Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1, 89–114
Avik Chakrabarti*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the changing global economic and political environment
has led to a renewed interest in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). First, there has
been a rapid and steady growth in global FDI flows since the late 1980s. Ag-
gregate net inflows of FDI (in current US dollars) increased nearly six times
from $ 53 billion in 1985 to $ 315 billion in 1996. Second, there was a sudden
appearance of a large volume of FDI into the U.S., between 1985 and 1987: ag-
gregate net inflows of FDI (in current US dollars) increased nearly three times
from $ 20 billion to $ 58 billion over the three year period 1. Finally, during most
of the 1980s, the majority of the developing economies were effectively shut
out of the international capital markets following the borrowing binge of the
1970s and the break down of normal financial relations in 1982–1983 (the so-
called ‘debt-overhang’). This financial constraint, particularly severe for the
heavily indebted countries, quickly translated into a sharp decline in investment
and growth rates in these economies. This resulted in the growing importance
of FDI as a relatively reliable source of capital flows for the LDCs.
With this backdrop it is not at all surprising that a vast empirical literature
has developed around the issue of determining the forces attracting FDI. Most
of these studies have used cross-country regressions to search for empirical
linkages between FDI and a variety of economic variables. The literature is not
only extensive but controversial as well.
The lack of a consensus over the conclusions reached by the wide range of
empirical studies as to the relative importance and the direction of impact of
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin, Address: 17 425 W. River Birch Dr. #208, Brook-
field, WI 53 045. E-Mail: chakra@csd.uwm.edu.
1. Source: World Development Report (1998).
89
90
Table 1
How Confusing Is the Evidence?
6. Sala-i-Martin (1997) used confidence levels in his analysis of the growth literature to propose a
test for robustness of explanatory variables that is alternative to Leamer’s (1985) EBA. I find it
meaningful to use Leamer’s EBA to identify whether (qualitatively) an estimated coefficient is
robust and Sala-i-Martin’s approach to determine how much (quantitative) confidence one
should have even when an estimated coefficient is labeled ‘fragile’ by the EBA.
91
II. METHODOLOGY
This Section motivates and explains the use of a variant of EBA and the cumu-
lative distribution function to provide evidence on the sensitivity of past find-
92
7. The reasonable range, for instance, may be defined by a confidence interval around some bench-
mark estimate.
8. The range would be too wide if, for instance, it extends beyond the limits of a confidence inter-
val.
9. In Bayesian terms, the ‘extreme bounds’ are applicable when the prior distribution for a subset
of coefficients is located at the origin but is otherwise unspecified, and the prior distribution for
the other coefficients is ‘diffuse’. A sensitivity analysis is then performed to determine if fea-
tures of the posterior distribution depend importantly on the way the partially defined prior dis-
tribution is fully specified.
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FDI regressions (at least all the studies listed in Table 1), one that somewhat
simplifies the application of EBA in the present context, is that the explanatory
variables have been entered independently and linearly. Thus the EBA uses
equations of the form:
Y = α + βX + γ I + δZ + ε
where Y stands for net FDI; X represents the set of explanatory variables (free
variables) that have been relatively less controversial, i.e., that have come out
with the same sign and significance of their coefficient estimates, individually
or in group, despite being included in major (mostly cited) cross-country re-
gressions of FDI; I is the variable of interest in each EBA; Z is a subset of var-
iables (doubtful variables) chosen from a pool of explanatory variables identi-
fied from a wide range of past studies as other potentially important candidates
that ‘need to be controlled’ for in cross-country FDI regressions 10. The EBA
then involves alterations in the subset of Z-variables that are included in the re-
gression, to find the widest range of coefficient estimates on the variables of in-
terest, I. In particular, a variable (I) that has been the focus of past empirical
studies on the determinants of FDI is chosen and a ‘base’ regression is run that
includes only the X-variables and the I-variable. Then the regression results are
computed for all possible linear combinations of up to three Z-variables. The
extreme upper bound (EUB) is defined by the group of Z-variables that pro-
duces the maximum value in terms of the estimated coefficient (γ ) of the I-var-
iable plus two standard deviations. The extreme lower bound (ELB) is defined
by the group of Z-variables that produces the minimum value in terms of ‘the
estimated coefficient (γ ), of the I-variable, minus two standard deviations’ 11.
