Nama : Shela Deanova

Kelas : X - MIPA - 2

No absen : 32

Bandung as Sea of Fire

The Bandung Sea of Fire (Indonesian: Bandung Lautan Api) was the deliberate burning of much
of the southern side of the city of Bandung by retreating Indonesian Republican troops during
the Indonesian National Revolution.

Following the Indonesian declaration of independence, tensions and fighting in the city of
Bandung began to emerge between the newly formed Indonesian armed forces (People's
Security Agency and its successors) and Indonesian nationalist youths on one side, with
Japanese and British forces on the other. After initial success in Japanese attempts to gain
control of the city in October, the arrival of British forces resulted in continued fighting, which
initially resulted in a stalemate where Bandung was segregated into the British-controlled north
and Indonesian-controlled south. Following an ultimatum to militarily evacuate South Bandung
in March 1946, Indonesian forces conducted a general evacuation of the area involving
hundreds of thousands of civilians, burning down various buildings and looting warehouses to
deny British, and later Dutch, forces the use of the buildings and supplies.

PRELUDE
Independence of Indonesia

When on 17 August 1945 proclamation reached Bandung first via radio on the same day, around
noon, with the news spreading throughout virtually the entire city by 19 August. Details about
the event remained scarce for the first few days, until more information arrived.The sudden
pronouncement left the existing social order largely intact for the first month or so, with the
nationalist government establishing a local government unit (Komite Nasional Indonesia, KNI) in
Bandung (i.e. the Priangan Regency) by 24 August. These committees were initially focused with
spreading information about the independence and maintaining public order.
Japanese occupation forces in the area had begun to disarm and disband the Japanese-trained,
Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) Indonesian units as soon as 18 August. The discharged officers and
personnel were then recruited into the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Agency,
BKR), the new armed forces of the nationalist government. Around late August and early.
September, some of the nationalist youths (pemuda) began to seize arms from Japanese forces
– in some cases involving murders, but largely through simple disarmament and in some cases
voluntarily. Looting against Chinese and Eurasians of the city also began to occur.

Revolution in Bandung and the 10 October affair

The first British forces began arriving in Indonesia by around late September 1945, and by 25
September the nationalist government declared that all Indonesian civil servants were working
for them. This resulted in an outburst of seizures of Japanese-controlled buildings and property.
Takeovers were initially relatively peaceful, but soon more looting began to occur, primarily of
military assets, with pemuda independently planning and launching attacks on Japanese posts
or vehicles to capture weapons. By early October, disarmament of Japanese forces began to
take a larger scale across the wider region. In some cases, disarmament was negotiated to be
held in a mock mass assault against Japanese forces who would "surrender" and disarm in order
to absolve Japanese forces of their responsibility to maintain order.

In early October, the Japanese military commander in Bandung, Major General Mabuchi Itsuo,
was negotiating a peaceful disarmament of his men.Throughout the first few days of the month,
several arms factories and warehouses were seized by nationalists and on 8 October a large
group of pemuda took over a Japanese airbase, taking control and disarming its guards with
almost no resistance. On 10 October, a large assault by pemuda was launched against the local
Kenpeitai headquarters – seemingly spontaneously – and the Japanese responded by calling in
commanders of the local BKR for negotiations, before coercing them with bayonets to surrender
and disperse the crowds. Throughout the day, the leaders were made to disperse attacks on
Japanese posts while the Japanese setup barricades and posts, sweeping throughout Bandung
within the following days and effectively retaking control of the city.A week later, the Japanese
handed over control of the city to arriving British units of the 37th Indian Infantry Brigade.
Following negotiations, British authorities agreed to rearm the Indonesian police.

Reescalation of tensions

Following the 10 October incident, revolutionary fervor in the city died down for around a
month.During this time, the BKR reorganized into the TKR (People's Security Army/Tentara
Keamanan Rakyat), with the 3rd division of its 1st army covering the Bandung region under the
command of Arudji Kartawinata (former BKR commander of Priangan). The division itself was
subdivided into five regiments, two of which were headquartered in Bandung proper (one later
moved to the outskirts). Each of these regiments consisted of four battalions, typically
comprising 500 to 1,000 men.Aside from these, there were also irregular units of pemuda
organizations, ethnic militias, and Hizbullah units under Masyumi.By November, the European
population of the city had also began to return, reaching 60,000 by late November or double
the pre-WW2 figure (compared to some 436,000 Indonesians, Chinese and Eurasians) with
2,000 British and 1,500 Japanese troops.

On the night of 24 November, the 3rd Division under Kartawinata was pressured by pemuda
following the outbreak of the Battle of Surabaya to launch a general attack against British and
Japanese troops – which ended up being a relatively limited operation, with only scattered
fighting in parts of the city.The following day, an incident occurred when a flash flood killed
more than 200 people, with Indonesian forces engaging in rescue operations and British troops
firing on them during the confusion that occurred. Within the following weeks, fighting
intensified across the city with the British calling in an additional battalion of troops in early
December, when most of the northern parts of Bandung were under British control. During this
time, British supply trains and trucks travelling from Jakarta were subjected to raids – in one
occasion, a supply train arrived in Bandung on 21 November looted and without its Gurkha
guards.

