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Building a role model for rust belt cities? Fuxin's economic revitalization in
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DOI: 10.1016/j.cities.2017.09.002

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 Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Cities
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cities

City profile

Building a role model for rust belt cities? Fuxin's economic revitalization in
question
Xiaohui Hua,⁎,1, Chun Yangb,2
a
School of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, China
b
Department of Geography, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Fuxin is a resource-based prefecture-level city of Liaoning province in Northeast China. Despite its remote lo-
Fuxin cation, short urban history and sparse population, the city was positioned as a nationwide role model of socialist
Rust belt city economy by the central state in the Maoist era. However, the city economy quickly turned into decline in the
National state agency wake of market reforms and resource depletion. Since 2001 the central state has been striving to revitalize
Policy failures
Fuxin's economy, through pumping massive investment for developing new industry. Many claim that given the
Revitalization
rapid rise of several new industries Fuxin has successfully regained its role model position for rust belt cities to
revitalize, but this taken-for-granted conclusion is questionable. This City Profile challenges the prevailing role-
model idea of Fuxin's revitalization, with a particular focus on the emerging negative impacts engendered by the
top-down policy interventions. We critically analyze why national policies failed to help the city transform, and
argue that Fuxin's economy has suffered from critical problems.

1. Introduction
Fuxin is a geographically peripheral, small-sized prefecture-level
city of Liaoning province in Northeast China (see Fig. 1). It is a typical
resource-based city whose economy since the late 19th century has
relied heavily on coal mining and coal-burning electricity generation
(Hu, 2014). Over recent decades, it enjoyed a reputation as a ‘Coal and
Power City’ (meidian zhicheng), possessing Asia's largest open-cast mine
and most productive thermal power station (FDRC, 2012). Particularly
in the Maoist era, Fuxin was one of the most prosperous industrialized
cities in China, which witnessed the powerful advantages of the so-
cialist centrally-planned economy. Thanks to Mao's pro-Soviet ideology
of industrialization in the 1950s, Fuxin, along with other Northeastern
cities, was chosen by the central state to adopt the Soviet model of
socialist mass production. Through China's First Five Year Plan
(1953–1958), Fuxin received over 416 million RMB of national-state
designated investment, higher than most of cities in China (Zhang,
2008).
The centrally planned economy model worked particularly well in
Fuxin. The city was lauded as China's energy supply center and it not
only fueled the local economy but also generated considerable power
for the national economy too (Wang, Cheng, Zhang, Tong, & Ma, 2014).
For that reason, it has been popularly argued that Fuxin was built by
Mao's regime as a role model city for promoting the superiority of the
socialist economy (FLAO, 1998).
While facing China's market reforms since 1979, Fuxin's centrally
planned model of economic development faded and even, ironically,
turned into a negative example, resulting in what typical rust belt cities
suffer from: firm closure and relocation, job loss, population outflow,
poverty, and social unrest (Cooke, 1995; Li, Zhang, & Cheng, 2009; Xie
et al., 2016). The Fuxin case caused Beijing to rethink its previous
geographically biased development policies and to shift its attention to
less favored cities. In 2001, it was designated as China's first ‘Resource-
exhausted Pilot City’, through which the central state sought to revitalize
Fuxin and more specifically to help the city regain the role model po-
sition for many other rustbelt cities (State Council, 2001). Since then,
an enduring policy push from the top on Fuxin can be identified, in-
cluding the “Northeast Revitalization Strategy” since 2003 and the
“Transformation of Resource-exhausted Cities” since 2008. These na-
tional policy interventions seem to be working well, particularly in
terms of facilitating new industry emergence. According to many
scholarly works, as well as media reports, Fuxin has manifested signs of
economic successes and has become a role model city for economic
revival (Economist, 2012; People's Daily, 2013; Wang et al., 2014).

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: xhhugeo@zufe.edu.cn (X. Hu), chunyang@hkbu.edu.hk (C. Yang).
1
Room 205B, 1# School Building, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, 18 Xueyuan Street, Xiasha Higher Educational District, 310018 Hangzhou, China.
2
12/F, Academic and Administration Building, 15 Baptist University Road, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2017.09.002
Received 19 July 2017; Received in revised form 5 September 2017; Accepted 7 September 2017
0264-2751/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Hu, X., Cities (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2017.09.002
X. Hu, C. Yang
Fig. 1. Locational map of Fuxin and Northeast China.
Source: Author's own compilation.