The degree of confidence one can have in the partial correlation between the Y
and I variables can be inferred from the extreme bounds on the coefficient γ. If
γ does not remain significant (at 95% level of confidence) or if the coefficient
changes sign at the extreme bound, then one has reason to lack confidence in
the relationship between Y and I because alterations in the conditioning infor-
mation set change the statistical inferences that one draws regarding the Y-I re-
lationship. In such a case the result is regarded as ‘fragile’ in the sense that
there is not enough independent variation in the variable of interest to explain
10. Note that there can be, and are in the EBA, overllaps between the set of X-variables and the set
of I-variables, as well as between the set of Z-variables and the set of I-variables. The distinc-
tion is made only for expositional convenience.
11. Note that a point estimate of the EUB and the ELB, though may be less restrictive, is less ap-
propriate. Using point estimates of the extreme bounds does not alter any of the conclusions of
the paper. See Chakrabarti (1998 a, chapter 1).
94
cross-country differences in FDI 12. If, on the other hand, the coefficient re-
mains significant and of the same sign at the extreme bounds, then one can
maintain a fair amount of confidence in the partial correlation. In such a case
the result is regarded as ‘robust’ 13.
Once each variable of interest is classified as either ‘robust’ or ‘fragile’ I look
at the entire distribution of the coefficients of these explanatory variables in or-
der to rank them in terms of their relative likelihood of being correlated with
FDI. Suppose i1 % of the density function for the estimates of the coefficient of
an explanatory variable I1 lies to the right or left of zero and i2 % of the coeffi-
cient of an explanatory variable I2 lies to the right or left of zero then I1 is more
likely to be correlated with the dependent variable than is I2 if i1 > i2. Let F(0) =
max (CDF(0), 1 – CDF(0)) represent the larger of the two areas to the right and
left of 0 under the density function where CDF stands for the cumulative distri-
bution function for each of the point estimates (obtained from alternative com-
binations of the Z-variables) of the coefficient of an explanatory variable.
In order to compute F(0) I calculate the weighted mean and standard devia-
tion of the distribution of the point estimates of the coefficient of each variable
of interest. For each combination ( j) of Z-variables, I compute the likelihood
(Lj), the point estimate γ j, and the standard deviation σj. I then construct the es-
timated mean (γ) and standard deviation (σ) using the following definitions:
γ = ∑j ωj γj (1)
σ 2 = ∑ j ω j σ j2 (2)
ωj = Lj / ∑j Lj (3)
Once the mean and standard deviation of the distribution is calculated I com-
pute the F(0) using the standard normal distribution 14. Intuitively, the ratio-
95
nale 15 for using this weighting scheme is to assign more weight to the regres-
sions that are more likely to be the true model. To the extent that the fit of re-
gression j is an indication of its likelihood of being the true model, the weight-
ing scheme is reasonable.
There is a possibility of running into problems associated with multicolline-
arity in any EBA unless the Z-variables are carefully combined. Although mul-
ticollinearity, to be precise, reflects weak data rather than a procedural prob-
lem 16, the analysis presented in this paper does carefully restrict the choice of
Z-variables to avoid any serious multicollinearity problems. First, to the va-
riables always included in the regression (the X-variable and the I-variable),
only two Z-variables are added in any regression. This restricts the total
number of explanatory variables included in any regression to be 4 17. Second,
for every variable of interest, I, the pool of variables from which the Z-varia-
bles are chosen is restricted by excluding variables that may measure the same
phenomenon as the I-variable. For example, when the relationship between
FDI and trade balance is studied, external debt, tariff, real exchange rate and
openness are not included in the subset of Z-variables; the wage is not com-
bined with inflation; openness is not combined with tariff or trade balance; and
so on 18.
X-variable (Market Size): The X-variable (free variable) is chosen on the basis
of its general acceptance in past empirical studies and economic theory. This is
the host country’s per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Market size has, by far, been the single most widely accepted as a significant
determinant of FDI flows. The market-size hypothesis upholds that a large mar-
ket is necessary for efficient utilization of resources and exploitation of econo-
mies of scale: as the market-size grows to some critical value, FDI will start to
increase thereafter with its further expansion (Scaperlanda and Mauer 1969).
This hypothesis has been rather popular and a variable representing the size
of the host country market has appeared as an explanatory variable in nearly all
15. Incidentally, the same rationale applies for using the same number (4) of explanatory variables
in all the regressions since regressions with more variables will generally have a better fit.
