EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 4 – EH 403
TORREGOSA
1. People v. Resabal 50 Phil. 780 (1927)
Doctrine: A witness which was an accused but was
subsequently excluded from the information filed may be a
witness for the prosecution especially in the absence of proof
showing his interest in testifying against the other accused.
Keywords: Bintana
Caveat: Super old case. Straight to the point case and the
facts of what happened during trial are either missing or
jumbled up. Emphasized impt parts related to discussion
Facts:
Evidence shows that Primo Ordiz died at his home in Maasin,
Leyte, from the effects of internal bleeding caused by a sharp
wound in his left lung. RTC found accused Resabal guilty of
murder with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring
amongst themselves and acting in common agreement and
taking advantage of nocturnity, mutually aiding each other,
opened the window and killed Primo Ordiz by shooting with
a .38 caliber revolver, inflicting a wound in the upper part of
the left nipple, which produced the instant death of said
Primo Ordiz.
Defense argues that the trial court should have ignored
Glicerio Orit’s testimony. According to Orit, the accused,
armed with a revolver, invited him to the victim’s house to
kill Ordiz. Upon reaching the house, Resabal opened the
window of the house and looked inside. And at that moment
when he left the place, he heard an explosion. His testimony
of hearing an explosion was corroborated by Jose Ordiz,
nephew of the deceased.
Further, the defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible
witness, because of his having been excluded from the
information to be used as a witness for the prosecution; and,
because, moreover, of the contradiction in his testimony at
the preliminary investigation and during the trial.
Issue: Whether or not Orit’s testimony should be
discredited?
Ruling: No, it should not.
The mere fact that the witness was an accused, which was
excluded from the information in order to be used as a
witness for the prosecution, does not prevent him from
telling the truth, especially in the absence of proof showing
his interest in testifying against the appellant.
The apparent contradiction between the testimony given by
the witness in the Court of First Instance and that given in
the justice of the peace court, is not sufficient to discredit it,
if he was not given ample opportunity to explain it in the
Court of First Instance. The mere presentation of the
document containing said declaration made in the justice of
the peace court is not sufficient; it must be read to him in
order that he may explain the discrepancies noted.
Accused Resabal is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ATTY.
2. People vs. Cortezano G.R. No.140732, 29
January 2002
Keyword: banca; flashlight; fetch fresh water
Doctrine(s):
• We have uniformly held that previous extrajudicial
statements cannot be employed to impeach the
credibility of a witness unless his attention is first
directed to the discrepancies, and he must then be
given an opportunity to explain them. It is only
when the witness cannot give a reasonable
explanation that he shall be deemed impeached.
• delay in reporting the ante mortem declaration does
not necessarily affect, much less impair the
credibility of the witness. it is equally established
that an antemortem statement or a dying
declaration is evidence of the highest order and is
entitled to the utmost credence because no person
who knows of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation. At the brink of death,
all thoughts of concocting lies are banished.
• The law dictates that the requirement of time and
place must be stringently complied with.
Facts:
At 7:00 in the evening of May 30, 1998, when the victim,
Roderick Valentin, and his younger brother, Jerny, were on
their way to fetch fresh water from a well in Daligan,
Bonawon on board a banca. Then, a flashlight beam
originating from some point along the shore fell on Roderick
and a gunshot rang out. The bullet hit Roderick in the chest.
Within seconds, the light shifted and focused on Jerny.
Another shot was fired, but it missed him.
The gunman extinguished his light and approached the
banca. Jerny, recovering from the shock of the unexpected
attack, got hold of his flashlight and beamed it on the
approaching shooter. From a distance of about six (6)
meters, both Jerny and the wounded Roderick immediately
recognized accused-appellant Job Cortezano. Despite the
shock and pain, Roderick asked Cortezano why he had shot
him (Roderick). Alarmed that he had been recognized and
identified, Cortezano hurriedly left the scene. Jerny then
started paddling the banca towards the direction of their
house to get help for Roderick.
Jimmy Valentin, father of Roderick and Jerny immediately
transferred Roderick to a rented motorized banca to bring
him to the nearest hospital. He died.
At the time of his death, Roderick was only 25 years old, the
eldest child and earning P200.00 daily wage as a fishpond
worker. The family was emotionally traumatized. These
events and circumstances were narrated by Jerny, Jimmy
and Tita Valentin on direct and cross-examination.
Jesus Alonzo, barangay captain, testifying for the
prosecution averred that the day after Roderick was shot,
Job Cortezanos father informed him that his son wanted to
surrender. Upon Alonzos questioning, Cortezano admitted
having shot Roderick with a gun which he turned over to a
certain Victor Pelicia, a CAFGU member from Siruma,
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Camarines Sur. Alonzo turned over Cortezano to the police
authorities at the PNP Tinambac Headquarters.
Another prosecution witness, PNP Investigator Crescencio
Arganda, testified that the crime was reported by Jimmy
Valentin and entered in the police blotter on May 31, 1998,
the day after the shooting. He also recorded therein the
surrender and detention of Cortezano.
The last witness for the prosecution was Dr. Salvador Betito,
Jr., who conducted the post-mortem examination of
Rodericks remains. His medico-legal autopsy report showed
that the bullet entered Rodericks back, piercing his chest,
then exiting 3 inches away from the right nipple. Rapid
internal and external hemorrhage secondary to the gunshot
wound was the reported cause of death. Judging from the
bullets trajectory and the location of the entrance and exit
wounds, Dr. Betito explained that the victims back was
turned to his assailant who was standing not too far to the
left and rear of the victim.
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimonies of
Job Cortezano himself, his father Hannibal Cortezano, and
that of Jovenal Agbones, an acquaintance.
Accused-appellant Cortezano denied that he shot Roderick,
alleging he was nowhere near the scene of the crime at the
time that it was supposed to have been committed. He
narrated that he was at the house of his parents in downtown
Daligan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, from 7:00 in the evening
of May 30, 1998 until 7:00 in the morning of the following
day.
He came from the fiesta celebration of their barangay and
was feeling inebriated, so he decided to sleep at his parents
house.
Accused-appellant Cortezano described Pelicia as a member
of the CAFGU who had the same build, height and
countenance as him. On the night the shooting took place,
Pelicia went to the Cortezanos house for a drinking session.
He brought with him, and even publicly displayed, a .38
caliber handgun. The following day, Cortezano stated, he
was threatened by Pelicia when the latter learned that
Cortezano was related to the Valentins.
Cortezano also denied having confessed to Barangay Captain
Jesus Alonzo that he was the one who shot Roderick. He
alleged that Alonzo came to the Cortezano residence upon
the request of accused appellants father. The elder
Cortezano had wanted his son to be escorted to the
Tinambac Police Station because they were afraid of Pelicias
threats.
However, on cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted
that he confessed to having shot Roderick, but only because
of Pelicias threats against him. He also described his relations
with the Valentin family prior to the incident as harmonious,
such that they had no reason to testify falsely against him.
Hannibal Cortezano, accused-appellants father, corroborated
his sons testimony. He narrated that in the late afternoon of
May 30, 1998, his son and a certain member of the CAFGU,
later identified as Pelicia, arrived at the Cortezano residence.
Pelicia wanted to take a bath, so his son gave him directions
ATTY. TORREGOSA
to the well where the local residents fetched fresh water.
Some thirty minutes later, Pelicia returned from the well.
Hannibal overheard Pelicia say to the accused, Even if that
person will be brought to the hospital, he will not survive.
Then Pelicia removed the gun tucked into the waistband of
his pants, and took out two (2) bullets from the chamber of
the gun. Pelicia dared the people around him to take the gun,
but they were all intimidated by his threatening stance.
Pelicia warned them not to say anything or something bad
would happen to them. He left Cortezanos house the
following day, May 31, 1998, at around 2:00 in the
afternoon.
