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Country and Industry Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization Based Trade
Country and Industry Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization Based Trade
Don P. Clark
To cite this article: Don P. Clark (2006) Country and industry-level determinants of
vertical specialization-based trade, International Economic Journal, 20:2, 211-225, DOI:
10.1080/10168730600699515
DON P. CLARK
Introduction
The rapid pace of globalization has created new competitive challenges.
Firms have responded to these challenges by integrating production across
national boundaries. Rather than producing in a single country, stages of
the production process are performed in multiple countries to exploit
inherent locational advantages such as proximity to markets and access to
cheaper inputs. This practice gives rise to a sequential method of production
in which a country exports a component to another country that uses it to
1
Hummels et al. (1998) describes outsourcing as the relocation of component production to
another country and subsequent importation of components from that country. Components
are then used to make a good that is not exported. If the final good is exported, both out-
sourcing and vertical specialization are said to have occurred. Vertical specialization-based
trade refers to the value of imported inputs embodied in goods that are exported.
2
See Clark et al. (1989), and Clark et al. (2000).
Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 213
3
Imports under both items 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 are included in the present study. The
latter accounts for 99% of all OAP imports. More than half of the 4-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) industries use the OAPs. For a list of countries and industries engaged in
OAP assembly and vertical specialization, see US International Trade Commission (1998,
1999).
4
A US International Trade Commission (1988) publication identified four types of offshore
operations that use OAPs: (a) foreign-based manufacturers that use US-based components;
(b) US producers that moved assembly to low wage countries; (c) US-based producers that
produce abroad to expand export markets, but send some goods back to the US; and (d) multi-
national firms that process metals.
214 Don P. Clark
5
Variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in the Appendix.
6
Feenstra et al. (2000) found goods exported from the US for further processing were more
skilled labor intensive than other goods US industries produce.
7
It is common practice to interpret differences in per capita income across countries as
differences in capital-labor endowment ratios. Unskilled labor abundant countries will have
relatively low levels of per capita income. See, for example, Helpman & Krugman (1985),
Helpman (1987), and Clark & Stanley (1999). A preferred approach would be to use the
actual capital – labor endowment ratio. These figures are unavailable for most countries in
the present study and are likely to be unreliable when available.
Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 215
8
See Dollar (1992), and Clark (1997).
9
See Dunning (1979).
10
For example, Helleiner (1973) and Grunwald & Flamm (1985) discuss labor costs, trans-
portation costs, tariffs, scale economies, and the ability to segment production processes as
determinants of offshore activity.
216 Don P. Clark
11
See Helleiner (1973).
12
See Vernon (1974).
13
See Markusen (1995) and Helleiner & Lavergne (1979).
Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 217
14
See Grunwald & Flamm (1985: 240).
15
Foreign tariffs and non-tariff measures also influence the location of production. These
data are unavailable on a disaggregated basis for the countries included in the present
study.
218 Don P. Clark
16
See Grunwald & Flamm (1985: 34– 37) for a discussion of this issue and other important
exclusions from OAP data.
17
A likelihood ratio test is used to compare random effects models with a model that does not
include random effects. We reject the null hypothesis that random effects do not contribute to
the model at all standard levels of significance. Fixed effect probit and tobit models are not
readily available.
18
Factors that influence the availability to search for a partner and establish relationship-
specific investments in an environment of incomplete contracts influence the success of out-
sourcing. See Grossman & Helpman (2005).
19
The black market premium exchange rate measures the deviation of the black market
exchange rate from the official rate. A negative coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis
that greater exchange rate distortion reduces the likelihood of vertical specialization.
Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 219
Tobit models
Note: Entries are marginal effects coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include
industry-level random effects. r is the share of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained
by the random effects.
a
Significant at the 1% level (two-tail test).
b
Significant at the 5% level.
220 Don P. Clark
20
Perhaps our tax measure reflects the ability of a foreign country to support the infrastructure
necessary to attract and sustain offshore assembly.
Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 221
21
Swenson’s (2004) study of OAP determinants found the OAP import share was positively
related to a country’s production costs and negatively related to competitor costs. Negative
relationships were established between the OAP share and GDP, per capita GDP, and
distance.
22
The Barro & Lee (1994) index of political rights varies from 1 to 7, with ‘1’ indicating ‘most
free.’ A negative coefficient is expected for this variable because we hypothesize that greater
political rights will raise the likelihood of vertical specialization-based trade.
222 Don P. Clark
Conclusions
This paper investigates country and industry-level determinants of vertical
specialization-based trade. Industries that engage in this pattern of
production and trade are identified through their use of offshore assembly
provisions in the US tariff code. Findings explain why industries engage
in vertical specialization-based trade and shed light on factors that enter
production location decisions.
