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Aggression Contained?
The Federal Republic of Germany and International Security
1
Two years ago, when I first proposed this topic, I had some
trepidation about its relevance to current NATO policy. Forty-eight
months of work on the topic and the rush of events especially in
Central and East Europe since that time have convinced me both of its
timeliness and of its relevance. Germany's role in SFOR in Bosnia
since 1996, the very positive deployment of the German Army
(Bundeswehr) in flood-relief work along the Oder River on the German-
Polish border in the summer of 1997, and even the most recent
revelations of neo-Nazi activity within the ranks of the Bundeswehr,
have served only to whet my appetite for the project. For, I remain
convinced that the German armed forces, more than any other, can be
understood only in terms of Germany's recent past and the special
military culture out of which the Bundeswehr was forged.
Introduction
The original proposal began with a scenario that had taken place
in Paris in 1994. On that 14 July, the day that France annually sets
aside as a national holiday to mark its 1789 Revolution, 189 German
soldiers of the 294th Tank-Grenadier Battalion along with their twenty-
four iron-crossed armoured personnel carriers for the first time since
1940 had marched down the Champs-Elysées in Paris. General Helmut
Willmann's men had stepped out not to the tune of "Deutschland,
1The research for this report was made possible by a NATO Research Fellowship. The
opinions expressed herein are my own and do not reflect NATO policy.
Herwig/NATO 2
2 Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National
Identity (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1988).
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Project Rationale
In order fully to understand the nature of the international
reaction to the German Army march-by in Paris, it is necessary to
comprehend the circumstances surrounding that organization's origins.
The Bundeswehr had been founded in theory in the Himmerod
Memorandum of October 1950, and in constitutional law in the General
Treaty of May 1952. Well remembering Germany's military past, the
founding fathers of the Federal Republic of Germany in drafting the
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) in May 1949 had committed the Bundeswehr
exclusively to self-defence. Articles 87a as well as 115a-115f stated
that the Bundeswehr could be deployed only in defensive wars; Article
26 further stipulated that the Bundeswehr could not prepare for or
conduct offensive operations. In other words, German soldiers were to
be stationed, and were to operate, only within the boundaries of the
Federal Republic as part of a multinational Western alliance.
But, beginning early in 1991, the Kohl government opted for a
more active foreign policy, one that would see the Federal Republic
seek a global role within the framework of existing alliances and the
United Nations (UN). Incrementally, units of the Bundeswehr saw
action "out of area." In January and February 1991 German AWAC
planes, Alpha jets, and Bundeswehr soldiers from Erhac and Diyarbakir
in Turkey assisted United States forces in the Gulf War. Clearly, the
international accusations that the FRG had limited its contribution in
the Gulf War to "checkbook diplomacy" via its $17 billion contribution
toward the American effort were well off the mark. In the wake of
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, German mine sweepers
helped clear the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of
Hormuz, assisted refugee work with the Kurds in Turkey as well as in
Iran, and eventually flew UN reconnaissance missions over Iraq. In
July 1992 German naval aircraft and destroyers operating in the
Adriatic Sea began to enforce the United Nations' weapons embargo in
Herwig/NATO 4
3 For an overview of how this plays in the Federal Republic, see Wolfgang-Uwe
Friedrich, "In Search of Stability: German Foreign Policy and the Public in the 1990s,"
in David P. Conradt, et al, eds., Germany's New Politics, special issue of German
Studies Review (1995), pp. 253-71.
4Recent revelations from the Finance Ministry show that the former German
Democratic Republic spent as much as 11 percent of Gross Domestic Product per year
on the armed forces--at times, more per capita than even the Soviet Union.
Herwig/NATO 7
5See Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994. "The Security of the Federal Republic of
Germany and theBundeswehr Now and in the Years Ahead", Abridged Version (Bonn,
April 1994); and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1994. Weißbuch zur
Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der
Bundeswehr (5 April 1994).
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figure shot up to DM 200 million for a single year. Today, the Federal
Republic finances 8.93 percent of the UN's budget, making it the third
largest supporter of the world organization.