Nevertheless, surprisingly, recent statistical evidence shows that
Liaoning is listed at the bottom of GDP growth rate among all pro-
vinces, and particularly, Fuxin's economy displays a severe downturn
(Economist, 2014; FSB, 2017). How are we to explain this contra-
diction? Has Fuxin really embarked on the path of economic re-
vitalization? This City Profile provides original analyses to address this
question, based on the authors' recent fieldwork in 2014 and 2015 with
first-hand data (see Table 1 in the Appendix). In the next section, we
present a brief descriptive introduction to the city including history,
social-economic conditions and current development problems. We
investigate the emergence and dynamics of several new industries
under national policy interventions since 2001 in Section 3. Section 4
critically examines the prevailing ‘success story’ account about Fuxin's
revitalization. By emphasizing the negative effects of top-down policy
interventions, this section explores why the role-model-building
strategy by the central state failed to revitalize Fuxin's economy. The
final section summarizes key findings of the study and discusses the
feasibilities of national policies for the city's future economic revival
and transformation. We provide an alternative viewpoint for policy-
makers and practitioners of the numerous rust belt cities in China.
Fig. 2. Left: a well-equipped mine of Fuxin in the Manchukuo era. Right: Fuxin (Haizhou)'s urban street.
Source: Zhang & Jia, 1936, originally pictured by the Japanese authorities.
2
Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2. Profile of Fuxin
2.1. The early history before 1949
Fuxin, was located in a remote border region in ancient times. It was
administrated by different nomadic ethnic powers such as Xiongnu in
the Qin Dynasty, Xianbei in the Han Dynasty, and Khitan in the Sui
Dynasty. The region was rural and sparsely populated until in 1890
locals discovered large scale coal reserves. Coal triggered an influx of
population, which laid the foundation for industry-driven urbanization.
Given a constant stream of economic growth, in 1903 the Qing Emperor
recognized Fuxin's importance and designated it as ‘Fuxin County’. This
decision further boosted the enthusiasm for coal mining. By 1913 Fuxin
had become one of China's largest coal producers, with 3000 miners in
nineteen coal companies (FLAO, 1998).
From 1914 to the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in 1931,
Japanese companies purchased a large number of pits and also obtained
mineral rights in Fuxin. After the occupation (through Japan's puppet
state of Manchukuo, 1931–1945), Imperial Japan accelerated the
plunder of Fuxin's coal resources. In 1934, the Manchuria Coal Co., took
control over all mine plants in Fuxin. In order to expand coal produc-
tion for war, Fuxin was officially designated as ‘Fuxin City’ in 1940.
Between 1940 and 1945, over 300, 000 Chinese and 100, 000 Japanese
were systematically organized to become new citizens and to live and
work in the city (Zhang & Jia, 1936). As Fuxin became an important
part of the war machine, its industrial infrastructures were modernized
and a well-planned city system evolved (Fig. 2).
2.2. Making a role model city in the socialist era (1949–1976)
Fuxin's economy came to a standstill due to the Chinese civil war
(1945–1949). In 1949. Mao decided to prioritize the development of
Northeast China. Plentiful mineral resources and well-established in-
dustrial infrastructures were regarded as regional advantages to facil-
itate the new nation's economy. The region's geographical proximity to
the USSR, coupled with Mao's pro-Soviet geo-political ideology, con-
stituted an ideal location for implementing Soviet-style industrializa-
tion (Shen & Xia, 2015). In particular, Liaoning was positioned as the
core of the ‘prioritizing’ strategy. Because Liaoning, then China's most
industrialized and urbanized province, was often portrayed as “the
eldest son of the Republic” (gongheguo changzi), and ascribed obliga-
tions for initiating Mao's ‘heavy industry first’ strategy (zhonggongye
youxianfazhan) (FDRC, 2009).
The strategy was completely put into effect in Liaoning in the 1950s
and 1960s by the central state injecting Soviet capital and technologies
into cities. Fuxin, and other coal cities, such as Fushun and Anshan,
were particularly supported, as Mao believed that “coal workers are
particularly able to fight” (meikuang gongren tebie nengzhandou) and
they can make a great contribution to ‘socialist industrialization’
X. Hu, C. Yang
Fig. 3. Fuxin's largest colliery in Haizhou Coal Mine was printed on the 1960′s Renminbi.
Source: FLAO.
(Wang, 2001). In the First Five-year Plan (1953–1957), four national
investment projects (three mine plants and one power station) were
deployed in Fuxin, which significantly fostered the development of the
coal industry. In the Maoist era (1949–1976), Fuxin produced
300 million tons of raw coal, which accounted for approximately 65%
of the nation's total coal production between 1949 and 2016 (FSB,
2017). Its population more than doubled, from 0.69 to 1.56 million,
with a remarkable growth rate higher than almost all cities in China.
