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 FIRST DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 1117. March 20, 1944.]

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS,  complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT,  respondent.

DECISION

OZAETA,  J p:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement
in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
"Marriage
"license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.
"Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room 105
Tel. 2-41-60."
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and
mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the
strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published
only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., 37, the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That
case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more
elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and
so decides that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
|||  (Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot, Adm. Case No. 1117, [March 20, 1944], 74 PHIL 579-581)

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 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-23815. June 28, 1974.]

ADELINO H. LEDESMA,  petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court

of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J  p:

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by
petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation
that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full
time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the
conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case."  2 It was likewise noted that the
prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former
category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly
asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse
of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused
that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them.
What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the
counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to
be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the bar,
who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he
was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for
the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on
the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration
having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel  de
oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the
proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his
order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for
postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case
without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two
witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since
October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status
of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11,
1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964, July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another
order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the
trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 3, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its
instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all
the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty
of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the

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Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could
be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel  de oficio is an irksome
chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such
an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not
a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay
stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting
standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his
services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is
not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to
attend to. That circumstance possesses, high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot
afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel  de oficio must be
fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the
opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most
scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases . . ." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v.
Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as
such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself.
Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not
mere perfunctory representation. . . . For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to
have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could
be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by
Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The
present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a
consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray
by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his
responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not
likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed,
considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as
defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that
there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of
self-interest.

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 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.]

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,

ROMULO CUI, intervenor-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; "TITULO DE ABOGADO" MEANS MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR. — The term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after
due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.
2. ID.; POSSESSION OF LAW DEGREE NOT INDISPENSABLE TO QUALIFY AS LAWYER. — Possession
of the law degree itself is not indispensable; completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
3. ID.; REINSTATEMENT TO THE ROLL WIPES OUT DISABILITIES. — Reinstatement to the roll of
attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a previous disbarment.
4. QUO WARRANTO; LIMITATIONS; ONE YEAR AFTER RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO HOLD OFFICE
AROSE. — Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly Sec. 16 Rule 68, taken from Section 215 of Act 190), an action
of quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD NOT TO BE COUNTED FROM DATE DEFENDANT BEGAN TO DISCHARGE
DUTIES OF OFFICE. — The basis of a quo warranto action being the plaintiff's own right to office, it is from the time
such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted and not from the date the incumbent defendant began to
discharge the duties of said office.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J p:

This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in
favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor,
Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislative passed 27
November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations,
principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity
or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed by them." Section 2 of the
deed of donation provides as follows:
“Spanish”
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the
second, on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.
Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of

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administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this
decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus
Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant
demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied
with, the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office,
being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed
of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred, pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion." cda
The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of
Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed
the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar, and although
disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on
10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken
alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that "as used in the deed of donation and considering the function of
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by intervenor.
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonio o instrumento dado para
ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profession" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, 1947 ed., p.
1224); and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictamen sobre las cuestiones o
puntos legales que se la consultan." (Id. p. 5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion
of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent
of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney- at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that
class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving
a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the
requirement that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the
law degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed course may be shown in some other way. Indeed
there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through
any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14
of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.") Yet certainly it would be
incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisedly, and
provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids
and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties
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of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to
practice the profession would be distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of
administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue
of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed, on the ground, among
others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the
fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is
also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the
Bar in the first place.
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion
of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of Justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit
and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,
notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for
reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court
may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission." (7 G.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 815.)
"The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is 'of good
moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit
and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his
mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the
moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications." (7 C.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816)."
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of
attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office
which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting to prescription or
laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action
must be filed within one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26
of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of
the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father, and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint
in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further
proceedings (Cui vs. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the
decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator
Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed
the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made
clear" his "intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter
dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he
took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2
March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his
communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary
of Justice, who in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in
effect ruled that the plaintiff, not being a lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.

9
 Meanwhile, the question again become the subject of a court controversy. On 14 March 1950
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ.
Case No. R-1216) because the bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On
19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss
the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of
the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take
another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to
dismiss in Civil Case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court,
stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath"
thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal
and the trial court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a
mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect
that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismissed
upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio . . . should be
ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the
office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that
time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff
Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on
the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between
them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case
of Cui vs. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of
the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator; and his failure to file an
action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu
Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be
ventilated in such an action — all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule
that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold office arose. The
excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness
did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the
defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of
the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be
counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista  vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil.
624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is
farther, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the
said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed
in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que deacienda legitimante de
cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimas Maiano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado . . . En egualdad de circumtancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente e quien tenia
ultimamente la administracion." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than
he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention
of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named
in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro  Cui, who
belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside,
and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee
and intervenor-appellant.
|||  (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, [August 31, 1964], 120 PHIL 725-735)

10
 THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.]

SOPHIA ALAWI,  complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE (R.A. 6713);
ENUNCIATES THE CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A PUBLIC SERVANT. — The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . . at
all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to
the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary.
2. ID.; ATTORNEY; WHEN USE OF SUCH TITLE CAN BE CONSIDERED PROPER. — As regards Alauya's use
of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors,"
in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully take the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; A JUDICIAL EMPLOYEE IS EXPECTED TO ACCORD
RESPECT TO A PERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS AT ALL TIMES. — Now, it does not appear to the Court
consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of
acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that
he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort
to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,  Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is
expected that he accord respect for the person and the right of others at all times, and that his every act and word should
be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps
be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

DECISION

11
NARVASA, C .J  p:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
". . . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on
the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales
agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform
you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal
action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales
agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage — PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:
" . . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.,
as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority
and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse
of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent
who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May
3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was
allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions
on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of . . .
(Alauya's) mortgage, and . . . the refund of . . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage —  PD 26." 1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
12
 1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit
of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the
service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage
that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court," but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and
voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office.
He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk
of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones, 5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.  6 He
stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as
sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the
franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage — PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other
person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters
with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the
court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-
at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but
she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject
of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He
also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant  Alawi having come to
the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

13
 It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19,
1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as " Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
M. ALAUYA." cda
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . . (his)
rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without . . . (his) authority and against . . . (his) will," and
"concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and
doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)inter alia enunciates
the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.  16 Section 4 of the
Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for
the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of
action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or
undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."  19 Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member
of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing,
or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His
radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study
of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or
not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

14
 Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, [February 24, 1997], 335 PHIL 1096-1106)

SECOND DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 1053. September 7, 1979.]