Hannibal further denied that he facilitated his sons surrender
before Barangay Captain Alonzo, but admitted asking Alonzo
to accompany Job to the police headquarters at Tinambac
since he had been informed by police investigator Crescencio
Arganda that Job was the primary suspect. Jovenal Agbones
testified that at about 7:30 of that fateful evening, he was at
the Cortezano residence to attend the barangay fiesta
celebration. While there, he heard Pelicia remark that a
certain person would not survive even if he were brought to
the hospital.
The trial court convicted accused-appellant and lent much
weight to Jerny Valentins eyewitness account of the events
and his identification of Cortezano as the perpetrator. The
trial court held that Jerny Valentin, who was then 13 years
old, delivered a straightforward, unshaken and convincing
narrative of the incident about the shooting of his brother,
Roderick Valentin by accusedappellant. Secondly, Jernys
testimony was corroborated by the dying declaration of the
victim, Roderick that he was shot by Job Cortezano and that
he could not bear it anymore. Thus he knew of his impending
death. The trial court ruled that the declaration of Roderick
Valentin is a dying declaration and an exception to the
hearsay rule.
The trial court refused to give credence to accused-
appellants defense of alibi and denial, considering that he
was positively identified as the one who shot Roderick
Valentin. It found the attendance of the aggravating
circumstance of treachery and rejected accused-appellants
claim of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Accused-appellant assails the eyewitness testimony of Jerny
Valentin as being riddled with inconsistencies and
implausibilities. Firstly, he posits that it is contrary to normal
human behavior for a perpetrator to come near his victim
after shooting, when the natural instinct of a gunman would
be to flee and escape detection or identification. Secondly,
accused-appellant points out that while Jerny testified in
court that he recognized accused-appellant from the beam
of his flashlight, in his earlier sworn statement, Jerny averred
that he recognized accusedappellant when the latter ran
towards the forested area near the seashore. Considering
that it was dark and Jerny was about six meters away from
where the gunman stood, the solitary illumination from
Jernys flashlight could not have been sufficient for both Jerny
and Roderick to identify the gunman with utmost certainty.
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Issue:
(1) W/N the trial court erred in giving credence to the
identification of the accused by the prosecution witness
Jerny. Not.
(2) W/N the trial court in considering the dying declaration
of the deceased in the identification of the accused.
Not.
(3) W/N the trial court erred in not considering the alibi of
the accused. Not.
Ruling:
The Court does not agree and upholds the RTC’s ruling.
On the first issue, the accused assials the testimony of
Jerny as being riddled with inconsistencies since it is contrary
to normal human behavior to come near the victim after
shoot and should have fled. But the court said there is no
standard form of behavior among perpetrators of crimes. It
is not contrary to known human behavior to approach the
banca after shooting twice to ensure that the work is
accomplished.
The accused also points out that Jerny gave different account
of the events in the sworn statement casting doubt on the
veracity of his testimony in court. But the court said that it is
well established that inconsistencies between an open court
testimony and a sworn statement do not necessarily discredit
the witness since ex parte affidavits are seldom complete.
Also, it appears in the records that Jerny was never allowed
to explain the inconsistencies between her statement in the
court and her sworn statement. It is clear that while the
pertinent portion of his sworn statement was read to Jerny,
counsel for the defense failed to call his attention to the
alleged discrepancy in order to elicit a response from him.
Considering that the sworn statement was written in English,
a language that Jerny admittedly could not understand, a
cursory reading of that portion of the sworn statement
naturally failed to impress upon Jerny the fact that his
testimony differed from his extrajudicial statement.
Moreover, the defense counsel never asked him to explain
the inconsistency.
We have uniformly held that previous extrajudicial
statements cannot be employed to impeach the credibility of
a witness unless his attention is first directed to the
discrepancies, and he must then be given an opportunity to
explain them. It is only when the witness cannot give a
reasonable explanation that he shall be deemed impeached.
Besides, there may not even be a conflict at all. Jerny
testified that he focused the flashlight on accused-appellants
face and body, after which the latter ran away. In his sworn
statement, Jerny narrated that he saw accused-appellants
face while he was running towards the mangrove trees along
the seashore. These two accounts do not necessarily conflict,
but rather clarify further the chronology of events as
witnessed by Jerny. He focused the light on accused-
appellant, enabling him and Roderick to recognize the latter.
When accused-appellant fled, Jerny trained the flashlight on
accused-appellant, following his hasty flight towards the
mangrove trees. Contrary to accusedappellants postulation,
there is no inconsistency or discrepancy between Jernys
ATTY. TORREGOSA
testimony and sworn statement, at least none that would
negate his creditworthiness.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Jerny
who, at that time, was only thirteen (13) years old. It is the
trial court that has the primary opportunity to observe the
child-witness as he testifies and to weigh his apparent
possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his
understanding of the obligation of an oath. The honesty and
candor of Jerny is reflected in his testimony before the trial
court. Thus, his competence and credibility to testify were
properly considered by the trial court. Not only was Jerny a
reliable eyewitness; his testimony itself was straightforward
and worthy of credence.
On the second issue, the court said that delay in reporting
the ante mortem declaration does not necessarily affect,
much less impair the credibility of the witness. it is equally
established that an antemortem statement or a dying
declaration is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
the utmost credence because no person who knows of his
impending death would make a careless and false
accusation. At the brink of death, all thoughts of concocting
lies are banished.
The same declaration may even be considered as part of the
res gestae. Rodericks declaration was made spontaneously
after a startling occurrence; his statements were made
before he had time to contrive or devise; and his statement
concerned his attacker and the immediately attending
circumstances of the attack. Thus, the statements of
Roderick, uttered shortly after he was shot and hours before
his death identifying the accused-appellant as the gunman
qualifies both as a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae.
The trial court did not err in relying on Jimmys and Tita
Valentins testimonies concerning Rodericks dying
declaration. The trial court had the opportunity to observe
the said witnesses firsthand and to determine if they were
telling the truth or not. Even if it were said that the Valentins
are biased witnesses on account of their relationship with the
victim, in the absence of a showing of improper motive on
their part, their testimonies are not affected by the fact that
the victim was their son. It is a fundamental precept that
relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of
bias, or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the
credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness.
On the third issue, accused said he was sleeping at the
time the crime was committed. But the corroborating
witnesses both declared that he was very much awake and
was seen drinking with others before and after the crime
occurred. Furthermore, apart from saying that he was asleep
at that time, accused-appellant presented no other credible
evidence to prove that he was not at the locus delicti or scene
of the crime when it was committed and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the proximate
time of its commission. The law dictates that the requirement
of time and place must be stringently complied with.
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3. Bartolome v. IAC 183 SCRA 102 (1990)
KEYWORDS: Bad Ursula (the villain in Little Mermaid)
claims a lot that was not hers.
PRINCIPLE: An ancient document does not need another
evidence of its execution and authenticity provided that it is
more than 30 years old, presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof and that there are no alterations or
circumstances of suspicion.
FACTS:
Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two
children: Pedro and Catalina. Pedro died without issue while
Catalina married one surnamed Bartolome. Catalina bore 5
children: Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Ruperta and Resurreccion.
In 1912, Epitacio entrusted subject lot to his cousin, Doroteo
Bartolome, before leaving for Isabela. Maria stayed in the lot
before following Epitacio to Isabela where she allowed
Doroteo to continue taking charge of the property. Five years
after Epitacio died, Maria Gonzales and her grandchildren,
Calixto and Resurreccion, went back to Laoag. Calixto
constructed a bamboo fence around the lot and they cleaned
it.
Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the
land involved. Ursula Cid who is the widow of Bernabe, the
son of Doroteo Bartolome, filed an answer in Cadastral Case
no. 53, claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165. It was
allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance from
Doroteo Bartolome with an area of 1660 sqm.
Resurrecion also filed an answer in the same cadastral case
claiming ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an
area of 864 sqm. It was allegedly acquired by inheritance
from Epitacio and Maria Gonzales. From then on, no further
proceedings were held in the cadastral case.
In 1934, Resurrection verbally entrusted the portion she had
claimed to Maria Bartolome, whom she later described as
daughter of Doroteo Bartolome.
In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children migrated to Davao City
leaving the house on subject lot to a lessee. They instructed
Maria Bartolome to receive the rentals from the house.