16. Note that existence of multicollinearity may mean that the data evidence is weak but it does not
invalidate the OLS estimate.
17. Although a limitation, this only makes it more difficult to implicate past findings as fragile.
18. See also Table 3 for correlations between explanatory variables.
96
empirical studies on the determinants of FDI. Bandera and White (1968), using
aggregate pooled data on US manufacturing FDI in 7 European economies over
the period 1958–1962, strongly supported the hypothesized dependency of the
level of FDI (but not the first order change in FDI) on the level of national in-
come in the host country. Schmitz and Bieri (1972) in their analyses of a single
equation model using aggregate data on US direct investment in the EEC over
the period 1952–1966 found market-size to be an important determinant of
FDI. Lunn (1980) found similar results even after controlling for changes in
growth rates.
Root and Ahmed (1979) in their econometric analysis of a single equation
model using aggregate data on 58 developing economies over the period 1966–
1970 demonstrated per capita GNP to be the most dominant variable in deter-
mining per-capita FDI. Kravis and Lipsey (1982) observed a significantly pos-
itive impact of the host country’s market size on the location decision of U. S.
multinationals in the 1960s. Nigh (1985), in an econometric analysis using
pooled aggregate data on US manufacturing investment in 24 countries over the
period 1954–1975, found per-capita GDP of the host country to be an impor-
tant factor determining FDI. Schneider and Frey (1985) analyzed a single equa-
tion politico-economic model using aggregate data on 54 less developed econ-
omies for 1976, 1979, and 1980, to conclude that real per capita GNP is the
most significant determinant of per-capita FDI.
Culem (1988), in his study of bilateral flows of direct investment among 6
industrialized countries over the period 1969–1982, found strong support for
the market-size hypothesis. Similar conclusions were drawn for the country
composition of UK manufacturing FDI by Papanastassiou and Pearce (1990),
for Swedish FDI by Swedenborg (1979), and for US FDI (both aggregate and
manufacturing) by Dunning (1980).
The results obtained by Wheeler and Mody (1992) in their econometric
analysis of a single equation model using aggregate sectoral data on US multi-
national investment in 42 countries over the period 1982–1988 demonstrate
that market-size is an important factor in determining multinational investor re-
sponse and that it plays an even more significant role in the developing econo-
mies than in the industrial economies. Sader (1993) in his cross-country regres-
sion, using data on 21 developing economies over the period 1988–1992,
observed a strong correlation between FDI and market-size. Tsai (1994) in an
econometric analysis of a non-linear simultaneous equations model using
pooled aggregate data for 62 countries over the period 1975–1978 and for 51
countries over the period 1983–1986 demonstrated that a larger market-size is
associated with a higher level of inward FDI. Shamsuddin (1994), Billington
(1999), and Pistoresi (2000) arrived at a similar conclusion.
97
It is evident, therefore, that the support for the market-size hypothesis is gen-
erally valid across a variety of countries, periods, and specification of variables.
While the market size variable may have statistical and conceptual prob-
lems, in keeping with this paper’s focus on assessing the statistical sensitivity
of past findings these problems are mentioned only briefly. First, while per-cap-
ita GDP has served as a proxy for market size in most empirical works on the
determinants of FDI and has, by far, been the most widely accepted as having
a significantly positive impact on FDI, some studies have used absolute GDP
as an alternative measure. It has been pointed out 19 that absolute GDP is a rel-
atively poor indicator of market potential for the products of foreign investors,
particularly in many developing economies, since it reflects size of the popula-
tion rather than income. On the one hand, for the purpose of the EBA, given
that the dataset includes countries of different size it seems appropriate to scale
the variables by population. On the other hand, the use of per-capita data may
introduce a bias in that it places the high-population countries in a less-attrac-
tive category. In line with these issues and the understanding that per-capita
GDP and absolute GDP mirror two very different aspects of market-size, in that
per-capita GDP reflects the income level while absolute GDP reflects the size
of the whole economy, for the EBA, per-capita GDP as well as absolute GDP
of the host country, in current U.S. dollars, are used as alternative proxies for
market size.
Second, some studies have used GNP or per-capita GNP as measures of mar-
ket size. However, GNP appears to be a less appropriate measure of the market
size of the multinationals’ products than GDP, for obvious reasons. On the one
hand, GNP captures earnings by nationals in foreign locations and, therefore,
over-estimates the market for the products of multinationals located in the
home country. On the other hand, GNP excludes the earnings of foreigners lo-
cated in the home country and, therefore, under-estimates the market for the
products of multinationals located in the home country.