SANTA PANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J  p:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this
administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These motions
were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon
verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D.  Ramos, 306 Doña Salud
Bldg., Dasmariñas, Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said
court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth
Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the "D.D." in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw", his other given
name and maternal surname. cdll
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio
D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the
Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he "will do no falsehood". As an officer in
the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness".  1 Indeed,
candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because
the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor, cannot be overemphasized. These injunctions
circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his "high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts to deception, or permits his client
to do so." 2
In using the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law — Dionisio D. Ramos — respondent in effect resorted to deception. He
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this
regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty. LLphil
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED
and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice
of law.
15
 It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is
directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of complainant to
appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Pangan v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053 (Resolution), [September 7, 1979], 181 PHIL 343-346)

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1222. February 4, 2004.]

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman
of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. After
making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be
conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to
nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04 October  2003 at eight o'clock in the
evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The resolution was
issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the matter.
Following the issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions from the Philippine
Association of Law Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of
the bar examinations in Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on the
subject. Several reasons were advanced by petitioners or movants, among these reasons being the physical, emotional
and financial difficulties that would be encountered by the examinees, if another examination on the subject were to be
held anew. Alternative proposals submitted to the Court included the spreading out of the weight of Mercantile Law among
the remaining seven bar subjects, i.e.,to determine and gauge the results of the examinations on the basis only of the
performance of the examinees in the seven bar subjects. In a resolution, dated 29 September 2003, the Court, finding
merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law on 04 October 2003 and to
allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, the Court further
resolved to create a Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough
investigation of the incident subject of the 23 September 2003 resolution.
In a resolution, dated 07 October 2003, the Court adopted the computation in the allocation of the fifteen
percentage points for Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar examination subjects, to wit:
Subject Original Adjusted Relative Adjusted
  Percentage Percentag Weight Relative
e
  Weight Weight   Weight
         
Political and        
International        
Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Labor and        

16
 Social        
Legislation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Civil Law 15% 17.647% 3 3.53%
Taxation 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Criminal Law 10% 11.765% 2 2.35%
Remedial        
Law 20% 23.529% 4 4.71
Legal Ethics        
and Practical        
Exercises 5% 5.882% 1 1.18%
    ————   ————
    100%   20%
In another resolution, dated 14 October 2003, the Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to compose the Investigating Committee:
Chairman: Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino
   
Members: Justice Jose A.R. Melo
  Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible
therefor or who might have benefited therefrom, recommend sanctions against all those found to have been
responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in question and to recommend measures to the Court
to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.
On 15 January 2004, the Investigating Committee submitted its report and recommendation to the Court, herein
reproduced in full; thus —
"In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the
examination in commercial law was held in De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of
the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried news of an alleged leakage in
the said examination. 1
"Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and
recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a formal investigation of the
leakage be undertaken.
"Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated
September 23, 2003, nullified the examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another
examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight o'clock in the evening (being the
earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests,
and motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the
Court cancelled the holding of such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile
law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003). DCHIAS
"In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating
Committee composed of three (3) retired Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the
leakage and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before December 15, 2003.
"The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
compose the Committee:
Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIÑO-
AQUINO
   
Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO
  Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA
"The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage,
the parties responsible therefor and those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to
safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

17
 "The investigation commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003.
The following witnesses appeared and testified at the investigation:
1. Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee;
2. Atty. Marlo Magdoza-Malagar, law clerk in the office of Justice Vitug
3. Atty. Marcial O. T. Balgos, examiner in mercantile law;
4. Cheryl Palma, private secretary of Atty. Balgos;
5. Atty. Danilo De Guzman, assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos & Perez;
6. Atty. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner of Balgos & Perez;
7. Eduardo J. F. Abella, reviewer in commercial law at the Lex Review Center;
8. Silvestre T. Atienza, office manager of Balgos & Perez;
9. Reynita Villasis, private secretary of Atty. De Guzman;
10. Ronan Garvida, fraternity brother of Atty. De Guzman;
11. Ronald F. Collado, most illustrious brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity;
12. Jovito M. Salonga, Asst. Division Chief of Systems Development for Judicial Application,
MISO;
The Committee held nine (9) meetings — six times to conduct the investigation and three times
to deliberate on its report.
"ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE C. VITUG, chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee,
testified that on Monday morning, September 22, 2003, the day after the Bar examination in mercantile
or commercial law, upon arriving in his office in the Supreme Court, his secretary, 2 Rose Kawada,
informed him that one of the law clerks, Atty. Mario Magdoza-Malagar, told her that a friend of hers
named Ma. Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee from Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City,
who was staying at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, confided to her that something was wrong with the
examination in mercantile law, because previous to the examination, i.e.,on Saturday afternoon, the eve
of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She did not pay attention
to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was hard-pressed to finish her review
of that subject, using other available bar review materials, of which there were plenty coming from
various bar review centers.
"However, upon perusing the questions after the examinations, Cecilia noticed that many of
them were the same questions that were asked in the just-concluded examination.
"Justice Vitug requested Marlo to invite her friend to his office in the Supreme Court, but
Carbajosa declined the invitation. So, Justice Vitug suggested that Mario and Rose invite Carbajosa to
meet them at Robinson's Place, Ermita. She agreed to do that.
"Cecilia Carbajosa arrived at Robinson's Place at the appointed time and showed the test
questions to Rose and Mario. Rose obtained a xerox copy of the leaked questions and compared them
with the bar questions in mercantile law. On the back of the pages, she wrote, in her own hand, the
differences she noted between the leaked questions and the bar examination questions.
"Rose and Marlo delivered the copy of the leaked questions to Justice Vitug who compared
them with the bar examination questions in mercantile law. He found the leaked questions to be the
exact same questions which the examiner in mercantile law, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had
prepared and submitted to him as chairman of the Bar Examinations Committee. However, not all of
those questions were asked in the bar examination. According to Justice Vitug, only 75% of the
final bar questions were questions prepared by Atty. Balgos; 25% prepared by Justice Vitug himself,
were included in the final bar examination. The questions prepared by Justice Vitug were not among
the leaked test questions.
"Apart from the published news stories about the leakage, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
and Justice Vitug received, by telephone and mail, reports of the leakage from Dean Mariano F.

18
Magsalin, Jr. of the Arellano Law Foundation (Exh. H) and a certain Dale Philip R. De los Reyes (Exh.
B–B-3),attaching copies of the leaked questions and the fax transmittal sheet showing that the source
of the questions was Danny De Guzman who faxed them to Ronan Garvida on September 17,  2003,
four days before the examination in mercantile law on September 21, 2003 (Exh. B-1).
 