Indeed, international security for the Federal Republic and much
of NATO and the EC has changed dramatically--from Cold War concerns
about a conventional confrontation with the Warsaw Pact nations,
possibly escalating up the nuclear ladder from theatre to strategic
exchanges, to international peace-keeping and peace-making missions.
Bonn has identified Africa, East Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East,
and the Caribbean region as the areas of immediate concern. According
to past UN Secretary-General Boutro Boutros-Ghali, in 1988 his
organization was involved in as many peace-keeping missions as the
United Nations had undertaken over the entire four decades from 1948
to 1987. By 1992, the UN conducted no fewer than twelve global
missions at a cost of $3 billion.
This project, then, was designed to assess the German
contribution to international security within the new framework of UN
peace-keeping and peace-making missions. Given my discipline and
training, I sought to contribute historical perception to the project, and
to place it within the context of the German past. From the start, I
analyzed the new "Bundeswehr Plan '94" and the disposal of the
erstwhile NVA arsenal in terms of their global implications, financial
feasibility, and political ramifications. I remain convinced that any
German action taken beyond the borders of the Federal Republic
involves more than simply a financial and logistical cost-effective
calculus, as it will evoke images of the recent past. To date,
discussions surrounding the "Bundeswehr Plan '94" have centred
almost exclusively on its financial and military-technological
implications; I am trying to provide the critical historical perspective.
To be sure, Bonn planners are keenly aware of some of the limits
imposed upon them by history. They are sensitive, for example, to the
fears especially in the borderlands of the former Soviet Union and in
the Balkans that Bundeswehr deployment will evoke memories of
Germany's two bids for "world power" in 1914 and in 1939. Yet, reality
often still intrudes on these inner sensibilities. For example, while
Bonn planners have promulgated an unwritten law that the
Herwig/NATO 12
Research
The research for this project has been far more (volume)
extensive and (time) intensive than I had initially realized. The recent
shuttling of the NVA military archives from Berlin to Freiburg--and the
concomitant, ill-conceived move of the Bundeswehr's military
historians from Freiburg to Potsdam--has wreaked havoc with both my
research and my plans for on-site consultation. Another problem that I
faced, was that while the papers of most Bonn ministries have been
deposited at the Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) at Koblenz, the current
records of Bonn's armed forces and government planners remain at the
Ministry of Defence at the Hardthöhe in Bonn. As a result, both the
number of trips and the cost of research have escalated beyond what I
originally had budgeted. Thankfully, I was able to use research funds
accrued during my five years as Department Head (1991-96) to pay for
the additional research travel. As I indicated in my "Interim
Report" to NATO's Academic Affairs Officer, I have undertaken several
separate research trips to Germany (and the United States) since being
awarded the NATO Research Fellowship in May 1996. I was able to
mount the first batch of research during, and largely made possible by,
my 1996-97 sabbatical leave from The University of Calgary. To keep
transportation and subsistence outlays to a minimum, I had planned
several of these trips around other contractual and conference
commitments (Bern University, Yale University, and a Bundeswehr
Tagung at Kühlungsborn/Mecklenburg-Pommern). All transportation
was undertaken by Apex excursion fares with Air Canada/Lufthansa.
To facilitate note-taking in archives, where reproduction costs now
average DM 1.00 per page for DIN A4, I purchased an Apple Powerbook
5300 with my own funds.
Herwig/NATO 14
6For a previous assessment, see Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The
Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton, 1988).
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I was able to deal with most of these files--mainly because the bulk of
the historical materials had earlier been published in some of the
anthologies of the Military Historical Research Office (first at Freiburg,
then at Potsdam) listed above.
I would be remiss if I did not officially thank Professor Dr.
