Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Troubling Solidarity
Troubling Solidarity
Digitalized Time
Abstract: Racist hate crimes have increased in Sweden since 2006 when
reports started, but they have also been followed by a variety of protests.
This article analyzes the so-called #HijabUppropet (#HijabOutcry), a call
initiated by Muslim feminist activists in response to a racist attack on a
Muslim woman, which encouraged all “sisters” in Sweden to temporarily
veil themselves in solidarity. The hijab outcry was widely heard and both
celebrated and debated. Drawing on postcolonial feminist theory, this ar-
ticle shows how the initial protest against racism was partly reduced to
a matter of being for or against the veil and the right to choose. Despite
intentions to normalize the veil, the flow of comments and pictures on
social media turned veils into examples of odd, exotic, and beautiful el-
ements that enrich Swedish culture. The white secular subject was again
reinstalled as the ideal and it seemed as though Muslim women could not
pass as agents of Swedish feminist solidarity. Yet, at the same time, the
debate in the aftermath of the hijab outcry had the effect of initiating an
uneasy feeling of not belonging among white non-Muslim participators.
This was a feeling that might affect future acts of solidarity—confronting
a Swedish context of secular pride and whiteness—where Muslim women
must struggle to be recognized as political subjects. Keywords: solidarity,
the veil, whiteness, secularism, Swedishness, feminist politics
For decades, right-wing populist parties have been flourishing and chang-
ing the political landscape throughout Europe. While initially Sweden
seemed excluded from this process, it is becoming increasingly clear that
the debate on Muslim immigration, Islam, and terrorism has moved to the
WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 46: 3 & 4 (Fall/Winter 2018) © 2018 by Linda Berg and Maria Carbin.
All rights reserved.
120
Troubling Solidarity 121
center of Swedish political discourse. With a political party with Nazi roots
currently in parliament, Sweden is proving to be no exception. Like else-
where in Europe, racist hate crimes against ethnic minorities in general,
and against Jews and Muslims in particular, have increased, causing the
United Nations Human Rights Council to criticize the Swedish govern-
ment for not taking action against the violence.
In 2013 as a response to a racist attack against a veiled woman in a sub-
urban Stockholm parking lot, the so-called hijab outcry (#Hijabupprop-
et) started. On August 18, 2013, Muslim feminist activists and journalists
Bilan Osman, Fatima Doubakil, Foujan Rouzbeh, Nabila Abdul Fattah,
and Nachla Libre urged all women—in the largest evening paper, Afton-
bladet, as well as published in social media—to jointly show their solidar-
ity with Muslim women:
The aim was to raise awareness of the types of abuse that Muslim women
face due to their religious identity. The call was announced both in one of
the largest national newspapers and on social media and spread rapidly.
Individual women (and men) uploaded pictures of themselves wearing a
veil2 on Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter, and some also participated by
wearing a hijab on the streets. The hijab outcry received wide attention
both nationally and internationally and was both celebrated and debated.
Some claimed that the initiative had been appropriated by white, secular
feminists, while others raised critical concerns about the hijab being a sign
of women’s oppression. The hijab outcry can be seen as part of a wider
array of transnational online activism, and is most closely linked with the
#MuslimahPride campaign launched earlier in 2013 by a British activist in
the United Kingdom.
In this article, we take a closer look at the hijab outcry, trying to unpack
challenges within contemporary feminist expressions of solidarity. How
did sympathy and solidarity play out in this wide-reaching and celebrat-
ed protest? What happens when white secular women veil themselves? In
what ways can particularly privileged subjects act in this context? What are
122 Linda Berg and Maria Carbin
This article is based on digital material from the hijab outcry campaign,
such as the flow of comments on social media, including Twitter, Insta-
gram, and Facebook, as well as newspaper articles. The hijab outcry was
a protest that manifested both on- and offline and we have followed it by
way of hashtag ethnography (Bonilla and Rosa 2015). Contemporary dig-
itization offers new forms and strategies for political mobilization, forms
where the self can be quickly represented, both as a powerful individual
voice and as part of a collective. It is unclear what the political effects of
such rapid movements will be. As Shefali Chandra and Saadia Toor have
pointed out, there is a “widening split between the intention and the effect
of solidarities” (2014, 16), and we thus intend to analyze both the inten-
tions and the effects of these protests.