The great socio-economic achievements of Fuxin were extensively
publicized by the central state, via newspaper, radio and even bank-
notes (see Fig. 3). In many ways, Mao deliberately positioned Fuxin as a
role model city of New China, in order to justify the superiority of the
centrally planned regime (FLAO, 1998).
2.3. Becoming a rust-belt city (1978–2000)
China's opening up and reform that began in 1978 became a turning
point for Fuxin's local economy. Fuxin's state-owned enterprise (SOE)
economy displayed great resistance to market reforms. This can be
associated with the deep local embeddedness of Mao's socialist egali-
tarianism. Under this regime, SOEs were centrally controlled and were
obliged to develop economically self-contained and socially inclusive
territorial industrial complexes. Many SOEs in Northeast China, and
Fuxin's monopoly, Fuxin Coal Mine (FCM) in particular, were finan-
cially over-loaded with paying considerable salaries to workers (even
redundant personnel) but also providing compulsory social welfare
(education, housing, health care, etc.) to workers' families. The locals
benefited from and relied on the well-known “big-pot” (daguofan)
system, and thus were reluctant to embrace market dynamics.
As a response, Fuxin expanded its coal production by opening new
pits, rather than practicing reforms. In 1980 Fuxin's economic devel-
opment started to slow down. This situation became worse in the early
1990s when Fuxin was confronted with dwindling coal reserves.
Official statistics show that between 1990 and 1995 Fuxin's GDP only
grew 2.1%, ranked at the bottom of Liaoning, and far from the national
average of 6.2% (FDRC, 2012). Moreover, in the wake of the 1998
radical SOE reform, FCM was forced to shut down its loss-making coal
plants, and moreover, to cut off all of its affiliated collective owned
companies. In a very short time, this caused over 200,000 workers to be
laid off, which pushed the city to the brink of economic collapse and
social disorder (FSB, 2014). In 2000, it was reported that most FCM coal
subsidiaries had declared bankruptcy, and 30 mass demonstrations in
protest at unemployment and poverty occurred (FDRC, 2012). In this
sense, the previous role model city became instead an archetypical rust
belt city.
2.4. Attempting revitalization and current problems (2001–present)
The decline of Fuxin's economy, reflects the increasing inequality of
regional development in China in the neoliberal era. Marketization and
3
Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig. 4. GDP and national investment in Fuxin 2001–2016.
Source: Fuxin Statistical Yearbook (FSB) 2017.
globalization, along with Deng's regionally biased policy initiatives,
jointly accelerated the rich-poor divide between the rich and promising
Eastern and the poor stagnant Northeastern/Western regions (Wei,
2001). The widening divide urged the central state to rebalance the
spatiality of the national economy, by launching a series of region-wide,
national investment-driven, and finance-supported development stra-
tegies. During the past fifteen years, cities in Northeastern China in
general and Fuxin in particular received considerable financial support
from national authorities. Since 2001, national direct investment on
infrastructure and industries, has become a major source and driver of
GDP growth in Fuxin. Fig. 4 clearly shows that Fuxin's GDP is closely
related to national investment. The national investment/GDP ratio
soared rapidly from 10% in 2001 to 60% in the peak year of 2013. The
eye-catching GDP record in 2013 gave a sign of successful transfor-
mation to the central state (People's Daily, 2013). This allowed the
central state to lower national investment in Fuxin. This seems to have
directly hit the economy. Since 2014, Fuxin's economy has confronted
severe problems, evident in a three-year period of negative growth.
In addition, the depletion of local coal reserves caused local coal
firms to relocate their production to coal-rich regions elsewhere. The
‘hollowing out’ of the coal industry in a way cancelled out the national
inputs in Fuxin (Interview: 1–2). Moreover, the previous national in-
vestment projects on infrastructure building merely created a transient
labor pool for locals. A large number of citizens could not find stable
jobs. This has led to a ubiquitous phenomenon of informal economies in
Fuxin (see Figs. 5, 6). Despite numerous national investment projects,
most of them focused on fostering industry (Interview 3). A lack of
social housing investment can be identified, as a result of which Fuxin
still displays many shanty towns with poor living conditions (Fig. 7).
Fuxin did receive massive national investment, it is nevertheless
true that the economy has relied heavily on real estate development. In
Fig. 5. Pickers of low-quality coal in Fuxin's Haizhou exhausted open cast mine.
Source: Authors.
X. Hu, C. Yang
Fig. 6. Informal laborers waiting for temporary work in Fuxin.
