1

II. Quasi- Delict Hearings were conducted. However, the trial court dismiss or plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
Elements suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further omission of the defendant.
Andamo v IAC hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the related Criminal
Nenaria Case. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
Mercury Drug v Baking distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana"
Pacquiao, JL Resolving respondent corporation’s motion to dismiss, the trial or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
Lucas v Tuano court issued the disputed order dismissing Civil Case for lack of foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Pacquiao, JP jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-
Huang v Philippine Hoteliers the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of
Soriano the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which the Supreme Court of Spain . . ."
VDM Trading v Leonita Carungcong provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same
Tado offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action In the case of Castillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
B. No double recovery rule final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
Joseph v Bautista individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
Unas Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising
Padua v Robles Appellate Court. Respondent Appellate Court, promulgated a from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
Vosotros decision affirming the questioned order of the trial court. extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
Atlanta Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila v CA produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
Banuelos Issue: Whether a corporation can be held civilly liable for or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
Lim v Ping damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
Macatol quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of
Rimando v People independently of the criminal case? course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared
Nenaria that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
Held: Yes, a careful examination of the complaint shows that the which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with
C. Person/s liable; nature of liability civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code it the extinction of the civil liability.
Worcester v Ocampo on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present: (a)
Pacquiao, JL damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
Mercury Drug v. Baking, G.R. No. 156037, May 25,
National Construction Corporation v CA defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
2007
Pacquiao, JP respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
On 1993, Baking went to the clinic of Dr.Sy for a medical check-
Chan, Jr. v Iglesia ni Cristo fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and
Soriano by the plaintiff.
hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that
Cerezo v Tuazon
respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal
Tado Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths and
levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions –
Spouses Perena v Spouses Zarate contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
Unas inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
triglyceride.
People v Inovero of a causal connection between the act of building these
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug (Alabang
Vosotros waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action
Branch) to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady
R Transport v Luisito Yu if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for
Banuelos for the recovery of damages.
Dormicum. Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a
potent sleeping tablet.
Quasi-Delict Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
A. Elements another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine,
Andamo v IAC, G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990 damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three consecutive days.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict is
On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine,
the owners of a parcel of land which is adjacent to that of private governed by the provisions of this chapter.
respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
driving collided with the car of one Peralta. Respondent fell
religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers
asleep while driving.
waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his
land. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
physical and mental state at the time of the collision, respondent
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action against officers and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally.
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
means of injunction under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, petitioners filed another action against respondent The distinctness of quasi-delicts is shown in Article 2177 of the
On 1994, respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
corporation, this time a civil case, for damages with prayer for Civil Code, which states:
complaint for damages against petitioner.
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
RTC – in favor of respondent
court. preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
CA – affirmed the RTC decision
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the

ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioner Mercury Drug was negligent, and if
so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
respondent’s accident (YES, YES)
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is justified (YES)
HELD
1. Yes, Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following
requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
plaintiff.
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages. It is
generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly
negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a
matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee
should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She
should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent
was indeed the one prescribed by his physician.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had
petitioner’s employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy’s
prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping
tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while
driving his car, resulting in a collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code
which states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable
for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused
by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the
part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in
the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption,
however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
2. As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same
to be in order.
Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous
to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the
award of moral damages when he testified that he suffered
mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the accident caused by
the negligence of petitioner’s employee.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair
and reasonable amount of moral damages. Taking into
consideration the attending circumstances here, we are
convinced that the amount awarded by the trial court is
exorbitant. Thus, we reduce the amount of moral damages from
₱250,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 only.
In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary
damages. Article 2229 allows the grant of exemplary damages by
way of example or correction for the public good. Due to the
sensitive nature of its business, petitioner must at all times
maintain a high level of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is in order.
On the matter of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, it is
settled that the reasons or grounds for the award thereof must
be set forth in the decision of the court. Since the trial court’s
decision did not give the basis of the award, the same must be
deleted.
Lucas v. Tuańo, G.R. No. 178763, April 21,
2009
2
FACTS: Petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter) contracted
"sore eyes" in his right eye. He went to Dr. Prospero Ma. C.
Tuaño, M.D. (Dr. Tuaño), an ophthalmologist at St. Luke’s Medical
Center, for an eye consult.
Upon consultation, Dr. Tuaño performed "ocular routine
examination" on Peter’s eyes then prescribed Spersacet-C eye
drops for Peter and told the latter to return for follow-up after one
week. Upon returning, Dr. Tuaño performed routine examination
and found out the same eye developed Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. To address the new
problem with Peter’s right eye, Dr. Tuaño prescribed to the
former a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol. To recall, Peter
had already been using Maxitrol prior to his consult with Dr.
Tuaño.
Peter returned several times to Dr. Tuaño complaining of eye
pain. So, Dr. Tuaño instructed Peter to resume the use of
Maxitrol. Peter was unable to get a hold of Maxitrol, as it was out
of stock. Consequently, Peter was told by Dr. Tuano to take
another steroid-based medication as substitute for the
unavailable Maxitrol.
Then again, Peter went to see Dr. Tuaño at his clinic, alleging
severe eye pain, feeling as if his eyes were about to "pop-out," a
headache and blurred vision. Dr. Tuaño examined Peter’s eyes
and discovered that the EKC was again present in his right eye.
As a result, Dr. Tuaño told Peter to resume the maximum dosage
of Blephamide.
Upon waking in the morning of 13 December 1988, Peter had no
vision in his right eye. Fatima observed that Peter’s right eye
appeared to be bloody and swollen. Thus, spouses Peter and
Fatima rushed to the clinic of Dr. Tuaño. Peter reported to Dr.
Tuaño that he had been suffering from constant headache in the
afternoon and blurring of vision.
Upon examination, Dr. Tuaño discovered that the tension in
Peter’s right eye was not normal. He then ordered to immediately
discontinue the use of Maxitrol and prescribed to the latter
Diamox and Normoglaucon.
During one of Peter’s regular follow-ups with Dr. Tuaño, the
doctor conducted another ocular routine examination of Peter’s
eyes. Dr. Tuaño was at a loss as to how to balance the treatment
of Peter’s EKC vis-à-vis the presence of glaucoma in the same
eye. Dr. Tuaño, thus, referred Peter to Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, M.D.
(Dr. Agulto), another ophthalmologist specializing in the
treatment of glaucoma. Dr. Agulto, upon examination, discovered
that Peter sustained significant glaucoma damage.
On 4 January 1989, Dr. Tuaño conducted a visual field study of
Peter’s eyes, which revealed that the latter had tubular vision in
his right eye. Dr. Tuaño directed Peter to religiously use his
steroids. Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser
trabeculoplasty to attempt to control the high IOP of his right
eye.
Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma and blaming Dr.
Tuaño for the same, Peter, joined by: (1) Fatima, his spouse; (2)

