RULE 111:PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
charges. Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried.
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions
Cruz vs Mina
Facts: Ferdinand Cruz, a third year law student, filed before the
MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance as private prosecutor for the
criminal case of grave threats, where his father is the complaining
witness. MeTC denied his petition, so he elevated this to the RTC.
The RTC denied his petition, stating that since there was no claim for
civil liability for damages, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable
Issue: Can the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats be prosecuted
despite the absence of a claim for civil liability for damages?
Ruling:YES
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable EXCEPT in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality,flight to an enemy country, and
crime against popular representation. The basic rule applies in the
instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation,
waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in the criminal case
for grave threats, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
Ricarze vs CA
Facts: Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial
services. He was assigned particularly to Caltex Philippines, Inc.
main office in Makati City. His task was to collect checks payable to
Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to
Caltex customers.Caltex, filed a criminal complaint against
Ricarze for estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Romano's (manager of banking dept.) allegations: While his
department was conducting a daily electronic report from
PCIB Makati Branch, one of its depository banks, it was discovered
that unknown to the department, a company check in the amount of
P5.7M payable to Dante Gutierrez had been cleared to through
PCIB. An investigation also revealed that two other checks were
missing and that in one of the checks, his signature as well as another
signatory, Victor Goquinco, was forged. Another check in the
amount of P1.7M was also cleared through the same bank and the
signatures appearing thereon were also forgeries.
Gutierrez, the name appearing on the checks was a regular customer
of Caltex. He disowned such savings account as well as his
signatures on the dorsal portions thereof. He also denied
having withdrawn from such savings account.
Further investigation revealed that said account has actually been
opened by petitioner Ricarze. The forged checks were deposited and
endorsed by him under Gutierrez's name. He was positively
identified by the bank teller, Winnie dela Cruz.PCIB credited the
amount of P581,229 to Caltex. However the City Prosecutor of
Makati was not informed of this development. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, two (2) Informations for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents were filed against
Ricarze.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
When petitioner Ricarze was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to both
Prosecution presented its witnesses after which Siguion
Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law offices (SRMO) as private
prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.
Contention of Ricarze:
Petitioner opposed the pleading contending that private complainant
was represented by ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices
during trial and it was only after the prosecution rested its case that
SRMO law office entered its appearance for PCIB. Since ACCRA
and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their
appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private
prosecutor. Under the Informations, the complainant was Caltex
and not PCIB, hence the formal offer of evidence by SRMO should
be stricken from the records.That unless the informations were
amended to change the complainant to PCIB, his right as accused
would be prejudiced, as he had already
been arraigned under the original informations. Amendments to the
informations would place him in double jeopardy.
Counter-Argument of PCIB:
It had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex when it
recredited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity.
Consequently, it is entitled to any civil indemnity which the
trial court would adjudge against the accused.
Sec. 2, Rule 110 also provides: the erroneous designation of the
name of the offended party is a mere formal defect which can be
cured by inserting the offended party in the information. PCIB
cited Sayson v. People.
Ruling of RTC:
Granted motion of private prosecutor for substitution of PCIB as
complainant for Caltex.Denied petitioner's motion to expunge the
formal offer of evidence by SRMO. Petitioner filed motion for
reconsideration but was denied by RTC.CA affirmed RTC. That
PCIB was subrogated to thr rights of Caltex when it restored the
amount of checks to Caltex and that the designation of the name of
the offended party is not absolutely indispensible for as long as the
criminal act complained of can be properly identified.
Issue: W/N Substitution by PCIB in place of Caltex was valid
Ruling:Yes the substitution was valid.
Petitioner's knowledge, consent or acquiescence of said substition is
NOT necessary because the instant case is one of LEGAL
subrogation which takes place by operation of law and without need
of the debtor's knowledge, as opposed to conventional subrogation
which takes place by agreement of the parties.
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal
actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in
damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly
instituted, and the offended party has not waived the civil action,
reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action
prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action
(including the civil) remains under the control and supervision of
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public
function.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by
counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would
only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of
the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into
one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating
the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same
or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
(So since this is a criminal action, civil liability is impliedly instituted.
Then since naay civil liabilty, maka substitute si PCIB ni Caltex kay
naa mn silay claim sa civil indemnity thru their private prosecutor)
Heirs of Sarah Burgos vs CA
Facts: A number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie
Palma Burgos while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle
Erasmo Palma. Another uncle, Victor Palma, and a friend, Benigno
Oquendo, survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a
land transaction gone sour between Sarahs live-in partner, David So,
and respondent Johnny Co motivated the assault.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman
and Romeo Martin who executed confessions, allegedly admitting
their part in the attack. They pointed to two others who helped
them. After trial, the RTC acquitted them both.
After 10 years Co surrendered to the National Bureau of
Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, Co
pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After
hearing the RTC granted bail on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration] but the
RTC, now presided over by another judge, denied the same. This
prompted the victims heirs to file a special civil action
of certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction.
The CA dismissed the petition, however, for having been filed
without involving the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil
action of certiorari, which questioned the RTCs grant of bail to
respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended
parties and without the OSGs intervention.
Ruling:Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the
criminal. The civil aspect is borne of the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable.
The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the
accused is the defendant, is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to
avoid multiplicity of suits.
But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the
case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not
automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can
be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The
offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and
appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine
the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with
his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense,
the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the
accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the
state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate
counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute
proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of
the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the
event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact
on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by
final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been
arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when
warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
(the case was granting of bail ila gi question through the CA but gi
dismiss sa CA kay only the OSG can institute the proceedings
before the CA or SC. Pwede ra unta to nga sila ang mo institute IF
civil case but dli mn civil case ang granting of bail mao gi dismiss sa
SC)
ABS-CBN vs Ombudsman
Facts: Senator Fernandez, representing Benedicto, met with Senator
Tañada to discuss on how to arrive at a reasonable rental for the use
of ABS-CBN stations and facilities. Thereafter, they entered into a
letter-agreement with ABS-CBN.
Barely two weeks from their entry into the ABS Broadcast Center,
KBS personnel started making unauthorized withdrawals from the
ABS Stock Room. All these withdrawals of supplies and equipment
were made under the orders of Benedicto, et. al. No payment was
ever made by either Benedicto for all the supplies and equipment
withdrawn from the ABS Broadcast Center.
Lopez, as officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN, executed separate
complaint-affidavits charging private respondents, Benedicto et al,
with various crimes penalized under the RPC.
The Ombudsman did not give rise to probable cause necessary to
indict respondents for the various felonies charged. Hence, this
recourse by the petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman's Joint Resolution and Order.
Subsequently, Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death (With
Prayer for Dismissal) moving that Benedicto be dropped as
respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending
criminal cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive
the death of the party accused."
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent,
citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals which held that "civil liability of
the accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for
the extinguishment of civil obligations."
Issue: Whether or not a criminal prosecution will proceed to
prosecute civil liability notwithstanding the death of an accused
during the pendency of the case as decided in People vs Bayotas.
Ruling:No. The Criminal prosecution will not proceed to prosecute
civil liability but without prejudice to the filing of a separate civil
action against the estate of Benedicto.
The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is
extinguished together with his criminal liability, has long been
clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at
bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists
is stripped of merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the
respondents. The Ombudsman did not find probable cause to
prosecute respondents for various felonies in the RPC. As such, the
rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along with the criminal
action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b)
reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action,16 is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas, the death of the
accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case
against him, regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The
civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on
other sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil
Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused
founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a
separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the
criminal action is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be
continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action.
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed
our ruling in People v. Bayotas by filing a separate civil action to
enforce a claim against the estate of respondent Benedicto. The
claim against the estate of Benedicto is based on contract-the June
8, 1973 letter- agreement-in consonance with Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents Benedicto
and Tan as parties herein is in order.
(Ana si respondents nga the death daw of Benedicto extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as his civil liability.
SC: Since Ombudsman level paman ni, wala pa’y criminal case to
speak of kay ombudsman did not find pobable cause and it dismissed
the complaint. So the rules still dont apply in the case at bar.
But since ni file na ug separate civil action and petitioners based on a
contract [which is accdg to Bayotas case, pwede ra under Article
1157 of the Civil Code] then mo push thru ang separate civil action
against the estate of Benedicto.)
Hun Hyung Park vs Eun Wong Choi
Facts: Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati for issuing a postdated
check in the amount of P1,875,000. The same was dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Choi filed a demurer to
evidence after the prosecution rested its case. The Makati
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
Metropolitan Trial Court granted the Demurrer and dismissed the
case.
Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the dismissal
of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. RTC held that
while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent‘s
criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its
decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further
proceedings, so that the defendant may adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case should
include its civil aspect.
Ruling:No.
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly
instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial
court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any.
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly
liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where;
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as
proof beyond reasonable doubt (for the criminal case), it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a
preponderance of evidence (for the civil case). For if the court grants
the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally
proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on
demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there
is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil
aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar
v. People, held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed
the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
(So since MeTC dismissed the case without any finding that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist,
THEN civil aspect of the case may proceed bisan gi dismiss na ang
criminal case)
Lo Bun Tiung vs Balboa
Principle: A separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in
cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is
filed ahead of the criminal case.
Facts: Balboa filed two (2) cases against Sps. Benito Lo Bun Tiong
and Caroline Siok Ching Teng:
(1) A CIVIL CASE for sum of money based on the three (3)
post-dated checks issued by Caroline in the total amount of
P5,175,250.00. The Regional Trial Court found the spouses liable
and ordered them to pay the amount.
(2) A CRIMINAL CASE for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
against Caroline covering the said three checks. The Municipal Trial
Court acquitted Caroline but held her civilly liable. On appeal, the
RTC modified the MTC Decision by deleting the award of civil
damages.
The spouses now comes to court charging Balboa with
forum-shopping.
Issue: Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and criminal
cases constitute forum-shopping.
Ruling: Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one
or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually
resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1)
identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the
same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp., the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of
action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a
result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the
prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal
of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
effective September 16, 1997, which provides that "the criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation
to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal
case were filed on February 24, 1997 and on July 21, 1997,
respectively, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No.
57-97 on September 16, 1997. At the time of filing of the cases, the
governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action,
then the civil case may proceed independently of the criminal cases
and there is no forum shopping to speak of. Even under the amended
rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases
of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases.
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.
Lanuzo vs Sy Bon Ping
Principle: The civil action which should be suspended after the
institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not
the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Facts: A Complaint for damages was instituted by the plaintiff
against Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck, and
his driver, Salvador Mendoza. It was alleged that while Mendoza was
driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San
Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless
negligence, he rammed into the residential house and store of
plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to
the ground causing damage to plaintiff. Plaintiff lost his means of
livelihood from the store.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action,
a Criminal Case for Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence, was pending between the same parties for the same
cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an
express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for
damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit. The lower
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss. The trial Court rendered a
default judgment in plaintiff's favor. The judgment ordered the
defendants to pay jointly and severally. They appealed the case to
CA contending that "after the criminal action has been commenced
the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action."
Issue: WON the civil case instituted by the petitioner shall be
suspended
Ruling:
The plaintiff made a reservation before the Municipal Court in the
criminal case of his right to institute a civil action separately.
"UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before
this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
"1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police
included in the complaint the claim of the undersigned for civil
liability;
"2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil
action for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused herein and his
employer;
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of
record therein and that the civil aspect of the above-entitled case be
not included herein.
x x x x x."
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make
out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in
plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee relationship
between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store
were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck
"recklessly, with gross negligence and imprudence, without
observance of traffic rules and regulations and without regard to the
safety of persons and property", and praying that appellants be held
jointly and solidarily liable for damages. These are, basically, what
should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict.