Source: Authors.
Fig. 7. A scene of a shanty town in Fuxin's urban area.
Source: Authors.
many years, real estate was recorded as the largest contributor to the
GDP (Economist, 2012). This well corresponds to the fact that urban
land development and finance is a crucial tool for local governments in
China to boost economic growth (Lin, 2009). Fuxin, among other less-
favored cities, was even more radical in selling rural lands in the name
of urbanization, but indeed mainly for coping with the problem of local
budgetary deficits (Interview 4). This can be evident by Fuxin's popu-
lation change between 2001 and 2016. Despite the decrease of the total
population from 1.93 to 1.78 million, the urban population increased
from 784 to 1036 thousand (FSB, 2017). So Fuxin's urbanization is not
driven by the inflow of population from elsewhere, but by a very lo-
calized process of peasant citizenization under land financialization.
However, both top-down investment strategy and local land financia-
lization seemed to fail to create enough jobs and to increase local
people's income, as most locals could not afford to buying homes
(CREB, 2015; Jin et al., 2017). Rather, land financialization created
many unskilled urban population to the shrinking job market, which in
turn has aggravated the problem of unemployment (Marukawa, 2017).
3. Policy-driven industry dynamics in Fuxin: regaining a role
model city?
Despite facing economic downturn and urban poverty, Fuxin has,
with considerable national investment inputs, developed several new
non-coal mining industries. We explore the question of whether these
new industries have the potential to revitalize the urban economy by
investigating the dynamics and roles of three selected key industries
4
Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
since 2001.
3.1. Agriculture and food processing
In 2001, Fuxin was suffering from severe unemployment and social
unrest caused by the 1998 radical SOE reform. The local state was
unable to cope with these issues alone, but was more likely to wait or
seek for help from the central state. Soon Beijing directed Fuxin to
nurture agriculture and food sectors in suburban areas for absorbing
massive numbers of laid-off miners (Interview: 1, 3, 4). By incentivizing
several domestic food firms, such as Shuanghui, Yili and Liuhe, to invest
in Fuxin, the central state truly saved the city. It is recorded that ap-
proximately 70, 000 former coal SOE employees were re-employed in
rural areas of Fuxin (FDRC, 2012). Some cultivated vegetables and
raised livestock in farmlands, others worked in food processing firms.
By 2005, the agriculture and food industry had become one of the pillar
industries in Fuxin. However, with the economy improving and more
urban jobs offered, the new industry confronted staff drain and thus
declined rapidly (Interview: 1, 3). Due to the strong emotional attach-
ment of urban life and place, and the social and occupational identity of
urban ‘working class’ rather than ‘peasants’, the rush of those agri-
culture/food employees back to the urban milieu was inevitable (In-
terview: 5–8). In this respect, Beijing may have successfully helped
Fuxin to cope with the unemployment crisis, whilst failing to create a
sustainable industry in the long-term.
3.2. Wind power
The rise of wind power has been widely regarded as a remarkable
new industrial path creation in Fuxin in recent years (Hu, 2014). It
started from scratch in 2003, based on a small scale experimental
project by one of China's largest central SOEs – Huadian Kingstone
(Interview 9). This single-firm action, however, did not become a
trigger to boost the industry, until in 2005 when China's renewable
energy law was released, and the National Energy Bureau (NEB)
decided to choose Fuxin as a pilot city of wind power. By issuing several
national former policies (NDRC, 2005; NDRC & State Council, 2006),
the central state designated China's largest wind power developer,
Huaneng, to deploy a large scale project of 500 MW in Fuxin. A con-
tinued and enhanced national push was also evident. Almost all leading
wind power firms, including centrally state-owned developers (e.g.
China Wind Power, Datang, Huarun, Guodian) and manufacturers (e.g.
Goldwind, Sinovel, Mingyang) have carried out projects in Fuxin, under
the national policy instruments and subsidies (Interview 10–15). In a
short span of time, the installed capacity of wind power in Fuxin
reached 1890 MW in 2016, nearly twenty-fold larger than it did in 2005
(FSB, 2017). Now Fuxin has become one of the largest wind power
generators in China, accounting for nearly one third of all wind power
installed capacity in Liaoning Province (CEN, 2017).