Wolfgang Mommsen of Düsseldorf University, arguably Germany's most
eminent historian of international relations; Professor Dr. Stig Förster
of Bern University in Switzerland, one of the brightest of the rising new
stars of military-diplomatic studies; and Professor Dr. Wilhelm Deist of
Freiburg University, for much of the 1970s and 1980s the "Leading
Historian" of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, when it was
still at Freiburg; for their expert guidance of my research and for their
willingness to discuss complex issues--both historical and current--
with me during my various research trips to Germany.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the Strategic Studies Program of
The University of Calgary and its Director, the eminent Canadian
military historian, Professor David J. Bercuson, for their documentary
and intellectual support. Largely as a result of Dr. Bercuson's constant
encouragement, and in good part on the basis of the work done during
my NATO Research Fellowship, in the Fall Semester 1997 I introduced
an upper-class lecture course (enrollment 64 students) on the
"Principles of Strategy: Past and Present" (History/Political Science
481).
Project Findings
Rather than offer a shopping list of findings, all differing in
degrees of importance and relevance, I will bracket my major findings
under three rubrics. First and foremost, the events surrounding the
founding of the Bundeswehr at the Himmerod monastery in
September/October 1950 in many ways shaped the intellectual mindset
of Bundeswehr leaders for a generation to come. Thus, I will analyze
the Himmerod discussions in some detail. Second, the restructuring of
the Bundeswehr from a bipolar Cold-War instrument into a post-Cold-
War multipolar, peace-keeping instrument will be addressed in detail,
so that we can understand its stated purpose. And finally, the nagging
issue of the historical past--that is, Traditionspflege--will be taken up
Herwig/NATO 20
7The operative documents on this issue are Ministry of Defence: "Bundeswehr und
Tradition," 1 July 1965; and "Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur
Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr," 20 September 1982.
Korean War, the arming and barracking of about 70,000 East German
"police forces" by the Soviet Union, and Moscow's demand for a Four-
Power Conference to formalize total German disarmament under the
terms of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 gave the matter great urgency.
The secrecy surrounding the meeting at Himmerod was prompted
by three factors. First, the discovery that fifteen of Hitler's former
generals and admirals, many of whom had been intimately associated
with the attack on, and the occupation of, the Soviet Union in and after
June 1941, were laying the foundations for another German army, was
bound to be exploited for propaganda purposes by East German and
Soviet leaders. Nor would this revelation play well in Paris, London,
and Washington, where "denazification" and "demilitarization" were
still official policy under Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067.
Moreover, it was an open secret that 60 percent of government section
chiefs appointed by Adenauer were members of the erstwhile National
Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), and that the man whom
Adenauer had chosen to run his Chancery, Hans Globke, had been one
of the authors of the infamous Nürnberg Racial Laws of 1935, which
had denied basic citizenship rights to countless, now "marginalized,"
Germans. One can only wonder whether the "monks" appreciated the
irony that, as they plotted German rearmament at Himmerod, French
9See excerpts of the relevant newspaper articles and public speeches in Karl Bauer,
Deutsche Verteidigungspolitik 1948-1967. Dokumente und Kommentare (Eine
Auswahl) (Boppard, 1968), pp. 67-76.
Herwig/NATO 22
authorities a few miles down the road at Wittlich held under guard
several hundred former Wehrmacht officers convicted of war crimes?
Second, Adenauer, who had been elected to his high office in
September 1949 by a plurality of a single vote, and his Christian
Democrats (CDU), who held a mere 31 percent of seats in the first
Bundestag, had just suffered serious setbacks in regional elections at
Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, and Bavaria. These political defeats were
due in large part to the able assistance rendered Kurt Schumacher's
Social Democrats by prominent church leaders such as Martin
Niemöller and Gustav Heinemann (for a time a member of Adenauer's
Cabinet). Thus, Adenauer was in a vulnerable position politically, and
he hardly needed a scandal over possible rearmament orchestrated by
former Wehrmacht generals. As late as 1965, Adenauer, in the first
volume of his memoirs, still could not bring himself to include even a
veiled reference to the Himmerod gathering.10
10 See Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart, 1965), vol. I, pp. 375 ff.
and would have to be built "without reliance on the forms of the old
Wehrmacht."