Resurreccion was also given by Maria Bartolome a small
amount in consideration of the lease contract.
Maria Bartolome filed a motion to admit answer in
intervention alleging that she is one of the children of
Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had been
excluded in Ursula Cid’s answer to the petition. Ursula Cid
failed a motion to amend her answer to reflect the complete
ground or basis of acquisition. She alleged that she “acquired
such by inheritance from Bernabe Bartolome, who together
with her, purchased the… lot which used to be the three
adjoining lots from their respective owners.”
Ursula presented 3 deeds of sale:
1. Dated March 1, 1917, showing that Bernabe and Ursula
bought a 374 sqm lot for Php15 from Domingo Agustin and
Josefa Manrique
ATTY. TORREGOSA
2. Dated February 18, 1913, executed by Ignacia Manrique
in favor of Bernabe
3. Dated February 9, 1917, executed by Maria Gonzales y
Paguyo, ceding to Bernabe and Ursula 772 sum of land. This
is the land being claimed by Resurreccion.
RTC ruled against Ursula Cid in deciding that Exhibit 4 has
no probative value as it was incomplete and unsigned.
CA ruled in favor of Ursula Cid in deciding that the deeds of
sale presented are ancient documents under Sec 22, Rule
132 of ROC and that her continuous possession of the lot
from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership
vested her with the legal presumption that she possessed it
under a just title. SC set aside CA decision.
ISSUE: W/N deed of sale is an authentic document
RULING:
NO.
Exhibit 4 consists of 3 pcs of paper. First piece is a blank
sheet which serves as cover page. The two other pages
contain the handwritten document in Ilocano stating that in
consideration of the amount of 103.75, Maria Gonzales sold
subject lot to Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid comprising
of 772 sqm. The 3rd sheet contains a warranty against
eviction.
Sec 22, Rule 132 of ROC provides:
"SEC. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a
private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from
a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity
need be given."
The deed of sale presented meets the first 2 requirements it
appearing that it was executed in1917, making it more than
30 years old when it was offered for evidence in 1983. It was
presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an
heir of the person who would naturally keep it. However, CA
failed to consider and discuss the 3rd requirement that no
alteration or circumstances of suspicion are present.
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred
by alteration. However, the missing page has nonetheless
affected its authenticity. It allegedly bears the signature of
the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and
therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission
of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature,
the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete
document is akin to if not worse than a document
with altered contents.
Moreover, if it is really true that the document was executed
in 1917, Ursula Cid would have had it in her possession when
she filed her answer in Cadastral Case No. 53 in 1933.
Accordingly, she could have stated therein that she acquired
the portion in question by purchase from Maria Gonzales. But
as it turned out, she only claimed purchase as a mode of
acquisition of Lot No. 11165 after her sister-in-law, Maria J.
Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo Bartolome
sought intervention in the case.
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All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit
4 is an ancient document. Necessarily, proofs of its due
execution and authenticity are vital.
Under Section 21 of Rule 132, the due execution and
authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by
anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a
subscribing witness.
The testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and
Ursula Cid's sworn statement in 1937 (which declared that
Maria Gonzales sold subject lot to Bernabe and Ursula Cid)
do not fall within the purview of Section 21.
Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it would
substantially be infirm. Under Article 834 of the old Civil
Code, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving spouse, "shall be
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding
by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or
descendants who has not received any betterment." And,
until it had been ascertained by means of the liquidation of
the deceased spouse's estate that a portion of the conjugal
property remained after all the partnership obligations and
debts had been paid, the surviving spouse or her heirs could
not assert any claim of right or title in or to the community
property which was placed in the exclusive possession and
control of the husband as administrator thereof. Hence, in
the absence of proof that the estate of Epitacio Batara had
been duly settled, Maria Gonzales had no right to sell not
even a portion of the property subject of Exhibit 4.
4. Aznar v. Citibank 519 SCRA 287 (28 March 2007)
KEYWORDS: “BLACKLISTED CREDIT CARD”
FACTS:
Petitioner is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card
(Mastercard) with a credit limit of P150,000. He and his wife
planned to take their two grandchildren on an Asian tour so
he made a total advance deposit of P480,000 with Citibank
thereby increasing his credit limit to P635,000. He claims,
however, that when he presented his credit card in some
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the
same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same
in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia to purchase
plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason
that his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank. To add
to his humiliation, Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying
to use blacklisted cards.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for damages against
Citibank. To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card,
Petitioner presented a computer print-out, denominated as
ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature
of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card
in question was “DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the
limit.
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s
Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented
Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its
canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip. Citibank
ATTY. TORREGOSA
also contended that Aznar never had personal knowledge
that his credit card was blacklisted as he only presumed such
fact because his card was dishonored.
RTC:
Dismissed the complaint at first. Held that the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent had more
weight as their due execution and authenticity was duly
established. Upon MR, the decision was reversed. It was
ruled that the computer print-out was printed out by Nubi in
the ordinary or regular course of business and Nubi was not
able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be
reached by subpoena. The RTC took judicial notice of the
practice of ATMs and credit card facilities which readily print
out bank account status, therefore the print-out can be
received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of
petitioner’s credit card.
CA:
Granted Citibank’s appeal. Ruled that the computer print-out
is an electronic document which must be authenticated
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court by anyone who saw the document executed or written;
Petitioner, however, failed to prove its authenticity, thus it
must be excluded.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Aznar has established his claim
against Citibank.
2. Whether or not the “On-Line Authorization Report”
is an electronic document and properly
authenticated to be admitted as evidence.
RULING:
1. NO.
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the
plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance of
evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the burden
of proving it. In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he
claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused
its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore,
and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia. As
correctly found by the RTC, Aznar failed to prove with a
preponderance of evidence that Citibank blacklisted his
Mastercard or placed the same on the "hot list." Aznar in his
testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that
his Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and only
presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card. The
dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a
conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted, especially in
view of Aznar’s own admission that in other merchant
establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his
Mastercard was accepted and honored.
2. NO.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, such exhibit
cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due
execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a
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computer printout handed to petitioner by Ingtan Agency, to
prove that his credit card was dishonored for being
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words “DECL
OVERLIMIT”. The prevailing rule at the time of the
promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a)
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b)
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Petitioner, who testified on the
authenticity did not actually see the document executed or
written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who
handed to him said computer print-out. Even if examined
under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on
August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by petitioner in
this case, the authentication of the computer print-out would
still be found wanting.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any
private electronic document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
A. By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the
person purported to have signed the same;
B. By evidence that other appropriate security
procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme
Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or;
C. By other evidence showing its integrity and
reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c),
i.e., it constitutes the “other evidence showing integrity and
reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of the judge.” The
Court is not convinced. Petitioner’s testimony that the person
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-
out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same
cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s
integrity and reliability.
Petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he was able to
secure the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also failed
to show the specific business address of the source of the
computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency
was mentioned by petitioner, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information
reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said
information could be relied upon as true.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
5. Heirs of Arcilla v. Teodoro G.R. No. 182886, 11
August 2008
TOPIC: AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Keywords: Belated Filing of Verification and CNFS
Doctrine: Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court
basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the
official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly
refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule
comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could
have included the same.
Facts:
Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent) initially filed
with the RTC-Virac, Catanduanes an application for land
registration of two parcels located at Barangay San Pedro,
Virac, Catanduanes. She alleged that, with the exception of
the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased
the lots from her father Pacifico Arcilla by a Deed of Sale
dated December 9, 1966. Pacifico acquired the lots by
partition of the estate of his father, Jose evidenced by an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. There is also an Affidavit
of Quit-Claim in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein
petitioners the Heirs of Vicente , brother of Pacifico.
In their Opposition, petitioners contended that they
are the owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots including the
building and other improvements constructed thereon by
virtue of inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses
Vicente and Josefa Arcilla; contrary to the claim of
respondent, the lots in question were owned by their father,
Vicente, having purchased the same from a certain Manuel
Sarmiento sometime in 1917; Vicente's ownership is
evidenced by several tax declarations attached to the record;
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject lots since 1906. Petitioners moved
to dismiss the application of respondent and sought their
declaration as the true and absolute owners pro-indiviso of
the subject lots and the registration and issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title in their names.
