22. Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T.

Domondon,

Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Licensure Exam she
took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the Board of Accountancy
(Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was shown her answer sheets but since
these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to determine why she failed the Exam. Consequently,
she asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and an
explanation of the grading system (collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two
grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of
1994, only allowed access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result of her examination
can be made only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance;
and (2) the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets)
by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed her that her
exam was investigated and no mechanical error was found in the grading. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Mandamus with Damages, with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board and
its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all
documents that would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her
answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended her
Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the documents requested, not recorrection of her
exam, deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate of registration as CPA.
Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC
denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She amended her Petition a second
time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had requested, that if
warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the PRC.
The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On her motion, however, the RTC
reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA examination did not render
the petition moot because the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as
Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As regards whether she had the
constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the parties
first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered the PRC to preserve
and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer keys for the October 1997
CPA Licensure Exam. When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the case
because: (1) the petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20,
Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to
information and access to government documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public
concern, because she merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or
mandatory function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of
a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she did not elevate the
matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the
Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner has the constitutionalright to have access to the Examination Papers.

Held: Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is limited to
“matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law”
(Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to
“transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law” (Sec.
28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the meanings of “public interest” and
“public concern” which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen,” and which are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a
case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National board
examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and
the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the
art and science of accounting. The Court, nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to limit
access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation,
generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the
questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC, however, had not been given
an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping
the Examination Papers confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may
impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may
be ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

23.

24. Stronghold Insurance Company Inc. vs Cuenca

G.R. No. 173297 March 6, 2013

Facts: On January 19, 1998, Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas for the collection
of a sum of money and damages. His complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-023, included an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. On January 26, 1998, the RTC granted
the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a
bond of P1,000,000.00 executed in favor of the Cuencas. Less than a month later, Marañon amended
the complaint to implead Tayactac as a defendant. On February 11, 1998, Marañon posted SICI Bond No.
68427 JCL (4) No. 02370 in the amount of P1,000,000.00 issued by Stronghold Insurance. Two days later,
the RTC issued the writ of preliminary attachment. The sheriff served the writ, the summons and a copy
of the complaint on the Cuencas on the same day. The service of the writ, summons and copy of the
complaint were made on Tayactac on February 16, 1998.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have the legal standing to sue petitioner for the recovery of the
attached properties and damages.

Held: No. To ensure the observance of the mandate of the Constitution, Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under the same rule, a real party in
interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled
to the avails of the suit. Accordingly, a person , to be a real party in interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, should appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that
is, his interest must be a present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest.

Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause
of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any
actual controversy. Truly, a person having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where the real
party in interest is not present or impleaded.

The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action at law
are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case;
(b) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to avoid
a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to
sound public policy. Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be based on a cause of action, defined
as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, the former as the defendant must
be allowed to insist upon being opposed by the real party in interest so that he is protected from further
suits regarding the same claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the defendant because
“the defendant can insist upon a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good res judicata
protection if the struggle is carried through on the merits to the end.”

The rule on real party in interest ensures, therefore, that the party with the legal right to sue brings the
action, and this interest ends when a judgment involving the nominal plaintiff will protect the defendant
from a subsequent identical action. Such a rule is intended to bring before the court the party rightfully
interested in the litigation so that only real controversies will be presented and the judgment, when
entered, will be binding and conclusive and the defendant will be saved from further harassment and
vexation at the hands of other claimants to the same demand.

But the real party in interest need not be the person who ultimately will benefit from the successful
prosecution of the action. Hence, to aid itself in the proper identification of the real party in interest, the
court should first ascertain the nature of the substantive right being asserted, and then must determine
whether the party asserting that right is recognized as the real party in interest under the rules of
procedure. Truly, that a party stands to gain from the litigation is not necessarily controlling.

Given the separate and distinct legal personality of Arc Cuisine, Inc., the Cuenca’s and Tayactac lacked
the legal personality to claim the damages sustained from the levy of the former’s properties. According
to Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,  even when the foreclosure on the assets of the
corporation was wrongful and done in bad faith the stockholders had no standing to recover for
themselves moral damages; otherwise, they would be appropriating and distributing part of the
corporation’s assets prior to the dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its debts and
liabilities. Moreover, in Evangelista v. Santos, the Court, resolving whether or not the minority
stockholders had the right to bring an action for damages against the principal officers of the
corporation for their own benefit.

Tileston v. Ullman

fact

Appellee claims that appellant, a physician, committed such an offense for giving professional advice
concerning the use of contraceptives to three patients whose condition of health was such that their
lives would be endangered by child-bearing. The appellant contended that because of the nature of his
patients' exceptional condition in light of the danger child-bearing could pose for them that this was a
just reason for the advice to be authorized and necessary. However, his complaint contained no
allegations asserting any claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of infringement of appellant's liberty
or his property rights. The relief prayed was a declaratory judgment as to whether the statutes are
applicable to appellant and, if so, whether they constitute a valid exercise of constitutional power
"within the meaning and intent of Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting a
state from depriving any person of life without due process of law.

significance

The sole constitutional attack upon the statutes in question are under the Fourteenth Amendment and
confined the physician's contention for depravity of life—not appellant's but his patients'. Thus, the life
of the appellant himself is not in danger. No genuine case or controversy essential to the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the Court for this subject-matter existed until Griswold v. Connecticut.
Holding[edit]

The Supreme Court held that the proceedings in the state courts presented no constitutional question
which appellant has standing to assert. No question is raised as to the applicability and constitutionality
of the statutes in their application to the physician in respect to deprivation of liberty or property in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court does not speak to whether it
has jurisdiction to enforce a law that prevents the use of contraceptives for the state of Connecticut.

Cuyegkeg’

The Executive Council of the Philippines Medical Association of the Philippines, acting in conformity with
the R.A. 2382 (Medical Act of 1959), submitted to the President a list of 12 nominees of qualified
physicians, including petitioners herein, for appointment as members of the Board of Medical
Examiners. Of the 12 names, two happen to be the personal physicians of the President. oSubsequently,
the President sent a letter to the Council informing the latter that he had appointed six persons, the first
five persons of which were mentioned in the list submitted by the Executive Council but the last
appointee, herein respondent, was not mentioned in the said list.oPetitioners challenged respondent’s
appointment on the ground that the President CANNOT appoint any person to the Board of Medical
Examiners not named in the list submitted by the Executive Council and that accordingly, the
appointment of respondent is null and void. They based their action on Section 13 of R.A. 2382.

Facts:Among the 12 nominees for the Board of Medical Examiners, only 6 were shortlisted by
thePresident, which includes Dr. Pedro Cruz, a government physician. The petitioners, who areamong
the nominees cut by the president, prayed for two causes of action. The first, being thatany one of them
is qualified for the position and that Dr. Cruz’s appointment be rendered illegal,thus null and void. While
the second, prays for a writ of preliminary injunction, ceasing, desistingand refraining the respondent
from assuming and performing the role of Board MedicalExaminer, and for the respondent to pay for
the costs of this suit.The petition for preliminary

26. People vs Vera

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera
upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation
of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power
to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And
even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this
also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of
the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.

Issue:

Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Held:

It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow
from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result
in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his
oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in
operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within
the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another
person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by
the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.