"ATTORNEY MARLO MAGDOZA-MALAGAR was subpoenaed by the Committee. She
identified the copy of the leaked questions that came from Cecilia Carbajosa (Exh. A).She testified that,
according to Carbajosa, the latter received the test questions from one of her co-bar  reviewees staying,
like her, at the Garden Plaza Hotel in Paco, and also enrolled in the review classes at the Lex Review
Center at the corner of P. Faura Street and Roxas Boulevard, Ermita. She did not pay for the hand-out
because the Lex Review Center gives them away for free to its bar reviewees.
"ATTORNEY MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS, 71 years of age, senior partner in the law firm of
BALGOS AND PEREZ with offices in Rm. 1009 West Tektite Tower, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, testified that in November 2002, Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chair of the Committee on
the 2003 Bar Examinations, invited him to be the examiner in commercial law. He accepted the
assignment and almost immediately began the preparation of test questions on the subject. Using his
personal computer in the law office, he prepared for three consecutive days, three (3) sets of test
questions which covered the entire subject of Mercantile Law (pp. 3–5, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).As he did not
know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private secretary, Cheryl Palma, to
format the questions (p. 13, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).And, as he did not know how to print the questionnaire,
he likewise asked Cheryl Palma to make a print-out (Id.,pp. 14–15).All of this was done inside his office
with only him and his secretary there. His secretary printed only one copy (Id.,p. 15).He then placed the
printed copy of the test questions, consisting of three sets, in an envelope which he sealed, and called
up Justice Vitug to inform him that he was bringing the questions to the latter's office that afternoon.
However, as Justice Vitug was leaving his office shortly, he advised Atty. Balgos to give the sealed
envelope to his confidential assistant who had been instructed to keep it. When Atty. Balgos arrived in
the office of Justice Vitug, he was met by Justice Vitug's confidential assistant to whom he entrusted the
sealed envelope containing the test questions (pp. 19–26, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer except to type on it.
He does not know how to open and close his own computer which has a password for that purpose. In
fact, he did not know, as he still does, the password. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and
closed his computer for him (p. 45, tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Atty. Balgos testified that he did not devise the password himself. It was Cheryl Palma who
devised it (Id.,p. 71).
"His computer is exclusively for his own use. It is located inside his room which is locked when
he is not in the office. He comes to the office every other day only.
"He thought that his computer was safely insulated from third parties, and that he alone had
access to it. He was surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer
was in fact interconnected with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys (tsn, pp. 30, 45).As a
matter of fact, the employees — Jovito M. Salonga and Benjamin R. Kaffy — of the Court's
Management Information Systems Office (MISO) who, upon the request of Atty. Balgos, were directed
by the Investigating Committee to inspect the computer system in his office, reported that there were
16, not 9, computers connected to each other via Local Area Network (LAN) and one (1) stand-alone
computer connected to the internet (Exh. M).Atty. Balgos' law partner, former Justice Secretary
Hernando Perez, also had a computer, but Perez took it away when he became the Secretary of
Justice.
"The nine (9) assistant attorneys with computers connected to Attorney Balgos' computer, are:
1. Zorayda Zosobrado (she resigned in July 2003)
2. Claravel Javier
3. Rolynne Torio
4. Mark Warner Rosal

19
 5. Charlynne Subia
6. Danilo De Guzman (resigned on October 22, 2003 [Exh. D])
7. Enrico G. Velasco, managing partner
8. Concepcion De los Santos
9. Pamela June Jalandoni
"Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in
mercantile law, Atty. Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated
all of them except Atty. Danilo De Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing
about the bar leakage.
"He questioned Silvestre Atienza, the office manager, Atienza is only a second year law student
at MLQU. But he is an expert in installing and operating computers. It was he and/or his brother
Gregorio who interconnected the computers in the law office, including Attorney Balgos' computer,
without the latter's knowledge and permission.
"Atienza admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or 'bar ops' of
the Beta Sigma Lambda law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation
consisted only of bringing food to the MLQU bar examinees (Tsn, pp. 46–47, Oct. 24, 2003).
"The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the
Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test
questions from Attorney Balgos' computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was
convinced that De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law (Tsn,
p. 52, Oct. 24, 2003).
"Attorney Balgos prepared a COMPARISON (Exh. E) of the juxtaposed final bar questions and
his proposed test questions, with marginal markings made by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
(Ret.),indicating whether the questions are similar: (S);or different: (D),together with the percentage
points corresponding to each question. On the basis of this comparative table and Atty. Balgos'
indications as to which questions were the same or different from those given in the final questionnaire,
Justice Mendoza computed the credit points contained in the proposed leaked questions. The proposed
questions constituted 82% of the final bar questions. Attached to this Report as Annex A is the
comparative table and the computation of credit points marked as Exh. E-1. caITAC
"CHERYL PALMA, 34 years old, private secretary of Attorney Balgos for the past six years,
testified that she did not type the test questions. She admitted, however, that it was she who formatted
the questions and printed one copy as directed by her employer. She confirmed Atty. Balgos' testimony
regarding her participation in the operation of his personal computer. She disclosed that what appears
in Atty. Balgos' computer can be seen in the neighborhood network if the other computers are open and
not in use; that Silvestre Atienza of the accounting section, can access Atty. Balgos' computer when the
latter is open and not in use.
"ATTORNEY ENRICO VELASCO, managing partner of the firm, testified that on October
16, 2003, he sent De Guzman a memo (Exh. C) giving him '72 hours to explain in writing why you
should not be terminated for causing the Firm an undeserved condemnation and dishonor because of
the leakage aforesaid.'
"On October 22, 2003, De Guzman handed in his resignation 'effective immediately.' He
explained that:
"'Causing the firm, its partners and members to suffer from undeserved
condemnation and humiliation is not only farthest from, but totally out of, my mind. It is
just unfortunate that the incident subject matter of your memorandum occurred. Rest
assured, though, that I have never been part of any deliberate scheme to malign the
good reputation and integrity of the firm, its partners and members.' (Exh. D)
"DANILO DE GUZMAN testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. He obtained his
LLB degree from FEU in 1998. As a student, he was an awardee for academic excellence. He passed
the 1998 bar examinations with a grade of 86.4%.In FEU, he joined the Beta Sigma Lambda law

