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Technological Nihilism Gandhi and Heidegger Anoop George Abstract By technological nihilism is meant the phenomenon of the loss of meaning with the rise of the technological civilization. In this essay, | will focus on the discourse of technological nihilism in Gandhi and Heidegger. Gandhi's critique of technology speaks to us concerning the dehumanization of the human being when entrenched in technological civilization, a dehumanization that propels her/his greed, avarice and arrogance, The dehumanized modern, in Gandhi's critique, dominates nature through technological means and dominates the other through militarization and war. For Heidegger, modern Western civilization understands being itself technologically, and so the comportment of the modern human person towards herself, others and nature operates at the level of calculation, organization and utility. Heidegger, unlike Gandhi, is not a moralist who would prescribe a way out of this situation, because, for him, transformation of ontological understanding, is not an event decided only by human beings but an event that unfolds in the realm of mutual engagement between humans and being, Heidegger's philosophy does evoke a moral critique of modernity and technology which Gandhi consciously engages in. Both of them are prophets who want to re-establish grounds for lost meaning. Modernity is characterized by the phenomenon of technological nihilism. In the present world what has become an integral part of our life and comportment is the technological artefacts. However, most critics of modern technology do not consider technology as something evil, or at least necessary evil. This is what Heidegger argues in The Question Concerning Technology: “There is no demonry of technology, but rather there is the mystery of its essence” (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 28). If so, what is the problem of technology? What is the phenomenon of technological nihilism? GITAM Journ of Gaudhinw Studies Vot. 3 Na. T pp. 208-220 Jaw-fuare 2014 © 2015 GIGS, GITAM Tecinorocicat NiiiuisM: GaNDHt AND HEIDrGcEr | 209 The term “nihilism” comes from the Latin nifil, meaning “nothing”. Friedrich Nietzsche, in saying “God is dead”, made explicit the dominant modern sense of the loss of anchor, of home, of meaning and of the metaphysical structure of certainties. There is neither a “true world” for our knowledge to discover nor permanent values and meaning to live for. Gandhi and Heidegger agree that contemporary nihilism is only the most overt manifestation of an anthropocentric, exploitative view of reality that took root in the Western intellectual culture since the last two millennia, culminated in modern technology and is in the process of making itself a global phenomenon since the dawn of the twentieth century. For Heidegger, in the words of a commentator, the present world follows the rhythm of “productionist metaphysics” (Clark, 2001, p. 29). The modern world with all its technological manifestations have ensnared the human beings and blinded them by a way of thinking that insists on grasping reality through imposed, technicized conceptual structures. ‘An important aspect of the modern culture is a reductive, calculative view of reality. In the words of an important philosopher of technology “[wle measure, plan, and control ceaselessly, reducing everything, including ourselves, to resources and system components” (Feenberg, 2005, p. 21). All our comportments towards nature and ourselves have become capital oriented for the fulfilment of arbitrary ends. The most nihilistic outcome of this is to look at both human beings and nature as sources of energy to be extracted and delivered. “Modernity is the total mobilization of the world by humans who are themselves mobilized in. the process” (Feenberg, 2005, p. 21). Contemporary nihilism comes to mean the loss of value and significance in the face of the reductive modern. metaphysics. Several modern phenomena such as rationalism, secularization, industrialization, the scientific cuiture, individualism, technological mastery of nature, globalization, and liberal democracy (Parekh, 2001, p. 78) have, in one way or another, helped deepen the modern sense of nihilism. Gandhi and Heidegger are well known for their assault on technological overhauling and decadent modernity, In Heidegger's view, nihilism is the unfolding of the whole cultural history of the West from the thought of Plato to Nietzsche's claims that nihilism is “a normal state of affairs”.' In Gandhi’s markedly ethical (as distinguishable from "Heidegger also argues similarly in Tac Question of Being: "On the one hand, the ‘movement of nihilism has become more manifest in its planetary, all-corroding, many-faceted itresistibleness. No one with any insight will still deny today that nihilism is in the most varied and most hidden forms of ’the normal state’ of man” (Heidegger, 1958, p. 47) 210 | Anoop GEorcE Heidegger's ontological) discourse of technological nihilism, the reign of brute rationality has led to the degeneration of life, dignity and value, and what remains is gross exploitation of humans and nature. In the discussion that follows, I will closely engage with the Gandhi's ethical critique of technology and Heidegger's ontology of technology and show that there are certain mutually reinforcing elements in these two divergent discourses. In the first part of the essay, I focus on Gandhi’s views on technology and its nihilistic impact on society and humanity. In the second section, I will elaborate how Heidegger views technology as “enframing”, which is a way of being of the human that has led to decadent modernity. In the third section I attempt to come to a convergence in the two discourses that arose in completely different philosophical paradigms, cultural milieu and historical exigencies. I It would be difficult