Roxas v.

De Jesus
134 SCRA 245

FACTS:

Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the
deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a
notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a “letter-will” entirely written and signed in
deceased’s handwriting. The will is dated “FEB./61 ” and states: “This is my will which I want to be
respected although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is
a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed
probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date
contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.

ISSUE:

W/N the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is
a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

Valid date.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental
objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of
their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes,
but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the
exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite
is actually attained by the form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled
that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. …

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a
Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its
execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by
the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness
and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of
their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The
objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally
defective because the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on the holographic Will is not
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be
entertained.

As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or
not the date “FEB./61” appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of
the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
Labrador v. CA
G.R. Nos. 83843-44, 5 April 1990, 184 SCRA 170

FACTS:

The deceased Melecio Labrador, left behind him a parcel of land which was partitioned among his nine heirs
through a holographic will. Sagrado, therefore, one of his heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged
holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. However, Jesus and Gaudencio, also heirs of the deceased, filed n
opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law alleging
therein that before Melecio’s death, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in
favor of Jesus and Gaudencio the parcel of land.

The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of Sale. Jesus and
Gaudencio appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court. It denied the allowance of
the probate of the will being undated. The aggrieved party, therefore, filed a petition to the Supreme Court alleging
among others that the CA erred in not allowing the probate proceedings withstanding the fact that in the first
paragraph of the second page of the alleged holographic will, which was written in Illocano, the testator mentioned a
date – “month of March, 17th, 1968.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic is dated.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The will has been dated in the hands of the testator himself in perfect
compliance of Article 810 of the Civil Code.

The law does not specify a particular location where the date must be placed in the will. The only requirements are
that the date be in the will itself and should be executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present
in the subject will. Hence, the probate proceeding should be allowed.

Maloto v. CA Digest
Maloto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 
1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs believed that the
deceased  did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will which was
purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the
devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under the   instruction of the deceased

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will was sufficiently
proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the  'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the
other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke
(animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not
established to be the will and the burning though  done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an effective revocation,
unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied
by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his
express direction and  presence.

GR No. 76464  Maloto vs CA

Facts: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto- Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private
respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased
did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced
an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While
the case was still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial settlement
of Adriana’s estate dividing it into four equal parts among themselves.
They presented the same and successfully gained court approval. Three years
later, a document was discovered entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento),”  purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana.
Malotos oppposed the probate of the Will stating among others that the said
will was revoked. Two witnesses were presented to prove that the will was
burned by Adriana herself.

Issue: Whether or not the will was validly revoked. 

Held: No, the will was not validly revoked. A valid revocation must be done
with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled with an overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under
his express direction. The document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established–that such was the will of
Adriana Maloto. And that the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. Also the burning was not in her presence.
Both witnesses stated that they were the only ones present at the place
where papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could not have
constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.

Molo v. Molo Digest

Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by
his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was
admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. 

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors
alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance
of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed
1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with
law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939. The
earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies
when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of
effect for some reason.

Caniza v. CA
The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA v.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997
NARVASA, C.J.

FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent by judgment in a
guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza was the owner of a
house and lot. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject the spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises.

The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing through her
legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caniza
was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the
Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house,
rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and
failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical
treatment;” among others.

The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since the 1960’s; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caniza as her own family, and the
latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house
and lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes
her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the
ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for probate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will may be given effect

HELD:
No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” An owner’s intention to confer title in
the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s
taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that, in this case,
there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
extreme age.

Nuguid v. Nuguid

GR L-23445, June 23, 1966

FACTS:

Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz,
and 6 brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years before her
death and prayed that she be admitted to the probate and be appointed administrator. The parents opposed saying that
they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line and that the will should be void on the ground
of absolute preterition.

ISSUE:

Is the will void on the ground of preterition?