20
fraternity which has chapters in MLQU, UE and MSU (Mindanao State University).As a member of the
fraternity, he was active during bar examinations and participated in the fraternity's 'bar ops.'
"He testified that sometime in May 2003, when he was exploring Atty. Balgos' computer, (which
he often did without the owner's knowledge or permission),to download materials which he thought
might be useful to save for future use, he found and downloaded the test questions in mercantile law
consisting of 12 pages. He allegedly thought they were quizzers for a book that Atty. Balgos might be
preparing. He saved them in his hard disk.
"He thought of faxing the test questions to one of his fraternity 'brods,' a certain Ronan Garvida
who, De Guzman thought, was taking the 2003 bar examinations. Garvida is also a law graduate from
FEU. He had taken the 2002 bar examinations, but did not pass.
"On September 17, 2003, four days before the mercantile law bar examination, De Guzman
faxed a copy of the 12-page-test questions (Exhs. I, I-I, I-2, I-3) to Garvida because earlier he was
informed by Garvida that he was retaking the bar examinations. He advised Garvida to share the
questions with other 'Betan' examinees. He allegedly did not charge anything for the test questions.
Later, after the examination was over, Garvida 'texted' (sent a text message on his cell phone) him (De
Guzman),that he did not take the bar examination.
"Besides Garvida, De Guzman faxed the mercantile law bar questions to another fraternity
brother named Arlan (surname unknown),through Reynita (Nanette) Villasis, his secretary (Tsn, pp. 20–
28, Oct. 29, 2003).But he himself faxed the questions to still another 'brod' named Erwin Tan who had
helped him during the 'bar ops' in 1998 when he (De Guzman) took the bar examinations (Id.,p. 28).He
obtained the cell phone numbers of Arlan and Erwin Tan from Gabby Tanpiengco whom he informed by
text message, that they were 'guide questions,' not tips, in the mercantile law examination.
 
"When he was confronted by Attorney Velasco on Wednesday after the examination, (news of
the leakage was already in all the newspapers),De Guzman admitted to Attorney Velasco that he faxed
the questions to his fraternity brothers, but he did not reveal where he got the test questions.
"De Guzman received a text message from Erwin Tan acknowledging that he received the test
questions. However, Erwin informed him that the questions were 'kalat na kalat' (all over the place)
even if he did not share them with others (Tsn, pp. 54–55, Oct. 29, 2003).
"De Guzman also contacted Garvida who informed him that he gave copies of the test
questions to Betans Randy Inigo and James Bugain.
"Arlan also 'texted' De Guzman that almost all the questions were asked in the examination.
Erwin Tan commented that many of the leaked questions were asked in the examination, 'pero hindi
exacto; mi binago' (they were not exactly the same; there were some changes).
"De Guzman tried to text Garvida, but he received no response.
"De Guzman disclosed that he learned how to operate a computer from Silvestre Atienza, the
office manager, and through self-study, by asking those who are knowledgeable on computers. He has
been using computers since 1997, and he bought his own computer in 2001, a Pentium 3, which he
uses at home.
"REYNITA VILLASIS, the 36-year-old legal secretary of Attorney De Guzman, submitted her
affidavit (Exh. F) and orally affirmed her participation in the reproduction and transmittal by fax of the
leaked test questions in mercantile law to Ronan Garvida and Arlan, as testified by De Guzman.
RONAN GARVIDA, appeared before the Investigating Committee in compliance with the
subpoena that was issued to him. Garvida graduated from FEU College of Law in 2000. He is about 32
years of age. While still a student in 1998, he was afflicted with multiple sclerosis or MS, a disease of
the nervous system that attacks the nerve sheaths of the brain and spinal cord. It is a chronic disabling
disease although it may have periods of remission. It causes its victim to walk with erratic, stiff and
staggering gait; the hands and fingers may tremble in performing simple actions; the eyesight can be
impaired, and speech may be slow and slurred (p. 737, Vol. 2, Reader's Digest Medical Encyclopedia,
1971 Ed.,compiled by Benjamin F. Miller, M.D.).All these symptoms were present when Garvida

21
testified before the Committee on November 6, 2003 to answer its questions regarding his involvement
in the leakage of the examiner's test questions in mercantile law.
"Garvida testified that when he was a freshman at FEU, he became a member of the Beta
Sigma Lambda fraternity where he met and was befriended by Attorney De Guzman who was his senior
by one and a half years. Although they had been out of touch since he went home to the province on
account of the recurrence of his illness, De Guzman was able [to] get this cell phone number from his
compadre, Atty. Joseph Pajara. De Guzman told Garvida that he was faxing him 'possible questions in
the bar examination in mercantile law.' Because the test questions had no answers, De Guzman
stressed that they were not 'tips' but only 'possible test questions.'
"Garvida had intended to take the 2003 bar examinations. He enrolled in the Consortium
Review Center in FEU, paying P10,000.00 as enrollment fee. However, on his way to the Supreme
Court to file his application to take the bar examination, he suffered pains in his wrist — symptoms that
his MS had recurred. His physician advised him to go to the National Orthopedic Hospital in Quezon
City for treatment. This he did.
"He gave up his plan to take the 2003 bar examinations. Nevertheless, he continued to attend
the review classes at the Consortium Review Center because he did not want to waste completely the
P10,000-enrollment fee that he paid for the review course ('Nahihinayang ako').That was presumably
why De Guzman thought that Garvida was taking the bar exams and sent him a copy of the test
questions in mercantile law.
"Upon receipt of the test questions, Garvida faxed a copy to his 'brod' Randy Iñigo who was
reviewing at the Consortium Review Center. Randy photocopied them for distribution to other fraternity
brods. Some of the brods doubted the usefulness of the test questions, but Randy who has a high
regard for De Guzman, believed that the questions were 'tips.' Garvida did not fax the questions to any
other person than Randy Iñigo. He allegedly did not sell the questions to Randy. 'I could not do that to a
brod,' he explained.
"In view of the fact that one of the copies of the leaked test questions (Exh. H) bore on the left
margin a rubber stamp composed of the Greek initials 'BEA-MLQU,' indicating that the source of that
copy was the Beta Sigma Lambda chapter at MLQU, the Committee subpoenaed Ronald Collado, the
Most Illustrious Brother of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity of MLQU.
"RONALD COLLADO is a senior law student at the MLQU. He admitted that his fraternity
conducted 'Bar Ops' for the 2003 bar exams. Bar Ops are the biggest activity of the fraternity every
year. They start as soon as new officers of the fraternity are elected in June, and they continue until
the bar examinations are over. The bar operations consist of soliciting funds from alumni brods and
friends to be spent in reproducing bar review materials for the use of their 'barristers' (bar candidates) in
the various review centers, providing meals for their 'brod'-barristers on examination days; and to rent a
'bar site' or place near De la Salle University where the examinees and the frat members can convene
and take their meals during the break time. The Betans' bar site for the 2003 bar examinations was
located on Leon Guinto Street, Malate. On September 19 and 21, before [the] start of the examination,
Collado's fraternity distributed bar review materials for the mercantile law examination to the examinees
who came to the bar site. The test questions (Exh. H) were received by Collado from a brod, Alan
Guiapal, who had received them from Randy Iñigo.
"Collado caused 30 copies of the test questions to be printed with the logo and initials of the
fraternity (BEA-MLQU) for distribution to the 30 MLQU examinees taking the bar exams. Because of
time constraints, frat members were unable to answer the test questions despite the clamor for
answers, so, they were given out 'as is' — without answers.
"DEAN EDUARDO J. F. ABELLA of the Jose 'Rizal University law school in Mandaluyong City,
was the reviewer in Mercantile Law and Practical Exercises at the Lex Review Center which is operated
by the Lex Review & Seminars Inc.,of which Dean Abella is one of the incorporators. He learned about
the leakage of test questions in mercantile law when he was delivering the pre-week lecture on Legal
Forms at the Arellano University. The leaked questions were shown to him by his secretary, Jenylyn
Domingo, after the mercantile law exam. He missed the Saturday lecture in mercantile law because he
was suffering from a touch of flu. He gave his last lecture on the subject on Wednesday or Thursday
before the exam. He denied having bought or obtained and distributed the leaked test questions in
Mercantile Law to the bar reviewees in the Lex Review Center.