As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim
for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with
this independent civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot
have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict.
And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed
independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case,
except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant.
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of the
criminal action, is that arising from delict, and not the civil action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Manliclic vs Calaunan
Principle: It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if
based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
Facts: Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic
and the owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan
and driven by Marcelo Mendoza collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to
the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. By reason
of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead
of the civil case. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it
acquitted Manliclic not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that
he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
Issue: WON Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision
and be found negligent not withstanding the declaration of
the CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of negligence
on his part
Ruling: In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held
liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil
action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2
(b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that
is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only.However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that
he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon
or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be
instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there
is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Aleria vs Mendoza
Principle: The rule of preference in favor of a criminal case does not
apply when the civil action is a prejudicial question.
Facts: A civil case was filed for unpaid wages due to a number of
laborers. There was then a criminal action pending against one of the
defendants for protracted delay in the payment of said wages as
penalized by Commonwealth Act No. 303. The defendant, asked for
the suspension of the civil action until the criminal case be finally
disposed of. The Court granted the request and the laborers appealed.
Issue: WON the order of suspension is valid.
Ruling: The order of suspension is wrong. The rule that a civil action
shall be suspended until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
case, applies when the civil action arises from the offense charged in
the criminal case. Here, the offense charged is extended delay in the
payment of wages which is penalized by law, and the civil action
arises not from such an extended delay but from the contract of
services entered into by the parties. Whether or not there has been a
protracted delay, the payment of wages due is demandable. The
success of the civil action does not depend upon proof of an existing
offense.
Furthermore, the rule of preference in favor of a criminal case does
not apply when the civil action is a prejudicial question.
(10 Enciclopedia Juridica Española, pp. 229-231.) For instance, in a
criminal case for bigamy, the civil action for annulment of the
annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial questioned for
there can be no extended delay in the payment of such obligation
unless extended delay in the payment of such obligation unless the
obligation be first proved.
Parker vs Panlilio
Principle: The failure on the part of the petitioner to reserve her right
to institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be
deemed as a waiver on her part to institute a separate civil action
against the respondent company based on its contractual liability, or
on culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Facts: Asuncion Parker, filed a complaint for damages against
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., based on the alleged failure of the
defendant to carry safely one Richard Parker on its plane PI-C98
from Daet Camarines Norte to Manila. Defendant’s answer to the
complaint is that the plain PI-C98 exploded in mid-air due to
"dynamite surreptitiously introduced into sad air craft by criminal
"for which crime a criminal case was file in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte against the supposed guilty parties.
The defendant presented an oral motion for the suspension of the
hearing invoking the support thereof subsection (c), Section 1, Rule
107, of the Rules of the Court, which provides that no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted until final
judgement in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. The court
suspended the hearing until the final determination of the criminal
case which was the pending appeal in the Supreme Court.
Petitioner contends that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of
discretion in suspending the hearing of civil case until the final
determination of the criminal case because her cause of action in the
civil case is based on culpa contractual and on the civil liability
arising from the offense involved in the criminal case and it is,
therefore, a mistake on the part of the respondent Judge to consider
and apply in the support of his action section 1, Rule 107, of the
Rules of Court.
On the other hand, respondents contented that "When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the
civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately," and that,
inasmuch as the petitioner had failed to expressly reserve her right to
institute another action separately, she may not now institute another
action under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code based on the act or
omission complained of in the criminal action.
Issue: WON the suspension of hearing of the civil case is valid
Ruling: YES. The SC finds merit in the contention that the present
civil case is based upon a cause of action not arising from the civil
liability involved in the criminal case instituted against the accused in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte. The civil case is
based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by respondent
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. because of its failure to carry safely the late
Richard Parker to his place of destination, whereas the criminal case
involves the civil liability of the accused, who bear no relation
whatsoever with said entity, and are complete strangers to it. The
failure, therefore, on the part of the petitioner to reserve her right to
institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be
deemed as a waiver on her part to institute a separate civil action
against the respondent company based on its contractual liability, or
on culpa aquiliana under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. law
library
It should be here emphasized that these two actions are separate and
distinct and should not be confused one with the other. In the
supposition that the one accused in the criminal case is a driver,
employee, or dependent of the respondent company, the failure to
reserve the right to institute a separate civil action in the
criminal case would not necessarily constitute a bar to the
institution of the civil action against respondent, for the cause of
action in one is different from that in the other. These are two
independent actions based on distinct causes of action.
A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime
and responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose
which remedy to enforce (Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil.
607).
But it cannot be denied that the present civil case is directly
interwoven with the criminal case in the sense that the main issue
involved in both cases is the determination of the failure of Richard
Parker to reach safety his destination or the determination of the
cause of his death. And this is the main reason that guided the lower
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
court in postponing the hearing of the civil case until final judgment
in the criminal case has been rendered.
Babala vs Albaño
Facts: Upon a dispute over a market stall, the respondent Patricio
Canela filed an information for grave coercion in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte, against the petitioner Pedro Babala.
The respondent also filed in said court a civil action against the
petitioner for damages on the same facts alleged in the information
for grave coercion, in which action respondent prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In the civil case, the
petitioner insisted that the criminal case should have precedence. The
court, issued an order providing that the trial of the civil case upon
the merits was suspended until after the criminal case shall have been
decided and terminated, but that the hearing on the petition for
preliminary injunction might be proceeded with. The petitioner files
for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the order.
Issue: WON the criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case,
including the matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Ruling: NO. Although the civil action is suspended until final
judgment in the criminal case, the court is not thereby deprived of its
authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of
bonds, and other processes of similar nature which do not go into the
merits of the case. It was reasoned out that "if those ancillary
processes cannot be resorted to during the suspension, there is no
sense in the rule providing only for suspension, when its effect is to
kill the action."
Jose-Cosing vs People
Facts: Rafael Consing and his mother Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz)
obtained a loan from Unicapital which was secured by a real estate
mortgage constituting a parcel of land. With its option to purchase
the mortgaged property, Unicapital purchased one-half of the
property and the other half was purchased by Plus Builders Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture of Unicapital. Before they could develop
the property, they learned that the title to the property was in the
names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng and that the TCT held
by petitioners appeared to be spurious. Petitioner filed a civil case
(Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection. Unicapital
initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document (Makati criminal case) and also sued petitioner
(Makati civil case) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages,
with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner
moved to defer his arraignment in the (Makati criminal case) on the
ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of
the (Pasig and Makati civil cases). * The RTC issued an order
suspending the proceedings in the (Makati criminal case) on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
In the meanwhile, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for
damages against petitioner (Manila civil case) and an information
was filed for estafa through falsification of public document (Cavite
criminal case). Again, petitioner filed a motion to defer the
arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question
(the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases) which was denied.
Petitioner filed in CA special civil action for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin his arraignment and trial in (Cavite criminal case).
The CA granted the petition enjoining the RTC from proceeding with
the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila cases had finally
decided. The state assailed the decision, which the CA granted and
reversed its previous ruling. Petitioner contends that the CA did not
consider the pendency of the (Makati civil case) which raised a
prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil
action would include the issue of whether they falsified a certificate
of title or had willfully defrauded of Unicapital, the resolution of
either of which would determine his guilt or innocence.
Issue: WON there exist prejudicial question that would warrant
suspension of the proceeding in the (Makati) criminal case.
Ruling: NO, the Unicapital’s complaint (Makati civil case) reveals
that the action was predicated on fraud. As such, the action was one
that could proceed independently of criminal case pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code. It is well settled that a civil action based on
fraud may be independently instituted and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.
Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Article 33 (fraud), the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission in
the criminal action. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be
suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that
Unicapital had filed.
Coscolluela vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman received a letter-complaint
from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the
anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the
Province of Negros Occidental in the amount of 20M which
allegedly happened around a month before petitioner (governor)
stepped down from office. Case Building Team of the Office of the
ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a
final evaluation report which upgraded the complaint into a criminal
case. The graft investigation officer in its resolution, found a
probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”
and recommended the filing of the corresponding information.
However, the information was only filed before the Sandiganbayan
after 6 years. Petitioner argued that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him
were resolved only after almost 8 years since the complaint was
instituted. Respondents on the other hand, argue that they still, had to
go through careful review and revision before its final approval. SB
denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash, it held that the preliminary
investigation was actually resolved 1 year and 4 months from the
date the complaint was filed.
Issue: WON the Province is precluded from instituting a subsequent
civil case based on the delict if only to recover the amount of 20M in
public funds attributable to the petitioner’s malfeasance.
Ruling: NO. The court holds that the petitioners’ right to a speedy
disposition of their criminal case had been violated and that the
criminal case against petitioners should be dismissed. However, it
does not necessarily follow that the petitioners are entirely
exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven
in a subsequent case which the province may opt to pursue. Section 2,
Rule 111 provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the
private offended party pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the
delict, unless the judgement of acquittal explicitly declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil case, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgement that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law
against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
Co vs Muñoz
Facts: Respondent Muῆoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested
for perjury in which in several interviews with the radio station he
made the statement against petitioner Co., a wealthy businessman
that he manipulated the results of the government bidding involving
the Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project. Three criminal
informations for libel were filed before RTC. In his defense,
respondent countered that he revealed the anomalous government
bidding as a call of public duty. The RTC found petitioner guilty of
three counts of libel and was reversed by CA. Petitioner claims
damages on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
and claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in
case of acquittal. Respondent on the other hand argues that since Co
did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising
from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from
filing the present petition to enforce the civil liability.
Issue: WON a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal
insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused’s civil liability.
Ruling: YES, the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 applies to
civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged,
regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the
criminal action. It governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This
is based on Art. 100 of RPC which states that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Each criminal act
gives rise to two libalities: criminal and civil. The Rules precisely
require the judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the
accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may
avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim for civil liability ex
delicto. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when,
notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the offended party may still
claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. In this case,
the respondent is not civilly liable because there was no libel
committed (privileged communication). Without a crime, no civil
liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co. that can be pursued.
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs People
Facts: The accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damages to property. The court ruled
that, in the event of the insolvency of the accused, the petitioner
(employer) shall be liable for the civil liabilities. After the judgement
become final and executory, the accused jumped bailed and remained
at-large. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgement of
the trial court. The CA ruled that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
accused-employee would be to a mend, nullify or defeat a final
judgement. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had
already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction
and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included
In the civil liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary
liability.
Issue: WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense
of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgement of conviction
independently of the accused.
Ruling: NO. The accused employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory. The cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein,
this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.
While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter's lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their
employees in the event of the latter's insolvency. To allow employers
to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latter's consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to
the former's civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the
employee. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee.
Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable
by reason of his flight, then the former's subsidiary civil liability has
also become immediately enforceable.
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions.
ABS-CBN vs Ombudsman
Facts: This case stemmed during the time of Martial Law when
ABS-CBN was ordered to be seized and closed by the Philippine
Government pursuant to the Letters of Instructions No. 1 issued by
President Ferdinand Marcos. Television and Radio stations of
Kanlaon Broadcasting Sytem (KBS) was consumed by fired, KBS is
an umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group of Companies as
well as Radio Philippines Network (RPN) under the Benedicto
Group of Companies owned by Roberto Benedicto. Roberto S.
Benedicto constituted a plan to temporarily use ABS-CBN’s
broadcast studios inorder to Operate RPN or TV Channel 9. The
Lopezes who owned ABS-CBN opposed the plan, however, the
emissary of Benedicto (Alfredo Montelibano) had already mentioned
that Malacañang has already approved of the plan and a government
ordered confiscation of the said company. A letter of agreement was
then implemented to convey by way of lease the broadcasting
equipments of ABS-CBN to RPN via payment of monthly rentals.
One of the problems in this case was throughout the time RPN used
the facilities they did not pay any rentals and hence ABS-CBN
demanded payment of such. When President Corazon Aquino
stepped into power, ABS-CBN requested for the return of their radio
and tv stations which the former acceded to. The Lopezes the filed a
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for the crimes of
Execution of Deeds by means of violence or intimidation, Estafa,
Theft, Robbery, Occupation or Usurpation of Real Property, and
Other Deceits for Benedicto’s ploy in conspiracy with the other
respondents to use and occupy ABS-CBN’s property without
compensation covering their master plan by using the letter of
agreement to give it the image of legality. However, the counsels of
respondent’s Tan and Benedicto filed respective pleadings informing
the court of their client’s demise, moving to drop Benedicto from the
case for the reason "that the pending criminal cases subject of this
appeal are actions which do not survive
the death of the party accused."
Issue: W/N the dropping of respondent Roberto S. Benedicto in the
aforementioned case is proper?
Held: Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent,
citing Torrijos v.Court of Appeals which held that "civil liability of
the accused survives his death;
because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil
obligations."
Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether
the civilliability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together
with his criminal liability,
has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as
a result of the same act
or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. The separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above. EHTCAa
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during theprosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
deprivation of right by prescription. Applying the foregoing rules,
ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench survives because the
civil liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the
respondents. The Ombudsman did not find probable cause to
prosecute respondents for various felonies
in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed
instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party:
(a) waives the civil action, (b) reserves the
right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action, is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas, the death of the
accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case
against him, regardless of the
institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives
the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of
obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil
Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused
founded on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a
separate civil action. In other words, civil
liability based solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a
different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the
same criminal action.
People vs Bayotas
Facts: A criminal case was filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. The Solicitor General was made to
comment and stated that the death of the accused did not extinguish
his criminal liability citing the case of People v Sandaydiego, counsel
for the accused on the other hand opposed the argument.
Issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal ofhis conviction
extinguish his civil liability?
Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise because of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription.