Teodoro filed a Motion for Admission contending
that through oversight and inadvertence she failed to include
in her application, the verification and certificate against
forum shopping required by Supreme Court (SC) Revised
Circular No. 28-91 in relation to SC Administrative Circular
No. 04-94.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application on the
ground that respondent should have filed the certificate
against forum shopping simultaneously with the petition for
land registration which is a mandatory requirement of SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and that any violation of
the said Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the
application upon motion and after hearing; and that the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping were
notarized in the USA and that the same may not be deemed
admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure to
comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132.
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CA: The CA ruled that the belated filing of a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping was substantial
compliance.
Issues:
1. Whether the belated filing, after more than two
(2) years and three (3) months from the initial application for
land registration, of a sworn certification against forum
shopping in Respondent's application for land registration,
constituted substantial compliance with SC Admin. Circular
No. 04-94.
2. Whether the certification of non-forum shopping
subsequently submitted by respondent requires a
certification from an officer of the foreign service of the
Philippines as provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
The petition is bereft of merit.
1. The CA ruled correctly when it held that the belated
filing of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping
was substantial compliance with SC Administrative
Circular No. 04-94.
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum
shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in
a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are
not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these prescribed
ATTY. TORREGOSA
procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. However, it is equally settled that litigation is not
merely a game of technicalities. Rules of procedure should
be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even
the Rules of Court reflect this principle. Moreover, the
emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause free from the constraints of
technicalities.
The apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the
petition for land registration filed by respondent with the MTC
coupled with the showing that she had no intention to violate
the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who invited the
attention of the court to the inadvertence committed by her
counsel, should be deemed as special circumstances or
compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a dismissal
contemplated under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
is, as a rule, a dismissal without prejudice, and since there is
no showing that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to
dismiss respondent's petition for registration would entail a
tedious process of re-filing the petition, requiring the parties
to re-submit the pleadings which they have already filed with
the trial court, and conducting anew hearings which have
already been done, not to mention the expenses that will be
incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings and in the re-
conduct of hearings. These would not be in keeping with the
judicial policy of just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.
2. The certification of non-forum shopping executed
in a foreign country is not covered by Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners’ contentions that the
verification and certification subsequently submitted by
respondent did not state the country or city where the notary
public exercised her notarial functions.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification
of an officer in the foreign service under Section 24 refers
only to the documents enumerated in Section 19(a), to wit:
written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers of the Philippines or of a foreign country. The Court
agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to include
notarial documents as one of the public documents
contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not
have specified only the documents referred to under
paragraph (a) of Section 19.
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were
made applicable to all public or official records without any
distinction because the old rule did not distinguish. However,
in the present rule, it is clear under Section 24, Rule 132 that
its provisions shall be made applicable only to the documents
referred to under paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule 132.
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Sec. 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate in favor of Pacifico,
respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, the Affidavit of
Quitclaim and the Deed of Sale in favor of respondent
establish respondent’s ownership over the disputed property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
6. Kummer vs. People G.R. No.174461, 11 September
2013
DOCTRINE:
1. Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open
court and their affidavits does not affect their credibility
2. It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it
be rendered by the judge who heard the case
3. There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form
of human behavior
4. Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively
identified by an eyewitness
5. Public documents are admissible in court without further
proof of their due execution and authenticity
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where
the disparity is not great, is merely a formal amendment,
thus, no arraignment is required
FACTS:
The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988,
between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied
by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo
BATCH 4 – EH 403 ATTY. TORREGOSA
knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself
by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and
co-accused, Johan, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice using
a gun about six (6) inches long.3 Malana, who was with Mallo
and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards
the west, This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed
beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped
and they all went back to sleep.
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the
prosecution’s evidence persuasive based on the testimonies
of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana
who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The
testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of
gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the
petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony
of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to find both
the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime, was released on the recognizance of his father, Moises
Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without
notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the
judgment of conviction with the CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed
reversible errors in its appreciation of the evidence, namely:
(1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of
Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between
their sworn statements and direct testimonies;
(2) in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite
the petitioner’s motive
(3) in failing to consider that the writer of the decision, Judge
Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the
testimonies; and
(4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the
petitioner positive for gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the
RTC judgment, holding that the discrepancies between the
sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses
do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions
are minimal and reconcilable
ISSUE:
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the
prosecution eyewitnesses and the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence.
HELD:
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Discrepancies between the statements of the affiant
in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness
stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte
affidavits are generally incomplete
The petitioner’s conviction is anchored on the positive and
direct testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, which
testimonies the petitioner submits to be both inconsistent
and illogical petitioner pointed to the following in
consistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of Malana’s July 21, 1988
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affidavit, he stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived
to the ground for cover and heard another shot louder than
the first two. This statement is allegedly inconsistent with his
declaration during the direct examination that he saw the
petitioner and Johan fire their guns at Mallo. Second, the July
22, 1988affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that he heard
two burst of gun fire coming from the direction of the
petitioner’s house and heard another burst from the same
direction, which statement is allegedly inconsistent with his
direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the petitioner
shoot Mallo. Third, in his affidavit, Malana declared that he
ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard two
shots, while in his testimony in court, he stated that he ran
away after Mallo was already hit.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has
consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony
of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements
in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to
minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and
the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch
upon the commission of the crime itself.
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and
Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open court that
they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and
inaccurate. Generally, the affiant is asked standard
questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit
answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of
the series of events as the affiant knows them.
The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities.
In fact, we have ruled that the discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by
him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him
since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. In the
present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and
Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one of the
assailants.
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the
judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize that the trial court
that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not
the same court that rendered the decision. Validity of a
judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge
who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered
the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a
judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely
on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial
as the basis for his decision.
Motive gains importance only when the identity of
the assailant is in doubt
We point out that the petitioner was positively identified by
Malana and Cuntapay. They both confirmed in their direct
testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a
gun at Mallo.
"whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts
which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem
ATTY. TORREGOSA
motam, then an inconsistency exists between the testimony
and the affidavit" is erroneous
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the
petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the crime by not one
but two prosecution eye witnesses, the failure to cite the
motive of the petitioner is of no moment.
Public documents are admissible in court without
further proof of their due execution and authenticity
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin
test is a public document. As a public document, the rule on
authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its due execution and genuineness
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was
Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in court to
identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist
who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner,
the report may still be admitted because the requirement for
authentication does not apply to public documents
We note at this point that while the positive finding of
gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that the
petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves
to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony that
the petitioner shot the victim confirm that these traces are
minimal and may be washed off with tap water, unlike the
evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.
Change in the date of the commission of the crime,
where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal
amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if
the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than
substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the
rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would
not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, when any evidence the accused might have would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when
any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable
to the complaint or information, as amended
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense
7. Heirs of Lacsa v. CA 197 SCRA 234 (1991)
DOCTRINE: Under the "ancient document rule," for a
private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due
execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more
than thirty years old; it is also necessary that the following
requirements are fulfilled;
1. that it is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine; and
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2. that it is unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion.
Facts:
The petition involves 2 cases namely Civil Case No. G-1190
and Civil Case No. G-1332.
Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession
with damages and preliminary injunction filed by petitioners,
the heirs of Lacsa against Songco and John Doe based on
the principal allegations that petitioners are the heirs of Lacsa
who, during her lifetime, was the owner of a land consisting
of a fishpond and a partly uncultivated open space as
evidenced by an OCT that principal respondent and his
predecessor-in-interest who are neither co-owners of the
land nor tenants thereof, through stealth, fraud and other
forms of machination, succeeded in occupying the fishpond
and cleared the open space for occupancy and refused to
vacate upon petitioners’ demands.
Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action by petitioners against
respondents for the cancellation of title, ownership with
damages and preliminary injunction on the basis that they
are the heirs of Lacsa who was the owner of the land involved
in Case No. 1190; that herein respondents through stealth
and fraud occupied the fishpond and later abandoned the
same but only after the case was filed and after all the fish
were transferred to the adjoining fish pond owned by the
respondents; that on certain dates, by presenting to the
Register of Deeds certain forged and absolutely simulated
documents "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA
ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA", and by means of flse
pretenses and misrepresentation, Songco , respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in transferring the title to
his name.
Respondents denied the allegations of both complaints and
alleged the petitioner’s lack of cause of action since the OCT
was merely based on a reconstituted copy upon petitioner’s
expedient claim that the owner’s duplicate copy had been
missing when the truth was that the OCT in the name of
Lacsa had long been cancelled and superseded by the TCT
in the name of Guevarra and Limpin by virtue of
TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE
PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL entered into by the heirs of
Lacsa, that the TCT was superseded by another TCT issue in
the name of Songco (father of respondents) through the
ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA executed by Limpin and
Guevarra in favor of Songco.
The lower court held that the fishpond in question belongs
to the respondents, having been inherited by them from their
deceased father Songco based on the two documents
presented. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in applying the Ancient
Document Rule on the questioned documents entitled
“ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL” and
“ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA”. (YES)
Ruling: Under the "ancient document rule," for a private
ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution
ATTY. TORREGOSA
and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty
(30) years old; it is also necessary that the following
requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
(2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances
of suspicion.
The "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the
second document, "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was
executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are,
therefore, more than 30 years old. Both copies of the
aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of
the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds
by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further
certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the
document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the
Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the
Department of General Services.
Documents which affect real property, to bind third parties,
must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds.
The documents here were certified as copies of originals on
file with the Register of Deeds thus can be said to be found
in the proper custody. Clearly, the first 2 requirements of the
"ancient document rule" were met. As to the last requirement
that the document must on its face appear to be genuine,
petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to
support their allegation of falsification of the said documents.
They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on
the first 2 pages could have easily led to their substitution.
We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document
rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration
or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality
of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first
pages, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents
in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on
file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and
free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
The documents in question are "ancient documents" as
envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no
longer required.
8. Victorias Milling vs Ong Su
Keywords: Sugar; Victorias; Valentine
DOCTRINE: If your evidence is excluded by the court and
you believe that the exclusion is without basis and you
believe that the excluded evidence is vital to your cause, this
is your remedy:
If your testimonial evidence is excluded and one of your vital
witnesses is not allowed to testify for whatever reason, the
rules provide for a remedy known as TENDER OF EXCLUDED
EVIDENCE or otherwise known as OFFER OF PROOF.
FACTS: The petitioner, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., a
domestic corporation and engaged in the manufacture and
sale of refined granulated sugar is the owner of the
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trademark "VICTORIAS" and design registered in the
Philippines Patent Office on November 9, 1961.
The respondent Ong Su is engaged in the repacking and sale
of refine sugar and is the owner of the trademark
"VALENTINE" and design registered in the Philippines Patent
Office on June 20, 1961.
On October 4, 1963, Victorias Milling Company, Inc. filed with
the Philippine Patent Office a petition to cancel the
registration of the Ong Su trademark "Valentine."
The petitioner alleged that its tradermark "Victorias" and
diamond design has distinctive of its sugar long before the
respondent used its trademark; that the registration of
"Valentine" and design has caused and will cause great
damage to petitioner by reason of mistake, confusion, or
deception among the purchasers because it is similar to its
"Victorias" trademark; that registration was fradulently
obtained by Ong Su and that "Valentine" falsely suggests a
connection with Saint Valentine or with an institution or belief
connected therewith.
Arturo Chicane a witness for the respondent, testified that he
was a distribution agent of Ong Su that he travelled a lot but
he never experience an instance when respondent Ong Su's
product was mistaken for the petitioner's product; that he
found the diamond design to be quite common in
combination with other words used as trademarks as a
background or to enhance their appearance.
The petitioner sought to present Ernesto T. Duran as rebuttal
witness to prove that there was a confusion among
consumers or buyers of sugar caused by the alleged sorority
of the "Victorias" and "Valentine" trademarks. The
presentation of Ernesto T. Duran as rebuttal witness was
objected to by counsel of the respondent on the ground that
the evidence sought to be elicited from Duran did not directly
contradict the testimony of witness Chicane.
The objection was sustained by the hearing officer whose
ruling was subsequently confer by the Director of Patents.
Counsel for the petitioner made the following formal offer of
proof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was denial of procedural due process
HELD:
Having made the foregoing formal offer of proof, the
petitioner cannot complain that it was denied procedural due
process.
The proposed testimony of Emesto T. Duran that in February
1963 he went to Arangue market and bought one bag of
sugar which he thought was "Victorias" and when he went
home he found out that the sugar was marked "Valentine" is
not sufficient evidence that the two trademarks are so similar
that buyers of sugar are confused. The words "Victorias" and
"Valentine" are not similar in spelling and do not have a
similar sound when pronounced. Even the diamond designs
are different. The diamond design of the trademark
"Valentine" has protruding fines at the comers. Even an
ATTY. TORREGOSA
illiterate person can see the difference between the two
diamond designs.
9. Yu vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No.154115, 29
November 2005
Keywords: legal separation and dissolution of conjugal
partnership, insurance application and contract, subpoena
duces tecum and ad testificandum, formal offer of evidence,
tender of excluded evidence.
Principles: While trial courts have the discretion to
admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised
only when the evidence has been formally offered. In
the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance
policy were yet to be presented in court, much less formally
offered before it. Before tender of excluded evidence is
made, the evidence must have been formally offered before
the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the
evidence must have been identified and presented before the
court.
FACTS: Private respondent, Viveca Yu brought against her
husband, petitioner Philip Sy Yu, an action for legal
separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on
the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case
was presided by Judge Jose Hernandez.
During trial, private respondent Viveca Yu move for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance
Co. Ltd. to compel the production of the insurance
policy and application of a person suspected to be
petitioner’s illegitimate child.
RTC Order: Denied the motion. It ruled that the insurance
contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter
No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which
presumably prevents insurance companies/agents from
divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining
to insurance policies. It added that the production of the
application and insurance contract would violate Article 280
of the Civil Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry Law, both
of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the
parents of an illegitimate child.
Aggrieved, private respondent Viveca Yu filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of Judge Hernandez in issuing the Order. The Court
of Appeals summarized the issues as follows: (i) whether or
not an insurance policy and its corresponding application
form can be admitted as evidence to prove a party's extra-
marital affairs in an action for legal separation; and (ii)
whether or not a trial court has the discretion to deny a
party's motion to attach excluded evidence to the record
under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
CA Decision: Private respondent was merely seeking the
production of the insurance application and contract, and
was not yet offering the same as part of her evidence.
Thus, it declared that petitioner's objection to the
admission of the documents was premature, and the
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EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 4 – EH 403
trial court's pronouncement that the documents are
inadmissible, precipitate. The contents of the insurance
application and insurance documents cannot be
considered as privileged information, the Court of
Appeals added, in view of the opinion of the Insurance
Commissioner to the effect that Circular Letter No. 11-
2000 "was never intended to be a legal impediment
in complying with lawful orders". Lastly, the Court of
Appeals ruled that a trial court does not have the
discretion to deny a party's privilege to tender
excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to
raise on appeal the exclusion of such evidence.
Petitioner’s contention: CA blundered in delving into
errors of judgment supposedly committed by the trial court
as if the petition filed therein was an ordinary appeal and not
a special civil action. Further, he claims that the Court of
Appeals failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the
assailed Order. Additionally, he posits that private
respondent had already mooted her petition before
the Court of Appeals when she filed her formal offer
of rebuttal exhibits, with tender of excluded evidence
before the trial court.
Petitioner claims that the CA passed upon errors of
judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, since it delved into
the propriety of the denial of the subpoena duces
tecum and subpoena ad testificandum.
