) acts of public malfeasance are exposed, (2) these are then publicized in
ways that fuel general awareness and condemnation, (3) political actors linked to the
scandal are singled-out and shamed, and (4) law enforcement officials take steps to
criminalize these misdeeds. In a nutshell, corruption scandals are constructed through the
exposure, publicity, political shaming, and criminalization of officials accused of misusing
public resources. Variations in the intensity in any of these mechanisms will affect the
outcome of a given scandal. Let us elaborate on each of them: A. Corruption can be
exposed in four basic ways, through: (a) whistle blowing, (b) plea bargains, (c) investigative
reporting, and (d) inquiries led by law enforcement officials. On his deathbed, a Chilean
whistleblower provided information that led to the Penta scandal. Plea bargains and an
effective inquiry led by the federal police and a team of prosecutors were crucial to
unearthing Brazil’s Petrolão ruse. A Mexican team of hard fact-finding journalists disclosed
the details that triggered the Casa Blanca affair. In Guatemala, La Línea was uncovered
through the efforts of a professional research team led by CICIG. Official criminal inquiries
were central to the revelations that set off the corruption scandals that took place in Brazil,
Chile, Guatemala, and Panama. By contrast, independent journalists played a pivotal role in
uncovering the episodes of corruption in Mexico and Honduras. The results that followed
from each trajectory suggest that exposés made by public authorities are likely to carry
greater weight and culminate in a criminal investigation. A press disclosure, on the other
hand, requires an added layer of validation, originating from the state, to generate a legal
inquiry. B. Publicity around corruption cases were fueled mostly by the press and
ensconced prominently on the public agenda through mass protest. Independent news
outlets played a crucial role in all episodes, most dramatically in Honduras and Mexico.
Mass mobilizations were particularly expressive in Guatemala, Brazil, and Honduras.
Guatemala’s national strike in August 2015 was the most inclusive and broad-based of
these protests. In Brazil and Honduras, street demonstrations were largely associated with
the political opposition. Moreover, in Brazil these activities exhibited a larger presence of the
wealthier strata of the population. Despite a general context of political freedoms in all case
studies, protections for independent journalism appeared to be more tenuous in some
countries than others. The top reporters who exposed dubious practices in Mexico and
Honduras suffered what many perceived were acts of reprisal. One was fired from her job,
and the other was convicted on un-related charges leveled after his exposé. No comparable
obstacles were observed in Brazil and Chile. In Guatemala the press played a more
ambiguous role, given the involvement of the head of a local news corporation in La Línea.
C. Political shaming should be recognized as a fairly common tactic and motive for
publicizing a corruption scandal. In Guatemala and Brazil publicity around the main cases of
public malfeasance was fueled strongly by political shaming and the quest to remove the
president from office. A similar dynamic took place in Panama, where the attention drawn to
corruption charges against the former president and his close allies served to discredit their
political party. By comparison, the fact that all the Chilean parties had benefited from the
illicit campaign finance scheme diminished the rationale and prospect for political shaming
in this country. D. The institutional capacity and autonomy of law enforcement bureaus—the
police, prosecution, audit agencies, and courts—were central to the possibilities of
criminalizing these prominent acts of corruption. Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala appeared to
offer stronger institutional resources for this. In all three countries the investigators were
able to probe political leaders and parties linked to the national government. Guatemala,
however, required substantial international assistance for this, made available through a
UN-sponsored agency, CICIG. In Panama, the fact that the anti-corruption measures were
taken after an election turnover and buoyed by a context of political shaming suggest that its
law enforcement agencies were less self-directed than those noted above. In Mexico, no
independent body investigated the Casa Blanca affair, which concluded after an in-house
inquiry. In Honduras, the institutional fragility was such that a core demand made by
protesters was to establish an international agency akin to CICIG, a point recognized by the
government in its agreement to set up an OAS-supported mission against corruption and
impunity, MACCIH. 5. The nature of the charges that set-off each corruption scandal
affected the likelihood, momentum and outcome of each criminal investigation. Episodes of
corruption linked to personal enrichment seem to generate an added level of public anger,
especially if the stolen funds were meant to feed the poor or care for the sick, as observed
in the Central American cases. Accusations brought against national leaders heightened the
political stakes of any investigation. In Guatemala, the ouster of President Pérez Molina
took place shortly after prosecutors showed he was directly implicated in La Línea. The
absence of comparable linkages in the Brazilian case weakened the opposition’s arguments
in the attempt to impeach President Rousseff. 6. Finally, these corruption scandals have
created opportunities for reform. In varying degrees, practically all countries have adopted
new anticorruption measures in the wake of these episodes, most visibly so in Chile. While
all countries are vulnerable to corruption, an important test of institutional strength lies in the
boldness and depth of the anticorruption reforms adopted by political leaders to close
longstanding loopholes and reverse deep-seated practices. Many factors may explain such
differences, including the weight of certain international actors such as the CICIG in
Guatemala or the sense of genuine shock—rather than deep-rooted cynicism—that meets
graft revelations in societies less tolerant to such practices, as in Chile. The recurrence of
these scandals in Latin America—the overview of this section is merely the tip of the iceberg
— has happened despite the fact that countries in the region have made a remarkable effort
to adjust their normative frameworks to the fight against corruption. In fact, as we will see
below, these scandals may have emerged because these normative changes were made. T
he recent wave of corruption scandals in Latin America was preceded by two decades of
policy diffusion, institutional development, and strengthening of social accountability
mechanisms designed to forestall corruption. These changes have taken place in a context
of newfound political freedoms, which has enabled growing public awareness, discussion,
and rejection of dishonest practices carried out by state officials. A great variety of
measures have been introduced to prevent corruption in Latin America. These include
international agreements, national laws and policies, a host of strategies devised at the sub-
national and local government level, and a wide array of civil society-based initiatives. The
surging civic antipathy and protest against corruption has been shaped in many ways by
these innovative developments. Though tenuous and insufficient in many regards, the novel
legal instruments, enhanced state capacity and multiple social accountability efforts have
helped foster a new normative edifice. This has elevated the standards of expectation
regarding basic matters of public integrity and accountability. An invigorated public
conversation has risen amid this process and nurtured an undercurrent of opinion more
susceptible to acts of public malfeasance and willing to rebuke their occurrence.
International agreements and standards The OAS Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (IACC), established in 1997, paved the way for the adoption……
Social accountability
The important strides in civil society development and social accountability across Latin
America must be set in context. The last quarter of a century offered an era of
unprecedented political freedoms and gains in human development across Latin America.
Notable deficiencies, nonetheless, have continued to mar the quality of citizenship rights
and the effectiveness of various mechanisms for accountability. This owes much to the
historic weakness of the state in many areas of the continent, longstanding social inequities,
and the uneven, often deficient practice of a democratic rule of law. Amid these
transformations and shortcomings, Latin American civil society has expanded and
diversified considerably and led to the inclusion of new voices and issues on the public
agenda. This has strengthened the region’s ability to engage in new forms of social
accountability
difice Substantial progress has been made throughout Latin America in developing a new
legal framework to prevent and prosecute corruption. Fueled by growing global attention to
this problem and rising domestic demand for public integrity a wave of reforms has taken
place since the early 1990s. International agreements and novel legislation and policies
have been adopted to enhance government transparency. What is more, a favorable
institutional milieu has enabled the expansion of multiple forms of social accountability.
Though thin-layered in many regards and spotted with shortcomings, these developments
have steadily enhanced capabilities within the region to deter, detect, and even prosecute
those engaged in acts of corruption.

I n the following pages we will examine five informed conjectures that may explain the
current wave of anticorruption activism in Latin America. As will soon become evident, the
five hypotheses under study, and the phenomena they embody, operate in a different time
frame. The deeply ingrained and widespread perception of economic and political
unfairness is a long-term factor that frames in a powerful way corrupt practices and
scandals, feeding social indignation about it. In turn, a set of midterm factors that seem to
have reached a tipping point (the increase of transparency in the public sector, the change
in the patterns of access to information, and, less clearly, the expansion of the middle
classes) facilitate the emergence of corruption as a highly potent political issue and the
corresponding activation of social and institutional reactions. Last but not least, the fifth
factor (the economic contraction) conceivably provides a strong short term impetus to anti-
incumbent anger and exacerbates the potential political fallout from corruption. Let us briefly
examine, in this order, each of the factors featured in this story The perception of unfairness
The first element of our explanation is related to the region’s “original sin”—inequality—and
its grievous political consequences. Long standing inequalities and accumulated
perceptions about the essential unfairness of political systems in Latin America provide the
context in which corruption—particularly large scale graft at the top—occurs and is
perceived by the population. The irregularities that make it to the public domain help to
confirm the widely held opinion that institutions work for the few and not for society as a
whole. When combined with other factors (an economic slowdown, growing economic
expectations, a citizenry increasingly empowered with information and legal resources,
among others), this long-held perception can fuel a very powerful social reaction against
corruption. It is not simply that inequalities and unfairness provide a context for corruption,
however. The imbrication of inequality and corruption is more profound, as attested by Latin
America’s political history. As we know, Latin America has long been regarded as one of the
most unequal regions in the world. Its great asymmetries in the distribution of wealth are
deeply rooted in the continent’s history and have shaped its societies in numerous ways. A
growing body of literature has reinforced our understanding of the harmful effects that such
stark and durable inequities can have on the prospects for economic, social, and political
development. Extreme inequities generate structural conditions that undermine productive
growth and diminish the overall quality of life, fueling societal tensions, crime, mistrust, and
a sense of personal insecurity. Such settings will hamper the development of basic civil
rights and weaken social capital, and in doing so hinder market and civil society-based
activities and stifle the workings of political democracy.69 Societies with severe wealth
disparities distort power relations and skew access to information and cultural assets. As
such, they bias the rules of the game and produce lopsided distributions of political strength
and representation. Politics and public policies are thus shaped to favor the interests of the
privileged few; a view shared consistently by close to two thirds of Latin America’s
population over the last decade,

The increase in public sector transparency Even a widely accepted narrative of unfairness is
not enough, however, to turn corruption into a potent political issue, able to mobilize society
and activate institutional resources. For that to happen, other precipitating conditions must
be present. In the case of Latin America, the increase in public sector transparency is one
such condition, indeed a particularly crucial one. This is our second explanatory factor: in
the vast majority of countries in the region governments have become more transparent.
This is, almost certainly, the result of the widespread legal transformation detected in the
previous section of this report.
Changes in patterns of access to information The next precipitating condition of the wave of
anticorruption indignation and of the social mobilization that has accompanied it concerns
the visible transformation of the ways in which Latin American citizens, notably those in
middle and upper income strata, acquire information. If it is true that internet access
continues to be strongly correlated with income levels and urban residence in Latin
America, at this point both its adoption and the speed of its expansion are more than
enough to impact social and political dynamics in decisive ways. In 2014, just over 50% of
the Latin American population were internet users, a 142% increase since 2006.76 It is thus
hardly surprising that, as shown in Table 10, the past decade has seen a decline in the
relevance of traditional media (TV, radio, and newspapers) and the flourishing of the web as
a source of information. In this Latin America is no different from the rest of the world.
The expansion of the middle class Our fourth explanatory factor has become a staple of
discussions of anti-corruption discontent in Latin America and elsewhere. In a recent article
about the proliferation of trials, investigations, demonstrations, convictions, and resignations
relating to corruption in Latin America, Jorge Castañeda noted that “Latin America’s
immense strides in consolidating democracy over the last 30 years have done little to
eradicate one of its longest-standing scourges. But it now has a renewed source of hope: its
burgeoning middle classes, the product of 15 years of impressive economic and social
progress. These new middle classes are demanding better governance, and they will not
rest until they get it.”83 There is nothing new about this. Dating back to Aristotle, middle-
income groups have been credited as the pillar of good governance and their expansion as
a worthy goal. In a typical statement, Nancy Birdsall has posed that “members of the middle
class are more likely to play the positive political role in the provision of accountable
government, e.g. in supporting the rule of law, property rights, and taxes to finance public
goods such as education…”84 This is a position that we share, albeit not without
reservations.
 The economic downturn The fifth trigger is the most immediate and, arguably, the most
obvious one. The strong social and political reactions against corruption that we are
witnessing in Latin America are taking place in the context of a very serious and widespread
economic downturn.

DIPLOMACIA Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

1. Antecedentes y fundamentos de la diplomacia

1.1 Definiciones y acepciones. Antecedentes históricos. Distinción entre la nueva y la antigua
diplomacia.

2. Órganos centrales de las relaciones exteriores

2.1 El Jefe de Estado. El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y el Servicio Diplomático. El rol
del Congreso. La Misión diplomática: concepto y clasificación, funciones y organización de
las misiones en el exterior.

3. Agentes diplomáticos
3.1 Definición, clasificación y nombramiento. Jefes de misión: atribuciones. Deberes del agente
diplomático. Derechos de la misión y del agente diplomático: inviolabilidad, inmunidad y
privilegios. Cualidades y condiciones personales para la diplomacia.

4. Mecanismos de la diplomacia en el sistema internacional

4.1 La negociación. Diplomacia bilateral y diplomacia multilateral. Diplomacia y mecanismos de
solución de controversias.

5. Diplomacia y orden internacional

5.1 El orden internacional en la era de la globalización y después de la crisis
financiera.
5.2 La Diplomacia y el equilibrio de poder en el orden internacional. Rol de la diplomacia en la
actualidad.

6. Diplomacia y política exterior peruana

6.1 Antecedentes generales y fundamentos de la diplomacia peruana. Rol de la diplomacia en
la política exterior peruana.

7. Principales problemas fronterizos resueltos de la política exterior peruana

de 1929 en adelante
7.1 El Tratado de 1929 y su Protocolo Complementario. Acuerdos sobre las cláusulas
pendientes de ejecución firmados el 13 de noviembre de 1999. El proceso de paz peruano-
ecuatoriano de febrero de 1995. Declaración de Paz de Itamaraty de 17 de febrero de
1995. Los Acuerdos de Brasilia de 26 de octubre de 1998. El Fallo de la Corte Internacional
de Justicia sobre delimitación marítima entre el Perú y Chile.

8. Relaciones bilaterales de mayor intensidad, organizaciones regionales y

foros
8.1 En el continente: Estados Unidos, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Argentina, México, Panamá, Canadá.

35
8.2 En Europa: principales países de la Unión Europea (UE) (España, Alemania, Francia, Gran
Bretaña, Italia, Holanda, Bélgica, la Comisión de la UE); principales países de la Europa no
comunitaria (Rusia, Suiza, Islandia y Noruega), La Asociación Europea de Libre Comercio
(por sus siglas en inglés EFTA). Las consecuencias del Brexit, perspectivas futuras de la
UE. Visa Shengen.
8.3 En Asia: China, Japón, India, Corea, Turquía, Indonesia y los países del sudeste asiático,
países del Golfo Pérsico. Israel, Irán e Irak y su gravitación en el equilibrio estratégico. El
Foro de Cooperación Económica Asia-Pacífico (APEC). La Liga Árabe. El fenómeno
islámico y sus derivaciones políticas y estratégicas. La Cumbre América del Sur - Países
Árabes (ASPA).
8.4 En Oceanía: Australia y Nueva Zelandia.
8.5 En África: Sudáfrica, Egipto, Argelia y Marruecos. La Unión Africana (UA).
8.6 Reformas del sistema interamericano. La Carta Democrática Interamericana y su aplicación
frente a gobiernos elegidos que vulneran el Estado de derecho. La migración y sus
consecuencias.

9. Naciones Unidas
9.1 Orígenes y evolución. El Consejo de Seguridad y el Sistema de Seguridad Colectiva. La
Asamblea General y sus seis comisiones principales. La Secretaría. Consejo Económico y
Social (ECOSOC). La Corte Internacional de Justicia. Las metas del milenio.
9.2 Reforma de las Naciones Unidas y la composición del Consejo de
Seguridad.
9.3 El Perú y el Consejo de Seguridad. Reciente elección del Perú como Miembro No
Permanente.

10. Organismos internacionales vinculados al sistema de las Naciones Unidas

10.1 Fondo Internacional de Desarrollo Agrícola (FIDA), Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI),
Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA), Organización de Aviación Civil
Internacional (OACI), Organización de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Industrial
(ONUDI), Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO),
Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (UNESCO),
Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), Organización Internacional del
Trabajo (OIT), Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI), Organización Meteorológica
Mundial (OMM), Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual (OMPI), Organización
Mundial de la Salud (OMS), Organización Mundial del Turismo (OMT), Organización para la
Prohibición de las Armas Químicas (OPAQ), Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones
(UIT), Unión Postal Universal (UPU), Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento
(BIRF) y Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), Corte Penal Internacional (CPI).

11. OEA y otras organizaciones y tratados.

11.1 La Carta Democrática Interamericana y sus problemas de aplicación frente a
The Doha Development Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the trade-negotiation
round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which commenced in November 2001 under then
director-general Mike Moore. Its objective was to lower trade barriersaround the world, and thus
facilitate increased global trade.
The Doha Round began with a ministerial-level meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2001. The aim was to put
less developed countries' priorities at heart. The needs of the developing countries were the core
reasons for the meeting. The major factors discussed include trade facilitation, services, rules of
origin and dispute settlement. Special and differential treatment for the developing countries were
also discussed as a major concern. Subsequent ministerial meetings took place in Cancún, Mexico
(2003), and Hong Kong (2005). Related negotiations took place in Paris, France (2005), Potsdam,
Germany (2007), and Geneva, Switzerland (2004, 2006, 2008);
Progress in negotiations stalled after the breakdown of the July 2008 negotiations.[1][2] The most
significant differences are between developed nations led by the European Union (EU), the United
States (US), Canada, and Japan and the major developing countries led and represented mainly by
India, Brazil, China, and South Africa. There is also considerable contention against and between
the EU and the US over their maintenance of agricultural subsidies—seen to operate effectively as
trade barriers.[3]
Since the breakdown of negotiations in 2008, there have been repeated attempts to revive the talks,
so far without success. Intense negotiations, mostly between the US, China, and India, were held at
the end of 2008 seeking agreement on negotiation modalities, an impasse which was not resolved.
In April 2011, then director-general Pascal Lamy "asked members to think hard about 'the
consequences of throwing away ten years of solid multilateral work'."[4] A report to the WTO
General Council by Lamy in May 2012 advocated "small steps, gradually moving forward the parts
of the Doha Round which were mature, and re-thinking those where greater differences
remained."[5] Adoption of the Bali Ministerial Declaration on 7 December 2013[6] for the first time
successfully addressed bureaucratic barriers to commerce—a small part of the Doha Round agenda.
[7]
 However, as of January 2014, the future of the Doha Round remains uncertain.
 36
ADMISIÓN 2018

gobiernos elegidos que vulneran el Estado de derecho. El régimen internacional aplicable a

la Antártida. Convenio sobre el Comercio Internacional de Especies Amenazadas de Fauna
y Flora Silvestres (CITES), Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en
América Latina (OPANAL), Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica (OTCA),
Organización Internacional de Maderas Tropicales (OIMT), Organización Internacional de
Policía (INTERPOL), Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), Organización para la
Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (OCDE, Parlamento Andino (PA). Tratado sobre la
no Proliferación de Armas Nucleares (TNP).

12. Agenda global

12.1 Cambio climático. Narcotráfico, terrorismo y crimen organizado. Proliferación nuclear.
Crisis financiera internacional y sus consecuencias económicas y políticas. El problema
migratorio y sus consecuencias.
12.2 Desarrollo, pobreza y desigualdad. Los objetivos del desarrollo del milenio y los objetivos
de desarrollo sostenible

13. Derechos humanos

13.1 La declaración universal de los derechos humanos. Los mecanismos de protección de los
derechos humanos a nivel mundial y regional. El Consejo de DDHH de NN.UU. El Sistema
Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos (la Comisión Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos). La perspectiva
peruana. El rol de las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONGs).

14. La negociación comercial multilateral y bilateral

14.1 El marco multilateral: la OMC y sus mecanismos; la Ronda de Doha. El marco bilateral: los
Tratados de Libre Comercio (TLC) del Perú (vigentes y en negociación). La negociación
comercial en los acuerdos regionales y subregionales de integración.

15. Los procesos de integración de América Latina

15.1 La Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI), la Comunidad Andina (CAN), el
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR),
Iniciativa para la Integración para la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA), los
Sistemas de integración centroamericano y caribeño. La Alianza del Pacífico.

16. La Unión Europea y América Latina

16.1 América Latina y la Comunidad Andina en las relaciones externas de la Unión Europea.
Perspectivas del diálogo político y de la cooperación con la UE. Importancia del comercio y
la inversión europea en relación a América Latina, la CAN y el Perú. Acuerdo Comercial
Multipartes entre el Perú, Colombia y la
37
UE.

17. El Perú Y el Foro de Cooperación Económica Asia-Pacífico (APEC)

17.1 Relaciones económicas del Perú con las principales economías de la Cuenca del
Pacífico. Naturaleza, foros y mecanismos de la APEC y participación del Perú.
Cumbres de líderes de la APEC en Lima.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an inter-governmental forum for 21 Pacific
Rim member economies[2] that promotes free trade throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Inspired from the success of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s series
of post-ministerial conferences launched in the mid-1980s, the APEC was established in
1989 in response to the growing interdependence of Asia-Pacific economies and the
advent of regional trade blocs in other parts of the world; and to establish new markets
for agricultural products and raw materials beyond Europe.[3][4][5] Headquartered in
Singapore, the APEC is recognized as one of the oldest forums and highest-level
multilateral blocs in the Asia-Pacific region, and exerts a significant global influence.[6]
[7][8][9][10][11]

An annual APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting is attended by the heads of government of all
APEC members except Republic of China (Taiwan) (which is represented by a
ministerial-level official under the name Chinese Taipei as economic leader).[12] The
location of the meeting rotates annually among the member economies, and a famous
tradition, followed for most (but not all) summits, involves the attending leaders dressing
in a national costume of the host country. APEC has three official observers: the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Secretariat, the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.[13] APEC's Host Economy of the
Year is considered to be invited in the first place for geographical representation to
attend G20 meetings following G20 guidelines.[14][15][16][17]

18. El Perú y la Cumbre América del Sur - Países Árabes (ASPA)

18.1 Relaciones políticas y económicas con los países Árabes.

The Summit of South American-Arab Countries is a bi-regional mechanism for

cooperation and political coordination, which gathers the 22 member-States of the League
of Arab States and the 12 countries of South America. Better known by its Portuguese and
Spanish acronym ASPA, the bi-regional forum was created upon proposal of the Brazilian
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, during the I ASPA Summit of Heads of State and
Government, held in Brasilia, Brazil, in May 2005. Since its inception, a second ASPA
Summit happened in Doha, Qatar, in March 2009, and a third Summit was held
in Lima, Peru, in October 2012, after being postponed, from February 2011, due to the Arab
Spring uprisings.
 ASPA's cooperation facet involves actions organized through five Sectorial Committees of
Cooperation for Economics, Science and Technology, Environmental, Social and Cultural
affairs. 

The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was adopted by

the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001 in Doha on November 14, 2001. It reaffirmed
flexibility of TRIPS member states in circumventing patent rights for better access
to essential medicines.

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is

an international legal agreementbetween all the member nations of the World Trade
Organization(WTO). It sets down minimum standards for the regulation by national
governments of many forms of intellectual property (IP) as applied to nationals of other
WTO member nations.[3] TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 and is administered by the
WTO.

19. Diplomacia pública

19.1 La cultura como herramienta de la política exterior. Su gravitación en la promoción
económica y el turismo. Cultura y prestigio. Cooperación. Principales agentes. Principales
instrumentos. Cultura y conflicto entre civilizaciones.
19.2 Diplomacia “blanda” y diplomacia “dura”.

20. Promoción del Perú

20.1 Inversiones. Comercio. Turismo. Cultura. Relación entre organizaciones e instituciones
externas e internas. Planos nacional y regional.
20.2 Ciencia y tecnología

21. Cooperación internacional

21.1 Planos multilateral y bilateral: NN.UU., organismos internacionales, Estados y organismos
públicos. Plano no gubernamental: ONGs, empresas y personas naturales (filántropos). La
Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional (APCI) como órgano adscrito al Ministerio
de Relaciones Exteriores. La cooperación internacional en el Perú. Cooperación Sur-Sur.

DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO

1. Derecho Internacional. Nociones generales

1.1 La sociedad internacional y el Derecho que la regula. Concepto de Derecho Internacional
Público.
1.2 Funciones del Derecho Internacional: la coexistencia y la cooperación.
2. Los sujetos del Derecho Internacional
2.1. Noción de sujeto del Derecho Internacional.
2.2. Los Estados como sujetos primarios u originarios del Derecho Internacional. Los elementos
constitutivos del Estado. Nacimiento, transformación y extinción del Estado. Rol del
Derecho Internacional en el nacimiento de un Estado. Reconocimiento de Estados y
reconocimiento de gobiernos. Sucesión de Estados.
2.3. Las Organizaciones Internacionales. Definición de organización internacional. Elementos
de la definición. Clasificación de organizaciones internacionales. La Organización de las
Naciones Unidas, antecedentes, propósitos y principios. Órganos principales y subsidiarios
de las Naciones Unidas. Composición, funciones y poderes de los órganos principales. Los
organismos especializados de las Naciones Unidas. La Organización de Estados
Americanos.
2.4. Los pueblos sujetos a dominación colonial. El principio de libre determinación de los
pueblos. Movimientos de Liberación Nacional.
2.5. El individuo y otros sujetos del Derecho Internacional.

3. Las fuentes del Derecho Internacional

3.1. Noción de fuente del Derecho Internacional. Las normas imperativas o de jus cogens.
3.2. Los tratados internacionales. El Derecho de los Tratados y la Convención de Viena sobre
Derecho de los Tratados de 1969.
3.3. La costumbre internacional.
3.4. Los principios del Derecho Internacional.
3.5. Los actos unilaterales de los Estados.
3.6. Los Actos de la Organizaciones Internacionales.
3.7. Las fuentes auxiliares: la jurisprudencia y la doctrina.

4. La prohibición de la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza

4.1. La prohibición de la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza. Regulación contenida en la Carta de la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas y la costumbre internacional. Carácter imperativo de
la prohibición. Excepciones a la prohibición: la legítima defensa y la autorización del uso de
la fuerza por el Consejo de Seguridad. La intervención en Irak (1990). La intervención en
Afganistán (2001).La invasión de Irak (2003) y la actual situación en Siria.
. La intervención en Irak (1990
The United Nations Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
offered Iraq one final chance to implement Resolution 660 (1990) which demanded that Iraq
withdraw its forces unconditionally from Kuwait to the positions in which they were located
on 1 August 1990, the day before the invasion of Kuwait began.

On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which gave Iraq until
15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait and empowered states to use "all necessary
means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait after the deadline. The Resolution requested Member
States to keep the Council informed on their decisions. This was the legal authorization for
the Gulf War, as Iraq did not withdraw by the deadline.[1]
Cuba's position was nuanced as it had voted for or abstained on previous resolutions
relating to the Iraqi invasion, but did not support Resolution 678 because of its authorization
of "all necessary means."[2]

Resolution 678 was adopted by 12 votes with two opposing (Cuba and Yemen) and one
abstention from the People's Republic of China. The authority granted to Member States in
this case contrasts with the disputed legality of U.S. actions in the invasion of Iraq of 2003.
The extent of authority that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 gave is the
subject of disagreement.

The United States government strenuously lobbied governments represented on the UN

Security Council, including the Soviet Union, China, Malaysia and Yemen, to support a
resolution authorizing UN members states to use "all necessary means" for removing Iraqi
forces from Kuwait.[3] China, which had usually vetoed such resolutions authorizing action
against a state, abstained in exchange for a promise from the US government that
sanctions placed on China after its massacre of participants in the Tiananmen Square
protests of 1989 would be eased,[4] and that the Chinese foreign minister would be
received in the White House.[5] Various members of the Council were rewarded with
economic incentives as a result of their 'yes' vote, and those who initially opposed the
resolution were discouraged from voting 'no' with the idea of economic penalties,
particularly by the United States. [6] The US successfully obtained a commitment from the
Saudi government to provide $1 billion to the Soviets in aid through the winter. [7]
After Yemen voted against the resolution, the US, World Bank and International Monetary
Fund halted aid programs to Yemen, and Saudi Arabia expelled Yemeni workers.
[8]
 Following the US government's fruitless effort to persuade the Yemeni government to
support the resolution, US diplomats bluntly informed Yemeni officials "That was the most
expensive no vote you ever cast"--referring to ceasing more than $70 million of US
government foreign aid to Yemen International law experts, such as Professor Burns H.
Weston, have argued that the UN security council resolution set a "dubious precedent" by
backing away from the "peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles" enshrined in
the United Nations Charter, a cornerstone of international law. It did this by failing to vest
in the UN the responsibility and the accountability for the military force that was deployed
to the region but instead allowing the United States to manage world policy essentially in a
unilateral manner In late 2001, the Security Council authorized the United
States to overthrow the Taliban government, as an offensive against the terrorist al-Qaeda
organization, said to be based in the country. The Council also authorized the US and its
NATO allies to set up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide military
support for a newly-established pro-Western government (the United States also
continued to run a separate anti-terrorist military operation). In March 2002 the Council
established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) to manage
all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. Despite (or perhaps
because of) these military-centered initiatives, Afghanistan has remained a "failed state."
The authority of President Hamid Karzai, victor in the presidential election of October
2004, barely extends beyond Kabul's suburbs, warlords have gained back control of most
of the country, and opium is now the principal agricultural crop.
The Taliban has enjoyed an upsurge of military success in 2007-2008 and several NATO
countries have expressed concern about the political viability of the operation. Public
support for deployments to Afghanistan in countries such as Germany and Canada has
evaporated. The media have reported on US-UK air bombardment of innocent civilians as
well as bold Taliban attacks against US and NATO forces, suggesting that the intervention
is failing to produce the promised security, democracy and prosperity.
The UN's role in the country includes an election operation that is working with Afghan
authorities to register voters and organize elections for 2009 and 2010. Other efforts
include promoting of good governance and the rule of law, training of police, and the like.
But in a land torn by violence, warlordism, drug production and intense suspicion of
foreigners, these programs seem unreal and very unlikely to succeed. Until Afghanistan
achieves a lasting and stable peace designed and supported by Afghanis, there can be no
prospect of progress, electoral or otherwise.
The military campaign in Afghanistan was not specifically mandated by the UN - there
was no specific Security Council Resolution authorising the invasion - but was widely
(although not universally) perceived to be a legitimate form of self-defence under the UN
Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the 'threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state'. The accepted exceptions to this
are where a competent organ of the UN (almost always the Security Council) has
authorised it, or where it is in self-defence under article 51 of the Charter. As required in
article 51, the US and the UK reported to the UN on the reasons for invoking the article to
justify their military action. The Taliban Government of Afghanistan was considered an
accomplice to the events of 9/11 and, therefore, a justifiable target for action. United
Nations Security Council Resolutions had already been passed requiring the Taliban to
stop giving sanctuary to al-Qaeda. Humanitarian law requires any action to be
proportionate. This means that the action must only be that which is necessary to repel
any attack and prevent further attacks from happening, if there is a realistic chance of
further attacks. It also requires civilian casualties to be minimised.
The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred after the September 11 attacks in late
2001,[2] supported by close US allies. The conflict is also known as the U.S. war in
Afghanistan.[3] Its public aims were to dismantle al-Qaeda, and to deny it a safe base of
operations in Afghanistan by removing the Taliban from power.[4] The United Kingdom
was a key ally of the United States, offering support for military action from the start of
preparations for the invasion. It followed the Afghan Civil War's 1996–2001 phase between
the Taliban and the Northern Alliance groups, although the Taliban controlled 90% of the
country by 2001.
U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden
and expel al-Qaeda; bin Laden had already been wanted by the FBI since 1998. The
Taliban declined to extradite him unless given what they deemed convincing evidence of
his involvement in the 9/11 attacks[5] and ignored demands to shut down terrorist bases
and hand over other terrorist suspects apart from bin Laden. The request was dismissed
by the U.S. as a meaningless delaying tactic and it launched Operation Enduring Freedom
on 7 October 2001 with the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other forces,
including the Northern Alliance troops on the ground.[6][7] The U.S. and its allies rapidly
drove the Taliban from power by 17 December 2001, and built military bases near major
cities across the country. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban members were not captured,
escaping to neighboring Pakistan or retreating to rural or remote mountainous regions
during the Battle of Tora Bora.[citation needed]
In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council established the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to oversee military operations in the country and train
Afghan National Security Forces. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid
Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya
jirga (grand assembly) in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the
popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[8] In August 2003, NATO became involved as an alliance,
taking the helm of ISAF.[9] One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under
NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah
Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2002, it launched an insurgency against the
government and ISAF that continues to this day. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was the first
stage of the Iraq War (also called Operation Iraqi Freedom). The invasion phase began on
20 March 2003 and lasted just over one month,[22] including 21 days of major combat
operations, in which a combined force of troops from the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq. This early stage of the war formally ended on
1 May 2003 when U.S. President George W. Bush declared the "End of Major Combat
Operations", after which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established as the
first of several successive transitional governments leading up to the first Iraqi
parliamentary election in January 2005. U.S. military forces later remained in Iraq until the
withdrawal in 2011.

The American-led coalition sent 177,194 troops into Iraq during the initial invasion phase,
which lasted from 19 March to 9 April 2003. About 130,000 arrived from the USA alone,
with about 45,000 British soldiers, 2,000 Australian soldiers, and 194 Polish soldiers. 36
other countries were involved in its aftermath. In preparation for the invasion, 100,000 U.S.
troops assembled in Kuwait by 18 February.[23] The coalition forces also received support
from the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan.

According to George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, the coalition aimed "to
disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for
terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."[24] Others place a much greater emphasis on the
impact of the September 11 attacks, on the role this played in changing U.S. strategic
calculations, and the rise of the freedom agenda.[25][26][27] According to Blair, the trigger
was Iraq's failure to take a "final opportunity" to disarm itself of alleged nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons that U.S. and British officials called an immediate and intolerable
threat to world peace.[28]

In a January 2003 CBS poll, 64% of Americans had approved of military action against
Iraq; however, 63% wanted Bush to find a diplomatic solution rather than go to war, and
62% believed the threat of terrorism directed against the U.S. would increase due to war.
[29] The invasion of Iraq was strongly opposed by some long-standing U.S. allies,
including the governments of France, Germany, and New Zealand.[30][31][32] Their
leaders argued that there was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and
that invading that country was not justified in the context of UNMOVIC's 12 February 2003
report. On 15 February 2003, a month before the invasion, there were worldwide protests
against the Iraq War, including a rally of three million people in Rome, which the Guinness
Book of Records listed as the largest ever anti-war rally.[33] According to the French
academic Dominique Reynié, between 3 January and 12 April 2003, 36 million people
across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against the Iraq war.[34]

The invasion was preceded by an airstrike on the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on 20

March 2003. The following day, coalition forces launched an incursion into Basra Province
from their massing point close to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. While special forces launched
an amphibious assault from the Persian Gulf to secure Basra and the surrounding
petroleum fields, the main invasion army moved into southern Iraq, occupying the region
and engaging in the Battle of Nasiriyah on 23 March. Massive air strikes across the
country and against Iraqi command-and-control threw the defending army into chaos and
prevented an effective resistance. On 26 March, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was
airdropped near the northern city of Kirkuk, where they joined forces with Kurdish rebels
and fought several actions against the Iraqi Army to secure the northern part of the
country.
The main body of coalition forces continued their drive into the heart of Iraq and met with
little resistance. Most of the Iraqi military was quickly defeated and the coalition occupied
Baghdad on 9 April. Other operations occurred against pockets of the Iraqi army, including
the capture and occupation of Kirkuk on 10 April, and the attack on and capture of Tikrit on
15 April. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and the central leadership went into hiding as
the coalition forces completed the occupation of the country. On 1 May President George
W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations: this ended the invasion period and
began the period of military occupation.
In March 2003 the United States government announced that "diplomacy has failed" and
that it would proceed with a "coalition of the willing" to rid Iraq under Saddam Hussein of
weapons of mass destruction the US insisted it possessed. The 2003 invasion of Iraq
began a few days later. Prior to this decision, there had been much diplomacy and debate
amongst the members of the United Nations Security Council over how to deal with the
situation.
There's been a civil war in Syria for the last seven years, with different groups trying to
seize control of the country.
The fighting is between: Soldiers who support the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad
Fighters known as rebels, who don't want Assad to be in power anymore
The group that calls itself Islamic State (IS)
In the chaos of fighting between the government and anti-government fighters, IS took
over large parts of Iraq and then moved into eastern Syria, where they were able to gain
land and power. Even though IS has since lost control of a lot of this land, fighting
continues in the country.The situation is also more complicated because other countries
have got involved in the conflict.The Syrian government's key supporters are Russia and
Iran, while the US, Turkey and Saudi Arabia back the rebels. The UK, France and other
western countries have also provided varying levels of support to what they consider to be
"moderate" rebels.According to the United Nations (UN) - a group of countries working
together to try to bring peace - at least 6.1 million ordinary people have had to flee their
homes inside Syria, while another 5.6 million have fled abroad.Read on to find out more
about the situation, but if you have any questions about what is going on, send them in to
us here and we will get a BBC expert to try to answer some of them.What is the latest?
On 14 April, armed forces from the UK, the US and France fired missiles to destroy what
they say are chemical weapons factories in Syria. The air strikes were in response to a
suspected chemical attack in an area called Douma, which shocked a lot of people. It was
the biggest military attack against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government by
western powers in Syria's civil war.
5. La solución pacífica de las controversias internacionales
5.1. La obligación de solucionar las controversias por medios pacíficos y la libertad de
elección de medios.
5.2. Procedimientos de carácter no jurisdiccional: la negociación, la investigación, los
buenos oficios, la mediación, la conciliación y otros medios, no típicos.
A controversy has been defined according to the Permanent Court of International Justice,
as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a contradiction, an opposition of legal theses
or interests between two people."
International law and the Charter of the United Nations impose on States the obligation to
settle their international disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to threats or the use
of force, but they do not impose on them certain means of solution. The choice of a given
medium depends on the agreement of the States in dispute.
. The Political or Diplomatic Means Direct negotiations are the normal means to resolve
disputes
international affairs, are normally developed through diplomatic channels and as a general
rule between plenipotentiaries appointed by the States in dispute, they may even
to be the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and even the Heads of State This is normal in the
treaties of peaceful resolution of controversies that expressly contemplate the recourse of
direct negotiations, some of them even come to establish that the Parties should try to
solve a
differentiating between them through direct negotiation before invoking other means of
peaceful settlement of disputes.
Good offices, is when a State, a prominent personality or an international organization lend
their good offices to approximate the parties in conflict and push them to negotiate
Mediation, is that a third party that can be a State or a personality highlighted (the
mediator) participates in the negotiations and formulates the Parties in
controversy suggestions and proposals tending to solve the dispute. The mediator It is not
a judge who dictates judgments but a facilitator who seeks compromise, his role is
recommend, suggest in order to reach a just and honorable solution for the Parties. The
investigation consists in the fact that the Parties in controversy can designate an
International Commission of Inquiry to clarify the points n fact, on which there is a
divergence of appreciation between the Parties, preparing the way for a negotiated
solution. The Parties are not obliged to accept the findings of the Commission of Inquiry,
unlessthat they have expressly agreed. These Commissions were created in the
Conferences of Peace of The Hague of 1899 and 1907.
The conciliation, by this means of peaceful resolution of the disputes, constitutes through
the Parties a Commission that proceeds with the impartial examination of a dispute and
strives to define terms of settlement susceptible to be accepted by the Parties. The terms
of settlement proposed by the Commission
they are not mandatory for the Parties. As a general rule, it is made up of members
appointed by each Party
and by one or more foreign members designated by mutual agreement by both Parties It
can be established on a permanent basis or it can be constituted "ad hoc" to understand a
particular litigation. 5.3. Procedimientos jurisdiccionales: el arbitraje y el arreglo judicial.
Los tribunales internacionales de carácter permanente. La Corte Internacional de Justicia:
competencias, composición y procedimiento. La obligación de cumplir las sentencias de la
Corte y el recurso al Consejo de Seguridad.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the
United Nations (UN),[1] charged with the maintenance of international peace and
security[2] as well as accepting new members to the United Nations[3] and approving any
changes to its United Nations Charter.[4] Its powers include the establishment of
peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the
authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions; it is the only UN body
with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states. The Security Council held
its first session on 17 January 1946.

Like the UN as a whole, the Security Council was created following World War II to
address the failings of a previous international organization, the League of Nations, in
maintaining world peace. In its early decades, the Security Council was largely paralyzed
by the Cold War division between the US and USSR and their respective allies, though it
authorized interventions in the Korean War and the Congo Crisis and peacekeeping
missions in the Suez Crisis, Cyprus, and West New Guinea. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, UN peacekeeping efforts increased dramatically in scale, and the Security
Council authorized major military and peacekeeping missions in Kuwait, Namibia,
Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Security Council consists of fifteen members.[5] The great powers that were the
victors of World War II—the Soviet Union (now represented by Russia), the United
Kingdom, France, China, and the United States—serve as the body's five permanent
members. These permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council
resolution, including those on the admission of new member states or candidates for
Secretary-General. The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on
a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body's presidency rotates monthly among its
members.

Security Council resolutions are typically enforced by UN peacekeepers, military forces

voluntarily provided by member states and funded independently of the main UN budget.
As of 2016, 103,510 peacekeepers and 16,471 civilians were deployed on sixteen
peacekeeping operations and one special political mission.[6]
The UN's role in international collective security is defined by the UN Charter, which
authorizes the Security Council to investigate any situation threatening international peace;
recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute; call upon other member
nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal,
and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations; and enforce its decisions
militarily, or by any means necessary. The Security Council also recommends the new
Secretary-General to the General Assembly and recommends new states for admission as
member states of the United Nations.[46][47] The Security Council has traditionally
interpreted its mandate as covering only military security, though US Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke controversially persuaded the body to pass a resolution on HIV/AIDS in Africa
in 2000.[48]

Under Chapter VI of the Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", the Security Council
"may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or
give rise to a dispute". The Council may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods
of adjustment" if it determines that the situation might endanger international peace and
security.[49] These recommendations are generally considered to not be binding, as they
lack an enforcement mechanism.[50] A minority of scholars, such as Stephen Zunes, have
argued that resolutions made under Chapter VI are "still directives by the Security Council
and differ only in that they do not have the same stringent enforcement options, such as
the use of military force".[51]

Under Chapter VII, the Council has broader power to decide what measures are to be
taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of
aggression".[27] In such situations, the Council is not limited to recommendations but may
take action, including the use of armed force "to maintain or restore international peace
and security".[27] This was the legal basis for UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the
Korean War and the use of coalition forces in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 and Libya in 2011.
[52][53] Decisions taken under Chapter VII, such as economic sanctions, are binding on
UN members; the Security Council is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding
resolutions.[54][55]

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes that the Security Council
has authority to refer cases to the Court in which the Court could not otherwise exercise
jurisdiction.[56] The Council exercised this power for the first time in March 2005, when it
referred to the Court "the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002"; since Sudan is
not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court could not otherwise have exercised jurisdiction.
[57][58] The Security Council made its second such referral in February 2011 when it
asked the ICC to investigate the Libyan government's violent response to the Libyan Civil
War.[59]

Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted on 28 April 2006, "reaffirms the provisions of
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity".[60] The Security Council reaffirmed this responsibility to protect
in Resolution 1706 on 31 August of that year.[61] These resolutions commit the Security
Council to take action to protect civilians in an armed conflict, including taking action
against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.[6
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations
(UN). It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began
work in April 1946.
The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). Of the six
principal organs of the United Nations, it is the only one not located in New York (United
States of America).
The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted
to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized
United Nations organs and specialized agencies. The Court is composed of 15 judges,
who are elected for terms of office of nine years by the United Nations General Assembly
and the Security Council. It is assisted by a Registry, its administrative organ. Its official
languages are English and French.

6. La responsabilidad internacional
6.1. Generación de la responsabilidad internacional. El hecho internacionalmente ilícito.
Circunstancias que excluyen la ilicitud. La obligación de reparar. La responsabilidad por
actividades ultra riesgosas.
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State There is an internationally wrongful
act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the
State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of
the State.

Forms of reparation Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act
shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in
combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Restitution A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to
make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act
was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) is not materially impossible;
(b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation.
Compensation 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not
made good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable
damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.
Satisfaction 1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made
good by restitution or compensation. 2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of
the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality. 3.
Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating
to the responsible State.
 Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority
 Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State
 Excess of authority or contravention of instructions
 Conduct directed or controlled by a State
 Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities
 Conduct of an insurrectional or other moveme
 Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own
Consent Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the
act remains within the limits of that consent.
 Self-defence The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a
lawful measure of selfdefence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation
towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a
countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with chapter II of part three.
Force majeure 1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is
the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the
State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.
Distress 1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other
reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other
persons entrusted to the author’s care. 2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of
distress is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the
State invoking it; or (b) the act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril.
Necessity 1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State
unless the act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the
State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or (b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.

7. El Derecho diplomático y consular

7.1. El Derecho diplomático y sus agentes. La misión diplomática. Privilegios e
inmunidades diplomáticos.
7.2. Las relaciones consulares. La oficina consular. Privilegios e inmunidades consulares.
7.3. La protección diplomática y la protección consular.

In international law, diplomatic protection (or diplomatic espousal) is a means for a state

to take diplomatic and other action against another state on behalf of its national whose rights
and interests have been injured by that state. Diplomatic protection, which has been
confirmed in different cases of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
the International Court of Justice, is a discretionary right of a state and may take any form
that is not prohibited by international law. It can include consular action, negotiations with the
other state, political and economic pressure, judicial or arbitral proceedings or other forms of
peaceful dispute settlement.
In 2006, the International Law Commission adopted the Articles on Diplomatic Protection,
regulating the entitlement and the exercise of diplomatic protection.

Consular protection
Consular protection is where the home state helps its nationals to defend their rights in
accordance with the legal system of the host state. In this case the home state acts in the
name and on behalf of its nationals.

Diplomatic protection
Diplomatic protection is where the home state intervenes on behalf of its nationals who
suffer a violation of international law by the host state. In this case the home state acts on
its own account as it is considered to be the injured party. The foundations of diplomatic
protection were explained in 1924 by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Mavrommatis case.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Consular Relations
Convention (1963). These agreements include the facilities, prerogatives of these
relationships. The diplomats. It is multilateral and bilateral. It is governed by Public
International Law. Declarations generate consequences and obligations for the State. They
represent the State. They are accredited by credentials.

And the Consulates. It is Bilateral. It is governed by Internal Law and Public International
Law. The declarations only generate consequences in the Internal Law. It is a function of a
technical nature. They are accredited by Letters patents. The Vienna Conventions, though,
marked the differences between diplomatic and consular relations, also framed some
doctrinal principles unique to both branches, such as the right of legation or jus legatio. The
right of legation is the power that States have to send or receive official emissaries on behalf
of their governments, such right can be freely used by all States with international legal
personality, before other States.

There are now 183 states parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961
(in this chapter, ‘the Convention’). Even for the handful of non-parties, the Convention now
represents an authoritative statement of the law, and as such is relied on heavily by the
International Court of Justice.2 Nevertheless, the manner in which the Convention is
interpreted and applied can vary to some degree from state to state. All members of
diplomatic missions and their local legal advisers therefore need to familiarise themselves
with the practice and procedures of the receiving state, which will often publish guidance.
The functions of a diplomatic mission The main functions of a diplomatic mission are
described in Article 3(1): representing the sending state, protecting its interests and those
of its nationals, negotiating with the receiving state, reporting what goes on in the receiving
state and promoting friendly relations, which includes providing the local population with
information about the sending state. The list is not exhaustive, and the customary
functions include also co-operation with the receiving state in trade promotion, and
financial, economic, scientific, defence and cultural matters and, increasingly, prevention
of crime (in particular drug-trafficking and terrorism) – in fact, anything which the two states
wish to do together through the means of their respective missions
Inviolability of the premises of the mission
It is sometimes said that a diplomatic mission is ‘foreign soil’. This may be correct
culturally, but not legally. The land on which the mission premises stand remains part of
the territory of the receiving state, and buying or leasing the land has to be done under
local law.18 But Article 22(1) states the fundamental principle that the premises of the
mission are inviolable: agents of the receiving state may not enter without the consent of
the head of mission. However, if a mission is located in part of a commercial office building
(quite common these days), those parts that it shares with non-diplomatic tenants will not
enjoy inviolability. The essence of inviolability is freedom from interference, coupled with a
special duty to protect (see below). Inviolability is an absolute rule, since any exception to
it could be abused by a receiving state.19 In contrast to consular premises,20 the
prohibition on entry applies even in an emergency. If an ambassador would rather his
 embassy burn down than call in the local fire service, all the receiving state can do is to try
to persuade him to let them in

The two states are known by the self-explanatory terms sending state and receiving state.
The term diplomatic mission is generic.
8. La relación entre el Derecho internacional y el derecho interno
8.1. La incorporación de los tratados en el Derecho interno. Teorías monista y dualista.
8.2. La jerarquía de los tratados en el Derecho interno.