Note: 1.) SC in this cased discussed flip flopping decisions prior to
the case at bar. The rule was not settled then and there were
instances SC justified the Civil Liability arising from crime
may still proceed despite the accused pending appeal.
(People V. Sandaydiego)
People vs Bunay
Facts: RTC of Apayao tried and found Bringas Bunay y Dam-at
(accused) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for qualified rape and was
sentenced to suffer the Supreme Penalty of Death. The accused was
further ordered to pay the victim “AAA” 75,000 pesos by way of
civil indemnity plus exemplary and moral damages of 60,000 pesos.
The case went to the CA and via intermediate review and affirmed
the conviction of the accused for qualified rape. The accused now
goes to the Supreme Court to appeal his conviction. Meanwhile, the
Bureau of Corrections sent a letter to the Court advising that the
accused has died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa
City. The immediate cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest (gi
atake agis ka kulba ang accused tungod sa death sentence nya) with
pneumonia
Issue: W/N the civil liability of the accused is also extinguished
because of his death?
Held: Under the foregoing circumstances, the death of the accused
during thependency of his appeal in this Court totally extinguished
his criminal liability. Suchextinction is based on Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provides:Article 89. How
criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liabilityis
totally extinguished:
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil
liability that was based
exclusively on the crime for which the accused was
convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because no final judgment of
conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only
civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other
than the delict survived the death of the accused, which the
offended party can recover by means of a separate civil
action.
People vs Ayochok
Facts: The accused Jaime Ayuchok y Tauli was found guilty by the
RTC of Baguio beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder of
SPO1 Claudio Caligtan. After trial on the merits he was ordered by
the RTC to indemnify the heirs of the victim 75,000 as civil
indemnity plus moral and actual damages. The case thereafter went
to the Court of Appeals for review and the decision was later
modified by the said court with regards to the civil aspect reducing
the civil indemnity to 50,000 pesos as well as its moral and actual
damages. The Bureau of Corrections then went to inform the
Supreme Court where the case was now under review that Ayochok
had died at the Philippine Genereal Hospital, Manila.
Issue: Effect of death on the present appeal?
Held: Ayochok's death on January 15, 2010, during the pendency of
his appeal,extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of
murder committed against Senior Police Officer 1 Claudio N.
Caligtan, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on
said crime. According to Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability is totallyextinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.
Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the
Court to rule on Ayochok's appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of
the crime charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89
(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisitionin Bayotas, even
assuming Ayochok had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally
extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Ayochok's appeal was
still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered
against him when he died, his civil liability arising from the crime,
being civil liability ex delicto, was likewise extinguished by his
death.
Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar.
Salta vs De Veyra
Facts: Almario Salta was a brach manager of the Philippine National
Bank in Malolos and it was his duty to grant loans or to recommend
granting loans. PNB then filed two civil complaints for
indiscriminately granting certain loans in a manner characterized by
negligence and fraud. The two cases were filed in different salas in
Manila, Branch 14 and 7. The former court (Judge De Veyra) denied
a motion to dismiss the case while the latter court (Judge Purisima)
granted the MD pursuant to the dismissal of the criminal case for
violation of R.A. 3019 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN THE
COURT OF PAMPANGA FOR FAILURE TO PROVE THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
Issue: Whether or not a decision of acquittal in a criminal case
operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed based on the same
facts as alleged in the criminal case
Held: We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued
by Judge de Veyra, which,for its brevity, but clear and convincing,
We quote as follows:
"Having been acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of
violation of the Anti-Graft Law, Defendant now seeks the dismissal
of the civil case which arose from the same set of facts. The motion
to dismiss must be denied for the reason that acquittal in the
criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper
unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even
civilly the accused would not be liable — there is no such a finding.
Apart from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case bases its case
either on fraud or negligence — evidence that only requires a
preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the
requisite in criminal cases. "The motion to dismiss is, therefore,
denied for lack of merit."
To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from
the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of
Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the
prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud, one of
the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on
the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil
actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given
rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. It needs
hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner
disputes, particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in
the civil complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following
allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints
do contain sufficient averment of fraud:
"13. That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting
the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which
fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme
aforementioned." That there is allegation of negligence is also
unmistakably shown when the complaint states that "the defendant
manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the rules and
regulations, and without exercising necessary prudence, . . . extended
a number of credit accommodation . . . " On this allegation of
negligence alone, the civil case may be
maintained as an entirely independent action from the criminal case.
Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court
has no application thereto.
The ruling in the case of PNB vs. Bagamaspad, involving the same
respondent herein, and also against its branch manager, unherringly
charts the course to be followed in final resolution of these cases.
Thus —
"The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on the
provisions of Article 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code, defining and
enumerating the duties and
obligations of an agent and his liability for failure to comply with
such duty. A careful study and consideration of the record, however,
convinces us and we agree with the trial court that the
defendants-appellants have not only violated
instructions of the plaintiff Bank, including things which the bank
wanted done ornot done, all of which were fully understood by them,
but they (appellants) also violated standing regulations regarding
the granting of loans, and what is more,thru their carelessness,
laxity and negligence, they allowed bans to be granted to
persons who were not entitled to secure loans."
If petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based
on negligence, apart from the averment of fraud, then on the
strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be
maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.
The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs. Alvendia
is not only enlightening,
but authoritative. Thus —
". . . in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code,
the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would
be entirely irrelevant to
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided
to make these actions `entirely separate and distinct' from the
criminal action (Articles 22,
33, 34 and 2177). Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d)
does not apply."
It is significant to note that under Article 31 of the New Civil Code,
it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed
separately from the criminal action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the
latter."
It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions
mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed
separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly, regardless
of the result of the criminal case. Indeed, when the law has allowed a
civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case,
the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal
case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be
so because the offenses specified in
Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not
mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil
action because of the distinct separability of their respective
juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the
case of swindling, a specie of an offense committed by means of
fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed
independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result
of the latter. LLjur
The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is
to be found in the fact that when the civil action is reserved to be
filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting
officer alone without intervention from, private counsel representing
the interest of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in the
present instance, the prosecution of the criminal case is left to the
government prosecutor undertake, any mistake or mishandling of the
case committed by the latter should not work to the prejudice of the
offend party whose interest would thus be protected by the measure
contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 12 of the New Civil
Code.
TN: Prosecutions of civil actions, allegations of fraud and negligence
warrants separate and independent civil action.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.
San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs Secretary of Justice
Facts: San Miguel purchased 130 residential lots from BF Homes in
Paranaque, amounting to P107.2M. 110 of the 130 TCTs were
delivered to herein petitioner, while 20 TCTs were withheld by BF
Homes.
BF Homes alleged that Atty. Orendain, their former Rehabilitation
Officer who handled the sale of said lots to petitioners, no longer had
the authority to sell said lots during the conduct of the sale since he
was already replaced by a different officer.
Despite receiving the full amount and several demands, BF Homes
refused to surrender the TCTs to petitioners. San Miguel Properties,
Inc. filed a complaint-affidavit against BF Homes for violation of
Section 25 and Section 39 of PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer’s Protective Decree).
At the same time, Petitioner filed a case for Specific Performance
with HLURB against BF Homes.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the Office of the
City Prosecutor, due to the pending receivership case of BF Homes
in the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the Complaint:
“Criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes will not
comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the
titles.”

Petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice, but the latter upheld
the resolution of the Public Prosecutor, adding: “HLURB has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and
practices.”
Unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions
involving the lands in question, there is as yet no basis to charge
criminally BF Homes for non-delivery of the titles.
The Court of Appeals upheld the resolution of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice. San Miguel anchored its petition on the mere
fact that there is no Civil Case, thus there is no Prejudicial Question.
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case pending with the
HLURB constitutes a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Ruling: Supreme Court: Petition has no merit
Contrary to what the petitioner believes, the administrative case
posed a prejudicial question before the criminal complaint can be
resolved.
A Prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
The Essential Elements of a Prejudicial Question are:
(Section 7 – Rule 111)
(a) Previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action.
(b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but
could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. The facts and
issues raised were related, and specific performance presupposes a
breach of contract, which provides the offended party with remedies
found in the civil code.
Furthermore, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
would determine whether or not San Miguel was legally entitled to
demand delivery.
A Prejudicial Question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to
simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in
order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.
A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime
have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the
indictment or may not have rested its case.
A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
Vicente Omicitin vs CA
Facts: Vicente Omictin, Operations Ad Interim of SAAG Phils. ,
filed two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati against private respondent George Lagos.
Lagos failed to return, despite several demands, two company cars
entrusted to him when he was still president of SAAG Phils.
The Public Prosecutor indicted Lagos with estafa.
Private Respondent filed a Petition for Recuse, allegedly seeing
presiding judge Quilala with SAAG Phils. Interim president, Atty.
Alex Y. Tan.
Lagos also filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a
prejudicial question petition with the SEC involving the same parties.
Apparently, Lagos filed a prior SEC case for the declaration of
nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Tan as president ad
interim, and petitioner Vicente Omictin as Operations Manager ad
interim, declaration of dividends, recovery of share of profits,
involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, damages,
TRO, and an injunction vs SAAG phils.
Respondent alleged that Tan’s appointment was invalid, since
according to the company’s by-laws, a president should only come
from the pool of directors. Tan appointed Omictin as Operations
Manager ad interim, which was also refuted by private respondent
since Tan’s appointment was invalid, so was his appointing authority
to appoint Omictin.
The Trial Court denied respondent’s motion to suspend proceedings
and motion to recuse.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion for recuse,
but reversed and granted the motion for suspension. The CA was of
the opinion that a prejudicial question exists. Furthermore, in the
crime of estafa, a valid demand is essential.
The delay of delivery by Lagos depends upon the decision of the case
lodged with the SEC, if it constitutes a valid demand by herein
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question to warrant the
suspension of criminal proceedings pending resolution of the SEC
Case.
Held: Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the
intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of
private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by the
petitioner before the RTC of Makati.
Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party
is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such a
demand on the company’s behalf. Private respondent is challenging
petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case
pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this
light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective,
it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa
cannot prosper.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no substantial basis in
petitioner’s contention that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Absent a
showing of a despotic, whimsical and arbitrary exercise of power by
the CA, the petition must fail.
People vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: Private respondents then Calamba Mayor Severino J. Lajara
and his fellow local public officials were, together with Jesus V.
Garcia, President of Australian Professional Realty (APRI), charged
before the Sandiganbayan under three separate informations for
violation of Sections 3(e), (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
The charges arose from private respondents public officials entering
into a Memorandum of Agreement with APRI represented by
respondent Garcia for the construction of the Calamba Shopping
Center.
Private respondents filed a Petition for Reinvestigation and a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest due to the pendency of two civil actions for the
nullification of the MOA, alleging that the said civil cases raised
prejudicial questions which must first be resolved as they are
determinative of their innocence or guilt.
Sandiganbayan held in abeyance the issuance of orders of arrest
pending further study by the prosecution on whether the informations,
as worded, can reasonably produce conviction.
After reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor submitted
to the Ombudsman a Memorandum recommending the dismissal of
the criminal cases, The Ombudsman disapproved the
recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, however, it
holding that while prejudicial question may be attendant, it does not
warrant the dismissal of the criminal cases.
Private respondents subsequently filed a Motion to Quash the
informations, alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the offenses charged or over their persons; the three
informations charging three different criminal offenses arising from
one and the same act of entering into a MOA violate their
constitutional rights against double jeopardy; the facts charged in
each information do not constitute an offense, and there is no
probable cause to hold them for trial. In a separate move, private
respondents filed on September 10, 1998 a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings reiterating that there are prejudicial questions involved
in the pending civil actions.
In the meantime, for failure to prosecute, Civil Case No. 2186-95-C
was dismissed on June 30, 1999.[22] As for Civil Case No.
2180-95-C, the trial court, by Decision[23] of September 8, 2000,
dismissed it after it found that the MOA was not tainted with marks
of nullity. he Sandiganbayan subsequently denied private
respondents Motion to Quash, by Resolution[25] of February 26,
2001, for lack of merit, and unaware that a decision had already been
rendered in Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, granted the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings after finding that prejudicial questions exist
which warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings. Private
respondents lbaliater filed another Motion to Quash, which was
treated by the Sandiganbayan as a motion to dismiss, and granted
such.
Issue:
Ruling: Petition for Certiorari dismissed; Sandiganbayan Resolution
is affirmed.
While the resolution of Civil Case No. 2180-95-C by the trial court
of the issues raised therein do not conclusively determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondents, still it puts to test the sufficiency of
the allegations in the informations, particularly whether further
prosecution of the criminal cases may be sustained. A challenge to
the allegations in the informations on account of the issues posed for
resolution in the trial court, which are deemed prejudicial questions,
is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a
non-criminal suit.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
Indeed, there would be no reason to proceed with the criminal cases
in light of the trial courts findings, which had become final and
executory after the appellate court considered the appeal therefrom
abandoned and dismissed, that the MOA was valid as APRI was
qualified to enter into the same. Contrary to the contention of
petitioner, a prejudicial question is different from the concept of res
judicata. That there is no identity of parties between the civil case
and the criminal cases does not abate the application of a prejudicial
question.
Finally, petitioner, not having assailed the Sandiganbayan Resolution
that there exists a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension
of the proceedings in view of the similarity or close relation of the
facts and issues, the issues to be resolved herein may be rendered
moot by a finding in the Civil cases that, under the circumstances, the
award of the contract and/or execution of the Memorandum of
Agreement was proper, legal, valid, and beyond question,[45] is now
precluded from questioning the existence of a prejudicial question.
Spouses Yu vs Philippine Commercial International Bank
Facts: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu
mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several
parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in
favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank,
respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of
a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and
penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for
extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the
Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued
notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the
auction sale on September 10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor
of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered
with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1,
1998. After two months before the expiration of the
redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for
writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners
complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to
dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was
denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then
filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on
annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the
filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of
which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ
of Possession.
Issue: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for
annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Ruling: Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can
arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a
certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are
both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take
their own direction independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is “one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de to suspend shall be filed in court for trial, and shall be filed in the
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
case”.
A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
Anthony Reyes v Pearlbank Securities, Inc.
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
Facts: Westmont Investment Corporation (WINCORP) is a domestic
Note that the Informations filed in the criminal cases charge
corporation operating as an investment house. Among the services
petitioner and his other co-accused with falsification of commercial
rendered by WINCORP to its clients in the ordinary course of its
and private documents.
business as an investment house is the arranging and brokering of
loans. Petitioner Anthony T. Reyes was formerly the Vice President
Although apparently arising from the same set of facts, the issues in
for Operations and Administration of WINCORP.
the criminal and civil cases are clearly different from one another.
Furthermore, the issues in the civil cases are not determinative of the
Pearlbank Securities, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the
issues in the criminal cases.
securities business.
Finally, we note that the criminal cases were already instituted and
PEARLBANK alleged that in March 2000, it received various letters
pending before the MTC. Petitioner would have the opportunity to
from persons who invested in WINCORP demanding payment of
present the arguments and evidence in his defense in the course of
their matured investments, which WINCORP failed to pay,
the trial of said cases.
threatening legal action. According to these investors, WINCORP
informed them that PEARLBANK was the borrower of their
Coca-Cola vs Social Security Commission
investments.
Facts: Dr. Dean Climaco was a former retainer physician of
WINCORP alleged that it was unable to repay its investors because
Coca-Cola Bottlers at the company's plant. Dr. Climaco entered into
of the failure of its fund borrowers, one of which was PEARLBANK,
a Retainer Agreementwith Coca Cola. Explicit in the contract,
to pay the loans extended to them by WINCORP. As proof of their
however, is the provision that no employee-employer relationship
claims, the investors presented Confirmation Advices,4 Special
shall exist between the company and Dr. Climaco while the contract
Powers of Attorney and Certifications signed and issued to them by
is in effect. Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the Department of
WINCORP.