When analyzing the hijab outcry, we draw on a postcolonial perspec-
tive that problematizes representations of a “we” in solidarity campaigns
and protests speaking for the Other, as laid out by Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak (1988). We also problematize the protest with the help of Sara
Ahmed’s work (2004a; 2004b) on how emotions circulate, and how the
feelings of doing good and doing right participate in constituting a fem-
inist community as anti-racist. In addition to a feminist postcolonial
perspective, our analytical approach also draws upon theories regarding
whiteness, secularism, and politics, with an emphasis on the particulari-
ties of the Swedish context, but nevertheless with relevance to a broader
geopolitical sphere. Our analysis is related to a very broad field of research
on gender, religion/secularism, and (anti-)racism in different European
countries (see Eze 1997; Goldberg 2008; Lentin 2004; Lentin and Titley
2011; El-Tayeb 2011; Wekker 2016), with a focus on the colorblindness
that is perpetuated throughout Europe. More specifically, we highlight a
myth of secularism that depends on monoreligious and monoracial pop-
ulations and the idea that the Other is “presecular” and “prehumanist” ac-
cording to Fatima El-Tayeb (2011).
Troubling Solidarity 123
The original call was primarily an appeal to “sisters,” for Muslim women,
where the position of woman was regarded as a platform for solidarity. Or,
rather, it was the “veil” that became the common symbol that everyone
participating could identify with: against discrimination, and for a femi-
nist community across borders.
The established media, however, started up by focusing the debate
around being for or against the veil, even though the initiators of the hijab
outcry were not interested in that discussion. In this debate, veils were
Troubling Solidarity 125
Here, the participant clearly states that this is a common cause, “our com-
mon cause.” The individual thus became subordinated to the collective
manifestation. The message is that we are all part of society and we can all
take a stand and defend the values we believe in. This political action, al-
beit an individual posting on Instagram, aimed to include Muslim women
in a broader we, and thus it can be seen as constituting a collective ac-
tion as well. But it is also an erasure of the specificity of Muslim women’s
vulnerabilities.
When analyzing the flood of pictures on social media featuring party
leaders and other famous white, non-Muslim women, it seems as though,
paradoxically, the protest had rather the opposite effect. The veil did not
become normalized as part of Swedishness, it was rather constructed as a
homogeneous object, as something with a fixed and unitary meaning, and,
above all, the veil symbolized deviance. Instead of deconstructing Swed-
ishness, the protests seemed to have the effect of reducing the veil to a
marker of that which is “not Swedish,” as will be discussed in the following.
Veiling is generally defined as a token of otherness, something that is not
a natural part of the modern Western state. Another way would be to see
how Muslim communities invent solutions to be able to participate in a
European society (Berg and Lundahl 2016, 275).
The group of Muslim feminists who started the initiative, however,
contributed in ways that deconstructed the meaning of the veil. They were
presented in the media as Muslim veiled women; however, not all of them
regularly wore the veil. A certain ambivalence and uneasiness could be seen
in the television studios when the journalists assumed (because of names
and looks) that these were “the victims/the women with veils” when they
instead insisted that the hijab outcry was an act of solidarity. Thus, they ap-
peared with veils in solidarity but instead they were read simply as Muslim
women. One of the activists even had to explain to the reporter that not
all of the initators wear the veil in their everyday life (Nyhetsmorgon/Tv4
Morning News 2013). This also shows that in the Swedish imaginary of
white solidarity movements, non-white women are less likely to be seen
as performing solidarity. Instead, Muslim women and non-white women
Troubling Solidarity 127
Right to Engage
The problems with this type of act of solidarity and with white, secular
women representing others were discussed during and after the campaign.