9. El Derecho del Mar y la controversia sobre delimitación marítima entre el

Perú y Chile
9.1. Evolución histórica del Derecho del Mar. Las tres conferencias de las Naciones
Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar. La Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el
Derecho del Mar de 1982.
9.2. Los espacios marítimos. El mar territorial. La zona económica exclusiva y la zona
contigua. La plataforma continental. La alta mar. La zona internacional de los fondos
marinos y oceánicos.

 The maritime zones- are sea-zones recognised under international law include, the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, the
high seas and the Area.
Principles and methods of delimitation

The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention defines equidistance as “the line every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each of the two States is measured.”32 The 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention contains a similar definition. This Convention employs the term “median line” for
an equidistant line between opposite States and refers only to a boundary determined by
application of the principle of equidistance in the case of adjacent States.33 It seems that
the use of equidistance methods depends on the baselines along the coasts of the
respective States whose offshore areas are to be separated by the boundary. There may be
difficulties here if one State utilizes normal baselines, following the sinuosities of the coasts,
and the other employs a straight baseline system connecting the outermost islands,
promontories and rocks.34 According to the 1958 Conventions, the use of the equidistance
method was obligatory in the absence of an agreement, historical titles or special
circumstances. This was called the combined equidistance/special circumstances

Equity and the equitable principle The notion of equity is at the heart of the delimitation of
the CS and entered into the delimitation process with the 1945 proclamation of US
President Truman, concerning the delimitation of the CS between the Unites States and
adjacent States. President Truman proclaimed that: The United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United states, subject
to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of
another States, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by
the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles The
Truman proclamation inspired the Court during the 1969 North Sea case, when the Court
stated that “delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles, and taking into account all the relevant circumstances.”102 This idea became
doctrine and was reiterated and confirmed by the ICJ and arbitral tribunals in subsequent
cases.

Following the emergence of the doctrine of the EEZ, there has been an increasing trend
among States to adopt, in the interest of simplicity, certainty and convenience, a single
maritime boundary to divide their maritime zones beyond the territorial sea. In the case of
adjacent coasts, a line drawn seaward from the coast will usually separate only the territorial
waters of the two States for the first twelve nautical miles. Beyond that, if States agree, the
same may separate the two maritime zones between them.120 The recourse of the single
maritime boundary is supported by the parallelism and similar character between the EEZ
and the CS up to 200 nautical miles. Under the 1982 LOS Convention (Articles 57 and 76),
the 200 nautical mile distance criterion governs the attribution of legal title to both the EEZ
and the CS in cases where the continental margin extends up to 200 nautical miles. Also, to
refer to Article 56 of the 1982 LOS Convention, the notion of the EEZ comprises both the
sea-bed and water column and the legal regime of the CS is virtually identical to the
corresponding rights and duties of States in their EEZ (with regard to the sea-bed
resources, artificial islands, scientific research). Indeed, Articles 74 and 83 concerning the
delimitation of the EEZ and CS are identical. The establishment of the distance criterion by
the ICJ in the 1985 Libya/Malta case as the sole basis of title to the sea-bed and subsoil
within 200 nautical miles is also in favour of the single maritime boundary between the two
zones.

Proportionality Some rules of international law leave judgment on the legality of an act to the
consideration of the specific situation of the case, and offer only a general notion of the
criteria for evaluation. One of these rules is the concept of proportionality. The concept of
proportionality plays an important role in various domains of international law and the law of
the sea, and in particular maritime delimitation. The concept of proportionality has been
taken into account in every judgment relating to maritime delimitation.
According to that concept, maritime delimitation should be effected by taking into account
the ratio between the water and CS areas attributed to each party and the length of their
respective coastlines. Thus, the Court and tribunals have to estimate roughly, or calculate
exactly, the lengths of the relevant coastlines and compare that ratio to the ratio of the
provisionally delimited relevant water and CS areas. If the proportion of the relevant
maritime zones does not roughly coincide with the relative length of the coastlines, further
analyses or adjustment would be considered.143 However, the concept of proportionality
was not considered in every ICJ case and arbitration tribunal award.

The perpendicular line to the general direction of the coast is also one of the methods used
for drawing the maritime boundary between adjacent coasts. This method was used by the
ICJ in some cases and has also found its place in State practice. The use of the
perpendicular line is more frequent in the case of adjacent States which present coasts that
are more or less straight. A lateral delimitation based on a perpendicular line, however, will
only lead to a mutually acceptable result when the coast at the point of termination of the
land frontier is relatively straight and the general direction of the coastline rather easy to
determine. For such delimitation, the locations of the baselines are important in determining
the general direction
9.3. La delimitación marítima. El establecimiento de límites marítimos y el método
desarrollado por la jurisprudencia internacional.
9.4. La controversia sobre delimitación marítima entre el Perú y Chile. Antecedentes: El
Decreto Supremo peruano Nº 781 de 1947, la Declaración de Santiago de 1952, el
Convenio sobre Zona Especial Fronteriza Marítima de 1954. Demanda del Perú del 16 de
enero de 2008. Los alegatos de las partes. El Fallo de la Corte del 27 de enero de 2014 y
su ejecución.
Peru v Chile (also called the Chilean–Peruvian maritime dispute) is a public international
law case concerning a territorial dispute between the South American republics of Peru and
Chile over the sovereignty of an area at sea in the Pacific Ocean approximately 37,900
square kilometres (14,600 sq mi) in size. Peru contended that its maritime boundary
delimitation with Chile was not fixed, but Chile claimed that it holds no outstanding border
issues with Peru. On January 16, 2008, Peru brought forth the case to the International
Court of Justice at The Hague, the Netherlands, which accepted the case and formally filed
it as the Case concerning maritime delimitation between the Republic of Peru and the
Republic of Chile - Perú v. Chile.

The dispute primarily concerned an area at sea between the parallel that crosses the end
point of the land border between Chile and Peru, and the bisecting line perpendicular to the
coasts of Chile and Peru. This line was formed by the overlapping of the baselines of both
countries, forming a trapezoid of 67,139.4 square kilometres (25,922.7 sq mi). Peru
requested an equitable division of the maritime territory, but Chile demanded sovereignty
over approximately 38,000 square kilometres (15,000 sq mi) of the territory. On a secondary
level, the dispute included the status of a maritime triangle to the left of the aforementioned
trapezoid, approximately 28,471.86 square kilometres (10,993.05 sq mi) in size, which Chile
considered part of the high seas and Peru as part of its maritime domain.

On January 27, 2014, in the final ruling of the Court, Peru gained some maritime territory.
The maritime boundary extends only to 80 nautical miles off of the coast. From that point,
the new border runs in a southwest direction to a point that is 200 miles equidistant from
the coast of the two countries.
Under the ruling, Chile lost control over part of its formerly claimed maritime territory and
gives additional maritime territory to Peru.
From the 27 January 2014 court press release: [1] The Court concludes that the maritime
boundary between the Parties starts at the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing
through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line, and extends for 80 nautical miles
along that parallel of latitude to Point A. From this point, the maritime boundary runs
along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the 200-nautical-mile limit
measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C. In view of the circumstances of the
case, the Court has defined the course of the maritime boundary between the Parties
without determining the precise geographical co-ordinates.
On 27 January 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its judgment on the
maritime boundary dispute between Peru and Chile (Peru v. Chile, Judgment, General
List No. 137). The Court had to determine first whether a maritime boundary existed
between Peru and Chile. If so, then it also had to consider the nature and extent of the
boundary.

Peru’s application instituting proceedings in 2008 asserted that the limits of its southern
maritime boundary and Chile’s abutting northern maritime boundary were uncertain and
requested the ICJ to delimit the respective maritime zones based on a line “equidistant
from the baselines of both Parties, up to a point situated at a distance of 200 nautical
miles (nm) from those baselines” (Peru v. Chile, para. 14). Chile disputed this uncertainty
and maintained that the maritime boundary had been settled by a prior agreement. Chile
maintained that the delimitation under the agreement was based on a “parallel of latitude
passing through the most seaward boundary marker of the land boundary between Chile
and Peru” and extending 200 nm (id.). The respective positions of both Chile and Peru
are shown below in sketch-map No. 2 of the Court’s judgment (Peru v. Chile, para 22).
Peru also argued that if the parallel of latitude method of delimitation was adopted, then
at the end of the common boundary it was entitled to exercise exclusive sovereign rights
over a maritime area lying out to a distance of 200 nm from its baseline (and beyond 200
nm from the Chilean baseline). Peru referred to this area as the “outer triangle” (shown
shaded in blue).
Delimiting the boundary by the use of the parallel of latitude method urged by Chile
(instead of based on the equidistance principle favoured by Peru) greatly enlarges the
ocean space subject to Chilean sovereign rights and jurisdiction, whilst significantly
diminishing those of Peru. The significant economic impact for both states in where the
boundary line is set is readily apparent. The water column seaward of the coasts of Peru
and Chile, known as the Humbolt Current, is extremely rich in living marine resources. In
2008, it was said to be the most productive marine ecosystem in the world and
approximately 18%-20% of world’s total fish catch is harvested in the waters off Peru and
Chile (Mark McGinley, Humboldt Current large marine ecosystem, Encyclopedia of
Earth). Given this economic significance, since 1982 Peru had repeatedly sought to
negotiate, presumably pursuant to Article 74 of the United Nations Convention for the
Law of the Sea, an agreement finally establishing a maritime boundary with Chile.
However, in Chile’s view the boundary had been formally delimited by an agreement
reflected in Paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago Declaration and that this boundary was
protected from challenge on the basis of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)
and the need to ensure the stability of boundaries.

Ultimately, the Court fashioned a boundary that neither Peru nor Chile had pleaded. The
Court delimited the starting point (Boundary Marker No. 1) and a parallel maritime
boundary line that extended 80 nm (Point A) on the basis of a tacit agreement. Beyond
that initial 80 nm segment, the Court called on customary international law in order to
delimit the seaward boundary related to overlapping claims out to 200 nm (Point B) then
dropping down to where the maritime entitlements of the parties end (Point C). The final
boundary declared delimited by the Court is shown in sketch-map No. 4 of the judgment
(Peru v. Chile, para 195).
The Treatment of the Dispute by the ICJ
The Court starts by noting that its jurisdiction arises, according to Peru and unchallenged
by Chile, by virtue of the compromissory clause in the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement (Art. XXXI). The judgment then briefly recounts the fascinating genesis of the
maritime boundary dispute between Peru and Chile. The dispute is traced back to the
19th Century and in the “War of the Pacific” (1879-1883) between Chile, Peru and
Bolivia, which revolved around control over nitrate resources in the Atacama Desert.
Chile ultimately proved victorious and annexed the Peruvian provinces of Tacna, Arica
and Tarapacá. In 1883 Chile and Peru entered into a peace treaty known as the Treaty of
Ancón and hostilities came to an end. Under the terms of the treaty, Chile was supposed
to organise a plebiscite after ten years in which the populations of Tacna and Arica would
decide which country they wanted to belong to. It failed to do this and following mediation
by the President of the United States in 1929 the two countries entered into the Treaty of
Lima whereby they agreed that Tacna would be returned to Peru and Chile would retain
Arica. They also agreed to the establishment of a Mixed Commission of Limits to
determine the land boundary between the two countries, which was accomplished by its
1930 Final Act (see sketch-map No. 2).While Peru and Chile agreed that their land
boundary had been conclusively determined, Peru maintained that this was not the case
with the party’s common maritime boundary and requested the Court to delimit the
maritime zones between the parties by means of a line equidistant from the baselines of
both parties. Peru asserted that the start of the boundary should be at Punta Concordia,
where the land border hits the sea. As noted, Peru also requested the ICJ to declare the
“outer triangle” subject to its sovereign rights and jurisdiction as within 200 nm of its
baselines, but more than 200 nm from Chile’s baselines. Chile argued contra-wise that a
definitive boundary had been agreed in the 1952 Santiago Declaration, as supported by a
reading of preceding and subsequent instruments and their travaux preparatoires. Chile
maintained that the maritime boundary line followed the parallel of latitude passing
through the most seaward boundary marker of the land boundary (250 meters north of
Punta Concordia), Boundary Marker No. 1 (referred to as Hito No. 1 in the 1930 Final
Act) and extending to 200 nm. Chile requested the Court to recognize and declare this
pre-existing maritime boundary and dismiss Peru’s claim in its entirety.

The Court began its analysis by considering a series of instruments and agreements
between Peru and Chile, including the 1947 unilateral Proclamations (1947
Proclamations) by both states claiming a 200 nm exclusive maritime zone of each coast,
the 1952 Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone (1952 Santiago Declaration), and
related agreements concluded over the next two years, especially the 1954 Agreement
Relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone (1954 Agreement), as well as relevant state
practice. Of course, at this period of time customary international law was silent about the
declaration of 200 nm exclusive maritime zones in relation to living marine resources,
although the Truman Proclamation did serve to crystalize the customary international law
over the delimitation of overlapping claims over the continental shelf. In terms of the 1947
Proclamations, the ICJ ruled (as conceded by Chile) that they did not, of themselves,
establish an international maritime boundary between the parties. However, the Court did
find that the Proclamations were evidence of the necessity of an understanding of the
need to establish the lateral limits of the claimed maritime zones in the future. The Court
then examined the 1952 Santiago Declaration, in particular paragraph IV which states: In
the case of island territories, the zone of 200 nautical miles shall apply to the entire coast
of the island or group of islands. If an island or group of islands belonging to one of the
countries making the declaration is situated less than 200 nautical miles from the general
maritime zone belonging to another of those countries, the maritime zone of the island or
group of islands shall be limited by the parallel at the point at which the land frontier of
the States concerned reaches the sea. For Chile, paragraph IV clearly indicated a
general maritime delimitation between Peru and Chile extending to 200 nm had been
intended. If this were not the case, then it would be impossible to know if an island was
within 200 nm of the “general maritime zone” of the neighbouring State. The Court
disagreed. Interestingly, the Court held that the 1952 Declaration, which presumably
started life as a declarative political instrument, was transformed into a treaty (properly so
called) by virtue of its ratification by each signatory and its registration with the U.N.
under Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. Treaty though it became, the Court held that it did
not constitute an agreement to establish a maritime boundary. Interpreting the 1952
Declaration according to the ordinary meaning of its terms, the Court found that the
Parties had only agreed on the limits of certain insular maritime zones and the zones
generated by the continental coasts that abut these zones. The Court further considered
the object and purpose of the 1952 Declaration and found the focus to be on
conservation and protection of natural resources. It found it was not necessary to
consider the situation of small islands located close to the coast near the Peru-Chile land
boundary because the concerns about insular zones arose from a concern expressed by
Ecuador. Finally the Court rejected Chile’s claim that the Minutes of the 1952 conference
leading to the Declaration constitute an “agreement relation to the treaty” under Article
31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Court found they were not
an agreement but more in the nature of travaux, which were not needed as
supplementary means of interpretation in this case.
Yet, the Court accepted Chilean reliance on the provisions of various agreements from
1952 to 1954, within the context of the 1947 Proclamations and the 1952 Santiago
Declaration, was sufficient to establish a tacit agreement for a general parallel maritime
boundary starting at Boundary Marker No. 1. In reaching this conclusion the Court
examined relevant practice of the Parties in the early and mid-1950s, as well as the wider
context including developments in the law of the sea at that time. It also assessed the
practice of the two Parties subsequent to 1954. The ICJ noted that the practice and
agreements before 1954 “suggested an evolving understanding between the Parties
concerning their maritime boundary” (Peru v. Chile, para. 91). The Court also considered
the 1954 Agreement as it addressed violations of the maritime frontier by small fishing
vessels. Article 1 of the 1954 Agreement established a special zone “at a distance of 12
nautical miles from the coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either side of
the parallel which constitutes the maritime boundary between the two countries.” The ICJ
found that the 1954 Agreement constituted an acknowledgement by the Parties that a
maritime boundary was in existence (even though the Agreement gave no indication of
the nature or extent of that boundary). Recognizing the heavy burden of the pre-existing
implied agreement, the Court stated:

In an earlier case, the Court, recognizing that “[t]he establishment of a permanent

maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance”, underlined that “[e]vidence of a tacit
legal agreement must be compelling” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (II), p. 735, para. 253). In this case, the Court has before it an Agreement
which makes clear that the maritime boundary along a parallel already existed between
the Parties. The 1954 Agreement is decisive in this respect. That Agreement cements the
tacit agreement.The Court found that certain 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements, while
not constituting maritime boundary delimitation, proceeded on the basis that a maritime
boundary already existed extending along the parallel of latitude from Boundary Marker
No.1 (and not Punta Concordia). The Court next examined the character of the maritime
boundary that had been established by tacit agreement. Because the 1947
Proclamations and the 1952 Declaration referred to both the sea-bed and the waters
above the sea-bed, making no distinction between these two different maritime aspects.
The Court concluded that the tacitly agreed boundary was a single maritime boundary
applicable to the water column, the sea-bed and its subsoil. Turning to the extent of the
existing maritime boundary established by tacit agreement, the Court focused on the
purpose of the 1954 agreement and the practice of the parties. As the 1954 Agreement
was specifically concluded to regulate fisheries and prevent innocent and inadvertent
violations of the frontiers of each state, the Court concluded that the boundary must
extend at least to the distance where such activity was taking place at the time. The
Court noted that the fish species making up the bulk of the annual catch of the two states
in the 1950s were mostly harvested within 60 nm of the coast. On the basis of 1950s
fishing practices and the law of the sea existing at the time, the ICJ concluded that the
agreed maritime boundary did not extend beyond 80 nm from its starting-point (Point A
on sketch-map No. 4). The Court then addressed the delimitation of the boundary beyond
Point A following its three-step method it has established to help reach an equitable
delimitation. At the first step – the application of the equidistance principle – the Court
constructed a provisional equidistance line, drawing a circle with an 80 nm radius from
Point A, in order to determine the relevant base points on the Peruvian coast. This
equidistance line was extended out to 200 nm from the Chilean coast (to Point B). The
Court did not find it necessary to address the submission of Peru regarding the “outer
triangle” because it did not arise. The delimitation of the Parties’ overlapping maritime
entitlements beyond Point A was by way of an equidistance line and it did not present an
“outer triangle.” Thus, the Peruvian entitlement by virtue of the maritime boundary
extends south of Point B to Point C for approximately 22 nm following the 200 nm limit of
Chile.At the second step – the consideration of other relevant circumstances that might
alter the provisional equidistance line – the Court found that there were no relevant
circumstances calling for adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. At the third step
– proportionality analysis – the Court examined whether the result achieved was
significantly disproportionate in relation to the lengths of the relevant coasts. The Court
noted that the object of delimitation was to achieve an equitable result, not an
arithmetical equal apportionment of maritime areas. In this case, the existence of an
agreed boundary running along a parallel for 80 nm made the calculation of the relevant
coastal length and coastal areas “difficult, if not impossible” (Peru v. Chile, para. 193).
The Court, accordingly, did not calculate any sort of precise ratios of entitlement, but
instead broadly assessed the proportionality of the delimitation and concluded no
significant disproportionality existed that militated against the equitable nature of the
provisional equidistance line beyond Point A (Peru v. Chile, para. 194).

Some Thoughts about the Judgment

The peaceful resolution of this maritime boundary dispute is to be welcomed, especially

given that its origins began through hostilities and the use of force. It seems plain that the
 Court achieved (even if it was not striving for) a reasonable compromise between the
absolutist positions that had been staked out by Peru and Chile. Chile has a lateral
boundary out to 80 nm and the some of the richest fisheries in the area of overlapping
claims. Peru has an equidistant boundary from that point out to 200 nm which gives it
roughly 21,000 sq km of the disputed 38,000 sq km overlapping claims, including its
“outer triangle”. Thus, both parties are able to claim “victory” to a degree.

Importantly, however, the judgment broadly adheres to the proposition that the
delimitation of maritime boundaries represent a just and “equitable solution”. It is true that
the Court in reaching its judgment has been proactive in achieving an outcome that was
pleaded by neither party. In this regard, the Declaration of Judge Donoghue bears
attention. Because neither party convinced the Court on the law, neither party fully
briefed the Court on the delimitation actually made by the Court; either the initial 80 nm
segment settled by agreement or the area beyond Point A delimited on the basis of
equidistance. Judge Donoghue would have the Court in such circumstances consider the
need to request additional briefing or evidence from the parties and/or render an interim
decision while seeking additional submissions on the new or remaining issues. Just as
importantly, Judge Donoghue is cognizant of opportunities for judicial cross-fertilization
and calls on the Court to be open to making use of appropriate procedural approaches
and practices of other tribunals.

Significantly, the Court took detailed, hands-on approach to the practice of the parties in
the pre-exclusive economic zone era and to the assessment of the evidence in an
attempt to identify what was the outer point of the tacitly agreed boundary. The Court
relied on fisheries statistics cited by both Chile in its written statements in order to
determine which species were fished in the 1950s. The Court also utilized statements
made by Peru at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to
determine the range of such species at the time. The evidence, thus, gives the 80 nm
initial established by the Court a basis in fact, although an empirical scientific basis is
absent and six members of the Court did not reach this conclusion.
In terms of the methodology of delimitation beyond Point A employed by the Court, not
much new appears in the judgment. The delimitation follows the doctrinaire three-step
methodology repeatedly approved by the Court in what is an unexceptional geographic
setting. Whether or not the judgment finally settles the nationalist competition that has
surrounded the claims and litigation remains to be seen, with some press reports
indicating continued jingoistic reaction (e.g. César Uco and Bill Van Auken, ‘World Court
decision on Peru-Chile border fails to quell nationalist rivalries’, World Socialist Web Site,
4 Feb 2014) and others reporting cooperation on implementation between the parties
(e.g. Ryan Dube, ‘Peru, Chile Agree to ‘Gradually’ Implement Sea-Border Ruling’, Wall
Street Journal, 30 Jan 2014). Beyond the dispute between Peru and Chile, next on the
next case on the radar is Bolivia’s request to the ICJ seeking an Order that Chile grant to
Bolivia a corridor to access the Pacific Ocean; a claim that has a common genesis in the
19th Century War of the Pacific.
El Derecho Penal Internacional
10.1. El Estatuto de Roma y sus implicancias. La posición de Estados Unidos.
10.2. La Corte Penal Internacional (CPI).
The International Criminal Court (ICC or ICCt)[2] is an intergovernmental organization and
international tribunal that sits in The Hague in the Netherlands. The ICC has the jurisdiction
to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The
ICC is intended to complement existing national judicial
systems and it may therefore only exercise its jurisdiction
when certain conditions are met, such as when national
courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals or
when the United Nations Security Council or individual
states refer situations to the Court. The ICC began
functioning on 1 July 2002, the date that the Rome Statute
entered into force. The Rome Statute is a multilateral
treaty which serves as the ICC's foundational and
governing document. States which become party to the
Rome Statute, for example by ratifying it, become
member states of the ICC. Currently, there are 123 states
which are party to the Rome Statute and therefore members of the ICC.

The ICC has four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Registry. The President is the most senior judge chosen by his or her
peers in the Judicial Division, which hears cases before the Court. The Office of the
Prosecutor is headed by the Prosecutor who investigates crimes and initiates proceedings
before the Judicial Division. The Registry is headed by the Registrar and is charged with
managing all the administrative functions of the ICC, including the headquarters, detention
unit, and public defense office.

The Office of the Prosecutor has opened ten official investigations and is also conducting an
additional eleven preliminary examinations. Thus far, 39 individuals have been indicted in
the ICC, including Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir,
Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Ivorian president
Laurent Gbagbo, and DR Congo vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba.

The ICC has faced a number of criticisms from states and civil society, including objections
about its jurisdiction, accusations of bias, the fairness of its case selection and trial
procedures, and its effectiveness.
The ICC is governed by an Assembly of States Parties, which is made up of the states
which are party to the Rome Statute.[23] The Assembly elects officials of the Court, approves
its budget, and adopts amendments to the Rome Statute. The Court itself, however, is
composed of four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Registry.
The International Criminal Court at a glance
1. What is the International Criminal Court?
The International Criminal Court (“the ICC” or “the Court”) is a permanent international court
established to investigate, prosecute and try individuals accused of committing the most
serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide,
crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
2. Why was the ICC established?
Some of the most heinous crimes were committed during the conflicts which marked the
twentieth
century. Unfortunately, many of these violations of international law have remained
unpunished. The
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were established in the wake of the Second World War. In
1948, when
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted,
the United
Nations General Assembly recognised the need for a permanent international court to deal
with the
kinds of atrocities which had just been perpetrated.
The idea of a system of international criminal justice re-emerged after the end of the Cold
War.
However, while negotiations on the ICC Statute were underway at the United Nations, the
world was
witnessing the commission of heinous crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda. In response to these atrocities, the United Nations Security Council established an
ad hoc tribunal foreach of these situations. These events undoubtedly had a most significant
impact on the decision to convene the conference
which established the ICC in Rome in the summer of 1998.
3. What is the Rome Statute?
On 17 July 1998, a conference of 160 States established the first treaty-based permanent
international
criminal court. The treaty adopted during that conference is known as the Rome Statute of
the
International Criminal Court. Among other things, it sets out the crimes falling within the
jurisdiction
of the ICC, the rules of procedure and the mechanisms for States to cooperate with the ICC.
The
countries which have accepted these rules are known as States Parties and are
represented in the
Assembly of States Parties.
The Assembly of States Parties, which meets at least once a year, sets the general policies
for the
administration of the Court and reviews its activities. During those meetings, the States
Parties review the activities of the working groups established by the States and any other
issues relevant to the ICC, discuss new projects and adopt the ICC’s annual budget. 4. How
many countries have ratified the Rome Statute? Over 120 countries are States Parties to
the Rome Statute, representing all regions: Africa, the AsiaPacific, Eastern Europe, Latin
America and the Caribbean, as well as Western European and North America.

The International Criminal Court at a glance 1. What is the International Criminal Court?
The International Criminal Court (“the ICC” or “the Court”) is a permanent international court
established to investigate, prosecute and try individuals accused of committing the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. 2. Why was
the ICC established? Some of the most heinous crimes were committed during the conflicts
which marked the twentieth century. Unfortunately, many of these violations of international
law have remained unpunished. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were established in
the wake of the Second World War. In 1948, when the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted, the United Nations General Assembly
recognised the need for a permanent international court to deal with the kinds of atrocities
which had just been perpetrated. The idea of a system of international criminal justice re-
emerged after the end of the Cold War. However, while negotiations on the ICC Statute
were underway at the United Nations, the world was witnessing the commission of heinous
crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. In response to these
atrocities, the United Nations Security Council established an ad hoc tribunal for each of
these situations. These events undoubtedly had a most significant impact on the decision to
convene the conference which established the ICC in Rome in the summer of 1998. 3. What
is the Rome Statute? On 17 July 1998, a conference of 160 States established the first
treaty-based permanent international criminal court. The treaty adopted during that
conference is known as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Among other
things, it sets out the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the rules of procedure
and the mechanisms for States to cooperate with the ICC. The countries which have
accepted these rules are known as States Parties and are represented in the Assembly of
States Parties. The Assembly of States Parties, which meets at least once a year, sets the
general policies for the administration of the Court and reviews its activities. During those
meetings, the States Parties review the activities of the working groups established by the
States and any other issues relevant to the ICC, discuss new projects and adopt the ICC’s
annual budget. 4. How many countries have ratified the Rome Statute? Over 120 countries
are States Parties to the Rome Statute, representing all regions: Africa, the AsiaPacific,
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Western European and North
America.
5. Where is the seat of the Court? The seat of the Court is in The Hague in the
Netherlands. The Rome Statute provides that the Court may sit elsewhere whenever the
judges consider it desirable. The Court has also set up offices in the areas where it is
conducting investigations. 6. How is the Court funded? The Court is funded by contributions
from the States Parties and by voluntary contributions from governments, international
organisations, individuals, corporations and other entities. 7. How does the ICC differ from
other courts? The ICC is a permanent autonomous court, whereas the ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as other similar courts established within the
framework of the United Nations to deal with specific situations only have a limited mandate
and jurisdiction. The ICC, which tries individuals, is also different from the International
Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations for the settlement
of disputes between States. The ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the
International Court of Justice also have their seats in The Hague. 8. Is the ICC an office or
agency of the United Nations? No. The ICC is an independent body whose mission is to try
individuals for crimes within its jurisdiction without the need for a special mandate from the
United Nations. On 4 October 2004, the ICC and the United Nations signed an agreement
governing their institutional relationship. 9. Is the ICC meant to replace national courts? No.
The ICC does not replace national criminal justice systems; rather, it complements them. It
can investigate and, where warranted, prosecute and try individuals only if the State
concerned does not, cannot or is unwilling genuinely to do so. This might occur where
proceedings are unduly delayed or are intended to shield individuals from their criminal
responsibility. This is known as the principle of complementarity, under which priority is
given to national systems. States retain primary responsibility for trying the perpetrators of
the most serious of crimes. 10. Under what conditions does the ICC exercise its jurisdiction?
When a State becomes a party to the Rome Statute, it agrees to submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the crimes enumerated in the Statute. The Court may
exercise its jurisdiction in situations where the alleged perpetrator is a national of a State
Party or where the crime was committed in the territory of a State Party. Also, a State not
party to the Statute may decide to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. These conditions do
not apply when the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, refers a situation to the Office of the prosecutor.

Structure of the ICC The ICC is composed of four organs: the Presidency, the Chambers,
the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. Each of these organs has a specific role and
mandate. 17. What does the Presidency do? The Presidency consists of three judges (the
President and two Vice-Presidents) elected by an absolute majority of the 18 judges of the
Court for a maximum of two, three-year terms. The Presidency is responsible for the
administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor. It represents
the Court to the outside world and helps with the organisation of the work of the judges. The
Presidency is also responsible for carrying out other tasks, such as ensuring the
enforcement of sentences imposed by the Court. 18. What do the Chambers do? The 18
judges, including the three judges of the Presidency, are assigned to the Court’s three
judicial divisions: the Pre-Trial Division (composed of seven judges), the Trial Division
(composed of six judges), and the Appeals Division (composed of five judges). They are
assigned to the following Chambers: the Pre-Trial Chambers (each composed of one or
three judges), the Trial Chambers (each composed of three judges) and the Appeals
Chamber (composed of the five judges of the Appeals Division). The roles and
responsibilities of the judges are outlined below, by category of Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals
Chambers. 19. How are the judges elected? The judges are persons of high moral
character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their
respective States for appointment to the highest judicial offices. All have extensive
experience relevant to the Court’s judicial activity. The judges are elected by the A ssembly
of States Parties on the basis of their established competence in criminal law and procedure
and in relevant areas of international law such as international humanitarian law and the law
of human rights. They have extensive expertise on specific issues, such as violence against
women or children. The election of the judges takes into account the need for the
representation of the principal legal systems of the world, a fair representation of men and
women, and equitable geographical distribution. The judges ensure the fairness of
proceedings and the proper administration of justice What is the role of the Pre-Trial
Chambers? The Pre-Trial Chambers, each of which is composed of either one or three
judges, resolve all issues which arise before the trial phase begins. Their role is essentially
to supervise how the Office of the Prosecutor carries out its investigatory and prosecutorial
activities, to guarantee the rights of suspects, victims and witnesses during the investigatory
phase, and to ensure the integrity of the proceedings. The Pre-Trial Chambers then decide
whether or not to issue warrants of arrest or summons to appear at the Office of the
Prosecutor’s request and whether or not to confirm the charges against a person suspected
of a crime. They may also decide on the admissibility of situations and cases and on the
participation of victims at the pre-trial stage. 21. What is the role of the Trial Chambers?
Once an arrest warrant is issued, the alleged perpetrator arrested and the charges
confirmed by a PreTrial Chamber, the Presidency constitutes a Trial Chamber composed of
three judges to try the case. A Trial Chamber’s primary function is to ensure that trials are
fair and expeditious and are conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and
due regard for the protection of the victims and the witnesses. It also rules on the
participation of victims at the trial stage. The Trial Chamber determines whether an accused
is innocent or guilty of the charges and, if he or she is found guilty, may impose a sentence
of imprisonment for a specified number of years not exceeding a maximum of thirty years or
life imprisonment. Financial penalties may also be imposed. A Trial Chamber may thus
order a convicted person to make reparations for the harm suffered by the victims, including
compensation, restitution or rehabilitation. 22. What are the main functions of the Appeals
Chamber? The Appeals Chamber is composed of the President of the Court and four other
judges. All parties to the trial may appeal or seek leave to appeal decisions of the Pre-Trial
and Trial Chambers. The Appeals Chamber may uphold, reverse or amend the decision
appealed from, including judgments and sentencing decisions, and may even order a new
trial before a different Trial Chamber. It may also revise a final judgment of conviction or
sentence. 23. What does the Office of the Prosecutor do? The Office of the Prosecutor is an
independent organ of the Court. Its mandate is to receive and analyse information on
situations or alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, to analyse situations referred
to it in order to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate an investigation into
a crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or the crime of aggression, and to
bring the perpetrators of these crimes before the Court. In order to fulfil its mandate, the
Office of the Prosecutor is composed of three divisions: (i) the Investigation Division, which
is responsible for conducting investigations (including gathering and examining evidence,
questioning persons under investigation as well as victims and witnesses).
Which crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC? The mandate of the Court is to try
individuals (rather than States), and to hold such persons accountable for the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression, when the conditions for
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over the latter are fulfilled.
What is genocide? According to the Rome Statute, “genocide” means any of the following
acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group: • killing members of the group; • causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; • deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; • imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; • forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
What are crimes against humanity? “Crimes against humanity” include any of the following
acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack: • murder; • extermination; • enslavement; •
deportation or forcible transfer of population; • imprisonment; • torture; • rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity; • persecution against an identifiable group on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds; • enforced
disappearance of persons; • the crime of apartheid; • other inhumane acts o f a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering or serious bodily or mental injury.
What are war crimes? “War crimes” include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict
and in conflicts “not of an international character” listed in the Rome Statute, when they are
committed as part of a plan or policy or on a large scale. These prohibited acts include: •
murder; • mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; • taking of hostages; • intentionally
directing attacks against the civilian population; • intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historical
monuments or hospitals; • pillaging; • rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy or any other
form of sexual violence; • conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 29. What is a
crime of aggression? As adopted by the Assembly of States Parties during the Review
Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala (Uganda) between 31 May and 11 June
2010, a “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an
act of using armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State. The act of aggression includes, among other things,
invasion, military occupation, and annexation by the use of force, blockade of the ports or
coasts, if it is considered being, by its character, gravity and scale, a manifest violation of
the Charter of the United Nations. The perpetrator of the act of aggression is a person who
is in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of
a State. 30. When will the Court have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression? The Court
may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, subject to a decision to be taken
after 1 January 2017 by a two-thirds majority of State s Parties and subject to the ratification
of the amendment concerning this crime by at least 30 States Parties.
The Court is composed of four (4) organs, two (2) semi-autonomous offices and the Victim
Fund (TFV). The organs are: Presidency, Judicial Divisions, Office of the Prosecutor and
Registry.
• President: Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, (Nigeria).
• First Vice President: Judge Robert Fremr, (Czech Republic).
• Second Vice President: Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, (France).
• 18 judges organized within the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division and the Appeals
Division.
• Prosecutor: Fatou Bensouda, (Gambia).
• Deputy District Attorney James Stewart (Canada),
• Secretary: Peter Lewis, (Great Britain).
The semi-autonomous offices are the Office of the Public Lawyer for Victims and the Office
of the Public Lawyer for Defense.
The operation of the Court is governed by a series of norms and principles that transform it
into a special court, only to know really particular cases. The applicable principles are:
• Complementarity: the Court works only when a country does not judge or can not judge
the facts of the court's jurisdiction.
• Nullum crime sine lege: the crime must be defined at the time of the commission and that
is the competence of the Court.
• Nulla poena sine lege: a person convicted by the Court can only be punished as ordered
by the Statute.
• Non-retroactivity ratione personae: no one can be prosecuted by the Court for acts or
crimes committed prior to its entry into force.
• Individual criminal liability: legal persons will not be subject to the punitive claim, except as
an aggravating act due to unlawful association.
• The Court is not competent to try those who were under 18 at the time of commission of
the alleged crime.
• Inadmissibility of official position: all are equal before the Court, even if the accused is, for
example, head of State.
• Responsibility for the position.
• Non-applicability.
• Responsibility for compliance with the charge: it is not exempt from criminal liability.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (often referred to as the International
Criminal Court Statute or the Rome Statute) is the treaty that established the International
Criminal Court (ICC).[5] It was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on 17 July
1998[6][7] and it entered into force on 1 July 2002.[2] As of October 2017, 123 states are
party to the statute.[2] Among other things, the statute establishes the court's functions,
jurisdiction and structure.

The Rome Statute established four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Those crimes "shall not be subject to
any statute of limitations".[8] Under the Rome Statute, the ICC can only investigate and
prosecute the four core international crimes in situations where states are "unable" or
"unwilling" to do so themselves; the jurisdiction of the court is complementary to jurisdictions
of domestic courts. The court has jurisdiction over crimes only if they are committed in the
territory of a state party or if they are committed by a national of a state party; an exception
to this rule is that the ICC may also have jurisdiction over crimes if its jurisdiction is
authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

The issue with the United States

On September 11, President Trump's National Security Adviser issued a harsh rebuke
against the ICC: "We will not cooperate with the ICC. We will not assist you. We will not join
her. We will let her die alone. After all, the ICC is already dead to us. " And now Trump
himself, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, said: "We will never relinquish US
sovereignty to a bureaucracy that is not accountable or has been elected by anyone. We
reject the ideology of the global and embrace the doctrine of patriotism. "

The United States was very active in the activities for the creation of the Court, appointed
David J. Scheffer as chief of mission and was one of those who put more effort into that
project, and thus worked in the International Law Commission (1994) and then in the
Preparatory Committee that was created in 1995 by the General Assembly to complete the
Rome Statute project, which finally and with its signature was approved on July 17, 1998,
the date of birth of the ICC, which then signed The Secretary of State withdrew by letter on
May 6, 2002, in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, due to
the diatribe that occurred in the United States about the risk of being prosecuted for carrying
out activities abroad in the United States. defense of democracy and freedom as the first
military, economic and political power in the world.

American exceptionalism

A thesis that has been called "American exceptionalism" emerged from the internal debates
that took place in North America. It consists in affirming that, being the United States the
nation where, like no other, it governs the respect of the law, and that it is indissolubly
committed to freedom and democracy, it could be prosecuted outside its own jurisdiction,
precisely for going to other parts of the world. in defense of such values where they were
attacked. The transfer of US sovereignty in favor of the ICC was understood as an act of
weakening and serious risk to its own national security, and that its vocation to help other
peoples who were subject to serious deterioration of the democratic system would be
greatly hindered. This is how in his recent appearance before the UN, in addition to Trump's
harsh speech at the UN, on September 11, his National Security Advisor John Bolton said
that they could apply sanctions to the judges and the ICC prosecutor, as prohibit them from
entering their territory, prosecute them through their courts, confiscate property and others.

11. El derecho internacional del medio ambiente

11.1. Regulaciones internacionales sobre el cambio climático. Estructura multilateral de
Naciones Unidas sobre cambio climático y el medio ambiente.
International environmental law is a body of international law concerned with protecting the
environment, primarily through bilateral and multilateral international agreements.
International environmental law developed as a subset of international law in the mid-
twentieth century. Although conservation movements developed in many nations in the
nineteenth century, these movements typically only addressed environmental concerns
within a single nation. A growing body of environmental scientific evidence from the 1950s
and 1960s, however, illustrated global environmental stresses, along with the need for a
multinational solution to environmental issues. Scientific research established that air and
water pollution, overfishing, and other environmental issues often have effects that reach far
beyond the borders of any particular nation. By the late-1960s, the international community
realized that an international approach to environmental issues was required.
The history of the EIS can be divided into three stages, separated by two of the most
important international conferences held so far: the Stockholm Conference (1972) and the
Earth Summit of Rio de Janeiro (1992).
I. Sovereignty and Responsibility 2
II. Principles of good neighborliness and international cooperation 5
III. Principle of Preventive Action 7
IV. Precautionary principle 9
V. Obligation to compensate for damages 10
SAW. Principle of common but differentiated responsibility 13
VII. Principle of sustainable development 14
to. Intergenerational Equity 14
b. Sustainable use of natural resources 14
c. Integration of environment and development
Principles
Environmental law has developed in response to emerging awareness of and concern over
issues impacting the entire world. While laws have developed piecemeal and for a variety of
reasons, some effort has gone into identifying key concepts and guiding principles common
to environmental law as a whole.[7] The principles discussed below are not an exhaustive
list and are not universally recognized or accepted. Nonetheless, they represent important
principles for the understanding of environmental law around the world.

Sustainable development
Main article: Sustainable development
Defined by the United Nations Environment Programme as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs," sustainable development may be considered together with the concepts of
"integration" (development cannot be considered in isolation from sustainability) and
"interdependence" (social and economic development, and environmental protection, are
interdependent).[8] Laws mandating environmental impact assessment and requiring or
encouraging development to minimize environmental impacts may be assessed against this
principle.
The modern concept of sustainable development was a topic of discussion at the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference), and the
driving force behind the 1983 World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED, or Bruntland Commission). In 1992, the first UN Earth Summit resulted in the Rio
Declaration, Principle 3 of which reads: "The right to development must be fulfilled so as to
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations."
Sustainable development has been a core concept of international environmental
discussion ever since, including at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Earth
Summit 2002), and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Earth
Summit 2012, or Rio+20).

Equity
Further information: Intergenerational equity
Defined by UNEP to include intergenerational equity - "the right of future generations to
enjoy a fair level of the common patrimony" - and intragenerational equity - "the right of all
people within the current generation to fair access to the current generation's entitlement to
the Earth's natural resources" - environmental equity considers the present generation
under an obligation to account for long-term impacts of activities, and to act to sustain the
global environment and resource base for future generations.[9] Pollution control and
resource management laws may be assessed against this principle.

Transboundary responsibility
Defined in the international law context as an obligation to protect one's own environment,
and to prevent damage to neighboring environments, UNEP considers transboundary
responsibility at the international level as a potential limitation on the rights of the sovereign
state.[10] Laws that act to limit externalities imposed upon human health and the
environment may be assessed against this principle.

Public participation and transparency

Identified as essential conditions for "accountable governments,... industrial concerns," and
organizations generally, public participation and transparency are presented by UNEP as
requiring "effective protection of the human right to hold and express opinions and to seek,
receive and impart ideas,... a right of access to appropriate, comprehensible and timely
information held by governments and industrial concerns on economic and social policies
regarding the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment,
without imposing undue financial burdens upon the applicants and with adequate protection
of privacy and business confidentiality," and "effective judicial and administrative
proceedings." These principles are present in environmental impact assessment, laws
requiring publication and access to relevant environmental data, and administrative
procedure.
Precautionary principle
Main article: Precautionary principle
One of the most commonly encountered and controversial principles of environmental law,
the Rio Declaration formulated the precautionary principle as follows:

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The principle may play a role in any debate over the need for environmental regulation.

Prevention
The concept of prevention . . . can perhaps better be considered an overarching aim that
gives rise to a multitude of legal mechanisms, including prior assessment of environmental
harm, licensing or authorization that set out the conditions for operation and the
consequences for violation of the conditions, as well as the adoption of strategies and
policies. Emission limits and other product or process standards, the use of best available
techniques and similar techniques can all be seen as applications of the concept of
prevention.[11]
Polluter pays principle
Main article: Polluter pays principle
The polluter pays principle stands for the idea that "the environmental costs of economic
activities, including the cost of preventing potential harm, should be internalized rather than
imposed upon society at large."[12] All issues related to responsibility for cost for
environmental remediation and compliance with pollution control regulations involve this
principle.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main
international agreement on climate action. It was one of the three conventions adopted at
the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992. To date it has been ratified by 195 countries. It was
initiated as a means of collaboration between countries to limit the increase in global
temperature and climate change and cope with its consequences.

The Council addresses two issues related to the UNFCCC:

the ratification of the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, regarding the commitments of
the second period, which runs from 2013 to 2020
the Paris Agreement (a new global agreement on climate change that includes all countries
of the UNFCCC), its ratification, implementation and entry into force in 2020.
1. Kyoto Protocol
In the mid-1990s, signatories of the UNFCCC realized that stricter rules were needed to
reduce emissions. In 1997, they approved the Kyoto Protocol, which introduced legally
binding emission reduction targets for developed countries.

The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol began on January 1, 2013 and will
end in 2020. It includes 38 developed countries, including the EU and its 28 member states.
The Doha amendment applies to this second period, according to which participating
countries have committed themselves to reducing emissions by at least 18% compared to
1990 levels. The EU is committed to reducing emissions in this period by 20% below 1990
levels.

The main shortcoming of the Kyoto Protocol is that it only requires developed countries to
act. Since the United States did not sign the Kyoto Protocol, Canada withdrew before the
end of the first commitment period and Russia, Japan and New Zealand do not participate
in the second commitment period, now it only applies to approximately 14% of global
emissions. However, more than 70 developed and developing countries have undertaken
several non-binding commitments to reduce or limit their greenhouse gas emissions. On
July 13, 2015, the Council adopted the decision that allowed the EU to ratify the amendment
of Doha by which the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is established.
2. Paris Agreement
The Paris Conference on Climate Change was held from November 30 to December 11,
2015.
On December 12, the parties reached a new global agreement on climate change. The
agreement presents a balanced result with an action plan to limit global warming «well
below» 2 ° C.
The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, after ratification conditions
were met by at least 55 countries representing at least 55% of global greenhouse gas
emissions. All the countries of the EU have ratified the Agreement.
Work on the instruments of implementation of the Paris Agreement will continue at the
COP23 Conference, to be held in November in Bonn
Key MEAs relevant to trade • Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)—1973 • Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer— 1985 – Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric Ozone
Layer—1987 • Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal—1992
• Convention on Biological Diversity—1992 – Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety—2000 •
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—1992 – Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—1997 •
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (PIC)—1998 • Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)—2001 (Dates refer to the completion of negotiations.
All treaties listed have entered into force.)