This industrial arrangement, indeed, shows a clear national-level
attempt, under the ‘Revitalizing Northeast’ strategy, to enable Fuxin's
long troubled economy to transform. The arrival of the wind power
central SOEs in Fuxin gave a strong sign to local stakeholders that the
city seemed to be ‘particularly taken care’ and ‘preferred’ by the na-
tional state again (Interview: 1, 9). The local state thus was determined
to spare no effort in supporting the national decision, despite ac-
knowledging the severe lack of localized wind power related assets. The
installed capacity soared rapidly, whereas the new industry contributed
to the local economy to a limited extent, and with many obstacles. One
key reason is that, central SOEs, by definition, are financially and ad-
ministratively out of Fuxin's lower-level municipal system. This means
that Fuxin benefited mainly from receiving national subsidies, but had
to offer large public resources to cater for the needs of those central
SOEs (Interview: 3, 11, 15). In addition, the expansion of on-shore wind
power in mountain areas (Fig. 8) has created emerging tensions be-
tween energy and environment/forestry authorities. Our interviews
X. Hu, C. Yang
Fig. 8. On-gird wind power farms in Fuxin's mountain areas. Source: Authors.
show that national power wind investment in Fuxin ‘is unsustainable,
and will soon come to a halt’ (Interview 15–16).
3.3. Coal chemicals
Defined as a modern new energy industry by NEB, the coal chemical
sector has been given much priority in China since 2005. Lead energy
central SOEs are key promoters, actively conducting large projects in
China's coal-rich locations. Fuxin's coal chemical industry emerged re-
latively late in 2010. But the initial plan to develop this industry can be
traced back to 2006. When fostering wind power in Fuxin, the central
state simultaneously leveraged central energy SOEs to develop coal
chemicals, as Beijing believed developing coal chemicals would also
bring the coal industry back and thus secure the local economy
(Interview 3). With central administrative approval, FCM was able to
acquire coal resources from Fuxin's neighboring region, Xilingol of East
Inner Mongolia. In 2007, a special railway (Baxin Railway) between
Fuxin and Xilingol was built so that coal-chemical plants can develop
with sufficient and secured raw materials of coal. All these efforts
turned out a centrally-designated investment of China Datang Group in
2010. It was planned to complete a $3.61 billion project by 2015
(Interview 18).
However, this planned project has settled merely in part (Fig. 9,
pictured in May 2013), and it mainly focuses on producing several low-
end coal-chemical products (e.g. synthetic ammonia and
Fig. 9. A partially constructed coal-chemical complex of Datang in Fuxin.
Source: Authors.
5
Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
formaldehyde). What is worse is that the existing plants are often op-
erating in part, as for yeas Datang has been running at a heavy loss in
Fuxin (Interview: 3, 18, 19). The devaluation of coal resources, huge
sunk costs of investment, as well as the over-capacity of low-end coal-
chemicals in China since 2010 have jointly led to loss-making in the
whole industry. More importantly, increasing critical voices related to
‘Nimbysim’, both from social and public institutions, can be heard re-
cently. They have shown great concerns with respect to high-level en-
vironmental harm and water resource waste of coal chemicals in cities
(Interview, 16). In this circumstance, national authorities have set up
stricter environmental rules and tightened project approval regulations.
In turn, new large-scale coal-chemical projects are now strictly pro-
hibited in China. This can be well evident in Fuxin, where Datang has
called a halt in new project construction since 2014, particularly in
terms of the coal-to-gas project that is of high energy consumption and
environmental risk (Financial Times, 2017). Thus the new industry, to a
large extent, has failed to bring positive economic benefits to Fuxin.
4. Policy failures: why it is difficult for Beijing to save Fuxin?
Given the evidence we have shown, Beijing's strategic efforts to
make Fuxin into a role model of economic revitalization for rustbelt
cities through national investments to create new industries can be
evaluated as a failure. This failure can be ascribed to, and analyzed
from, two key intrinsically inter-related dimensions, namely national
policy pragmatism and multi-scalar institutional lock-ins (Hassink,
2010), both of which have been underpinned by historically condi-
tioned dynamic geographical political economy.
The national policies in Fuxin can be characterized as explicit in-
vestment-driven top-down state interventionism, strongly focused on
creating/implanting new industries. These policies are neither like
general national policy orientations which are usually loosely defined
and with much leeway for regions themselves to adaptively implement,
nor the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy approach that fully disregards regional
specificities (Tödtling & Trippl, 2004). Rather, they are highly de-
termined and formalized at the national level, followed by central SOE-
dominated implementation at the local. Despite some advantages such
as strong executive ability and efficiency, these policy interventions
have generated harmful effects on Fuxin's economic revitalization.
