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    10 views7 pages

    Challenging Codes - 1

    Uploaded by

    Silvia Spolaor

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    CAMBIRND GE CULTURAL SiOlciAL s} SaI RS eehiers ey Aloenrie Una o1Crtomie ee /neete ia tener Sisto), Ubswersty el Albers, Sette Uren yr owiNtene ort. oie ‘ltr Nsiveris 2m tals ~ hfs mAREr seo price tut ot cartel moments ‘gensettonat cotter actions ihe erpatemcatt ‘has seminal lesa encierciae meyfreiition! acim ent autiure) Frecietionis 2), an rosso revert aay qieneiorma furl [psec eecnerrarcrs esta ctor (genettom ane Sartell connote (rose Se ate reat, redler] IsouRSeM Cy All Same] SALES st Be Ae ea eo vise arsetere erases fr elise aates mtn eee Rensiormer| inte nection: AND Towels Hoole clas Mavis haces em Stars Sees, Chetan Casts, Alberta Malwa prowices a rrmaIeeTAl pracentestan ie fae keto erase to ts uy eerceny aoa ewe a ee ERTS Omen lf anton re, lca eres ar agian fo oailacttraaton thet pleas tay 2ré-cratana eR cents Sage, The apace fs vcd tole the comtmsmeny hare staeay ems ot cotarpareny WETS! Challenging . codes Collective aeuen in the information age Sapno9 Guibuayeys | e272N The construction of collective action Tra When talking of social movements and collective ation, one is usually referring to empirical phenomena with a certain degree of external unity Movements are often described in terms similar to those used in address- ing personalities or personages in tragic theatre, characters with a distinct and coherent role, Yet what in fact is in question are heterogeneous and fragmented phenomena, which internally contain a multitude of differen- tiated meanings, forms of action, and modes of organization, und which often consume a large part oftheir energies in the elfort to bind such differ- ences together, Movements, characteristically, must devote a considerable share of their resources to the task of managing the complexity and differentiation that constitutes them, ILis, furthermore, customary 10 refer to movements as the effects of & particular historical situation, or as an outcome of a particular conjunc ture (such as an economic crisis or contradictions within the system). In doing so, however, one ignores the motives for, and the meaning and com: ponents of, collective action, by assuming that the ways in which such action comes into being and persists over time are irrelevant when com- pared to the interplay of ‘structural’ variables. These manners of consider- ing social movements as either historical characters or results of structural determinants are not just commonplace notions of everyday discourse; they also stamp many of the current analyses of contemporary collective action, ‘They indeed demonstrate how wide the gup still is that separates the established linguistic convention, or the political interest that issues in the talk of “social movements’, from the possibility of giving an adequate theo- retical basis to the analysis of collective action. Too often, a movement is sMill portrayed us the incarnation of an essence or the secondary ellect of | | } | 14 Thooty of collective action the ‘tendential laws’ of a structure. The collective action of a movement is thus always related to something other than itself; properly speaking, it does not even exist It is important to react against such theoretical liquidation of an object so salient in daily discourse and theoretical debate, and with so crucial a role in contemporary social processes. Beyond linguistic convention, only a theory of collective action can provide a meaningful basis for analysis of social movements. A discipline that sets out to study social movements can accomplish its task meaningfully only if itstarts out from a theory that can account for the specificity and autonomy of sovial action, and can give & foundation to its collective character as something different from the sum total of aggregate individual behaviours, Up until the 1960s, thove interested in these issues inthe sociological field Grew, directly or indirectly, either on Marxist theory or on the sociology of collective behaviour. One has not much to say ubout the former, for [ believe that, strictly speaking, there exists no specifically Marxist branch of analy- sis of social movements today in the proper sense of the term, only studies (sometimes very accurate) of the crisis of the capitalist mode of production and of its transformations. Marxism has provided a theoretical framework for the historical analysis of class action, but its explicit contribution to the theory of social movements has been poor, indirect, or frankly derivative (see Calhoun 1982; Pakulski 1995), On the other side, one finds the schol- ars who in the 1960s ventured to examine collective behaviour within the functionalist and interactionist traditions, the most influential among them, being Smelser and Turner (Smelser 1962, 1968: Turner 1969; see also ‘Turner and Killian 1987). Even though many differences divide and some- times oppose to each other the functionalist and the interactionist per- spectives, they both rely on a theory of shared beliefs, applied to various Kinds of collective behaviour ranging from panic to revolution. The great spectrum of behavioural phenomena drawn to these analyses likewise dis- solves the object ‘social movements’; it now becomes a particular case of generalized belief, a specific way of restructuring the field of collective nor. ‘mative patterns, When norms or shared values are threatened by some form ‘of imbalance or erisis, the response through which an attempt is made to reestablish social order is centred around a common belief which, while often fictitious, mobilizes collective energies. In the legacy of these intellectual traditions, 1wo ingenuous epistemo- Jogical assumptions stil persist that have left their mark on the study of col- lective phenomena. The first one is the supposition that factual unity of the phenomenon, as perceived or believed to be there by the observer, actually exists. The proximity in space and time of concomitant forms of individual ‘The consteu ion of collective action 15 and group behaviour is clevated from the phenomenological to the con- ‘eptual level and thus granted ontological weight and qualitative homo- geneity; collective reality, as it were, exists as a unified thing. A second assumption now enters into the process of reification: the collective dimen sion of social behaviour is taken as a given, us a datum obvious enough to require no further analysis. How