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. The earliest of the key
MEAs, CITES was drawn up in 1973 and entered into force two years later. CITES seeks to
regulate trade in certain species and their parts, as well as products made from such
species. Three annexes list species identified by the Conference of Parties (on scientific
advice) as requiring various degrees of trade restrictions to ensure their sustainability.
These restrictions range from a general prohibition on commercial trade to a partial
licensing system. CITES has long been known for the unusually active participation of non-
governmental organizations—scientific and advocacy organizations in particular—in its
deliberations. In recent years it has begun—not without controversy—to address species
traded in such volumes as to have a significant economic value, such as certain tree and
fish species. (169 parties). The Vienna Convention for Protection of the Stratosphere, and
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric Ozone Layer. The
Vienna Convention was concluded in 1985, at which time ozone depletion was suspected
but not yet confirmed. It provided for research and cooperation to better understand the
issue, and formed a framework agreement under which specific protocols could be
negotiated as needed. The evidence soon became stronger, and in 1987 the Parties drafted
the Montreal Protocol, establishing a regime of control for several classes of industrial
chemicals now known to harm the stratospheric ozone layer. The Protocol has been
amended four times to tighten controls. The result has been a ban on the production and
use of several industrial chemicals, together with severe limitations on others. It has
successfully implemented a precautionary approach, by acting before the availability of
clear scientific evidence, and that of common and differentiated responsibility, by
establishing a fund to assist developing countries in their transition away from the use of
controlled substances. Its principal implementation tool—apart from continuing public
pressure—is the control of production and trade of ozone-depleting substances and trade in
products containing controlled substances. It included the possibility of imposing controls on
trade in products produced with (but not containing) controlled substances, but the parties
have not considered it necessary to implement such controls. (Vienna Convention: 190
parties; Montreal Protocol: 189 parties). The Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. The Basel Convention
resulted from the concern of developing countries, particularly in Africa, that they could
become the dumping ground for hazardous wastes whose disposal in the developed world
had become difficult and expensive. Developing countries and non-governmental
organizations have played a significant role in the regime since its inception. Discussions
within the regime have been marked by disputes over the most appropriate strategy for
controlling the movement of hazardous waste (regional bans versus prior informed consent)
and the technical difficulty in establishing unambiguous distinctions between wastes and
materials for recycling. Parties have adopted an amendment banning the export of
hazardous waste from mainly OECD to non-OECD countries (the Basel Ban) and a protocol
on liability and compensation, both of which have yet to enter into force even though
numerous countries currently adhere to them. (166 parties, 3 signatories not ratified).
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Opened for
signature at the Rio Conference, the Convention’s objecive is conserving biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. The Convention has resulted in national
biodiversity strategies and action plans in over 100 countries, and has produced the
landmark Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, discussed below. It also plays a major role in
highlighting the importance of biodiversity issues globally, through research and public
education. Linkages connecting the CBD, agriculture and the WTO TRIPS Agreement are
discussed in Section 5.6.1. (188 parties, 1 signatory not ratified). Cartagena is a Protocol to
the CBD, covering trade in most forms of living genetically modified organisms (LMOs) and
the risks it may present to biodiversity. It creates an advanced informed agreement system
for LMOs destined to be introduced to the environment (such as micro-organisms and
seeds), and a less complex system for monitoring those destined for use as food, animal
feed or processing. It sets out a procedure for countries to decide whether to restrict imports
of LMOs, spelling out, for example, the type of risk assessment that must be carried out. In
allowing such decisions to be taken even where the risks are unknown, the Cartagena
Protocol operationalizes the precautionary approach. (125 parties, 22 signatories not
ratified). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.
The UNFCCC, adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992, is grappling with one of the most
complex of all environmental issues, and the one with greatest potential for economic
impacts: it aims to stabilize the emission of various greenhouse gases (such as carbon-
dioxide or methane) that contribute to global climate change. Since such emissions can
rarely be limited with technical, “end-ofpipe” technologies, the principal strategy of the
UNFCCC must be to change the patterns of future production, consumption and investment
in favour of activities that emit fewer greenhouse gases. In December 1997 the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted, entering into force in February 2005. It created two categories of
countries—those with greenhouse gas limitation commitments (industrialized countries) and
those without. Although neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol includes trade-related
provisions, it is highly likely that the parties, in fulfilling their Kyoto obligations, will adopt
domestic policies and measures with significant trade implications. (UNFCCC: 189 parties,
Kyoto Protocol: 155 parties). Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade. The
Rotterdam Convention is designed to help countries monitor and control trade in certain
hazardous chemicals. Many domestically banned or severely limited goods are traded
internationally. For years there was controversy over the procedures to ensure that the
appropriate authorities in the importing country were informed promptly. Indeed, a GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—the predecessor to the WTO) working group
devoted several years of negotiation to this topic, without achieving a generally acceptable
result. UNEP (concerned with the management of potentially toxic substances) and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (concerned with pesticide use) had a strong interest in
developing a uniform system of notification. The PIC regime offers assurance that
information will be provided quickly, and that it will reach the appropriate authorities when
needed. And it creates a system that allows developing countries to stop the import of
certain substances if they feel a need to do so. (98 parties, 17 signatories not ratified).
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS). The POPS Convention
entered into force in May 2004. It establishes an international regime for the control of
certain substances that persist in the environment and can accumulate in the food chain, all
of which are suspected of disrupting hormonal functions in animals and humans (such
chemicals are known as endocrine disruptors). The controlled substances are listed in three
annexes: one that envisages elimination of nine chemicals or classes of chemicals (subject
to time limited exceptions), one that imposes restrictions on DDT, and one that deals with
the unintentional production of certain chemicals. The POPS Convention also establishes a
procedure for adding to these annexes. (108 parties, 68 signatories not ratified). Emerging
Regimes. Several other international environmental regimes are still being negotiated, or
which are likely to remain based on a less formal understanding between the interested
parties. The international forest regime remains controversial and is not fully articulated;
most observers doubt that it will coalesce into a multilateral agreement in the near future.
There is, however, a viable private regime for forestry, the result of collaboration between
producers and environmental non-governmental organizations on labelling for sustainable
practices. We may yet see a similar private regime for sustainable fisheries develop. These
regimes are highly relevant for trade, since they involve widely traded commodities.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an

international environmental treaty adopted on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992. It then entered into force on 21
March 1994, after a sufficient number of countries had ratified it. The UNFCCC objective is
to "stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".[3] The framework sets non
binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and contains no
enforcement mechanisms. Instead, the framework outlines how specific international
treaties (called "protocols" or "Agreements") may be negotiated to specify further action
towards the objective of the UNFCCC

Initially, an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) produced the text of the

Framework Convention during its meeting in New York from 30 April to 9 May 1992. The
UNFCCC was adopted on 9 May 1992, and opened for signature on 4 June 1992.[4] The
 UNFCCC has 197 parties as of December 2015. The convention enjoys broad legitimacy,
largely due to its nearly universal membership.[5]

The parties to the convention have met annually from 1995 in Conferences of the Parties
(COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was
concluded and established legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2008–2012.[6] The 2010 United Nations
Climate Change Conference produced an agreement stating that future global warming
should be limited to below 2.0 °C (3.6 °F) relative to the pre-industrial level.[7] The Protocol
was amended in 2012 to encompass the period 2013–2020 in the Doha Amendment, which
as of December 2015 had not entered into force. In 2015 the Paris Agreement was adopted,
governing emission reductions from 2020 on through commitments of countries in Nationally
Determined Contributions, lowering the target to 1.5 °C. The Paris Agreement entered into
force on 4 November 2016.

One of the first tasks set by the UNFCCC was for signatory nations to establish national
greenhouse gas inventories of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals, which were
used to create the 1990 benchmark levels for accession of Annex I countries to the Kyoto
Protocol and for the commitment of those countries to GHG reductions. Updated inventories
must be submitted annually by Annex I countries.

"UNFCCC" is also the name of the United Nations Secretariat charged with supporting the
operation of the Convention, with offices in Haus Carstanjen, and the UN Campus (known
as Langer Eugen) in Bonn, Germany. From 2010 to 2016 the head of the secretariat was
Christiana Figueres. In July 2016, Patricia Espinosa succeeded Figueres. The Secretariat,
augmented through the parallel efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), aims to gain consensus through meetings and the discussion of various strategies.

12. El derecho internacional de las energías renovables

12.1. Estudio de la estructura de la Agencia Internacional de las Energías Renovables y sus
implicancias. T
he International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is an intergovernmental organization to
promote adoption and sustainable use of renewable energy. It was founded in 2009 and its
statute entered into force on 8 July 2010. The agency is headquartered in Abu Dhabi.[1] The
Director-General of IRENA is Adnan Amin, a national of Kenya. [2] IRENA is an official United
Nations observer.

The Agency is based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE); it is a universal
international organization open to all members of the United Nations and to international
economic integration organizations16. Currently, IRENA has 147 members the Assembly is
the supreme organ of the Agency21 and is composed of representatives of all the Member
States22. Except decision to the contrary, holds regular sessions at the headquarters of
IRENA once a year23. The Council is the second most important body and is composed of
twenty-one Representatives of the Member States elected on a rotating basis by the
Assembly. In two years German diplomacy achieved something that in thirty years had not
been achieved within the framework of the United Nations. Two preparatory conferences,
carried out in 2008, one in Germany and one in Spain, were enough for the Agency to be
established on January 29, 2009 at the founding conference in Bonn, in which
representatives from more than 120 countries. The mission of the Agency is the promotion
and generalized and reinforced implementation of all forms of renewable energy and its
sustainable use. As regards the institutional structure, the Assembly is the supreme organ
of the Agency and is composed of representatives of all the Member States. Unless
otherwise decided, it holds regular sessions at the IRENA headquarters once a year. The
Council is the second most important body and is composed of twenty-one representatives
of the member states elected on a rotating basis by the Assembly for a period of two years.
In the election of the members of the Council should be guarantee the effective participation
of developed and developing countries, and a fair and equitable geographical distribution.
The Council is convened every six months and meets, unless otherwise agreed, at the
headquarters of the Agency. In addition, it has the Secretariat, composed of the general
director, as the governing body and administrative director, and by the personnel that is
necessary. The appointment of the Director General is made by the Assembly, on the
recommendation of the Board, for periods of four years, which may be extended once. The
Center for Innovation and Technology (CIT) is also part of the institutional structure,
although it is not one of its organs. The CIT was established in Bonn as a consolation prize
to Germany because it had not been granted the headquarters of the Agency. The CIT was
inaugurated in October 2011 and is presented as a center of excellence in innovation and
technology on renewable energies, with a practical approach. One of its main objectives is
to facilitate access to information related to patents on renewable energies, of which it is
estimated that there are about 215,000. In addition, it prepares studies on costs and
efficiency of renewable energies, and on the viability of technology transfer. The first group
of activities of the Agency is to analyze, monitor and systematize current practices in
renewable energy A second group of activities refers to the interaction with other
international and non-governmental organizations, as well as with public networks active in
the field of renewable energies A third category of activities of the IRENA is the provision of
advisory services and support on energy policy to members who request them, including
advice on financing renewable energies Another group of activities of the IRENA is to
improve the mechanisms of knowledge and technology transfer, as well as the promotion of
the development of capacities and competences in the Member States.Main initiatives and
projects of the Agency The evaluation of the potential for the deployment of renewable
energies: the Agency has carried out complete individual studies of the conditions for the
deployment of renewable energies in more than eighteen African countries. The role of the
confluence node for renewable energies In 2011, the Secretary General of the United
Nations launched the initiative Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL), which aims to achieve
three goals by the year 2030: a) generate access to energy for all; b) double the ratio of
energy efficiency; and c) duplicate the contribution of renewable energies to global sources
of energy. The Portal of Knowledge on Renewable Energies whose objective is to allow free
access through Internet to a wide range of information, current and easily locatable, about
renewable energies such as market statistics, potential resources, opportunities 2.4.
Initiatives to promote investment and economic growth.
In 2009, the Secretary General of the United Nations told the General Assembly that climate
change is the greatest challenge facing humanity. He also said that, in order to avoid
catastrophic consequences for people and the planet, the international community had less
than ten years to stop the increase in greenhouse gas emissions. That was seven years
ago, but, far from stop, emissions continue to increase globally. Indeed, despite the
magnitude of this challenge, the responses of the international community continue to wait.
IRENA, despite being a very small international organization, has a great potential to make
a significant contribution to the transition towards sustainable energy Its approach, based on
 transmitting reliable, neutral, free and universal information about existing, not future,
options for the deployment of
Various forms of renewable energy, is a very effective and smart way to motivate
investments and national and regional policies. IRENA does not waste energy in sterile
debates that try to justify the commitment to renewable energies. On the contrary, it takes
advantage of the natural functioning of private initiative, always willing to engage in
profitable activities. IRENA's approach to an international system, which is difficult to
construct, is also particularly appropriate.
solidarity between states and in which the selfish interests of some of them base many of
their decisions. Its design, its approach and the context in which it must operate indicate
that IRENA is a success of institutional innovation. Its role as a catalyst for the deployment
of renewable energies makes IRENA an indispensable element of the global governance of
energies. Therefore, it is advisable that the academic sector and also the public recognize
their role
as a relevant element in the face of the energy challenges of the 21st century

13. El derecho internacional humanitario y de los refugiados

13.1. Estudios del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR) y
sus implicancias.

ECONOMÍA Y COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL

1. Introducción a la economía
1.1 Definición
What is Economics in General? Economics is the study of _________. •
Economics is the science of scarcity.
• Scarcity is the condition in which our wants are greater than our limited resources.
• Since we are unable to have everything we desire, we must make choices on how we will
use our resources.
• In economics we will study the choices of individuals, firms, and govern
Economics -Social science concerned with the efficient use of limited resources to achieve
maximum satisfaction of economic wants. (Study of how individuals and societies deal with
________)

MICROeconomics - Study of small economic units such as individuals, firms, and industries
(competitive markets, labor markets, personal decision making, etc.)

MACROeconomics - Study of the large economy as a whole or in its basic subdivisions

(National Economic Growth, Government Spending, Inflation, Unemployment, etc.)

Positive vs. Normative Positive Statements- Based on facts. Avoids value

judgements (what is). Normative Statements- Includes value judgements (what
ought to be).

Society’s wants are unlimited, but ALL resources are limited (scarcity). 2. Due to scarcity,
choices must be made. Every choice has a cost (a trade-off). 3. Everyone’s goal is to make
choices that maximize their satisfaction. Everyone acts in their own “selfinterest.” 4.
Everyone acts rationally by comparing the marginal costs and marginal benefits of every
choice 5. Real-life situations can be explained and analyzed through simplified models and
graphs.
Trade-offs ALL decisions involve trade-offs. The most desirable alternative given up as a
result of a decision is known as opportunity cost. Trade-offs are all the alternatives that we
give up whenever we choose one course of action over others.

A production–possibility frontier (PPF) or production possibility curve (PPC) is a curve

which shows various combinations of set of two goods which can be produced with the
given resources and technology where the given resources are fully and efficiently utilized
per unit time. One good can only be produced by diverting resources from other goods, and
so by producing less of them. This tradeoff is usually considered for an economy, but also
applies to each individual, household, and economic organization.
Graphically bounding the production set for fixed input quantities, the PPF curve shows the
maximum possible production level of one commodity for any given production level of the
other, given the existing state of technology. By doing so, it defines productive efficiency in
the context of that production set: a point on the frontier indicates efficient use of the
available inputs (such as points B, D and C in the graph), a point beneath the curve (such
as A) indicates inefficiency, and a point beyond the curve (such as X) indicates impossibility.

An example PPF with illustrative points marked

PPFs are normally drawn as bulging upwards or outwards from the origin ("concave" when
viewed from the origin), but they can be represented as bulging downward (inwards) or
linear (straight), depending on a number of assumptions. A PPF illustrates several
 economic concepts, such as scarcity of resources (the fundamental economic problem that
all societies face), opportunity cost (or marginal rate of transformation), productive
efficiency, allocative efficiency, and economies of scale.
An outward shift of the PPC results from growth of the availability of inputs, such as physical
capital or labour, or from technological progressin knowledge of how to transform inputs into
outputs. Such a shift reflects, for instance, economic growth of an economy already
operating at its full productivity (on the PPF), which means that more of bothoutputs can
now be produced during the specified period of time without sacrificing the output of either
good. Conversely, the PPF will shift inward if the labor force shrinks, the supply of raw
materials is depleted, or a natural disaster decreases the stock of physical capital.
However, most economic contractions reflect not that less can be produced but that the
economy has started operating below the frontier, as typically, both labor and physical
capital are underemployed, remaining therefore idle.
Key Assumptions
Only two goods can be produced
• Full employment of resources
• Fixed Resources (Ceteris Paribus )

• Fixed Technology

2. Fundamentos de la teoría microeconómica

2.1 Teoría del consumidor. Teoría de la demanda y factores que la determinan

The theory of consumer and choice is the branch of microeconomics that

relates preferences to consumption expenditures and to consumer demand curves. It
analyzes how consumers maximize the desirability of their consumption as measured by
their preferences subject to limitations on their expenditures, by maximizing utility subject to
a consumer budget constraint.[1]
Consumption is separated from production, logically, because two different economic
agents are involved. In the first case consumption is by the primary individual; in the second
case, a producer might make something that he would not consume himself. Therefore,
different motivations and abilities are involved. The models that make up consumer theory
are used to representprospectively observable demand patterns for an individual buyer on
the hypothesis of constrained optimization. Prominent variables used to explain the rate at
which the good is purchased (demanded) are the price per unit of that good, prices of
related goods, and wealth of the consumer.
The law of demand states that the rate of consumption falls as the price of the good rises,
even when the consumer is monetarily compensated for the effect of the higher price; this is
called the substitution effect. As the price of a good rises, consumers will substitute away
from that good, choosing more of other alternatives. If no compensation for the price rise
occurs, as is usual, then the decline in overall purchasing power due to the price rise leads,
for most goods, to a further decline in the quantity demanded; this is called the  income
effect.
In addition, as the wealth of the individual rises, demand for most products increases,
shifting the demand curve higher at all possible prices.
 The basic problem of consumer theory takes the following inputs:

 The consumption set C – the set of all bundles that the consumer could
conceivably consume.
 A preference relation over the bundles of C. This preference relation can be
described as an ordinal utilityfunction, describing the utility that the consumer derives from
each bundle.
 A price system, which is a function assigning a price to each bundle.
 An initial endowment, which is a bundle from C that the consumer initially
holds. The consumer can sell all or some of his initial bundle in the given prices, and can
buy another bundle in the given prices. He has to decide which bundle to buy, under the
given prices and budget, in order to maximize his utility.

2.2 Elasticidad precio demanda, técnicas de medición.

2.3 Teoría de la producción. Función de producción, nociones de corto y largo
plazo.
2.4 Teoría de costos de producción. Costos de corto y largo plazo. Costos fijos y variables
2.5 Teoría de la oferta, factores que influyen en la oferta. Ley de oferta, función de oferta,
ecuación y gráfica.
2.6 Equilibrio de mercado. Cantidad y precio de equilibrio. Exceso de producción y escasez
2.7 Estructuras de mercado. Modelos de competencia perfecta. Modelos de competencia
imperfecta: monopolio y oligopolio.
2.8 Organismos reguladores.

3. Fundamentos de la teoría macroeconómica

3.1 Producto bruto interno (PBI), métodos de cálculo. PBI real y nominal.
3.2 El ingreso, el gasto y el flujo circular.
3.3 Modelo de oferta y demanda agregada. Consumo e inversión, gobierno y comercio exterior.
Situación de equilibrio.
3.4 Mercado de bienes y mercado monetario. Curva IS – LM. Demanda y oferta monetaria.
Emisión primaria y tasa de interés. Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP). Objetivo y
funciones.
3.5 Política monetaria y política fiscal. Objetivos e instrumentos. Rol del estado en la economía.
Ley de presupuesto del sector público.
3.6 Teoría de los ciclos económicos. Crisis económica mundial de 1929 y 2008, fases del ciclo
económico. El desempleo y la ley de Okun. Políticas anti cíclicas.

4. Modelo de economía abierta

4.1 Modelo Mundell – Fleming. Supuestos básicos para una economía pequeña y abierta.
4.2 Finanzas internacionales. El Sistema Monetario Internacional: patrón oro y los tipos de
cambio. El Sistema de Bretton Woods y el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI).

46
 ADMISIÓN 2018

4.3 Tipo de cambio y mercado de divisas.

4.4 Balanza de pagos y su estructura: cuenta corriente, y la cuenta
financiera.
4.5 Modelos de comercio internacional. De la ventaja absoluta a la ventaja competitiva.
4.4 Integración económica, etapas de integración económica.

5. Comercio exterior
5.1 Instrumentos de política comercial. Principales instrumentos de política internacional:
medidas arancelarias y no arancelarias.
5.2 Globalización y comercio: organización mundial del comercio (omc). Medio ambiente y
empresa socialmente responsable.
5.3 Internacionalización de la empresa. Incoterms, estrategia internacional para la empresa.
5.4 Tratados de libre comercio: acuerdo de promoción comercial Perú y
EE.UU.
Unión Europea y países asiáticos.
5.5 El comercio exterior peruano: evolución y perspectivas.
5.6 Mercados de destino de las exportaciones peruanas: exportaciones tradicionales y no
tradicionales.

ÍA

1. Conceptos fundamentales de la geografía

1.1 Objeto de estudio de la Geografía. Conceptos claves: espacio, territorio, región, paisaje,
lugar. El concepto de geosistema. Principios y métodos de la Geografía. Grandes ramas y
subdisciplinas principales.
Location Where is it? Place What is it like? Region How are places similar or different?
Movement How do people, goods, and ideas move from one location to another? Human-
Environment Interaction How do people relate to the physical world?

Theme: Location
The geographic question “Where is it?” refers to location. Geographers describe location in
two ways. Absolute location is the exact place on earth where a geographic feature, such as
a city, is found. Relative location describes a place in comparison to other places around it.
ABSOLUTE LOCATION To describe absolute location, geographers use a grid system of
imaginary lines for precisely locating places on the earth’s surface. (See the diagram at left.)
Earth is divided into two equal halves. Each half of the globe is called a hemisphere.
Because the earth is round, a hemisphere can be north and south, or east and west. The
equator is the imaginary line that divides the north and south halves. The prime meridian is
the imaginary line dividing the earth east and west. Sometimes this line is called the
Greenwich meridian (GREHN•ich muh•RIHD•ee•uhn) line because the line runs through
Greenwich, England.
RELATIVE LOCATION Relative location describes how a place is related to its surrounding
environment. For example, you may tell a person that the library is three blocks west of the
park. This helps the person find the library—if he or she knows where the park is located.
Using relative location may help you become familiar with the specific characteristics of a
place. Learning that Cairo, Egypt, is located near the mouth of the Nile River in Africa, for
example, tells you something about Cairo, the Nile River, and even Africa itself.
Theme: Place The question “What is it like?” refers to place. Place includes the physical
features and cultural characteristics of a location. All locations on earth have physical
features that set them apart, such as climate, landforms, and vegetation. Other features are
the product of humans interacting with the environment, such as by building dams,
highways, or houses. Still others are the result of humans interacting with animals or with
each other. In the photograph above, you can see place features of Rio de Janeiro. Since a
location’s culture and its use of space may change over time, the description of a place may
also change.

FORMAL REGIONS A formal region is defined by a

limited number of related characteristics. For example,
the Sahel region of Africa is a desert area characterized
by specific climate, vegetation, and land use patterns.

FUNCTIONAL REGIONS A functional region is organized

around a set of interactions and connections between
places. Usually a functional region is characterized by a
hub, or central place, and links to that central place. For
example, a city and its suburbs may form a functional
region. Highways, commu

PERCEPTUAL REGIONS A
perceptual region is a region in
which people perceive, or see,
the characteristics of the region in
the same way.
PLATE MOVEMENT Tectonic plates move in one of four ways: 1) spreading, or moving
apart; 2) subduction, or diving under another plate; 3) collision, or crashing into one another;
4) sliding past each other in a shearing motion. The diagrams below show details about
plate movement. When tectonic plates come into contact, changes on the earth’s surface
occur. Three types of boundaries mark plate movements: • Divergent boundary—Plates
 move apart, spreading horizontally. • Convergent boundary—Plates collide, causing either
one plate to dive under the other or the edges of both plates to crumple. • Transform
boundary—Plates slide past one another.

SOIL FACTORS When geographers study soil, they look at five factors: • Parent material
The chemical composition of the original rock, or parent rock, before it decomposes affects
its fertility. • Relief Steeper slopes, such as mountainsides, are eroded easily and do not
produce soil quickly. • Organisms Organisms include plants, small animals like worms, ants,
and bacteria that decompose material. They help to loosen soil and supply nutrients for
plants. • Climate Hot climates produce a soil different from that produced by cold climates.
Wet climates and dry climates produce soils that are different from each other as well. •
Time The amount of time to produce soil varies, but a very rough average is about 2.5 cubic
centimeters per century.

2. Geografía General y física del Perú

2.1 Geografía General. Ubicación geográfica del Perú, sus referentes, potencialidades y
peligros naturales vinculados. Superficie, territorio y límites. Tratados y puntos limítrofes.
2.2 Geografía Física I. Relieve del territorio peruano, su origen y agentes de formación. Relieve
costeño. Geoformas del litoral peruano. Relieve submarino. Relieve andino: cordilleras,
volcanes, mesetas y valles. Relieve amazónico. Ceja de Selva. Selva Alta. Selva Baja.
2.3 Geografía Física II. Sistemas hidrográficos del Perú, características de sus ríos. Vertiente
del Pacífico. Vertiente del Atlántico. Cuenca endorreica del Titicaca. Lagos y lagunas del
Perú. El mar peruano. Sistema de corrientes marinas y su influencia. Climas del Perú y
factores que lo modifican.
2.4. Geografía Física III. Las ocho regiones naturales del Perú. Las ecorregiones del Perú.

3. Geografía humana del Perú

3.1 Los censos, su historia y cambios importantes. Tendencias del crecimiento poblacional.
Indicadores demográficos. Cambios en la estructura demográfica. La distribución de la
población por regiones y departamentos. Urbanización. Las ciudades. Las migraciones
internas y externas en el Perú.
3.2 PEA, empleo e informalidad. Diversidad cultural y grupos étnicos.

4. Geografía económica del Perú

4.1. Recursos naturales, su explotación. Papel de la exportación de materias primas en la
economía nacional.
4.2. Minería y energía. Recursos minerales, clasificación. Principales yacimientos mineros. La
producción minera y lugar que ocupa el Perú a nivel mundial. Proyectos mineros. Las
concesiones mineras. La actividad minera en el mar peruano. Los recursos energéticos
renovables y no-renovables. Carbón y cuencas carboníferas. Visión futura del carbón
peruano. Petróleo y gas natural, reservas y producción. Situación de la balanza comercial
de hidrocarburos. Diversidad de recursos energéticos renovables. La producción de
energía eléctrica, tipo de centrales. Localización de las principales centrales hidroeléctricas.
4.3. Actividades primarias y condiciones para la explotación de recursos renovables.
La actividad pesquera en el Perú, su lugar en el contexto mundial. Pesca marítima,
principales puertos. Pesca continental, especies y lugares importantes. El sector pesquero
como fuente de alimentos proteicos. El fenómeno El Niño. Parámetros de la perturbación
del sistema
 océano-atmósfera. Efectos en el clima y en la pesca. La explotación del guano de isla y su
crisis. La importancia actual del abono orgánico, esfuerzos para recuperar la producción de
guano. La agricultura. Características regionales de la actividad agraria. La ampliación de la
frontera agrícola. Proyectos de irrigación. La agroexportación de productos tradicionales y
no-tradicionales; mercados. La ganadería, características regionales. Tipos de ganadería
en el Perú. La actividad forestal. Funciones de los bosques. Distribución geográfica de los
bosques peruanos. La deforestación, regiones afectadas. Las áreas naturales protegidas,
categorías.
4.4. Actividades secundarias y terciarias. El sistema nacional de carreteras. Red vial nacional,
departamental y vecinal. Ferrocarriles. Clasificación de líneas férreas. Transporte ferroviario
de pasajeros y de carga. Transporte marítimo, fluvial y lacustre. Principales puertos. Red
aérea nacional, instalaciones aeroportuarias y su distribución. Las telecomunicaciones.
Distribución territorial de la telefonía fija. La expansión de la telefonía móvil. Internet,
cobertura de conexiones. Transporte, comunicaciones y la integración social y territorial. La
industria, primaria, de bienes de consumo, bienes intermedios y bienes de capital. La
actividad comercial, comercio exterior. Turismo. Principales centros turísticos.
4.5 Economía, sociedad y medio ambiente. El Perú frente al cambio climático. Principales
problemas ambientales del Perú. Vulnerabilidad social y territorial. Desastres. Exclusión y
pobreza.

5. Geografía política del Perú

5.1. Geografía Política del Perú. La demarcación político administrativa, papel en el
desarrollo.
La descentralización y regionalización, situación actual.
5.2 Integración fronteriza. La integración global con los TLC. El Perú y la cuenca del Pacífico.
El Perú y la Antártida.

6. Geografía física, humana, económica y política de América

6.1 América del Sur. Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El condicionamiento del
medio físico-natural y de los recursos naturales. Geografía Humana. Población e
indicadores relevantes. Capitales y centros urbanos. Diversidad cultural. Geografía
Económica. Indicadores económicos. Principales productos de exportación. Geografía
Política. Países independientes y dependencias territoriales. La integración subregional
y regional. CAN, MERCOSUR, UNASUR. IIRSA, Alianza del Pacífico.

South America is a continent in the Western Hemisphere, mostly in the Southern

Hemisphere, with a relatively small portion in the Northern Hemisphere. It may also be
considered a subcontinent of the Americas,[5][6] which is how it is viewed in the Spanish
and Portuguese-speaking regions of the Americas. The reference to South America instead
of other regions (like Latin America or the Southern Cone) has increased in the last decades
due to changing geopolitical dynamics (in particular, the rise of Brazil).[7]

It is bordered on the west by the Pacific Ocean and on the north and east by the Atlantic
Ocean; North America and the Caribbean Sea lie to the northwest. It includes twelve
sovereign states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela), a part of France (French Guiana), and a non-
sovereign area (the Falkland Islands, a British Overseas Territory though this is disputed by
Argentina). In addition to this, the ABC islands of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Panama may also be considered part of
South America.

Latin America has an enormous span from north to

south, as you can see from the map on page 191. It
reaches from the border between the United States
and Mexico down to Tierra del Fuego at the
southernmost tip of South America, a distance
of about 7,000 miles. It covers part of North America, all
of Central and South America, and the Caribbean
Islands. Its highlands, lowlands, rain forests, and plains are bounded by the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. The mountains of Latin America
form one of the great ranges of the World.

THE ANDES MOUNTAINS The Andes Mountains of the South American continent are part
of a chain of mountain ranges that run through the western portion of North, Central, and
South America. This range is called the Rockies in the United States, the Sierra Madre in
Mexico, and the Andes in South America. There are many active volcanoes throughout the
región.

HIGHLANDS Other ranges in Latin America include the Guiana Highlands in the northeast
section of South America. Highlands are made up of the mountainous or hilly sections of a
country. The highlands of Latin America include parts of Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname,
French Guiana, and Brazil. The Brazilian Highlands (see the map on page 203) are located
along the east coast of Brazil
South America occupies the southern portion of the Americas. The continent is generally
delimited on the northwest by the Darién watershed along the Colombia–Panama border,
although some may consider the border instead to be the Panama Canal. Geopolitically and
geographically[8] all of Panama – including the segment east of the Panama Canal in the
isthmus – is typically included in North America alone[9][10][11] and among the countries of
Central America.[12][13] Almost all of mainland South America sits on the South American
Plate.

South America is home to the world's highest uninterrupted waterfall, Angel Falls in
Venezuela; the highest single drop waterfall Kaieteur Falls in Guyana; the largest river (by
volume), the Amazon River; the longest mountain range, the Andes (whose highest
mountain is Aconcagua at 6,962 m [22,841 ft]); the driest non-polar place on earth, the
Atacama Desert;[14][15][16] the largest rainforest, the Amazon Rainforest; the highest
capital city, La Paz, Bolivia; the highest commercially navigable lake in the world, Lake
Titicaca; and, excluding research stations in Antarctica, the world's southernmost
permanently inhabited community, Puerto Toro, Chile.

South America's major mineral resources are gold, silver, copper, iron ore, tin, and
petroleum. These resources found in South America have brought high income to its
countries especially in times of war or of rapid economic growth by industrialized countries
elsewhere. However, the concentration in producing one major export commodity often has
hindered the development of diversified economies. The fluctuation in the price of
commodities in the international markets has led historically to major highs and lows in the
economies of South American states, often causing extreme political instability. This is
leading to efforts to diversify production to drive away from staying as economies dedicated
to one major export.

South America is one of the most biodiverse continents on earth. South America is home to
many interesting and unique species of animals including the llama, anaconda, piranha,
jaguar, vicuña, and tapir. The Amazon rainforests possess high biodiversity, containing a
major proportion of the Earth's species.

Brazil is the largest country in South America, encompassing around half of the continent's
land area and population. The remaining countries and territories are divided among three
regions: The Andean States, the Guianas and the Southern Cone.
Encyclopedic entry. South America is a continent of extremes. It is home to the world's
largest river (the Amazon) as well as the world's driest place (the Atacama Desert). South
America, the fourth-largest continent, extends from the Gulf of Darién in the northwest to the
archipelago of Tierra del Fuego in the south.

South America’s physical geography, environment and resources, and human geography
can be considered separately.

South America can be divided into three physical regions: mountains and highlands, river
basins, and coastal plains. Mountains and coastal plains generally run in a north-south
direction, while highlands and river basins generally run in an east-west direction.

South America’s extreme geographic variation contributes to the continent’s large number of
biomes. A biome is a community of animals and plants that spreads over an area with a
relatively uniform climate.

Within a few hundred kilometers, South America’s coastal plains’ dry desert biome rises to
the rugged alpine biome of the Andes mountains. One of the continent’s river basins (the
Amazon) is defined by dense, tropical rain forest, while the other (Paraná) is made up of
vast grasslands.

With an unparalleled number of plant and animal species, South America’s rich biodiversity
is unique among the world’s continents.

Mountains & Highlands

South America’s primary mountain system, the Andes, is also the world’s longest. The
range covers about 8,850 kilometers (5,500 miles). Situated on the far western edge of the
continent, the Andes stretch from the southern tip to the northernmost coast of South
America. There are hundreds of peaks more than 4,500 meters (15,000 feet) tall, many of
which are volcanic.

The highest peak in the Andes, Aconcagua, stands at 6,962 meters (22,841 feet) and
straddles the Argentina-Chile border. Aconcagua is the tallest mountain outside Asia.

High plateaus are also a feature of the Andes. The altiplano of Peru and Bolivia, for
example, has an elevation of about 3,700 meters (12,300 feet). The Patagonia region of
Argentina and Chile consists of lower-elevation plateaus and rugged glaciers.
Most plants in the alpine biome are small, and their leaves are stiff and strong to protect
them from frost and drought. The largest herb in the world, Puya raimondii, is known as the
Queen of the Andes. A Puya raimondii can live for 100 years and can grow to more than 9
meters (30 feet) tall. The leaves of this endangered species all grow from one woody stem,
allowing moisture to run down the leaves to the base of the plant.

Outside the Andes, South America has two principal highland areas: the Brazilian Highlands
and the Guiana Highlands. Located south of the Amazon River in Brazil, the Brazilian
Highlands are made up of low mountains and plateaus that rise to an average elevation of
1,006 meters (3,300 feet). The Guiana Highlands are located between the Amazon and
Orinoco Rivers. The heavily forested plateau of the Guiana Highlands covers southern
Venezuela, French Guiana, Guyana, northern Brazil, and a portion of southeastern
Colombia.

River Basins

South America has three important river basins: the Amazon, Orinoco, and
Paraguay/Paraná.

The Amazon River basin has an area of almost 7 million square kilometers (2.7 million
square miles), making it the largest watershed in the world. The basin, which covers most of
northern South America, is fed by tributaries from the glaciers of the Andes. Every second,
the Amazon River empties 209,000 cubic meters (7,381,000 cubic feet) of freshwater into
the Atlantic Ocean.

The Amazon River is the life force of the equally vast Amazon rain forest, which makes up
about half of the rain forest of the entire planet. This tropical biome has as many as 100
different tree species on a single acre, including the rubber tree, silk cotton tree, and Brazil
nut tree. Other important plant species include palms, ferns, and ropelike vines known as
lianas that network throughout the rain forest’s dense canopy.

The diversity of animal life in the Amazon rain forest is unsurpassed in the rest of the world.
The rain forest is perfectly suited for arboreal, or tree-living, animals. More than 2 million
species of insects are native to the region, including hundreds of spiders and butterflies.
Primates are abundant—howler monkeys, spider monkeys, and capuchin monkeys—along
with sloths, snakes, and iguanas. Thousands of native birds include brightly colored
macaws, parrots, toucans, and parakeets.
The Orinoco River flows north of the Amazon. The Orinoco flows in a giant arc for more
than 2,736 kilometers (1,700 miles), originating in the Guiana Highlands of northern Brazil
and discharging in the Atlantic Ocean in Venezuela. The Orinoco River basin covers an
area of about 948,000 square kilometers (366,000 square miles) and encompasses
approximately 80 percent of Venezuela and 25 percent of Colombia.

A vast savanna or grassland region, known as the Llanos, is the primary biome of the
Orinoco River basin. The Llanos is primarily made up of grasses. Swamp grasses, sedges,
and bunchgrass are found in wet, low-lying areas. Carpet grass is found in the higher and
drier elevations.

Like most grassland biomes, the Llanos is the perfect habitat for many bird species,
including the scarlet ibis, bellbird, and umbrellabird. Important river species include the
piranha, electric eel, and the Orinoco crocodile, which can reach a length of more than 6
meters (20 feet).

The Paraguay/Paraná River basin covers almost 2.8 million square kilometers (1,081,000
square miles), which is much of southeastern Brazil and Bolivia, Paraguay, and northern
Argentina. The Paraná River includes Iguazu Falls, a massive series of waterfalls that
extend for 2.7 kilometers (1.7 miles).

Along with the Uruguay River, the Paraná River empties into the Rio de la Plata estuary
between Argentina and Uruguay. The Rio de la Plata is the most populated region of both
countries. The capital cities of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Montevideo, Uruguay,
practically face each other across the estuary.

The Paraguay/Paraná River basin supplies water to the plains biome, or Pampas, of South
America. The Pampas have rich, fertile soil and predictable rainfall patterns. They are the
most important grazing and cropland areas on the continent.

Coastal Plains

A coastal plain is an area of low, flat land next to a seacoast. South American coastal plains
are found on the northeastern coast of Brazil, on the Atlantic Ocean, and the western,
Pacific coast of Peru and Chile. The coastal plains of northeastern Brazil are extremely dry.
The Brazilian Highlands act as a wedge that pushes moist sea winds away from the coastal
plains.

The western coastal plains are also extremely dry. They are trapped between the cold Peru
Current to the west and the Andes Mountains to the east. The Peru Current brings cold
water to the Pacific coast of Peru and Chile. This cold surface water results in thermal
inversion: cold air at sea level and stable, warmer air higher up. Thermal inversion produces
a thick layer of clouds at low altitudes. These low-lying clouds blanket much of the Pacific
coast of South America. They do not allow precipitation to form.

The Atacama Desert is part of the western coastal plain. The Atacama is considered the
driest region in the world. The average rainfall is about 1 millimeter (0.04 inches) a year,
and some parts of the Atacama have never had rain in recorded history.

Very few plants grow in this desert. Even bacteria, insects, and fungi are scarce. Larger
animal species are also rare, and include the grey fox, a type of deer called the huemul, and
the viscacha—the largest member of the chinchilla family. Ocean birds, such as penguins,
cormorants, and pelicans, are found on the desert coast. While Atacama lacks flora and
fauna, it is a rich source of copper and a chief source of revenue for the Chilean economy.

South America: Physical Geography

South America is a continent of extremes. It is home to the world's largest river (the
Amazon) as well as the world's driest place (the Atacama Desert).

Map by the National Geographic Society

Largest Urban Area

Sao Paulo, Brazil (20.4 million people)

Highest Elevation
Aconcagua, Argentina (6,901 meters/22,641 feet)

Largest Watershed
Amazon River (7 million square kilometers/2.72 million square miles)

Population Density
57 people per square kilometer

Most Renewable Electricity Produced

Paraguay (99.9%, hydropower)

– Trade Blocks
• To foster internal markets and reduce trade barriers
– Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), Central
American Common Market (CACM), Andean Group,
NAFTA, Mercosur
– Insurgencies and Drug Traffickers
 • Guerrilla groups have controlled large portions of their countries
through violence and intimidation
– FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia); ELN
(National Liberation Army)
– Colombia has highest murder rate in the world
• Drug cartels: powerful and wealthy organized crime syndicates

The Andean Community (Spanish: Comunidad Andina, CAN) is a customs union comprising
the South American countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The trade bloc was
called the Andean Pact until 1996 and came into existence when the Cartagena Agreement
was signed in 1969. Its headquarters are in Lima, Peru.

The Andean Community has 98 million inhabitants living in an area of 4,700,000 square
kilometers, whose Gross Domestic Product amounted to US$745.3 billion in 2005, including
Venezuela, who was a member at that time. Its estimated GDP PPP for 2011 amounts to
US$902.86 billion, excluding Venezuela.

The Andean Community is a trade bloc of four countries - Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru. Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay are associate members while
Panama, Mexico, and Spain are Observers. The Headquarters of CAN are located in Lima,
Peru. Colombia assumed the Presidency Pro-Tempore of CAN for the period 2011-2012.
The Andean Community and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) comprise
the two main trading blocs of South America. In April 1998, they signed a Framework
Agreement for the creation of a Free Trade Area between each other and launched
negotiations. The first stage of signing by CAN of economic complementarity or tariff
preferences agreements with individual Mercosur members were concluded, followed by
each CAN member signing a free trade agreement with Mercosur. Subsequently, CAN and
Mercosur, along with nations like Chile, have been spearheading deeper integration of all
South America through the Union of South American Nations(UNASUR) patterned on the
European Union.

Mercosur, officially Southern Common Market[7] is a South American trade bloc established
by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 and Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994. Its full members are
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is a full member but has been
suspended since December 1, 2016. Associate countries are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname.[8] Observer countries are New Zealand and Mexico.
[9][10]

Mercosur's purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, people, and
currency. It currently confines itself to a customs union, in which there is free intra-zone
trade and a common trade policy between member countries. The official languages are
Spanish, Portuguese, and Guarani.[11] Since its foundation, Mercosur's functions have
been updated, amended, and changed many times: it is now a full customs union and a
trading bloc. Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations are customs unions that are
components of a continuing process of South American integration connected to the Union
of South American Nations (USAN).

The Union of South American Nations (USAN; Spanish: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas,
UNASUR; Portuguese: União de Nações Sul-Americanas, UNASUL; Dutch: Unie van Zuid-
Amerikaanse Naties, UZAN; and sometimes referred to as the South American Union) is an
intergovernmental regional organization comprising twelve South American countries.

The UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed on 23 May 2008, at the Third Summit of
Heads of State, held in Brasília, Brazil.[9] According to the Constitutive Treaty, the Union's
headquarters will be located in Quito, Ecuador.[3] On 1 December 2010, Uruguay became
the ninth state to ratify the UNASUR treaty, thus giving the union full legality.[10][11] As the
Constitutive Treaty entered into force on 11 March 2011, UNASUR became a legal entity
during a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Mitad del Mundo, Ecuador, where they had laid the
foundation stone for the Secretariat Headquarters.[12] The South American Parliament will
be located in Cochabamba, Bolivia, while the headquarters of its bank, the Bank of the
South are located in Caracas, Venezuela.[3]
On 4 May 2010, at a heads of state summit held in Campana, 75 km (47 mi) north of
Buenos Aires, former Argentine President Néstor Kirchner was unanimously elected the first
Secretary General of UNASUR for a two-year term. The new post was conceived as a first
step towards the creation of a permanent bureaucratic body for a supranational union,
which will eventually replace the political bodies of Mercosur and CAN. The headquarters of
the secretariat is located in Quito.

After Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela, Uruguay
became the ninth nation to ratify the constitutive treaty of the organization on 1 December
2010, thus completing the minimum number of ratifications Necessary for the entry into
force of the Treaty, on 11 March 2011[13][10][11] With the entry into force of the Treaty,[14]
Unasur became a legal entity during the Summit Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in Mitad del
Mundo, Ecuador, where the cornerstone was laid for the headquarters of the General
Secretariat of the Union.[15][16]

In April 2018, six countries suspended membership: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Paraguay and Peru.[17][18]

In August 2018, Colombia announced its withdrawal from the organization.

The Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) is a
development plan to link South America's economies through new transportation, energy,
and telecommunications projects.

IIRSA investments are expected to integrate highway networks, river ways, hydroelectric
dams and telecommunications links throughout the continent—particularly in remote,
isolated regions—to allow greater trade and create a South American community of nations.

The initiative was launched in late 2000 with the participation of the 12 countries of South
America which form the Union of South American Nations. It is being supported by the
Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and
the River Plate Basin Financial Development Fund (FONPLATA). Together the three
institutions form the Technical Coordination Committee (CCT) which provides technical and
financial support for IIRSA activities.[1]
The Pacific Alliance (Spanish: Alianza del Pacífico) is a Latin American trade bloc, formed
by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which all border the Pacific Ocean. These countries
have come together to form an area of integration with the purpose of ensure a complete
freedom in the movement of goods, services, capital, and people. Together, these four
countries have a combined population of 210 million people and about 35% of the region's
GDP.
he Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Spanish: Comunidad de Estados
Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC; Portuguese: Comunidade de Estados Latino-
Americanos e Caribenhos; French: Communauté des États latino-américains et caribéens;
Dutch: Gemeenschap van Latijns-Amerikaanse en Caraïbische Staten) is a regional bloc of
Latin American and Caribbean states thought out on February 23, 2010, at the Rio Group–
Caribbean Community Unity Summit,[5][6][7] and created on December 3, 2011, in
Caracas, Venezuela, with the signature of The Declaration of Caracas.[8] It consists of 33
sovereign countries in the Americas representing roughly 600 million people. Due to the
focus of the organization on Latin American and Caribbean countries, other countries and
territories in the Americas, Canada and the United States, as well as the overseas territories
in the Americas of France (Overseas departments and territories of France), the
Netherlands (Dutch Caribbean), Denmark (Greenland) and the United Kingdom (British
Overseas Territories) are not included.[9]

CELAC is an example of a decade-long push for deeper integration within Latin America.
[10] CELAC was created to deepen Latin American integration and by some to reduce the
significant influence of the United States on the politics and economics of Latin America. It
is seen as an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS), the regional body
that was founded by United States and 21 other Latin American nations originally as a
countermeasure to potential Soviet influence in the region.[10][11][12]

CELAC is the successor of the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit
on Integration and Development (CALC).[13] In July 2010, CELAC selected President of
Venezuela Hugo Chávez and President of Chile Sebastián Piñera, as co-chairs of the forum
to draft statutes for the organization.[

6.2 América Central y el Caribe. Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El

condicionamiento del medio físico-natural y de los recursos naturales. Geografía Humana,
población e indicadores relevantes. Capitales y centros urbanos, diversidad cultural.
Geografía Económica. Principales productos de exportación. Geografía Política. Países
independientes y dependencias territoriales. La integración centroamericana y caribeña.
CELAC.
6.3 América del Norte. Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El
condicionamiento del medio físico-natural y de los recursos naturales. Geografía Humana,
población e indicadores relevantes; diversidad cultural. Urbanización, metrópolis y
megalópolis. Geografía Económica. Regiones industriales. Geografía Política. Países
independientes y dependencias territoriales.
NAFTA. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA; Spanish: Tratado de Libre
Comercio de América del Norte, TLCAN; French: Accord de libre-échange nord-américain,
ALÉNA) is an agreement signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, creating a
trilateral trade bloc in North America. The agreement came into force on January 1, 1994.[4]
It superseded the 1988 Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement between the United
States and Canada,[5] and is expected to be replaced by the United States–Mexico–
Canada Agreement once it is ratifed.[6]

NAFTA has two supplements: the North American Agreement on Environmental

Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).

Most economic analyses indicate that NAFTA has been beneficial to the North American
economies and the average citizen,[7][8][9] but harmed a small minority of workers in
industries exposed to trade competition.[10][11] Economists hold that withdrawing from
NAFTA or renegotiating NAFTA in a way that reestablishes trade barriers will adversely
affect the U.S. economy and cost jobs.[12][13][14] However, Mexico would be much more
severely affected by job loss and reduction of economic growth in both the short term and
long term.[15]

On September 30, 2018, it was announced that the United States, Mexico, and Canada had
come to an agreement to replace NAFTA with the United States–Mexico–Canada
Agreement (USMCA). The USMCA is the result of the renegotiation of NAFTA that the
member states undertook from 2017 to 2018, though NAFTA will remain in force until the
USMCA is ratified by its members.[16]

The Treaty of Lisbon (initially known as the Reform Treaty) is an international agreement
that amends the two treaties which form the constitutional basis of the European Union
(EU). The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007,
and entered into force on 1 December 2009.[2] It amends the Maastricht Treaty (1993),
known in updated form as the Treaty on European Union (2007) or TEU, and the Treaty of
Rome (1957), known in updated form as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (2007) or TFEU.[3] It also amends the attached treaty protocols as well as the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

Prominent changes included the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting in at least
45 policy areas in the Council of Ministers, a change in calculating such a majority to a new
double majority, a more powerful European Parliament forming a bicameral legislature
alongside the Council of Ministers under the ordinary legislative procedure, a consolidated
legal personality for the EU and the creation of a long-term President of the European
Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The
Treaty also made the Union's bill of rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, legally
binding. The Treaty for the first time gave member states the explicit legal right to leave the
EU and the procedure to do so.

The stated aim of the treaty was to "complete the process started by the Treaty of
Amsterdam [1997] and by the Treaty of Nice [2001] with a view to enhancing the efficiency
and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action".[4]
Opponents of the Treaty of Lisbon, such as former Danish Member of the European
Parliament (MEP) Jens-Peter Bonde, argued that it would centralize the EU,[5] and weaken
democracy by "moving power away" from national electorates.[6] Supporters argue that it
brings more checks and balances into the EU system, with stronger powers for the
European Parliament and a new role for national parliaments.

Negotiations to modify EU institutions began in 2001, resulting first in the Treaty

establishing a Constitution for Europe, which would have repealed the existing European
treaties and replaced them with a "constitution". Although ratified by a majority of member
states, this was abandoned after being rejected by 54.67% of French voters on 29 May
2005[7][8] and then by 61.54% of Dutch voters on 1 June 2005.[9] After a "period of
reflection", member states agreed instead to maintain the existing treaties, but to amend
them, salvaging a number of the reforms that had been envisaged in the constitution. An
amending "reform" treaty was drawn up and signed in Lisbon in 2007. It was originally
intended to have been ratified by all member states by the end of 2008. This timetable
failed, primarily due to the initial rejection of the Treaty in June 2008 by the Irish electorate,
a decision which was reversed in a second referendum in October 2009 after Ireland
secured a number of concessions related to the treaty.[citation needed]

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is a regional trade organization and free
trade area consisting of four European states: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and
Switzerland.[3] The organization operates in parallel with the European Union (EU), and all
four member states participate in the European Single Market and are part of the Schengen
Area.[4] They are not, however, party to the European Union Customs Union.