Private Respondent’s Contention: The details
surrounding the insurance policy are crucial to the issue of
petitioner's infidelity and his financial capacity to provide
support to her and their children. Further, she argues that
she had no choice but to make a tender of excluded evidence
considering that she was left to speculate on what the
insurance application and policy ruled out by the trial court
would contain.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the trial court properly declared the
documents (insurance application and contract) as
inadmissible even before these were presented
during trial – No
(2) WON the information contained in the documents is
privileged in nature – NO
(3) WON private respondent Viveca Yu has rendered
moot her petition before the CA by virtue of her
tender of excluded evidence, since the move
evinced that she had another speedy and adequate
remedy under the law – No
HELD:
(1) While trial courts have the discretion to admit or
exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when
the evidence has been formally offered. For a long time,
the Court has recognized that during the early stages of the
development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge
to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not,
and thus the practice of excluding evidence on
doubtful objections to its materiality should be
avoided. As well elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v.
Phoenix Insurance Co.:
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides a judge of
first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging of the relevancy of proof where a
fair and logical connection is in fact shown.
When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed
and possibly unable to correct the effects of
the error without returning the case for a
new trial, — a step which this court is always very
loath to take. On the other hand, the admission
of proof in a court of first instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the
trial judge is supposed to know the law; and
it is its duty, upon final consideration of the
case, to distinguish the relevant and
material from the irrelevant and immaterial.
If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal,
this court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the
insurance policy were yet to be presented in court,
much less formally offered before it. In fact, private
respondent was merely asking for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed
Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually
be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in
a position to make a declaration to that effect at that
point. Thus, it barred the production of the subject
documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As
observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere
ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was, more
importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling
within the general powers of the judge is not authorized and
is consequently void with respect to the particular case
because the conditions under which he was only authorized
to exercise his general power in that case did not exist and
therefore, the judicial power was not legally exercised. Thus,
in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and
inadmissible even before they were formally offered,
much less presented before it, the trial court acted in
excess of its discretion.
(2) Anent the issue of whether the information contained in
the documents is privileged in nature, the same was clarified
and settled by the Insurance Commissioner's opinion
that the circular on which the trial court based its
ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court
orders. Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting
the insurance application and policy.
(3) Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private
respondent's tender of excluded evidence, she has rendered
moot her petition before the Court of Appeals since the move
evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy
under the law. The Court holds otherwise.
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Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If
documents or things offered in evidence are excluded
by the court, the offeror may have the same attached
to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded
evidence is made, the evidence must have been
formally offered before the court. And before formal
offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been
identified and presented before the court. While private
respondent made a "Tender of Excluded Evidence," such is
not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for
obviously, the insurance policy and application were
not formally offered much less presented before the
trial court. At most, said "Tender of Excluded
Evidence" was a manifestation of an undisputed fact
that the subject documents were declared
inadmissible by the trial court even before these were
presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy
and adequate remedy which private respondent could have
resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed
before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way render
the said petition moot.
Decision: Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
10. Abarquez v. People 479 SCRA (20 January 2006)
Keywords: DIFFERENT STORIES OF HOW A MAN GOT
STABBED AND KILLED - THE WEED STORY VS. THE
STORY OF RANDOM, ANGRY MEN; LET MAN BE FREE
IF STORY ADMITS TWO SIDES OF THE COIN OF
JUSTICE
Doctrine: The rule is that the trial court is in the best
position to determine the value and weight of the testimony
of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to
consider certain facts of substance and value, which if
considered, might affect the result of the case; application of
equipoise rule when facts and circumstances generate two
or more explanations which may either spell the accused’s
guilt or innocence.
Facts:
The prosecution charged Abarquez with two
Informations of the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide. The Information alleging homicide
stated that the accused conspired with Villanueva who was
already charged with the same offense before the RTC of
Manila, where they stabbed Quejong Y Bello twice with a
bladed weapon and hit him with a gun at the back - causing
his death. The other Information on Attempted Homicide
states that they tried to stab Paz Y Umali with a bladed
weapon but only hit him in the left arm causing slight injuries.
A plea of not guilty was entered for both charges.
Version of the prosecution: Paz and Quejong drank liquor
in celebration of Boyet’s son and were on their way home
BATCH 4 – EH 403 ATTY. TORREGOSA
from a party when Almojuela and companions blocked their
way, asking if the two were brave. Almojuela got angry and
attacked Paz with a knife then Abarquez held Paz on both
shoulders. Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had
an altercation, followed by a scuffle, which eventually led to
the death of Quejong as it turned out that Almojuela stabbed
Quejong with a knife. Paz ran away to ask for help while
Abarquez shouted at him, saying that he left his
companion already wounded.
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong
on the ground while the perpetrators were still in the area.
They went to report the incident to the nearest Police
Precinct after bringing Quejong to the hospital but found
nobody there. At WPD General Headquarters, they learned
of Quejong’s death. The officers in WPD learned of the
death and went to investigate in the hospital morgue
and found that Quejong was stabbed by Almojuela
and Abarquez, where they subsequently filed the
Informations. Dr. Rebosa, the medico-legal consultant at
UST Hospital, conducted post-mortem examination and
found that the sharp instruments caused stab wounds to the
heart and left lung.
Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station and
Almojuela voluntarily surrendered.
Version of the defense: Almojuela was merely trying
to stop the group of Paz from smoking marijuana.
While Abarquez, a barangay kagawad, was only informed by
Almojuela's wife that the group of Paz was challenging
Almojuela to a fistfight and that he was just there to stop the
fight. He found that Paz was holding Almojuela’s waist and
boxing him in the stomach. Another person was near
Almojuela’s head holding a piece of stone as if he was waiting
for a chance to strike. Abarquez shouted at them to stop
but was unheeded. He was forced to call two warning
shots before they ran away.
Winfred Evangelista (a witness) testified that he was resting
in his house when he heard a commotion, seeing Paz and
Quejong quarreling. He then saw Paz kicking Almojuela.
When Abarquez showed up to break the fight up, he was
forced to fire a warning shot.
(RTC RULING) The trial court found Abarquez guilty
as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court
held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was
a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong.
However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and
restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong
and allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without
resistance. CA affirmed the decision, giving more
credence to the testimony of Paz.
Issues: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding
that Abarquez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
ABARQUEZ IS NOT AN ACCOMPLICE; THERE IS NO
UNITY IN CRIMINAL DESIGN; ABARQUEZ IN PAZ’S
TESTIMONY WAS SHOWN TO HAVE RESTRAINED HIM
BECAUSE OF HIS INTENT TO PACIFY.
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Yes. While the trial court is in the best position to
determine the value and weight of the witness’s
testimony, the case here is an exception. When the
court fails to consider certain facts of substance and value
which might affect the result of the case, the testimony may
be re-evaluated.
Two elements must be shown before one is
considered an accomplice: (a) community of design and
(b) performance by accomplice of previous or simultaneous
acts dispensable to the crime’s commission.
In convicting Abarquez, the trial court and CA mainly
relied on Paz’s testimony. The testimony presented did
not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela's criminal
design. Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray
by holding him by his shoulders, not from helping Quejong.
Paz claims to have only been talking to Almojuela, but it could
not have been so since Almojuela was already grappling with
Quejong at that time. In Paz’s testimony, he admitted
that while being restrained, Abarquez was scolding
him and telling him to stop. To be deemed an accomplice,
one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation
in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the
accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their
efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both
were united in their criminal design.
The mere fact that the accused had prior knowledge of the
principal’s criminal design does not automatically make one
an accomplice. Paz testified that Abarquez’s son, Bardie
(Paz’s companion) tried to pacify Almojuela. Abarquez was
stated to be remiss in his duties as a barangay
kagawad in not extending assistance to Quejong. It
doesn’t show concurrence since Abarquez shouted at
Paz, stating that he left his wounded companion since
Abarquez did not know how injured Quejong was.