Section Six, "Conclusions," clearly revealed that Baudissin and
Foertsch were in the minority. Its tone was accusatory and demanding,
calling on Adenauer at once to abrogate all High Commission laws,
thereby making--albeit, retroactively--the Himmerod gathering legal.
The "monks" pointedly reminded the Chancellor that even General von
Seeckt's "Black Reichswehr" had come about "with the support of the
determining members of the then ruling cabinets." And they again
demanded of Bonn that "eminently visible steps" be taken "to end the
defamation" of German soldiers, and to solve "the so-called 'war-
criminals-question'" at the highest levels. Finally, the fifteen generals
and admirals of the erstwhile Third Reich counseled that rearmament
could succeed only by way of accepting at face value "the repeatedly
proven loyalty and incorruptibility of the German soldier."
The Himmerod Memorandum was officially marked "Secret
Federal Matter." Only four copies were made. Graf Kielmannsegg
personally delivered the document to Chancellor Adenauer via Globke
at 11 a.m. on 2 November 1950. Seven hours later, Adenauer discussed
the Memorandum with Speidel, Heusinger, Globke, Blank, and General
Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler's former military intelligence chief. There can
be no doubt today that Adenauer read the Memorandum. 12
13 Adolf M. Birke, Nation ohne Haus. Deutschland 1945-1961 (Berlin, 1989), p. 289.
Herwig/NATO 28
change of the 1990s, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) made it possible
not only for Germany to reunite on the basis of the Two-plus-Four
Talks, but also for NATO to consider "eastern expansion" (Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland) by 1999 on the basis of the recent
NATO summit discussions at Madrid. Both would have been
unthinkable before 1991.
The future will bring with it much change. The European
Community is already in the process of transforming itself into a
European Union on the basis of the Maastricht accords. NATO, as just
stated, is transforming itself from a purely military Cold War alliance,
into a security and economic development agency that, under the broad
framework of the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, is reaching out
toward Central (Czech Republic, Hungary), East (Poland) and possibly
Southeast (Romania, Slovenia) Europe. By contrast, the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), while technically
restructuring itself as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), has not been able to implement real reform. Thus, the
future, as far as Germany is concerned, will remain militarily with
NATO, and economically with the European Union. It is within this
umbrella that Bonn developed its "Bundeswehr Plan '94."
Priority in German spending shifted in 1991: from the
requirements of national and alliance defence, to those of German
"accession." The latter has held steady at an annual cost of roughly
DM 170 billion, and is likely to continue at this level well into the next
millennium. For Defence Minister Rühe, this has meant overall
reductions in the defence budget from DM 53.6 billion in 1991 to DM
48.48 billion in 1994; put differently, from 18.3 percent of overall
budgetary outlays to 10.1 percent. Prognostications for defence
expenditures until 1998 remain steady at around DM 47.5 billion. In
real monetary terms, this breaks down to DM 25 million (51.6%) for
personnel, DM 5.9 million (12.2%) for military procurement, and DM 2.5
million (5.2%) for research, development, and testing.
16 Obviously,
20Martin K. Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War: German Military and Civilian
Losses Resulting from World War II (New York, Westport, and London, 1986), pp. 1 ff.
22Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust (New York, 1996).
barbaric Nazi past. For, there was no "hour zero" for most German
professionals. Civil service reforms were torpedoed by the entrenched
ministerial bureaucracy. Universities after 1945 restored the Weimar
Republic's reactionary Universities' Constitution. The judiciary served
Konrad Adenauer just as it had Adolf Hitler and Paul von Hindenburg,
Friedrich Ebert and Kaiser Wilhelm II, Otto von Bismarck and Frederick
the Great. Reform in the economic sector was limited to the 1950
currency reform. The Basic Law (Articles 140 and 4) even restored the
conservative State Church Law of the 1920s for its 16,000 pastors and
priests, many of whom had loyally prayed for Hitler. Thus, it hardly
came as a surprise when Josef Cardinal Frings of Cologne, even before
Himmerod, publicly admonished Germans that "propaganda for
unrestricted and absolute refusal to undertake military service is not
compatible with Christian belief."