Sara Yazdanfar, who is active in the Social Democratic youth section, was
critical of the hijab outcry and wrote under the title “you should focus on
anti-racism, not selfies”:
To take on a veil for a few hours will not reform the system—not as long
as we do not see our own role. The veil became cosmetic. One way to
make oneself a subject, rather than focusing on the interaction of hate
crimes, racism, and sexism. (2013)
Yazdanfar also believes that the original petition was taken over by white,
middle-class women posing to win identity-politics credibility. Through
these actions, Muslim women became exoticized, while many of the pro-
testers seemed unaware of their own privilege. Critics highlighted the par-
adox, that the protest was not much more than an egocentric posing, a
minimal effort.
The criticism did not stand unchallenged. Another position was the
voice of the white debaters, announcing their right to speak up. Under the
headline “Shut up, you’re white,” on August 21, the editor of the leading
national newspaper, Dagens Nyheter (Daily News) asked rhetorically what
“buzz words” like exoticizing and racialization really mean. He wrote:
Here the white, middle-class editor defended both the right to protest
and the right to define the political content, i.e., the meaning and effects
128 Linda Berg and Maria Carbin
of racism. Also, one could read this comment as a defense of the white
subject’s right to feel good about herself/himself. The basic assumption
here was also that the larger the community is, the better it is. The more
the merrier, defining a huge “we” against something that can rather easily
be identified. Everyone can be part of this we, if they just become enlight-
ened. Drawing on Sara Ahmed, we can see how this response enables a
pride in white liberal solidarity, “we live for this . . .” It thus becomes a “way
of ‘re-turning’ to the white subject”, as Ahmed describes it (2004a, 33).
Tribute Multiculturalism
“Why not develop a certain degree of rage against the history that has
written such an abject script for you that you are silenced?” Then you
begin to investigate what it is that silences you, rather than take this very
deterministic position—since my skin color is this, since my sex is this,
I cannot speak. . . . I say that you have to take a certain risk: to say “I
won’t criticize” is salving your conscience, and allowing you not to do
any homework. On the other hand, if you criticize having earned the
right to do so, then you are indeed taking a risk and you will probably
be made welcome, and can hope to judged with respect. (1988, 62–63)
Instead of seeking to explore these issues, the answers seem all too
often to fall into a defensive position concerning the right to speak.
Meanings of Solidarity
which almost any cause can become global through the proliferation of
likes and retweets (Chandra and Toor 2014).
Thus, solidarity today is more popular than ever and yet, at the same
time, as a practice, it has become fragile in the face of a growing global,
liberal discourse of rights and in the absence of a strong internationalist
left-wing politics. In these neoliberal times, when individualism is praised
and collectivity becomes questioned, solidarity is up for negotiation; it is
a battleground for political and ideological struggle (Chandra and Toor
2014). In line with U.S. philosopher Richard Rorty, we argue that solidar-
ity should not be interpreted as a common core of all human beings; if
anything, it means to distinguish, to mark out the differences and enclose
them within a broader definition of a “we” (1989). The hijab outcry es-
tablished this broader “we” in the description of a transcultural (feminist)
sisterhood, linked with emotion and insight as “sisters” to take a stand for
all Muslim women. This “we” was constituted partly by articulating the
opponents as hateful “white, Swedish men” and partly by fascism, both
in Sweden and around Europe, and constructing the vulnerable “Muslim
women” in need of support.
take a stance. As one participant tweeted during the campaign: “If today is
the day, one should . . .” and another tweeted a statement saying:
The interpellation is strong when when your social media feed is filled with
friends who pose wearing a veil. Thus, anyone who does not show her face
framed by a headscarf on this particular day could be accused of not caring,
of being intolerant or even racist. So, in a sense, the requirement to speak
makes the campaign also about the fear of being exposed as Islamophobic.