Abbeygail, his natural child; and (3) Gillian, his legitimate child
with Fatima, instituted on 1 September 1992, a civil complaint for
damages against Dr. Tuaño, before the RTC, Branch 150, Quezon
City.
In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the
"direct consequence of Peter’s prolonged use of Maxitrol, he
suffered from steroid induced glaucoma which caused the
elevation of his intra-ocular pressure. The elevation of the intra-
ocular pressure of Peter’s right eye caused the impairment of his
vision which impairment is not curable and may even lead to
total blindness."
In the end, petitioners sought pecuniary award for their supposed
pain and suffering, which were ultimately brought about by Dr.
Tuaño’s grossly negligent. In rebutting petitioners’ complaint, Dr.
Tuaño asserted that the "treatment made by him has no causal
connection to Peter’s present glaucoma or condition. He further
explained that drug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable,
and the steroids have the side effect of increasing intraocular
pressure.
The court decided in favor of Dr. Tuaño, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
in affirming the judgment of the RTC that petitioners failed to
prove their claim for damages against Dr. Tuaño.
HELD: NO. the present controversy is a classic illustration of a
medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter’s
professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his
heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance
of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of
skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same
profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages.
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence
committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for
damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice
suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the
doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for
damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3)
injury; and (4) proximate causation, must be established by the
plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find
the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the
improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician
when the patient is injured in body or in health and this
constitutes the actionable malpractice. Even so, proof of breach
of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for
there must be a causal connection between said breach and the
resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in
order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be
shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes"; that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause of
the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
In the case at bar, there is no question that a physician-patient
relationship developed between Dr. Tuaño and Peter when the
latter was seeking a consult for the treatment of his sore eyes.
Admittedly, Dr. Tuaño, an ophthalmologist, prescribed Maxitrol
when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC.
However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial
court that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure,
prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and
exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of
general practitioners similarly situated." Unfortunately, in this
case, there was an absolute failure on the part of petitioners to
present any expert testimony to establish: (1) the standard of
care to be implemented by competent physicians in treating the
same condition as Peter’s under similar circumstances; (2) that,
in his treatment of Peter, Dr. Tuaño failed in his duty to exercise
said standard of care that any other competent physician would
use in treating the same condition as Peter’s under similar
circumstances; and (3) that the injury or damage to Peter’s right
eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as
prescribed by Dr. Tuaño. Petitioners’ failure to prove the first
element alone is already fatal to their cause.
Petitioners maintain that Dr. Tuaño failed to follow in Peter’s case
the required procedure for the prolonged use of Maxitrol. But
what is actually the required procedure when ophthalmologists
prescribe steroid medications? Absent a definitive standard of
care or diligence required of Dr. Tuaño under the circumstances,
we have no means to determine whether he was able to comply
with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Peter.
Petitioners assert that prior to prescribing Maxitrol, Dr. Tuaño
should have determined first whether Peter was a "steroid
responder." Yet again, petitioners did not present any convincing
proof that such determination is actually part of the standard
operating procedure which ophthalmologists should unerringly
follow prior to prescribing steroid medications.
In contrast, Dr. Tuaño was able to clearly explain that what is
only required of ophthalmologists, in cases such as Peter’s, is the
conduct of standard tests/procedures known as "ocular routine
examination,"
A doctor cannot determine immediately whether the latter would
react adversely to the use of steroids; all the doctor can do is
map out a course of treatment recognized as correct by the
standards of the medical profession. It must be remembered that
a physician is not an insurer of the good result of treatment. The
mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result
occurs does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care. The
3
result is not determinative of the performance of the physician
and he is not required to be infallible.
Moreover, that Dr. Tuaño saw it fit to prescribe Maxitrol to Peter
was justified by the fact that the latter was already using the
same medication when he first came to see Dr. Tuaño on 2
September 1988 and had exhibited no previous untoward
reaction to that particular drug.
Also, Dr. Tuaño categorically denied petitioners’ claim that he
never monitored the tension of Peter’s eyes while the latter was
on Maxitrol. Dr. Tuaño testified that he palpated Peter’s eyes
every time the latter came for a check-up as part of the doctor’s
ocular routine examination, a fact which petitioners failed to
rebut. Dr. Tuaño’s regular conduct of examinations and tests to
ascertain the state of Peter’s eyes negate the very basis of
petitioners’ complaint for damages. The plaintiff must plead and
prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been
at fault, but also that the defendant’s fault caused the injury.
The causation between the physician’s negligence and the
patient’s injury may only be established by the presentation of
proof that Peter’s glaucoma would not have occurred but for Dr.
Tuaño’s supposed negligent conduct. Once more, petitioners
failed in this regard.
In contrast, without supporting expert medical opinions,
petitioners’ bare assertions of negligence on Dr. Tuaño’s part,
which resulted in Peter’s glaucoma, deserve scant credit.
Huang v Philippine Hoteliers G.R. No. 180440
Facts:
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28
August 1996 by petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang against herein
respondents Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI) and Dusit Thani Public
Co., Ltd. (DTPCI), as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit
Hotel); and co-respondent First Lepanto Taisho Insurance
Corporation (First Lepanto), as insurer of the aforesaid hotel.
Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited
her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the
hotel’s swimming pool facility. They started bathing at around
5:00 p.m. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool
attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was about
to be closed. The two subsequently proceeded to the shower
room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress
up. However, when they came out of the bathroom, the entire
swimming pool area was already pitch black and there was no
longer any person around but the two of them. They carefully
walked towards the main door leading to the hotel but, to their
surprise, the door was locked.
Delia became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to
walk around to look for a house phone. Delia followed petitioner.
After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguard’s
counter. While slowly walking towards the phone, a hard and
heavy object, which later turned out to be the folding wooden
countertop, fell on petitioner’s head that knocked her down
almost unconscious.

Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the
hotel telephone operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel
staff arrived at the main entrance door of the swimming pool
area but it took them at least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside.
When the door was finally opened, three hotel chambermaids
assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some
ointment on her head. After petitioner had slightly recovered, she
requested to be assisted to the hotel’s coffee shop to have some
rest. Petitioner demanded the services of the hotel physician.
Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached
petitioner and introduced herself as the hotel physician.
However, instead of immediately providing the needed medical
assistance, Dr. Dalumpines presented a "Waiver" and demanded
that it be signed by petitioner, otherwise, the hotel management
will not render her any assistance. Petitioner refused to do so.
Petitioner started to feel extraordinary dizziness accompanied by
an uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted until the
following day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home, thus,
missing all her important appointments with her patients. She
also began experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches that
caused her three (3) sleepless nights.
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr.
Noble), a neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required
her to have an X-ray and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
tests. Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly
showed that her head was bruised. Based also on the same MRI
result, Dr. Noble told her that she has a very serious brain injury.
Petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which greatly
affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession.
Thus, on 25 October 1995, petitioner, through counsel, sent a
demand letter to respondents PHI and DTPCI seeking payment of
an amount not less than P100,000,000.00 representing loss of
earnings on her remaining life span. But, petitioner’s demand
was unheeded.
Respondents, on the other hand, denied all the material
allegations of petitioner and, in turn, countered the latter’s
statement of facts, thus:
According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had
been posted on the glass door of the hotel leading to the
swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel
guests, that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m.
to 7:00 p.m. Though the hotel’s swimming pool area is open only
between the aforestated time, the lights thereon are kept on until
10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2) housekeeping personnel
to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings; and (3)
people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer’s World Gym
adjacent to the swimming pool area, which was then open until
10:00 p.m., to have a good view of the hotel’s swimming pool.
Even granting that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area
were turned off, it would not render the area completely dark as
the Slimmer’s World Gym near it was well-illuminated.
Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s
swimming pool attendant advised petitioner and Delia to take
their showers as it was already closing time. Afterwards, at
around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie Benedicto-Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the
hotel staff nurse, who was at the hotel clinic located at the
mezzanine floor, received a call from the hotel telephone
operator informing her that there was a guest requiring medical
assistance at the hotel’s swimming pool area located one floor
above the clinic.
Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly
went to the hotel’s swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and
petitioner, who told her that she was hit on the head by a folding
wooden counter top. Although petitioner looked normal as there
was no indication of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie
still asked her if she needed any medical attention to which
petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did
not need any medical attention. Petitioner, instead, requested for
a hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.
After attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to the hotel
clinic to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at the hotel’s
swimming pool area. But before she could do that, Dr.
Dalumpines had already chanced upon Delia and petitioner at the
hotel’s coffee shop and the latter reported to Dr. Dalumpines that
her head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while she was
inside the hotel’s swimming pool area. When asked by Dr.
Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor,
she was fine and she was already attended to by the hotel nurse,
who went at the hotel’s swimming pool area right after the
accident. Dr. Dalumpines then called Ms. Pearlie to verify the
same, which the latter confirmed.
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked
the latter’s condition. Petitioner insisted that she was fine and
that the hirudoid cream was enough. Having been assured that
everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to
execute a handwritten certification regarding the incident that
occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner
to have an X-ray test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary.
Petitioner also refused further medical attention.
The court a quo in its Decision dismissed petitioner’s Complaint
for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals with the following assignment of errors: (1) the trial court
erred in finding that the testimony of petitioner is self-serving
and thus void of credibility; (2) the trial court erred in applying
the doctrine of proximate cause in cases of breach of contract
and even assuming arguendo that the doctrine is applicable,
petitioner was able to prove by sufficient evidence the causal
connection between her injuries and respondents PHI and DTPCI’s
negligent act; and (3) the trial court erred in holding that
petitioner is not entitled to damages.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the findings
and conclusions of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable. (NO)
Ruling:
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly
on account of their negligence but not on any breach of contract.
4
Presently, petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based
both on quasi-delict and breach of contract.
A perusal of petitioner’s Complaint evidently shows that her
cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict.
It is clear from petitioner’s allegations that her Complaint for
Damages was predicated on the alleged negligence of
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s staff in the untimely putting off of
all the lights within the hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as the
locking of its main door, prompting her to look for a way out,
leading to the fall of the folding wooden counter top on her head
causing her serious brain injury. The said negligence was
allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to
render prompt and adequate medical assistance. These
allegations in petitioner’s Complaint constitute a cause of action
for quasi-delict, which under the New Civil Code is defined as an
act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence.
It is evident from petitioner’s Complaint and from her open court
testimony that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts
committed against her by respondents PHI and DTPCI, through
their management and staff. It is now too late in the day to raise
the said argument for the first time before this Court.
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the
following differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and
breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence
is direct, substantive and independent, while in breach of
contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of
the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or
obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a
family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents,
guardians and employers are concerned, while in breach of
contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the
selection and supervision of employees. In quasi- delict , there is
no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the
injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant,
otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in
breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be
proved that there was a breach of the contract and the burden is
on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the
carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat
superior is followed.
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioner’s change of theory or
cause of action from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on
appeal would necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and
DTPCI. First, the latter will have no more opportunity to present
evidence to contradict petitioner’s new argument. Second, the
burden of proof will be shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI
and DTPCI. Petitioner’s change of theory from quasi-delict to
breach of contract must be repudiated.
As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is
incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following
requisites before respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable,
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect

between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further, since petitioner’s case
is for quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is
upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It is then up
for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant
to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his
complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of
the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It
is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence.
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged
negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than petitioner’s
self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotel’s swimming
pool area were shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly
prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence
was presented to substantiate the same. Even her own
companion during the night of the accident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her
allegations. Moreover, petitioner’s aforesaid allegations were
successfully rebutted by respondents PHI and DTPCI. (See facts)
The following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner
stayed in the hotel’s swimming pool facility beyond its closing
hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that
eventually hit her head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI
extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can
be attributed either to respondents PHI and DTPCI or to their staff
and/or management. Since the question of negligence is one of
fact, this Court is bound by the said factual findings made by the
lower courts. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's
factual findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
significance and influence. Petitioner has not presented sufficient
ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.
With regard to petitioner’s contention that the principles of res
ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case,
this Court holds otherwise.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of
an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence
warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking. Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there
is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is
sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under
which the injury occurred, then the creative reason for the said
doctrine disappears.
Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3)
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and
DTPCI’s staff negligently turned off the lights and locked the
door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on
petitioner’s head had she not lifted the same. Although the
folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive management
or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the same
and hitting the head of petitioner was not due to the negligence
of the former. As found by both lower courts, the folding wooden
counter top did not fall on petitioner’s head without any human
intervention. Records showed that petitioner lifted the said
folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head.
The same was evidenced by the, (1) 11 June 1995 handwritten
certification of petitioner herself; (2) her Letter dated 30 August
1995 addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General
Manager of Dusit Hotel; and, (3) Certification dated 7 September
1995 issued to her by Dr. Dalumpines upon her request, which
contents she never questioned.
This Court is not unaware that in petitioner’s Complaint and in
her open court testimony, her assertion was, "while she was
passing through the counter door, she was suddenly knocked out
by a hard and heavy object, which turned out to be the folding
wooden counter top." However, in her open court testimony,
particularly during cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that
she made such statement that "she lifted the hinge massive
wooden section of the counter near the swimming pool." In view
thereof, this Court cannot acquiesce petitioner’s theory that her
case is one of res ipsa loquitur as it was sufficiently established
how petitioner obtained that "bukol" or "hematoma."
The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the
absence of any showing that the employees of respondents PHI
and DTPCI were negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and
the appellate court found no negligence on the part of the
employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot
also be held liable for negligence and be made to pay the millions
of pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.
VDM Trading v. Leonita Carungcong, G.R. No. 206709,
February 6, 2019
FACTS:
Petitioners:
VDM TRADING, INC. – owner of the Unit 2208B-1 (the Unit) at
Wack Wack Twin Towers Condominium
Spouses Luis Domingo and Nena Domingo – majority stockholder
of VDM and actual occupants of the unit; complainant
Respondents:
Spouses Carungcong – Owner of Unit 2308B-1, the unit directly
above the unit of sps Domingo
Tan – actual occupant of Unit 2308B-1
Wack Wack Twin Towers Condominium
5
While spouses Domingo were in the US, Nena’s sister, Nancy
Lagman-Castillo discovered that soapy water was heavily
penetrating through the ceiling of the unit which persisted for
several days. The matter was reported to the counsel of Spouses
Domingo, Atty. Villareal who allegedly met with Wack Wack’s
Acting Property Manager, Cruz who supposedly revealed that she
conducted an inspection on the unit and found that the leak
came from the unit owned by Spouses Carungcong as leased by
Tan. Cruz explained that Unit 2308B-1’s balcony, which was
being utilized as a laundry area, had unauthorized piping and
plumbing works installed therein, which were in violation of Wack
Wack’s rules and regulations, as well as the building’s original
plans.
Atty. Villareal conducted his own inspection of the Unit in the
presence of Lagman-Castillo and Cruz, and noted damages on
the following: (1) ceilings and walls, including the wall paper and
panel board; (2) cabinets and other improvements on the wall;
(3) narra flooring, which showed warping and permanent
discoloration; (4) bed, mattress, sheets, and covers; (5) curtains,
which showed signs of shrinking and deterioration; (6) personal
clothing, articles of personal use, and important documents
inside the cabinet; and (7) miscellaneous damages.
For this reason, on behalf of the petitioners Sps. Domingo, Atty.
Villareal sent a letter5 dated December 16, 1998, demanding
that respondents Wack Wack and Carungcong make restoration
works and/or pay for the damages caused upon the Unit.
Wack Wack and Carungcong made no action.
Subsequently, repair works on the Unit were referred to M. Laher
Construction (M. Laher) for a quotation. Luis, M. Laher stated that
the estimated cost in repairing the Unit's balcony, master
bedroom, dining and living room, and the children's room
amounted to P490,635.00. Afterwards, several demand letters8
were sent by the counsel of the petitioners Sps. Domingo to
respondents Wack Wack, Carungcong, Tan, and Golden Dragon
for the payment of the amount quoted by M. Laher, but to no
avail.
Hence, the petitioners Sps. Domingo were constrained to file
their Complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for damages
RULING: NO
Firstly, the instant petition raises pure questions of fact. For this
reason alone, the instant Petition warrants dismissal.
By alleging that damage was caused to their property by virtue of
the respondents' individual and collective fault and/or
negligence, the petitioners' cause of action is anchored on quasi-
delict.
According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
A quasi-delict has the following elements:

a) the damage suffered by the plaintiff;
b) the act or omission of the defendant supposedly constituting
fault or negligence; and
c) the causal connection between the act and the damage
sustained by the plaintiff, or proximate cause.32
A perusal of the evidence on record shows that the foregoing
elements of a quasi-delict are absent insofar as respondents
Carungcong and Wack Wack are concerned.
The full extent of the damage caused to the petitioners' Unit was
not sufficiently proven.
Aside from the purely self-serving testimony of Atty. Villareal, the
sole witness of the petitioners who is also the petitioners'
counsel, there was no sufficient evidence presented to show the
extent of the damage caused to the Unit.
As correctly found by the CA, the photographs offered into
evidence by the petitioners merely depict a wet bed, wet floor,
and wet cabinet apparently taken from one room only, i.e., the
master bedroom. The CA was correct in its assessment that "[n]o
photographs were presented to prove that the other rooms of
Unit 2208B-1 were also damaged by the leak."33
The petitioners maintain that the letter-quotation from M. Laher,
a private document, proves the foil extent of the damage caused
to the Unit.
Such contention is erroneous.
As a prerequisite to its admission in evidence, the identity and
authenticity of a private document must be properly laid and
reasonably established according to Section 20, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioners also heavily rely on the handwritten report of the
petitioners' sister, Lagman-Castillo, which purportedly show the
extent and location of the damage caused to the Unit.
Atty. Villareal's testimony on the observations contained in the
handwritten report of Lagman-Castillo is inadmissible. Simply
stated, as to the contents of the handwritten report of Lagman-
Castillo, Atty. Villareal's testimony is hearsay.
Aside from the foregoing, the petitioners likewise rely on the
supposed statements made by Cruz, the Acting Property Manager
of respondent Wack Wack. However, it must be emphasized that
Cruz herself was not presented as a witness.
Lastly, the petitioners cite the various demand letters as
evidence of the supposed damage caused to their Unit. It goes
without saying that these letters are self-serving documents that
deserve scant consideration in the determination of damages.
Fault or negligence on the part of respondents Carungcong and
Wack Wack was not proven.
As regards the second element of a quasi-delict, a careful perusal
of the evidence on record shows that the petitioners failed to
present even a shred of evidence that there was fault or
negligence on the part of the respondents Carungcong and Wack
Wack.
As to the supposed fault or negligence of respondent
Carungcong, there is no evidence presented that suggests that
such plumbing works were illegally or negligently made. The
petitioners could not even point out what specific rule or
regulation was supposedly violated by respondent Carungcong or
her lessee, Tan, in undertaking the plumbing works. There was
no proof offered showing that such plumbing works were even
prohibited, disallowed, or undertaken in a negligent manner.
With respect to the supposed negligence on the part of
respondent Wack Wack, the petitioners do not even dispute that
under the Amended Master Deed, respondent Wack Wack holds
title over and exercises maintenance and supervision only with
respect to the common areas. It is also not disputed that the
maintenance and repair of the condominium units shall be made
solely on the account of the unit owners, with each unit owner
being "responsible for all the damages to any other Units and/or
to any portion of the Projects resulting from his failure to effect
the required maintenance and repairs of his unit."
Proximate cause between the supposed damage caused and the
plumbing works undertaken was not established.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.39
Stated in simple terms, it must be proven that the supposed fault
or negligence committed by the respondents, i.e., the
undertaking of plumbing works on Unit 2308B-1, was the cause
of the damage to the Unit.
Such was not proven by the petitioners.
As noted by the CA, the subject plumbing works are isolated in
the balcony area of Unit 2308B-1. The petitioners do not dispute
that the said area is separated from the other areas of the unit
and sealed off by a wall and beam. Hence, if a leakage in the
plumbing works on the balcony of Unit 2308B-1 indeed occurred,
it is highly improbable that such leak would spread to a wide area
of the Unit.
Second, aside from the unsubstantiated self-serving testimony of
Atty. Villareal, there was no evidence presented to show that the
supposed widespread leak of soapy water in the various parts of
the Unit was caused by plumbing works on the balcony of Unit
2308B-1. No witness or document establishing a causal link
between the plumbing works and the damage to the Unit was
offered.
Lastly, the fact that the plumbing works done in Unit 2308B-1
was not the cause of the damage suffered by the petitioners' Unit
is further supported by the factual finding of the CA that a case
before the HLURB was previously filed by the petitioners against
Golden Dragon. In this complaint, which was offered in evidence
by the petitioners themselves, the latter alleged that in 1996,
way before the installation of the subject plumbing works in Unit
2308B-1, they had already discovered water leaks in the Unit
which damaged the interiors thereof. It was the petitioners'
allegation that the water leakage in the Unit was made possible
due to Golden Dragon's delivery of a "defective and/or
substandard unit."40 In fact, the CA noted that the HLURB issued
a Decision dated July 9, 2009 holding Golden Dragon liable for
the water leakage suffered by the petitioners. It is of no
6
coincidence that the award for actual damages granted to the
petitioners is similar to the award for actual damages sought by
the petitioners in the instant case.
All in all, with the petitioners failing to prove the existence of the
elements of a quasi-delict in the instant case, the CA committed
no reversible error that warrants the Court's exercise of its
discretionary appellate power.
B. No double recovery rule
Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-41423, February 23, 1989
FACTS: Patrocinio Perez was the owner of a cargo truck driven by
Domingo Villa for conveying cargoes and passengers for
consideration. On January 12, 1973, when the truck was on its
way to Valenzuela from Pangasinan, it tried to overtake a
tricycle. While in the process of overtaking, another pick-up truck
driven by Lazaro Villanueva tried to do the same. This event
forced the cargo truck to veer towards the end of the road and
hit a mango tree. Luis Joseph, one of the passengers of the cargo
truck suffered bone fractures in one of his legs.
Luis Joseph filed a complaint for damages against Patrocino Perez
(owner of cargo truck) based on breach of contract. He also filed
against the owners of pick-up truck a complaint based on quasi-
delict. The owners of the pick-up truck together with their insurer
(Insurance Corporation of the Philippines) paid Luis Joseph (P1,
300.00) for the injuries he sustained. Luis then executed a
release of claim releasing them from liabilities. The same
happened to Patrocinio Perez when he claimed for damages to
his cargo truck. They indemnified Perez P7, 420.61. Perez now
claims that the execution of release of claim inured to his benefit
as he is one of the solidary debtor in the case where only one
cause of action arises due to the accident. The RTC Judge
dismissed the case. Luis Joseph now appealed this order
contending that there are two causes of action embodied in his
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement
under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the
cause of action for breach of contract of carriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Luis Joseph can claim damages based on
breach of contract even if there was already payment of
damages by way of amicable settlement in the case for quasi-
delict.
RULING: No. A recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the
rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily
liable to petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court
below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is undisputed
that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial
court hold respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore,
the allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded
respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous
contention of petitioner that said allegations are intended to
apply only in the event that execution be issued in his favor.
There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would
countenance such a procedure.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to
petitioner, the full payment made by some of the solidary debtors
and their subsequent release from any and all liability to
petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release
from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
respondent Patrocinio Perez.
NOTE (ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSE OF ACTION): It is true that a
single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the
same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of
several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where
there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of
action regardless of the number of rights that may have been
violated belonging to one person. The singleness of a cause of
action lies in the singleness of thedelict or wrong violating the
rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted
from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the
case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a
single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of
action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the
different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed
by law.
Padua v. Robles, G.R. No. L-40486, August 29, 1975
Facts:
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab
(bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395) driven by Romeo N. Punzalan
but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles,
struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in
barrio Barretto, Olongapo City.
The impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the
point where the taxicab struck him, as a result of which he died.
Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin
Padua), by complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of
Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and
the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by
information filed with the same court (criminal case 1158-O),
charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.
After the judgment in civil case became final, the Paduas sought
execution thereof. This proved futile; the corresponding court
officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.
The judgment in the civil case ordered Punzalan to pay the
plaintiffs, although absolving at the same time the herein private
respondent, and then, the judgment in the criminal case was as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y
Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay the costs. The civil liability of the accused has already
been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled
'Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al. (Emphasis
supplied)
Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor,
the Paduas instituted action in the same court against Gregorio
N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under
the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of
action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case includes
a determination and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability
arising from his criminal act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil
responsibility may be based. (NO)
Held: No. The court ruled that a negligent act such as that
committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and
independent kinds of liabilities:
(1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and;
(2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa
aquiliana.
These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that
exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the
other.
Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately
and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the
Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission, which means that should there be
varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff
may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if
the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one
case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he
shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the
one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a
bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in
the second case.
Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, hence, the judgment in the
criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of civil
liability, unless the basis therefor has been shown not to exist,
which is not the case here. And since the judgment in question
says that "the civil liability of the accused has already been
determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O entitled Paulino
Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et al.," it is but logical to
conclude that the meaning of such statement is that the same
amounts of damages fixed in the previous case were being
awarded to the offended party in the criminal case.
7
Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been
sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-
stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be
adjudged to pay a higher amount.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. v. CA,
G.R. No. 114841-42, October 20, 1995
Facts:
Sometime in 1982, ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the
Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating dredging
operations at the Batangas Bay in an area adjacent to the real
property of CASTILLOs.
CASTILLOs alleged that during the on-going construction of its
steel and fabrication yard, ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY’s personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the
adjacent parcels of land belonging to CASTILLOs without their
consent. These heavy equipment damaged big portions of
CASTILLOs' property which were further used by ATLANTIC GULF
AND PACIFIC COMPANY as a depot or parking lots without paying
any rent therefor, nor does it appear from the records that such
use of their land was with the former's conformity.
CASTILLOs further alleged that as a result of the dredging
operation of ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, the sea silt
and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land.
Consequently, the said property which used to be agricultural
lands principally devoted to rice production and each averaging
an annual net harvest of 75 cavans, could no longer be planted
with palay as the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and
unsuitable for agriculture.
On September 6, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision
with this fallo:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant:
1) To pay Carlito Castillo the sum of P65,240.00 plus legal
interest from the time of the filing of his complaint;
2) To pay the heirs of Cristeta Castillo the sum of P32,630.00 plus
legal interest from the time of the filing of her complaint;
3) To pay Cornelio Castillo the sum of P47,490.00 with legal
interest from the time of the filing of his complaint;
4) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as exemplary
damages;
5) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as attorney's
fees;
6) To pay the costs of suit.
Dissatisfied with said judgment, ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 29, 1994,
respondent court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with the
following modifications:
Ordering defendant-appellant to pay:
1. Carlito Castillo the following amounts:
a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P56,290.00 with
legal interest from the time of the finality of this decision until the
same shall have been fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and