to locate the advent of nihilism in history. However in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe with the beginning of Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, nihilism made its appearance. Mostly the trend towards nihilism was manifested in rejecting reli and the erstwhile foundations of morality. According to Nietzsche, with the “death of God” the whole universe was unhinged and there was nothing to hold it together unless the human being herself ascended the throne of God (Sinha, 1988, p. 3). When we reflect over human technological mastery and the paradoxical technological dependence, Nietzsche appears right? As the principal architect of India’s freedom movement, the pre- eminent theorist of the nonviolent civil disobedience and the most BE. Skinner writes: “In trying to solve the terrifying problems that face us in the world today, we naturally turn to the things we do best. We play from strength, and our strength is science and technology. To contain a population explosion we look for better methods of birth control. Threatened by a nuclear holocaust, we build bigger deterrent forces and anti-ballistic-missile systems. We try to stave off world famine with new foods and better ways of growing them. Improved sanitation and medicine will, we hope, control disease, better housing and transportation will solve the problems of the ghettos, and new ways of reducing or disposing of waste will stop the pollution of the environment, We can point to remarkable achievements in all these fields, and it is not surprising that we should try to extend them. But things grow steadily worse, and it is disheartening to find that technology itself is increasingly at fault” (Skinner, 1973, p. 9). The problem, thus, is not with technology or with the human being, but with the human ontological transformation in the modern era. We ourselves have become “technicized beings”. TECHNOLOGICAL NIHILISM: GANDH} AND HEIDEGGER § 211 important contributor to modern Indian self-identity, Gandhi's enduring contribution for contemporary thought was the view he developed of the colonizing modern West and the civilization it sought to globalize — an exploitative civilization through technological means. While Gandhi accepted several aspects of modern Western civilization, like freedom, equality and the human bond, he began to articulate an important counter- view that it is problematic to think in the long run that these hallowed modern ideals, good and valuable in themselves, could not be achieved without reductive technologization. He thought that the latter would cripple humanity and paradoxically would make the new human values — liberty, equality and fraternity — empty, and the human pursuit after them violent and inhuman. This critique that he began to articulate in the very first decade of the twentieth century today appears absolutely relevant and alarmingly prophetic. The modern technological civilization, in Gandhi's view, denudes human interior dimension and ignores the essence of the soul. Gandhi accepted the Hindu metaphysics of the human being, and like Heidegger, appreciated the scientific temper that modern humans manifest. But in his view unreflective humans, technologically equipped and powerful, gradually fall victim to pervasive greed and sordid thoughts. The moderns have fallen prey to the comforts wrought by technology. Any preoccupation with the highest human values and spiritual ideals were considered a hindrance to the undiluted pursuit of material prosperity and its vulgar display. And Gandhi noticed that the representative new human person gave rise to by the modern Western civilization was not humane but aggressive, violent, ambitious, and self-centred (Parekh, 2001, p. 82). Hence, like Heidegger's, Gandhi’s concern was not the machine as such but the machine-like human person created by the machine- culture. Technological humans spend most of their time and energy frying to steady themselves in a hostile and unstable environment. Much before the environmental crisis began to be a discourse in its own right in the 1970s Gandhi lashed out at the extreme manipulation of nature, and spoke of it as a direct fallout of the technological civilization. Gandhi thought that modern civilization had a depressing air of “futility” and “madness” about it and was likely to “enslave” the whole humanity and destroy itself before long (Gandhi, 2009, p. 73). It created an unreflective attitude that did not encourage persons and societies to engage in seli-critique. Gandhi was convinced that the advent of technology and machineries would disrupt the present social and economic life. Technology and large- 212 | Anoor GEORGE scale wealth creation would bring discord into human relations, community life and the natural habitat. In Gandhi's view the exploitation of one’s fellow human beings is built into the very structure of modern civilization (ibid., p. 174). The modern media have almost enveloped us and our decisions are mostly prompted by them. Consumers were constantly manipulated into desiring things beyond their long-term interest. Workers were made to do boring jobs at subsistence wages under inhuman conditions, and given little opportunity or encouragement to develop to their intellectual and moral potential. The poor were treated with contempt, weaker races were regarded as subhuman and were bought and sold, and weaker nations were conquered and mercilessly oppressed and exploited (ibid., p. 167). For Gandhi European imperialism was a natural expression of the aggressive and exploitative impulse lying at the heart of modern civilization (Parekh, 2001, pp. 82-83). For Gandhi, the result of the present modern technological civilization is nihilistic. The modern fascination with speed and conquest is meaningless and aimless. According to Gandhi faster modes of transport like the railways are an evil as he argues in the