people actually manage acting together and becoming « “we' evades the problematic as itis taken for granted. However, in contemporary societies affected by accelerated change and permanently on the brink of a catastrophe, it has in the meantime become evident that social processes are products of aetions, choices, and decisions. Collective action is not the result of natural forces or of the iron laws of history: but no more s it the product of the beliefs and representations held by the actors On the one hand, research traditions have located the roots of all conflicts in the social fabric (in the economic structure in particular) and explained them in terms of an historical necessity of some sort. The ‘most significant example of this tendency is given to us in the dilemma that, at least since the Second International, has divided Marxist scholarship: is class action born out of voluntarist orientation, emerging spontaneously from the condition of the proletariat, or is it a necessary elfect of the contradictions of a capitalist production system marked by fate for a col- lapse? This question has remained unresolved in the Marxist traditions, and the fact bespeaks all the difficulties that arise when collective action is taken to be a phenomenon without its own autonomy from ‘structural determinants’. Various attempts have been made to bridge this gulf between the contradictions of the capitalist system and class action, some. times by emphasizing the determinism of structural laws, al others by stressing the voluntarism of mobilization. This dualistic legacy is still alive incurrent debates on the relationship between structure and agency (Sewell 1992; Berejikian 1992) (On the other hand stand those who seck to explain collective behaviour in terms of the beliefs held by actors, such as are manifest, for example, in common objectives or shared values. Actors, it is claimed, respond to certain dysfunctions of the social system by creating a collective set of representations which fuel action, Iu this ease, to0, the problem of how the collective subject of action comes about and persists in time is let unre- solved. The actors’ own beliefs will not provide a sufficient ground for an ‘account of their actions, for such beliefs always depend on the broader rela- tions in which the actors are involved. Analysis cannot simply identify action with that which the actors report about themselves, without taking into aecount the system of relationships in which goals, values, frames, and iscourses are produced. 16 Theory of collective action Thus, explanations based on the common structural condition of aetors lake for granted the actors’ ability to pereeive, evaluate, and decide what they have in common. That is such explanations ignore the processes which enable aetors 10 define ‘situation’ as field of shared aetion. On the other hhand, actors’ motives, beliefs discourses and individual differences again are never enough to provide an explanation of how certain individuals or groups recognize each other and become part of a“we' Between these two poles of the dualism bequeathed to us by research tradition there stretches an open, still unexplored theoretical space: it con- werns the ways in which actors consiruet their action, During the last ‘wenty-tive years, to be sure, some progress has been made towards resoly- ing the evident impasse created by the dualistic tradition. European authors on one hand have contributed to a better understanding of the process through which collective action is formed in highly differentiated or postindustrial ~ systems (Touraine 1977, 1981, 1985; Habermas 1984, 1987, 1990; Giddens 1984, 1987, 1990), American proponents of the Resouree Mobilization Theory, on the other, have provided a framework for the analysis of the actual mobilization process ((available resources, entrepreneurs, opportunity structures) (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Zald and McCarthy 1979. 1987; for a review, Jenkins 1983), Other authors have extended in original ways this paradigm (Oberschall 1973: Gamson 1990; Gamson, Fireman and Rytina 1982; Tilly 1978: McAdam 1982: Klundermans 1984; Tarrow 1989). In my previous work I have tried to bridge these approuches by stressing the constructive dimension of collec- tive action (Melucci 1980, 1984, 1988, 1989) and other authors have increasingly supported the necessity of reducing the gap between European ‘and American tradition (Cohen 1985; Tarrow 1988b; Klandermans, Kei and Turrow 1988; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Gamson 1992a), More recent contributions are building on these advances and are explicitly addressing the processes through which actors give meuning to their aetion (Klandermans 19894, 1992; Tarrow 1992, 1994; Morris and Mueller 1992; Mueller 1992, Laran, Johnston and Gusfield 1994, Johnston and Klandermans 1995). Today we are in a better position to build 2 new framework for the analysis of collective action by both acknowledging the legacy of the past and overcoming its deficiencies, Collective action as a construct Should we want to draw up @ balance sheet summing up the contribution of elassical und recent sociology to the study of social movements and col- lective action, one can point out a number of fundamental insights whieh The construction of collective action 17 constitute ini ispensable points of reference for the ongoing debate on, and theoretical analysis of, collective aetion. The tradition of Marxism has taught us that collective action cannot be analysed without addressing its relationship 10 a “structural” (or, better, “structured’) field of relationships which provides resources und constraints for the action itself: Moreover, it hs persuasively demonstrated the impor. tanee of social conflicts and the fact that some of them are of an antago- nist nature. It is within this legacy that recent European contributions (Touraine 1988a, 1994a; Habermas 1989, 1990; Giddens 1990, 1991) have tried to understand the changes that modern, postindustrial systems are undergoing today. Within the classic funetionalist approach, Merton's well-known distine tion between deviance and nonconformism goes beyond the limited and sometimes ideological perspective from which Parsons examines social confliets. This distinetion with whose terminology one may or may not agree — raises a crucial problem for analysis of social movements. It rejects any reduction of collective action to the status of a mere symptom of the

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