22
 "FINDINGS
"The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions
which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C.
Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of the
questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday,
in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed
by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the
mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have been assured of passing the
examination with at least a grade of 82%!
"The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared
by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of
Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.
"Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer.
Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos' computer. The culprit who
stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos' computer without the latter's knowledge and consent, and
who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos' legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who
voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the
test questions, with the help of his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity 'brods,' namely, Ronan
Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall),and Erwin Tan. ETDSAc
"In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iñigo and James Bugain.
"Randy Iñigo passed a copy or copies of the same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal,
who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambda's] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald F. Collado, who
ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQU's 30 bar candidates.
"Attorney Danilo De Guzman's act of downloading Attorney Balgos' test questions in mercantile
law from the latter's computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It
was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being
the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.
"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos' right to
privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and
seizure — rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article
III, 1987 Constitution).
"He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers' Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that '[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect
for law and legal processes.'
 
"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma
Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other
examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his
fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct
Canon 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the
law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its
dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of
the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduate's academic preparedness to embark upon
the practice of law.

23
 "However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely
responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos' proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination.
The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the assistance and cooperation of
other persons, such as:
"Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos' private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos
himself, was the only person who knew the password, who could open and close his
computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a
computer may not be accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must
have opened Atty. Balgos' computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the test
questions stored therein.
"Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity 'brod' of De Guzman, who was responsible
for interconnecting Atty. Balgos' computer with the other computers outside Atty.
Balgos' room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who
knew the password of Atty. Balgos' computer.
"The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked
test questions, appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test
questions. They could not have been motivated solely by a desire to help the fraternity, for the
leakage was widespread ('kalat na kalat') according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators
were:
Ronan Garvida,
Arlan,
Erwin Tan,
Randy Iñigo,
Ronald Collado, and
Allan Guiapal
"The Committee does not believe that De Guzman recklessly broke the law and risked his job
and future as a lawyer, out of love for the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity. There must have been an
ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very
well knows, covers the bar examinations.
"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos'
computer could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the
secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a powerful modern machine which
he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions
that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on
his secretary to use the password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to
which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use of the machine whose potential for mischief he
could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so sensitive an undertaking
as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of
which he is quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty
typewriter, in the privacy of his home, (instead of his law office),where they would have been safe from
the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos' negligence in the preparation and
safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the
proximate cause of the 'bar leakage;' it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple
precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and
circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not have been sullied by the scandal. He
admitted that 'Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened' (43 tsn, Oct. 24, 2003).
"RECOMMENDATION
"This Honorable court in the case of Burbe v. Magulta,A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002, 383
SCRA 276, pronounced the following reminder for lawyers: 'Members of the bar must do nothing that
may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of
the profession.' In another case, it likewise intoned: 'We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all

24
 times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients.' (Reyes v. Javier,A.C. No. 5574, February
2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538),It goes without saying that a lawyer who violates this precept of the profession
by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the 'public's respect for the legal
profession, should be disciplined.
"After careful deliberation, the Investigating Committee recommends that:
"1. Attorney Danilo De Guzman be DISBARRED for he had shown that he is morally unfit to
continue as a member of the legal profession, for grave dishonesty, lack of integrity, and criminal
behavior. In addition, he should make a written PUBLIC APOLOGY and pay DAMAGES to the
Supreme Court for involving it in another 'bar scandal,' causing the cancellation of the mercantile law
examination, and wreaking havoc upon the image of this institution.
2. Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos should be REPRIMANDED by the Court and likewise be
required to make a written APOLOGY to the Court for the public scandal he brought upon it as a result
of his negligence and lack of due care in preparing and safeguarding his proposed test questions in
mercantile law. As the Court had to cancel the Mercantile Law examination on account of the 'leakage'
of Attorney Balgos' test questions, which comprised 82% of the bar questions in that examination, Atty.
Balgos is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject.
"3. FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan
Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Inigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal by the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal
prosecution as probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law.
"With regard to recommending measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations and
prevent a repetition of future leakage in the said examinations, inasmuch as this matter is at present
under study by the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, as an aspect of proposals
for bar reforms, the Investigating Committee believes it would be well-advised to refrain from including
in this report what may turn out to be duplicative, if not contrary, recommendations on the matter." 3
The Court adopts the report, including with some modifications the recommendation, of the Investigating
Committee. The Court, certainly will not countenance any act or conduct that can impair not only the integrity of
the Bar Examinations but the trust reposed on the Court.
The Court also takes note that Mr. Jovito M. Salonga and Mr. Benjamin R. Katly, two of its employees assigned to
the Management Information Systems Office (MISO), who were tasked by the Investigating Committee to inspect the
computer system in the office of Atty. Balgos, found that the Court's Computer-Assisted Legal Research (CALR)
database 4 was installed in the computer used by Atty. Balgos. Mr. Salonga and Mr. Katly reported that the system, which
was developed by the MISO, was intended for the exclusive use of the Court. The installation thereof to any external
computer would be unauthorized without the permission of the Court. Atty. Velasco informed the two Court employees
that the CALR database was installed by Atty. De Guzman on the computer being used by Atty. Balgos. The matter would
also need further investigation to determine how Atty. De Guzman was able to obtain a copy of the Court's CALR
database. acTDCI
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving
any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile Law;
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De
Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James
Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to determining their participation and
respective accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an investigation on
how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Court's CALR database.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the  Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the
Office of the Court Administrator to all courts.