EQUIPOISE RULE (BETTER TO LET A GUILTY MAN
FREE THAN AN INNOCENT MAN IMPRISONED)
APPLIES WHEN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
ARE CAPABLE OF TWO OR MORE EXPLANATIONS,
WHICH MAY EITHER PROVE THE ACCUSED’S GUILT
OR INNOCENCE
When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt
should be resolved in his favor. Every person accused has
the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. We apply in this case the
equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact
is in issue or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden
of proof loses. Hence:
The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case,
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof
to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
lacking.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
11. Heirs of Reyes v. CA G.R. No. 157959, March 28,
2007
Topic: Testimony of Carpenter vs. Renter, regarding the
property of a lessor
Doctrine: Applying the well-known test of credibility called
the actors rule, it is the witness whose action is more closely
connected to the point at issue that should be given more
credence—Renter, Gloria Reyes-Palmario
Facts:
The case stemmed from the action for partition and
accounting filed by the children of the siblings of the late
Eustaquia Reyes (whose estate is in question) against Magno
Sarreal (husband of Eustaquia), Anatalia Reyes and Gloria
Reyes-Paulino (nieces of Eustaquia who bought the property
from her). The land is situated at Balintawak, Quezon City
with an area of 7,848 square meters.
The property was originally registered in the name of
Eustaquia evidenced by a TCT and was inherited by her prior
to her marriage with Magno Sarreal.
On June 5, 1963, Eustaquia leased a portion of the said
property to ACME (Abrasive Manufacturing Corp) for 20
years. From June 1, 1963 to June 1, 1983. The lease contract
provided that the lessee shall have the right to introduce
improvements thereon and upon the expiration of the lease
period the ownership of all the improvements would
automatically be transferred to the lessor. The contract was
thumbmarked by Eustaquia as the lessor, with Magno Sarreal
affixing his signature only to indicate his marital consent to
the transaction.
However, on January 24, 1979, during the subsistence of the
lease contract, Eustaquia sold the property to private
respondents Anatalia and Gloria evidenced by a notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale or “Patuluyang Pagbili ng Lupa”. In
the said document, Eustaquia stated that the property was
paraphernal or exclusive and does not belong to the conjugal
partnership. It was only her signature and thumb mark which
appeared on such a document. The buyers therein divided
the properties and registered it in their own names.
Eustaquia died of natural causes on May 7, 1987.
On May 17, 1993, the children of the siblings of Eustaquia
filed a complaint with the RTC for partition and accounting
with receivership against Magno, Amalia and Gloria. They
alleged that the property was clandestinely, fraudulently and
unlawfully divided between the private respondents by
means of simulated or fictitious and unlawful conveyances.
They contended that not having waived or repudiated their
shares, they are co-owners with the private respondents.
Similarly, the rents on the market stalls situated in the
property also allegedly belonged to them.
During the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the sole issue to
be resolved in this case was: Whether or not the sale of the
property to private respondents was simulated or fictitious.
RTC: DOS is null and void because the property was conjugal
and it did not bear the signature of the husband.
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CA: reversed the RTC, it held that the nature of the property
was not the issue as determined in the pre-trial. It dismissed
the complaint because petitioners were not able to
substantiate their burden of proof that the sale was fictitious
or simulated. The petitioner’s witnesses only testified that the
private respondents had no means or source of income that
would enable them to buy the property and that they merely
live with the spouses Eustaquia and Magno. The CA found
the testimony of Gloria more convincing that she was able to
establish that she was earning an income and that she lived
with her husband independently of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the property to private
respondents was simulated or fictitious.
(however, due to implied waiver by respondents, the issue
regarding the nature of the property whether conjugal or
paraphernal was tried)
Ruling:
The RTC ruled on the basis of the evidence presented that
the DOS was void for not embodying the consent of the
husband, the conclusion was drawn on its finding that the
property was conjugal and not paraphernal in nature due to
the improvement made thereon at the expense of the
conjugal partnership. Under Art. 158 of the Civil Code, “the
land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building
without awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation
of the partnership upon the occurrence of two conditions, to
wit: (1) construction of the building at the expense of the
partnership and (2) the ownership of the land by one of the
spouses (Embrado v. CA)
There is merit in the petitioner’s claim that the limitation
upon the issue embodied in the pre-trial order did not control
the course of the trial. The issue on the nature of the
property was embodied in the pleadings filed by the
parties subsequent to the complaint and was actively
litigated by them without any objection on the part of
private respondents. In view thereof, the latter are
deemed to have given their implied consent for the RTC to
try the issue.
The RTC found it unnecessary to make a categorical finding
whether the deed was simulated or fictitious because the
focal point was the character of the property at the time of
the transfer to private respondents. While it is true that the
RTC cited evidence introduced by the petitioners to establish
that the sale was simulated or fictitious, it did not make a
clear and definitive ruling on this matter, and instead stated
that while there are circumstances that may be considered
in the determination of the alleged fraud, the RTC is
nevertheless confronted with a significant factual element
which, by and in itself alone and independent of the
circumstances indicative of fraud nullifies the said DOS. (That
there was a clear absence of the signature of Magno).
In this regard, the evidence relied by the RTC that the
property had become conjugal, therefore required Magno’s
consent was principally the testimony of Monico Reyes
Palmario as well as the lease agreement with ACME. Monico
testified that he was employed as a carpenter and mason to
make improvements “on the property” (It will be clarified
ATTY. TORREGOSA
later that Monico is testifying on behalf of another property,
not the one in issue). He also testified that there were
at least 10 houses on the said property and a building
housing a knitting company. Because there was no
substantial evidence presented as to the source of funds
used in the improvements, but it was testified that they were
made during the subsistence of the marriage, hence it is
under the presumption under Art. 158 of the Civil Code that
the funds used were conjugal funds. Thus, while the land
originally belonged to Eustaquia, the same became
conjugal upon the construction of the improvements
thereon.
In the present case, the CA considered only the
improvements made by ACME during the lease. It ruled in
the negative after concluding that these improvements were
not at the partnership’s expense, but rather at the expense
of the lessee ACME. It is argued that the improvements made
by ACME did not transform the character of the property from
paraphernal to conjugal because the said improvements
were not made at the expense of the conjugal
partnership. Rather, it was made at the expense of the
lessee, subject to the condition that after the termination of
the lease, the same would inure to the benefit of the lessor.
The SC agrees that the expense incurred by ACME in
constructing the building on Eustaquia’s property cannot be
construed as being converted into an expense taken against
the civil fruits of the property by virtue of the lease. When
the said lease expired, it can be stated that the property was
not anymore owned by Eustaquia due to the prior sale,
therefore, as stated in the contract, the ownership of the
improvements would only redound to the benefit of the
lessor at the expiration of the contract. Upon the expiration,
the lessor was not Eustaquia anymore and that is the reason
why said property could not be characterized as conjugal
property between Eustaquia and Magno, it would have been
different if Eustaquia was still the owner because it will be as
if she gained the ownership of the buildings during the
subsistence of the marriage, therefore making it conjugal
property.
Evidence:
The RTC relied heavily on the statements made by Monico
Reyes-Palmario who testified that there were houses and
buildings that were constructed on the property prior to the
purported sale to private respondents.
The CA, however, held otherwise, stating that the testimony
of private respondent Gloria Reyes-Paulino was more
credible. The CA stated that the complaint itself never
mentioned any “house” or a “building occupied by a knitting
company” (as held by Monico). It only stated a “parcel of
land” and “market stalls”. Hence, Monico must be
referring to another land and his lack of certitude is
confirmed by his inability to sure of the number of
houses that he was talking about.
Indeed, it is therefore the testimony of private respondent
Gloria, who is renting one of those “houses” mentioned by
Monico, which is owned by the spouses Eustaquia and
Magno, who is thus more knowledgeable of the place and
hence more reliable between the two. Gloria stated in her
testimony when she was asked that: they are outside
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EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 4 – EH 403
(because she is renting on one of the “houses”) the
property or land subject of the controversy.
Applying the well-known test of credibility called the
actors’ rule, it is the witness whose action is more
closely connected to the point at issue that should be
given more credence.