EFTA was historically one of the two dominant western European trade blocs, but is now
much smaller and closely associated with its historical competitor, the European Union. It
was established on 3 May 1960 to serve as an alternative trade bloc for those European
states that were unable or unwilling to join the then European Economic Community (EEC),
which subsequently became the European Union. The Stockholm Convention, to establish
the EFTA, was signed on 4 January 1960 in the Swedish capital by seven countries (known
as the "outer seven").

Since 1995, only two founding members remain, namely Norway and Switzerland. The
other five, Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have joined the
EU in the intervening years. The initial Stockholm Convention was superseded by the
Vaduz Convention, which aimed to provide a successful framework for continuing the
expansion and liberalization of trade, both among the organization's member states and
with the rest of the world.

Whilst the EFTA is not a customs union and member states have full rights to enter into
bilateral third-country trade arrangements, it does have a coordinated trade policy.[3] As a
result, its member states have jointly concluded free trade agreements with the EU and a
number of other countries.[3] To participate in the EU's single market, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Norway are parties to the Agreement on a European Economic Area
(EEA), with compliances regulated by the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court.
Switzerland has a set of bilateral agreements with the EU instead.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; Russian: Содружество Независимых

Государств, СНГ, tr. Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, SNG), also sometimes
called the Russian Commonwealth in order to distinguish it from the Commonwealth of
Nations,[3] is a regional intergovernmental organization of 10 post-Soviet republics in
Eurasia formed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has an area of 20,368,759
km² (8,097,484 sq mi) and has an estimated population of 239,796,010. The CIS
encourages cooperation over economical, political and military aspects and has certain
powers possessing coordinating in trade, finance, lawmaking and security. It has also
promoted cooperation on cross-border crime prevention.

The CIS has its origins in the Soviet Union (USSR), which was established by the 1922
Treaty and Declaration of the Creation of the USSR by the Russian SFSR, Byelorussian
SSR and Ukrainian SSR. When the USSR began to fall in 1991, the founding republics
signed the Belavezha Accords on 8 December 1991, declaring the Soviet Union would
cease to exist and proclaimed the CIS in its place. A few days later the Alma-Ata Protocol
was signed, which declared that Soviet Union was dissolved and that the Russian
Federation was to be its successor state. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania),
which regard their membership in the Soviet Union as an illegal occupation, chose not to
participate. Georgia withdrew its membership in 2008. Ukraine, which participated as an
associate member, ended its participation in CIS statutory bodies on 19 May 2018.[3]

Eight of the nine CIS member states participate in the CIS Free Trade Area. Three
organizations are under the overview of the CIS, namely the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union (alongside subdivisions, the Eurasian Customs
Union and the Eurasian Economic Space, which comprises territory inhabited by over 180
million people); and the Union State. While the first and the second are military and
economic alliances, the third aims to reach a supranational union of Russia and Belarus
with a common government, flag, currency and so on.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations[11] (ASEAN /ˈɑːsiɑːn/ AH-see-ahn,[12]

/ˈɑːziɑːn/ AH-zee-ahn)[13][14] is a regional intergovernmental organization comprising ten
countries in Southeast Asia, which promotes intergovernmental cooperation and facilitates
economic, political, security, military, educational, and sociocultural integration among its
members and other countries in Asia. It also regularly engages other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region and beyond. ASEAN maintains a global network of alliances and dialogue
partners and is considered by some as global powerhouse,[15][16] the central union for
cooperation in Asia-Pacific, and a prominent and influential organisation. It is involved in
numerous international affairs, and hosts diplomatic missions throughout the world.[17][18]
[19][20] It is a major partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, developing
cooperation model with the organisation for the peace, stability, development and
sustainability of Asia.[21][22][23][24] It also serves as an international role model in seeking
harmony and strength among diversity and differences, as well as a leading figure in global
economy, trade, diplomacy and politics.[25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36]

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed free trade

agreement (FTA) between the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) and the six Asia-Pacific states with which ASEAN has
existing free trade agreements (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New
Zealand). It is reported that a broad agreement is likely to be reached in November 2018.[1]

RCEP negotiations were formally launched in November 2012 at the ASEAN Summit in
Cambodia.[2] The free trade agreement is scheduled and expected to be signed in
November 2018 during the ASEAN Summit and Related Summit in Singapore, after the first
 RCEP summit was held on 14 November 2017 in Manila, Philippines.[3] RCEP is viewed as
an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed trade agreement which
includes several Asian and American nations but excludes China and India.[4]

In 2017, prospective RCEP member states accounted for a population of 3.4 billion people
with a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP, PPP) of $49.5 trillion, approximately 39 percent
of the world's GDP,[5] with the combined GDPs of China and India making up more than
half that amount.

RCEP is the world's largest economic bloc, covering nearly half of the global economy.[6]
According to estimates by PwC, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP, PPP) of RCEP member
states is likely to amount to nearly $250 trillion by 2050, or a quarter of a quadrillion dollars,
with the combined GDPs of China and India making up more than 75% of the amount.
RCEP's share of the global economy could account for half of the estimated $0.5 quadrillion
global GDP (PPP) by 2050.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU; French: Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA))

was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 32 signatory governments.
[1]
 It was disbanded on 9 July 2002 by its last chairperson, South African PresidentThabo
Mbeki, and replaced by the African Union (AU). Some of the key aims of the OAU were to
encourage political and economic integration among member states, and to eradicate
colonialism and neo-colonialism from the African continent. Although it did achieved some
success, there were also differences of opinion as to how that was going to be achieved.

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) simplified Chinese: 中 非 合 作 论 坛 ;

traditional Chinese: 中非合作論壇 ; pinyin: Zhōng Fēi hézuò lùntán; French: Forum sur la
coopération sino-africaine) is an official forum between the People's Republic of China and
all states in Africa (with the exception of Eswatini, the last African state with which the PRC
currently does not have diplomatic relations, since it recognizes Taiwan). There have been
three summits held to date, with the most recent having occurred from September 3–4,
2018 in Beijing, China. The first summit was held November 2006 in Beijing. The third
summit will take place in September 2018 in Beijing.

7. Geografía física, humana, económica y política de Europa

7.1 Europa I. Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El condicionamiento del medio físico
y de los recursos naturales. Geografía Humana. Población e indicadores relevantes.
Capitales y áreas metropolitanas. Diversidad cultural.
7.2 Europa II. Geografía Económica. Sistema de comunicación. Regiones y desarrollo
económico. Geografía Política. Países independientes y dependencias territoriales.
Organización política de los estados: estructura y forma de gobierno. La Unión Europea y el
Tratado de Maastricht. Tratado de Lisboa. La Europa no comunitaria. EFTA. CEI. BREXIT.

8. Geografía física, humana, económica y política de Asia

8.1 Asia I. Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El condicionamiento del medio físico y
de los recursos naturales. Geografía Humana. Población, capitales y megalópolis.
Diversidad cultural.
8.2. Asia II. Geografía Económica. Redes de comunicación. Regiones y desarrollo económico.
China, Japón, Corea del Sur y Corea del Norte. Países del Golfo Pérsico. Rusia y los
países asiáticos de la ex URSS. India, Pakistán, Bangladesh. Países del Sudeste Asiático.
Geografía Política. ASEAN, APEC, RCEP. TPP.

9. Geografía física, humana, económica y política de África

Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El condicionamiento del medio físico y de los
recursos naturales. Geografía Humana. Población, capitales y centros urbanos, diversidad
cultural. Geografía Económica. Redes de comunicación. Desarrollo económico y
diferencias regionales. El Magreb, Egipto, Sudáfrica. Geografía Política. El Panafricanismo.
OAU. FOCAC.

10. Geografía física, humana, económica y política de Oceanía

Ubicación geográfica y límites continentales. El condicionamiento del medio físico y de los
recursos naturales. Geografía Humana. Población, capitales y centros urbanos. Geografía
Económica. Geografía Política.

Oceania (UK: /ˌoʊsiˈɑːniə, ˌoʊʃi-, -ˈeɪn-/, US: /ˌoʊʃiˈæniə/ (About this soundlisten), /-ˈɑːn-/)[3]
is a geographic region comprising Australasia, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.[4]
Spanning the eastern and western hemispheres, Oceania covers an area of 8,525,989
square kilometres (3,291,903 sq mi) and has a population of 40 million. Situated in the
southeast of the Asia-Pacific region, Oceania is the smallest continental grouping in land
area and the second smallest in population after Antarctica.

The islands at the geographic extremes of Oceania are the Bonin Islands, a politically
integral part of Japan; Hawaii, a state of the United States; Clipperton Island, a possession
of France; the Juan Fernández Islands, belonging to Chile; and the Campbell Islands,
belonging to New Zealand. Oceania has a diverse mix of economies from the highly
developed and globally competitive financial markets of Australia and New Zealand, which
rank high in quality of life and human development index,[5][6] to the much less developed
economies that belong to countries such as of Kiribati and Tuvalu,[7] while also including
medium-sized economies of Pacific islands such as Palau, Fiji and Tonga.[8] The largest
and most populous country in Oceania is Australia, with Sydney being the largest city of
both Oceania and Australia.[9]

The first settlers of Australia, New Guinea, and the large islands just to the east arrived
between 50,000 and 30,000 years ago. Oceania was first explored by Europeans from the
16th century onward. Portuguese navigators, between 1512 and 1526, reached the
Tanimbar Islands, some of the Caroline Islands and west Papua New Guinea. On his first
voyage in the 18th century, James Cook, who later arrived at the highly developed Hawaiian
Islands, went to Tahiti and followed the east coast of Australia for the first time.[10] The
Pacific front saw major action during the Second World War, mainly between Allied powers
the United States and Australia, and Axis power Japan.

The arrival of European settlers in subsequent centuries resulted in a significant alteration in

the social and political landscape of Oceania. In more contemporary times there has been
increasing discussion on national flags and a desire by some Oceanians to display their
distinguishable and individualistic identity.[11] The rock art of Australian Aborigines is the
longest continuously practiced artistic tradition in the world.[12] Puncak Jaya in Papua is
often considered the highest peak in Oceania.[13] Most Oceanian countries have a
parliamentary representative democratic multi-party system, with tourism being a large
source of income for the Pacific Islands nations.[14]
 CIENCIA POLÍTICA E HISTORIA DE LAS IDEAS POLÍTICAS

1. Ciencia Política
1.1. Política y Ciencia Política: Concepto y evolución histórica de la política. La política como
realidad social. La ciencia política, concepto, métodos y técnicas, enfoques clásicos y
modernos, ramas.
1.2. El poder: Orígenes y conceptos. Formas de expresión del poder. Poder y élite.
Clasificación y estructura del poder.
1.3. La Democracia: Orígenes y concepto. Evolución histórica. La democracia liberal y la
democracia moderna. La democracia participativa, deliberativa y radical. Conceptos
modernos de democracia.
1.4. Partidos Políticos: Orígenes y conceptos. Definiciones de Partido político. Los elementos
constitutivos de los partidos. Funciones y Sistemas de Partido.
1.5. Ideología: Orígenes y conceptos de ideología. Ideología y política. Principales vertientes
ideológicas: el liberalismo, el marxismo, el anarquismo y el humanismo. La crisis de los
modelos ideológicos paradigmáticos. Las nuevas vertientes ideológicas.

2. Historia de las Ideas Políticas

2.1. El Pensamiento Político Griego: El marco de la ciudad-Estado. Instituciones e ideales: la
polis, la democracia y la ley. El materialismo antiguo y el viraje de la filosofía hacia los
hombres. Las ideas políticas de Platón y Aristóteles. De la polis a la comunidad universal.
2.2. El Pensamiento Político en Roma: La República y el Imperio. Instituciones e ideales.
Polibio y la teoría de los ciclos políticos. El imperio: la juridización de las ideas políticas. El
pensamiento de Cicerón y Séneca.
2.3. El Pensamiento Político del Cristianismo: El Cristianismo y la Iglesia. La teologización de la
política. San Agustín de Hipona y Santo Tomás de Aquino. Las Herejías.
2.4. La política en el Renacimiento: Concepciones políticas y sociales. Erasmo de
Rotterdam y el erasmismo. Las utopías renacentistas: Tomás Moro y Campanella.
2.5. La teoría política y el Estado moderno: De la comunidad universal al Estado nacional. La
secularización del pensamiento político: Maquiavelo. Bodín y el Estado absolutista.
Hobbes, el poder como dominación y el contrato social.
2.6. El Pensamiento político ilustrado: La ilustración. Locke: el individualismo liberal, el contrato
social y el Estado. Montesquieu: la división de poderes y la voluntad general. Rousseau:
derecho natural, contrato social y soberanía popular. El utilitarismo inglés: Bentham y Mill.
El pensamiento político de la Revolución francesa.
2.7. El socialismo: La clase obrera. Las corrientes utópicas: Owen, Saint Simón y Fourier. El
socialismo marxista: Marx y Engels, el materialismo histórico y dialéctico. El anarquismo:
Bakunin y Kropotkin. La socialdemocracia: Bernstein y la II Internacional.

58
ADMISIÓN 2018

2.8. Las ideas políticas en el siglo XX: Lenin: el Bolchevismo y la construcción

del socialismo. El Neoliberalismo: Von Mises y Hayek. El pensamiento
contemporáneo: Fukuyama, Huntington, Giddens. Los fundamentalismos.
 HISTORIA UNIVERSAL CONTEMPORÁNEA

1. Las grandes revoluciones de la modernidad occidental.

a. La revolución industrial y la expansión del capitalismo. 1780 -1840

The Industrial Revolution was the transition to new manufacturing processes in the period

from about 1760 to sometime between 1820 and 1840. This transition included going
from hand production methods to machines, new chemical manufacturing and iron
production processes, the increasing use of steam power, the development of machine
tools and the rise of the factory system. The Industrial Revolution also led to an
unprecedented rise in the rate of population growth.

Textiles were the dominant industry of the Industrial Revolution in terms of employment, value
of output and capital invested. The textile industry was also the first to use modern production
methods

The Industrial Revolution began in Great Britain, and many of the

[2][3]
technological innovations were of British origin.  By the mid-18th century Britain was the
world's leading commercial nation, [4]controlling a global trading empire with colonies in North
America and the Caribbean, and with some political influence on the Indian subcontinent,
through the activities of the East India Company.[5] The development of trade and the rise of
business were major causes of the Industrial Revolution.

b. La revolución francesa. La ilustración. Xiix 1789

The French Revolution (French: Révolution française [ʁevɔlysjɔ̃ fʁɑ̃sɛːz]) was a period of
far-reaching social and political upheaval in France and its colonies beginning in 1789. The
Revolution overthrew the monarchy, established a republic, catalyzed violent periods of
political turmoil, and finally culminated in a dictatorship under Napoleon who brought many of
its principles to areas he conquered in Western Europe and beyond. Inspired by liberal and
radical ideas, the Revolution profoundly altered the course of modern history, triggering the
global decline of absolute monarchies while replacing them with republics and liberal
democracies.[1] Through the Revolutionary Wars, it unleashed a wave of global conflicts that
extended from the Caribbean to the Middle East. Historians widely regard the Revolution as
one of the most important events in human history.[2][3][4]
The causes of the French Revolution are complex and are still debated among historians.
Following the Seven Years' War and the American Revolution,[5] the French government was
deeply in debt. It attempted to restore its financial status through unpopular taxation schemes,
which were heavily regressive. Leading up to the Revolution, years of bad harvests worsened
by deregulation of the grain industry also inflamed popular resentment of the privileges
enjoyed by the aristocracy and the Catholic clergy of the established church. Some historians
hold something similar to what Thomas Jefferson proclaimed: that France had "been
awakened by our [American] Revolution." [6] Demands for change were formulated in terms
of Enlightenment ideals and contributed to the convocation of the Estates General in May
1789. During the first year of the Revolution, members of the Third Estate (commoners) took
control, the Bastille was attacked in July, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen was passed in August, and a group of women marched on Versailles that forced the
royal court back to Paris in October. A central event of the first stage, in August 1789, was
the abolition of feudalism and the old rules and privileges left over from the Ancien Régime.
The Seven Years' War was a global conflict fought between 1756 and 1763. It involved every
European great power of the time and spanned five continents, affecting Europe, the
Americas, West Africa, India, and the Philippines. The conflict split Europe into two coalitions,
led by the Kingdom of Great Britain (including Prussia, Portugal, Hanover, and other small
German states) on one side and the Kingdom of France(including the Austrian-led Holy
Roman Empire, the Russian Empire (until 1762), Bourbon Spain, and Sweden) on the other.
Meanwhile, in India, some regional polities within the increasingly fragmented Mughal Empire,
with the support of the French, tried to crush a British attempt to conquer Bengal. The war's
extent has led some historians to describe it as "World War Zero", similar in scale to
other world wars

Del directorio al imperio.

The Directory or Directorate (French: le Directoire) was a five-member committee which

governed France from 2 November 1795, when it replaced the Committee of Public Safety,
until 9 November 1799, when it was overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte in the Coup of 18
Brumaire, and replaced by the French Consulate. It gave its name to the final four years of
the French Revolution.
The regime of the Directorate, during the French Revolution, lasted four years which were of
enormous political agitation and, for that reason, prevented the normal consolidation of this
system, since the conspiracies occurred without ceasing, due to the commitment that the
realistic and Jacobin to end with the form of moderate republic, which until then came
reigning. To this it is added that, for the first time, they had to face an organized conspiracy of
communist type that was headed by Babeuf, who ended up being guillotined. Despite this
situation and despite the worsening financial crisis, the board of directors, without However, I
manage to achieve some successes abroad, thanks to the work of Generals Moreau and
Napoleon Bonaparte, the latter was elected because of his campaigns in Italy and Egypt that
earned him, after the blow of 18 Brumaire , seize power. This would establish the Consulate
that would last until the year 1804.

Las guerras napoleónicas

The Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) were a series of major conflicts pitting the French
Empire and its allies, led by Napoleon I, against a fluctuating array of European powers
formed into various coalitions, financed and usually led by the United Kingdom. The wars
stemmed from the unresolved disputes associated with the French Revolution and
its resultant conflict. The wars are often categorised into five conflicts, each termed after the
coalition that fought Napoleon: the Third Coalition (1805), the Fourth (1806–
07), Fifth (1809), Sixth(1813), and the Seventh and final (1815).
Napoleon, upon ascending to First Consul of France in 1799, had inherited a chaotic republic;
he subsequently created a state with stable finances, a strong bureaucracy, and a well-
trained army. In 1805, Austria and Russia waged war against France. In response, Napoleon
 defeated the allied Russo-Austrian army at Austerlitz in December 1805, which is considered
his greatest victory. At sea, the British severely defeated the joint Franco-Spanish navy in
the Battle of Trafalgar on October 1805. This victory secured British control of the seas and
prevented the invasion of Britain itself. Prussian concerns about increasing French power led
to a resumption of war in October 1806. Napoleon quickly defeated the Prussians,
and defeated Russia in June 1807, bringing an uneasy peace to the continent. The peace
failed, though, as war broke out in 1809, and a new coalition was soon defeated.

c. La independencia de Estados Unidos.

The United States Declaration of Independence is the statement adopted by the Second

Continental Congress meeting at the Pennsylvania State House (now known
as Independence Hall) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 4, 1776. The Declaration
announced that the Thirteen Colonies at war with the Kingdom of Great Britain would regard
themselves as thirteen independent sovereign states, no longer under British rule. With the
Declaration, these new states took a collective first step toward forming the United States of
America. The declaration was signed by representatives from New
Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia.
The Lee Resolution for independence was passed on July 2 with no opposing votes.
The Committee of Five had drafted the Declaration to be ready when Congress voted on
independence. John Adams, a leader in pushing for independence, had persuaded the
committee to select Thomas Jefferson to compose the original draft of the document, [2] which
Congress edited to produce the final version. The Declaration was a formal explanation of
why Congress had voted to declare independence from Great Britain, more than a year after
the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War. Adams wrote to his wife Abigail, "The
Second Day of July 1776, will be the most memorable Epocha, in the History of America" [3] –
although Independence Day is actually celebrated on July 4, the date that the wording of the
Declaration of Independence was approved.
La doctrina Monroe.
The Monroe Doctrine Most Latin American colonies had gained their independence by the
early 1800s. But their position was not secure. Many Latin Americans feared that European
countries would try to reconquer the new republics. The United States, a young nation itself,
feared this too. So, in 1823, President James Monroe issued what came to be called the
Monroe Doctrine. This document stated that “the American continents . . . are henceforth not
to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” Until 1898,
though, the United States did little to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Cuba provided a real
testing ground.

The Monroe Doctrine was a United States policy of opposing European colonialism in

the Americas beginning in 1823. It stated that further efforts by European nations to take
control of any independent state in North or South America would be viewed as "the
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." [1] At the same time, the
doctrine noted that the U.S. would recognize and not interfere with existing European
 colonies nor meddle in the internal concerns of European countries. The Doctrine was issued
on December 2, 1823 at a time when nearly all Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal
had achieved, or were at the point of gaining, independence from
the Portuguese and Spanish Empires.
President James Monroe first stated the doctrine during his seventh annual State of the Union
Address to Congress. The term "Monroe Doctrine" itself was coined in 1850. [2] By the end of
the 19th century, Monroe's declaration was seen as a defining moment in the foreign policy of
the United States and one of its longest-standing tenets. It would be invoked by many U.S.
statesmen and several U.S. presidents, including Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore
Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. The intent and impact of the Monroe
Doctrine persisted with only small variations for more than a century. Its stated objective was
to free the newly independent colonies of Latin America from European intervention and
avoid situations which could make the New World a battleground for the Old World powers,
so that the U.S. could exert its own influence undisturbed. The doctrine asserted that the New
World and the Old World were to remain distinctly separate spheres of influence, for they
were composed of entirely separate and independent nations.

La guerra civil.

The American Civil War (also known by other names) was a war fought in the United

States from 1861 to 1865.[c] The Civil War is the most studied and written about episode
in U.S. history.[16]Primarily as a result of the long-standing controversy over the enslavement
of black people, war broke out in April 1861 when secessionist forces attacked Fort
Sumter in South Carolina shortly after Abraham Lincoln had been inaugurated as
the President of the United States. The loyalists of the Union in the North proclaimed support
for the Constitution. They faced secessionists of the Confederate States in the South, who
advocated for states' rights to uphold slavery.
Among the 34 U.S. states in February 1861, seven Southern slave states declared
their secessionfrom the country and formed the Confederate States of America. The
Confederacy grew to include eleven states, all of them slaveholding. The Confederate States
was never diplomatically recognized by the government of the United States or by that of any
foreign country.[d] The states that remained loyal to the U.S. were known as the Union. [e] The
Union and Confederacy quickly raised volunteer and conscription armies that fought mostly in
the South over the course of four years. Intense combat left 620,000 to 750,000 people dead,
more than the number of U.S. military deaths in all other wars combined. [f]
The war ended when General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Ulysses S. Grant at
the Battle of Appomattox Court House. Confederate generals throughout the southern states
followed suit. Much of the South's infrastructure was destroyed, especially the transportation
systems. The Confederacy collapsed, slavery was abolished, and four million black slaves
were freed. During the Reconstruction Era that followed the war, national unity was slowly
restored, the national government expanded its power, and civil rights were guaranteed to
freed black slaves through amendments to the Constitutionand federal legislation.

2. Imperialismo y expansión colonial.

 Imperialism is a policy in which one country seeks to extend its authority by conquering other
countries or by establishing economic and political dominance over other countries.
SETTING THE STAGE The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 was a European conference. And,
although black South Africans participated in it, the Boer War was largely a European war.
Europeans argued and fought among themselves over the lands of Africa. In carving up the
continent, the European countries paid little or no attention to historical political divisions or to
the many ethnic and language groupings in Africa. Uppermost in the minds of the Europeans
was the ability to control Africa’s land, its people, and its resources.

The imperialism of the 18th and 19th centuries was conducted differently from the
explorations of the 15th and 16th centuries. In the earlier period, imperial powers often did not
penetrate far into the conquered areas in Asia and Africa. Nor did they always have a
substantial influence on the lives of the people. During this new period of imperialism, the
Europeans demanded more influence over the economic, political, and social lives of the
people. They were determined to shape the economies of the lands to benefit European
economies. They also wanted the people to adopt European customs.

a. El imperio británico.
British Empire, a worldwide system of dependencies—colonies, protectorates, and other
territories—that over a span of some three centuries was brought under the sovereignty of the
crown of Great Britain and the administration of the British government. The policy of granting
or recognizing significant degrees of self-government by dependencies, which was favoured
by the far-flung nature of the empire, led to the development by the 20th century of the notion
of a “British Commonwealth,” comprising largely self-governing dependencies that
acknowledged an increasingly symbolic British sovereignty. The term was embodied in
statute in 1931. Today the Commonwealth includes former elements of the British Empire in a
free association of sovereignstates.

b. Geopolítica imperial: El imperio otomano y la “cuestión de Oriente”.

The "Question of the East" is the name given to the set of problems that arise during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as a consequence of the progressive weakening until
the final fall of the Ottoman Empire. The situation, especially at the end of the 19th century, is
presented in three ways:

the decline of the Ottoman Empire;

 the Christians of the Balkans;
the great empires
The Ottoman Empire and considerably weakened in the eighteenth century, is in full decline
in the nineteenth century. Detained in the Balkans since the end of the seventeenth century,
and with the Russian threat in Asia, the times of wars and pillages ended for the Empire; what
obliged the sultans, for the maintenance of their administration and the army, to resort to the
imposition of increasingly heavy taxes and difficult to pay for the population. The authority of
the sultan in the different provinces decreases in favor of the viziers and the local janissaries,
who in turn rarely receive their salaries and in turn, impose new taxes on the inhabitants.
Population that has been waiting for two centuries to be liberated from Turkish juice.

c. Afganistán y el “gran juego”.

The Great Game For much of the 19th century, Great Britain and Russia engaged in yet
another geopolitical struggle, this time over Muslim lands in Central Asia. Known as the
“Great Game,” the war was waged over India, one of Britain’s most profitable colonies.
Russia sought to extend its empire and gain access to India’s riches. Britain defended its
colony and also attempted to spread its empire beyond India’s borders. Afghanistan, which
lay between the Russian and British empires, became the center of their struggle. (See the
map on page 771.) In the 1800s, Afghanistan was an independent Muslim kingdom. Its dry,
mountainous terrain and determined people continually frustrated the invading imperial
powers. After decades of fighting, Great Britain finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1881. In
1921, Britain formally agreed that its empire would not extend beyond the Khyber Pass, which
borders eastern Afghanistan. The newly formed Soviet Union, meanwhile, signed a
nonaggression pact with Afghanistan. That agreement was honored until 1979, when the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
"The Great Game" was a political and diplomatic confrontation that existed for most of the
nineteenth century between the British Empire and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and
neighbouring territories in Central and Southern Asia. Russia was fearful of British
commercial and military inroads into Central Asia, and Britain was fearful of Russia adding
"the jewel in the crown", India, to the vast empire that Russia was building in Asia. This
resulted in an atmosphere of distrust and the constant threat of war between the two empires.
[1][2][3]
 Britain made it a high priority to protect all the approaches to India, and the "great game"
is primarily how the British did this in terms of a possible Russian threat. Historians with
access to the archives have concluded that Russia had no plans involving India, as the
Russians repeatedly stated.[4]
The Great Game began on 12 January 1830 when Lord Ellenborough, the President of the
Board of Control for India, tasked Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, to establish a
new trade route to the Emirate of Bukhara.[2][3][5] Britain intended to gain control over
the Emirate of Afghanistan and make it a protectorate, and to use the Ottoman Empire,
the Persian Empire, the Khanate of Khiva, and the Emirate of Bukhara as buffer states
between both empires. This would protect India and also key British sea trade routes by
stopping Russia from gaining a port on the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. [2][3] Russia
proposed Afghanistan as the neutral zone. [6] The results included the failed First Anglo-
Afghan War of 1838, the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845, the Second Anglo-Sikh War of 1848,
the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878, and the annexation of Khiva, Bukhara,
and Kokand by Russia.
Historians consider the end of the Great Game to be 10 September 1895 signing of
the Pamir Boundary Commission protocols, [7] when the border between Afghanistan and the
Russian empire was defined.[8][9][10][11]:p14 The 1901 novel Kim by Rudyard Kipling made the
term popular and introduced the new implication of great power rivalry. It became even more

popular after the 1979 advent of the Soviet–Afghan War.[12]

China y las guerras del opio

The Opium Wars were two wars in the mid-19th century involving China and the British
Empire over the British trade of opium and China's sovereignty. The clashes included
the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War(1856–1860). The wars and
events between them weakened the Qing dynasty and forced China to trade with the other
parts of the world.[1][2]
In 1820, China's economy was the largest in the world, according to British economist Angus
Maddison.[3] Within a decade after the end of the Second Opium War, China's share of global
GDP had fallen by half.[4] In another research paper published by Michael Cemblast of JP
Morgan[citation needed] and updated by the World Economic Forum, similar conclusions were
reached—i.e. China was the largest economy in the world for many centuries until the Opium
Wars.

First Opium War[edit]

Main article: First Opium War
The First Opium War, fought over opium trade, [4] financial reparations,[5] and diplomatic status,
[6]
 began in 1839 and was concluded by the Treaty of Nanking(Nanjing) in 1842. The treaty
ceded the Hong Kong island to the United Kingdom in perpetuity, and it established five treaty
ports at Shanghai, Canton, Ningpo(Ningbo), Foochow (Fuzhou), and Amoy. Another treaty
the next year gave most favored nation status to the United Kingdom[citation needed] and added
provisions for British extraterritoriality.[citation needed] Then France secured concessions on the
same terms as the British, in treaties of 1843 and 1844. [citation needed]
In the late 18th century, the British East India Company started smuggling opium from India
into China through various means and became the leading suppliers by 1773. [7] By 1787, the
British were sending 4,000 chests - one chest weighed 170 lbs - of opium to China. [8] The
Chinese Emperor passed many decrees/edicts against opium in 1729, 1799, 1814 and 1831,
but the trade flourished.[9] Even some Americans entered the trade by bringing opium from
Turkey into China. Some of the American opium traders included the great-grandfather of US
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and ancestors of US Secretary of State John Forbes Kerry.
[10]
 By 1833, the number of chests of opium trafficked into China soared to 30,000. [8] According
to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the British sent the opium to their warehouses
in the free trade region of Canton (Guangzhou), from where Chinese smugglers would take
the opium into mainland China.[9]The opium trade resulted in 4-12 million Chinese addicts and
devastated especially the large coastal Chinese cities. [8] In 1839, after having a letter to the
queen of England, pleading for a halt to the import of opium ignored, the emperor issued an
edict ordering the seizure of all the opium in Canton, including that held by foreign
governments.[citation needed] British traders alone lost 20,000 chests (1,300 metric tons) of opium,
without compensation.[9]

Second Opium War[edit]

Main article: Second Opium War
During 1856–1860, British forces fought towards legalization of the opium trade, to expand
trade in coolies (cheap laborers),[11] to open all of China to British merchants, and to exempt
foreign imports from internal transit duties[citation needed]. France joined the British. The war is also
known as the "Arrow War"[citation needed], referring to the name of a vessel at the starting point of
the conflict. The war resulted in the second group of treaty ports being set up; eventually,
more than 80 treaty ports were established in China, involving many foreign powers. All
foreign traders gained rights to travel within China
Japan Attacks China The Japanese first turned their sights to their neighbor, Korea. In 1876,
Japan forced Korea to open three ports to Japanese trade. But China also considered Korea
to be important both as a trading partner and a military outpost. Recognizing their similar
interests in Korea, Japan and China signed a hands-off agreement. In 1885, both countries
pledged that they would not send their armies into Korea. In June 1894, however, China
broke that agreement. Rebellions had broken out against Korea’s king. He asked China for
military help in putting them down. Chinese troops marched into Korea. Japan protested and
sent its troops to Korea to fight the Chinese. This Sino-Japanese War lasted just a few
months. In that time, Japan drove the Chinese out of Korea, destroyed the Chinese navy, and
gained a foothold in Manchuria. In 1895, China and Japan signed a peace treaty. This treaty
gave Japan its first colonies, Taiwan and the neighboring Pescadores Islands. (See the map
on page 803.)
La guerra de Crimea

Russia and the Crimean War Each generation of Russian czars launched a war on the
Ottomans to try to gain land on the Black Sea. The purpose was to give Russia a warm-
weather port. In 1853, war broke out between the Russians and the Ottomans. The war was
called the Crimean War, after a peninsula in the Black Sea where most of the war was fought.
Britain and France wanted to prevent the Russians from gaining control of additional Ottoman
lands. So they entered the war on the side of the Ottoman Empire. The combined forces of
the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and France defeated Russia. The Crimean War was the first war
in which women, led by Florence Nightingale, established their position as army nurses. It
was also the first war to be covered by newspaper correspondents. The Crimean War
revealed the Ottoman Empire’s military weakness. Despite the help of Britain and France, the
Ottoman Empire continued to lose lands. The Russians came to the aid of Slavic people in
the Balkans who rebelled against the Ottomans. The Ottomans lost control of Romania,
Montenegro, Cyprus, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and an area that became Bulgaria. The Ottomans
lost land in Africa too. By the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was reduced in
size and in deep decline
 . La guerra ruso-japonesa.
Russo-Japanese War Japan’s victory over China changed the world’s balance of power.
Russia and Japan emerged as the major powers—and enemies—in East Asia. The two
countries soon went to war over Manchuria. In 1903, Japan offered to recognize Russia’s
rights in Manchuria if the Russians would agree to stay out of Korea. But the Russians
refused. In February 1904, Japan launched a surprise attack on Russian ships anchored off
the coast of Manchuria. In the resulting Russo-Japanese War, Japan drove Russian troops
out of Korea and captured most of Russia’s Pacific fleet. It also destroyed Russia’s Baltic
fleet, which had sailed all the way around Africa to participate in the war. In 1905, Japan and
Russia began peace negotiations. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt helped draft the treaty,
which the two nations signed on a ship off Portsmouth, New Hampshire. This agreement, the
Treaty of Portsmouth, gave Japan the captured territories. It also forced Russia to withdraw
from Manchuria and to stay out of Korea.
Western Views of the East The Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905 exploded a
strong Western myth. Many Westerners believed that white people were a superior race. The
overwhelming success of European colonialism and imperialism in the Americas, Africa, and
Asia had reinforced this belief. But the Japanese had shown Europeans that people of other
races were their equals in modern warfare. Unfortunately, Japan’s military victory led to a
different form of Western racism. Influenced by the ideas of Germany’s Emperor Wilhelm II,
the West imagined the Japanese uniting with the Chinese and conquering Europe. The
resulting racist Western fear of what was called the yellow peril influenced world politics for
many decades.

d. Diplomacia y equilibrio imperial: De los Tratados de Westfalia al Congreso de Viena.

La Santa Alianza. El Congreso de Berlín.

Peace of Westphalia The war did great damage to Germany. Its population dropped from 20
million to about 16 million. Both trade and agriculture were disrupted, and Germany’s
economy was ruined. Germany had a long, difficult recovery from this devastation. That is a
major reason it did not become a unified state until the 1800s. The Peace of Westphalia
(1648) ended the war. The treaty had these important consequences: • weakened the
Hapsburg states of Spain and Austria; • strengthened France by awarding it German territory;
• made German princes independent of the Holy Roman emperor; • ended religious wars in
Europe; • introduced a new method of peace negotiation whereby all participants meet to
settle the problems of a war and decide the terms of peace. This method is still used today.
Beginning of Modern States The treaty thus abandoned the idea of a Catholic empire that
would rule most of Europe. It recognized Europe as a group of equal, independent states.
This marked the beginning of the modern state system and was the most important result of
the Thirty Years’ War.
The Peace of Westphalia (German: Westfälischer Friede) was a series of peace
treaties signed between May and October 1648 in the Westphalian cities
of Osnabrück and Münster, largely ending the European wars of religion. The treaties of
Westphalia brought to a close a calamitous period of European history which caused the
deaths of approximately eight million people. [1] Scholars have identified Westphalia as the
beginning of the modern international system, based on the concept of Westphalian
sovereignty.
The negotiation process was lengthy and complex. Talks took place in two different cities, as
each side wanted to meet on territory under its own control. A total of 109 delegations arrived
to represent the belligerent states, but not all delegations were present at the same time.
Three treaties were signed to end each of the overlapping wars: the Peace of Münster, the
Treaty of Münster, and the Treaty of Osnabrück. These treaties ended the Thirty Years'
War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, with the Habsburgs and their Catholic allies on
one side, battling the Protestant powers (Sweden, Denmark, Dutch, and Holy Roman
principalities) allied with France (Catholic but anti-Habsburg). The treaties also ended
the Eighty Years' War(1568–1648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic, with Spain
formally recognising the independence of the Dutch.
The Peace of Westphalia established the precedent of peace established
by diplomatic congress. A new system of political order arose in central Europe, based upon
peaceful coexistence among sovereign states. Inter-state aggression was to be held in check
by a balance of power, and a norm was established against interference in another state's
domestic affairs. As European influence spread across the globe, these Westphalian
principles, especially the concept of sovereign states, became central to international law and
to the prevailing world order.[2]
he Congress of Vienna (German: Wiener Kongress) also called Vienna Congress, was a
meeting of ambassadors of European states chaired by Austrianstatesman Klemens von
Metternich, and held in Vienna from November 1814 to June 1815, though the delegates had
arrived and were already negotiating by late September 1814. The objective of the Congress
was to provide a long-term peace plan for Europe by settling critical issues arising from
the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars. The goal was not simply to restore
old boundaries but to resize the main powers so they could balance each other and remain at
peace. The leaders were conservatives with little use for republicanism or revolution, both of
which threatened to upset the status quo in Europe. France lost all its recent conquests
while Prussia, Austria and Russia made major territorial gains. Prussia added smaller
German states in the west, Swedish Pomerania and 60% of the Kingdom of Saxony; Austria
gained Venice and much of northern Italy. Russia gained parts of Poland. The new Kingdom
of the Netherlands had been created just months before, and included formerly Austrian
territory that in 1830 became Belgium. he immediate background was Napoleonic France's
defeat and surrender in May 1814, which brought an end to 25 years of nearly continuous
war. Negotiations continued despite the outbreak of fighting triggered by Napoleon's dramatic
return from exile and resumption of power in France during the Hundred Days of March to
July 1815. The Congress's "final act" was signed nine days before his final defeat at Waterloo
on 18 June 1815.
The Congress has often been criticized for causing the subsequent suppression of the
emerging national and liberal movements,[1] and it has been seen as a reactionary
movement for the benefit of traditional monarchs. However, others praise it for having created
relatively long-term stability and peaceful conditions in most of Europe.[2][3]
In a technical sense, the "Congress of Vienna" was not properly a congress: it never met in
plenary session, and most of the discussions occurred in informal, face-to-face sessions
among the Great Powers of Austria, Britain, France, Russia, and sometimes Prussia, with
limited or no participation by other delegates. On the other hand, the congress was the first
occasion in history where, on a continental scale, national representatives came together to
formulate treaties instead of relying mostly on messages among the several capitals. The
Congress of Vienna settlement, despite later changes, formed the framework for European
international politics until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

The Holy Alliance (German: Heilige Allianz; Russian: Священный союз, Svyashchennyy

soyuz; also called the Grand Alliance) was a coalition created by the monarchist great
powers of Russia, Austria and Prussia. It was created after the ultimate defeat of Napoleon at
the behest of Tsar Alexander I of Russia and signed in Paris on 26 September 1815.[1]The
intention of the alliance was to restrain liberalism and secularism in Europe in the wake of the
devastating French Revolutionary Wars, and the alliance nominally succeeded in this until
the Crimean War (1853–1856). Otto von Bismarckmanaged to reunite the Holy Alliance after
the unification of Germany but the alliance again faltered by the 1880s over Austrian and
Russian conflicts of interest with regard to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.
The Berlin Conference of 1884–85, also known as the Congo
Conference (German: Kongokonferenz) or West Africa Conference (Westafrika-Konferenz),
[1]
 regulated European colonization and trade in Africa during the New Imperialismperiod and
coincided with Germany's sudden emergence as an imperial power. The conference was
organized by Otto von Bismarck, first Chancellor of Germany; its outcome, the General Act
of the Berlin Conference, can be seen as the formalisation of the Scramble for Africa. The
conference ushered in a period of heightened colonial activity by European powers, which
eliminated or overrode most existing forms of African autonomy and self-governance.
Early history of the “Berlin Conference”
Before the conference, European diplomacy treated African indigenous people in the same
manner as the New World natives, forming trading relationships with the indigenous chiefs. In
the early 1800s the search for ivory, which was then often used in the production of luxurious
products, led many white traders further into the interior of Africa.[3] By 1870, the momentum
of European intervention with Africa quickly increased, which can be seen as The Conquest
of Africa.[3] With the exception of trading posts along the coasts, the continent was
essentially ignored.[4]In 1876, King Leopold II of Belgium, who had previously founded and
controlled the International African Society that same year, invited Henry Morton Stanley to
join him in researching and 'civilizing' the continent. In 1878, the International Congo Society
was also formed, with more economic goals, but still closely related to the former society.
Léopold secretly bought off the foreign investors in the Congo Society, which was turned to
imperialistic goals, with the African Society serving primarily as a philanthropic front.[5]
From 1878 to 1885, Stanley returned to the Congo, not as a reporter but as an envoy from
Léopold with the secret mission to organize what would become known as the Congo Free
State. French intelligence had discovered Leopold's plans, and France quickly engaged in its
own colonial exploration. In 1881, French naval officer Pierre de Brazza was dispatched to
central Africa, traveled into the western Congo basin, and raised the French flag over the
newly founded Brazzaville, in what is currently the Republic of Congo. Finally, Portugal, which
already had a long, but essentially abandoned colonial Empire in the area through the mostly
defunct proxy state Kongo Empire, also claimed the area. Its claims were based on old
treaties with Spain and the Roman Catholic Church. It quickly made a treaty on 26 February
1884 with its former ally, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to block off the
 Congo Society's access to the Atlantic. By the early 1880s, due to many factors including
diplomatic maneuvers, subsequent colonial exploration, and recognition of Africa's
abundance of valuable resources such as gold, timber, rubber, land, and markets, European
interest in the continent had increased dramatically. Stanley's charting of the Congo River
Basin (1874–77) removed the last terra incognita from European maps of the continent,
delineating the areas of British, Portuguese, French, and Belgian control. The powers raced
to push these rough boundaries to their furthest limits and eliminate any potential local minor
powers which might prove troublesome to European competitive diplomacy.[6] France moved
to take over Tunisia, one of the last of the Barbary Pirate states, under the pretext of another
piracy incident. French claims by Pierre de Brazza were quickly solidified with French taking
control of today's Republic of the Congo in 1881 and Guinea in 1884. Italy became part of the
Triple Alliance, upsetting Bismarck's carefully laid plans with the state and forcing Germany to
become involved in Africa.[7] In 1882, realizing the geopolitical extent of Portuguese control
on the coasts, but seeing penetration by France eastward across Central Africa toward
Ethiopia, the Nile, and the Suez Canal, Britain saw its vital trade route through Egypt and its
Indian Empire threatened. Under the pretext of the collapsed Egyptian financing and a
subsequent riot, in which hundreds of Europeans and British subjects were murdered or
injured, Britain intervened in nominally Ottoman Egypt and kept control for decades.

e. El imperio alemán.
the German Empire (German: Deutsches Kaiserreich, officially Deutsches Reich),[5][6][7][8] also
known as Imperial Germany,[9] was the German nation state[10] that existed from
the Unification of Germany in 1871 until the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1918.
It was founded in 1871 when the south German states, except for Austria, joined the North
German Confederation. On 1 January 1871, the new constitution came into force that
changed the name of the federal state and introduced the title of emperor for Wilhelm I, King
of Prussia from the House of Hohenzollern.[11] Berlin remained its capital, and Otto von
Bismarck remained Chancellor, the head of government. As these events occurred,
the Prussian-led North German Confederation and its southern German allies were still
engaged in the Franco-Prussian War.
The German Empire consisted of 26 states, most of them ruled by royal families. They
included four kingdoms, six grand duchies, five duchies (six before 1876),
seven principalities, three free Hanseatic cities, and one imperial territory.
Although Prussia was one of several kingdoms in the realm, it contained about two thirds of
Germany's population and territory. Prussian dominance was also established
constitutionally.
After 1850, the states of Germany had rapidly become industrialized, with particular strengths
in coal, iron (and later steel), chemicals, and railways. In 1871, Germany had a population of
41 million people; by 1913, this had increased to 68 million. A heavily rural collection of states
in 1815, the now united Germany became predominantly urban. [12] During its 47 years of
existence, the German Empire was an industrial, technological, and scientific giant, gaining
more Nobel Prizes in science than any other country.[13] By 1900, Germany was the largest
economy in Europe, surpassing the United Kingdom, as well as the second-largest in the
world, behind only the United States.[14]
From 1867 to 1878/9, Otto von Bismarck's tenure as the first and to this day longest
reigning Chancellor was marked by relative liberalism, but it became more conservative
afterwards. Broad reforms and the Kulturkampfmarked his period in the office. Late in
Bismarck's chancellorship and in spite of his personal opposition, Germany became
involved in colonialism. Claiming much of the leftover territory that was yet unclaimed in
the Scramble for Africa, it managed to build the third-largest colonial empire after
the British and the French ones.[15] As a colonial state, it sometimes clashed with
other European powers, especially the British Empire. Germany became a great power,
boasting a rapidly developing rail network, the world's strongest army, and a fast-growing
industrial base.[16] In less than a decade, its navy became second only to Britain's Royal Navy.
After the removal of Otto von Bismarck by Wilhelm II in 1890, the Empire embarked
on Weltpolitik – a bellicose new course that ultimately contributed to the outbreak of World
War I. In addition, Bismarck's successors were incapable of maintaining their predecessor's
complex, shifting, and overlapping alliances which had kept Germany from being
diplomatically isolated. This period was marked by various factors influencing the Emperor's
decisions, which were often perceived as contradictory or unpredictable by the public. In
1879, the German Empire consolidated the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, followed by
the Triple Alliance with Italy in 1882. It also retained strong diplomatic ties to the Ottoman
Empire. When the great crisis of 1914 arrived, Italy left the alliance and the Ottoman
Empire formally allied with Germany.In the First World War, German plans to capture Paris
quickly in the autumn of 1914 failed. The war on the Western Front became a stalemate.
The Allied naval blockade caused severe shortages of food. However, Imperial Germany had
success on the Eastern Front; it occupied a large amount of territory to its east following
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in
early 1917, contributed to bringing the United States into the war.The high
command under Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff increasingly controlled the
country, but in October after the failed offensive in spring 1918, the German armies were in
retreat, allies Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire had collapsed, and Bulgaria had
surrendered. The Empire collapsed in the November 1918 Revolution with the abdications of
its monarchs. This left a postwar federal republic and a devastated and unsatisfied populace,
which later led to the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazism.[citation needed]
3. Las guerras mundiales
a. Primera Guerra Mundial: Orígenes y causas. Rivalidades y equilibrios imperiales.

SETTING THE STAGE By 1914, Europe was divided into two rival camps. One alliance, the
Triple Entente, included Great Britain, France, and Russia. The other, known as the Triple
Alliance, included Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war
against Serbia set off a chain reaction within the alliance system. The countries of Europe
followed through on their pledges to support one another. As a result, nearly all of Europe
soon joined what would be the largest, most destructive war the world had yet seen.

World War I (often abbreviated as WWI or WW1), also known as the First World War or
the Great War, was a global war originating in Europe that lasted from 28 July 1914 to 11
November 1918. Contemporaneously described as "the war to end all wars",[7] it led to the
mobilisation of more than 70 million military personnel, including 60 million Europeans,
making it one of the largest wars in history. [8][9]An estimated nine million combatants and
seven million civilians died as a direct result of the war, and it also contributed to later
genocides and the 1918 influenza pandemic, which caused between 50 and 100 million
deaths worldwide.[10] Military losses were exacerbated by new technological and industrial
developments and the tactical stalemate caused by gruelling trench warfare. It was one of the
deadliest conflicts in historyand precipitated major political changes, including the Revolutions
of 1917–1923, in many of the nations involved. Unresolved rivalries at the end of the
conflict contributed to the start of World War II about twenty years later.[11]
The 1917 February Revolution in Russia replaced the Tsarist autocracy with the Provisional
Government, but continuing discontent at the cost of the war led to the October Revolution,
the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic, and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by
the new government, ending Russia's involvement in the war. This allowed the transfer of
large numbers of German troops from the East to the Western Front, resulting in the German
March 1918 Offensive. The offensive was initially successful, but the Allied Powers rallied and
drove the Germans back in the Hundred Days Offensive.[22] Bulgaria was the first Central
Power to sign an armistice—the Armistice of Salonica on 29 September 1918. On 30
October, the Ottoman Empire capitulated, signing the Armistice of Mudros.[23] On 4
November, the Austro-Hungarian empire agreed to the Armistice of Villa Giusti. With its allies
defeated, revolution at home, and the military no longer willing to fight, Kaiser
Wilhelm abdicated on 9 November and Germany also signed an armistice on 11 November
1918
World War I was a significant turning point in the political, cultural, economic, and social
climate of the world. As a result of the war, the Russian Empire, the German Empire, Austria-
Hungary and the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist. Revolutions and uprisings in the aftermath
of the war became widespread, being mainly socialist or anti-colonial in nature. The Big
Four (Britain, France, the United States and Italy) imposed their terms in a series of treaties
agreed at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The formation of the League of Nations was
intended to prevent another world war, but for various reasons failed to do so. The rise of
the Nazi Party and their central role in World War II led to a focus on how the Treaty of
Versailles affected Germany, but the peace treaties in addition to various secret agreements
during the war also transformed borders throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East, with
repercussions that still echo to this day.