d) Costs of this suit.
2. Cornelio Castillo the following sums:
a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P255,401.25 with
legal interest from the time of the finality of this decision up to
the time the amount is fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of this suit;
3. Cristeta Castillo the following amount(s):
a) Compensatory damages of P249,815.62 with legal interest
from the time this decision becomes final until the amount is fully
paid;
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of suit.
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY is now before the SC,
arguing for nullification or, at least, partial modification of CA's
judgment, one of its arguments is that respondent Honorable
Court of Appeals violated Article 2177 of the Civil Code which
states that: "the CASTILLOs cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant" when it condemned
the ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY as a result of its
dredging operations, to pay private respondents not only the
expected total amount of profits the latter would have derived
from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or
over 11 years, from the half hectare agricultural land, but also
rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of their said entire
landholdings.
Legal Issue: Did the CA committed an error when they have
modified the judgement violating Article 2177?
Held:
YES. CA exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the judgment
of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of
private respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose an
appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be
satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court. As to
them, the judgment of the court below may be said to have
attained finality.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party
who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the
decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any
argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's
claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed. He can
assign errors on appeal if such are required to strengthen the
views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors, in
turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain
the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose
of modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him
other affirmative reliefs.
Lim v. Ping, G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012
FACTS: FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal
authorities1 for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-
Cement and Tigerbilt (FCCT).
FCCT then sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags
of cement to respondent Co for the amount of P3.15 million or
P63.00 per bag.
Co then sold the same withdrawal authorities to petitioner Lily
Lim for the alleged amount of P3.2 million or P64.00 per bag.
Lim, using the withdrawal authorities, withdrew 2,800 bags of
cement from FRCC. He then sold some of the withdrawal
authorities covering 10,000 bags back to respondent Co.
(Remaining: 37,200 bags)
Sometime within the same year, FRCC no longer allowed Lim to
withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities. According to Co and the manager of FCCT, the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the goods
once Lim paid for the price difference or agreed to receive a
lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities were not subject to price fluctuations.
Because of this, Lim filed an information for Estafa through
Misappropriation or Conversion before the RTC of Pasig City. The
criminal case was dismissed. The civil liability was subsequently
dismissed as well after the reception of the evidence.
Lim appealed the dismissal of the civil liability before the CA.
While the appeal before the CA was pending, she filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC
of Manila. The complaint asserted two causes of action: breach of
contract and abuse of rights.
In his defense, Co maintained that the two causes of action raise
the same issue, which was Co’s liability to Lim for her inability to
withdraw the bags of cement, and SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON
THE GROUNDS OF LIS PENDENS AND FORUM SHOPPING.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim committed forum shopping in filing
the civil case for specific performance and damages during the
pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of Estafa.
HELD: NO, Lim did not commit forum shopping in filing the civil
case for specific performance and damages during the pendency
of her appeal on the civil aspect of Estafa.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising
from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code,- and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that
may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of
contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission
that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of
8
Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries").
The filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa
cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the
same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based
on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are
based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-
shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the
filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently
of the criminal action.
In the case at bar, The first action is clearly a civil action ex
delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal
action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the
allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising
from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of
rights).
Rimando v. People, G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014
Facts: An Information was filed before the RTC charging Rimando
of the crime of estafa through the use of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations. According to the prosecution,
Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the
assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8%
monthly interest. Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking
into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave
Rimando a check as investment in her business. In turn, Rimando
gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdated checks and made them
sign an investment contract with Multitel International Holding
Corporation. Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted
to encash the same but were dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand
Rimando to make good the said checks, but to no avail. Hence,
they were constrained to file a criminal complaint for estafa
against her.
In her defense, Rimando denied that she enticed Sps. Aldaba to
invest in her own business, as she had none. According to her,
she only referred them to Multitel Investment Manager Jaimelyn
Cayaban who handled their investment.
Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against
Rimando for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 2212. On
July 7, 2010, Rimando was acquitted in the BP 22 cases on the
ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or
omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her
civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba. It found the absence of the element
of deceit as Sps. Aldaba were fully aware that they would be
investing their money in Multitel and not in Rimando’s purported
business. Nevertheless, the RTC ruled that as an accommodation