For one thing, the national state has tended to underestimate or
simplify Fuxin's complex problems, and has sought to impetuously ‘fix’
them by exercising the power of fast policy. Creating new industries,
while ignoring and evading intrinsic deficiencies of the economy, seem
to have evidently brought transient effects and created a developmental
bottleneck. For another, and more importantly, the newly created in-
dustries are not selected based on Fuxin's local industrial conditions and
contexts. Rather, they are consistent with macro national industrial
strategies. Developing agriculture/food in Fuxin, for instance, fitted
well to the “three issues related to agriculture, rural areas, and farmers”
(sannong wenti) initiated in the early 2000s (Wang et al., 2014).
Likewise, fostering wind power and coal-chemicals also matched with
and responded to the 2005 nation-wide industrial campaign of “de-
veloping renewable energies” (fazhan zaisheng nengyuan) (Hu, 2014,
2017). Such nationally contextualized and mission-centered policy ap-
proach, combined with a lack of thorough understanding on local socio-
economic conditions, have led to many negative consequences hin-
dering the revitalization of Fuxin.
It is also understood that the local weaknesses towards revitaliza-
tion has been part of the national policy failure. These weaknesses have
been strongly place-dependent, for a long period of time, historically
conditioned and enhanced by multi-scalar institutional lock-ins. One
key point is that Fuxin at the very beginning was positioned by the
central bureaucracy as a national mono-structural energy supply center.
Particularly in Mao's planned era, the ideology of ‘central SOEs led’
(yangqi zhudao) was completely implemented in Fuxin. Central control
on local economic affairs was regarded as a superior model, leading to a
X. Hu, C. Yang
well-accepted reality of ‘big mine SOEs, small city’ (kuangda cheng-
xiao) (Wang, 2001; Zhang, 2008). In Fuxin, the centrally owned com-
pany, FCM, in the Maoist era, had more administrative power with
higher hierarchical ranking than Fuxin as a municipal city per se. Such
inner-city power incoherence and segmentation was too difficult to
change, even in the radical reform time of 1990s. Although now FCM
has been decentralized to the provincial level, the so-called ‘tiao-kuai
divide’ (fragmented vertical and horizontal governance) still persists.
Our evidence shows that the presence of higher extra-local political
powers in Fuxin not only horizontally disrupts the local governance
structure, but also vertically introduces new conflicts into the local
scene (e.g. conflicts between national energy authorities and national
environmental production ones) (Interview, 9, 16, 18, 20). Therefore,
the tiao-kuai problem can be seen as a fundamental obstruction of re-
vitalization. It indeed has put Fuxin in a dilemma, namely, seeking for
structural change yet severely lacking endogenous power and capacity
to make it.
These institutional legacies have also brought about a close re-
lationship between the national and local state. Over time this re-
lationship has legitimized the central state to frequently intervene in
Fuxin's economy (Hu, 2014). Importantly, the central state does not
merely seek to resolve local problems, but is dedicated to achieve its
own national strategy, often in the name of making Fuxin as a ‘pilot’ or
‘role model’ city. Moreover, this relationship also renders the local ac-
tors to generate a strong dependent mentality of ‘waiting, replying,
asking’ (deng, kao, yao) in a way eliminating the sense of making place-
based decisions and motivations (Hu & Hassink, 2017). We argue that
the unfinished situation of power decentralization in Fuxin and its close
political marriage with the central state are two intertwined and mu-
tually-reinforcing factors. On the one hand, the two factors keep Fuxin
institutionally and politically locked-in, difficult to revitalize autono-
mously and endogenously. One the other hand, they allow the central
state to treat Fuxin as a testing ground of national-policy initiatives in
order to examine whether and to what extent these national policies are
applicable and likely to be effective in elsewhere.
In sum, due to several overarching multi-scalar institutional defi-
ciencies and barriers Beijing could not save Fuxin. Fuxin's problems,
similar to many other rustbelt cities, at base, are ‘institutional pro-
blems’, rather than ‘industrial problems’ (Hu & Hassink, 2017; Zhang,
2008). By creating new industries or giving any sense of ‘role model’
policy inputs, the central state is likely to give a transient impulse to the
economy (see Fig. 4). It, however, fails to generate place-based,
nuanced, long-run policy strategies for the local revitalization agenda.
Therefore, the idea of making Fuxin a role model for rustbelt cities can
be regarded a wishful thinking of the central state rather than a tailor-
made, institutionally-reflective and far-reaching strategy.