I-variables: The I-variables (variables of interest) include the host country’s
wage (W), openness (OP), real exchange rate (REX), tariff (TAR), trade balance
(NX), growth rate of real GDP (GRGDP), and tax rate (TAX). W is the industrial
wage rate measured in U. S. dollars at current market prices. OP measures the
ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. REX denotes the real exchange
rate 20. TAR is measured by average tariff on intermediate and final goods.
GRGDP is growth rate of GDP calculated on an annual percentage basis. NX
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measures the value of exports less imports in U.S. dollars at current market
prices. TAX captures taxes on income, profits and capital gains as a percentage
of current revenue.
Wage: Wage has been the most controversial of all the potential determi-
nants of FDI. Theoretically, the importance of cheap labor in attracting multi-
nationals is agreed upon by the proponents of the dependency hypothesis as
well as those of the modernization hypothesis, though with very different
implications 21. There is, however, no unanimity even among the comparatively
small number of studies that have explored the role of wage in affecting FDI:
results range from higher host country wages discouraging inbound FDI to hav-
ing no significant effect or even a positive association.
Goldsbrough (1979), Saunders (1982), Flamm (1984), Schneider and Frey
(1985), Culem (1988), Shamsuddin (1994), and Pistoresi (2000) demonstrated
that higher wage discouraged FDI. Sader (1993) observed a significantly nega-
tive impact of wages on FDI in a share equation but only a weak inverse link in a
per-capita regression. Tsai (1994) obtained a strong support for the cheap-labor
hypothesis over the period 1983–1986 but only weak support over 1975–1978.
Owen (1982), while analyzing the inter-industry determinants of FDI in Ca-
nadian manufacturing industries, found wage differentials between Canada and
the US to be statistically insignificant. Gupta (1983) found that the wage of pro-
duction workers in Canada relative to their counterparts in the US was not a sig-
nificant determinant in a comprehensive model. Edwards (1990) observed an
insignificant effect of wage on FDI for a cross-section of 58 developing coun-
tries during the period 1971–1981. Caves (1974), Swedenborg (1979), and
Nankani (1979) obtained a positive association between inbound FDI and the
real wage. Wheeler and Mody (1992) obtained a significantly positive impact
of the wage on FDI in the electronics industry but only a weak positive link in
the manufacturing sector.
Openness: There is mixed evidence regarding the significance of openness
(measured mostly by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) in determining
FDI, as well. The maintained hypothesis is: given that most investment projects
are directed towards the tradable sector, a country’s degree of openness to in-
ternational trade should be a relevant factor in the decision. Kravis and Lipsey
(1982), Culem (1988), Edwards (1990), and Pistoresi (2000) reported a strong
21. The dependency theorists argue that MNCs create an ‘international division of labor’ in a way
that ‘high-paying white collar jobs’ are located in the source country whereas ‘low-paying blue
collar’ jobs are located in the host country. The modernization theorists do not refute the pos-
sibility of such an international division of labor – they argue that all international economic
activity create a division of labor and it is indeed from the resulting specialization that mutual
gains from trade are generated.
99
positive effect of openness on FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992) observed strong
support for the hypothesis in the manufacturing sector but a weak negative link
in the electronics sector. Schmitz and Bieri (1972) obtained a weak positive
link between openness and FDI.
Exchange Rate: The exchange rate is often cited as a critical determinant of
FDI. The currency area hypothesis runs as follows: the weaker the currency of
a country the less likely it is that foreign firms will invest in that location. The
crucial assumption of this theory is the existence of a bias in the capital market:
the bias is assumed to arise because an income stream from a country with a
weak currency is associated with an exchange rate risk and, therefore, an in-
come stream is capitalized at a higher rate by the market when it is owned by a
weak currency firm (Aliber 1970). A more elaborate theory based on capital
market imperfections with similar implications was developed by Froot and
Stein (1989). Caves (1988), Froot and Stein (1991), Blonigen (1995) and Blo-
nigen and Feenstra (1996) observed strong negative correlations between a
country’s exchange rate (foreign currency per domestic currency) and FDI. Ed-
wards (1990) reported a significantly positive effect of the exchange rate on
FDI. Sader (1991) and Tuman and Emmert (1999) observed that the exchange
rate has an insignificant effect on FDI in a share regression but a significantly
negative effect in a per-capita regression.