US industries engage in vertical specialization-based trade to counter a
comparative disadvantage in home production by shifting simple assembly
operations to unskilled labor abundant countries. Other motives include pro-
ducing and exporting more R&D intensive components than would other-
wise be possible, gaining greater access to foreign markets, enjoying tariff
duty savings, and becoming more competitive with foreign producers who
sell in the US market.
Factors that enter production location decisions include labor force avail-
ability and quality, foreign market size, proximity to foreign countries, politi-
cal rights, degree of exchange rate distortion, and the trade policy orientation
of host countries. Industries that engage in vertical specialization-based trade
have relatively low wages, less pronounced scale economies, high tariffs and
non-tariff measures, relatively low ad valorem international transport costs,
differentiated and R&D intensive products, and have high levels of import
penetration at home.
Identifying factors that encourage vertical specialization-based production
and trade will enhance our understanding of industry strategy and how trade
patterns will evolve as the process of globalization continues. Globalization
will continue to force many industries to lower overall production costs by
shifting segments of the production process to locations where they can be
conducted more efficiently. This trend leads to the expectation that vertical
specialization-based trade will continue to grow relative to total trade.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Donald Bruce and two anonymous reviewers for
providing many helpful comments.
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Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 223
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Appendix
Data Definitions and Sources
Offshore Assembly Provision (OAP) imports, dutiable OAP imports, and
non-dutiable OAP import values pertain to 1992, and are taken from a US
Bureau of the Census (1995b) publication.
Figures on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Per Capita Gross Domestic
Product (PCGDP) pertain to 1992 and are taken from United Nations (1997).
Population DENSITY, expressed in people per square kilometer, and
HEALTH expenditures per capita are taken from a World Bank (2001) pub-
lication. DISTANCE, in kilometers, is from Fitzpatric & Modlin (1986).
These variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Following Stone &
Lee (1995), trade orientation (TO) is proxied by the residuals from a
regression of per capita merchandise trade (exports plus imports) on per
capita income and population. Data are from United Nations (1997). TAX
revenue as a percentage of GDP is from a World Bank (2001) publication.
The black market premium (BMP) exchange rate expresses the deviation of
the black market exchange rate from the official exchange rate. BMP rates,
taken from Barro & Lee (1994), are averaged over the 1985– 98 period.
The index of political rights (RIGHTS) is from Barro & Lee (1994). This
index varies from 1– 7, with ‘1’ indicating most free.
The average wage (WAGE) is total employee compensation per worker.
Minimum efficient scale (MES), our scale economy measure, is defined as
average sales per firm for firms in the midpoint class size (defined by
product shipments) as a percentage of shipment values. These figures
pertain to 1992 and are from the US Bureau of the Census (1995a). The
advertising-to-sales ratio (AS) pertains to 1987 and is calculated from a US
Department of Commerce (1994) publication. R&D expenditures as a per-
centage of sales (R&D) in 1992 is taken from a National Science Foundation
(1993) publication. These figures are available only at the 2 and 3-digit SIC
level.
Ad valorem tariff rates (TARIFF) are from the US Bureau of the Census
(1993). The non-tariff measure trade coverage ratio (NTM) expresses the
share of imports (by value) subject to one or more non-tariff measures.
Non-tariff measures include para-tariff measures (such as tariff-rate
quotas), import licensing schemes, antidumping duty actions, price actions,
import quotas and voluntary export restraint agreements. NTM trade cover-
age ratios pertain to 1992, and are from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database on Trade Control Measures.
Ad valorem international transport charges (TRANS), and the total value
of US imports are from the US Bureau of the Census (1993). Import PEN-
ETRATION expresses the 1992 total value of imports as a share of total
Country and Industry-Level Determinants of Vertical Specialization 225
Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
OAP Share 2.558 13.055 0.000 100.000
Dutiable OAP Share 1.279 6.954 0.000 100.000
Non-dutiable OAP share 1.278 7.896 0.000 93.811
PCGDP 8.787 1.416 5.370 10.450
HEALTH 4.987 1.024 2.054 6.763
DENSITY 4.688 1.107 2.398 6.778
DISTANCE 8.636 1.259 2.302 9.676
GDP 11.772 1.683 7.392 15.130
TO 0.007 0.524 21.506 1.325
TAX 41.421 101.515 10.000 960.000
BMP 0.186 0.531 0.000 3.731
RIGHTS 2.602 1.692 1.000 6.500
WAGE 33024.230 9887.152 14092.000 65036.000
MES 0.027 0.075 0.000 1.000
AS 1.886 1.759 0.000 15.000
R&D 2.304 2.580 0.500 13.800
TARIFF 4.454 5.611 0.000 153.800
NTM 6.681 23.137 0.000 100.000
TRANS 8.273 11.787 0.000 498.9
PENETRATION 9.144 12.019 0.000 91.123