Labor and Employment and the SSS whether he was an employee of
the company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative. As a result, Dr.
PEARLBANK denied having any outstanding loan obligation with
Climaco Fled a complaint before the National Labor Relations
WINCORP or its investors. PEARLBANK alleged that WINCORP’s
Commission (NLRC). In his complaint, he sought recognition as a
acts of stating and making it appear in several Confirmation Advices,
regular employee of the company and demanded payment of his 13th
Special Powers of Attorney and Certifications that PEARLBANK
month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive
was the borrower of funds from the lenders/investors of WINCORP
leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits. During the
constituted falsification of commercial and private documents.
pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer
Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco Filed another
EARLBANK filed two complaints with the Securities and Exchange
complaint for illegal dismissal against the company before the
Commission (SEC) against Ong and several John Does for full and
NLRC. He asked that he be reinstated to his former position as
accurate accounting of the investments of WINCORP and of
company physician of its Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority
PEARLBANK’s alleged loan obligations to WINCORP and/or its
rights, with full payment of backwages, other unpaid benefits, and
investors. Juanita U. Tan, Treasurer of PEARLBANK, filed a
for payment of damages. Meantime, while the NLRC cases were
complaint on behalf of PEARLBANK for falsification by private
pending, Dr. Climaco Fled with the (Social Security Court) SSC, a
individuals of commercial and private documents before the DOJ.
petition praying, among others, that petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers
(Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him for compulsory social security
Ong, Lucena, Briones, Tamundong and Espiritu filed a Motion to
coverage.
Admit Attached Memorandum before the DOJ, asserting that the
criminal complaint against them should be dismissed for lack of
Issue: WON there is a prejudicial question involved in the cases
probable cause or suspended due to the existence of a prejudicial
pending before the NLRC and the cases filed in th SSC
question involving the SEC cases.
Held: No. The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a) the
DOJ Secretary Datumanong reversed the 27 June 2003 Resolution of
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
Usec. Gutierrez and reinstated the 18 June 2001 Resolution of
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
Prosecutor Rances finding probable cause to charge petitioner and
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
other respondents in I.S. No. 2000-149, except for Eric R. G. Espiritu,
criminal action may proceed. It comes into play generally in a
for the crime of falsification of commercial and private documents
situation where a civil action and a criminal action both pend and
there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
Issue: Whether the two cases before the SEC are prejudicial
resolved before the criminal action may proceed. This is so because
questions, which have to be resolved before the criminal cases may
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
proceed.
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no
Ruling: Supreme Court: Petition is without Merit
pending criminal case. The consolidated NLRC cases cannot be
considered as "previously instituted civil action". Prejudicial question
Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, a criminal action may
is understood in law to be that civil action must precede the criminal
be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action, that which requires a decision with which said question is
action, to wit:
closely related.
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for
Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be applied by
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
analogy. The issue in the case Fled by Dr. Climaco with the SSC
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
involves the question of whether or not he is an employee of
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the compulsory
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
coverage of the Social Security System. On the contrary, the cases
Fled by Dr. Climaco before the NLRC involved different issues. In
his First complaint, Dr. Climaco sought recognition as a regular
employee of the company and demanded payment of his 13th month
pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits. The second complaint
was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to his former
position as company physician of the company's Bacolod Plant,
without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of backwages,
other unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages. Thus, the issues
in the NLRC cases are not determinative of whether or not the SSC
should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to be
prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the
court.
Monreal vs COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Desederio Monreal (Monreal) filed his certificate of
candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay in Caloocan City. But
respondent Felipe M. Alday sought his disqualification by the
Commission on Elections under the three-term limit rule
for barangay officials embodied in Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9164.
Sec. 2. Term of Office The term of office of
all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the
effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That
the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
Monreal moved to suspend the hearing of this case on the ground of
the pendency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City in SCA C-914 (Conrado Cruz v. Commission on Elections) of
the issue of whether or not the cited law is unconstitutional.
Meantime, petitioner Monreal was declared by the Caloocan City
Metropolitan Trial Court as the duly elected Punong Barangay.
COMELEC rendered a decision, disqualifying Monreal from seeking
election to a fourth term as Punong Barangay and canceling his
certificate of candidacy. But, invoking the decision rendered by the
Caloocan City RTC, which annulled as unconstitutional the second
paragraph of Section 2 of R.A. 9164, he filed a motion for
reconsideration in the disqualification case but the COMELEC En
Banc denied the same. (Take note that the decision which he invoked
declaring such law as unconstitutional is not yet final and executory
because it is subject to appeal)
In a parallel development, respondent Alday appealed the decision of
the RTC. But the COMELEC, a party to that case, filed a motion for
its reconsideration. The parties have not updated the Court regarding
the RTC's action on that motion.
(Another case is consolidated in this case with a different GR number.
More or less the same facts. The elected official is FORONDA and
the one who questioned is MANALILI)
Issue: Whether or not the pendency in court of the issue of
unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 2 of R.A. 9164,
which provides for a three-term limit for barangay officials reckoned
from 1994, constitutes a prejudicial question to the disqualification
cases based on that law against petitioners Monreal and Foronda.
Held: A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
that case. Because the jurisdiction to try and resolve the prejudicial
question has been lodged in another tribunal, however, the rule is that
the proceedings in the first case may be suspended to await the
resolution of the prejudicial question in the second case.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
But, here, what has been involved is the alleged unconstitutionality
of the second paragraph of Section 2 of R.A. 9164, which reckons
the three-term limit rule from the year 1994 before the passage of the
law on March 19, 2002. It is a settled doctrine in this
jurisprudence that laws are presumptively constitutional until
they are found otherwise in an appropriate case. Consequently, to
suspend the disqualification actions against petitioners, while the
issue of unconstitutionality of Section 2 of R.A. 9164 was still
pending, would be to contravene such established doctrine. It would
amount to a preliminary injunction against the implementation of that
provision of the law.
Petitioner of course points out that the RTC of Caloocan City has
since decided that Section 2 of R.A. 9164 is unconstitutional. But
that decision has not yet attained finality and the RTC has issued no
order making the same executory pending appeal. Consequently,
such provision of law remains in full force.
Jose vs Suarez
Facts: Respondents, spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had
availed of petitioner Carolina Jose's (Carolina) offer to lend money
at the daily interest rate of 1% to 2%. However, Carolina and her
husband, petitioner Reynaldo Jose, later on increased the interest
to 5% per day, which respondents were forced to accept because
they allegedly had no other option left. It then became a practice
that petitioners would give the loaned money to Purita and the
latter would deposit the same in her and her husband's account to
cover the maturing postdated checks they had previously issued in
payment of their other loans. Purita would then issue checks in
favor of petitioners in payment of the amount borrowed from them
with the agreed 5% daily interest.
On 7 May 2004, respondents filed a Complaint 3 against
petitioners seeking the declaration of "nullity of interest of 5% per
day, fixing of interest, recovery of interest payments" 4 and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the
interest rate of 5% a day is iniquitous, contrary to morals, done
under vitiated consent and imposed using undue influence by
taking improper advantage of their financial distress. They claimed
that due to serious liquidity problems, they were forced to rely on
borrowings from banks and individual lenders, including
petitioners, and that they had to scramble for funds to cover the
maturing postdated checks they issued to cover their other
borrowings.
Thereafter, at the instance of Carolina, several cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 6 were filed against respondent Purita. Purita, in
turn filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question, on the theory that the checks
subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are void for being contra bonos
mores or for having been issued in payment of the iniquitous and
unconscionable interest imposed by petitioners.
The appellate court stated that respondents had sought to annul the
checks for being void pursuant to Article 1422 of the Civil Code
which provides that "a contract which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent". Accordingly,
the appellate court concluded that if the checks subject of the
criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said
checks could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions
under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the outcome of the
determination of the validity of the said checks is determinative of
guilt or innocence of Purita in the criminal case.
Issue: Whether or not a case for the determination of an invalid
interest rate in a loan would suspend a case for violation of BP No.
22 (WON there is a prejudicial question)
Held: A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Now the prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply this:
whether the daily interest rate of 5% is void, such that the checks
issued by respondents to cover said interest are likewise void for
being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no
longer prosper.
The prejudicial question theory advanced by respondents must fail.
In the first place, the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal
cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason
for the
issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal
culpability under B.P. Blg. 22 In several instances, we have held that
what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are
properly proved.
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is
eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect
the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately
be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the
primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22
cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing
check has been issued.
Sy Tiong Shiou vs Sy Chim
Facts: Four criminal complaints were filed by (Spouses Sy) against
(Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.) before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila.
Two of the complaints were for alleged violation of Section 74 in
relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. In these complaints,
the Spouses Sy averred that they are stockholders and directors of Sy
Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation) who asked Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al., officers of the corporation, to allow them to inspect the books and
records of the business on three occasions to no avail. In a letter, Sy
Tiong Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and intra-corporate
cases pending in court.
In the two other complaints, Sy Tiong Shiou was charged with
falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), and perjury under Article 183 of the
RPC. According to the Spouses Sy, Sy Tiong Shiou executed
under oath the 2003 General Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he
falsely stated that the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had
decreased despite the fact that they had not executed any
conveyance of their shares.
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor that the issues
involved in the civil case for accounting and damages pending