Trade Barriers: The effect of trade barriers on FDI has also been widely de-
bated. The tariff discrimination hypothesis holds that to avoid obstacles in
trade, resulting from the imposition of a tariff, foreign investment is undertaken
in the country to which it is difficult to export because of the tariff obstacle;
trade liberalization allows goods to move freely and, hence, is expected to re-
duce the amount of international investment (Mundell 1957). Schmitz and
Bieri (1972) and Lunn (1980) observed a significantly positive effect of trade
barriers on FDI. Culem (1988) reported a significantly negative correlation be-
tween trade barriers and FDI. Beaurdeau (1986) and Blonigen and Feenstra
(1996) found that trade barriers play an insignificant role in attracting FDI.
Trade Deficit: The trade deficit has often been referred to as being an im-
portant determinant of FDI. The hypothesis, based on Torissi (1985), is that a
trade surplus is indicative of a dynamic and healthy economy with export po-
tential and is therefore likely to encourage FDI. Torissi (1985), Schneider and
Frey (1985), Hein (1992), Dollar (1992) and Lucas (1993) reported a strong
positive correlation between trade surpluses and FDI. Culem (1988), Tsai
(1994), and Shamsuddin (1994), on the other hand, observed a significantly
positive effect of trade deficit on FDI.
Growth: The role of growth in attracting FDI has also been the subject of
controversy. The growth hypothesis maintains that a rapidly growing economy
100
provides relatively better opportunities for making profits than the ones grow-
ing slowly or not growing at all (Lim 1983). Bandera and White (1968), Lunn
(1980), Schneider and Frey (1985), Culem (1988), and Billington (1999) ob-
served a significantly positive effect of growth on FDI. Tsai (1994) obtained
strong support for the hypothesis over the period 1983–1986 but only a weak
link over 1975–1978. Nigh (1988), on the other hand, reported a differential
impact of growth on FDI: a weak positive correlation for the less developed
economies and a weak negative correlation for the developed countries.
Tax: The literature remains fairly inconclusive as to whether FDI may be
sensitive to tax incentives. Hartman (1984), Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines
and Rice (1994), Loree and Guisinger (1995), Guisinger (1995), Cassou
(1997), Kemsley (1998), and Billington (1999) observed that host country cor-
porate taxes (corporate and income) have a significant negative effect on FDI
flows. Root and Ahmed (1978), Lim (1983), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Jack-
son and Markowski (1995), Yulin and Reed (1995), and Porcano and Price
(1996) have concluded that taxes do not have a significant effect on FDI. Swen-
son (1994) reported a positive correlation between taxes and FDI.
Z-variables: The pool of variables, from which the Z-variables (doubtful
variables) are chosen, include all the I-variables and inflation (INF), budget
deficit (DEF), domestic investment (DI), external debt (ED), government con-
sumption (GC), and political stability (PS). Lower case letters represent the
per-capita measurement of the corresponding variable. DEF measures the
budget deficit in U.S. dollars at current market prices. INF is based on con-
sumer price indices (CPI). DI measures domestic investment in U.S. dollars at
current market prices. ED is measured by public and publicly guaranteed exter-
nal debt in U.S. dollars at current market prices. GC represents government
consumption in U.S. dollars at current market prices. PS is measured by the
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) political stability index.
The list of Z-variables can be extended to include variables like human cap-
ital, natural resources, infrastructure etc. 22, but even the set considered in this
paper yields substantial amount of fragility in the coefficients of the variables
of interest.
101
Table 2 below lists all variables used in the EBA. Note that some of the explan-
atory variables are in per-capita terms (i.e., scaled by population) since the
sample includes countries of vastly different size.
Table 2
List of Variables
In the case of PS, problems may arise due to the fact that the concept embodies
a variety of concerns, ranging from production disruptions (riots, strikes etc.),
coups, civil wars, institutionally sanctioned dissolution of legislature, to a
change in macroeconomic management or the regulatory environment. This
makes the measurement of political uncertainty inherently difficult. The exist-
ing literature has so far used a variety of indices, none of which can be regarded
as being meaningfully comprehensive. The BERI political stability index used
here for the EBA ranges from 0 (prohibitive political risk) to 100 (complete sta-
bility) and takes into account internal causes of political risk (e.g., linguistic,
102
V. RESULTS
First an EBA is performed on the base equation which regresses the level of
per-capita FDI exclusively on per-capita GDP (gdp) and absolute GDP (GDP).