The British commander issued an ultimatum to the local Indonesian governor demanding
Indonesians (numbering some 100,000) to evacuate North Bandung on 27 November – which
the governor rejected. Later, the nationalist government compromised, agreeing to move
"elements which disturbed peace". In effect, significant civilian movements occurred, due to
pressure from European inhabitants backed by British forces. Some form of a boundary
eventually formed between Indonesian and British/Indian forces, though there were significant
desertions of the Indian troops and the Gurkha units would trade weapons for food items. As
the British asserted control over North Bandung, around 100,000 Indonesians evacuated the
area between November 1945 and March 1946.During the remaining days of 1945 and in early
1946, a relatively calm period ensued from the stalemate, with pemuda organizations continued
to consolidate to form larger entities, and the 3rd Division saw a replacement of Kartawinata
with Abdul Haris Nasution as commander.

SEA OF FIRE
The 23rd Indian Infantry Division was moved to Bandung on 16 February 1946, and some
fighting began to erupt again in early March. On 22 March, British authorities notified then-
Prime Minister of Indonesia Sutan Sjahrir that they were planning a military operation in
Bandung, requesting him to evacuate the city of armed forces to prevent fighting – specifically,
the British requested that all armed Indonesian units removed from an area within eleven
kilometers of the city center.

Major General Douglas Hawthorn, commander of the 23rd Division, announced on the radio on
the afternoon the following day of the demands, requiring South Bandung to be evacuated of
military forces while asking civilians to remain. He set a deadline of midnight the following day
for the evacuation. Indonesian leaders such as Nasution requested a delay in the deadline –
nominally to organize the movement of people but primarily to move supplies and equipment –
but this was rejected by Hawthorn.

Faced with evacuation, the regimental commanders in the city opted-in the afternoon the
following day for a total general evacuation of South Bandung, in a scorched earth move
intended to be a revolutionary gesture. On 4 p.m. that day, Nasution (who had approved of the
plan) announced that the entire half of the city was to be evacuated by 8 p.m. – though some
scorched earth actions had been conducted as early as the previous evening.

Various figures were given for the affected population within the eleven kilometer limit – from
200,000 given by Merdeka newspaper a month after the event to 500,000 estimated by
American historian John Smail (including those living in villages outside Bandung). British
historian John Newsinger wrote that a third to half of the city were razed to the ground, and
250,000 were evacuated. As the civilians left the city, the Pemuda started fires and detonated
dynamites to destroy the city's buildings though most of the involved soldiers were
inexperienced with demolition and instead opted to loot the warehouses or distribute the
contents to the public; most of the flames originated from private homes and lighter buildings.
Chinese residents were particularly hard-hit by the looting and burning, and many moved north
instead of the countryside.

AFTERMATH AND LEGACY

The loss of Bandung itself resulted in significant military and psychological blow to the
nationalist government, with the newly arrived Dutch forces being handed control of Bandung
from the British on 17 April. American historian John Smail, who visited Bandung 18 months
after the event, described South Bandung as "a dead city with grass growing in its streets",
through Dutch authorities did not calculate the exact figure of losses. The conflict in the larger
area continued, with continued damage in the countryside surrounding Bandung.Nasution,
when later questioned on why he did not hold the city, argued that he did not want to sacrifice
his units and had opted to conduct guerilla warfare in the city with his still relatively intact
battalions. Scorched earth tactics employed in Bandung were later used elsewhere during the
revolution by Nasution – and later Army Commander Sudirman, who created the Strategic
Order No. 1 (Perintah Siasat No. 1) ordering scorched earth tactics to delay enemy attacks,
especially during later Dutch military actions.

In the immediate aftermath of the events, only around 16,000 Indonesians still lived in North
Bandung, with "practically none" living in the south, compared to the official figure of 380,000
in August 1945. Though the population of Bandung was estimated as 480,000 in 1945, it fell to
around 100,000 by 1946 due to the fighting and the destruction, though it had recovered to
over 640,000 by 1950. Despite the massive population displacement of Indonesians, the
movement of the Chinese population to the northern parts of the city further complicated the
overcrowding already there. This issue became more pronounced after the Darul Islam rebellion
in 1948, when a large number of refugees moved to Jakarta and Bandung. When many of the
March 1946 evacuees returned to the city, they found their houses occupied by new residents –
who in some cases had managed to obtain a residential permit from the government.

During the fires, an Indonesian journalist based in Tasikmalaya recorded the events from a hill in
Garut and published an article in the 26 March issue of the Soeara Merdeka newspaper –
initially titled Bandoeng Djadi Laoetan Api (Bandung Becomes Sea of Fire), but shortened to
Bandoeng Laoetan Api (Bandung Sea of Fire) the name the event is known by today.Soon after
the event, Ismail Marzuki composed the song Halo, Halo Bandung, which became a major
popular impression of the events in Indonesia.A monument commemorating the event was
erected in Bandung in 1981.The Gelora Bandung Lautan Api Stadium, the largest stadium in the
province, was named after the event.