Orígenes y causas. Rivalidades y equilibrios imperiales

Rising Tensions in Europe While peace and harmony characterized much of Europe at the
beginning of the 1900s, there were less visible—and darker—forces at work as well. Below
the surface of peace and goodwill, Europe witnessed several gradual developments that
would ultimately help propel the continent into war.
The Rise of Nationalism One such development was the growth of nationalism, or a deep
devotion to one’s nation. Nationalism can serve as a unifying force within a country. However,
it also can cause intense competition among nations, with each seeking to overpower the
other. By the turn of the 20th century, a fierce rivalry indeed had developed among Europe’s
Great Powers. Those nations were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Russia, Italy,
and France. This increasing rivalry among European nations stemmed from several sources.
Competition for materials and markets was one. Territorial disputes were another. France, for
example, had never gotten over the loss of AlsaceLorraine to Germany in the Franco-
Prussian War (1870). Austria-Hungary and Russia both tried to dominate in the Balkans, a
region in southeast Europe. Within the Balkans, the intense nationalism of Serbs, Bulgarians,
Romanians, and other ethnic groups led to demands for independence.
Imperialism and Militarism Another force that helped set the stage for war in Europe was
imperialism. As Chapter 27 explained, the nations of Europe competed fiercely for colonies in
Africa and Asia. The quest for colonies sometimes pushed European nations to the brink of
war. As European countries continued to compete for overseas empires, their sense of rivalry
and mistrust of one another deepened.

Tangled Alliances Growing rivalries and mutual mistrust had led to the creation of several
military alliances among the Great Powers as early as the 1870s. This alliance system had
been designed to keep peace in Europe. But it would instead help push the continent into
war. Bismarck Forges Early Pacts Between 1864 and 1871, Prussia’s blood-and-iron
chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, freely used war to unify Germany. After 1871, however,
Bismarck declared Germany to be a “satisfied power.” He then turned his energies to
maintaining peace in Europe. Bismarck saw France as the greatest threat to peace. He
believed that France still wanted revenge for its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.
Bismarck’s first goal, therefore, was to isolate France. “As long as it is without allies,”
Bismarck stressed, “France poses no danger to us.” In 1879, Bismarck formed the Dual
Alliance between Germany and AustriaHungary. Three years later, Italy joined the two
countries, forming the Triple Alliance. In 1881, Bismarck took yet another possible ally away
from France by making a treaty with Russia.

Shifting Alliances Threaten Peace In 1890, Germany’s foreign policy changed dramatically.
That year, Kaiser Wilhelm II—who two years earlier had become ruler of Germany—forced
Bismarck to resign. A proud and stubborn man, Wilhelm II did not wish to share power with
anyone. Besides wanting to assert his own power, the new kaiser was eager to show the
world just how mighty Germany had become. The army was his greatest pride. “I and the
army were born for one another,” Wilhelm declared shortly after taking power.

Wilhelm let his nation’s treaty with Russia lapse in 1890. Russia responded by forming a
defensive military alliance with France in 1892 and 1894. Such an alliance had been
Bismarck’s fear. War with either Russia or France would make Germany the enemy of both.
Germany would then be forced to fight a two-front war, or a war on both its eastern and
western borders. Next, Wilhelm began a tremendous shipbuilding program in an effort to
make the German navy equal to that of the mighty British fleet. Alarmed, Great Britain formed
an entente, or alliance, with France. In 1907, Britain made another entente, this time with both
France and Russia. The Triple Entente, as it was called, did not bind Britain to fight with
France and Russia. However, it did almost certainly ensure that Britain would not fight against
them. By 1907, two rival camps existed in Europe. On one side was the Triple Alliance—
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. On the other side was the Triple Entente—Great
Britain, France, and Russia. A dispute between two rival powers could draw all the nations of
Europe into war.

Nowhere was that dispute more likely to occur than on the Balkan Peninsula. This
mountainous peninsula in the southeastern corner of Europe was home to an assortment of
ethnic groups. With a long history of nationalist uprisings and ethnic clashes, the Balkans was
known as the “powder keg” of Europe
Shot Rings Throughout Europe Into this poisoned atmosphere of mutual dislike and mistrust
stepped the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife,
Sophie. On June 28, 1914, the couple paid a state visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. It
would be their last. The royal pair was shot at point-blank range as they rode through the
streets of Sarajevo in an open car. The killer was Gavrilo Princip, a 19-year-old Serbian and
member of the Black Hand. The Black Hand was a secret society committed to ridding Bosnia
of Austrian rule.

The Great War Begins In response to Austria’s declaration of war, Russia, Serbia’s ally,
began moving its army toward the Russian-Austrian border. Expecting Germany to join
Austria, Russia also mobilized along the German border. To Germany, Russia’s mobilization
amounted to a declaration of war. On August 1, the German government declared war on
Russia. Russia looked to its ally France for help. Germany, however, did not even wait for
France to react. Two days after declaring war on Russia, Germany also declared war on
France. Soon afterward, Great Britain declared war on Germany. Much of Europe was now
locked in battle. Nations Take Sides By mid-August 1914, the battle lines were clearly drawn.
On one side were Germany and Austria-Hungary. They were known as the Central Powers
because of their location in the heart of Europe. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire would later
join the Central Powers in the hopes of regaining lost territories. On the other side were Great
Britain, France, and Russia. Together, they were known as the Allied Powers or the Allies.
Japan joined the Allies within weeks. Italy joined later. Italy had been a member of the Triple
Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, the Italians joined the other side after
accusing their former partners of unjustly starting the war. In the late summer of 1914,
millions of soldiers marched happily off to battle, convinced that the war would be short. Only
a few people foresaw the horror ahead. One of them was Britain’s foreign minister, Sir
Edward Grey. Staring out over London at nightfall, Grey said sadly to a friend, “The lamps are
going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.”
The Battle on the Eastern Front Even as the war on the Western Front claimed thousands of
lives, both sides were sending millions more men to fight on the Eastern Front. This area was
a stretch of battlefield along the German and Russian border. Here, Russians and Serbs
battled Germans and Austro-Hungarians. The war in the east was a more mobile war than
that in the west. Here too, however, slaughter and stalemate were common

World War I was much more than a European conflict. Australia and Japan, for example,
entered the war on the Allies’ side, while India supplied troops to fight alongside their British
rulers. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Turks and later Bulgaria allied themselves with Germany and
the Central Powers. As the war promised to be a grim, drawn-out affair, all the Great Powers
looked for other allies around the globe to tip the balance. They also sought new war fronts
on which to achieve victory.
America Joins the Fight In 1917, the focus of the war shifted to the high seas. That year, the
Germans intensified the submarine warfare that had raged in the Atlantic Ocean since shortly
after the war began. In January 1917, the Germans announced that their submarines would
sink without warning any ship in the waters around Britain. This policy was called unrestricted
submarine warfare.

The Allies Win the War With the United States finally in the war, the balance, it seemed, was
about to tip in the Allies’ favor. Before that happened, however, events in Russia gave
Germany a victory on the Eastern Front, and new hope for winning the conflict. Russia
Withdraws In March 1917, civil unrest in Russia—due in large part to war-related shortages of
food and fuel—forced Czar Nicholas to step down. In his place a provisional government was
established. The new government pledged to continue fighting the war. However, by 1917,
nearly 5.5 million Russian soldiers had been wounded, killed, or taken prisoner. As a result,
the war-weary Russian army refused to fight any longer. Eight months after the new
government took over, a revolution shook Russia (see Chapter 30). In November 1917,
Communist leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin seized power. Lenin insisted on ending his country’s
involvement in the war. One of his first acts was to offer Germany a truce. In March 1918,
Germany and Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which ended the war between them
The Central Powers Collapse Russia’s withdrawal from the war at last allowed Germany to
send nearly all its forces to the Western Front. In March 1918, the Germans mounted one
final, massive attack on the Allies in France. As in the opening weeks of the war, the German
forces crushed everything in their path. By late May 1918, the Germans had again reached
the Marne River. Paris was less than 40 miles away. Victory seemed within reach. By this
time, however, the German military had weakened. The effort to reach the Marne had
exhausted men and supplies alike. Sensing this weakness, the Allies—with the aid of nearly
140,000 fresh U.S. troops—launched a counterattack. In July 1918, the Allies and Germans
clashed at the Second Battle of the Marne. Leading the Allied attack were some 350 tanks
that rumbled slowly forward, smashing through the German lines. With the arrival of 2 million
more American troops, the Allied forces began to advance steadily toward Germany. Soon,
the Central Powers began to crumble. First the Bulgarians and then the Ottoman Turks
surrendered. In October, revolution swept through AustriaHungary. In Germany, soldiers
mutinied, and the public turned on the kaiser. On November 9, 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II
stepped down. Germany declared itself a republic. A representative of the new German
government met with French Commander Marshal Foch in a railway car near Paris. The two
signed an armistice, or an agreement to stop fighting. On November 11, World War I came to
an end.
The Legacy of the War World War I was, in many ways, a new kind of war. It involved the use
of new technologies. It ushered in the notion of war on a grand and global scale. It also left
behind a landscape of death and destruction such as was never before seen. Both sides in
World War I paid a tremendous price in terms of human life. About 8.5 million soldiers died as
a result of the war. Another 21 million were wounded. In addition, the war led to the death of
countless civilians by way of starvation, disease, and slaughter. Taken together, these figures
spelled tragedy— an entire generation of Europeans wiped out. The war also had a
devastating economic impact on Europe. The great conflict drained the treasuries of
European countries. One account put the total cost of the war at $338 billion, a staggering
amount for that time. The war also destroyed acres of farmland, as well as homes, villages,
and towns. The enormous suffering that resulted from the Great War left a deep mark on
Western society as well. A sense of disillusionment settled over the survivors. The insecurity
and despair that many people experienced are reflected in the art and literature of the time.
Another significant legacy of the war lay in its peace agreement. As you will read in the next
section, the treaties to end World War I were forged after great debate and compromise. And
while they sought to bring a new sense of security and peace to the world, they prompted
mainly anger and resentment
The Allies Meet and Debate Despite representatives from numerous countries, the meeting’s
major decisions were hammered out by a group known as the Big Four: Woodrow Wilson of
the United States, Georges Clemenceau of France, David Lloyd George of Great Britain, and
Vittorio Orlando of Italy. Russia, in the grip of civil war, was not represented. Neither were
Germany and its allies. Wilson’s Plan for Peace In January 1918, while the war was still
raging, President Wilson had drawn up a series of peace proposals. Known as the Fourteen
Points, they outlined a plan for achieving a just and lasting peace. The first four points
included an end to secret treaties, freedom of the seas, free trade, and reduced national
armies and navies. The fifth goal was the adjustment of colonial claims with fairness toward
colonial peoples. The sixth through thirteenth points were specific suggestions for changing
borders and creating new nations. The guiding idea behind these points was self-
determination. This meant allowing people to decide for themselves under what government
they wished to live. Finally, the fourteenth point proposed a “general association of nations”
that would protect “great and small states alike.” This reflected Wilson’s hope for an
organization that could peacefully negotiate solutions to world conflicts. The Versailles Treaty
As the Paris Peace Conference opened, Britain and France showed little sign of agreeing to
Wilson’s vision of peace. Both nations were concerned with national security. They also
wanted to strip Germany of its war-making power. The differences in French, British, and U.S.
aims led to heated arguments among the nations’ leaders. Finally a compromise was
reached. The Treaty of Versailles between Germany and the Allied powers was signed on
June 28, 1919, five years to the day after Franz Ferdinand’s assassination in Sarajevo.
Adopting Wilson’s fourteenth point, the treaty created a League of Nations. The league was to
be an international association whose goal would be to keep peace among nations. The
treaty also punished Germany. The defeated nation lost substantial territory and had severe
restrictions placed on its military operations. As tough as these provisions were, the harshest
was Article 231. It was also known as the “war guilt” clause. It placed sole responsibility for
the war on Germany’s shoulders. As a result, Germany had to pay reparations to the Allies.
All of Germany’s territories in Africa and the Pacific were declared mandates, or territories to
be administered by the League of Nations. Under the peace agreement, the Allies would
govern the mandates until they were judged ready for independence.
A Troubled Treaty The Versailles treaty was just one of five treaties negotiated by the Allies.
In the end, these agreements created feelings of bitterness and betrayal—among the victors
and the defeated. The Creation of New Nations The Western powers signed separate peace
treaties in 1919 and 1920 with each of the other defeated nations: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and the Ottoman Empire. These treaties, too, led to huge land losses for the Central Powers.
Several new countries were created out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were all recognized as independent nations. The Ottoman
Turks were forced to give up almost all of their former empire. They retained only the territory
that is today the country of Turkey. The Allies carved up the lands that the Ottomans lost in
Southwest Asia into mandates rather than independent nations. Palestine, Iraq, and
Transjordan came under British control; Syria and Lebanon went to France. Russia, which
had left the war early, suffered land losses as well. Romania and Poland both gained Russian
territory. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, formerly part of Russia, became independent
nations. “A Peace Built on Quicksand” In the end, the Treaty of Versailles did little to build a
lasting peace. For one thing, the United States—considered after the war to be the dominant
nation in the world—ultimately rejected the treaty. Many Americans objected to the settlement
and especially to President Wilson’s League of Nations. Americans believed that the United
States’ best hope for peace was to stay out of European affairs. The United States worked
out a separate treaty with Germany and its allies several years later In addition, the treaty
with Germany, in particular the war-guilt clause, left a legacy of bitterness and hatred in the
hearts of the German people. Other countries felt cheated and betrayed by the peace
settlements as well. Throughout Africa and Asia, people in the mandated territories were
angry at the way the Allies disregarded their desire for independence. The European powers,
it seemed to them, merely talked about the principle of national self-determination. European
colonialism, disguised as the mandate system, continued in Asia and Africa. Some Allied
powers, too, were embittered by the outcome. Both Japan and Italy, which had entered the
war to gain territory, had gained less than they wanted. Lacking the support of the United
States, and later other world powers, the League of Nations was in no position to take action
on these and other complaints. The settlements at Versailles represented, as one observer
noted, “a peace built on quicksand.” Indeed, that quicksand eventually would give way. In a
little more than two decades, the treaties’ legacy of bitterness would help plunge the world
into another catastrophic war
Following the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke of Franz Ferdinand by a
Bosnian Serb, the Kaiser offered Emperor Franz Joseph full support for Austro-Hungarian
plans to invade the Kingdom of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary blamed for the assassination.
This unconditional support for Austria-Hungary was called a "blank cheque" by historians,
including German Fritz Fischer. Subsequent interpretation – for example at the Versailles
Peace Conference – was that this "blank cheque" licensed Austro-Hungarian aggression
regardless of the diplomatic consequences, and thus Germany bore responsibility for starting
the war, or at least provoking a wider conflict.
Germany began the war by targeting its chief rival, France. Germany saw France as its
principal danger on the European continent as it could mobilize much faster than Russia and
bordered Germany's industrial core in the Rhineland. Unlike Britain and Russia, the French
entered the war mainly for revenge against Germany, in particular for France's loss of Alsace-
Lorraine to Germany in 1871. The German high command knew that France would muster its
forces to go into Alsace-Lorraine. Aside from the very unofficial Septemberprogramm, the
Germans never stated a clear list of goals that they wanted out of the war

Rivalidades y equilibrios imperiales

La crisis de 1914. Desarrollo del Conflicto. Consecuencias. Tratado de Versalles.

b. Período entre guerras: Auge de los totalitarismos: la revolución rusa, el fascismo
italiano y el ascenso del partido nazi alemán.

The Russian Revolution was a pair of revolutions in Russia in 1917 which dismantled

the Tsarist autocracy and led to the rise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Empire collapsed
with the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II and the old regime was replaced by a provisional
government during the first revolution of February 1917 (March in the Gregorian calendar; the
older Julian calendar was in use in Russia at the time). Alongside it arose grassroots
community assemblies (called 'Soviets') which contended for authority. In the second
revolution that October, the Provisional Government was toppled and all power was given to
the Soviets.
The February Revolution (March 1917) was a revolution focused around Petrograd
(now Saint Petersburg), the capital of Russia at that time. In the chaos, members of the
Imperial parliament (the Duma) assumed control of the country, forming the Russian
Provisional Government which was heavily dominated by the interests of large capitalists and
the noble aristocracy. The army leadership felt they did not have the means to suppress the
revolution, resulting in Tsar Nicholas's abdication. The Soviets, which were dominated by
soldiers and the urban industrial working class, initially permitted the Provisional Government
to rule, but insisted on a prerogative to influence the government and control various militias.
The February Revolution took place in the context of heavy military setbacks during the First
World War (1914–18), which left much of the Russian Army in a state of mutiny.
A period of dual power ensued, during which the Provisional Government held state power
while the national network of Soviets, led by socialists, had the allegiance of the lower classes
and, increasingly, the left-leaning urban middle class. During this chaotic period there were
frequent mutinies, protests and many strikes. Many socialist political organizations were
engaged in daily struggle and vied for influence within the Duma and the Soviets, central
among which were the Bolsheviks ("Ones of the Majority") led by Vladimir Lenin who
campaigned for an immediate end to the war, land to the peasants, and bread to the workers.
When the Provisional Government chose to continue fighting the war with Germany, the
Bolsheviks and other socialist factions were able to exploit virtually universal disdain towards
the war effort as justification to advance the revolution further. The Bolsheviks turned workers'
militias under their control into the Red Guards (later the Red Army) over which they exerted
substantial control.[1]
In the October Revolution (November in the Gregorian calendar), the Bolsheviks led an
armed insurrection by workers and soldiers in Petrograd that successfully overthrew the
Provisional Government, transferring all its authority to the Soviets with the capital being
relocated to Moscow shortly thereafter. The Bolsheviks had secured a strong base of support
within the Soviets and, as the now supreme governing party, established a federal
government dedicated to reorganizing the former empire into the world's first socialist
republic, practicing Soviet democracy on a national and international scale. The promise to
end Russia's participation in the First World War was honored promptly with the Bolshevik
leaders signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March 1918. To further secure
the new state, the Cheka was established which functioned as a revolutionary security
service that sought to weed out and punish those considered to be "enemies of the people" in
campaigns consciously modeled on similar events during the French Revolution.
Soon after, civil war erupted among the "Reds" (Bolsheviks), the "Whites" (counter-
revolutionaries), the independence movements and the non-Bolshevik socialists. It continued
for several years, during which the Bolsheviks defeated both the Whites and all rival socialists
and thereafter reconstituted themselves as the Communist Party. In this way, the Revolution
paved the way for the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922.
While many notable historical events occurred in Moscow and Petrograd, there was also a
visible movement in cities throughout the state, among national minorities throughout the
empire and in the rural areas, where peasants took over and redistributed land.

SETTING THE STAGE The Russian Revolution was like a firecracker with a very long
fuse. The explosion came in 1917, yet the fuse had been burning for nearly a century. The
cruel, oppressive rule of most 19th-century czars caused widespread social unrest for
decades. Army officers revolted in 1825. Secret revolutionary groups plotted to overthrow the
government. In 1881, revolutionaries angry over the slow pace of political change
assassinated the reform-minded czar, Alexander II. Russia was heading toward a full-scale
revolution.
The Bolshevik Revolution Lenin and the Bolsheviks soon gained control of the Petrograd
soviet, as well as the soviets in other major Russian cities. By the fall of 1917, people in the
cities were rallying to the call, “All power to the soviets.” Lenin’s slogan—“Peace, Land, and
Bread”—gained widespread appeal. Lenin decided to take action. The Provisional
Government Topples In November 1917, without warning, armed factory workers stormed the
Winter Palace in Petrograd. Calling themselves the Bolshevik Red Guards, they took over
government offices and arrested the leaders of the provisional government. Kerensky and his
colleagues disappeared almost as quickly as the czarist regime they had replaced.
Bolsheviks in Power Within days after the Bolshevik takeover, Lenin ordered that all farmland
be distributed among the peasants. Lenin and the Bolsheviks gave control of factories to the
workers. The Bolshevik government also signed a truce with Germany to stop all fighting and
began peace talks. In March 1918, Russia and Germany signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Russia surrendered a large part of its territory to Germany and its allies. The humiliating
terms of this treaty triggered widespread anger among many Russians. They objected to the
Bolsheviks and their policies and to the murder of the royal family. Civil War Rages in Russia
The Bolsheviks now faced a new challenge—stamping out their enemies at home. Their
opponents formed the White Army. The White Army was made up of very different groups.
There were those groups who supported the return to rule by the czar, others who wanted
democratic government, and even socialists who opposed Lenin’s style of socialism. Only the
desire to defeat the Bolsheviks united the White Army. The groups barely cooperated with
each other. At one point there were three White Armies fighting against the Bolsheviks’ Red
Army. The revolutionary leader, Leon Trotsky, expertly commanded the Bolshevik Red Army.
From 1918 to 1920, civil war raged in Russia. Several Western nations, including the United
States, sent military aid and forces to Russia to help the White Army. However, they were of
little help.
Totalitarianism CASE STUDY
SETTING THE STAGE Stalin, Lenin’s successor, dramatically transformed the government of
the Soviet Union. Stalin was determined that the Soviet Union should find its place both
politically and economically among the most powerful of nations in the world. Using tactics
designed to rid himself of opposition, Stalin worked to establish total control of all aspects of
life in the Soviet Union. He controlled not only the government, but also the economy and
many aspects of citizens’ private lives. A Government of Total Control The term
totalitarianism describes a government that takes total, centralized, state control over every
aspect of public and private life. Totalitarian leaders appear to provide a sense of security and
to give a direction for the future. In the 20th century, the widespread use of mass
communication made it possible to reach into all aspects of citizens’ lives. A dynamic leader
who can build support for his policies and justify his actions heads most totalitarian
governments. Often the leader utilizes secret police to crush opposition and create a sense of
fear among the people. No one is exempt from suspicion or accusations that he or she is an
enemy of the state. Totalitarianism challenges the highest values prized by Western
democracies—reason, freedom, human dignity, and the worth of the individual. As the chart
on the next page shows, all totalitarian states share basic characteristics. To dominate an
entire nation, totalitarian leaders devised methods of control and persuasion. These included
the use of terror, indoctrination, propaganda, censorship, and religious or ethnic persecution.
Police Terror Dictators of totalitarian states use terror and violence to force obedience and to
crush opposition. Normally, the police are expected to respond to criminal activity and protect
the citizens. In a totalitarian state, the police serve to enforce the central government’s
policies. They may do this by spying on the citizens or by intimidating them. Sometimes they
use brutal force and even murder to achieve their goals. Indoctrination Totalitarian states rely
on indoctrination—instruction in the government’s beliefs—to mold people’s minds. Control of
education is absolutely essential to glorify the leader and his policies and to convince all
citizens that their

The Birth of Fascism In the early 1920s, in the wake of economic turmoil, political disorder,
and the general insecurity and fear stemming from World War I, Benito Mussolini (1883--
1945) burst upon the Italian scene with the first Fascist movement in Europe. Mussolini began
his political career as a socialist but was expelled from the Socialist Party after supporting
Italy’s entry into World War I, a position contrary to the socialist principle of ardent neutrality in
imperialist wars. In 1919, Mussolini established a new political group, the Fascio di
Combattimento, or League of Combat. It received little attention in the parliamentary elections
of 1919, but Italy’s three major political parties were unable to form an effective governmental
coalition. When socialists began to speak of the need for revolution, provoking worker strikes
and a general climate of class violence, alarmed conservatives turned to the Fascists, who
formed armed squads to attack socialist offices and newspapers. By 1922, Mussolini’s
nationalist rhetoric and ability to play to middle-class fears of radicalism, revolution, and
disorder were attracting ever more adherents. On October 29, 1922, after Mussolini and the
Fascists threatened to march on Rome if they were not given power, King Victor Emmanuel
III (r. 1900--1946) capitulated and made Mussolini prime minister of Italy. By 1926, Mussolini
had established the institutional framework for his Fascist dictatorship. Press laws gave the
government the right to suspend any publication that fostered disrespect for the Catholic
church, the monarchy, or the state. The prime minister was made ‘‘head of government’’ with
the power to legislate by decree. A police law empowered the police to arrest and confine
anybody for both nonpolitical and political crimes without due process of law. In 1926, all anti-
Fascist parties were outlawed. By the end of 1926, Mussolini ruled Italy as Il Duce, the leader.
Mussolini left no doubt of his intentions. Fascism, he said, ‘‘is totalitarian, and the Fascist
State, the synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and gives strength to the
whole life of the people.’’1 His regime attempted to mold Italians into a single-minded
community by developing Fascist organizations. By 1939, about two-thirds of the population
between eight and eighteen had been enrolled in some kind of Fascist youth group. Activities
for these groups included Saturday afternoon marching drills and calisthenics, seaside and
mountain summer camps, and youth contests. Beginning in the 1930s, all young men were
given some kind of premilitary exercises to develop discipline and provide training for war.
Mussolini hoped to create a new Italian: hardworking, physically fit, disciplined, intellectually
sharp, and martially inclined. In practice, the Fascists largely reinforced traditional social
attitudes, as is evident in their policies toward women. The Fascists portrayed the family as
the pillar of the state and women as the foundation of the family. ‘‘Woman into the home’’
became the Fascist slogan. Women were to be homemakers and baby producers, ‘‘their
natural and fundamental mission in life,’’ according to Mussolini, who viewed population
growth as an indicator of national strength. A practical consideration also underlay the Fascist
attitude toward women: working women would compete with males for jobs in the depression
economy of the 1930s. Eliminating women from the market reduced male unemployment.
Hitler and Nazi Germany As Mussolini began to lay the foundations of his Fascist state in
Italy, a young admirer was harboring similar dreams in Germany. Born on April 20, 1889,
Adolf Hitler was the son of an Austrian customs official. He had done poorly in secondary
school and eventually made his way to Vienna to become an artist. Through careful
observation of the political scene, Hitler became an avid German nationalist who learned from
his experience in mass politics in Austria how political parties could use propaganda and
terror effectively. But it was only after World War I, during which he had served as a soldier
on the Western Front, that Hitler became actively involved in politics. By then, he had become
convinced that the cause of German defeat had been the Jews, for whom he now developed
a fervent hatred. The Roots of Anti-Semitism Anti-Semitism, of course, was not new to
European civilization. Since the Middle Ages, Jews had been portrayed as the murderers of
Christ and were often subjected to mob violence and official persecution. Their rights were
restricted, and they were physically separated from Christians in residential quarters known
as ghettos. By the nineteenth century, as a result of the ideals of the Enlightenment and the
French Revolution, Jews were increasingly granted legal equality in many European
countries. Nevertheless, Jews were not completely accepted, and this ambivalence was
apparent throughout Europe. Nowhere in Europe did Jews play a more active role in society
than in Germany and the German-speaking areas of Austria-Hungary. During the nineteenth
century, many Jews in both countries had left the ghettoes where they had previously been
restricted and become assimilated into the surrounding Christian population. Some entered
what had previously been the closed world of politics and the professions. Many Jews
became successful as bankers, lawyers, scientists, scholars, journalists, and stage
performers. In 1880, for example, Jews made up 10 percent of the population of Vienna but
accounted for 39 percent of its medical students and 23 percent of its law students All too
often, such achievements provoked envy and distrust. During the last two decades of the
nineteenth century, conservatives in Germany and Austria founded parties that used dislike of
Jews to win the votes of traditional lower-middle-class groups who felt threatened by
changing times. Such parties also played on the rising sentiment of racism in German society.
Spurred by social Darwinian ideas that nations, like the human species, were engaged in a
brutal struggle for survival, rabid German nationalists promoted the concept of the Volk
(nation, people, or race) as an underlying idea in German history since the medieval era.
Portraying the German people as the successors of the pure ‘‘Aryan’’ race, the true and
original creators of Western culture, nationalist groups called for Germany to take the lead in
a desperate struggle to fight for European civilization and save it from the destructive assaults
of such allegedly lower races as Jews, blacks, and Asians.

Italian Fascism (Italian: fascismo italiano), also known as Classical Fascism or

simply Fascism, is the original fascist ideology as developed in Italy. The ideology is
associated with a series of three political parties led by Benito Mussolini: the Fascist
Revolutionary Party (PFR) founded in 1915,[1] the succeeding National Fascist Party (PNF)
which was renamed at the Third Fascist Congress on 7–10 November 1921 and ruled
the Kingdom of Italy from 1922 until 1943 and the Republican Fascist Party that ruled
the Italian Social Republic from 1943 to 1945. Italian Fascism is also associated with the
post-war Italian Social Movement and subsequent Italian neo-fascistmovements.
SETTING THE STAGE Many democracies, including the United States, Britain, and France,
remained strong despite the economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. However,
millions of people lost faith in democratic government. In response, they turned to an extreme
system of government called fascism. Fascists promised to revive the economy, punish those
responsible for hard times, and restore order and national pride. Their message attracted
many people who felt frustrated and angered by the peace treaties that followed World War I
and by the Great Depression. Fascism’s Rise in Italy Fascism (FASH•IHZ•uhm) was a new,
militant political movement that emphasized loyalty to the state and obedience to its leader.
Unlike communism, fascism had no clearly defined theory or program. Nevertheless, most

Fascists shared several ideas. They preached an extreme form of nationalism, or loyalty to
one’s country. Fascists believed that nations must struggle—peaceful states were doomed to
be conquered. They pledged loyalty to an authoritarian leader who guided and brought order
to the state. In each nation, Fascists wore uniforms of a certain color, used special salutes,
and held mass rallies In some ways, fascism was similar to communism. Both systems were
ruled by dictators who allowed only their own political party (one-party rule). Both denied
individual rights. In both, the state was supreme. Neither practiced any kind of democracy.
However, unlike Communists, Fascists did not seek a classless society. Rather, they believed
that each class had its place and function. In most cases, Fascist parties were made up of
aristocrats and industrialists, war veterans, and the lower middle class. Also, Fascists were
nationalists, and Communists were internationalists, hoping to unite workers worldwide.
Mussolini Takes Control Fascism’s rise in Italy was fueled by bitter disappointment over the
failure to win large territorial gains at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Rising inflation and
unemployment also contributed to widespread social unrest. To growing numbers of Italians,
their democratic government seemed helpless to deal with the country’s problems. They
wanted a leader who would take action A newspaper editor and politician named Benito
Mussolini boldly promised to rescue Italy by reviving its economy and rebuilding its armed
forces. He vowed to give Italy strong leadership. Mussolini had founded the Fascist Party in
1919. As economic conditions worsened, his popularity rapidly increased. Finally, Mussolini
publicly criticized Italy’s government. Groups of Fascists wearing black shirts attacked
Communists and Socialists on the streets. Because Mussolini played on the fear of a workers’
revolt, he began to win support from the middle classes, the aristocracy, and industrial
leaders. In October 1922, about 30,000 Fascists marched on Rome. They demanded that
King Victor Emmanuel III put Mussolini in charge of the government. The king decided that
Mussolini was the best hope for his dynasty to survive. After widespread violence and a
threatened uprising, Mussolini took power “legally.” Il Duce’s Leadership Mussolini was now Il
Duce (ihl DOO•chay), or the leader. He abolished democracy and outlawed all political parties
except the Fascists. Secret police jailed his opponents. Government censors forced radio
stations and publications to broadcast or publish only Fascist doctrines. Mussolini outlawed
strikes. He sought to control the economy by allying the Fascists with the industrialists and
large landowners. However, Mussolini never had the total control achieved by Joseph Stalin
in the Soviet Union or Adolf Hitler Rises to Power in Germany When Mussolini became
dictator of Italy in the mid-1920s, Adolf Hitler was a little-known political leader whose early
life had been marked by disappointment. When World War I broke out, Hitler found a new
beginning. He volunteered for the German army and was twice awarded the Iron Cross, a
medal for bravery. Years of Crisis 911 CHARACTERISTICS OF FASCISM Basic Principles •
authoritarianism • state more important than the individual • charismatic leader • action
oriented Chief Examples • Italy • Spain • Germany Economic • economic functions controlled
by state corporations or state Political • nationalist • racist (Nazism) • one-party rule • supreme
leader Social • supported by middle class, industrialists, and military Cultural • censorship •
indoctrination • secret police Fascism Fascism is a political movement that promotes an
extreme form of nationalism and militarism. It also includes a denial of individual rights and
dictatorial one-party rule. Nazism was the Fascist movement that developed in Germany in
the 1920s and the 1930s; it included a belief in the racial superiority of the German people.
The Fascists in Italy were led by Benito Mussolini, shown in the chart at right.
SKILLBUILDER: Interpreting Charts 1. Synthesizing Which political, cultural, and economic
characteristics helped make fascism an authoritarian system? 2. Making Inferences What
characteristics of fascism might make it attractive to people during times of crisis such as the
Great Depression? Clarifying What promises did Mussolini make to the Italian people? 912
Chapter 31 The Rise of the Nazis At the end of the war, Hitler settled in Munich. In 1919, he
joined a tiny right-wing political group. This group shared his belief that Germany had to
overturn the Treaty of Versailles and combat communism. The group later named itself the
National Socialist German Workers’ Party, called Nazi for short. Its policies formed the
German brand of fascism known as Nazism. The party adopted the swastika, or hooked
cross, as its symbol. The Nazis also set up a private militia called the storm troopers or Brown
 Shirts. Within a short time, Hitler’s success as an organizer and speaker led him to be chosen
der Führer (duhr FYUR•uhr), or the leader, of the Nazi party. Inspired by Mussolini’s march on
Rome, Hitler and the Nazis plotted to seize power in Munich in 1923. The attempt failed, and
Hitler was arrested. He was tried for treason but was sentenced to only five years in prison.
He served less than nine months. While in jail, Hitler wrote Mein Kampf (My Struggle). This
book set forth his beliefs and his goals for Germany. Hitler asserted that the Germans, whom
he incorrectly called “Aryans,” were a “master race.” He declared that non-Aryan “races,”
such as Jews, Slavs, and Gypsies, were inferior. He called the Versailles Treaty an outrage
and vowed to regain German lands. Hitler also declared that Germany was overcrowded and
needed more lebensraum, or living space. He promised to get that space by conquering
eastern Europe and Russia. After leaving prison in 1924, Hitler revived the Nazi Party. Most
Germans ignored him and his angry message until the Great Depression ended the nation’s
brief postwar recovery. When American loans stopped, the German economy collapsed. Civil
unrest broke out. Frightened and confused, Germans now turned to Hitler, hoping for security
and firm leadership. Hitler Becomes Chan

c. La crisis económica de 1930.

The Great Depression People could not pay the money they owed on margin purchases.
Stocks they had bought at high prices were now worthless. Within months of the crash,
unemployment rates began to rise as industrial production, prices, and wages declined. A
long business slump, which would come to be called the Great Depression, followed. The
stock market crash alone did not cause the Great Depression, but it quickened the collapse of
the economy and made the Depression more difficult. By 1932, factory production had been
cut in half. Thousands of businesses failed, and banks closed. Around 9 million people lost
the money in their savings accounts when banks had no money to pay them. Many farmers
lost their lands when they could not make mortgage payments. By 1933, one-fourth of all
American workers had no jobs. A Global Depression The collapse of the American economy
sent shock waves around the world. Worried American bankers demanded repayment of their
overseas loans, and American investors withdrew their money from Europe. The American
market for European goods dropped sharply as the U.S. Congress placed high tariffs on
imported goods so that American dollars would stay in the United States and pay for
American goods. This policy backfired. Conditions worsened for the United

The World Confronts the Crisis The Depression confronted democracies with a serious
challenge to their economic and political systems. Each country met the crisis in its own way.
Britain Takes Steps to Improve Its Economy The Depression hit Britain severely. To meet the
emergency, British voters elected a multiparty coalition known as the National Government. It
passed high protective tariffs, increased taxes, and regulated the currency. It also lowered
interest rates to encourage industrial growth. These measures brought about a slow but
steady recovery. By 1937, unemployment had been cut in half, and production had risen
above 1929 levels. Britain avoided political extremes and preserved democracy. France
Responds to Economic Crisis Unlike Britain, France had a more selfsufficient economy. In
1930, it was still heavily agricultural and less dependent on foreign trade. Nevertheless, by
1935, one million French workers were unemployed. The economic crisis contributed to
political instability. In 1933, five coalition governments formed and fell. Many political leaders
were frightened by the growth of antidemocratic forces both in France and in other parts of
Europe. So in 1936, moderates, Socialists, and Communists formed a coalition. The Popular
Front, as it was called, passed a series of reforms to help the workers. Unfortunately, price
increases quickly offset wage gains. Unemployment remained high. Yet France also
preserved democratic government. Percent of Work Force ■ Great Britain ■ Germany ■
United States 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 Unemployment Rate,
1928–1938 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Trade (in billions of dollars)
World Trade, 1929–1933 ■ World imports ■ World exports Sources: European Historical
Statistics: 1750–1970; Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970.
Source: Kenneth Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange SKILLBUILDER:
Interpreting Graphs 1. Comparing What nation had the highest rate of unemployment? How
high did it reach? 2. Clarifying Between 1929 and 1933, how much did world exports drop?
What about world imports? Socialist Governments Find Solutions The Socialist governments
in the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway also met the challenge of
economic crisis successfully. They built their recovery programs on an existing tradition of
cooperative community action. In Sweden, the government sponsored massive public works
projects that kept people employed and producing. All the Scandinavian countries raised
pensions for the elderly and increased unemployment insurance, subsidies for housing, and
other welfare benefits. To pay for these benefits, the governments taxed all citizens.
Democracy remained intact. Recovery in the United States In 1932, in the first presidential
election after the Depression had begun, U.S. voters elected Franklin D. Roosevelt. His
confident manner appealed to millions of Americans who felt bewildered by the Depression.
On March 4, 1933, the new president sought to restore Americans’ faith in their nation.
PRIMARY SOURCE This great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will
prosper. . . . let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—
nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat
into advance. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, First Inaugural Address Roosevelt immediately
began a program of government reform that he called the New Deal. Large public works
projects helped to provide jobs for the unemployed. New government agencies gave financial
help to businesses and farms. Large amounts of public money were spent on welfare and
relief programs. Roosevelt and his advisers believed that government spending would create
jobs and start a recovery. Regulations were imposed to reform the stock market and the
banking system. The New Deal did eventually reform the American economic system.
Roosevelt’s leadership preserved the country’s faith in its democratic political system. It also
established him as a leader of democracy in a world threatened by ruthless dictators, as you
will read about in Section 3.

Segunda Guerra Mundial.

World War II (often abbreviated to WWII or WW2), also known as the Second World War,
was a global warthat lasted from 1939 to 1945. The vast majority of the world's countries—
including all the great powers—eventually formed two opposing military alliances:
the Allies and the Axis. A state of total war emerged, directly involving more than 100 million
people from over 30 countries. The major participants threw their entire economic, industrial,
and scientific capabilities behind the war effort, blurring the distinction between civilian and
military resources. World War II was the deadliest conflict in human history, marked by 50 to
85 million fatalities, most of whom were civilians in the Soviet Union and China. It
included massacres, the genocide of the Holocaust, strategic bombing, premeditated death
from starvation and disease, and the only use of nuclear weapons in war.[1][2][3][4]
Japan, which aimed to dominate Asia and the Pacific, was at war with China by 1937,[5]
[b]
 though neither side had declared war on the other. World War II is generally said to have
begun on 1 September 1939, [6]with the invasion of Poland by Germany and subsequent
declarations on Germany by France and the United Kingdom. From late 1939 to early 1941,
in a series of campaigns and treaties, Germany conquered or controlled much of
continental Europe, and formed the Axis alliance with Italy and Japan. Under the Molotov–
Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union partitioned and annexed
territories of their European neighbours, Poland, Finland, Romania and the Baltic states.
Following the onset of campaigns in North Africa and East Africa, and the fall of France in mid
1940, the war continued primarily between the European Axis powers and the British Empire.
War in the Balkans, the aerial Battle of Britain, the Blitz, and the long Battle of the
Atlantic followed. On 22 June 1941, the European Axis powers launched an invasion of the
Soviet Union, opening the largest land theatre of war in history. This Eastern Front trapped
the Axis, most crucially the German Wehrmacht, into a war of attrition. In December 1941,
Japan launched a surprise attack on the United States and European colonies in the Pacific
Ocean. Following an immediate U.S. declaration of war against Japan, supported by one from
Great Britain, the European Axis powers quickly declared war on the U.S. in solidarity with
their Japanese ally. Rapid Japanese conquests over much of the Western Pacific ensued,
perceived by many in Asia as liberation from Western dominance and resulting in the support
of several armies from defeated territories.
The Axis advance in the Pacific halted in 1942 when Japan lost the critical Battle of Midway;
later, Germany and Italy were defeated in North Africa and then, decisively, at Stalingrad in
the Soviet Union. Key setbacks in 1943, which included a series of German defeats on the
Eastern Front, the Allied invasions of Sicily and Italy, and Allied victories in the Pacific, cost
the Axis its initiative and forced it into strategic retreat on all fronts. In 1944, the Western
Allies invaded German-occupied France, while the Soviet Union regained its territorial losses
and turned toward Germany and its allies. During 1944 and 1945 the Japanese suffered
major reverses in mainland Asia in South Central China and Burma, while the Allies crippled
the Japanese Navy and captured key Western Pacific islands.
The war in Europe concluded with an invasion of Germany by the Western Allies and the
Soviet Union, culminating in the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops, the suicide of Adolf
Hitler and the German unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945. Following the Potsdam
Declaration by the Allies on 26 July 1945 and the refusal of Japan to surrender under its
terms, the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August respectively. With an invasion of the Japanese
archipelago imminent, the possibility of additional atomic bombings, the Soviet entry into the
war against Japan and its invasion of Manchuria, Japan announced its intention to surrender
on 15 August 1945, cementing total victory in Asia for the Allies. Tribunals were set up by fiat
by the Allies and war crimes trials were conducted in the wake of the war both against the
Germans and the Japanese.
World War II changed the political alignment and social structure of the globe. The  United
Nations (UN) was established to foster international co-operation and prevent future conflicts;
the victorious great powers—China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States—became the permanent members of its Security Council.[7] The Soviet Union
and United States emerged as rival superpowers, setting the stage for the nearly half-century
long Cold War. In the wake of European devastation, the influence of its great powers waned,
triggering the decolonisation of Africa and Asia. Most countries whose industries had been
damaged moved towards economic recovery and expansion. Political integration,
especially in Europe, emerged as an effort to end pre-war enmities and create a common
identity.[8]

La Sociedad de Naciones.

The League of Nations (abbreviated as LN or LoN in English, La Société des Nations [la

sɔsjete de nɑsjɔ̃]abbreviated as SDN or SdN in French) was an intergovernmental
organisation founded on 10 January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that
ended the First World War. It was the first international organisation whose principal mission
was to maintain world peace.[1] Its primary goals, as stated in its Covenant, included
preventing wars through collective security and disarmament and settling international
disputes through negotiation and arbitration.[2] Other issues in this and related treaties
included labour conditions, just treatment of native inhabitants, human and drug trafficking,
the arms trade, global health, prisoners of war, and protection of minorities in Europe. [3] At its
greatest extent from 28 September 1934 to 23 February 1935, it had 58 members.
The diplomatic philosophy behind the League represented a fundamental shift from the
preceding hundred years. The League lacked its own armed force and depended on the
victorious Great Powers of World War I (France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan were
the permanent members of the executive Council) to enforce its resolutions, keep to its
economic sanctions, or provide an army when needed. The Great Powers were often
reluctant to do so. Sanctions could hurt League members, so they were reluctant to comply
with them. During the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, when the League accused Italian soldiers
of targeting Red Cross medical tents, Benito Mussoliniresponded that "the League is very well
when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall out." [4]
After some notable successes and some early failures in the 1920s, the League ultimately
proved incapable of preventing aggression by the Axis powers in the 1930s. The credibility of
the organization was weakened by the fact that the United States never officially joined the
League and the Soviet Union joined late and only briefly.[5][6][7][8] Germany withdrew from the
League, as did Japan, Italy, Spain and others. The onset of the Second World War showed
that the League had failed its primary purpose, which was to prevent any future world war.
The League lasted for 26 years; the United Nations (UN) replaced it after the end of the
Second World War and inherited several agencies and organisations founded by the League.

La Conferencia de Múnich.
The Munich Agreement (Czech: Mnichovská dohoda; Slovak: Mníchovská
dohoda; German: Münchner Abkommen) or Munich Betrayal (Czech: Mnichovská
zrada; Slovak: Mníchovská zrada), was an agreement between France and Nazi Germany,
that France would not provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia in the upcoming German
occupation of "Sudetenland", effectively dishonoring French-Czechoslovak alliance [1] and
allowing Nazi Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland, a region of western Czechoslovakia
inhabited by 800,000 people, mainly German speakers. Adolf Hitler announced it was his last
territorial claim in Europe, and the choice seemed to be between war and appeasement. An
emergency meeting of the main European powers, not including the Soviet Union, took place
in Munich, Germany, on 29-30 September 1938. An agreement was quickly reached on
Hitler's terms. It was signed by the top leaders of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.
Czechoslovakia was not invited to the conference. Militarily, the Sudetenland was of strategic
importance to Czechoslovakia as most of its border defenses were situated there to protect
against a German attack. Germany took control of the Sudetenland following a low-intensity
undeclared war in the area that had started on 17 September 1938. The agreement was soon
followed by the First Vienna Award which set the new border between Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, while Poland also annexed territories from Czechoslovakia. In March 1939, the First
Slovak Republic was proclaimed and shortly by the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia Germany took full control of the Czech parts. As a result, Czechoslovakia was
dismembered.
Today, it is widely regarded as a failed act of appeasement, and the term has become "a
byword for the futility of appeasing expansionist totalitarian states". [

Desarrollo y fases del conflicto. El holocausto. Las Naciones Unidas. Los juicios de
Núremberg.