Certainly, there were many participants in the hijab outcry who could
be classified as tourists in other people’s feelings, and it is easy to dismiss
them as “low-cost” activists, since many did no more than change their
profile picture on Facebook. White women, who usually do not wear a
headscarf, who pose with a veil while winning identity-politics points at-
tract particular criticism, guilt, and irritation. A risk of this reasoning is
obviously to get stuck in an unproductive circle around “white guilt.” As
Ahmed asks: “But what does declaring one’s bad feeling do?” In allowing
oneself, or the nation, to feel bad, shame also allows the nation to feel bet-
ter or even to feel good as Ahmed describes it (2004a, 21). Thus, shame or
bad feelings are transformed into pride. “Declarations of shame can work
to re-install the very ideals they seek to contest” and in this way, according
to Ahmed, the white subject is once again positioned as the ideal (27).
We would nevertheless like to try to consider whether this temporary
manifestation challenged or repoliticized solidarity, by interrogating the
effects of the protest in a particular white Swedish context and discussing
the pride and guilt involved. Expressions of guilt can also be seen as fric-
tion against secularism, the uncomfortable insights for people who incor-
porate hegemonic norms, which can have violent effects.
this has had a racial dimension, where the upper- and middle classes have
been, and still mainly consist of, white Christian or secular citizens who
have been considered the agents of solidarity. Being white forms the cen-
tral core of Swedishness, and ideas about a specific Swedish look affect
whiteness as a crucial component in a more general shared image of na-
tional belonging (Sawyer 2000; Mattsson and Pettersson 2007).
From a postcolonial perspective, one of the obvious problematic parts
of the hijab outcry is how the participants created a feminist community,
a unity, a sense of belonging. The sense of belonging was partly articulated
through a liberal discourse in which the unity has to do with “the right to
choose.” Here, the differences in terms of religion, skin color, and other
signifiers of Swedishness, and ways in which some bodies are excluded,
are not considered. What is striking is that whiteness and skin color are
neglected on one level. Here, one has to remember the narrow conceptu-
alization of whiteness in a Swedish context, where those who do not live
up to the norm of being blond, blue-eyed, and very pale are at risk of not
passing as white, and thus are not “real” Swedes.
This campaign thus clearly highlights the risks of intersectional femi-
nism and the dream that differences can be overcome and everyone can
join in a common project of solidarity (Carbin and Edenheim 2013).
When the issue at stake is reduced to the veil or reduced to the right to
choose, the underlying, and maybe most significant problem, namely rac-
ism, is obscured. Racial thinking was normal when most of the thinking
that we proudly see as defining Western subjects—modernity, secularity,
democracy, human rights—was articulated. And even though Sweden,
like France, has been one of the nations most proud to erase references
to race, this does not free the dominant culture from this heritage of the
Enlightenment (Eze 1997). The non-Muslim, white women in the cam-
paign did not discuss the issue of cultural appropriation, and seemed to be
confident that they were “doing good.”
At the same time, the hijab outcry and the following debates are multi-
farious. In this particular protest, both national and transnational networks
were associated with complex translocal articulations. The hijab outcry has
clear links to both local and translocal events, which, among other things,
constituted a source of inspiration for a similar petition, #WISH, Women
in Solidarity of Hijabis, in Australia a year later. What happened in this
feminist protest and call for solidarity was that the very space for talking,
the public room—usually marked by whiteness and secularism—became
Troubling Solidarity 133
Linda Berg and Maria Carbin work as senior lecturers at Umeå Centre for Gender Stud-
ies, Umeå University, Sweden. They research and teach within the fields of feminism,
anti-racism, and postcolonial studies, and can be reached at linda.berg@umu.se,
maria.carbin@umu.se.
Notes
1. Almost all quotations from social media and established press are in Swedish
translated by the authors of this article.
2. The word veil in the singular was used by the initiators of the protest and is
used by the authors of the article, while acknowledging that there are numer-
ous names for different forms of clothing covering the face, hair, body, etc.
Works Cited