As between the two witnesses, Gloria was more reliable since
her act of renting and living in one of the “houses” or
apartments makes her the actor more closely related to the
point at issue, i.e., whether or not the houses were on the
property in question. For while a carpenter would not
concern himself with the title of the property, a lessee would
normally look into the title covering the property leased,
including its precise location or boundaries, and in fact Gloria
testified that the lot on which the house she rented was
found had a separate title.
The “houses or apartments being outside the land in suit”
(conjugal), the only improvements that should be looked into
in the case at bench are the “improvements introduced by
ACME. No conjugal fund ever went into the improvements
made by ACME and by the expiration of the lease agreement,
the ownership of the improvement redounds to the benefit
of the lessor, the lessor now not being Eustaquia because of
a prior sale, the said property cannot in any way be classified
as conjugal.
Accordingly, since the property sold by Eustaquia to private
respondents was paraphernal, the consent of Magno was not
required and the sale cannot be invalidated by the absence
of his signature on the Deed of Sale.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.
12. People v. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, 26 November
2014
Keywords: Hearsay evidence; Father raped his
daughter; Police officer testified in place of the victim
because she never appeared in court.
Doctrine:The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is
based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of the hearsay
evidence due to its not being given under oath or
solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected
to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test
the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness
of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose
reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.
Facts:
This is a rape case on automatic review to the Supreme Court
committed by the accused against his 13 year old
daughter,AAA. According to the information, the accused
raped his daughter on February 5, 2009. Apparently, BBB,
the wife of the accused and mother of AAA, together with
the latter, complained to Police Officer 3 Fretzie Cobardo, the
officer assigned at the Philippine National Police Women and
Children Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she who
investigated the whole incident and took the sworn
statement of AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009.
ATTY. TORREGOSA
Members of the Barangay Security Force Michael Estudillo
and Ronilla Perlas arrested the accused. She testified in
court. However, AAA, did not appear in court despite several
subpoenas. Later on, BBB and AAA, manifested their
desistance stating that AAA has already forgiven her father.
As a result, the incriminatory statements, which were
allegedly made by AAA, were conveyed to the court by PO3
Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO
Cobardo made a summation of what she claims was AAA’s
narration of her ordeal, along with her observations of her
demeanor during the investigation.
The trial court convicted the accused, ruling that the
testimony of PO3 Cobardo was part of the res gestae and
thus, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that
due to the absence of AAA’s testimony, the prosecution failed
to establish the circumstances proving beyond reasonable
doubt that he raped his daughter; that the testimonies of the
prosecuting witness PO3 Cobardo and other, not being
themselves victims or witnesses to the “startling occurrence”
of rape cannot create the hearsay exception of res gestae.
The CA convicted the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies presented are
hearsay evidence due to the fact that there was no cross-
examination made by the adverse party, against the original
declarant (AAA).
Ruling: YES. The testimonies must be dismissed as
hearsay, since AAA’s statements were not subjected to cross-
examination consistent with the constitutional right of the
accused-appellant to confront evidence against him.
All witnesses must be subjected to the cross-examination by
the adverse party as further elaborated in Section 6, Rule
142 of the rules of Court, “Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witnesses may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness
and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue.” This equally applies
to non-criminal proceedings.
The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of the hearsay evidence due to its not being
given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its
not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory,
veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of
the out-of-court statement depends.
Also, excluding hearsay aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant
claiming to have direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be
denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
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EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST BATCH 4 – EH 403
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the
administration of justice.
Therefore, the accused was acquitted
13. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126713, 27 July
1998
Key phrases/words: Pips declared that they are absolute
owners but later nana kaso ana sila co-owners na sila; res
inter alios acta; exceptions.
Facts: Adoracion (hehe hi Adrian) and Delfin were spouses
and they have children namely: Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel and
Gerry. Delfin died and as a result his surviving spouse and
children executed a notarized deed of partial partition (DPP)
by virtue of which each one of them was given a share of
several parcels of land all situated in Taytay, Rizal.
The next day, mother and children executed a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) wherein they covenanted and agreed
among themselves that they shall alike and receive equal
shares from the proceeds of the sale of any of the lot or lots
allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by virtue
of the DPP thus designating themselves as common co-
owners pro-indiviso of the Rizal property. The MOA was
registered and annotated in the titles of the lands covered by
the Deed of Partial Partition. The DPP was subsequently
registered and title were issued in their names. The
annotation pertaining to the MOA was carried in each of the
title. Meanwhile, spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo (one of the
daughter) and Nelson Tamayo were sued by the spouses
Eliseo and Virginia Malolos for a sum of money in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City).
The Tamayo spouses, after trial, were condemned by the trial
court to pay a sum of money to the Malolos spouses. After
the finality of that decision, a writ of execution was
issued. The sheriff of the court then levied upon the land in
question and thereafter sold the properties in an execution
sale to the highest bidders, the Malolos spouses. Accordingly,
the sheriff executed a certificate of sale. Nerissa Cruz-
Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption within the
statutory period and so the final deed of sale was executed
by the sheriff conveying the lands to the Malolos spouses.
The Malolos spouses moved the court to compel her to
surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
cancellation. The motion was granted, but Nerissa was
adamant. She did not comply with the order so the Malolos
couple asked the court to declare said titles null and void.
At this point, here comes the ‘Avengers’, Adoracion Cruz,
Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Arnel Cruz entered the picture
by filing is said lower court a motion for leave to intervene
and oppose [the] Maloloses motion. The Cruzes alleged that
they were co-owners of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the
lands in question. The lower court rendered a decision for
private respondents from which the defendants appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The CA then holds that the DPP was
not materially and substantially incompatible with the MOA.
The DPP conferred absolute ownership of the parcels of land
in issue on Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo, while the MOA merely
created an obligation on her part to share with the petitioners
ATTY. TORREGOSA
the proceeds of the sale of the said properties and that
petitioners were estopped from claiming co-ownership over
the disputed properties because, as absolute owners, they
either mortgaged or sold the other properties adjudicated to
them by virtue of the DPP. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners
are in estoppel by deed.
Ruling: No, the CA was correct. The petitioners in this case
are estopped. The CA found that several deeds of sale and
real estate mortgage, which petitioners executed when they
sold or mortgaged some parcels adjudicated to them under
the DPP, contained the statement that the
vendor/mortgagor was the absolute owner of the
parcel of residential land and that he or she
represented it as free from liens and encumbrances.
On the basis of these pieces of evidence, respondent Court
held that petitioners were estopped from claiming that there
was a co-ownership over the disputed parcels of land which
were also covered by the DPP. Petitioners contend that
Respondent Court , in so ruling violated the res inter alios
acta rule. This is untenable, Res inter alios acta, as a general
rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that tends to show
that what a person has done at one time is probative of the
contention that he has done a similar as act at another time.
The rule, however, is not without exception. While
inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be received as
evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is
a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions
giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances
surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of
similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in
actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on
the state of mind or knowledge of a persons; it provides
insight into such persons motive or intent; it uncovers a
scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.
In this case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to
the other parcels of land they entered into, in the concept of
absolute owners, are inadmissible as evidence to show that
the parcels in issue are not co-owned. The Court is not
persuaded. Evidence of such transactions falls under the
exception to the rule on res inter alios acta. Such evidence is
admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and
corroborative of evidence already received. The relevancy of
such transactions is readily apparent. The nature of
ownership of said property should be the same as that of the
lots in question since they are all subject to the MOA. If the
parcels of land were held and disposed by petitioners in fee
simple, in the concept of absolute owners, then the lots in
question should similarly be treated as absolutely owned.
Other issues: The MOA falls short of producing a novation,
because it does not express a clear intent to dissolve the old
obligation as a consideration for the emergence of the new
one. Thus, DPP was not novated by the MOA.
Moreover, the annotation of the MOA in the certificate of
title did not engender any co-ownership. Well-settled is the
doctrine that registration merely confirms, but does not
confer, title. Thus no co-ownership was created by the MOA.
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