25
 SO ORDERED.
|||  (Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 1222 (Resolution), [February 4, 2004], 466 PHIL 548-568)

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 2540. September 24, 2013.]
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO,  petitioner.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J  p:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979  1 and
passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney's Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together
with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, 4 but he failed to
do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the
Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of
the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7 TCAScE
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief
[that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten." 9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he
was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys. 11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
2012 12 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. 13 The OBC recommended that
the instant petition be denied for petitioner's gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.  14 It explained
that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys. 15

26
 After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado's prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of
a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. IEAaST
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon
him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to
Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court's attention to petitioner's omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa'yo, you don't know what's gonna happen. At the same time, it's a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what's gonna happen. And, finally it's the right thing to do. I have to
come here . . . sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,  17 which is
more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For
this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession,
and that he has  prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine
Bar. CSHDTE
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
the Laurel Law Office, 18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation. 19
All these demonstrate Medado's worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." 22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts  23 as
it negates malice or evil motive, 24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat. cCSDTI
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact
when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that
would have made him so. 26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the
necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court,the unauthorized practice of law by one's assuming to be an attorney or officer of the
court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must be reached after the
filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: HSTaEC
CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
27
 While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,
the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of
law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is
not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael
A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before
he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court. cDTaSH
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 35            September 30, 1949

In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.

REYES, J.:

The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for misappropriating funds
entrusted to him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson. Respondent having answered denying the charge, the
complaint was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. After the investigation the Solicitor General rendered his
report finding the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and recommending disciplinary action. The Solicitor
General reports the following facts to have been conclusively established:

. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his client Briccio Henson to be applied to the
payment of inheritance and real estate taxes due from the estate of Esteban Henson for 1945, 1946 and 1947 (p.
3, t. s. n.), for which he signed a receipt (Annex 'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On several occasions, complainant asked the
respondent to show him the official tax receipt evidencing the payment of said taxes, to which the latter answered
that he had already paid them, but the receipts were left with his friend in San Fernando. Respondent promised to
give the receipt later. Complainant waited patiently for it but it was never delivered. After the respondent had failed
to deliver the receipt, complainant became suspicious and inquired from the provincial treasurer of Pampanga
about the matter. Said official gave the information that the taxes were never paid. Consequently, complainant
requested the respondent to refund the money given him for the payment of said taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG), but he
failed to do so. Respondent made several promises to return the money which he never complied. Neither had he
done anything to transfer the titles of the land in the name of the heirs of Esteban Henson up to the present (p. 9,
t. s. n.). In view of this failure of the respondent, the complainant was ultimately forced to pay the taxes out of his
own pocket (p. 8, t.s.n.).

Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General on the basis of his report, respondent failed to do
so. And despite due notice he likewise failed to appear at the hearing before this Court. Indeed, we note from the Solicitor
General's report that respondent, instead of welcoming every opportunity for hearing, seems to have wanted to avoid it.
On this point the report says:

28
 At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the complainant had testified, the hearing was
set for continuance the following day. Both parties agreed in the presence of the investigator to postpone said
hearing for June 5, 1948. On June 5, 1948, complainant appeared, but respondent did not show up, so to give the
respondent a chance, the investigator postponed the continuation of the hearing to June 17. Both parties were
duly subpoenaed (attached to the records). On June 15th, respondent sent a letter (attached to the records) to
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be postponed to June 25, 1948. According
to the request, both parties were again duly subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the record). In the
subpoena sent to respondent, his attention was invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if he fails to appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor in charge will proceed to hear the case ex
parte. In spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he again sent another letter (attached to the records) to
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, asking that the hearing be transferred to July 7, or 8, 1948. In order that the
respondent be given all the chances to defend himself, his request was granted. In the subpoena sent him setting
the hearing for July 8, 1948, as requested, the following remark was stated:

Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed with the investigation and to file the
corresponding recommendation to the Supreme Court. No further postponement will be entertained.

It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for hearing the complainant made his appearance.

On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent made a formal request in person to the
investigator asking that the hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day. Out of consideration to him,
even to the discomfiture of complainant, respondent's request was again granted. But contrary to his assurance,
the respondent again failed to appear.

There is no question that respondent received from complainant the sum of P840 for the specific purpose of
applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the estate which he was engaged to settle. The receipt which
he issued for said amount as well as for the sum of P110 and a sack of rice paid to him for his expenses and fee
reads as follows: . . .

February 15, 1947.

Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight hundred and forty (P840) pesos to be paid as
follows:

P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don

Esteban Henson.
P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.

Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts corresponding to the above mentioned amount, I
promise to return to him the whole amount of P840 not later than April 16, 1947 without any obligation on
his part.

A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos and a sack of rice was paid to me for my
expenses and fee.

(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.

Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he would make it appear that he was entitled to and
had been promised a legal fee for his services and that, as this promise was not complied with, he "saw it fit to withhold
said amount (the P840 for taxes) until he is paid." This explanation is obviously an afterthought and clearly unfounded. For
the established fact is that respondent at first made complainant believe that the sum in question had already been
applied by him to the payment of taxes, and, as testified to by complainant, for the little that respondent was able to do in
connection with the case entrusted to him, he has already received his fee as shown by the above-copied receipt. The

29
conclusion is therefore irresistible that respondent misappropriated the money of his client. This makes him guilty of
unprofessional conduct.

In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. David is hereby ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of five years from the date this decision become final, without prejudice to a more severe
action if the sum misappropriated is not refunded within one month from the same date.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Torres, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.]

ROBERTO SORIANO, complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON,  respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS; CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL

TURPITUDE IS A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION; RATIONALE. —Under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By
such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character. . . . Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the
exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. Where their misconduct outside of
their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges
conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that
office. We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an
essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT JUSTIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The actions of respondent erode rather than
enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not
merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find
the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate. . . . We stress that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
30
 admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. In sum, when lawyers are convicted of
frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances — not the mere fact of their conviction — would demonstrate their
fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
3. ID.; ID.; MORAL TURPITUDE; DEFINED. — Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN THE TOTALITY OF FACTS BEARS THE EARMARKS OF MORAL TURPITUDE;
EXEMPLIFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By
his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a
god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple
traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with
which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
5. ID.; ID.; LAWYER'S POSSESSION OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM IS CONSIDERED
TRANSGRESSION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. — It is also glaringly clear that
respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession
of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney's oath and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."
6. ID.; ID.; LAWYERS MUST NOT MISLEAD THE COURT OR ALLOW IT TO BE MISLED BY ANY
ARTIFICE. — Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness. The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.
Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
expected to act in good faith.
7. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; PURPOSE OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS, EXPLAINED. — The purpose of a
proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function be competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate
to rid our profession of odious members.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with

the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and constitutes sufficient
ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated
May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11,
2004. 4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and
its attachments. 5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27,
2004. 6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which
was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12,
2005.