The t-statistics are provided in parentheses below the estimated parameters.
23. For a list of countries included in the sample see the Appendix (Data).
24. Results from the same EBA were reported in Chakrabarti (1998 a, chapter 1) for earlier years
(1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990). The conclusions were strikingly similar in that market size
(GDP) was found to be the only robust predictor of FDI.
25. The BERI multi-component system of country risk assessment was developed in the mid 1960s
and was opened to general subscription in 1971. The political stability index was constructed
by a group of more than 60 political scientists from over the world and is used by hundreds of
major corporations, banks and government agencies to assess risk in conducting international
business. See Chakrabarti (1998 a, chapter 3).
103
Table 3
Sensitivity Results for the X-Variables (Dependent Variable: fdi)
Table 3 presents the EBA test for per-capita GDP and absolute GDP using fdi
as the dependent variable. The coefficient of per-capita GDP is positive and ro-
bust. At the lower bound the coefficient of per-capita GDP is 0.00115 with a t-
statistic of 3.06; at the upper bound it is 0.0221 with a t-statistic of 3.27. The
robust positive relationship between fdi and gdp confirms that there is enough
independent variation in gdp that can significantly explain some of the cross-
country differences in fdi. However, the positive coefficient of absolute GDP is
not robust: at the lower bound the coefficient of absolute GDP is 0.1149 with a
t-statistic of 1.38.
Given the robustness of the base regression (4a), the main aim of the rest of
the paper is to evaluate the degree of confidence one should have in the partial
correlations between fdi and other potential candidates, some of which are
more controversial than the others, that have found their place in the empirical
literature on the determinants of FDI. Before reporting the results from the for-
mal EBA it is, perhaps, useful to note that Table 4, in a crude sense, anticipates
some of the paper’s findings in this direction. Most (6 out of 7) of the I-variables
(tax, wage, openness, exchange rate, tariff, and growth rate) show a low and in-
104
significant correlation with the residuals calculated from the base regressions
of fdi on the X-variable. Therefore, while many of these variables may be found
to be significantly related to FDI in cross-country regressions, it is not unlikely
that at least some of these relationships depend critically on which factors are
being held constant.
Table 4
Magnitude of Cross-Country Correlations
Table 5 summarizes the results from the EBA. The number of observations
fluctuates across I-variables due to missing data problems. For each I-variable
I have used the same sample across all regressions to ensure that fragility in any
coefficient is due exclusively to the configuration of Z-variables and not a
change in the sample size and composition 26. The results signify that, for each
of the I-variables, one can find a significant coefficient of the theoretically pre-
dicted sign only by selectively adding and combining explanatory variables as
there is not enough independent variation in any of these variables to explain
cross-country differences in FDI.
26. Allowing the sample to vary across regressions for any given I-variable would enlarge the sam-
ple but undermine the power of the conclusions since a change in the size and composition of
the sample can highlight underlying heterogeneity. For instance, when the sample comprises
lots of countries without natural resources, wage can have a significant effect on FDI but not
so when these countries are absent. Moreover, homogenizing the sample only makes it more
difficult to implicate past findings as fragile.
105
Table 5
Sensitivity Results for the I-Variables (Dependent Variable: fdi; X-Variable: gdp)
106
tory variables. On the other hand, most of the studies reporting a negative sig-
nificant coefficient on REX, combined it with openness, government consump-
tion etc., among the other explanatory variables.
Next I look at the entire distribution of the estimated coefficients. Table 6
ranks the explanatory variables in terms of their relative likelihood of being
correlated with FDI. Column (i) reports the weighted mean (using (1)) of the
estimated coefficients for each explanatory variable. Column (ii) reports the
weighted standard error (using (2)). Column (iii) reports the level of signifi-
cance under the assumption of normality.
Table 6
The Distribution of Estimated Coefficients of the I-Variables
(Dependent Variable: FDI; X-Variable: gdp)
The Table departs from the labeling of variables as ‘robust’ or ‘fragile’ and as-
signs some level of confidence to each of the variables. OP has the highest like-
lihood of being correlated with FDI among all the explanatory variables clas-
sified as ‘fragile’ by the EBA. It is followed by W, nx, GRGDP, TAX, TAR, and
REX, in descending order of their likelihood of being correlated with FDI. The
results also indicate that, on an average, the variables OP, GRGDP, TAX are
more likely to be positively correlated with FDI and the variables W, nx, TAR,
and REX are more likely to be negatively correlated with FDI. In some sense,
the distribution results validate the studies of Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Culem
(1988), and Edwards (1990). The evidence encourages policy makers, intent on
increasing FDI, to increase participation in international trade.