26 Perhaps Friedrich Wilhelm Graf von
27Volker Rühe, "Ethos des deutschen Widerstandes als moralisches Fundament der
Bundeswehr," Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, Nr. 2 (6
January 1995), p. 5.
Interestingly, Rühe at the same time used the occasion to lecture his
listeners that the leaders of the erstwhile German Democratic
Republic had no place in that tradition. He thereby reiterated his
earlier stance that the "tradition" of the GDR's National Peoples' Army,
"due to its nature as a party and class army of a Communist system,"
could not offer "any tradition for the Bundeswehr."30
Project Outcome
The first, and most immediate, outcome of my NATO Research
Fellowship came in the unexpected form of an invitation by the United
States Information Agency (USIA), working through the United States
Embassy in Ottawa and the United States Consulate-General in
Calgary (Ms. Betty Rice), to undertake a ten-day whirlwind "NATO
Enlargement Tour" to Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, and Prague, in
September 1997.
At NATO Headquarters in Brussels, I joined a dozen delegates
from other NATO countries (Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Greece,
Holland, Iceland, and Italy) for a full day of briefings at the U.S.
Mission. These included presentations by Lieutenant General Nicholas
B. Kehoe, USAF, Deputy Chairman, International Military Committee,
and by two Permanent Representatives to NATO (Giovanni Januzzi of
Italy; Sir John Goulden of the U.K.) as well as by the American Chargé
D'Affaires (Douglas McElhaney). Thereafter, I departed for on-site visits
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and the
Presidential Palace at Bucharest; next came the Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Defence at Budapest; and finally, the Ministry of
Defence as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Prague. Most of
the discussions were with government officials at the levels of Deputy
Ministers of Defence and Finance. The "NATO Enlargement Tour" was a
magnificent learning experience, as I was able to connect my academic
research with contemporary issues and actors. Once back in Calgary, I
used the opportunity to lecture to both my strategy undergraduate
Herwig/NATO 38
Conclusions
During my two years of work on "Aggression Contained? The
Federal Republic of Germany and International Security," a number of
colleagues, both in Canada and in Germany, questioned whether this
work should not more properly have fallen under the jurisdiction of
political scientists. Put differently:
Why a Historian? I was not deterred
by such comments. For, the project has convinced me of the need,
stated in my original application, to imbed current Bundeswehr policy
firmly within the parameters of the peculiar German military culture,
so rooted in the events of the not-too-distant past.
Much of the debate concerning the future role of the Bundeswehr
has been left almost by default to political scientists and international
systems analysts. Even special editions in 1991 and 1995 of the
German StudiesReview, the flagship journal of professors of German
history and literature in North America, while featuring contributions
on German elections, foreign policy, NATO and EU membership and
possible expansion, as well as the economics of reunification, have
omitted any analysis of the instrument with which Germany seeks to
Herwig/NATO 39
that the Wehrmacht did not fight a "clean war" in the East, but rather
joined the Schutzstaffel (SS) in the war of annihilation under the
banner of partisan warfare (Partisanenkampf), has called into question
the role of military force--both past and present--in the modern
German state. In fact, an impassioned debate on the exhibition in the
Bundestag on 20 March 1997 showed how close to the surface the
debate over the role of Germany's armed forces in the nation's recent
past truly lies--especially among the general populace. Needless to
say, the December 1997 revelations about the Bundeswehr's "brown
taint" (Der Spiegel) has done nothing to allay that shock and
confusion.
It can only be hoped that the recent revelations of neo-Nazi
activity in the Bundeswehr, as stated above, will prompt Chancellor
Helmut Kohl's government to treat education about the military
historical past seriously. For, the debate is no longer restricted to
academics; rather, it reaches German society as a whole. It demands
answers that are firmly rooted in the German past--answers that I set
out in part to provide. My intellectual journey, then, has launched me