31
 In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, 7 which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent's conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
". . . . The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi
driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is
not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the
influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at
[the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held
him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall
to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor.
Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But
the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow
when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and
was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver
held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his
car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver
was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on
the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in
this case, Roberto Soriano." 8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,  9 complainant would have
surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr.
Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body
and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver. AEIDTc
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an
application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the
civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano." 10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. 11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred
from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi,
had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car,
got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant." 12

32
 On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. 13 In the instant case, respondent
has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as
follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants
disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI)  v. NLRC, 15 a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of
his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Court rejected the employer's contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did,
the crime would have been violative of the IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.)
The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that
was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral
turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
". . . . Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. . . . ." 16 (Emphasis
supplied) TcHDIA
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of
that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
". . . . The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored
and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt
and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed
him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend
his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character
and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust." 17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected
it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm
twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyer's assault.
We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression
that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty.  Dizon when
the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his
crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected
33
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was
definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one
trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities. 19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that,
both in his attorney's oath 20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of
the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has
been four years 21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains
adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent
reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his
victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter
has lost. AICTcE
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers,
but certainly to their good moral character. 22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so
gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license
and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. 23
We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an
essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty. 24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant's
family. 25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainant's family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. 26
The lies of Atty. Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been
mauled by complainant and two other persons. 27 The trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined
[Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so
little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant's version of the incident particularly
when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. . . ." 28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness. 29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior. 30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings,
they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it
is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach." 31
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence. 32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile
confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

34
 We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should
never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court
cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to
society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty
aspiration for the legal profession — that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.
Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession. AHcDEI
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances — not the mere fact
of their conviction — would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the
appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue
as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar;
and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, [January 25, 2006], 515 PHIL 635-647)

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with
malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.

On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had
been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa
35
filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and
a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in
respondent's office at the City Hall.

An entrapment was set up by the NBI.

Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the
Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment.

When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So
complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with
respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter
greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which
respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he
placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and
Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied
earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the
NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to
explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.

On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution
of disbarment proceedings against him.

On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his
administrative case (Case No. 74).

Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent:
namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein
respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for
partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution.

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked
money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.

He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still
pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said
that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official
against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila.

In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice
or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent
against him.

In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the
case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition.

On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.

II

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

36
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto  in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of
administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and
retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA
653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen
v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v.
Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968
[1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics
66-67 [1983]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a
copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5161. April 14, 2004.]

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S.  TORRES,  respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

In a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges

respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise
against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the
canons of legal and judicial ethics.

37
 The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are
Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and
Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square
meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more
or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more
or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T-1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and
used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal,
unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they
were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the
same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the
title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc.
for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving
Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He
even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the
property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made
to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by
Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:  Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy
and Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the
respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and
Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for
the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express
conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings,
Inc., for $2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment
was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the
full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a
month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution
case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the
Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment, 2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take
advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any
desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while he
believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant's
signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the
reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only
children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight.
38
Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through
his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his
alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the end of November
1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for
reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous
lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance
plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and
allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden
death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter
was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondent's wife herself; (3) on 5
February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying
the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the
administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation or decision. 3
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. 4
In its Resolution No. XV-2003.333 5 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted
Commissioner San Juan's report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The
respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable
fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is
time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus: DTcASE
LAWYER'S OATH
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of
justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer's oath, they
become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of
justice. 6 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
 
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
xxx xxx xxx

39
 CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the
oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant,
respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November
1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion
of their other siblings. 7 There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the
deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainant's sister, he
knew of his wife's siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the
Philippines. 8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the
transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted 9 regarding the falsification of complainant's signature in
the Extrajudicial Settlement 10 dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the
complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant's name in that
document. 11 Such act of counterfeiting the complainant's signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document. 12
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he
presented 13 such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his
wife. 14 He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the
complainant and her other co-heirs. 15 Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the
legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603. 16
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have
kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy
of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes. 17 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 18 As such, he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate. 19 He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. 20 He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct. 21
Respondent's argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister-in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in
LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in
view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when
there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot. 22 Second, during the hearing of said case when the
respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The
transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita
Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.

40
 Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir. 23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony 24 in court, and he never
corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. 25 Moreover, in knowingly
offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony. 26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good
faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice." 27 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted
Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the
petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part
that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him. 28
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of
Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina
admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession
of the title 29 and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the
release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that
he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released
within the month. 30 Respondent's information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997,
or almost a year after he sent the letter. 31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the
respondent.
Respondent's acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to  Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;  grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the
primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. 32 While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion,
the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should
ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. 33
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. 34 Verily, given the peculiar
factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent's gross misconduct calls for the severance of his
privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law,
and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
 

41
 Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161 (Resolution), [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 1-15)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 3360. January 30, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  complainant, vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. —
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent  Tuanda. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add
that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: "Sec. 27. Attorneys
removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
42
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." "Sec.
28. Suspension of Attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of
First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after
such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE, VALID GROUND THEREFOR;
RATIONALE. — The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of
the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that: "the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that
she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the
practice of law;  its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar,
asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated
value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales
proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also
for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment
for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her
obligations to Ms. Marquez. LLpr
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for
estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as
Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated
25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 85-38359;.
(c) to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
(d) to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to
pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition,
suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision reads as follows:
"For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

43
 It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda  is a member of the Bar, and the offense for
(sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the
practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in
accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED." 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal
to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of
Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared
that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for
filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost
her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
"that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a painful penalty aggravating the
lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the
trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she
is innocent of the offenses charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee."
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage
to complainant Ms. Marquez. llcd
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent  Tuanda. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add
that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.
In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
"xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. xxx The thrust
of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation.  Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an
offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest." 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
"Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." (Emphasis supplied)

44
  
"Sec. 28. Suspension of Attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez  v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
"the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law." 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the
Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. prLL
|||  (People v. Tuanda, A.C. No. 3360 (Resolution), [January 30, 1990])

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 139 . March 28, 1983.]

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of
the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc.,  complainant, vs. ELMO S. ABAD respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ADMISSION TO THE — BAR; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES TO BE COMPLIED WITH

BEFORE BECOMING A MEMBER THEREOF. — Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he
has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court).

45
 2. REMEDIAL LAW; ASSUMING TO BE AN ATTORNEY AND ACTING AS SUCH WITHOUT AUTHORITY
CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. — Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr.
Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. The proven charge against  Abad constitutes contempt of
court [Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court].