107
VI. CONCLUSION
108
APPENDIX
Data
109
Descriptive Statistics
Variable n Mean s. d.
FDI 135 1415128231 4880873637
GDP 135 1.48664E+11 6.60644E+11
PS 69 50.75510204 13.54703321
TAX 93 23.67691496 13.21298478
W 83 22.94274007 11.39983
OP 135 82.77454365 48.04049161
REX 74 99.56710405 21.10948405
DEF 92 – 3.061887665 4.560416836
INF 135 352.0706829 2271.095486
TAR 79 10.53848111 11.2782549
DI 135 35368409919 1.53027E+11
GC 135 25195971567 1.04234E+11
GRGDP 135 2.128340173 7.417818667
ED 135 12989058696 26813020839
NX 134 – 400302268.2 15335212296
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SUMMARY
A vast empirical literature has used ad hoc linear cross-country regressions to search for the deter-
minants of FDI. The literature is extensive and controversial. Can policy-makers use this body of re-
search to learn anything that can help them stimulate FDI? The author uses Extreme Bound Analysis
(EBA) to examine if any of the conclusions from the existing studies is robust to small changes in
the conditioning information set. The EBA upholds the robustness of the correlation between FDI
and market-size, as measured by per-capita GDP, but indicates that the relation between FDI and
many of the controversial variables (namely, tax, wage, openness, exchange rate, tariff, growth, and
trade balance) are highly sensitive to small alterations in the conditioning information set. The author
also studies the distribution of the estimated coefficients of the controversial explanatory variables
to rank them in order of their likelihood of their being correlated with FDI.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Eine umfangreiche empirische Literatur hat mit Hilfe von ad-hoc-Querschnittsregressionen nach den
Determinanten der direkten Auslandsinvestition (DA) gesucht. Die Publikationen sind ebenso um-
fangreich wie widersprüchlich. Können politische Entscheidungsträger aus diesen gesammelten Re-
cherchen Lehren ziehen über die Förderung der DA? In dieser Arbeit wird mittels der Extreme Bound
Analyse (EBA) untersucht, ob Schlussfolgerungen aus den vorliegenden Studien geringen Verände-
rungen des bestimmenden Informationssatzes standhalten. Die EBA bestätigt die Robustheit der
Korrelation zwischen DA und Marktgrösse, gemessen als Bruttosozialprodukt pro Kopf, zeigt aber
auf, dass das Verhältnis zwischen DA und zahlreichen kontroversen Variablen (wie z.B. Steuern, Ein-
kommen, Öffnung, Wechselkurs, Zölle, Wachstum und Handelsbilanz) auch auf geringe Schwankun-
gen im bestimmenden Informationssatz reagiert. Darüber hinaus untersuchen wir auch die Verteilung
der geschätzten Koeffizienten der kontroversen Erklärungsvariablen, um sie nach der Wahrschein-
lichkeit ihrer Korrelation zur DA zu ordnen.
RÉSUMÉ
De nombreuses documentations ont utilisé et adapté les principes de régression linéaire à travers le
pays pour expliquer les facteurs de l’investissement direct à l’étranger (IDE). Cette documentation
est considérable et controversée. Les responsables politiques peuvent-ils utiliser ce corps de recher-
che afin de trouver quelque élément qui puisse aider à stimuler l’IDE? Dans cet article, j’utilise
l’Analyse Appliquée Extrême (AAE) pour déterminer si certaines des conclusions des études déjà
existantes résistent à de légers changements effectués sur le groupe d’informations déterminantes.
L’AAE confirme la solidité de la corrélation entre l’IDE et la taille du marché, calculée en PIB par
personne, mais indique que la relation entre l’IDE et grand nombre des variables controversées
(c’est-à-dire les taxes, les salaires, la franchise, les taux d’échanges, les tarifs douaniers, la crois-
sance et l’équilibre commercial) est extrêmement sensible aux faibles altérations dans le groupe d’in-
formations déterminantes. J’étudie également la distribution des coefficients estimés des variables
explicatives controversées afin de les classer en fonction de leur possibilité d’être en corrélation avec
l’IDE.
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