before the RTC of Manila were intimately related to the two
criminal complaints filed by the Spouses Sy against them, and thus
constituted a prejudicial question that should require the
suspension of the criminal complaints. They also argued that the
Spouses Sy's request for inspection was premature as the latter's
concern may be properly addressed once an answer is filed in the
civil case.
Issue: WON there is a prejudicial question between a civil case of
accounting and damages and criminal cases of falsification and
perjury
Held: A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there
exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed since howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinativejuris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
reason behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 24
The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve any
prejudicial question. DHEACI
The civil action for accounting and damages seeks the issuance of
an order compelling the Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and
true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid to,
received and earned by the corporation since 1993 and to restitute
it such amounts, proceeds and funds which the Spouses Sy have
misappropriated. The criminal cases, on the other hand, charge that
the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting inside
company premises and from inspecting company records, and that
Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS, specifically the
Spouses Sy's shares in the corporation.
Surely, the civil case presents no prejudicial question to the
criminal cases since a finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the
funds will have no effect on the determination of guilt in the
complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of
the Corporation Code; the civil case concerns the validity of Sy
Tiong Shiou's refusal to allow inspection of the records, while in
the falsification and perjury cases, what is material is the veracity
of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou in the sworn GIS.
IBP vs Ateinza
Facts: On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President
Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor
of Manila a letter application 4for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be
participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and
multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit 5 dated June 16, 2006 allowing the
IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza
Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit
the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition having been
unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before
this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari which assailed
the appellate court's inaction or refusal to resolve the petition
within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of
1985. (Take note, that the date for the rally has already lapsed
before the petition in the CA has been resolved)
The Court denied two petitions for being moot and academic and
denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge
The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action, against Cadiz
(National President of the IBP) for violating the Public Assembly
Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
Issue: WON there is a prejudicial question notwithstanding the
invocation of the same before the wrong court
Held: Respecting petitioners' argument that the issues presented in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to the criminal
case against Cadiz, the Court finds it improper to resolve the same in
the present case.
Under the Rules, the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground
in a petition to suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be
made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or
the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance
of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to suspend
being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the
criminal action, the determination of the pendency of a
prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the
criminal action, and not before this Court in an appeal from
the civil action.
Land Bank of the PH (LBP) vs Jacinto
Facts: The First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a
loan from petitioner LBP for 400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line
Agreement. As security for the loan, Jacinto, FWCC president,
issued in favor of LBP 9 postdated checks amounting to 465 million.
Thereafter there was a mutual decision to craft a new agreement and
terms of payment were changed.
When FWCC defaulted in payment under the terms of their
restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the
drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, the
checks were dishonored for the reason “Payment Stopped or Drawn
Against Insufficient Fund.” Respondent also failed to make good the
checks despite demands. Hence, LBP filed before the Makati
Prosecutor a Complaint against respondent for a BP 22 violation.
Respondent countered, averring that it is devoid of merit as the loan
obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue
of the execution of the Restructuring Agreement. The prosecutor
dismissed the complaint, saying that the original loan was
restructured and novated and thus the checks lost efficacy and
therefore cannot be a valid basis to sustain a violation of BP 22.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, the DOJ held that novation is not
a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. The CA reversed the DOJ
ruling and said that novation may prevent criminal liability from
arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal
information is filed in court because novation cases doubt as to the
true nature of the obligation. Also, CA found merit in respondents
assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because
the issue of WON the obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored
checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements entered into
by FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in
another case.
Issue: WON there exists a prejudicial question in this case – No.
Ruling: A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a
civil and criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.
The elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Sec. 7,
Rule 111, ROC, are: (1) a previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (2) the resolution of such issue
determines WON the criminal action may proceed.
In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was
novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is not determinative
of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law.
Respondents contention that if it be proven that the loan of FWCC
had been novated and restructured then his liability under the
dishonored checks would be extinguished, fails to persuade us.
There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that
respondent is released from his liability on the issued checks. In fact,
out of the 9 checks in question, 8 checks were dated June 8 to
October 30, 1998 or after the execution of the June 3, 1998
Restructuring Agreement. If indeed respondents liability on the
checks had been extinguished upon the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the
return of the checks. However, there was no proof that he had been
released from his obligation. On the contrary, the Restructuring
Agreement contains a proviso which states that This Agreement
shall not novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage,
and other collateral agreements, promissory notes, solidary
undertaking previously executed by and between the parties and
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
shall continue in full force and effect modified only by the provisions
of this Agreement.
Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless
check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22.
Thus, we hold that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P.
22. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.
Sabandal vs Tongco
Facts: Sabandal entered into a MOA on dealership with respondent
Philippines Today (now Philippine Star) for the distribution of
newspapers in Bacolod. Under the agreement, petitioner shall pay for
an equivalent amount of 1 month of deliveries in advance within the
first 7 days of the succeeding month. After the execution of the
agreement, respondent made regular deliveries of the newspaper to
petitioner.
In order to make partial payments for the deliveries, petitioner issued
to respondent several checks amounting to 90,000. When respondent
presented the checks, the bank dishonored the checks for
insufficiency of fund and/or account closed. Respondent then made
demands for petitioner to make good the checks, but petitioner still
failed.
Upon a Complaint by respondent, the Manila Prosecutor filed with
the RTC 11 Informations for BP 22 violations. Three years later,
petitioner filed with RTC-Negros Occidental a Complaint against
Philippines Today for specific performance.
Petitioner also filed with the RTC-Manila a motion to suspend the
trial in the criminal case against him based on a prejudicial question.
Issue: WON a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension
of the trial of the criminal cases for violation of BP 22 against
petitioner until after the resolution of the civil action for specific
performance – Nope.
Ruling: Petition has no merit. The 2 essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of BP 22is
whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in
the civil action for specific performance is whether complainant
Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today. If, after trial
in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it
does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks
he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense.
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate
that the filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of
the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case 3 years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil
action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in
the criminal cases.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs Isagani Bobis
Facts: Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with
Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage being annulled or
nullified, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage
(bigaon) with a certain Julia Hernandez.
Based on petitioner’s Complaint, an Information for bigamy was
filed against respondent at the RTC-Quezon City. Thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage (ground: no marriage license).
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case as a
prejudicial question.
Petitioner now argues that respondent should have first obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering
into the second marriage.
Issue: WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy
Ruling: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused. Its resolution is determinative of
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Its two essential
elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case.
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear
implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the
accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a
matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its
nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been
valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the
first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke
that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
cannot have his cake and eat it too (Charot). Otherwise, all that
an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of
the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a
bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Ignorance of the
existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse.
Landicho vs Hon. Relova
Facts: Petitioner was charged before CFI-Batangas with bigamy.
The Information alleged that petitioner “being then lawfully married
to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully contract a second marriage
with Fe Pasia.” An action was filed before CFI-Batangas, seeking to
declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous
character. Petitioner, as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the
first spouse, praying that his marriage with said third-party defendant
be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats,
force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract a
marriage with her.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal
case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two
marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent judge
denied the motion for lack of merit.
Respondent judge was then required to answer wherein he said that
one of its special and affirmative defenses that “the mere fact that
there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are
automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal case for bigamy."
Respondent stressed that even on the assumption that the first
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the
fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Respondent says that parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. He
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this
Article.
Issue: WON respondent judge’s contention is tenable – Yes!
Ruling: At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact
that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. Then consequently, it was the second spouse, not
petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. It was sometime later when petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the