party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of
Multitel, Rimando should be held liable to Sps. Aldaba.
Aggrieved, Rimando appealed to the CA. She contended that her
acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22
cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability
from her in the estafa case.
The CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that a prosecution for
violation of BP 22 is distinct, separate, and independent from a
prosecution for estafa. As such, Rimando’s acquittal and
subsequent exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases
does not automatically absolve her from civil liability in the estafa
case.
Rimando moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied,
hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s civil liability in
the estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from civil
liability in the BP 22 cases?
Held: Yes, Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not
necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private
complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that “the acquittal of
the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil
action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed
to him.”
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any
purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly
found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to
induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability
was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one
of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In
lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to
the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the
value of the issued check. Verily, Rimando’s civil liability to Sps.
Aldaba does not arise from or is not based upon the crime she is
charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the same
despite her acquittal in the estafa case.
In this relation, the CA is also correct in holding that Rimando’s
acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no
effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the
same factual circumstances. In Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy, the
Court laid down the fundamental differences between BP 22 and
estafa:
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that
deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d)
Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is
dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the
part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient
funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal
Code. Other differences between the two also include the
following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same
for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability;
(2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two
offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime
against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking
system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are
mala prohibita.25chanrobleslaw
Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People v. Reyes even
instructs that the simultaneous filing of BP 22 and estafa cases
do not amount to double jeopardy:
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to
identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution
thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single
criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where
there is variance or differences between the elements of an
offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar there will
be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the
mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give
rise to double jeopardy.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted
from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different
causes of action, which, under the law, are considered “separate,
distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both
cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their
criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double
recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the
criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any
bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related
estafa case, as in this instance.
C. Person/s liable; nature of liability
Worcester v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 5932, February 27, 1912
FACTS
Plaintiff Worcester commenced an action against the defendants
in the CFI of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages
resulting from an alleged libelous publication. Defendants were
the owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the
9
daily newspaper “El Renacimiento” (Spanish version) and “Muling
Pagsilang” (tagalog version.)
Worcester’s allegations:
1. The defendants have been maliciously persecuting and
attacking him in the newspapers for a long time and they
published an editorial entitled “Birds of prey” with the malicious
intent of injuring Worcester, both as a private person and as a
government official as the editorial obviously referred to him.
2. He was likened to “birds of prey” in the following manner:
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time
an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges
himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a
petulent omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood
of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
Defendants demurrer that was filed on the following grounds:
1. That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.
2. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a
cause or right of action.
3. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff
and several of the defendants for the same cause; and
4. That some of the defendants have been erroneously
included therein.
RTC – in favor of Worcester; defendants jointly and severally
liable for 60k total damages
ISSUE
Whether or not defendants’ individual properties can be made
jointly and severally liable for the damages under civil and
commercial codes (YES)
HELD
Yes. The RTC decision was modified. Damages were reduced.
Santos was absolved.
National Construction Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 159270,
August 22, 2005
FACTS: Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc.
(PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and
Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991
heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and
Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested
permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to
enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via
Dau-Sta. Ines from Mabalacat, and via Angeles from Magalang,
and exit at San Fernando going to its milling factory. The TRB
furnished the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)
(the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in
the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways) with a copy of the
said request for it to comment thereon.
On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), where the latter was allowed
to enter and pass through the NLEX subject to conditions:
On January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor,
and his co-employees saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle
portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road. They
proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of

sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling company in
the area. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived,
and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked
the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area at
around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered
on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and
transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no
longer a need to man the traffic.
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his two-door
Toyota Corolla with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend
Ricardo Generalao along the NLEX. As the vehicle ran over the
scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces
away from the scattered sugarcane.
Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the matter and
saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes,
which appeared to be flattened.
On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a
complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC
of Manila, Branch 16. They alleged that through its negligence,
PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists
when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured
sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled
sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency
devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the
existence of such spillage; and that the combined gross
negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate
cause of the injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to
Arnaiz’s car.
The lower court rendered judgment declaring PASUDECO and
PNCC, jointly and solidarily liable.
ISSUE: Whether PASUDECO and PNCC is jointly and solidarily
liable
HELD: YES. Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee
PNCC, should be held liable.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. There are
three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists.
The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed
even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The
highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened
sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet
condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at
night or in the wee hours of the morning.
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC,
should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the
expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties.
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were
no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces
of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an
observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient
warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane
stalks still left along the tollway.
PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without
proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the
emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts
which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries.
As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability
is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions
of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring
negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Thus, with PASUDECO’s and the petitioner’s successive negligent
acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.
Chan, Jr. v Iglesia ni Cristo
Facts:
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner
JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR. The gasoline station supposedly
needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms.
In view of this, the services of Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a
retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a
construction contractor in the locality.
Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) which is reproduced hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY
incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY;
5. In the event that valuable objects are found on the property,
the same shall be divided among the parties as follows:
FIRST PARTY - 60%
SECOND PARTY - 40%
6. In the event that valuable objects are found outside the
property line during the said digging, the same shall be divided
among the parties as follows:
FIRST PARTY - 35%
SECOND PARTY - 65%
10
Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was
informed by the members of the respondent that the digging
traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the
latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was
dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the
respondent.
A Complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller,
petitioner’s engineer, was filed by the respondent before the RTC
The trial court promulgated its Decision11 holding that the
diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and
septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden
treasure.12 The trial court adjudged the petitioner and Yoro
solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the
petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any
liability.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING
THE LATTER SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE
RESPONDENT. (NO)
Ruling:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are
the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious
act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent
because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it
may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation
on respondent’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was
no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and
Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are
jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility
of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.
The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited
earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the
tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would
 11

divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner’s RULING: YES. the Pereñas, acting as a common carrier, were Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by
property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner already presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident Antonio P. Gimena, who was then employed by petitioner R
from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so because death had occurred to their passenger. The presumption Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical
declared as liable. of negligence, being a presumption of law, laid the burden of City Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the evidence on their shoulders to establish that they had not been
excavation traversed the respondent’s property. In fact, he had negligent. It was the law no less that required them to prove their On February 3, 1994, the husband of the deceased, respondent
two (2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his observance of extraordinary diligence in seeing to the safe and Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages before the Regional
security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller. secure carriage of the passengers to their destination. Until they Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against petitioner R Transport,
did so in a credible manner, they stood to be held legally Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC)
responsible for the death of Aaron and thus to be held liable for for the death of his wife. MMTC denied its liability reasoning that
Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004
all the natural consequences of such death. it is merely the registered owner of the bus involved in the
Spouses Pereña v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917,
incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R Transport. For its
August 29, 2012
There is no question that the Pereñas did not overturn the part, petitioner R Transport alleged that respondent had no cause
FACTS: Petitioner Sposuses Pereña were engaged in the business
presumption of their negligence by credible evidence. Their of action against it for it had exercised due diligence in the
of transporting students from their respective residences in
defense of having observed the diligence of a good father of a selection and supervision of its employees and drivers and that
Parañaque City to Don Bosco in Pasong Tamo, Makati City, and
family in the selection and supervision of their driver was not its buses are in good condition.
back. In their business, the Pereñas used a KIA Ceres Van which
legally sufficient. According to Article 1759 of the Civil Code, their RTC: rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu ruling that
had the capacity to transport 14 students at a time, two of whom
liability as a common carrier did not cease upon proof that they petitioner R Transport failed to prove that it exercised the
would be seated in the front beside the driver, and the others in
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection
the rear, with six students on either side. They employed
selection and supervision of their employee. This was the reason and supervision of its driver, who, by its negligence, ran over the
Clemente Alfaro as driver of the van. Aaron, son of respondent
why the RTC treated this defense of the Pereñas as inappropriate deceased resulting in her death. It also held that MMTC should be
spouses, was a member of the carpool.
in this action for breach of contract of carriage. held solidarily liable with petitioner R Transport because it would
unduly prejudice a third person who is a victim of a tort to look
Considering that the students were due at Don Bosco by 7:15
The Pereñas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact beyond the certificate of registration and prove who the actual
a.m., and that they were already running late because of the
that their driver might have acted beyond the scope of his owner is in order to enforce a right of action.
heavy vehicular traffic on the South Superhighway, Alfaro took
authority or even in violation of the orders of the common carrier.
the van to an alternate route at about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the
In this connection, the records showed their driver’s actual CA: affirmed the Decision of the RTC with modification that
narrow path underneath the Magallanes Interchange that was
negligence. defendant Antonio Gimena is made solidarily liable for the
then commonly used by Makati-bound vehicles as a short cut into
damages caused to respondent. According to the appellate court,
Makati. At the time, the narrow path was marked by piles of
The lower courts correctly held both the Pereñas and the PNR considering that the negligence of Antonio Gimena was
construction materials and parked passenger jeepneys, and the
"jointly and severally" liable for damages arising from the death sufficiently proven by the records of the case, and that no
railroad crossing in the narrow path had no railroad warning
of Aaron. They had been impleaded in the same complaint as evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to
signs, or watchmen, or other responsible persons manning the
defendants against whom the Zarates had the right to relief, support its defense of due diligence in the selection and
crossing. In fact, the bamboo barandilla was up, leaving the
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect to or supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
railroad crossing open to traversing motorists.
arising out of the accident, and questions of fact and of law were Gimena, may be held liable for the damage caused. The CA noted
common as to the Zarates. that the fact that petitioner is not the registered owner of the bus
At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing,
which caused the death of the victim does not exculpate it from
PNR Commuter No. 302 (train), was in the vicinity of the
Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates (i.e., liability.
Magallanes Interchange travelling northbound. As the train
breach of contract of carriage) against the Pereñas was distinct
neared the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the van eastward
from the basis of the Zarates’ right to relief against the PNR (i.e., The decision of the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it
across the railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus.
quasi-delict under Article 2176, Civil Code), they nonetheless holds that inasmuch as the third-party defendant had used the
His view of the oncoming train was blocked because he overtook
could be held jointly and severally liable by virtue of their truck on a route not covered by the registered owner's franchise,
the passenger bus on its left side. The train blew its horn to warn
respective negligence combining to cause the death of Aaron. both the registered owner and the actual owner and operator
motorists of its approach. The passenger bus successfully
PNR did not ensure the safety of others through the placing of should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made
crossed the railroad tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro did not.
crossbars, signal lights, warning signs, and other permanent liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
The impact threw nine of the 12 students in the rear, including
safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians from crossing petitioner, in its relentless attempt to evade liability, cites our
Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which
there. The RTC observed that the fact that a crossing guard had rulings in Vargas v. Langcay and Tamayo v. Aquino insisting that
dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing
been assigned to man that point from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. was a it should not be held solidarily liable with MMTC for it is not the
him.
good indicium that the PNR was aware of the risks to others as registered owner of the bus which killed the deceased.
well as the need to control the vehicular and other traffic there.
The Zarates filed an action for damages based on breach of
Verily, the Pereñas and the PNR were joint tortfeasors. Legal Issue: Is the R Transport’s contention correct that it should
contract of carriage against petitioners; while the basis for
not be solidary liable with MMTC since it is not the registered
damages against PNR was quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
People v. Inovero, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014 owner of the bus?
Civil Code. The lower courts found that the Perenas were, in fact,
negligent in the selection and supervision of Alfaro, and ruled
R Transport v. Luisito Yu, G.R. No. 174161, February 18, Held:
against them.
2015 NO. The contention is devoid of merit. While the Court therein
Facts: ruled that the registered owner or operator of a passenger
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the CA to hold the
At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the said
Pereñas jointly liable with PNR for damages.
Yu, after having alighted from a passenger bus in front of vehicle for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a
Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of the
 12

said vehicle, the Court did so to correct the erroneous findings of

the Court of Appeals that the liability of the registered owner or
operator of a passenger vehicle is merely subsidiary, as
contemplated in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case
did the Court exempt the actual owner of the passenger vehicle
from liability. On the contrary, it adhered to the rule followed in
the cases of Erezo vs. Jepte, Tamayo vs. Aquino, and De Peralta
vs. Mangusang, among others, that the registered owner or
operator has the right to be indemnified by the real or actual
owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage
for the injury caused.

Moreover, while We held in Tamayo that the responsibility of the

registered owner and actual operator of a truck which caused the
death of its passenger is not solidary, We noted therein that the
same is due to the fact that the action instituted was one for
breach of contract, to wit:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it

holds that inasmuch as the third-party defendant had used the
truck on a route not covered by the registered owner's franchise,
both the registered owner and the actual owner and operator
should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made
liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are

liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

It must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach
of contract of carriage, as in Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict
under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. As such, the liability for which petitioner is being made
responsible actually arises not from a pre-existing contractual
relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a
damage caused by the negligence of its employee. Petitioner
cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape its
solidary liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.

Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for
the better protection of the public for both the owner of record
and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally
liable with the driver. As aptly stated by the appellate court, "the
principle of holding the registered owner liable for damages
notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has
already been transferred to another is designed to protect the
public and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees
of the vehicle to take refuge in, in order to free itself from liability
arising from its own negligent act."

Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena was

sufficiently proven by the records of the case, and that no
evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to
support its defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the death
of respondent Yu's wife.