5. Conclusions
This City Profile has discussed economic history and development
characteristics, as well as recent challenges and problems towards
economic revitalization in Fuxin, one of China's most important rust
belt cities. As clearly exemplified in the study, for many geographically
and historically conditioned political-economic reasons the central state
has been likely to intervene in Fuxin's economy by policy tools. And it
indeed has, for a long run, taken the place of the city's decision-making
and planning practice. This study has highlighted the salient role of
national policy interventions in creating three key new industries
(agriculture/food, wind power and coal-chemicals) in Fuxin since 2001
when the city faced severe economic setback and social risks. Instead of
supporting the recent prevailing idea of ‘Fuxin's successful revitaliza-
tion’ under massive national investment, this paper challenges the idea
and argues that the central state has failed to revitalize Fuxin.
This study has identified two key inter-related constraining factors
that are undermining the revitalization of Fuxin, namely inappropriate
top-down national policy approach and weak local capacity. First, the
6
Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
central's endeavors to revitalize Fuxin cannot be simply understood as a
single-purpose action for the city per se. They have intended to build a
regional role model or create a success experimental example for more
rustbelt cities to learn and replicate. Moreover, their policy actions
often cater to then national interests and, more broadly, to fit with
certain national development agendas. In this regard, the national
policy interventions in Fuxin can be characterized as a typical ‘fast
policy’ approach (Peck & Theodore, 2015). The central state fails to
read and interpret locally-specific needs of Fuxin, and thus are not able
to generate place-based, down-to-ground, visionary policies towards
revitalization. Second, the ways in which the central sought to re-
vitalize Fuxin, namely pumping inward investment and developing new
industries, are problematic. These exogenous sources have brought
transient benefits to the local, in terms of GDP and employment. They
are however evidently not subject to structural and institutional basis,
due to the absence of knowledge interactions between the newly cre-
ated industries and the existing core industries (Trippl,
Grillitsch, & Isaken, 2017). Indeed, the industrial unrelatedness of Fuxin
is mainly caused by the SOE hierarchical system. This system constrains
the development of related variety towards structural change.
Third, Fuxin itself as a rustbelt city has suffered from a lack of en-
dogenous ability to facilitate revitalization. This weakness has been
enhanced frequently by higher-level state agencies, making Fuxin very
incoherent in terms of institutions, power and governance. The ex-
perience of Fuxin well manifests how the centrally planned regime still
persists and how it continually weakens local capacity and adaptability
towards economic revival and resilience.
To end up, we remain critical of centrally-planned or centrally-led
revitalization in rustbelt cities, particularly in the name of any so-called
‘pilot city’ or ‘role model city’ policy strategies. We also strongly
question the ways in which the central state gets involved in the re-
vitalization of regions and cities, namely by simply designating central
SOEs to implement central policies. The plug of central SOEs in rustbelt
cities can be seen as a process of rebuilding the past planned economy
model. It makes the local institution thickened and disrupted, demoti-
vating local actors to generate place-based policies and actions. It is
therefore suggested that future national revitalization policies for rust
belt cities should be more open-ended and institutional-change or-
iented. National policies also need to be spatially differentiated and
industrially sensitive, given the varieties of types and characteristics of
rust belt cities in China (Tan, Zhang, Lo, Li, & Liu, 2017). Instead of
direct interventions, national policy orientations or indirect instruments
with enough room for local policy fine-tuning and adaptive im-
plementation are critically needed. By purposively securing local in-
terests and power, fostering endogenous capacity, offering available
resources and knowledge for local use, we can say such kinds of na-
tional policy may enable the revitalization of rust belt cities in China.
Acknowledgements
This research was jointly supported by the National Science
Foundation of China (no. 41601113, 41571119), Faulty Research Grant
from Hong Kong Baptist University (no. FRG1/15-16/053), and Open
Grant of Resource-exhausted City Transformation and Development
Research Center from Hubei Normal University (no. KF2017Y03).
Appendix Table 1
Interview information.
Label Interviewee and affiliation Date
Interview Deputy Director, Fuxin Resource- Apr 2014;
1 exhausted City Transition Office Nov 2015
Interview Secretary, Fuxin Municipality Dec 2015
2 Government
X. Hu, C. Yang Cities xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Interview Director, Fuxin Development and Reform Apr 2014; transformation planning (2010− 2020): A special report. (In Chinese).
Fuxin Development and Reform Commission (FDRC) (2012). Ten-year transformation
3 Commission Nov 2015 and revitalization of Fuxin: The explorative path of sustainable development for re-
Interview Deputy Chief, Fuxin Land and Resources Mar 2014 source-based cities. Government report (In Chinese).
4 Bureau Fuxin Local Annals Office (FLAO) (1998). The liberation of Fuxin after 50 years. (Fuxin
Jiefang 50 nian). Shanghai: The Eastern Publishing (In Chinese).