first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared
null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. We
agree with respondent judge that the parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration
of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge
in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first
wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy
was started could have been inspired by the thought that he
could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial
question.
Beltran vs People
Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were
married. After 24 years of marriage and 4 children, petitioner filed a
petitioner for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
In her Answer, respondent alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint
for concubinage under Art. 334, RPC against petitioner and his
paramour (that’s what you get when you let your heart win) with the
prosecutor, who found probable cause filing an Information against
them.
Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage
and the criminal case for concubinage.
Issue: WON there exists a prejudicial question in this case – No.
Ruling: Petitioner’s contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of
the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. Furthermore in a
case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage
other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the
charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void,
suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Thus, in the
case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage.
Prado vs People
Facts: (Bigamy case was filed; then annulment case; Filed motion to
suspend the bigamy case because of prejudicial question; respondent
court denied; denied the MoR too; Hence, petition for Certiorari and
prohibition; SC set aside the assailed order and ruled that the
criminal action should be suspended; why? abangan)
In August 1971, an Information was filed with the CFI of Manila
charging petitioner Virginia B. Prado with the crime of Bigamy,
committed as follows:
In October 1969, at the Philippine Embassy in Vietnam, Prado,
having been previously legally united in wedlock with one Arturo R.
Espiritu without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did a
subsequent and second marriage with one Julio Manalansang.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Philippine
Courts have no jurisdiction over the marriage solemnized in Saigon,
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
as it is outside Philippine territory and the case does not fall under
any of the exceptions. Opposition based on the principle of
extraterritoriality was filed by the prosecution. Dismissal was denied
by the Trial Court, which Order was assailed by petitioner in a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed with this Court in G.R.
No. L-36344. SC resolved to dismiss the same "for being premature,
an appeal by way of review on certiorari in due course being the
proper remedy
In July1973, petitioner filed with the CFI of Rizal, an action for
annulment of her Saigon marriage contending that her consent was
obtained by means of force and intimidation, and that she never
freely cohabited with her second husband. The case was
subsequently transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, Caloocan City.
Few days after, a "Motion to Suspend Trial by Reason of the
Existence of Prejudicial Question" was filed by petitioner in the
Bigamy Case. The prosecution opposed contending that is only done
to delay the disposition of said criminal case, that the grounds for
annulment of her second marriage are bereft of factual basis and truth
in that petitioner would not have waited for two years from the filing
of the bigamy charge, or for almost four (4) years from the
celebration of the second marriage, before filing the annulment case,
if she had valid grounds to annul the same; that she had freely
cohabited with Julio Manalansang for about sixmonths after their
marriage; and that even her mother was present during the marriage
ceremony.
Petitioner’s argument is it must first be resolved as the same would
be determinative of her guilt or innocence. Respondent Court denied
suspension of trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was
denied on September 1973, ruling that the Motion to Suspend was
only a scheme to unduly delay the hearing of the case. Thus, this
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of said
Order.
On November 16, 1973, respondent Court, motu proprio, suspended
the proceedings in the Bigamy Case.
Issue: Whether or not a pending civil suit for annulment of marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question in a Bigamy Case
Ruling: Yes, the pending civil suit for annulment of marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question in a Bigamy Case.
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal action, the following requisites
must be present:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and
(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.
The foregoing requisites being present in the case at bar.
The Solicitor General’s opposition to the suspension was belatedly
filed after petitioner had faced trial in the Bigamy Case. Should
petitioner be able to establish that her consent to the second marriage
was, indeed, obtained by means of force and intimidation, her act of
entering into marriage with Julio Manalansang would be involuntary,
and there can be no conviction for the crime of Bigamy.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of her right to prove her grounds for
annulment, which could well be determinative of her guilt or
innocence. The State is not thereby deprived from proceeding with
the criminal case in the event that the Court decrees against petitioner
in the Annulment Case
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.
Magestrado vs People
Facts: The private respondent filed a criminal complaint for perjury
against the petitioner for executing an affidavit of loss of a certificate
of title of a parcel of land despite allegedly knowing that no loss of
the certificate occurred because the petitioner had actually delivered
the same to the private respondent as security for a loan which the
petitioner contracted from the private respondent. After an
information for perjury against the petitioner was instituted, he filed
a motion for suspension of the proceedings based on a prejudicial
question. He alleged that a case filed against him by the private
respondent for recovery of a sum of money is pending before another
court. He further alleged that another civil case is also pending before
another branch of the same court when he filed against private
respondent a complaint for cancellation of mortgage, delivery of title
and damages. The issues in the said civil cases according to
petitioner are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the
criminal action.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to suspend the criminal case in
view of the pending civil cases
Ruling: It is improper to suspend the criminal case.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action;
and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and
(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on
the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.
The Supreme Court observed that the pending civil cases are
principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by
the petitioner from the private respondent and whether petitioner
executed
a real estate mortgage in favor of the private respondent. On the other
hand, the criminal case involves the determination of whether
petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to
support his request for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of
the certificate of title.
The Court went on to hold that it is evident that the civil cases and
the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.
Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish
the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for
perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a
real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether
petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of
loss.
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.
Torres vs Garchitorena
Facts: Susana Realty, Incorporated (SRI for brevity) is the registered
owner of two (2) parcels of land located in Cavite. These parcels of
land are adjacent to the sea and over time portions thereof were
submerged by sea water. SRI installed a caretaker on the property.
On October 10, 1997, Mayor of Noveleta, Cavite caused the leveling
and reclamation of the submerged portion of SRI’s property for the
relocation of displaced squatters who were living along river banks
and esteros. The caretaker protested to the Mayor informing him that
his employer owned the property being levelled and reclaimed at the
instance of the Mayor. However, the Mayor ignored the protests of
the caretaker and continued with the leveling and reclamation of the
property.
On October 16, 1997, representatives of SRI conferred with the
Mayor and furnished him with copies of its titles over the property.
The SRI had the property surveyed to confirm that the portions of the
land reclaimed by the Mayor were within the perimeter of its titled
property.
On October 27, 1997, SRI sent a letter to the Mayor formally
protesting the leveling and reclamation of the submerged portion of
its property and demanding that the Mayor desist from continuing
with said reclamation.
On October 31, 1997, the Mayor and representatives of SRI had a
conference during which the Mayor informed SRI that he had already
spent P1,000.000,00 for the reclamation and offered to help SRI in
connection with its other projects in Cavite provided that SRI will no
longer file the suit to enjoin the reclamation.
SRI requested for the deferment of the reclamation project until
November 7, 1997 to enable it to study the offer of the Mayor.
On January 7, 1998, SRI filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court for prohibition with a plea for injunctive relief against the
Mayor, the Municipal Building Official and Municipal Engineer. In
their Answer to the petition, Torres and Alvarez alleged that they
were not aware that the subject property was titled in the name of
SRI and that the records of the Assessor’s Office failed to show that
the property had been declared for taxation purposes under the name
of SRI.
On April 16, 1998, SRI filed with the Ombudsman a criminal
complaint against Torres and Alvarez for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019. After due preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman found probable cause against the two for violation of
said law.
He filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information dated August 27,
1998 for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019
On September 1, 1998, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, filed with the RTC of Cavite City a complaint
against SRI and the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the reversion of
the subject property covered. The Republic alleged inter alia that said
property had been ascertained by the DENR as part of the Manila
Bay.
Issue: Whether or not civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action
Ruling: The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution
of the criminal action.
Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in court for trial, d shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law
as that which must precede the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in
the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.
In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the civil case complain. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil
action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even
if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed and all that is
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Besides, a final judgment of the RTC declaring the property as

foreshore land and hence, inalienable, is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the petitioners in the criminal case. It bears
stressing that unless and until declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction in an appropriate action therefor, the titles of
SRI over the subject property are valid. SRI is entitled to the
possession of the properties covered by said titles. It cannot be
illegally deprived of its possession of the property by petitioners in
the guise of a reclamation until final judgment is rendered declaring
the property covered by said titles as foreshore land.

the Supreme Court stated that under the amendment, a prejudicial

question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. //micb

Pimentel vs Pimentel

Facts: (Criminal case of frustrated parricide was instituted before the

annulment case; WON prejudicial question applies; SC ruled in the
negative. Why? Abangan)

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private

respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before

the RTC of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend

the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not civil action must be instituted prior to the

institution of the criminal action

Ruling: The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution

of the criminal action

It was affirmed that under the amendment to the Rules of Court, a

prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede
the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted
prior to the institution of the criminal action. If the criminal
information was filed ahead of the complaint in the civil case, no
prejudicial question exists.

Another point: In the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue
is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
Abayon. Arapan. Baguio. Balisado. Bongalos. Costillas. Elesterio. Escaño. Eyas. Rufin. Sayson.