SETTING THE STAGE During the 1930s, Hitler played on the hopes and fears of the
Western democracies. Each time the Nazi dictator grabbed new territory, he would declare an
end to his demands. Peace seemed guaranteed—until Hitler moved again. After his moves
into the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, Hitler turned his eyes to Poland. After World
War I, the Allies had cut out the Polish Corridor from German territory to give Poland access
to the sea. In 1939, Hitler demanded that the Polish Corridor be returned to Germany.
Germany Sparks a New War in Europe At this point, as you recall from Chapter 31, Soviet
dictator Joseph Stalin signed a ten-year nonaggression pact with Hitler. After being excluded
from the Munich Conference, Stalin was not eager to join with the West. Also, Hitler had
promised him territory. In a secret part of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to
divide Poland between them. They also agreed that the USSR could take over Finland and
the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Germany’s Lightning Attack After
signing this nonaggression pact, Hitler quickly moved ahead with plans to conquer Poland.
His surprise attack took place at dawn on September 1, 1939. German tanks and troop trucks
rumbled across the Polish border. At the same time, German aircraft and artillery began a
merciless bombing of Poland’s capital, Warsaw. France and Great Britain declared war on
Germany on September 3. But Poland fell some time before those nations could make any
military response. After his victory, Hitler annexed the western half of Poland. That region had
a large German population. The German invasion of Poland was the first test of Germany’s
newest military strategy—the blitzkrieg (BLIHTS•kreeg), or “lightning war.” It involved using
fast-moving airplanes and tanks, followed by massive infantry forces, to take enemy
defenders by surprise and quickly overwh helm them. In the case of Poland, the strategy
worked. The Soviets Make Their Move On September 17, Stalin sent Soviet troops to occupy
the eastern half of Poland. Stalin then moved to annex countries to the north of Poland.
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia fell without a struggle, but Finland resisted. In November, Stalin
sent nearly one million Soviet troops into Finland. The Soviets expected to win a quick victory,
so they were not prepared for winter fighting. This was a crucial mistake. The Finns were
outnumbered and outgunned, but they fiercely defended their country. In the freezing winter
weather, soldiers on skis swiftly attacked Soviet positions. In contrast, the Soviets struggled
to make progress through the deep snow. The Soviets suffered heavy losses, but they finally
won through sheer force of numbers. By March 1940, Stalin had forced the Finns to accept
his surrender terms. The Phony War After they declared war on Germany, the French and
British had mobilized their armies. They stationed their troops along the Maginot
(MAZH•uh•NOH) Line, a system of fortifications along France’s border with Germany. There
they waited for the Germans to attack—but nothing happened. With little to do, the bored
Allied soldiers stared eastward toward the enemy. Equally bored, German soldiers stared
back from their Siegfried Line a few miles away. Germans jokingly called it the sitzkrieg, or
“sitting war.” Some newspapers referred to it simply as “the phony war.” Suddenly, on April 9,
1940, the calm ended. Hitler launched a surprise invasion of Denmark and Norway. In just
four hours after the attack, Denmark fell. Two months later, Norway surrendered as well. The
Germans then began to build bases along the Norwegian and Danish coasts from which they
could launch strikes on Great Britain
The Fall of France In May of 1940, Hitler began a dramatic sweep through the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg. This was part of a strategy to strike at France. Keeping the Allies’
attention on those countries, Hitler then sent an even larger force of tanks and troops to slice
through the Ardennes (ahr•DEHN). This was a heavily wooded area in northern France,
Luxembourg, and Belgium. Moving through the forest, the Germans “squeezed between” the
Maginot Line. From there, they moved across France and reached the country’s northern
coast in ten days. Rescue at Dunkirk After reaching the French coast, the German forces
swung north again and joined with German troops in Belgium. By the end of May 1940, the
Germans had trapped the Allied forces around the northern French city of Lille (leel).
Outnumbered, outgunned, and pounded from the air, the Allies retreated to the beaches of
Dunkirk, a French port city near the Belgian border. They were trapped with their backs to the
sea. In one of the most heroic acts of the war, Great Britain set out to rescue the army. It sent
a fleet of about 850 ships across the English Channel to Dunkirk. Along with Royal Navy
ships, civilian craft—yachts, lifeboats, motorboats, paddle steamers, and fishing boats—
joined the rescue effort. From May 26 to June 4, this amateur armada, under heavy fire from
German bombers, sailed back and forth from Britain to Dunkirk. The boats carried some
338,000 battle-weary soldiers to safety. France Falls Following Dunkirk, resistance in France
began to crumble. By June 14, the Germans had taken Paris. Accepting the inevitable,
French leaders surrendered on June 22, 1940. The Germans took control of the northern part
of the country. They left the southern part to a puppet government headed by Marshal
Philippe Pétain (pay•TAN), a French hero from World War I. The headquarters of this
government was in the city of Vichy (VEESH•ee). After France fell, Charl es de Gaulle (duh
GOHL), a French general, set up a government-in-exile in London. He committed all his
energy to reconquering France. In a radio broadcast from England, de Gaulle called on the
people of France to join him in resisting the Germans: The Battle of Britain With the fall of
France, Great Britain stood alone against the Nazis. Winston Churchill, the new British prime
minister, had already declared that his nation would never give in. In a rousing speech, he
proclaimed, “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall
fight in the fields and in the streets . . . we shall never surrender.”
The Mediterranean and the Eastern Front The stubborn resistance of the British in the Battle
of Britain caused a shift in Hitler’s strategy in Europe. He decided to deal with Great Britain
later. He then turned his attention east to the Mediterranean area and the Balkans—and to
the ultimate prize, the Soviet Union.
The United States Aids Its Allies Most Americans felt that the United States should not get
involved in the war. Between 1935 and 1937, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts.
The laws made it illegal to sell arms or lend money to nations at war. But President Roosevelt
knew that if the Allies fell, the United States would be drawn into the war. In September 1939,
he asked Congress to allow the Allies to buy American arms. The Allies would pay cash and
then carry the goods on their own ships. Under the Lend-Lease Act, passed in March 1941,
the president could lend or lease arms and other supplies to any country vital to the United
States. By the summer of 1941, the U.S. Navy was escorting British ships carrying U.S. arms.
In response, Hitler ordered his submarines to sink any cargo ships they met. Although the
United States had not yet entered the war, Roosevelt and Churchill met secretly and issued a
joint declaration called the Atlantic Charter. It upheld free trade among nations and the right of
people to choose their own government. The charter later served as the Allies’ peace plan at
the end of World War II. On September 4, a German U-boat fired on a U.S. destroyer in the
Atlantic. In response, Roosevelt ordered navy commanders to shoot German submarines on
sight. The United States was now involved in an undeclared naval war with Hitler. To almost
everyone’s surprise, however, the attack that actually drew the United States into the war did
not come from Germany. It came from Japan SETTING THE STAGE Like Hitler, Japan’s
military leaders also had dreams of empire. Japan’s expansion had begun in 1931. That year,
Japanese troops took over Manchuria in northeastern China. Six years later, Japanese
armies swept into the heartland of China. They expected quick victory. Chinese resistance,
however, caused the war to drag on. This placed a strain on Japan’s economy. To increase
their resources, Japanese leaders looked toward the rich European colonies of Southeast
Asia.

The Holocaust

”non-Aryans.“ The violence against Jews during the Holocaust led to the founding of Israel
after World War II. • Aryan • Holocaust • Kristallnacht • ghetto • ”Final Solution“ • genocide 3
SETTING THE STAGE As part of their vision for Europe, the Nazis proposed a new racial
order. They proclaimed that the Germanic peoples, or Aryans, were a “master race.” (This
was a misuse of the term Aryan. The term actually refers to the Indo-European peoples who
began to migrate into the Indian subcontinent around 1500 B.C.) The Nazis claimed that all
non-Aryan peoples, particularly Jewish people, were inferior. This racist message would
eventually lead to the Holocaust, the systematic mass slaughter of Jews and other groups
judged inferior by the Nazis. The Holocaust Begins To gain support for his racist ideas, Hitler
knowingly tapped into a hatred for Jews that had deep roots in European history. For
generations, many Germans, along with other Europeans, had targeted Jews as the cause of
their failures. Some Germans even blamed Jews for their country’s defeat in World War I and
for its economic problems after that war. In time, the Nazis made the targeting of Jews a
government policy. The Nuremberg Laws, passed in 1935, deprived Jews of their rights to
German citizenship and forbade marriages between Jews and non-Jews. Laws passed later
also limited the kinds of work that Jews could do. “Night of Broken Glass” Worse was yet to
come. Early in November 1938, 17-year-old Herschel Grynszpan (GRIHN•shpahn), a Jewish
youth from Germany, was visiting an uncle in Paris. While Grynszpan was there, he received
a postcard. It said that after living in Germany for 27 years, his father had been deported to
Poland. On November 7, wishing to avenge his father’s deportation, Grynszpan shot a
German diplomat living in Paris. When Nazi leaders heard the news, they launched a violent
attack on the Jewish community. On November 9, Nazi storm troopers attacked Jewish
homes, businesses, and synagogues across Germany and murdered close to 100 Jews. An
American in Leipzig wrote, “Jewish shop windows by the hundreds were systematically . . .
smashed. . . . The main streets of the city were a positive litter of shattered plate glass.” It is
for this reason that the night of November 9 became known as Kristallnacht
(krih•STAHL•NAHKT), or “Night of Broken Glass.” A 14-year-old boy described his memory of
that awful night:

Kristallnacht marked a major step-up in the Nazi policy of Jewish persecution. The future for
Jews in Germany looked truly grim. A Flood of Refugees After Kristallnacht, some Jews
realized that violence against them was bound to increase. By the end of 1939, a number of
German Jews had fled to other countries. Many however, remained in Germany. Later, Hitler
conquered territories in which millions more Jews lived. At first, Hitler favored emigration as a
solution to what he called “the Jewish problem.” Getting other countries to continue admitting
Germany’s Jews became an issue, however. After admitting tens of thousands of Jewish
refugees, such countries as France, Britain, and the United States abruptly closed their doors
to further immigration. Germany’s foreign minister observed, “We all want to get rid of our
Jews. The difficulty is that no country wishes to receive them.” Isolating the Jews When Hitler
found that he could not get rid of Jews through emigration, he put another plan into effect. He
ordered Jews in all countries under his control to be moved to designated cities. In those
cities, the Nazis herded the Jews into dismal, overcrowded ghettos, or segregated Jewish
areas. The Nazis then sealed off the ghettos with barbed wire and stone walls. They hoped
that the Jews inside would starve to death or die from disease. Even under these horrible
conditions, the Jews hung on. Some, particularly the Jews in Warsaw, Poland, formed
resistance organizations within the ghettos. They also struggled to keep their traditions.
Ghetto theaters produced plays and concerts. Teachers taught lessons in secret schools.
Scholars kept records so that one day people would find out the truth. The “Final Solution”
Hitler soon grew impatient waiting for Jews to die from starvation or disease. He decided to
take more direct action. His plan was called the “Final Solution.” It was actually a program of
genocide, the systematic killing of an entire people. Hitler believed that his plan of conquest
depended on the purity of the Aryan race. To protect racial purity, the Nazis had to eliminate
other races, nationalities, or groups they viewed as inferior—as “subhumans.” They included
Roma (gypsies), Poles, Russians, homosexuals, the insane, the disabled, and the incurably
ill. But the Nazis focused especially on the Jews. The Killings Begin As Nazi troops swept
across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the killings began. Units from the SS (Hitler’s
elite security force) moved from town to town to hunt down Jews. The SS and their
collaborators rounded up men, women, children, and even babies and took them to isolated
spots. They then shot their prisoners in pits that became the prisoners’ graves. Jews in
communities not reached by the killing squads were rounded up and taken to concentration
camps, or slave-labor prisons. These camps were located mainly in Germany and Poland.
Hitler hoped that the horrible conditions in the camps would speed the total elimination of the
Jews. The prisoners worked seven days a week as slaves for the SS or for German
businesses. Guards severely beat or killed their prisoners for not working fast enough. With
meals of thin soup, a scrap of bread, and potato peelings, most prisoners lost 50 pounds in
the first few months. Hunger was so intense, recalled one survivor, “that if a bit of soup spilled
over, prisoners would . . . dig their spoons into the mud and stuff the mess in their mouths.”
The Final Stage Hitler’s war on the Jews turned toward the “Final Solution” in 1942. The
Nazis built extermination camps equipped with huge gas chambers that could kill as many as
6,000 human beings in a day. (See the map on page 953.) When prisoners arrived at
Auschwitz (OUSH•vihts), the largest of the extermination camps, they paraded before a
committee of SS doctors. With a wave of the hand, these doctors separated the strong—
mostly men—from the weak—mostly women, young children, the elderly, and the sick. Those
labeled as weak would die that day. They were told to undress for a shower and then led into
a chamber with fake showerheads. After the doors were closed, cyanide gas or carbon
dioxide poured from the showerheads or holes in the ceiling. All inside were killed in a matter
of minutes. Later, the Nazis installed crematoriums, or ovens, to burn the bodies. The
Survivors Some six million European Jews died in these death camps and in Nazi massacres.
Fewer than four million survived. Some escaped the horrors of the death camps with help
from non-Jewish people. These rescuers, at great risk to their own lives, hid Jews in their
homes or helped them escape to neutral countries. Those who survived the camps were
changed forever by what they had experienced.

Los juicios de Núremberg.

The Nuremberg Trials While nations were struggling to recover politically and economically,
they also tried to deal with the issue of war crimes. During 1945 and 1946, an International
Military Tribunal representing 23 nations put Nazi war criminals on trial in Nuremberg,
Germany. In the first of these Nuremberg Trials, 22 Nazi leaders were charged with waging a
war of aggression. They were also accused of committing “crimes against humanity”—the
murder of 11 million people. Adolf Hitler, SS chief Heinrich Himmler, and Minister of
Propaganda Joseph Goebbels had committed suicide long before the trials began. However,
Hermann Göring, the commander of the Luftwaffe; Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s former deputy; and
other high-ranking Nazi leaders remained to face the charges. Hess was found guilty and was
sentenced to life in prison. Göring received a death sentence, but cheated the executioner by
committing suicide. Ten other Nazi leaders were hanged on October 16, 1946. Hans Frank,
the “Slayer of Poles,” was the only convicted Nazi to express remorse: “A thousand years will
pass,” he said, “and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased.” The bodies of those
executed were burned at the concentration camp of Dachau (DAHK•ow). They were
cremated in the same ovens that had burned so many of their victims.

United Nations (UN)
the United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization that was tasked to maintain
international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve
international co-operation and be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.
[3]
 The headquarters of the UN is in Manhattan, New York City, and is subject
to extraterritoriality. Further main offices are situated in Geneva, Nairobi, and Vienna. The
organization is financed by assessed and voluntary contributions from its member states. Its
objectives include maintaining international peace and security, protecting human rights,
delivering humanitarian aid, promoting sustainable development and upholding international
law. [4] The UN is the largest, most familiar, most internationally represented and most
powerful intergovernmental organization in the world. In 24 October 1945, at the end of World
War II, the organization was established with the aim of preventing future wars. [5]At its
founding, the UN had 51 member states; there are now 193. The UN is the successor of the
ineffective League of Nations.
On 25 April 1945, 50 governments met in San Francisco for a conference and started drafting
the UN Charter, which was adopted on 25 June 1945 in the San Francisco Opera House, and
signed on 26 June 1945 in the Herbst Theatre auditorium in the Veterans War Memorial
Building. This charter took effect on 24 October 1945, when the UN began operation.
The UN's mission to preserve world peace was complicated in its early decades during
the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union and their respective allies. Its
missions have consisted primarily of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with
primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. [6] The organization's
membership grew significantly following widespread decolonization which started in the
1960s. Since then, 80 former colonies had gained independence, including 11 trust territories,
which were monitored by the Trusteeship Council.[7] By the 1970s its budget for economic and
social development programmes far outstripped its spending on peacekeeping. After the end
of the Cold War, the UN shifted and expanded its field operations, undertaking a wide variety
of complex tasks.[8]
The UN has six principal organs: the General Assembly; the Security Council; the Economic
and Social Council; the Trusteeship Council; the International Court of Justice; and the UN
Secretariat. The UN System agencies include the World Bank Group, the World Health
Organization, the World Food Programme, UNESCO, and UNICEF. The UN's most prominent
officer is the Secretary-General, an office held by Portuguese politician and diplomat António
Guterres since 1 January 2017. Non-governmental organizations may be granted consultative
status with ECOSOC and other agencies to participate in the UN's work.
The organization, its officers and its agencies have won many Nobel Peace Prizes.
Other evaluations of the UN's effectiveness have been mixed. Some commentators believe
the organization to be an important force for peace and human development, while others
have called the organization ineffective, corrupt, or biased.
 United Nations System

The United Nations System consists of the United Nations, and the six principal organs of
the United Nations: the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the UN Secretariat,
[1]
 specialized agencies, and affiliated organizations.[2] The executive heads of some of the
United Nations System organizations and the World Trade Organization, which is not formally
part of the United Nations System, [3][4][5] have seats on the United Nations System Chief
Executives' Board for Coordination (CEB).[6] This body, chaired by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, meets twice a year to co-ordinate the work of the organizations of the
United Nations System.
The United Nations System includes the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies (such as
the separately-administered funds and programmes, research and training institutes, and
other subsidiary entities), specialized agencies, and affiliated organizations. [7][8] Some of the
organizations of the United Nations System predate the founding of the United Nations in
1945 and were inherited after the dissolution of the League of Nations.
he principal organ of the UN System is the United Nations itself. It consists of the six principal
organs established by the Charter of the United Nations:
Principal organs of the United Nations [9]
 v
 t
 e
UN General UNAssembly S
Deliberative assembly of all UN member states —
Administrative organ of the UN —

May resolve non-compulsory Supports the

recommendations to states or suggestions to thebodies administratively
Security (for example, in the organ
Council (UNSC); conferences, the writing of reports and studies
Decides on the admission of newpreparation
members, of the budget);
following proposal by the UNSC; Its chairperson – the UN
Adopts the budget; General – is elected by the General Assembly
Elects the non-permanent membersyear of
mandate
the and is the UN's foremost represent
UNSC; all members of ECOSOC; the UN Secretary
General (following his/her proposal by the UNSC); and the
fifteen judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Each country has one vote.

UN Security UN Council
Economic and Social
For international security issues — For global economic and social affairs —

Responsible for the maintenance Responsible for co-operation

international peace and security; states as regards economic and social matters;
May adopt compulsory resolutions; Co-ordinates co-operation betw
Has fifteen members: five UN's numerous specialized agencies;
permanent
memberswith veto power and ten elected members. Has 54 members, elected by the
 Assembly to serve staggered three-year mandate

General Assembly[edit]
Main article: United Nations General Assembly
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA/GA) is one of the six principal organs of the
United Nations and the only one in which all member nations have equal representation. Its
powers are to oversee the budget of the United Nations, appoint the non-permanent
members to the Security Council, receive reports from other parts of the United Nations and
make recommendations in the form of General Assembly Resolutions.[10] It has also
established a wide number of subsidiary organs.[11]
Security Council[edit]
Main article: United Nations Security Council
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs of the United
Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers,
outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of peacekeeping operations,
the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action. Its
powers are exercised through United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House,
Westminster, London. Since its first meeting, the Council, which exists in continuous session,
has travelled widely, holding meetings in many cities, such as Paris and Addis Ababa, as well
as at its current permanent home at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City.
There are 15 members of the Security Council, consisting of five veto-wielding permanent
members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 10 elected
non-permanent members with two-year terms. This basic structure is set out in Chapter V of
the UN Charter. Security Council members must always be present at UN headquarters in
New York so that the Security Council can meet at any time.
Economic and Social Council[edit]
Main article: United Nations Economic and Social Council
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) constitutes one of the six
principal organs (one is not active, as of 2011) of the United Nations. It is responsible for co-
ordinating the economic, social and related work of 14 UN specialized agencies, their
functional commissions and five regional commissions. ECOSOC has 54 members; it holds a
four-week session each year in July. Since 1998, it has also held a meeting each April with
finance ministers heading key committees of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The ECOSOC serves as the central forum for discussing international economic
and social issues, and for formulating policy recommendations addressed to member states
and the United Nations System.[12]
Secretariat[edit]
Main article: United Nations Secretariat
The United Nations Secretariat is headed by the United Nations Secretary-General, assisted
by a staff of international civil servants worldwide. It provides studies, information, and
facilities needed by United Nations bodies for their meetings. It also carries out tasks as
directed by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the UN Economic and Social
 Council, and other U.N. bodies. The United Nations Charter provides that the staff to be
chosen by application of the "highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity," with
due regard for the importance of recruiting on a wide geographical basis.
The Charter provides that the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any authority
other than the UN. Each UN member country is enjoined to respect the international
character of the Secretariat and not seek to influence its staff. The Secretary-General alone is
responsible for staff selection.
International Court of Justice[edit]
Main article: International Court of Justice
The International Court of Justice is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. It is
based in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. Its main functions are to settle legal
disputes submitted to it by states and to provide advisory opinions on legal questions
submitted to it by duly authorized international organs, agencies, and the UN General
Assembly.
Trusteeship Council[edit]
Main article: United Nations Trusteeship Council
The United Nations Trusteeship Council, one of the principal organs of the United Nations,
was established to help ensure that trust territories were administered in the best interests of
their inhabitants and of international peace and security. The trust territories—most of them
are former mandates of the League of Nations or territories taken from nations defeated at
the end of World War II—have all now attained self-government or independence, either as
separate nations or by joining neighbouring independent countries. The last was Palau,
formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which became a member state of the
United Nations in December 1994.

Funds and programmes, research and training institutes, and other bodies[edit]
The separately-administered funds and programmes, research and training institutes, and
other subsidiary bodies are autonomous subsidiary organs of the United Nations. [8]
Funds and programmes[edit]
Throughout its history the United Nations General Assembly has established a number of
programmes and funds to address particular humanitarian and development concerns. These
bodies usually report to the General Assembly through an executive board. Only one UN
programme has ever closed in the history of the organization, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which ceased to exist in 1959 and was subsequently
replaced by the UNHCR.
Each of the funds and programmes is headed by an Executive Director at the Under-
Secretary-General level and is governed by an Executive Board. One former fund, the United
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), was merged with other elements of the
United Nations System into a new organization, UN Women, in January 2011.

 International Trade Centre (ITC)

 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  (HCR)
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  (OHCHR)
  United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  (UNCTAD)
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
 United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
 United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA)
 World Food Programme (WFP)

4. La Guerra Fría
a. Bipolaridad y amenaza nuclear. El sistema de Naciones Unidas. La descolonización
y el Tercer Mundo.

During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought together as allies
against the Axis powers. However, the relationship between the two nations was a
tense one. Americans had long been wary of Soviet communism and concerned about
Russian leader Joseph Stalin’s tyrannical, blood-thirsty rule of his own country. For
their part, the Soviets resented the Americans’ decades-long refusal to treat the USSR
as a legitimate part of the international community as well as their delayed entry into
World War II, which resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of Russians. After the war
ended, these grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and
enmity. Postwar Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe fueled many Americans’ fears
of a Russian plan to control the world. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what they
perceived as American officials’ bellicose rhetoric, arms buildup and interventionist
approach to international relations. In such a hostile atmosphere, no single party was
entirely to blame for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was inevitable.

The Cold War: Containment

By the time World War II  ended, most American officials agreed that the best defense
against the Soviet threat was a strategy called “containment.” In 1946, in his famous
“Long Telegram,” the diplomat George Kennan (1904-2005) explained this policy:
The Soviet Union , he wrote, was “a political force committed fanatically to the belief
that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi [agreement between
parties that disagree]”; as a result, America’s only choice was the “long-term, patient
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” President  Harry
Truman  (1884-1972) agreed. “It must be the policy of the United States,” he declared
before Congress in 1947, “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation…by outside pressures.” This way of thinking would shape American
foreign policy for the next four decades.
Did you know? The term 'cold war' first appeared in a 1945 essay by the English writer
George Orwell called 'You and the Atomic Bomb.'
The Cold War: The Atomic Age

The containment strategy also provided the rationale for an unprecedented arms
buildup in the United States. In 1950, a National Security Council Report known as
NSC–68 had echoed Truman’s recommendation that the country use military force to
“contain” communist expansionism anywhere it seemed to be occurring. To that end,
the report called for a four-fold increase in defense spending.In particular, American
officials encouraged the development of atomic weapons like the ones that had ended
World War II. Thus began a deadly “arms race.” In 1949, the Soviets tested an atom
bomb of their own. In response, President Truman announced that the United States
would build an even more destructive atomic weapon: the hydrogen bomb, or
“superbomb.” Stalin followed suit.

As a result, the stakes of the Cold War  were perilously high. The first H-bomb test, in
the Eniwetok atoll in the Marshall Islands, showed just how fearsome the nuclear age
could be. It created a 25-square-mile fireball that vaporized an island, blew a huge hole
in the ocean floor and had the power to destroy half of Manhattan. Subsequent
American and Soviet tests spewed poisonous radioactive waste into the atmosphere.

The ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation had a great impact on American

domestic life as well. People built bomb shelters in their backyards. They practiced
attack drills in schools and other public places. The 1950s  and 1960s saw an epidemic
of popular films that horrified moviegoers with depictions of nuclear devastation and
mutant creatures. In these and other ways, the Cold War was a constant presence in
Americans’ everyday lives.

The Cold War Extends to Space

b. Space exploration served as another dramatic arena for Cold War competition.
On October 4, 1957, a Soviet R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile launched Sputnik
(Russian for “traveler”), the world’s first artificial satellite and the first man-made object
to be placed into the Earth’s orbit. Sputnik’s launch came as a surprise, and not a
pleasant one, to most Americans. In the United States, space was seen as the next
frontier, a logical extension of the grand American tradition of exploration, and it was
crucial not to lose too much ground to the Soviets. In addition, this demonstration of
the overwhelming power of the R-7 missile–seemingly capable of delivering a nuclear
warhead into U.S. air space–made gathering intelligence about Soviet military activities
particularly urgent

In 1958, the U.S. launched its own satellite, Explorer I, designed by the U.S. Army
under the direction of rocket scientist Wernher von Braun, and what came to be known
as the Space Race was underway. That same year, President Dwight Eisenhower
signed a public order creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), a federal agency dedicated to space exploration, as well as several programs
seeking to exploit the military potential of space. Still, the Soviets were one step
ahead, launching the first man into space in April 1961.

That May, after Alan Shepard become the first American man in space, President  John
F. Kennedy  (1917-1963) made the bold public claim that the U.S. would land a man on
the moon by the end of the decade. His prediction came true on July 20, 1969,
when Neil Armstrong  of NASA’s Apollo 11  mission, became the first man to set foot on
the moon, effectively winning the Space Race for the Americans. U.S. astronauts came
to be seen as the ultimate American heroes, and earth-bound men and women seemed
to enjoy living vicariously through them. Soviets, in turn, were pictured as the ultimate
villains, with their massive, relentless efforts to surpass America and prove the power
of the communist system.

The Cold War: The Red Scare

Meanwhile, beginning in 1947, the House Un-American Activities Committee ( HUAC )

brought the Cold War home in another way. The committee began a series of hearings
designed to show that communist subversion in the United States was alive and well.

In Hollywood , HUAC forced hundreds of people who worked in the movie industry to
renounce left-wing political beliefs and testify against one another. More than 500
people lost their jobs. Many of these “blacklisted” writers, directors, actors and others
were unable to work again for more than a decade. HUAC also accused State
Department workers of engaging in subversive activities. Soon, other anticommunist
politicians, most notably Senator Joseph McCarthy  (1908-1957), expanded this probe
to include anyone who worked in the federal government. Thousands of federal
employees were investigated, fired and even prosecuted. As this anticommunist
hysteria spread throughout the 1950s, liberal college professors lost their jobs, people
were asked to testify against colleagues and “loyalty oaths” became commonplace.

The Cold War Abroad

The fight against subversion at home mirrored a growing concern with the Soviet threat
abroad. In June 1950, the first military action of the Cold War began when the Soviet-
backed North Korean People’s Army invaded its pro-Western neighbor to the south.
Many American officials feared this was the first step in a communist campaign to take
over the world and deemed that nonintervention was not an option. Truman sent the
American military into Korea, but the war dragged to a stalemate and ended in 1953.

Other international disputes followed. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy faced a
number of troubling situations in his own hemisphere. The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961
and the Cuban missile crisis the following year seemed to prove that the real
communist threat now lay in the unstable, postcolonial “Third World” Nowhere was this
more apparent than in Vietnam, where the collapse of the French colonial regime had
led to a struggle between the American-backed nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem in the south
and the communist nationalist Ho Chi Minh  in the north. Since the 1950s, the United
States had been committed to the survival of an anticommunist government in the
region, and by the early 1960s it seemed clear to American leaders that if they were to
successfully “contain” communist expansionism there, they would have to intervene
more actively on Diem’s behalf. However, what was intended to be a brief military
action spiraled into a 10-year conflict.

The Close of the Cold War

Almost as soon as he took office, President Richard Nixon (1913-1994) began to

implement a new approach to international relations. Instead of viewing the world as a
hostile, “bi-polar” place, he suggested, why not use diplomacy instead of military action
to create more poles? To that end, he encouraged the United Nations  to recognize the
communist Chinese government and, after a trip there in 1972, began to establish
diplomatic relations with Beijing. At the same time, he adopted a policy of
“détente”–”relaxation”–toward the Soviet Union. In 1972, he and Soviet premier Leonid
Brezhnev (1906-1982) signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which
prohibited the manufacture of nuclear missiles by both sides and took a step toward
reducing the decades-old threat of nuclear war.

Despite Nixon’s efforts, the Cold War heated up again under President  Ronald
Reagan  (1911-2004). Like many leaders of his generation, Reagan believed that the
spread of communism anywhere threatened freedom everywhere. As a result, he
worked to provide financial and military aid to anticommunist governments and
insurgencies around the world. This policy, particularly as it was applied in the
developing world in places like Grenada and El Salvador, was known as the Reagan
Doctrine.

Even as Reagan fought communism in Central America, however, the Soviet Union
was disintegrating. In response to severe economic problems and growing political
ferment in the USSR, Premier Mikhail Gorbachev (1931-) took office in 1985 and
introduced two policies that redefined Russia’s relationship to the rest of the world:
“glasnost,” or political openness, and “perestroika,” or economic reform. Soviet
influence in Eastern Europe waned. In 1989, every other communist state in the region
replaced its government with a noncommunist one. In November of that year, the Berlin
Wall–the most visible symbol of the decades-long Cold War–was finally destroyed, just
over two years after Reagan had challenged the Soviet premier in a speech at
Brandenburg Gate in Berlin: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” By 1991, the Soviet
Union itself had fallen apart. The Cold War was over.
The Cold War was a state of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union with its satellite
states (the Eastern Bloc), and the United States with its allies (the Western Bloc) after World
War II. A common historiography of the conflict begins with 1946, the year U.S.
diplomat George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow cemented a U.S. foreign
policy of containment of Soviet expansionism threatening strategically vital regions, and
ending between the Revolutions of 1989 and the 1991 collapse of the USSR, which
ended communism in Eastern Europe. The term "cold" is used because there was no large-
scale fighting directly between the two sides, but they each supported major regional wars
known as proxy wars.
The Cold War split the temporary wartime alliance against Nazi Germany, leaving the Soviet
Union and the United States as two superpowers with profound economic and political
differences. The USSR was a Marxist–Leniniststate led by its Communist Party, which in turn
was dominated by a leader with different titles over time, and a small committee called
the Politburo. The Party controlled the state, the press, the military, the economy and many
organizations throughout the Second World, including the Warsaw Pact and other satellites,
and funded communist parties around the world, sometimes in competition with
communist China, particularly following the Sino-Soviet splitof the 1960s. In opposition stood
the capitalist West, led by the United States, a federal republic with a two-partypresidential
system. The First World nations of the Western Bloc were generally liberal democratic with a
free press and independent organizations, but were economically and politically entwined with
a network of banana republicsand other authoritarian regimes throughout the Third World,
most of which were the Western Bloc's former colonies.[1][2] Some major Cold War frontlines
such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Congo were still Western colonies in 1947.
A neutral bloc arose with the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought good relations with both
sides. The two superpowers never engaged directly in full-scale armed combat, but they were
heavily armed in preparation for a possible all-out nuclear world war. Each side had a nuclear
strategy that discouraged an attack by the other side, on the basis that such an attack
would lead to the total destruction of the attacker—the doctrine of mutually assured
destruction (MAD). Aside from the development of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, and their
deployment of conventional military forces, the struggle for dominance was expressed via
proxy wars around the globe, psychological warfare, massive propaganda campaigns
and espionage, far-reaching embargos, rivalry at sports events, and technological
competitions such as the Space Race.
The first phase of the Cold War began in the first two years after the end of the Second World
War in 1945. The USSR consolidated its control over the states of the Eastern Bloc, while the
United States began a strategy of global containment to challenge Soviet power, extending
military and financial aid to the countries of Western Europe (for example, supporting the anti-
communist side in the Greek Civil War) and creating the NATO alliance. The Berlin
Blockade (1948–49) was the first major crisis of the Cold War. With the victory of
the Communist side in the Chinese Civil War and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–
53), the conflict expanded. The USSR and the USA competed for influence in Latin
America and the decolonizing states of Africa and Asia. The Soviets suppressed
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The expansion and escalation sparked more crises, such
as the Suez Crisis (1956), the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962,
which was perhaps the closest the two sides came to nuclear war. Meanwhile, an
international peace movement took root and grew among citizens around the world, first in
Japan from 1954, when people became concerned about nuclear weapons testing, but soon
also in Europe and the US. The peace movement, and in particular the anti-nuclear
movement, gained pace and popularity from the late 1950s and early 1960s, and continued to
grow through the '70s and '80s with large protest marches, demonstrations and various non-
parliamentary activism opposing war and calling for global nuclear disarmament. Following
the Cuban Missile Crisis, a new phase began that saw the Sino-Soviet split complicate
relations within the Communist sphere, while US allies, particularly France, demonstrated
greater independence of action. The USSR crushed the 1968 Prague Spring liberalization
program in Czechoslovakia, while the US experienced internal turmoil from the Civil Rights
movement and opposition to the Vietnam War (1955–75), which ended with the defeat of the
US-backed Republic of Vietnam, prompting further adjustments.
By the 1970s, both sides had become interested in making allowances in order to create a
more stable and predictable international system, ushering in a period of détente that
saw Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the US opening relations with the People's Republic
of China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union. Détente collapsed at the end of the
decade with the beginning of the Soviet–Afghan War in 1979. The early 1980s were another
period of elevated tension, with the Soviet downing of KAL Flight 007 and the "Able Archer"
NATO military exercises, both in 1983. The United States increased diplomatic, military, and
economic pressures on the Soviet Union, at a time when the communist state was already
suffering from economic stagnation. On 12 June 1982, a million protesters gathered
in Central Park, New York to call for an end to the Cold War arms race and nuclear weapons
in particular. In the mid-1980s, the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the
liberalizing reforms of perestroika ("reorganization", 1987) and glasnost ("openness", c. 1985)
and ended Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Pressures for national independence grew
stronger in Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Gorbachev meanwhile refused to use Soviet
troops to bolster the faltering Warsaw Pact regimes as had occurred in the past. The result in
1989 was a wave of revolutions that peacefully (with the exception of the Romanian
Revolution) overthrew all of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. The
Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself lost control and was banned following an abortive
coup attempt in August 1991. This in turn led to the formal dissolution of the USSR in
December 1991 and the collapse of communist regimes in other countries such
as Mongolia, Cambodia and South Yemen. The United States remained as the world's only
superpower.
The Cold War and its events have left a significant legacy. It is often referred to in popular
culture, especially in media featuring themes of espionage (notably the internationally
successful James Bond book and film franchise) and the threat of nuclear warfare.
Meanwhile, a renewed state of tension between the Soviet Union's successor state, Russia,
and the United States in the 2010s (including its Western allies) has been referred to as
the Second Cold War.[3]

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, some 750 million people, nearly a third of the
world's population, lived in Territories that were dependent on colonial Powers. Today, fewer
than 2 million people live under colonial rule in the 17 remaining non-self-governing territories.
The wave of decolonization, which changed the face of the planet, was born with the UN and
represents the world body’s first great success.
As a result of decolonization many countries became independent and joined the UN.

The international trusteeship system was established by the UN Charter. Affirming the
principle of self-determination, the Charter describes the responsibility of States for territories
under their administration as “a sacred trust” in which the interests of their inhabitants are
paramount.

Trusteeship Council

The Charter also created the Trusteeship Council as a main organ of the UN. It was to
monitor the situation in 11 specific “Trust Territories” which were subject to separate
agreements with administering States. These territories had been formally administered
under mandates from the League of Nations, or separated from countries defeated in the
Second World War, or voluntarily placed under the system by their administering
Power. Eleven Territories were placed under this system.

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

As the process of decolonization continued to advance, the General Assembly, in 1960,

adopted its landmark Declaration on the Granting of Independence  to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. The Declaration affirmed the right of all people to self-determination and proclaimed
that colonialism should be brought to a speedy and unconditional end. Two years later,
a Special Committee on Decolonization was established to monitor its implementation.

In 1990, the Assembly proclaimed the International Decade for the Eradication of

Colonialism (1990-2000), which included a specific plan of action. In 2001, it was followed by
a Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism. The end of the Second
Decade coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. At the same time the General
Assemblydeclared the period 2011–2020 the Third International Decade for the Eradication of
Colonialism.

Since the creation of the United Nations, 80 former colonies have gained their independence.
This includes all 11 Trust Territories, which have achieved self-determination through
independence or free association with an independent State. The Special
Committee continues to monitor the situation in the remaining 17 territories, working to
facilitate their advance towards complete self-determination.

Fighting for the Third World The Third World nations were located in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa. They were economically poor and politically unstable. This was largely due to a long
history of colonialism. They also suffered from ethnic conflicts and lack of technology and
education. Each needed a political and economic system around which to build its society.
Soviet-style communism and U.S.-style free-market democracy were the main choices. Cold
War Strategies The United States, the Soviet Union, and, in some cases, China, used a
variety of techniques to gain influence in the Third World. (See feature on next page.) They
 backed wars of revolution, liberation, or counterrevolution. The U.S. and Soviet intelligence
agencies—the CIA and the KGB—engaged in various covert, or secret, activities, ranging
from spying to assassination attempts. The United States also gave military aid, built schools,
set up programs to combat poverty, and sent volunteer workers to many developing nations.
The Soviets offered military and technical assistance, mainly to India and Egypt. Association
of Nonaligned Nations Other developing nations also needed assistance. They became
important players in the Cold War competition between the United States, the Soviet Union,
and later, China. But not all Third World countries wished to play a role in the Cold War. As
mentioned earlier India vowed to remain neutral. Indonesia, a populous island nation in
Southeast Asia, also struggled to stay uninvolved. In 1955, it hosted many leaders from Asia
and Africa at the Bandung Conference. They met to form what they called a “third force” of
independent countries, or nonaligned nations. Some nations, such as India and Indonesia,
were able to maintain their neutrality. But others took sides with the superpowers or played
competing sides against each other

c. El conflicto ideológico. El equilibrio: la OTAN y el Pacto de Varsovia. El imperio

soviético. El bloqueo y el Muro de Berlín, Praga, la crisis de

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO /ˈneɪtoʊ/; French: Organisation du Traité de

l'Atlantique Nord; OTAN), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is
an intergovernmental military alliance between 29 North American and European countries.
The organization implements the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949. [3]
[4]
 NATO constitutes a system of collective defence whereby its independent member states
agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party. NATO’s
Headquarters are located in Haren, Brussels, Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied
Command Operations is near Mons, Belgium.
Since its founding, the admission of new member states has increased the alliance from the
original 12 countries to 29. The most recent member state to be added to NATO
is Montenegro on 5 June 2017. NATO currently recognizes Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia and Ukraine as aspiring members.[5] An additional
21 countries participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, with 15 other countries
involved in institutionalized dialogue programs. The combined military spending of all NATO
members constitutes over 70% of the global total.[6]Members have committed to reach or
maintain defense spending of at least 2% of GDP by 2024.
Pacto de Varsovia

The Warsaw Pact, formally known as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual

Assistance,[1] was a collective defence treaty signed in Warsaw, Poland among the Soviet
Union and seven Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe in May 1955, during
the Cold War. The Warsaw Pact was the military complement to the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CoMEcon), the regional economic organization for the socialist
statesof Central and Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact was created in reaction to the
integration of West Germany into NATO[2][3][4][5] in 1955 per the London and Paris
Conferences of 1954,[6][7][8][9][10] but it is also considered to have been motivated by Soviet
desires to maintain control over military forces in Central and Eastern Europe. [11]
The Warsaw Pact was established as a balance of power [12] or counterweight[13] to NATO;
there was no direct confrontation between them. Instead, the conflict was fought on an
ideological basis and in proxy wars. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact led to the expansion of
military forces and their integration into the respective blocs. [13] Its largest military engagement
was the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 (with the participation of all
Pact nations except Albania, Romania and East Germany),[12] which, in part, resulted in
Albania withdrawing from the pact less than a month later. The Pact began to unravel in its
entirety with the spread of the Revolutions of 1989 through the Eastern Bloc, beginning with
the Solidarity movement in Poland[14] and its electoral success in June 1989.
East Germany withdrew from the Pact following reunification with West Germany in 1990. On
25 February 1991, the Pact was declared at an end at a meeting of defence and foreign
ministers from the six remaining member states in Hungary. The USSR itself was dissolved in
December 1991, although most of the former Soviet republics formed the Collective Security
Treaty Organization shortly thereafter. Throughout the following 20 years, the seven Warsaw
Pact countries outside the USSR each joined NATO (East Germany through its reunification
with West Germany; and the Czech Republic and Slovakia as separate countries), as did the
three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that had been part of the Soviet Union.

The informal term "Soviet Empire" has two meanings. In the narrow sense, it expresses a
view in Western Sovietology that the Soviet Union as a state was a colonial empire. The
onset of this interpretation is traditionally attributed to Richard Pipes's book The Formation of
the Soviet Union (1954).[1] In the wider sense, it refers to the country's
perceived imperialist foreign policy during the Cold War.[citation needed] The nations said to be part
of the Soviet Empire (in the wider sense) were officially independent countries with separate
governments that set their own policies, but those policies had to remain within certain limits
decided by the Soviet Union and enforced by threat of intervention by the Warsaw
Pact(Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Poland 1980). Countries in this situation are
often called satellite states.

Though the Soviet Union was not ruled by an emperor and declared itself anti-imperialist and
a people's democracy, critics[2][3] argue that it exhibited tendencies common to
historic empires. Some scholars hold that the Soviet Union was a hybrid entity containing
elements common to both multinational empires and nation states.[2] It has also been argued
that the Soviet Union practiced colonialism as did other imperial powers.[3] Maoists argued
that the Soviet Union had itself become an imperialist power while maintaining a socialist
façade.
The other dimension of "Soviet imperialism" is cultural imperialism. The policy of Soviet
cultural imperialism implied the Sovietization of culture and education at the expense of local
traditions.[4]
The penetration of the Soviet influence into the "socialist-leaning countries" was also of the
political and ideological kind as rather than getting hold on their economic riches, the Soviet
Union pumped enormous amounts of "international assistance" into them in order to secure
influence,[5] eventually to the detriment of its own economy. After the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, when Russia declared itself successor it recognized $103 billion of Soviet foreign debt
while claiming $140 billion of Soviet assets abroad.

The Berlin Blockade (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949) was one of the first major international
crises of the Cold War. During the multinational occupation of post–World War II Germany,
the Soviet Union blocked the Western Allies' railway, road, and canal access to the sectors
of Berlin under Western control. The Soviets offered to drop the blockade if the Western Allies
withdrew the newly introduced Deutsche Mark from West Berlin.
The Western Allies organised the Berlin airlift (26 June 1948–30 September 1949) to carry
supplies to the people of West Berlin, a difficult feat given the size of the city's population. [1]
[2]
 Aircrews from the United States Air Force, the Royal Air Force, the French Air Force,
[3]
 the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air
Force, and the South African Air Force[4]:338 flew over 200,000 sorties in one year, providing to
the West Berliners up to 12,941 tons of necessities in a day, such as fuel and food, with the
original plan being to lift 3,475 tons of supplies. However, by the end of the airlift, that number
was often met twofold.[5] The Soviets did not disrupt the airlift for fear this might lead to open
conflict, even though they far outnumbered the allies in Germany and especially Berlin. [6] [7]
By the spring of 1949, the airlift was clearly succeeding, and by April it was delivering more
cargo than had previously been transported into the city by rail. On 12 May 1949, the USSR
lifted the blockade of West Berlin, although for a time the U.S., U.K and France continued to
supply the city by air anyway because they were worried that the Soviets were simply going
to resume the blockade and were only trying to disrupt western supply lines. The Berlin
Blockade served to highlight the competing ideological and economic visions for postwar
Europe and was the first major multinational skirmish of the cold war.

he Berlin Wall (German: Berliner Mauer, pronounced [bɛʁˈliːnɐ ˈmaʊ̯ɐ] ( listen)) was a

guarded concrete barrierthat physically and ideologically divided Berlin from 1961 to 1989.
[1]
 Constructed by the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), starting on 13
August 1961, the Wall cut off (by land) West Berlin from virtually all of surrounding East
Germany and East Berlin until government officials opened it in November 1989. [2] Its
demolition officially began on 13 June 1990 and finished in 1992. [1][3] The barrier included
guard towers placed along large concrete walls, [4] accompanied by a wide area (later known
as the "death strip") that contained anti-vehicle trenches, "fakir beds" and other defenses.
The Eastern Bloc portrayed the Wall as protecting its population from fascist elements
conspiring to prevent the "will of the people" in building a socialist state in East Germany.
GDR authorities officially referred to the Berlin Wall as the Anti-Fascist Protection Rampart
(German: Antifaschistischer Schutzwall). The West Berlin city government sometimes
referred to it as the "Wall of Shame", a term coined by mayor Willy Brandt in reference to the
Wall's restriction on freedom of movement.[5] Along with the separate and much longer Inner
German border (IGB), which demarcated the border between East and West Germany, it
came to symbolize physically the "Iron Curtain" that separated Western Europe and
the Eastern Blocduring the Cold War.[6
Before the Wall's erection, 3.5 million East Germans circumvented Eastern Bloc emigration
restrictions and defected from the GDR, many by crossing over the border from East Berlin
into West Berlin; from there they could then travel to West Germany and to other Western
European countries. Between 1961 and 1989 the Wall prevented almost all such emigration.
[7]
 During this period over 100,000 [6] people attempted to escape and over 5,000 people
succeeded in escaping over the Wall, with an estimated death toll ranging from 136 [8] to more
than 200[9][6] in and around Berlin.
In 1989 a series of revolutions in nearby Eastern Bloc countries—
Poland and Hungary in particular—caused a chain reaction in East Germany that
ultimately resulted in the demise of the Wall. [10] After several weeks of civil unrest, the
East German government announced on 9 November 1989 that all GDR citizens
could visit West Germany and West Berlin. Crowds of East Germans crossed and
climbed onto the Wall, joined by West Germans on the other side in a celebratory
atmosphere. Over the next few weeks, euphoric people and souvenir hunters chipped
away parts of the Wall; the governments later used industrial equipment to remove
most of what was left. [6] The "fall of the Berlin Wall" paved the way for German
reunification, which formally took place on 3 October 1990. [6]

The Prague Spring (Czech: Pražské jaro, Slovak: Pražská jar) was a period of

political liberalization in Czechoslovakia as a Communist state after World War II. It began on
5 January 1968, when reformist Alexander Dubček was elected First Secretary of
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), and continued until 21 August 1968 when
the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact invaded the country to suppress the
reforms.
The Prague Spring reforms were a strong attempt by Dubček to grant additional rights to the
citizens of Czechoslovakia in an act of partial decentralization of the
economy and democratization. The freedoms granted included a loosening of restrictions on
the media, speech and travel. After national discussion of dividing the country into
a federation of three republics, Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia and Slovakia, Dubček oversaw the
decision to split into two, the Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic. [1] This
dual federation was the only formal change that survived the invasion.
The reforms, especially the decentralization of administrative authority, were not received well
by the Soviets, who, after failed negotiations, sent half a million Warsaw Pact troops and
tanks to occupy the country. The New York Times cited reports of 650,000 men equipped
with the most modern and sophisticated weapons in the Soviet military catalogue. [2] A large
wave of emigration swept the nation. Non-violent resistance was mounted throughout the
country, involving attempted fraternization, sabotage of street signs, defiance of curfews, etc.
While the Soviet military had predicted that it would take four days to subdue the country, the
resistance held out for eight months until it was finally circumvented by diplomatic stratagems
(see below). It became a high-profile example of civilian-based defense; there were sporadic
acts of violence and several protest suicides by self-immolation (the most famous being that
of Jan Palach), but no military resistance. Czechoslovakia remained controlled by the Soviet
Union until 1989, when the Velvet Revolution peacefully ended the communist regime; the
last Soviet troops left the country in 1991.
After the invasion, Czechoslovakia entered a period known as "normalization": subsequent
leaders attempted to restore the political and economic values that had prevailed before
Dubček gained control of the KSČ. Gustáv Husák, who replaced Dubček as First Secretary
 and also became President, reversed almost all of the reforms. The Prague Spring inspired
music and literature including the work of Václav Havel, Karel Husa, Karel Kryl and Milan
Kundera's novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being.

d. Cuba. Las guerras de Corea, Vietnam y Afganistán.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of 1962 (Spanish: Crisis de

Octubre), the Caribbean Crisis (Russian: Карибский кризис, tr. Karibsky krizis, IPA: [kɐ
ˈrʲipskʲɪj ˈkrʲizʲɪs]), or the Missile Scare, was a 13-day (October 16–28, 1962) confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Unioninitiated by American ballistic
missile deployment in Italy and Turkey with consequent Soviet ballistic missile deployment
in Cuba. The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating
into a full-scale nuclear war.[1]
In response to the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961 and the presence of American Jupiter
ballistic missilesin Italy and Turkey, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuba's request
to place nuclear missiles on the island to deter a future invasion. An agreement was reached
during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in July 1962, and construction
of a number of missile launch facilities started later that summer.
The 1962 United States elections were under way, and the White House had for months
denied charges that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 90 miles (140 km) from Florida.
The missile preparations were confirmed when an Air Force U-2 spy plane produced clear
photographic evidence of medium-range (SS-4)and intermediate-range (R-14) ballistic
missile facilities. The US established a naval blockade on October 22 to prevent further
missiles from reaching Cuba; Oval Office tapes during the crisis revealed that Kennedy had
also put the blockade in place as an attempt to provoke Soviet-backed forces in Berlin as
well.[2][3][4] The US announced it would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba
and demanded that the weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the Soviet
Union.
After several days of tense negotiations, an agreement was reached between US
President John F. Kennedyand Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their
offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United
Nations verification, in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to avoid invading
Cuba again. Secretly, the United States agreed that it would dismantle all US-built  Jupiter
MRBMs, which had been deployed in Turkey against the Soviet Union; there has been
debate on whether or not Italy was included in the agreement as well.
When all offensive missiles and Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba,
the blockade was formally ended on November 21, 1962. The negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union pointed out the necessity of a quick, clear, and direct
communication line between Washington and Moscow. As a result, the Moscow–Washington
hotline was established. A series of agreements reduced US–Soviet tensions for several
years until both parties began to build their nuclear arsenal even further.
Las guerras de Corea