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of
practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S.  Abad could not deny and
had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation: LLjur
"1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, . . . prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar,
paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, . . .
paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, . . . and
also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown
by Official Receipt No. 83740, . . ."
"2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme
Court, included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as
shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, . . .
"3. At around Eleven O'clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take
my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk  in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice,
the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to
my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and
for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. . .
"4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the
Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
"5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon
my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual
General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, . . .
"6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr.
Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my
name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good
Standing, I paid my membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, . . .
Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and
Official Receipt No. 4601685, . . .
"7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also
included the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the
year 1981-1982, . . .
"8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8,
1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC-607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and
Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a
prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;

46
 "9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982
membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt
No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, . . .
"10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official
Receipt No. 3195776, . . .
"11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, . . ."
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission
to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) prcd
The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of
Court.)
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within
ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (In re Abad v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, [March 28, 1983], 206 PHIL 172-175)

EN BANC

[AC-1928. December 19, 1980.]

In the matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1).

SYNOPSIS

47
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978 for his refusal to pay membership fees due the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Since then, he has sought reinstatement, invoking his state of health, his advanced age and the welfare of
former clients who still rely on him for counsel.
The Court, considering the change of his attitude and the lapse of two years since he was barred from
practicing his profession, ordered his reinstatement making certain that he pays his dues and accepts the Court's
competence to regulate the legal profession and integrate the bar.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ORGANIZATION OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES LEGALLY
UNOBJECTIONABLE. — The integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, and within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF A MEMBER'S NON-PAYMENT OF REQUIRED FEES. — The IBP Board of Governors has
the authority to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
as found in Rule of Court: "Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be ground for the removal of the same of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys." (Section 10, Rule of Court 139-A).
3. ID.; ID.; DISBARMENT; REINSTATEMENT ORDERED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The penalty of disbarment imposed
on Atty. Edillon for his obstinate refusal to pay his membership dues was more than justified. Since then, however, there
were other communications to the Court where a different attitude on his part was discernible. The tone of defiance was
gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise
spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. The
Court, in the light of the above, felt reinstatement could be ordered after it made certain that there was full acceptance on
his part of the competence of the Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can
integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE. — As in the case of the inherent power to punish for
contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919), the power to
discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle.
5. ID.; ID.; MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR, A PRIVILEGE. — Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the
transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J  p:

The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar
admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession
and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A.
Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late Chief Justice Castro as ponente.
From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980,
granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss.
As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP for short Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case
No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the
48
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads: '. . . Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent
by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: "Effect of
non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys." 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect." 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues were "raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration
of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973," 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no
constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were
various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19,
1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on
the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to
be oblivious to certain basic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect.
Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other cases
coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had
been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from plain and sheer obstinacy.
Necessarily, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified. llcd
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was
discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his
health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of
October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal  in the
exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he was barred from exercising his
profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish
for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11
 
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the
bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that
49
 membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having
elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once
again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980. LLphil
|||  (In Re: Edillion, AC-1928, [December 19, 1980], 189 PHIL 468-473)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO  VILLANUEVA,  defendant-

appellant.

SYLLABUS
50
 1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE IN PRIVATE
PRACTICE; MEANING. — Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public,
as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.
2. ID.; ID.; ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR RELATIVE WITH PERMISSION OF
SUPERIOR NOT IN PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. — The isolated appearance as a private prosecutor,
previously authorized by his superior, of an assistant city attorney in a criminal case for malicious mischief before a
justice of the peace court where the offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

DECISION

PAREDES, J p:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime
of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al., vs. Blanco, et al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an
attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining
the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP
issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting
as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually
engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
"The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel
because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the
Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for
his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San
Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the
municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be
no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in
the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

51
 "In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court in Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of the offended party.
"WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs."
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceedings.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which We
consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule
127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.
|||  (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, [May 27, 1965], 121 PHIL 894-898)

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 139. October 11, 1984.]

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., Complainant, v. ELMO S. ABAD, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

52
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; A SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE FOUND IN CONTEMPT OF COURT
AND PENALIZED FOR UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. — In a comprehensive and well-
documented Report the Clerk of Court concluded that the documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the report of
the National Bureau of Investigation, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision
of the Supreme Court of March 28, 1983 which held the respondent in contempt of court for unauthorized practice of law.
The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and
that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury. Elmo S.
Abad is ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice, failing which he shall be imprisoned for twenty
(20) days. He is also warned that if he persists in the unauthorized practice of law he shall be dealt with more severely.
The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that the respondent has not been authorized to
practice law, a copy of which to be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of Court is directed to file with
the City Fiscal of Manila an appropriate complaint for false testimony against the Respondent.

2. ID.; ATTORNEYS; LAWYER HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR COLLABORATING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW WITH ONE
WHO IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE BAR; CASE AT BAR. — The Report of the Clerk of Court reveals that Atty. Ruben A.
Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos.
26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Exhibit D). Atty. Jacobe is required to explain within
ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with
the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

On March 28, 1983, this Court held respondent ELMO S. ABAD in contempt of court for unauthorized practice of law and
he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217.) He paid the fine.

On May 5, 1983, Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO
MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. law library

Asked to comment on the Motion, Mr. Abad opposed it. He denied the allegation in the Motion that he had been practicing
law even after our Decision of March 28, 1983.

Because the Motion and the Opposition raised a question of fact, in Our resolution of April 10, 1984, We directed "the
Clerk of Court to conduct an investigation in the premises and submit a report thereon with appropriate
recommendation."virtua1aw library

In a comprehensive and well-documented Report which is hereby made a part of this Resolution, the Clerk of Court
concluded:
"The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that
respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Clerk of Court makes the following recommendations:

"a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty
(20) days in case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary action of imprisonment in case of any further
practice of law after receipt of this resolution; and

b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court find him fit to become such a member.

"It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in the Philippines through the Office of the Court
Administrator that respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar and is therefore not authorized to
practice law."cralaw virtua1aw library
53
We find the Report to be in order and its recommendations to be well-taken. However, the latter are not sufficiently
adequate in dealing with the improper activities of the Respondent.

The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and
that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.

The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla
one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit
D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with the Respondent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice, failing which
he shall be imprisoned for twenty (2) days. he is also warned that if he persists in the unauthorized practice of law he shall
be dealt with more severely.

The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that the respondent has not been authorized to
practice law. A copy of the circular should be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila an appropriate complaint for false testimony against
the Respondent.

Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for
collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 712 . March 19, 1997.]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

54
 SYLLABUS

1.LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW.
— The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed our" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
2.ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER'S OATH; NOT A MERE CEREMONY OR FORMALITY FOR
PRACTICING LAW; EVERY LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES WEIGH HIS ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAWYER'S
OATH AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. — After a very careful evaluation of this case, we
resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following, admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that
Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the
lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr.  Argosino will
continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J  p:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to
homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the
order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner
likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing
victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
55
 In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a.He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since
the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b.He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the
accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their
knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of
the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c.As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law
practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his
death.
d.He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of
one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of
third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for
forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer' s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath.

56
If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a
date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
|||  (Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL 766-771)

57