RULING:

YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her
parents. And, the will completely omits both of them; thus receiving nothing by the testament, depriving them of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Note that A. 854 of the NCC merely
nullifies the “institution of heir”. Considering that the will presented solely provides for the institution of the petitioner
as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The will is null and void.

Nuguid v. Nuguid
G.R. No. L-23445, 23 June 1966, 17 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951,
some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs
of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is
void.

RTC ruled the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition on the ground of

ISSUE:

Whether there is preterition

HELD:

Yes. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.” Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one
in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, “shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in
toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of
heirs”, put only “insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

G. R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID VS. FELIX NUGUID AND PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid some 11 years before her demise. The legitimate father
and mother of the deceased entered their opposition on the ground that by the institution of petitioner Remedios
Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
line - were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

ISSUE: Whether the will is completely void

RULING: Yes. This is a clear case of preterition. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid. The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the
Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides
for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

INSTITUTION OF HEIRS

PECSON vs. CORONEL 45 Phil 216

INSTITUTION OF HEIRS
Case no. 39

[No. 20374. October 11, 1923]

In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant and

appellee, vs. AGUSTIN CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants.
 

ROMUALDEZ, J.;                                                    
 
FACTS:        On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as
the last will and testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir Lorenzo
Pecson, the husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity questioned the
genuineness of the will on the following grounds: First, that it was improbable and
exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate by excluding her blood
relatives; and second, that if such will was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous
illegal influence.
 

 
ISSUE:        Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her
estate.
 

HELD:        YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but
we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The
liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced (compulsory) heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1989.
 

The SC held that nothing is strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore,
although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and
customary, still this would not be null per se.
 

“In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over
his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or
legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will,
and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is not
rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent
the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity,
or revenge can dictate. X X X ” (40 Cyc., 1079.)

PRETERITION

Acain v. IAC
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987, 155 SCRA 100

FACTS:

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio
Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a
legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that:
(1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC
granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will.
Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been preterited.

HELD:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results
in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

6.Constantino C. Acain, Petitioner

Vs.
Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Virginia A Fernandez and Rosa
Diongson, Respondents
Facts: On May 29, 1984 petitioner, one of the children of Segundino Acain who was designated to received all the properties
of the testator his brother upon his death who however predeceased said testator,  filed a petition for a probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which
petitioners and his siblings were instituted as heirs.  Motion to dismiss was filed by the private respondents on the grounds
that petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings as he is merely a universal heir and the widow and adopted
daughter were preterited.

Issue:  Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.

Held:  Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are
not mentioned therein or, they are neither instituted as heir nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned,
preterition may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir and that she
is not of the direct line. The adopted daughter however, whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner
cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both were deprived of at least their legitime.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of petitioner together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing
at all was written.

ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987

FACTS:

Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares
from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo
dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
 The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE:

Was there preterition?

HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she
was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived
of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any
other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee
or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased.
NERI v. AKUTIN

GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943

74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by
his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner.
The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of
the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over
which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the
respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all
his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those
given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall
annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which
annuls the institution of heirs.

1.Administration of the Estate of Agripino Neri Y Chavez, Eleuterio Neri

et al., Petitioner
Vs.
Ignacia Akutin and her children, Respondents

Facts:  Testator in his will left all his property by universal to the children by his second marriage, the respondents, with
preterition of the children by his first marriage, the petitioners.  The court annulled the institution of heirs and declared total
intestacy.  Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents on the ground that there is no preterition and assuming if
there was, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of bequest made to
them.

Issues: Whether receipt in advance of shares in the properties of the decedent a ground of preterition?

Held:  Upon the findings of facts, all the parcels that corresponds to the decedent is on the hands of the administrator after
the inventory was filed in court thus the property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion has been given to
the first marriage. The testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and that without
expressly disinheriting  the children by first marriage, he left nothing to them upon erroneous belief that he had given them
already more shares in his property than those given to the children by the second marriage. This is accordingly a case of
preterition governed by Art. 184 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate
succession should be declared open.