The Korean War (in South Korean Hangul: 한 국 전 쟁 ; Hanja: 韓國戰爭; RR: Hanguk

Jeonjaeng, "Korean War"; in North Korean Chosŏn'gŭl: 조국해방전쟁; Hancha: 祖國解放戰爭;
 MR: Choguk haebang chŏnjaeng, "Fatherland: Liberation War"; 25 June 1950 – 27 July
1953)[38][39][d] was a war between North Korea (with the support of China and the Soviet Union)
and South Korea (with the principal support of the United States). The war began on 25 June
1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea [41][42] following a series of clashes along the
border.[43][44]
As a product of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, Korea had
been split into two sovereign states. Both governments claimed to be the sole legitimate
government of all of Korea, and neither accepted the border as permanent. The conflict
escalated into open warfare when North Korean forces—supported by the Soviet Union and
China—moved into the south on 25 June 1950. [45] The United Nations Security
Council authorized the formation and dispatch of UN forces to Korea [46] to repel what was
recognized as a North Korean invasion. [47][48] Twenty-one countries of the United Nations
eventually contributed to the UN force, with the United States providing around 90% of the
military personnel.[49]
After the first two months of war, South Korean and U.S. forces rapidly dispatched to Korea
were on the point of defeat, forced back to a small area in the south known as the Pusan
Perimeter. In September 1950, an amphibious UN counter-offensive was launched
at Incheon, and cut off many North Korean troops. Those who escaped envelopment and
capture were forced back north. UN forces rapidly approached the Yalu River—the border
with China—but in October 1950, mass Chinese forces crossed the Yalu and entered the
war.[45] The surprise Chinese intervention triggered a retreat of UN forces which continued
until mid-1951.
In these reversals of fortune, Seoul changed hands four times, and the last two years of
fighting became a war of attrition, with the front line close to the 38th parallel. The war in the
air, however, was never a stalemate. North Korea was subject to a massive bombing
campaign. Jet fighters confronted each other in air-to-air combat for the first time in history,
and Soviet pilots covertly flew in defense of their communist allies.
The fighting ended on 27 July 1953, when an armistice was signed. The agreement created
the Korean Demilitarized Zone to separate North and South Korea, and allowed the return of
prisoners. However, no peace treaty was ever signed, and according to some sources the
two Koreas are technically still at war, engaged in a frozen conflict.[50][51] In April 2018, the
leaders of North and South Korea met at the demilitarized zone [52] and agreed to sign a treaty
by the end of the year to formally end the Korean War. [53]
As a war undeclared by all participants, the conflict helped bring the term "police action" into
common use. It also led to the permanent alteration of the balance of power within the United
Nations, where Resolution 377—passed in 1950 to allow a bypassing of the Security Council
if that body could not reach an agreement—led to the General Assembly displacing the
Security Council as the primary organ of the UN. [54]
Vietnam

The Vietnam War (Vietnamese: Chiến tranh Việt Nam), also known as the Second

Indochina War,[76] and in Vietnam as the Resistance War Against
America (Vietnamese: Kháng chiến chống Mỹ) or simply the American War, was a conflict
that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from 1 November 1955[A 1] to the fall of
Saigon on 30 April 1975. It was the second of the Indochina Wars and was officially fought
between North Vietnam and the government of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese army
was supported by the Soviet Union, China,[29] and other communist allies; the South
Vietnamese army was supported by the United States, South Korea, the Philippines,
Australia, Thailand and other anti-communist allies.[77] The war is considered a Cold War-
era proxy war by some US perspectives.[78] The war would last approximately 19 years and
would also form the Laotian Civil War as well as the Cambodian Civil War, which resulted in
all 3 countries becoming communist states in 1975.
There are several competing views on the conflict. Some on the North
Vietnamese and National Liberation Front side view the struggle against U.S. forces as
a colonial war and a continuation of the First Indochina War against forces from France and
later on the United States, [79] especially in light of the failed 1954 Geneva Conference calls for
elections. Other interpretations of the North Vietnamese side include viewing it as a civil war,
especially in the early and later phases following the U.S. interlude between 1965 and 1970,
[80]
 as well as a war of liberation. [79] In the perspective of some, the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the successor to the Việt Cộng, was
motivated in part by significant social changes in the post-World War II Vietnam, and had
initially seen it as a revolutionary warsupported by Hanoi.[81][82] The pro-government side
in South Vietnam viewed it as a civil war, a defensive war against communism, [80][83] or were
motivated to fight to defend their homes and families. [84] The U.S. government viewed its
involvement in the war as a way to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam. This was
part of the domino theory of a wider containment policy, with the stated aim of stopping the
spread of communism.[85]
Beginning in 1950, American military advisors arrived in what was then French Indochina.[86][A
3]
 Most of the funding for the French war effort was provided by the U.S. [87] The Việt Cộng,
also known as Front national de libération du Sud-Viêt Nam or FNL (the National Liberation
Front), a South Vietnamese communist common front aided by the North, fought a guerrilla
war against anti-communist forces in the region, while the People's Army of Vietnam, also
known as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), engaged in more conventional warfare, and
had launched armed struggles from 1959 onward. U.S. involvement escalated in 1960 under
President John F. Kennedy, with troop levels gradually surging under the MAAG program
from just under a thousand in 1959 to 16,000 in 1963. [88][89]
By 1964 there were 23,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, but this escalated further following the
1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which a U.S. destroyer was alleged to have clashed with
North Vietnamese fast attack craft. In response the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Lyndon B.
Johnson authorization to increase U.S. military presence, deploying ground combat units for
the first time and increasing troop levels to 184,000. [88]Every year onward there was
significant build-up despite little progress, with Robert McNamara, one of the principal
architects of the war, beginning to express doubts of victory by the end of 1966. [90] U.S. and
South Vietnamese forces relied on air superiority and overwhelming firepower to
conduct search and destroyoperations, involving ground forces, artillery, and airstrikes. The
U.S. conducted a large-scale strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Following
the Tết Offensive, U.S. forces began withdrawal under the Vietnamization phase; the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam unconventional and conventional capabilities increased following a
period of neglect and became modeled on heavy fire-power focused doctrines like US forces.
Operations crossed international borders: bordering areas of Laos and Cambodia were used
by North Vietnam as supply routes and were heavily bombed by U.S. forces.
Gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces began as part of "Vietnamization", which aimed to
end American involvement in the war while transferring the task of fighting the communists to
the South Vietnamese themselves and begun the task of modernizing their armed forces.
Morale declined significantly among U.S. forces during the wind-down period and incidents
of fragging, drug-use and insubordination increased[91]with General Creighton
Abrams remarking "I need to get this army home to save it". [92] From 1969 onwards the
military actions of the Việt Cộng insurgency decreased as the role and engagement of the
NVA grew. Initially fielding less conventional and poorer weaponry, from 1970 onward
the People's Army of Vietnamand its branch People's Liberation Armed Forces of South
Vietnam had increasingly became mechanised and armoured, capable of
modernised combined arms and mobile warfare and begun to widely deploy newer, untested
weapons.[93] These two sides would see significant, rapid changes throughout its lifetime from
their original post-colonial armies, and by mid-1970s the ARVN became the fourth largest
army[94] with the PAVN became the fifth largest army in the world [95] in two countries with a
population of roughly 20 million each.[96]
Despite the Paris Peace Accord, which was signed by all parties in January 1973, the fighting
continued as both Saigon and Hanoi attempted to take territory before and after the accord;
the ceasefire was broken just days after its signing. [97] In the U.S. and the Western world, a
large anti-Vietnam War movement developed as part of a larger counterculture, the largest
such anti-war movement up to that point in history. [98] The war changed the dynamics
between the Eastern and Western Blocs, altered North–South relations,[99] and significantly
influenced the political landscape in the United States. [100] Across much of Western
Europe[101]and the U.S., ground-force intervention spurred the rise of transnational political
movements and campaigning.[102]
Direct U.S. military involvement ended on 15 August 1973 as a result of the Case–Church
Amendmentpassed by the U.S. Congress.[103] The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese
Army in April 1975 marked the end of the war, and North and South Vietnam were reunified
the following year. The war exacted a huge human cost in terms of fatalities (see Vietnam
War casualties). Estimates of the number of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed vary from
966,000[43] to 3.8 million.[72] Some 275,000–310,000 Cambodians,[73][74][75] 20,000–
[72]
62,000 Laotians,  and 58,220 U.S. service members also died in the conflict, and a further
1,626 remain missing in action.[A 2] The Sino-Soviet split re-emerged following the lull during
the Vietnam War and ties between the DRV and its Cambodian allies in the Royal
Government of the National Union of Kampuchea, the newly-formed Democratic
Kampuchea begun almost immediately in a series of border raids by the Khmer Rouge and
erupted into the Cambodian–Vietnamese War, with Chinese forces directly intervening in
the Sino-Vietnamese War. The end of the war and resumption of the Third Indochina
War would precipitate the Vietnamese boat people and the bigger Indochina refugee crisis,
which saw an estimated 250,000 people perish at sea.

Guerra afganistan

The Soviet–Afghan War lasted over nine years, from December 1979 to February 1989.

Insurgent groups known collectively as the mujahideen, as well as smaller Maoist groups,
fought a guerrilla war against the Soviet Army and the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan government, mostly in the rural countryside. The mujahideen groups were
backed primarily by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, making it a Cold
War proxy war. Between 562,000[32] and 2,000,000 civilians were killed and millions of
Afghans fled the country as refugees,[33][34][36][37] mostly to Pakistan and Iran.
Prior to the arrival of Soviet troops, Afghanistan's communist party took power after a 1978
coup, installing Nur Mohammad Taraki as president. The party initiated a series of radical
modernization reforms throughout the country that were deeply unpopular, particularly among
the more traditional rural population and the established traditional power structures. [38] The
regime's nature[39] of vigorously suppressing opposition, executing thousands of political
prisoners and ordering massacres against unarmed civilians, led to the rise of anti-
government armed groups, and by April 1979 large parts of the country were in open
rebellion.[40] The government itself experienced in-party rivalry, and in September 1979 Taraki
was murdered under orders of his rival and Minister of Foreign Affairs,  Hafizullah Amin, which
soured relations with the Soviet Union. Eventually the Soviet government, under
leader Leonid Brezhnev, decided to deploy the 40th Army on December 24, 1979.[41] Arriving
in the capital Kabul, they staged a coup,[42] killing president Amin and installing Soviet
loyalist Babrak Karmal from a rival faction.[40] The deployment had been variously called an
"invasion" (by Western media and the rebels) or a legitimate supporting intervention (by the
Soviet Union and the Afghan government) [43][44] on the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
In January 1980, foreign ministers from 34 nations of the Islamic Conference adopted a
resolution demanding "the immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops"
from Afghanistan,[45] while the UN General Assembly passed a resolution protesting the
Soviet intervention by a vote of 104 (for)–18 (against), with 18 abstentions and 12 members
of the 152-nation Assembly absent or not participating in the vote - [45][46] with only Soviet
allies Angola, East Germany and Vietnam, along with India, supporting the intervention.
[47]
 Afghan insurgents began to receive massive amounts of aid and military training in
neighboring Pakistan and China,[16] paid for primarily by the United States and Arab
monarchies in the Persian Gulf.[8][9][16][12][48][49][50][51] As documented by the National Security
Archive, "the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a significant role in asserting U.S.
influence in Afghanistan by funding military operations designed to frustrate the Soviet
invasion of that country. CIA covert action worked through Pakistani intelligence services to
reach Afghan rebel groups." [52] Soviet troops occupied the cities and main arteries of
communication, while the mujahideen waged guerrilla war in small groups operating in the
almost 80 percent of the country that was outside government and Soviet control, almost
exclusively being the rural countryside. [53] The Soviets used their air power to deal harshly
with both rebels and civilians, levelling villages to deny safe haven to the mujahideen,
destroying vital irrigation ditches, and laying millions of land mines. [54][55][56][57]
The military intervention was sharply and almost immediately denounced by the international
community, with numerous sanctions and embargoes being imposed against the Soviet
Union and the U.S.-led 1980 Summer Olympics boycott against Moscow, which was holding
the event; the boycott and sanctions exacerbated Cold War tensions and enraged the Soviet
government which later began and led a revenge boycott of the 1984 Olympics held in Los
Angeles.[58] The Soviets initially planned to secure towns and roads, stabilize the government
under new leader Karmal, and withdraw within six months or a year. But they were met with
fierce resistance from the guerillas, [59] and were stuck in a bloody war that lasted nine years.
[60]
 By the mid-1980s, the Soviet contingent was increased to 108,800 and fighting increased,
but the military and diplomatic cost of the war to the USSR was high. [10] By mid-1987 the
Soviet Union, now under reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev, announced it would start
withdrawing its forces after meetings with the Afghan government.[6][7] The final troop
withdrawal started on May 15, 1988, and ended on February 15, 1989, leaving the
government forces alone in its battle against the insurgents, which continued until 1992 when
the former Soviet-backed government collapsed. Due to its length, it has sometimes been
referred to as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam War" or the "Bear Trap" by the Western media.[61]
[62][63]
 The Soviets' failure at the war [64] is thought to be a contributing factor to the fall of the
Soviet Union.[65]

Wars in Korea and Vietnam

SETTING THE STAGE When World War II ended, Korea became a divided nation. North of
the 38th parallel, a line that crosses Korea at 38 degrees north latitude, Japanese troops
surrendered to Soviet forces. South of this line, the Japanese surrendered to American
troops. As in Germany, two nations developed. (See map on next page.) One was the
Communist industrial north, whose government had been set up by the Soviets. The other
was the non-Communist rural south, supported by the Western powers. War in Korea By
1949, both the United States and the Soviet Union had withdrawn most of their troops from
Korea. The Soviets gambled that the United States would not defend South Korea. So they
supplied North Korea with tanks, airplanes, and money in an attempt to take over the
peninsula. Standoff at the 38th Parallel On June 25, 1950, North Koreans swept across the
38th parallel in a surprise attack on South Korea. Within days, North Korean troops had
penetrated deep into the south. President Truman was convinced that the North Korean
aggressors were repeating what Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had done in the 1930s.
Truman’s policy of containment was being put to the test. And Truman resolved to help South
Korea resist communism. South Korea also asked the United Nations to intervene. When the
matter came to a vote in the Security Council, the Soviets were absent. They had refused to
take part in the Council to protest admission of Nationalist China (Taiwan), rather tan
Communist China, into the UN. As a result, the Soviet Union could not veto the UN’s plan to
send an international force to Korea to stop the invasion. A total of 15 nations, including the
United States and Britain, participated under the command of General Douglas MacArthur.
Meanwhile, the North Koreans continued to advance. By September 1950, they controlled the
entire Korean peninsula except for a tiny area around Pusan in the far southeast. That month,
however, MacArthur launched a surprise attack. Troops moving north from Pusan met with
 forces that had made an amphibious landing at Inchon. Caught in this “pincer action,” about
half of the North Koreans surrendered. The rest retreated.

e. Panorama regional: Europa, Medio Oriente, la revolución China.

The Chinese Communist Revolution or the Chinese revolution of 1949 was a revolution in
China that was led by the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong which resulted in the
proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China on 1 October 1949. It started in 1946, after the
end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and was the second part of the Chinese Civil War. In
the Chinese media, this period is known as the War of Liberation (simplified Chinese: 解放战
争; traditional Chinese: 解放戰爭; pinyin: Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng)

The Cuban Revolution (Spanish: Revolución cubana) was an armed revolt conducted

by Fidel Castro's revolutionary 26th of July Movement and its allies against the authoritarian
government of Cuban PresidentFulgencio Batista. The revolution began in July 1953, [4] and
continued sporadically until the rebels finally ousted Batista on 31 December 1959, replacing
his government with a revolutionary socialist state. 26 July 1959 is celebrated in Cuba as
the Day of the Revolution. The 26th of July Movement later reformed along communist lines,
becoming the Communist Party in October 1965.[5]
The Cuban Revolution had powerful domestic and international repercussions. In particular, it
transformed Cuba's relationship with the United States, although efforts to improve diplomatic
relations have gained momentum in recent years. [6][7][8][9] In the immediate aftermath of the
revolution, Castro's government began a program of nationalization and political consolidation
that transformed Cuba's economy and civil society.[10][11] The revolution also heralded an era
of Cuban intervention in foreign military conflicts, including the Angolan Civil War and
the Nicaraguan Revolution.[12]

f. América Latina: La teoría de la dependencia. La revolución cubana.

Dependency theory is the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor
and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of
the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished
and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system".
The theory arose as a reaction to modernization theory, an earlier theory of
development which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development,
that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed
areas at some time in the past, and that, therefore, the task of helping the underdeveloped
 areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development,
by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into
the world market. Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped
countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features
and structures of their own; and, importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker
members in a world market economy.[1]
Dependency theory no longer has many proponents as an overall theory, though some
writers have argued for its continuing relevance as a conceptual orientation to the global
division of wealth.

g. Perestroika y glasnost. Caída del muro de Berlín. Colapso de la Unión Soviética.

Perestroika (/ˌpɛrəˈstrɔɪkə/; Russian: Перестро́йка, IPA: [pʲɪrʲɪˈstrojkə] ( listen))[1] was a
political movement for reformation within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the
1980s and 1990s and is widely associated with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and
his glasnost (meaning "openness") policy reform. The literal meaning of perestroika is
"restructuring," referring to the restructuring of the Soviet political and economic system.
Perestroika is sometimes argued to be a significant cause of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War.[2]
Perestroika allowed more independent actions from various ministries and introduced
some market-like reforms. The goal of perestroika, however, was not to end the command
economy but rather to make socialism work more efficiently to better meet the needs of
Soviet citizens.[3] The process of implementing perestroika arguably exacerbated already
existing political, social, and economic tensions within the Soviet Union and is often blamed
for furthering the political ascent of nationalism and nationalist political parties in the
constituent republics. Perestroika and its associated structural ailments have been cited as
major catalysts leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union
Glasnost
n the Russian language the
word Glasnost (/ˈɡlæznɒst/; Russian: гла́сность, IPA: [ˈɡɫasnəsʲtʲ] ( listen)) has several
general and specific meanings. It has been used in Russian to mean "openness and
transparency" since at least the end of the eighteenth century. [1]
In the Russian Empire of the late-19th century, the term was particularly associated with
reforms of the judicial system, ensuring that the press and the public could attend court
hearings and that the sentence was read out in public. In the mid-1980s, it was popularised
by Mikhail Gorbachev as a political slogan for increased government transparency in
the Soviet Unio

GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was engulfed by a multitude of problems. The economy,
especially the agricultural sector, began to fall apart. The country lacked technological
advancements and used inefficient factories, all while consumers were buying low-quality
 products and suffered from a shortage of social freedoms.  To reform the distraught Soviet
Union, the democratization of the Communist Party was promoted through Party Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev‘s policies of “perestroika” and “glasnost.”  

Perestroika refers to the reconstruction of the political and economic system established by
the Communist Party. Politically, contested elections were introduced to reflect the
democratic practices of Western society and allow citizens to have a slight say in
government. Economically, Perestroika called for de-monopolization and some semi-private
businesses to function, ending the price controls established by the government for the past
seven decades. The goal was to create a semi-free market system, reflecting successful
capitalist practices in the economies of Germany, Japan, and the United States.
Unfortunately, such an economy took time to thrive, and people found themselves stuck in a
worn-out economy, which led to long-lines, strikes, and civil unrest.

The term “Glasnost” means “openness” and was the name for the social and political reforms
to bestow more rights and freedoms upon the Soviet people. Its goals were to include more
people in the political process through freedom of expression. This led to a decreased
censoring of the media, which in effect allowed writers and journalists to expose news of
government corruption and the depressed condition of the Soviet people. Glasnost also
permitted criticism of government officials, encouraging more social freedoms like those that
Western societies had already provided. Yet, the totalitarian state present since 1917 was
difficult to dismantle, and when it fell apart, citizens were not accustomed to the lack of
regulation and command. The outburst of information about escalating crime and crimes by
the government caused panic in the people. This caused an increase in social protests in a
nation used to living under the strictest government control, and went against the goals of
Gorbachev.
       
These policies were in effect from 1985 to 1991, when Boris Yeltsin became Russia’s first
popularly elected president. He then formed the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Reconstructing the organization of the Soviet Union proved difficult and the effects were
mixed; while more social freedoms were permitted, the economy was in deterioration and
social unrest was growing among the people. Glasnost and Perestroika eventually helped
cause the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which had lasted from 1945 to
1991.

5. La era de la globalización
a. El nuevo orden mundial. Los debates: el “fin de la historia” y el choque de
civilizaciones. La híper potencia estadounidense. La guerra de los Balcanes. Las guerras del
Golfo. Fundamentalismo religioso.

New world order (politics)

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This article is about the use of the term "new world order" in international politics. For its use
in conspiracy theory, see New World Order (conspiracy theory). For other uses, see New
World Order (disambiguation).
The term "new world order" has been used to refer to any new period of history evidencing a
dramatic change in world political thought and the balance of power. Despite various
interpretations of this term, it is primarily associated with the ideological notion of  global
governance only in the sense of new collective efforts to identify, understand, or address
worldwide problems that go beyond the capacity of individual nation-states to solve.
One of the first and most well-known Western uses of the term was in Woodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points[citation needed] and in a call for a League of Nationsfollowing the
devastation of World War I. The phrase was used sparingly at the end of World War II when
describing the plans for the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system and partly
because of its negative associations with the failed League of Nations. However, many
commentators have applied the term retroactively to the order put in place by the World War
II victors as a "new world order."
The most widely discussed application of the phrase of recent times came at the end of
the Cold War. Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bushused the term to try to
define the nature of the post-Cold War era and the spirit of great power cooperation that they
hoped might materialize. Gorbachev's initial formulation was wide-ranging and idealistic, but
his ability to press for it was severely limited by the internal crisis of the Soviet system. In
comparison, Bush's vision was not less circumscribed: "A hundred generations have
searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of
human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from
the one we've known".[1] However, given the new unipolar status of the United States, Bush's
vision was realistic in saying that "there is no substitute for American leadership". [1] The Gulf
War of 1991 was regarded as the first test of the new world order: "Now, we can see a new
world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order.
[...] The Gulf war put this new world to its first test". [2][3]

Hyperpower
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A hyperpower is a state that dominates all other states in every domain (i.e. military, culture,
economy)[1] and is considered to be a step higher than a superpower. The term often refers to
 the United States of America due to its status as the world's only current superpower;
however, its possible status above that remains a topic of dispute.

The British journalist Peregrine Worsthorne coined the term in a Sunday Telegraph article

published March 3, 1991.[3] After the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, some political
commentators felt that a new term was needed to describe the United States' position (Pax
Americana) as the lone superpower. [4][5][6] French foreign minister Hubert Védrine popularized
the term in 1998, because from France's position, the United States looked like a hyperpower,
although the validity of classifying the United States in this way was disputed. [2]
The term has also been applied retroactively to dominant states of the past. In her book  Day
of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall, American
professor Amy Chua suggests that the Achaemenid Empire, the Tang dynasty, the Roman
Empire, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the British Empire were successful
examples of historical hegemons; the Spanish Monarchy, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, and Third Reich were counters; and she reflects on assertions that the United States
is a modern hyperpower. In a historical context, it is usually understood to mean a power that
greatly exceeds any others in its political environment along several axes; Rome did not
dominate Persia, Ancient India or China, but did dominate the entire Mediterranean area
militarily, culturally, and economically.

The Balkan Wars (Turkish: Balkan Savaşları, literally "the Balkan Wars" or Balkan Faciası,

meaning "the Balkan Tragedy") consisted of two conflicts that took place in the Balkan
Peninsula in 1912 and 1913. Four Balkan states defeated the Ottoman Empire in the first war;
one of the four, Bulgaria, suffered defeat in the second war. The Ottoman Empire lost the bulk
of its territory in Europe. Austria-Hungary, although not a combatant, became relatively
weaker as a much enlarged Serbia pushed for union of the South Slavic peoples. [1] The war
set the stage for the Balkan crisis of 1914 and thus served as a "prelude to the First World
War".[2]
By the early 20th century, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia had achieved
independence from the Ottoman Empire, but large elements of their ethnic populations
remained under Ottoman rule. In 1912 these countries formed the Balkan League. The First
Balkan War had three main causes:[3][2]

1. The Ottoman Empire was unable to reform itself, govern satisfactorily, or deal
with the rising ethnic nationalism of its diverse peoples.
2. The Great Powers quarreled amongst themselves and failed to ensure that the
Ottomans would carry out the needed reforms. This led the Balkan states to impose their own
solution.
3. Most importantly, the Balkan League had been formed, and its members were
confident that it could defeat the Turks.
The Ottoman Empire lost all its European territories to the west of the River Maritsa as a
result of the two Balkan Wars, which thus delineated present-day Turkey's western border. A
large influx of Turks started to flee into the Ottoman heartland from the lost lands. By 1914,
the remaining core region of the Ottoman Empire had experienced a population increase of
around 2.5 million because of the flood of immigration from the Balkans.
Citizens of Turkey regard the Balkan Wars as a major disaster (Balkan harbi faciası) in
the nation's history. The unexpected fall and sudden relinquishing of Turkish-dominated
European territories created a psycho-traumatic event amongst many Turks that is said [by
whom?]
 to have triggered the ultimate collapse of the empire itself within five years. Nazım
Pasha, Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Army, was held responsible for the failure and was
assassinated on 23 January 1913 during the 1913 Ottoman coup d'état.[4]
The First Balkan War began when the League member states attacked the Ottoman Empire
on 8 October 1912 and ended eight months later with the signing of the Treaty of London on
30 May 1913. The Second Balkan War began on 16 June 1913. Both Serbia and Greece,
utilizing the argument that the war had been prolonged, repudiated important particulars of
the pre-war treaty and retained occupation of all the conquered districts in their possession,
which were to be divided according to specific predefined boundaries. Seeing the treaty as
trampled, Bulgaria was dissatisfied over the division of the spoils in Macedonia (made in
secret by its former allies, Serbia and Greece) and commenced military action against them.
The more numerous combined Serbian and Greek armies repelled the Bulgarian offensive
and counter-attacked into Bulgaria from the west and the south. Romania, having taken no
part in the conflict, had intact armies to strike with, invaded Bulgaria from the north in violation
of a peace treaty between the two states. The Ottoman Empire also attacked Bulgaria and
advanced in Thrace regaining Adrianople. In the resulting Treaty of Bucharest, Bulgaria lost
most of the territories it had gained in the First Balkan War in addition to being forced to cede
the ex-Ottoman south-third of Dobroudja province to Romania

The Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991), codenamed Operation Desert Shield (2

August 1990 – 17 January 1991) for operations leading to the buildup of troops and defense
of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991) in its
combat phase, was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States
against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait.
The war is also known under other names, such as the Persian Gulf War, First Gulf
War, Gulf War I, Kuwait War, First Iraq War or Iraq War,[25][26][27][a] before the term "Iraq War"
became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War. The Iraqi Army's occupation of Kuwait that
began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation and brought
immediate economic sanctions against Iraqby members of the UN Security Council. Together
with the UK's prime minister Margaret Thatcher—who had resisted the invasion by Argentina
of the Falkland Islands a decade earlier[28]—George H. W. Bush deployed US
forces into Saudi Arabia, and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An
array of nations joined the coalition, forming the largest military alliance since World War II.
The great majority of the coalition's military forces were from the US, with Saudi Arabia, the
United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
paid around US$32 billion of the US$60 billion cost. [29]
The war was marked by the introduction of live news broadcasts from the front lines of the
battle, principally by the US network CNN.[30][31][32] The war has also earned the
 nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast of images from cameras on board
US bombers during Operation Desert Storm.[33][34]
The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and naval
bombardment on 17 January 1991, continuing for five weeks. This was followed by a ground
assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, who liberated
Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased its advance and declared a
ceasefire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was
confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles
against coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel.
Economic collapse of the Soviet Union
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The economic collapse of the Soviet Union was a crisis that that country suffered in the late
1980s. It consisted of important changes in its economy, which led to its dissolution as a
centralized political unit. This was made official on December 8, 1991 with the Treaty of
Belavezha, signed by the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The former Soviet
Union gave rise to several independent countries, which experienced severe contractions of
their economies during their transition to capitalism.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, the natural heir of Soviet power, became a
radically different country. In 1997, its GDP was just over half of 1989 levels. Uzbekistan,
where the 1997 GDP was around 80% of that of 1989, was one of the least affected former
Soviet republics. Armenia or Georgia were the most affected, the GDP of 1997 was around
30% of that of 1989.

b. El apogeo de Occidente. Desarrollo tecnológico y auge de las comunicaciones. La

globalización financiera y comercial.
c. El auge económico. Japón, el “milagro asiático” y la emergencia de China.
The rise of China and its wider implications for international politics form the most important
issue in our time. China’s economic miracle has contributed to growth and development both
at home and abroad. Based on the World Bank’s purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of
a country’s GDP, China’s GDP may surpass the US GDP in 2014.1 China’s economic growth
has also enabled a rapid modernization of China’s armed forces. China’s military expenditure
is still only a fifth of the United States’ military budget but is fast catching up, and China’s
official military budget of USD 132 billion in 2014 is twice the size of Russia’s military
spending.2 China’s increased economic and military might is changing not only Chinese
society and how the Chinese view their role and place in the world but also the regional
dynamics in Asia, and it has the potential to transform international politics at large.
Since China launched its economic reforms and opening up in the late 1970s, China has
pursued a foreign policy oriented towards securing economic growth and stability. National
defense was from the very beginning one of the Four Modernizations enacted by Deng
Xiaoping in 1978, but China’s international strategy and regional security policy were guided
by the “low profile” strategy, and China managed to build peaceful relations with its neighbors,
conducting a flexible policy securing almost all its land borders. In recent years, influenced by
China’s pride in its handling of the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing’s strategic thinking and
security policy seem to have shifted towards a more coercive diplomacy, an increase in
Chinese rhetoric on China’s “core interests”, and a more forceful policy protecting China’s
maritime interests.
The 2013 China Maritime Development Report concluded that maritime security has become
China’s leading external security issue, and the current major threat to Chinese security is the
possibility that the maritime territorial disputes could escalate into military conflict. The PLA
Navy remains a distant second to the US navy and maybe
China and international order Although China’s influence in international politics has grown,
China complies in large part with its obligations under international regimes like the World
Trade Organization, the Arms Control and Disarmament regime, and the human rights
regime, and China played a constructive role in the G-20 process during the financial crisis.
China, as do other countries, wants to use each regime to maximize Chinese interests and
challenge a traditional norm, like its interpretation of innocent passage under the UNCLOS,
and seek changes in the international status quo, such as in the international monetary
system where it wishes to strengthen the Chinese yuan’s position and diminish the dollar’s
dominating role as the leading reserve currency.
China is also beginning to deploy its economic wealth to support foreign policy goals on a
wider range of issues, including to deter arms sales to Taiwan, isolate the Dalai Lama, avoid
criticism of China’s human rights policies, and to defend its maritime claims. However, we
cannot claim that China is seeking to overthrow international regimes or promoting a
“Chinese model”, and in this sense China is behaving more like a status quo power than a
revisionist power. Also, we should be careful not to overestimate China’s influence because,
as David Shambaugh argues, China’s global presence is more broad than deep.
Concluding observations China’s rise offers both opportunities and challenges. East Asia has
been the most peaceful and economically vital region over the last three decades, and China
has played a large part in this achievement. China has pointed to provocative actions from
neighboring countries and the US to explain its recent more assertive foreign policy, but there
is no denying that the latest developments in the region have encouraged growing
nationalism and anti-Chinese sentiments in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, with
Vietnam experiencing large anti-China demonstrations. These states are becoming
increasingly concerned about China’s rise and are seeking a counterweight through closer
ties with the US.
With a strong US presence and alliance obligations in the region, East Asia and, in particular,
the maritime theater of East Asia are now also emerging as the strategic and security focal
point of the 21st century. As such, China’s rise and emergence as a sea power may have
wider global implications as the US is rebalancing towards East Asia, forcing the European
NATO partners to fend more for their own security, a development coinciding with Russia’s
more assertive policy in Eastern Europe and a number of energy deals signaling a closer co-
operation between China and Russia. As China’s global power continues to grow, China’s
new leader Xi Jinping is grappling with domestic challenges that, if handled well, will fulfill his
“China Dream”, but if mishandled, could temporarily derail China’s great power ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS China is a rising power, not just regionally, but globally. This rise in power
has affected governmental affairs on all three levels: domestic, regional, and international.
Although China’s rise to power has largely been peaceful up to this point, this could likely
change in the future as regional and global partners continue to react to China’s rise.
Changes to the regional or even global power structures can have adverse effects on the
international environment, causing states to choose sides and take up alignment strategies.
Countries are currently unsure of what to expect from China’s increasing power. China has
shown two different sides of its rising power, one of soft power and a second of aggression
and force. Will China be a rising power who employs soft power or use force to secure its
interests? Although China is quickly building and strengthening its military, political, and
economic capabilities there are other internal and external factors that China must consider
and address in its rise to power. On the domestic level, the Chinese government 106
Economic, environmental, and personal human security issues are all intertwined, leading this
thesis to argue that there is more than one human security issue within China that has the
potential to cause unrest. All of these human security issues negatively impact the Chinese
population in one way or another and because many of these issues are intertwined a
problem in one area could affect another. For example, if a person falls ill due to the poor air
quality, this in turn could come to have economic impacts as they could no longer work. The
Chinese government has been focused on keeping economic levels high and unemployment
low; however, they also need to focus on other human security factors including
environmental and personal security. These problems could equally cause unrest within
China. The Chinese government has slowly begun to address some of these human security
issues including inequality and pollution levels. However, the rate at which the Chinese
government is dealing with these problems has not kept up with the growth rate of these
issues and the problems continue to multiply. China must address all of these human security
issues in order to better secure its future, meet its economic goals, and gain military strength.
On the regional level, China must continue to engage with its neighbors through soft power
interactions. China’s neighbors have begun to diversify relations so as not to be so reliant on
a rising power whose true intensions are unclear. China must not only continue to assure its
regional neighbors of its soft power approach, but also demonstrate that approach to them.
China needs to become involved in more soft power projects that do not just benefit China’s
national agenda. Many of China’s soft power projects explored in chapter two have an
internal benefit to China. For example, the dam that China was constructing in Burma, while it
helped provide power to the Burmese people it 107 was primarily for China’s gain. The
Chinese spun the project as economic development for Burma in order to win its approval.
This, however, caused the local people to distrust Chinese intensions and the project was
ultimately cancelled. Recently, China began to use a hospital boat to visit countries and
provide medical assistance. This is the type of soft power influence China needs to utilize in
order to win over the hearts and minds of many neighboring countries. As China comes to
bear the responsibility of a regional power it needs to demonstrate it has regional interests in
mind. China also needs to reassess its aggressive positions in regional conflicts, like the
South China Sea dispute. China’s hostile behavior towards many of its regional neighbors
over these disputes could enhance distrust and lead to countries diversifying their relations,
as was observed with Burma, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries do not want to
be reliant on a rising power that cannot be trusted or depended upon. Historic relations with
China suggest that China has a past of invasion and violence against its neighbors. Many of
these countries recall that history and China’s capabilities. Now that China has even more
military strength, regional countries have become more concerned. The threats and
aggressive posturing that China has demonstrated over territorial disputes has only added to
the regional anxieties. As a result of Chinese increased military power and aggressions,
Burma and Vietnam have begun to be move towards a different alignment strategy regarding
China. China’s rise to power has had global affects as well. This impact is clearly visible in the
ongoing South China Sea dispute. Prior to China’s rise to power the United States showed
little interest in this regional territorial dispute. It has only been since China’s rise that the US
has been more active in the conflict and more vocal concerning Chinese 108 aggression. This
has led to the South China Sea conflict potentially becoming a flash point for violence
between the two countries. China’s assertion in the South China Sea conflict has not
necessarily increased, in fact, it has decreased because China has not engaged in a naval
battle over the dispute since 1988. What, however, has increased is China’s power and
military capabilities. This has allowed China to be more brazen in pursuing its territorial
claims. It now has the ability to support its rhetoric and many of the smaller neighboring states
have little chance of defe 109 distrust that currently exists between both countries. Taking
these cooperative steps will lessen tensions in the region and make for a more stable
environment. As China continues into the 21st century as a rising power, the Chinese
government will continue to focus on several key goals in order to maintain China’s new
status and stability on the home front. The Communist Party’s main focus will be on
preserving stability domestically as its economy, environment, and social structure continue to
change. The Chinese citizens are ultimately the state’s largest threat and China will remain
focused on suppressing any potential uprising or social movements. China must remain
stable in order to continue its rise to power and its domestic stability will take precedent over
many other goals sought by the regime. China will also continue to focus on projecting its new
rising power status around the world. This rising power will continue to seek raw materials
and access to foreign markets across the globe to fuel its economic growth. The South China
Sea dispute also is and will continue to be a main goal of the regime. For China this dispute is
much more then access to territory and resources, it is also about Chinese power projection
in the region. The world has begun to change due to the arrival of a new power. China’s rise
to power is extremely influential in many aspects of foreign affairs today. This thesis pointed
out several factors that need to be considered when attempting to understand the impact that
China’s rise could ultimately have. China’s rise to power still faces obstacles, especially
domestically, which could undermine much of the economic, political, and military power
China has established. Unfortunately, as examined through the last three chapters, it appears
that China has allowed its rise to power to take on a negative 110 connotation. This is largely
a result of China’s aggressive behavior directed at its neighbors. China must recognize what
its role as a rising power is in the larger global arena and how it wants to impact the world.

Overview: The Making of a Miracle

AST ASIA HAS A REMARKABLE RECORD OF HIGH AND sustained economic growdh.
From 1965 to 1990 the twenty-three economliies of East Asia grew faster than all other
regions of the world (figure 1). Most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly
miraculous growth in just eight economies: Japan; the 'Four Tigeser-Hong Kong, the Republic
of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, China; and the three newly industrializing economies
(NiEs) of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. These eight highperforming
Asian economies (HPAEs) are the subject of this study.* Selectinganysecofeconomiesand
attemptingto undesand theorigins of their successful growth are necessarily arbitnary
processes.' Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, and Lesotho in Sub-Saharan Africa have also been
among the world's top growth performers in the past two decades, as have such diverse
economies as Brazil, Cyprus, Greece, and Portugal (see figure 2). Why focus on eight
economies in East Asia? In part the choice reflects popular interest; it has become common
to see references to the "Asian Economic Miracle., In part it reflects recent artention by the
academic and development policy communities to the relationship between public policies-
which some authors have argued have a number of common threads in the eight economies,
especially Japan, Korea,
The Japanese economic miracle was Japan's record period of economic growth between
the post-World War II era to the end of the Cold War. During the economic boom, Japan
rapidly became the world's second largest economy (after the United States). By the 1990s,
Japan's demographics began stagnating and the workforce was no longer expandingas it did
in previous decades, despite per-worker productivity remaining high.

Background[edit]
This economic miracle was the result of post-World War II Japan and West
Germany benefiting from the Cold War.[dubious  –  discuss] It occurred chiefly due to the economic
interventionism of the Japanese government and partly due to the aid and assistance of the
U.S. Marshall Plan.[1] After World War II, the U.S. established a significant presence in Japan
to slow the expansion of Soviet influence in the Pacific. The U.S. was also concerned with the
growth of the economy of Japan because there was a risk after World War II that an unhappy
and poor Japanese population would turn to communism and by doing so ensure that the
Soviet Union would control the Pacific.
The distinguishing characteristics of the Japanese economy during the "economic miracle"
years included: the cooperation of manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, and banks in closely
knit groups called keiretsu; the powerful enterprise unions and shuntō; good relations with
government bureaucrats, and the guarantee of lifetime employment (shūshin koyō) in big
corporations and highly unionized blue-collar factories.

Governmental contributions[edit]
The Japanese financial recovery continued even after SCAP departed and the economic
boom propelled by the Korean War abated. The Japanese economy survived from the deep
recession caused by a loss of the U.S. payments for military procurement and continued to
make gains. By the late 1960s, Japan had risen from the ashes of World War II to achieve an
astoundingly rapid and complete economic recovery. According to Mikiso Hane, the period
leading up to the late 1960s saw "the greatest years of prosperity Japan had seen since
the Sun Goddess shut herself up behind a stone door to protest her brother Susano-o's
misbehavior." The Japanese government contributed to the post-war Japanese economic
miracle by stimulating private sector growth, first by instituting regulations and protectionism
that effectively managed economic crises and later by concentrating on trade expansion.
Brief introduction to the Japanese economic miracle[edit]
Japanese economic miracle refers to the significant increase in the Japanese economy
during the time between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War (1945-1991).
The economical miracle can be divided into four stages: the recovery (1946-1954), the high
increase (1955-1972), the steady increase (1972-1992), and the low increase (1992-2017). [3]
Though heavily destroyed by the nuclear bombardment in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and other
Allied air raids on Japan, Japan was able to recover from the trauma of WWII, and managed
to become the second largest economic entity of the world (after the United States) by the
1960s[4] (Soviet Union excluded). However, after three decades, Japan had experienced the
so-called "recession in growth", as the United States had been imposing economic protection
policy in oppressing Japanese production and forcing the appreciation of the Japanese yen.
In preventing further oppression, Japan greatly improved its technological advances and
raised the value of the yen, since to devalue, the yen would have brought further risk and a
possible depressing effect on trade. [5] The appreciation of the yen led to significant economic
recession in the 1980s. To alleviate the influence of recession, Japan imposed a series of
economical and financial policy to stimulate the domestic demand. Nevertheless, the bubble
economy that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the subsequent deflationary
policy destroyed the Japanese economy. After the deflationary policy, the Japanese economy
has been through a time of low increase period which has lasted until today. For more
detailed information regarding this period, see Economic history of Japan and Lost Decade
(Japan).

Role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry[edit]

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was instrumental in Japan's post-war
economic recovery. According to some scholars, no other governmental regulation or
organization had more economic impact than MITI. "The particular speed, form, and
consequences of Japanese economic growth," Chalmers Johnson writes, "are not intelligible
without reference to the contributions of MITI" (Johnson, vii). Established in 1949, MITI's role
began with the "Policy Concerning Industrial Rationalization" (1950) that coordinated efforts
by industries to counteract the effects of SCAP's deflationary regulations. In this way, MITI
formalized cooperation between the Japanese government and private industry. The extent of
the policy was such that if MITI wished to "double steel production, the neo- zaibatsu already
has the capital, the construction assets, the makers of production machinery, and most of the
other necessary factors already available in-house". The Ministry coordinated various
industries, including the emerging keiretsu, toward a specific end, usually toward the
intersection of national production goals and private economic interests.
MITI also boosted the industrial security by untying the imports of technology from the imports
of other goods. MITI's Foreign Capital Law granted the ministry power to negotiate the price
and conditions of technology imports. This element of technological control allowed it to
promote industries it deemed promising. The low cost of imported technology allowed for
rapid industrial growth. Productivity was greatly improved through new equipment,
management, and standardization.
MITI gained the ability to regulate all imports with the abolition of the Economic Stabilization
Board and the Foreign Exchange Control Board in August 1952. Although the Economic
Stabilization Board was already dominated by MITI, the Yoshida Governments transformed it
into the Economic Deliberation Agency, a mere "think tank," in effect giving MITI full control
over all Japanese imports. Power over the foreign exchange budget was also given directly to
MITI.
MITI's establishment of the Japan Development Bank also provided the private sector with
low-cost capital for long-term growth. The Japan Development Bank introduced access to the
Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan, a massive pooling of individual and national savings. At the
time FILP controlled four times the savings of the world's largest commercial bank. With this
financial power, FILP was able to maintain an abnormally high number of Japanese
construction firms (more than twice the number of construction firms of any other nation with
a similar GDP).

Conclusion[edit]
Coincidentally, the conclusion of the economic miracle coincided with the conclusion of
the Cold War. While the Japanese stock market hit its all-time peak at the end of 1989,
making a recovery later in 1990, it dropped precipitously in 1991. The year of the conclusion
of the Japanese asset price bubble coincided with the Gulf War and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union.
HISTORIA DEL PERÚ

1. El Perú antiguo (Ancient Peru)

a. Orígenes de la civilización en los Andes: del Lítico al Arcaico. Sitios representativos. El

complejo Caral.( Origins of civilization in the Andes: from the Lithic to the Archaic.
Representative sites The Caral complex.)

lithic
Nomadic hunters and gatherers.

period
inferior semi-nomadic
horticulturists

archaic
superior
sede
ntary farmers

14000 10500 9500 8000 7500 7000

paicasa chivateros Toquepala Paijan lauricocha Siches

 Pacaycasa located in the district of Pacaycasa, province of Huamanga, Ayacucho

region, in Peru. The lithic tools found in the Pacaicasa phase of the Piquimachay
cave are the oldest artifacts made by the Andean man.(highland) Richard
MacNeish
 Chivateros is an ancient stone tool quarry and associated workshop located near
the mouth of the Chillón river in the Ventanilla District, northwest of Lima, Peru.
Thomas C. Patterson and Edward P. Lanning in 1963 and 1966.
  Toquepala Caves are located near Toquepala mine, about 154 km (96 mi) from the
city of Tacna, in the extreme southeast of Peru. They are notable for a number of
rock paintings. The best known of them is the cave named Abrigo del Diablo
("Devil's rock face"). Bojovich and Gonzales.
 Paijan Rafael Larco Hoyle They are considered as the oldest human remains in
Peru.
 Lauricocha august cardish human bone remains, rock paintings, lithic remains
 Siches-richarson –lithic remain Guitarrero Tomas Lynch Guitarrero Cave is located
in the Callejón de Huaylas valley in Yungay Province, in the Ancash
region of Peru.
 Guitarrero tomas lynch-ancash Some of the earliest cultivated plants in South
America have been found in the cave.
 Tres ventanas (bernadino ojeda)-lima cultivated plants in South Americ, human
burials
 Telarmachay (Danielle)-junin domesticator of camelids
 Piquimachay(Richard mac neish)-ayacucho domesticator pignean pig
 Jayhumachay-ayacucho
 Pamapa de santo domingo (federic engel)-ica first settlemet human
 Chilca (federic engel)-lima dog
-

immigration theory -max uhle

autoctonist theory-julio cesar tello
aloquist theory- federico kauffman
hologenista-guillermo lumbreas

The Chavín culture 
 Early Horizon

a.
b. Período Formativo (Horizonte Temprano). Chavín. Paracas.
c. Surgimiento del Estado en los Andes (período Intermedio temprano). Moche,
Nazca, Tiahuanaco.
d. Expansión del Estado y desarrollo urbanístico (Horizonte Medio). Wari.
e. Los señoríos regionales (período Intermedio Tardío). Chimú, Chachapoyas,
Chincha, Chanca.

2. El Tahuantinsuyo
a. Fundamentos de la civilización andina: la reciprocidad y la redistribución.
b. La economía andina y el control vertical de pisos ecológicos.
c. Cosmovisión y religiosidad andina.
d. La expansión imperial del Tahuantinsuyo.
e. Caída del Tahuantinsuyo y desestructuración de la civilización andina. Colapso
demográfico.

3. Período colonial
a. La conquista. La expansión de Occidente. Etapas de la conquista de América. Los
viajes de Pizarro y la capitulación de Toledo. Guerras civiles. La rebelión de los
encomenderos.
By the Capitulation of Toledo signed on July 26, 1529 by the Queen consort Isabel
of Portugal, wife of Charles V, Francisco Pizarro was granted 200 leagues south
from the mouth of the Santiago River (1 ° 20'N to 9 ° 57'S) to constitute the
government of Nueva Castilla. The Capitulation of Toledo of 1529 is a royal decree
issued on July 26, 1529 in Toledo by the Crown of Castile, by means of which an
advance was granted to the conquistador Francisco Pizarro, within the framework of
the Spanish conquest and colonization of America. This document was signed by
Queen Consort Isabel of Portugal (with powers delegated by mandate of her
husband, King Carlos I of Spain, who was absent from Cortes), the Count of
Osorno, García Fernández Manrique (President of the Council of the Indies) and Dr.
Diego Beltrán.

For this Capitulation, Pizarro received the authorization for the conquest and
population of the province of Peru or Nueva Castilla, from the town of Tempulla or
Santiago (coast of present-day Ecuador) to the town of Chincha (coast of present-
day Peru); between both points a distance of 200 leagues was mediated. Much of
this area, which stretched along the coast of what was then called the South Sea,
had already been discovered and explored by Pizarro and his partner, Captain
Diego de Almagro, in the five years prior to the signing of the capitulation.

From the parallel in which the jurisdiction given to Pizarro ended, Simon de
Alcazaba and Sotomayor were granted another 200 leagues to the south (up to 21 °
6,5 'S), naming him governor, captain general, advance and senior sheriff of the
government of Nueva León. However, Alcazaba and Sotomayor could not make the
expedition and the king projected (between 1530 and 1531) to deliver the territories
from Chincha to the Strait of Magellan to the Fugger family of Germany.