Interview Section Chief, Fuxin Rural Economy Mar 2014; Fuxin Statistical Bureau (FSB) (2014, 2017). Fuxin statistical yearbook. Beijing: China
5 Commission Nov 2015 Statistical Press.
Interview Office Director, Fuxin Shuanghui Meat Mar 2014 Hassink, R. (2010). Locked in decline? On the role of regional lock-ins in old industrial
areas. In R. Boschma, & R. Martin (Eds.). Handbook of evolutionary economic geography
6 Processing Company (pp. 450–468). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Interview Senior Manager, Fuxin Yili Dairy Industry Apr 2014 Hu, X. H. (2014). State-led path creation in China's rustbelt: The case of Fuxin. Regional
7 Co., Ltd. Studies, Regional Science, 1, 294–300.
Hu, X. H. (2017). From coal mining to coal chemicals? Unpacking new path creation in an
Interview Vice General Manager, Fuxin Luhua Apr 2014
old industrial region of transitional China. Growth and Change, 48, 233–245.
8 Fragrant Peanut Oil Co.Ltd Hu, X. H., & Hassink, R. (2017). New perspective on restructuring of old industrial areas
Interview Office Director, Fuxin City New Energy Apr 2014; in China: A critical review and research agenda. Chinese Geographical Science, 27,
9 Bureau Dec 2015 110–122.
Jin, X., Long, Y., Sun, W., Lu, Y., Yang, X., & Tang, J. (2017). Evaluating cities' vitality and
Interview Factory Manager, GoldWind (Fuxin) Mar 2014; identifying ghost cities in China with emerging geographical data. Cities, 63, 98–109.
10 Assembly Factory Dec 2015 Li, H., Zhang, P., & Cheng, Y. (2009). Economic vulnerability of mining city: A case study
Interview Senior Manager, China Huaneng (Fuxin) Mar 2014; of Fuxin city, Liaoning Province, China. Chinese Geographical Science, 19, 211–218.
Lin, G. C. S. (2009). Scaling-up regional development in globalizing China: Local capital
11 Nov 2015 accumulation, land-centred politics, and reproduction of space. Regional Studies, 43,
Interview Office Secretary, Longyuan Electricity Apr 2014 429–447.
12 (Liaoning) Marukawa, T. (2017). Regional unemployment disparities in China. Economic Systems, 41,
203–214.
Interview General Manager, China Wind Power Apr 2014 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2005). Policy suggestions on
13 Group (Liaoning) accelerating the localization of wind power equipment. Policy document no. [2005]
Interview Senior Manager, Mining Yang Wind Mar 2014 1593 (In Chinese).
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) & State Council (2006). Special
14 Power Industry Group (Fuxin)
instructions on resolving Fuxin's economic transformation problems. Policy document
Interview Vice General Manager, China Datang New Apr 2014 no. [2006]629 (In Chinese).
15 Energy Group (Liaoning) Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2015). Fast policy: Experimental statecraft at the thresholds of
neoliberalism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Interview Office Director, Fuxin Environmental Nov 2015
People's Daily (2013). Economic transition has fostered a great change of Fuxin. 25th Nov.
16 Protection Administration Shen, Z. H., & Xia, Y. F. (2015). Mao and the Sino-Soviet partnership, 1945–1959: A new
Interview Vice Chief, Fuxin Forestry Bureau Nov 2015 history. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
17 State Council (2001). Meeting report on the economic transition of the resource-ex-
hausted city Fuxin in Liaoning Province. Document no. [2001]76 (in Chinese).
Interview Office Director, Fuxin Coal Chemical Mar 2014; Tan, J. T., Zhang, P. Y., Lo, K., Li, J., & Liu, S. W. (2017). Conceptualizing and measuring
18 Industry Office Dec 2015 economic resilience of resource-based cities: Case study of Northeast China. Chinese
Interview Senior Manager, China Datang Group Dec 2015 Geographical Science, 27, 471–481.
Tödtling, F., & Trippl, M. (2004). One size fits all? Towards a differentiated regional
19 (coal-to-gas project) Fuxin innovation policy approach. Research Policy, 34(8), 1203–1219.
Interview Office Director, Fuxin Coal Mine (Group) Apr 2014 Trippl, M., Grillitsch, M., & Isaken, A. (2017). Exogenous sources of regional industrial
20 change: Attraction and absorption of non-local knowledge for new path development.
Progress in Human Geography. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309132517700982.
Wang, J. (2001). Mao Zedong and China's industrialization. Fuzhou: Fujian Education Press
(in Chinese).
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