This agreement meant the personal triumph of Pizarro to the detriment of its
partners (Almagro and Luque), due to the enormous advantages and benefits it
derived from it. In this way the conquest of Peru or the Tahuantinsuyo was legalized
and legitimized by the Spanish Crown itself

The Great Rebellion of Encomenderos of 1544, was a rebellion of the Spanish

encomenderos in Peru against the Spanish crown, in the protest by the dación of
the New Laws of 1542 that protected the natives, and limited the actions and
abuses of the encomenderos created by King Carlos I of Spain at the proposal of
Bartolomé de las Casas. Its leader was Gonzalo Pizarro, also emphasizing
Francisco de Carvajal. After the Conquest of Peru, and as antecedent, the Civil War
between the conquerors of Peru had already taken place between the supporters of
Francisco Pizarro and those of Diego de Almagro, resulting in Pizarro being
assassinated, and the followers of Almagro finally defeated.

During the revolt, Gonzalo Pizarro was appointed Governor of Peru (1544 - 1548).
Defeated by Pedro de La Gasca, in the battle of Jaquijahuana (April 9, 1548), he
was imprisoned, tried, sentenced to death and beheaded.
b. El orden colonial. Las reformas de virrey Francisco de Toledo. Estructura de
dominación política: El consejo de Indias, el virrey, la Real Audiencia y los
corregidores.

Francisco Álvarez de Toledo (Oropesa, 10 July 1515 – Escalona, 21 April 1582), also

known as The Viceroyal Solon,[1] was an aristocrat and soldier of the Kingdom of
Spain and the fifth Viceroy of Peru. He is often considered the "best of Peru's
viceroys," [2]albeit controversial for the deleterious impact of some of his actions on
the Native American (Indian) population. He brought stability to a
tumultuous viceroyalty of Spain and enacted administrative reforms which changed the
character of Spanish rule and the relationship between the indigenous Native
Americans of the Andes and their Spanish overlords.[3] With a policy called reductions,
Toledo forcibly relocated much of the Indian population of Peru and Bolivia into new
settlements to facilitate Christianization, to collect tribute and taxes, and to gather
Indian labor to work in mines and other Spanish enterprises.
He held the position of viceroy from November 30, 1569, until 1 May 1581, a total of
eleven years and five months. He has been praised as the "supreme organizer" of the
immense viceroyalty, giving it an adequate legal structure and strengthening important
institutions under which the Spanish colony functioned for more than two hundred
years. [4] He is criticized for the reductions of the Indian population, expanding the forced
labor demanded of the Indians under the mita of the Inca Empire, and executing Túpac
Amaru, the last Inca of the Neo-Inca State in Vilcabamba.[5]
After the conquest of Peru a civil war arose between Francisco Pizarro and Diego
de Almagro for the control of the new lands.

To put an end to these conflicts, King Carlos I of Spain decreed the New Laws in
1542, with which he ordered the creation of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the title of
Viceroy.
The first ruler was Blasco Núñez de Vela, and years later a character remembered
very much in history due to the reforms he formulated: Francisco de Toledo, who
ruled the viceroyalty from 1569 to 1581.

His most outstanding reforms are:

a) The creation of the reductions: The indigenous people were forced to leave their
homes in the highest parts of the mountains and concentrate on the areas of easy
access.
     This in order to speed up the evangelization, the collection of taxes and the
recruitment of labor.

b) The establishment of the mining mita: It was a system of work by turns and
forced that the natives had to realize in benefit of the Spanish crown.

c) The installation of the Holy Inquisition: Its objective was to watch over the
interests of the Catholic Church, combating heresies, witchcraft and religions alien
to the Catholic faith.
    It only worked for Spaniards and mestizos; the Indians were outside their
jurisdiction.
d) The obligatory nature of the tribute: It consisted in a payment in money or in
products that the indigenous men from 18 to 50 years had to make.
 e) The creation of the Casa de la Moneda de Potosí: In order to mint the coin,
monitor the extraction of silver and ensure the payment of taxes.

f) Finally, the destruction of the resistance in Vilcabamba, which culminated in the

execution of José Gabriel Condorcanqui, better known as Túpac Amaru II.
    For this reason, Franciso de Toledo was recognized as the viceroy who
consolidated the political and administrative institutions in the viceroyalty of Peru.
c. Economía colonial. Política imperial: El sistema del monopolio comercial y el
circuito de la plata. Mercado interno: Haciendas, obrajes y economías regionales.

d. La sociedad colonial. El orden social. Mecanismos de explotación de la mano de

obra nativa: Las encomiendas, el tributo, la mita y los repartos.

Encomienda (Spanish pronunciation: [eŋkoˈmjenda]) was a Spanish labor system. It

rewarded conquerors with the labor of particular groups of subject people. It was first
established in Spain following the Christian conquest of Muslim territories. It was
applied on a much larger scale during the Spanish colonization of the Americas and
the Philippines. Conquered peoples were considered vassals of the Spanish monarch.
The Crown awarded an encomienda as a grant to a particular individual. In the
conquest era of the sixteenth century, the grants were considered to be a monopoly on
the labor of particular groups of Indians (indigenous peoples), held in perpetuity by the
grant holder, called the encomendero, and his descendants.[1]
Encomiendas were a form of "communal" slavery. In the encomienda, the Spanish
Crown granted a person a specified number of natives from a specific community, but
did not dictate which individuals in the community would have to provide their labor.
Indigenous leaders were charged with mobilizing the assessed tribute and labor. In
turn, encomenderos were to ensure that the encomienda natives were given instruction
in the Christian faith and Spanish language, and protect them from warring tribes or
pirates; they had to suppress rebellion against Spaniards, and maintain infrastructure.
In return, the natives would provide tributes in the form of metals, maize, wheat, pork, or
other agricultural products.
With the ouster of Christopher Columbus, the Spanish crown sent a royal governor,
Fray Nicolás de Ovando, who established the formal encomiendasystem.[2] In many
cases natives were forced to do hard labor and subjected to extreme punishment and
death if they resisted.[3]However, Queen Isabella of Castile forbade Indian slavery and
deemed the indigenous to be "free vassals of the crown". [4] Various versions of
the Leyes de Indias or Laws of the Indies from 1512 onwards attempted to regulate the
interactions between the settlers and natives. Both natives and Spaniards appealed to
the Real Audiencias for relief under the encomienda system.
Encomiendas had often been characterized by the geographical displacement of the
enslaved and breakup of communities and family units, but in Mexico,
the encomienda ruled the free vassals of the crown through existing community
hierarchies, and the natives were allowed to keep in touch with their families and
homes.[5]

Contents
e. Las reformas borbónicas. Reformas políticas, administrativas y fiscales. La
expulsión de los jesuitas. Impacto político: las rebeliones anticoloniales. Túpac
Amaru.

4. Independencia
a. Marco histórico general: las grandes transformaciones de la modernidad occidental.
La revolución industrial. La difusión de la ilustración, la revolución francesa y los
ideales republicanos. La independencia de Estados Unidos.
b. La crisis de 1808: La abdicación de Carlos IV a la Junta Central, el Consejo de
Regencia y las Cortes. El impacto en Hispanoamérica: Las Juntas americanas y la
legitimidad imperial en cuestión. La constitución de 1812. La lucha
revolucionaria.

62
 ADMISIÓN 2018

c. La guerra de independencia en el Perú. La contrarrevolución de Abascal. Tensiones

regionales: Tacna y el Alto Perú; el Cuzco y la rebelión de 1814. La independencia
en Trujillo. El conflicto de intereses entre Lima y las regiones.
d. Los Libertadores. San Martín y la corriente libertadora del sur. Bolívar y la corriente
libertadora del norte. Geopolítica de la independencia: El papel de las grandes
potencias y la conferencia de Guayaquil. El Congreso de Panamá.
e. El debate ideológico. El Real Convictorio de San Carlos y el Mercurio Peruano. La
Carta de Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán. Los clivajes políticos: Monarquistas -
republicanos; conservadores – liberales; centralismo - federalismo. El debate entre
Bernardo de Monteagudo y Faustino Sánchez Carrión.

5. República Siglo XIX

a. La república temprana. Caudillos y revoluciones. Dispersión del poder y las regiones.
La Confederación Peruano Boliviana.
b. La economía republicana. El auge del Extractivismo: minería, lanas y
agroexportación. El guano y el salitre. El contrato Dreyfus.
c. El civilismo y su propuesta de desarrollo. Manuel Pardo. Inestabilidad política. Guerra
con España.
d. La guerra del Pacífico. Causas y desarrollo. Negociaciones de paz: de la misión
Lavalle al Tratado de Ancón.
e. La reconstrucción. El contrato Grace.

6. República Siglo XX
a. La agenda ideológica. Manuel Gonzales Prada. El arielismo y su legado. El
indigenismo. El movimiento obrero y la reforma universitaria de 1919. La polémica
entre Haya y Mariátegui. La revolución de 1932.

Jose Manuel de los Reyes González de Prada y Ulloa (Lima, January 5, 1844 – Lima, July
22, 1918) was a Peruvian politician and anarchist, literary critic and director of the National
Library of Peru. He is well remembered as a social critic who helped
develop Peruvian intellectual thought in the early twentieth century, as well as the academic
style known as modernismo. He was close in spirit to Clorinda Matto de Turner whose first
novel, Torn from the Nest approached political indigenismo, and to Mercedes Cabello de
Carbonera, who like González Prada, practiced a positivism sui generis.

Arielismo refers to an idealistic quality of Hispanic American thought. The term is a neologism
derived from José Enrique Rodo's Ariel (1900), an essay that advocates a harmonious
synthesis of the finest attributes of Greco-Roman culture, the Judeo-Christian heritage, and
modern (late-nineteenth-century) perspectives. In Latin American intellectual circles it has
customarily been associated with elitism, spiritualist aesthetics, and high standards of
excellence.

Arielismo has often been used to explain the contrast between refined intellectual activity and
high culture on the one hand, and a more direct, pragmatic approach to Latin American
problems on the other. Practical-minded critics of the tendency have recognized its value as a
cultural ideal and educational stimulus but have considered its advocates to be out of touch
with Latin America's most pressing political, social, and economic needs.

Arielismo has had few explicit defenders. However, important twentieth-century writings have
shared or revised its spirit, among them: the Peruvian José de la Riva-Agüero's Carácter de la
literatura del Perú independiente (1905) as well as his compatriot Francisco García Calderón's
Le Pérou contemporain: étude sociale (1907), the Mexican Alfonso Reyes's Visión de Anáhuac
(1917), the Venezuelan Mariano Picón-Salas's Regreso de tres mundos (1959), and the
Dominican Pedro Henríquez Ureña's Seis ensayos en busca de nuestra expresión (1928). Its
detractors have been more pointed in their reaction: for example, Alberto Zum Felde, Proceso
intelectual del Uruguay y crítica de su literatura (1941), and Luis Alberto Sánchez, Balance y
liquidación del novecientos (1941). In 1971 Roberto Fernández Retamar published Calibán, a
socialist-oriented essay in which the leading roles in Rodó's work are reversed: Now Próspero,
the imperialistic magician, symbolizes the United States, and the uncouth Calibán is made over
to represent a victimized Latin America.

Indigenismo (Spanish: [indixeˈnizmo]) is a political ideology in several Latin American countries

emphasizing the relation between the nation state and indigenous nations and indigenous
minorities.[1] In some contemporary uses, it refers to the pursuit of greater social and political
inclusion for indigenous peoples of the Americas, whether through national-level reforms or
region-wide alliances.[2] In either case, this type of indigenismo seeks to vindicate indigenous
cultural and linguistic difference, assert indigenous rights, and seek recognition and in some
cases compensation for past wrongdoings of the colonial and republican states. Hispanismo is
a similar but opposite ideology.[3] Nevertheless some historical figures like José Martí are
classified as having been both indigenistas and hispanistas.

Revolution of Trujillo was a social and political conflict in Peru which began in Trujillo city on
July 6, 1932. It started with an uprising led by Manuel Barreto (known as "Buffalo"), against
President Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro[1]

On January 8, 1932, President of Peru Luis Sanchez Cerro carried out an "autocoup" by
outlawing political liberties and allowing for citizens to be detained without a warrant. It was the
combination of this action, social inequalities and violations of sugar plantation workers labor
rights which led to further civil unrest. Additionally, the party showed little interest in the
indigenous peasants.[2]

On the dawn of July 7, 1932, an insurgent group composed mainly of peasants and workers,
led by Manuel Barreto, attacked and captured the artillery barrack Ricardo O'Donovan, located
at the former entrance to the city. In this assault, Barreto was one of the first to fall afflicted.
The headquarters were ransacked. The weapons (including six mobile guns, rifles and
machine guns) were distributed among the insurgents. In the morning, the city was taken by
the people. Rebel Don Agustín Haya de la Torre (brother Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre) was
appointed Prefect (highest civil authority). The districts bordering the city also joined the
insurrection.

Mariátegui collaborated with Haya and APRA [2], while this organization remained a unique
anti-imperialist front, in various jobs such as the Gonzales Prada Popular Universities [3] and in
others. But, when Haya de la Torre decides to transform it into the Peruvian Aprista Party,
Mariátegui opened and broke openly with this political proposal. The main point of discord was
the change of APRA from a political front to a political party with interests of coming to power
through elections without demarcating with the form of capitalist democracy in Peru.

Here is the great ideological difference of transforming Peru: between the Aprista reformism of
developing capitalism in Peru led by progressive professionals and middle class intellectuals
[4]; and the construction of a proletarian party to lead the socialist revolution in Peru [5]

b. Ciclos políticos: La República Aristocrática. Leguía y la Patria Nueva. Odría y las

obras públicas. El gobierno revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas. Populismo y
democracia.

It is known as Aristocratic Republic (1895-1919) at the time of the history of Peru

characterized by the political dominance of an oligarchy dedicated to agricultural exports,
mining and finance, through the Civil Party. The term was coined by the historian Jorge
Basadre.

The period begins with the rise to power of Arequipa politician and lawyer Nicolás de Piérola
which marks the beginning of a succession of democratically elected governments, until the
coup of Augusto B. Leguía in 1919. The only interruption of this succession occurs in 1914
when, due to differences between the Civil Party and Guillermo Billingurst, General Óscar R.
Benavides gives a coup d'etat to call general elections. It is the longest period of democratic
succession in the history of Peru and begins the republican history of this country in the
twentieth century.

Broadly speaking, the characteristics of this period are the following:

Economic dependence on English capitalism.

Development of new economic activities: agro-export (sugar and cotton), rubber extraction
and oil extraction.
Political dominance of the Civil Party in the executive and legislative power. The Democratic
Party or Pierolista was constituted in the opposition, although progressively it was diminishing
its presence in the political scene. Civilization suffered, however, a schism, splitting into
classical civilism and leguiism.
Emergence of organized labor movements (anarcho-syndicalism).

Leguia patria nueva

In 1908 he succeeded José Pardo(a succession event that would occur again in 1919) after
being elected president for the first time by an alliance of the Civil and Constitutional parties.
Some of Leguía's first actions were to institute social and economic reforms in an attempt to
industrialize Peru and turn it into a modern capitalist society.

During this period the country was also confronting boundary disputes with five of its
neighbors. Leguía succeeded in reaching agreements with two of them, Bolivia and Brazil.
The Boundary with Brazil was settled with the signing of the Treaty of Velarde-Río Branco.
This provided that two rivers (Yaravi and Yaverija) would compose most of the border for both
countries.
With Bolivia, The Treaty of Polo-Bustamante determined the partition of the Lake Titicaca and
provided a much more accurate definition of the Peruvian-Bolivian border. This treaty also
delimited the borders with Tacna (which was until then in Chilean control).
In 1919, he again sought the presidency of Peru by trying to succeed José Pardo. Fearing
that the former president's government along with the Civilist Parliament would not recognise
his victory, he launched a successful military coup, which led Leguía to succeed Pardo as an
interim president. He then proceeded to dissolve Congress and the new parliament elected
him constitutional president of Peru.
Treaties of limits with Colombia and Chile were also signed:
The boundary with Colombia was settled with the secession of all the lands between
the Putumayo and Caquetá rivers. This was officially solved with the signing of the Treaty of
Salomón-Lozano in 1922. (However, the treaty was published after the overthrow of Leguía in
1930.)
The Tacna–Arica compromise was also signed with Chile, which unfortunately led to
economic depression in later years. Leguía was bitterly criticized for accepting the
compromise.

Savings were stimulated, borrowings were avoided that made the country more indebted and
the formation of cooperatives was encouraged.
The monetary system was reformed with the introduction of the gold standard. By law of
December 29, 1897 was ordered the minting of the Peruvian Pound of Gold, with the same
law and weight of the British pound sterling.
Reduction of the tax on products of first necessity (food) and increase of those that serve as
pleasure or vice (alcohol and tobacco).
The development of the Amazon was promoted, whose economic boom began with the
exploitation of rubber.
Manuel Madueño tried to create a federated state in Loreto, known as the Federal State of
Loreto.
By law of January 22, 1896, the Ministry of Public Works was created to organize a plan for
public works and promote industrial development. Its prime minister was the engineer
Eduardo Lopez de Romaña, who later was the one who succeeded Piérola in the presidency.
The Military School of Chorrillos was created on April 24, 1898, the purpose of which was to
make the militia a technical career.
Technical progress arrived: the first phonograph (1896); the first cinematographer (1897),
whose inaugural function was given with the presence of Pierola; the Roentgen rays (1896);
the first automobiles (1898) and telephone lines were increased.
The salt pond was introduced, whose product was destined as a fund for the rescue of Tacna
and Arica, held by Chile.
The Treaty Billinghurst-La Torre (1898) was signed to establish the normative procedure to
follow in the realization of the plebiscite in Tacna and Arica. This would never come to fruition,
and Chile rather accentuated its desalted policy of Chileanization in these Peruvian
provinces.

Manuel Arturo Odría Amoretti (26 November 1896 – 18 February 1974) was a military officer
who served as the 34th President of Peru, essentially ruling as a military dictator.
Manuel Odría was born in 1896 in Tarma, a city in the central Andes just east of Lima. He
graduated first in his class from the Chorillos Military Academy in 1915. He joined the army
and as a Lieutenant Colonel was a war hero in the 1941 Ecuadorian-Peruvian war. He soon
achieved the rank of Major General.

In 1945, José Bustamante had attained the presidency with the help of the American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). Soon, major disagreements arose between Víctor Raúl Haya
de la Torre, the founder of APRA, and President Bustamante. The President disbanded his
Aprista cabinet and replaced it with a mostly military one. Odría, a fierce opponent of APRA,
was appointed Minister of Government and Police. In 1948, Odría and other right-wing
elements urged Bustamante to ban APRA. When the President refused, Odría resigned his
post. On October 27, 1948, he led a successful military coup against the government and
took over as president. After two years, he resigned and had one of his colleagues, Zenón
Noriega, take office as a puppet president so he could run for president as a civilian. He was
duly elected a month later as the only candidate.

Odría came down hard on APRA, momentarily pleasing the oligarchy and all others on the
right. Like Juan Perón, he followed a populist course that won him great favor with the poor
and lower classes. A thriving economy allowed him to indulge in expensive but crowd-
pleasing social policies. At the same time, however, civil rights in the nation were severely
restricted and corruption was rampant throughout his régime. People feared that his
dictatorship would run indefinitely; they were surprised when Odría legalized opposition
parties in 1956 and called fresh elections. He did not run for office. He was succeeded by a
former president, Manuel Prado.

When national elections were held again in 1962, Odría ran as a right-wing candidate for the
Unión Nacional Odriista party. None of the three major candidates - Odría, Haya de la Torre
and Fernando Belaúnde - received the required one third of the vote to win with a plurality. It
appeared that Odría would win the Presidency in Congress, after having made a deal with
Haya de la Torre, but a military coup removed President Prado from office a few days before
his term ended. Elections were held again in 1963, with the same three major candidates.
This time Belaúnde won with 39% of the vote.[1]

During the Belaúnde administration, Odría made an alliance with Haya de la Torre to create a
single opposition block in Parliament, which became known as the APRA-UNO Coalition. As
a political force, they managed to create strong parliamentary opposition to President
Belaúnde, who was forced to make important concessions to the Coalition in order to get
most of his party-sponsored legislation enacted. The Coalition suffered a setback after losing
the elections for mayor in the capital, Lima.

After the military coup that overthrew Belaúnde in 1968, Odría kept a low profile in Peruvian
politics until his death in 1974.

El Perú entre la crisis de los ochenta y su ingreso al Siglo XXI.

During the 1980s, Peru faced one of its worst economic crises and the start of an internal
armed conflict. The Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, combined with an inherited state-
led growth model, drove the country into a cycle of GDP contraction and hyperinflation. By the
end of the decade, inflation rates had hit four digits (reaching 7,500 percent) and output had
fallen by 25 percent. GDP per capita, relative to that of the United States, fell from 25 percent
in the 1970s to 15 percent in 1990. Moreover, in the early 1980s, the Communist Party of
Peru— Shining Path (PCPSL) launched an armed struggle against the Peruvian state that
was soon followed by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). This armed
rebellion—similar in spirit, but much bloodier than other communist movements in the region
—claimed to empower the peasantry against the State and the ruling classes. The armed
conflict left behind close to 70,000 civilian casualties, most of whom were poor, rural Sierra
peasants, mainly from Quechua and other indigenous communities.1 Victims also included
local authorities and community leaders. The nature of the PCPSL terror and military tactics,
and the lack of a proper response by the Peruvian State subsequently led to thousands of
human rights abuse cases on both sides of the conflict, a legacy of violence with which the
country is still struggling to come to terms. The human rights abuses and the economic
turmoil of that period further eroded social trust. 8. During the 1990s, Peru undertook several
deep macroeconomic reforms supporting monetary and fiscal policy discipline, but also
reverted upon some institutional progress. These reforms included trade and financial
liberalization, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and implementation of a more
flexible exchange rate regime. To ensure a credible monetary policy and a sustainable fiscal
policy, greater autonomy was given to the Central Bank of Peru (Banco Central de Reserva
del Perú; BCRP), and the National Customs and Tax Administration Superintendence
(Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria; SUNAT) was
created. The reforms laid the basis for the subsequent output recovery (Figure 1). The
volatility of output growth declined somewhatin the 1990s but investment uncertainty
remained unusually high as high-level corruption scandals and an increasing abuse of
executive power undermined the rule of law. During this period previous institutional progress,
for instance, in decentralization, transparency, and accountability mechanisms to control
executive was partially reverted. 1 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report points
out that out of the estimated 69,280 victims, 79 percent lived in rural areas, 56 percent were
farmers, and 75 percent were had an indigenous mother tongue. In addition, 85 percent of
them lived in the departments of Ayacucho (40 percent), Apur

7. Actualidad nacional
a. La agenda de la democracia. El Acuerdo Nacional.

The National Agreement is a forum that elaborates and approves guidelines on State policies
based on dialogue and agreement between the three levels of government and the political
and social institutions of Peru. The agreement was signed on July 22, 2002.1 2

The 4 objectives of the agreement are Strengthening Democracy and the Rule of Law; Equity
and Social Justice; Country Competitiveness and Efficient, Transparent and Decentralized
State.

The policies in the National Agreement signed by Peru's political and social organizations in
2002, which propose a set of economic, political, social, cultural and institutional guidelines
based on the concept of social justice and governability (the real ability of citizens to influence
the daily decisions of the political class with their opinions and decisions) and sustainable
development (enabling citizens to manage their own lives in decent conditions, with equality
of opportunities and optimum environmental management).
The National Agreement approved 31 state policies grouped around four thematic axes: 1.
Democracy and the rule of law 2. Fairness and social justice 3. The competitiveness of the
country. 4. An efficient, transparent and decentralized state.

The National Agreement between political groups and representatives of Peruvian

society in 2002 placed great importance on a democratic, decentralized, efficient State at
the service of citizens and development, which guarantees national security and defense,
peace, social development and democracy. The first problem to be considered with
regard to this strategic objective is the need for a reform of the State that will give us an
agile, transparent and effective system serving the rights of individuals and placing value
on a career in administration. An important aspect of this reform is to define the problem
of the size and cost of the State. Sometimes it is not realized that: • The number of public
employees changed from 15% to 8% of the economically active population (EAP)
between 1990 and 2006. • The public sector payroll has represented only 5% of GDP
since 2006. • Public sector remuneration, bonuses and severance pay (CTS) are lower
than in the private sector. State activity at present is far removed from the productive
sector. Public expenditure on productive sectors is proportionately lower (11.1% in 2008)
compared with the increase in social expenditure (47.4% in 2008) and expenditure on
administration (30.7 in 2008).

b. Los modelos de crecimiento económico.

The history of Peru’s successful performance began with an ambitious stabilization program in
1990– 92, which addressed a multitude of macroeconomic problems, and began a long
process of structural reforms that set the basis for high economic growth in the future. The
program was responsible for a number of achievements, including: (i) sharply reducing the
budget deficit; (ii) abolishing price controls and liberalizing financial markets; (iii) opening up
economic activity; (iv) strengthening the framework for the implementation of monetary policy;
and (v) bolstering financial supervision and prudential regulation. The period from 1993–98
marked the resumption of sustained growth, something not seen since the early 1970s.
However, the period also included 1998, the only year of economic contraction in the post
stabilization period, and a reminder of Peru’s vulnerabilities to external shocks. A number of
additional structural reforms were implemented during this period— including tax reform,
pension system restructuring, public enterprise divesture, and financial system strengthening.
In addition, Peru finally normalized relations with all external creditors. The following nine years
(1999–2007) are associated with a temporary slowdown in growth, a positive swing in the fiscal
accounts, improvements in external conditions, and a deepening of reforms. In particular, the
reform process continued with two macroeconomic milestones: (i) the introduction of a fiscal
rule in 1999; and (ii) the introduction of inflation targeting in 2002. The economy grew on
average at an annual rate of 4½ percent, while inflation was finally brought down to levels
similar to those in advanced economies, averaging 2½ percent.
In early 2008, Peru was booming, but there were clear signs of overheating, with inflation
running at almost 6 percent, although the fiscal surplus was one of the highest in history. Public
debt was on a continuing downward path and Peru was granted investment grade in the first
half of 2008 (the third country in the region). However, the world changed in September 2008
with the onset of the global financial crisis. Fortunately, there was limited financial contagion
from the global crisis thanks to a quick policy response, including vigorous monetary and fiscal
stimulus. The effectiveness of the countercyclical response and the rapid economic recovery
soon turned the policy debate to the optimal speed of stimulus withdrawal in the post global
financial crisis period. Real GDP grew on average by 6¾ percent in the period 2010–13, while
core inflation remained under control. To prevent overheating risks, the authorities began the
tightening cycle in 2010–11. However, the capital inflow problem came to an abrupt end
following the announcement by the U.S. Federal Reserve in May 2013 of a potential “tapering”
of its unconventional monetary policy. The news created uncertainty in the markets and the
magnitude of capital inflows declined significantly. In the first half of 2014, Peru’s economy
experienced its sharpest deceleration since the global financial crisis. Real GDP grew 2½
percent in 2014 due to uncertainties about external conditions in a world economy with
mediocre growth. Real GDP growth in 2015 is expected to remain moderate.

c. La inclusión social, la lucha contra la pobreza y el desarrollo sostenible.

Peru has been one of the most prominent performers in Latin America in the last 25 years.
With GNI per capita of US$5,975 in 2015 (2011 PPP), its economy is one of the largest in
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Peru’s rapid economic growth, averaging 5.3
percent since 2001, was second only to Panama’s in LAC. Its population of about 31
million is relatively young, with more than half being under 30 years of age (Box 1). After a
massive urbanization process over the last 60 years, Peru is today a mostly urban country,
with about 80 percent of the population living in urban areas. Economic growth has been
widely shared. The poverty incidence rate fell from 58 to 23 percent from 2004–14, and
households’ incomes at the bottom 40 percent grew 50 percent faster than the national
average. The fast and widely shared growth transformed Peru into an upper-middle income
economy, with aspirations to become a high-income economy in the next 20 years.
Peru is characterized by a complex and diverse geography that holds wealth in natural
resources and several spatial development challenges. Peru’s geography is incredibly
diverse, with the massive Andean cordillera dividing its surface into three natural regions:
the Costa (arid coastal plains, where about 55 percent of the population resides) to the
west; the Sierra (highlands, with 32 percent of the population); and the Selva (the lush
Amazon rainforest, with 13 percent of the population) to the east. The country’s latitude, its
mountain ranges, sharp variations in topography, and the Humboldt (ocean) Current create
dramatically different climatic zones. Its geographic diversity exposes Peru to natural
hazards—it has seven of the nine possible characteristics that make a country vulnerable
to natural disasters: earthquakes, flash flooding, landslides, and volcanic activity, among
them. The country’s varied geography causes challenges for connectivity, raising the cost
of service delivery. The vast Sierra and Selva regions are difficult to traverse, having
historically isolated their remote communities from those living in the Costa region, thereby
resulting in large development gaps among the country’s regions.
Peru’s geography, natural endowments, and diverse population have shaped its
unbalanced economic development. The country’s plentiful natural and human
endowments shaped its economic development based on capital-intensive growth that
resulted in spatially unbalanced outcomes for the population. The cost of service delivery
and connectivity in the vast Sierra and Selva regions is high, which has concentrated
economic activity in the Costa region, especially in the area of Lima, the country’s capital.
The Lima area now accounts for one-third of Peru’s population and one half of its GDP. As
an example of its unbalanced development, the primary transport network connects Lima
to other coastal cities, but not necessarily to medium and smaller cities in the Sierra or
Selva, other than those important to the mining industry. The country’s abundant resources
have attracted large foreign investments in mining and enabled growth based on fast
capital accumulation, albeit with few gains in productivity and little export diversification.
Mining activities are centered in few areas, which has disproportionately benefitted a small
number of districts under current decentralization arrangements.
Geography and resource abundance have thus led to a spatial concentration of economic
activities and opportunities, creating large disparities in development across the country’s
territory and its population groups. Poverty is unevenly distributed—only 180 out of more
than 1,800 district municipalities account for half of all poverty in the country, and districts
with the highest poverty incidence are located mostly in the Sierra and Selva. Extreme
poverty incidence in rural areas is 13 times higher than in urban centers. Furthermore, a
historically low presence of the State in isolated regions fueled a lack of trust in the State
that is still visible in the generally low compliance with rules and regulations, which in part
explains Peru’s abnormally high economic informality.
Development and social inclusion: a new policy for the Peruvian State. On the 20th of
October 2011, the President of Peru, Ollanta Humala, promulgated law Nº 29792, which
created the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion. This is the start of a new
framework for public policies aimed at closing the poverty gap and lack of access to
services. MIDIS’ aim is for all Peruvians, wherever they live or wherever they were born,
regardless of the language and culture of the parents, or their social condition or level of
education, to receive high-quality services and have the same opportunities to benefit from
economic growth and to contribute to the welfare of their families, their communities and
the country.
Turning economic growth into a sustainable improvement in household quality of life, in
access to services throughout the country and in opportunities for people to increase their
incomes is the strategic aim of social policy
MIDIS defines two means of intervention to encourage development as a way to fight
poverty. One is supply based: it involves centrally planning the action necessary to
overcome the lack of basic infrastructure —water, drainage, telecommunications, electricity
and roads— affecting rural dwellers in coordination with other ministries, and to earmark a
budget for the purpose. The other is demand based and consists of supporting initiatives
arising from people in the process of inclusion and providing options to improve their
productive abilities, access to markets and food security. The direct link —that is, the link
between users themselves— between relief and development action, defines the exit
strategies described below.
Over the last decade, poverty and inequality dropped dramatically in Peru, thanks to
economic growth and increasing labor incomes, especially at the bottom of the income
distribution. Human development and access to services also improved. Rural areas,
however, still have high poverty rates, and their populations have lower access to services
and lower human capital than their urban counterparts. Women face disparities in the labor
market, and they are highly exposed to violence, in particular in the domestic realm. And,
Indigenous and Afro-Peruvians face further disadvantages in living conditions. However,
location plays a much larger role than ethnicity in explaining poverty. Peru’s large spatial
disparities in development are thus a key impediment hindering many Peruvians from
acquiring the human capital necessary to access better job opportunities
Sustained growth caused poverty and extreme poverty to fall sharply in the last ten years
Over the last ten years, moderate poverty fell by more than half, and extreme poverty by
more than two-thirds. Both extreme and moderate poverty rates fell faster in Peru than the
regional average.

Economic growth was inclusive and reduced poverty significantly. Poverty responded
strongly to growth—for each percentage point increase in GDP growth, poverty fell by 1.4
percentage points. Thus, from 2004–15, 9.3 million Peruvians escaped poverty, moderate
poverty fell by more than half, from 58 to 22 percent and extreme poverty fell from 16 to 4
percent. More broadly, households’ incomes in the bottom 40 percent increased by an
average of 6.8 percent per year, against 4.4 percent for the average income. As a result,
inequality declined by 12.6 percent over the period. The middle class grew by 18
percentage points from 2004–14, and outnumbered the poor by 2013. Higher labor
incomes explain the lion’s share of the reductions in poverty and inequality. However, non-
labor incomes (mostly public transfers from social programs) have helped to reduce rural
poverty, especially over the last five years: the non-labor income contribution to rural
poverty reduction had increased to 20 percent in 2014. The virtuous cycle of growth and
shared prosperity can be explained in large part by a combination of two main forces:
favorable exogenous conditions and successful macrostructural reforms (Figure 2). The
commodity price boom that started in the early 2000s boosted investment in mining, which
had important ramifications for Peru’s economy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) increased
four-fold as a share of GDP. Mining investment, which peaked at US$10 billion in 2013,
accounted for 20 percent of total private investment from 2001-13. The mining boom also
spurred private investments in upstream sectors such as chemicals, metal products,
electricity and gas, land transport, and financial services. And in mining regions, higher
incomes boosted consumption, especially of services

A number of important macroeconomic reforms supported the acceleration in capital

accumulation. The Government developed a sound macro-fiscal framework for managing
public resources. It adopted an inflation-targeting regime, eliminated interest rate controls,
and strengthened banking supervision and regulation. It also reduced tariffs and removed
other barriers to trade and foreign investments. These structural reforms led to low inflation
expectations and together with the adoption of a countercyclical fiscal policy, allowed the
Government to accumulate savings from the windfall that came from the commodity boom.
In contrast to other Latin American countries, Peru raised its savings during the boom
years by almost 2 percent annually from 2000–13, which helped finance the higher
investment rates.

Past sources of shared prosperity are drying out. A weak external environment, with
declining commodity prices, together with the global economic slowdown have led to a
deceleration of private investment. The new headwinds indicate that the past virtuous cycle
of growth and shared prosperity may have reached its limit. Still, labor income will have to
continue to be the main mechanism for reducing poverty and raising the income of the
bottom 40 percent. These new headwinds highlight two structural challenges that have
emerged from Peru’s specific endowments, and that constrain the opportunities for income
growth of the bottom 40 percent. First, the persistence of large spatial disparities in
development consistently undermine the ability of certain population groups, particularly
indigenous and AfroPeruvians, from overcoming poverty. Despite the impressive progress
in poverty reduction over the last decade, at least 40 percent of the population is still
vulnerable to falling into poverty, and there remain large gaps in income and human
development across the socioeconomic spectrum. Many segments of the population are
still largely underserved. The rural population is almost a quarter of the total, but it
accounts for half of the poor and 82 percent of the extreme poor.
Addressing Peru’s spatial disparities in a manner that would balance access to
opportunities for all of its citizens will require paying close attention to the underlying
features of poverty and vulnerability. The specificities of Peru—in particular geographic
segmentation and high urbanization—pose important challenges to ensuring that growth
continues to be inclusive and that it consolidates the process of social mobility, not just
between poverty and vulnerability, but towards a solid middle class. These challenges
include:
 Chronic rural poverty. Despite the impressive reduction in poverty and extreme poverty,
in half of Peru’s regions, 40 to 90 percent of districts still have a poverty incidence above
50 percent. In other words, there are a large number of districts—even if these are small—
that have not benefited from income growth either from better labor market opportunities or
from direct social interventions. In terms of individuals, there is evidence that most of the
poor in Peru today are chronically poor: they were already poor 10 years ago.3  Low
service quality. In general, access to services has improved tremendously in the last
decade. But quality gaps are still very large. This affects not only the poor in rural areas,
but also the large numbers of vulnerable individuals across the country (42 percent of the
population in 2015). In many aspects, quality is a significant factor in lifting people out of
poverty and vulnerability into the middle class  Large urban populations. Recent
demographic changes pose new challenges for the Government’s inclusion agenda. Urban
areas have grown tremendously, reaching around 75 percent of the total population. Lima
has grown 10-fold since the 1950s (Box 2). This urban growth puts pressure on the
capacity of municipalities to provide good services for their residents that respond to their
needs. Urban areas are characterized by having limited urban transport systems, unstable
labor markets with high levels of informality, poor planning, and deficient land
management, among others.4 Social services to the poor and vulnerable in these areas
are generally non-existent. Addressing three important sustainability risks is vital to achieve
shared prosperity in Peru and to maximize the benefits for all Peruvians from micro-
structural reforms. Regulating the use of Peru’s diverse natural resources and better
enforcing environmental laws are both crucial to mitigate the risks facing Peru’s diverse
resource, and to minimize their potential adverse impacts on health outcomes and human
capital. Also, low tax revenues constrain the quality of public and the sustainability of
higher infrastructure spending. Finally, and most importantly, current institutional
arrangements weaken government coordination, capacity, and law enforcement. Other
reforms will not yield the desired results unless institutional reforms improve government
efficiency, including its ability to plan, coordinate, and implement policies, and to guarantee
the enforcement of laws and access to justice Peru’s geographic diversity and the
country’s economic dependence on its natural resources, create challenges for its
environmental sustainability. Extractive activities— mining, fishing, and hydrocarbons—
represented 66 percent of Peru’s exports in 2015, and 68 percent when including
agriculture (INEI, 2016). Natural resources are thus the bedrock of the Peruvian economy,
and need to be managed sustainably if they are to continue as the source of the country’s
prosperity
Urbanization has increased the pressure on the “brown” and “grey” agendas. About 80
percent of the Peruvian population is now living in urban areas. As a result, there is
growing pressure on natural resources coming from an increased use of motor vehicles,
and from insufficient waste and water treatment Peru is characterized by its high
vulnerability to natural hazards. Studies reveal that temperatures and rainfall patterns are
changing throughout the country. The retreat of glacier surface in Peru is also altering the
country’s water sources. Economic losses due to climate change are potentially large.
Studies that estimate the impact of climate change on Peru’s economic growth indicate
that in a climate change scenario, by 2030, the total real GDP loss could be between 5.7
percent and 6.8 percent of the baseline scenario without climate change; by 2050, the
estimated loss would be 20–23 percent of GDP. The El Niño phenomenon causes regular
economic losses. Sustainable development is the organizing principle for meeting human
development goals while at the same time sustaining the ability of natural systems to
provide the natural resources and ecosystem services upon which the economy and
society depend. The desired result is a state of society where living conditions and
resource use continue to meet human needs without undermining the integrity and stability
of the natural system. Sustainable development can be classified as development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations.

Robert Owen (/ˈoʊɪn/; 14 May 1771 – 17 November 1858) was a Welsh textile
manufacturer, philanthropic social reformer, and one of the founders of utopian socialism
and the cooperative movement. Owen is best known for his efforts to improve the working
conditions of his factory workers and his promotion of experimental socialistic communities.
In the early 1800s Owen became wealthy as an investor and eventual manager of a large
textile mill at New Lanark, Scotland. (He initially trained as a draper in Stamford,
Lincolnshire, and worked in London before relocating at the age of 18 to Manchester and
going into business as a textile manufacturer.) In 1824 Owen travelled to America, where
he invested the bulk of his fortune in an experimental socialistic community at New
Harmony, Indiana, the preliminary model for Owen's utopian society. The experiment was
short-lived, lasting about two years. Other Owenite utopian communities met a similar fate.
In 1828 Owen returned to the United Kingdom and settled in London, where he continued
to be an advocate for the working class. In addition to his leadership in the development of
cooperatives and the trade union movement, he also supported passage of child labour
laws and free, co-educational schools.

Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon, often referred to as Henri de Saint-

Simon (French: [ɑ̃ʁi də sɛ ̃ simɔ̃]; 17 October 1760 – 19 May 1825), was a French political
and economic theorist and businessman whose thought played a substantial role in
influencing politics, economics, sociology, and the philosophy of science.

He created a political and economic ideology known as Saint-Simonianism that claimed

that the needs of an industrial class, which he also referred to as the working class,
needed to be recognized and fulfilled to have an effective society and an efficient
economy.[10] Unlike later conceptions by others of a working class being manual labourers
alone, Saint-Simon's conception of this class included all people engaged in productive
work that contributed to society, that included businesspeople, managers, scientists,
bankers, along with manual labourers amongst others.[11] He said the primary threat to the
needs of the industrial class was another class he referred to as the idling class, that
included able people who preferred to be parasitic and benefit from the work of others
while seeking to avoid doing work.[10] Saint-Simon stressed the need for recognition of the
merit of the individual and the need for hierarchy of merit in society and in the economy,
such as society having hierarchical merit-based organizations of managers and scientists
to be the decision-makers in government.[11] He strongly criticized any expansion of
government intervention into the economy beyond ensuring no hindrances to productive
work and reducing idleness in society, regarding intervention beyond these as too
intrusive.[10]

This ideology soon inspired and influenced utopian socialism,[11] liberal political theorist
John Stuart Mill,[6] anarchism through its founder Pierre-Joseph Proudhon who was
inspired by Saint-Simon's thought[7] and Marxism with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
identifying Saint-Simon as an inspiration to their ideas and identifying him among the
utopian socialists.[11] However historian Alan Ryan regards certain followers of Saint-
Simon, rather than Saint-Simon himself, as being responsible for the rise of utopian
socialism that based itself upon Saint-Simon's ideas.[11] He also regards strong
differences as existing between Saint-Simon's conceptions and Marxism's as Saint-Simon
did not promote class conflict as a solution to societal problems nor did he adhere to the
narrower definition of the working class as manual labourers as defined by Marxists.[11]
Saint-Simon unlike Marx did not regard the prevalent form of ownership as being
paramount issue in the economy but rather the form of management.[11] Furthermore,
Saint-Simon held no opposition to capitalists as a whole unlike Marx and he regarded them
as an important component of the industrial class.[12] Later Saint-Simon's views influenced
sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen, including Veblen's creation of institutional
economics that has included prominent economists as adherents.[13] Historian Alan Ryan
states that by the 1950s it was clear that Saint-Simon had invented the modern
understanding of industrial society and its organization.[11]

Saint-Simon and his secretary Auguste Comte developed what Comte would complete as
sociology.

François Marie Charles Fourier (/ˈfʊrieɪ, -iər/;[2] French: [ʃaʁl fuʁje]; 7 April 1772 – 10
October 1837) was a French philosopher, influential early socialist thinker and one of the
founders of utopian socialism. Some of Fourier's social and moral views, held to be radical
in his lifetime, have become mainstream thinking in modern society. For instance, Fourier
is credited with having originated the word "feminism" in 1837.[3]

Fourier's social views and proposals inspired a whole movement of intentional

communities. Among them in the United States were the community of Utopia, Ohio; La
Reunion near present-day Dallas, Texas; the North American Phalanx in Red Bank, New
Jersey; Brook Farm in West Roxbury, Massachusetts; the Community Place and Sodus
Bay Phalanx in New York State; Silkville, Kansas in Kansas; and several others. Fourier
later inspired a diverse array of revolutionary thinkers and writers.

Friedrich Engels (/ˈɛŋ(ɡ)əlz/;[2][3] German: [ˈfʁiːdʁɪç ˈʔɛŋl̩ s]; sometimes anglicised

Frederick Engels; 28 November 1820 – 5 August 1895) was a German philosopher,
communist, social scientist, journalist and businessman.[4] His father was an owner of a
large textile factory in Salford, England.

Engels founded Marxist theory together with Karl Marx and in 1845 published The
Condition of the Working Class in England, based on personal observations and research
in Manchester. In 1848, Engels co-authored The Communist Manifesto with Marx and also
authored and co-authored (primarily with Marx) many other works. Later, Engels supported
Marx financially to do research and write Das Kapital. After Marx's death, Engels edited the
second and third volumes. Additionally, Engels organised Marx's notes on the Theories of
Surplus Value, which he later published as the "fourth volume" of Capital.[5]

Engels died in London on 5 August 1895, at the age of 74 and following cremation his
ashes were scattered off Beachy Head, near Eastbourne.

Karl Marx[14] (German: [ˈkaɐ̯l ˈmaɐ̯ks];[15][16] 5 May 1818 – 14 March 1883) was a
German philosopher, economist, historian, sociologist, political theorist, journalist and
socialist revolutionary.

Born in Trier, Germany, Marx studied law and philosophy at university. He married Jenny
von Westphalen in 1843. Due to his political publications, Marx became stateless and lived
in exile with his wife and children in London for decades, where he continued to develop
his thought in collaboration with German thinker Friedrich Engels and publish his writings,
researching in the reading room of the British Museum. His best-known titles are the 1848
pamphlet, The Communist Manifesto, and the three-volume Das Kapital. His political and
philosophical thought had enormous influence on subsequent intellectual, economic and
political history and his name has been used as an adjective, a noun and a school of social
theory.

Marx's theories about society, economics and politics – collectively understood as Marxism
– hold that human societies develop through class struggle. In capitalism, this manifests
itself in the conflict between the ruling classes (known as the bourgeoisie) that control the
means of production and the working classes (known as the proletariat) that enable these
means by selling their labour power in return for wages.[17] Employing a critical approach
known as historical materialism, Marx predicted that, like previous socio-economic
systems, capitalism produced internal tensions which would lead to its self-destruction and
replacement by a new system: socialism. For Marx, class antagonisms under capitalism,
owing in part to its instability and crisis-prone nature, would eventuate the working class'
development of class consciousness, leading to their conquest of political power and
eventually the establishment of a classless, communist society constituted by a free
association of producers.[18] Marx actively pressed for its implementation, arguing that the
working class should carry out organised revolutionary action to topple capitalism and bring
about socio-economic emancipation.[19]

Marx has been described as one of the most influential figures in human history, and his
work has been both lauded and criticised.[20] His work in economics laid the basis for
much of the current understanding of labour and its relation to capital, and subsequent
 economic thought.[21][22][23] Many intellectuals, labour unions, artists and political parties
worldwide have been influenced by Marx's work, with many modifying or adapting his
ideas. Marx is typically cited as one of the principal architects of modern social science.[24]
[25]

Participatory democracy emphasizes the broad participation of constituents in the direction and

operation of political systems. Etymological roots of democracy (Greek demos and kratos) imply that
the people are in power and thus that all democracies are participatory. However, participatory
democracy tends to advocate more involved forms of citizen participation and greater political
representation than traditional representative democracy.
Participatory democracy strives to create opportunities for all members of a population to make
meaningful contributions to decision-making, and seeks to broaden the range of people who have
access to such opportunities. Since so much information must be gathered for the overall decision-
making process to succeed, technology may provide important forces leading to the type
of empowerment needed for participatory models, especially those technological tools that enable
community narratives and correspond to the accretion of knowledge. Effectively increasing the scale
of participation, and translating small but effective participation groups into small world networks, are
areas currently being studied.[1] Other advocates have emphasised the importance of face to face
meetings, warning that an overreliance on technology can be harmful.[2]
Some scholars argue for refocusing the term on community-based activity within the domain of civil
society, based on the belief that a strong non-governmental public sphere is a precondition for the
emergence of a strong liberal democracy.[3] These scholars tend to stress the value of separation between
the realm of civil society and the formal political realm. [4] In 2011, considerable grassroots interest in
participatory democracy was generated by the Occupy movement. Deliberative
democracy or discursive democracy is a form of democracy in which deliberation is central to decision-
making. It adopts elements of both consensus decision-making and majority rule. Deliberative democracy
differs from traditional democratic theory in that authentic deliberation, not mere voting, is the primary source
of legitimacy for the law.
While deliberative democracy is generally seen as some form of an amalgam of representative
democracy and direct democracy, the actual relationship is usually open to dispute. [1] Some practitioners and
theorists use the term to encompass representative bodies whose members authentically deliberate on
legislation without unequal distributions of power, while others use the term exclusively to refer to decision-
making directly by lay citizens, as in direct democracy.
The term "deliberative democracy" was originally coined by Joseph M. Bessette in his 1980
work Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government.
A political party is an organized group of people, often with common views, who come
together to contest elections and hold power in the government. The party agrees on
some proposed policies and programmes, with a view to promoting the collective good or
furthering their supporters' interests.
While there is some international commonality in the way political parties are recognized
and in how they operate, there are often many differences, and some are significant.
Many political parties have an ideological core, but some do not, and many represent
ideologies very different from their ideology at the time the party was founded. Many
countries, such as Germany and India, have several significant political parties, and some
nations have one-party systems, such as China and Cuba. The United States is in
practice a two-party system but with many smaller parties also participating and a high
degree of autonomy for individual candidates.