Hind Swaraj: “They (Railways) are the carriers of plague germs” (Gandhi, 2009, p. 47). Gandhi dreamt of a civilization which will be rooted in science and technology but not devoid of ethical values. Expensive machineries are a monopoly of the elite. Massive production of essential items like food and clothing would cause a profound imbalance in economy and gradually would overthrow small-scale industries in the villages. Gandhi argues Machinery well used has to help and ease human effort. The present use of machinery tends more and more to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few in total disregard of millions of men and women whose bread is snatched by it out of their mouths. — CWMG 61: 416 In Gandhi's view nihilism has conquered humanity because all human efforts are for “bodily welfare”. With bodily welfare emerging as the “object of life”, the resources of the entire civilization are put at the service » Though not against technology and better means of transport, what Gandhi argues in this context is that, the cheaper modes of transport, like the railways, would cause people to move in large numbers from place to place, often unwarranted, and spreading diseases, communal disharmonies and causing congestion in certain parts (cities) of the country. Human displacement from their naturat habitat was a problem for Gandhi. A similar argument is made by Jared Diamond in his work Guns, Germs and Steel (Diamond, 2005); he argues that colonization with the help of modern technologies has set in many evils in many parts of the world. In Gandhi's view modern technology has colonized individuals and communities, and erased much of their value systems. Tecrnotocicat Nudism: GANDHI AND HEIDEGGER 1213 of the good of material happiness. Material happiness, for Gandhi, is anchored in insatiable possessiveness, machinery, mechanization of every aspect of human life, rejection of the virtue of religion, and coercive power. Thus, according to Gandhi, modern civilization has its foundation built on questionable theories of the human being. Unlike ancient civilization, where primacy was given to the spirit of the person, modern civilization attributes primacy to the body (Ray, 2008, p. 82). While Gandhi did not articulate a view of the embodied person as Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty did, he offered unstinted resistance to the modern materialistic view of the person, which he thought, arose out of the technological culture. In Gandhi’s view the reign of nihilism today is due to our inability to put a “check” or find a "middle path” in our engagement with technology. We let ourselves be manipulated and our decisions are often prompted by the way things work or fail to work. Such a utilitarian view of life was unacceptable to Gandhi, for whom human beings should be ruled by their inherent worth and not by the power of their possessions. According to Gandhi, technological domination has led to spiritual and moral poverty, dehumanization and a violent culture. Further, it has deprived humanity of a sound intellectual culture. It reduced wisdom to knowledge as a form of power only useful as an instrument of control and dominion over nature (ibid., p. 82) In Gandhi's view greed and want were two interrelated principles hidden in the modern civilization. Technological monopoly was always in the hands of a few capitalists, who had the single aim of profit creation by the means of producing goods cheaply in huge quantity to satisfy people's wants. This capitalist search culminated in mechanization and industrialization. Gandhi laments this development because it led to the accumulation of property in the hands of a few and thus is morally questionable because the promise of modern civilization to heal human want is not fulfilled. Further, without any ethical questioning, the modern productive system ultimately resulted in the mass production of commodities beyond human requirement and the paradoxical effect of a large chunk of humanity living without even the basic needs. This is what Gandhi argues in the Hind Swaraj regarding the modern technological society: People would not be happy in them (technological society), that there sould be gangs of thieves and robbers, prostitution and vice flourishing in them and that poor men would be robbed by rich men. — Gandhi, 2009, p. 69 Like Heidegger, Gandhi is not against machinery or modern technology, 214 | Anoop GEorGE but against what he calls “the machinery craze”. Thus Gandhi would say that, it was not just the moral inadequacy and extravagant pretensions of modern civilization, but its treacherously deceptive, hypnotic and self- deceptive tendency which has to be seriously dealt with. He further argues: What I object to, is the craze for machinery, not machinery as such. The craze is for what they call labour-saving machinery. Men go on “saving labour” till thousands are without work and thrown on the open streets to die of starvation. I want to save time and labour, not for a fraction of mankind, but for all. I want the concentration of wealth, not in the hands of the few, but in the hands of all. Today machinery merely helps a few to ride on the backs of millions. The impetus behind it all is not the philanthropy to save labour, but greed. It is against this constitution of things that I am fighting with all my might. — CWMG 25: 251 T Technological nihilism in Heidegger has to be understood within the framework of Heidegger's famous enquiry into the question of being. Heidegger argues in Being and Time, that “the essence of Dasein lies in its existence” (Heidegger, 1973a, p. 67), meaning that our life is not a conglomeration of pre-given, timeless human nature, rather we are, essentially, that nexus of practices, assumptions, prejudices, habits and traditions that make up the very experiences and actions in which we find ourselves (Clark, 2001, p. 27). Heidegger says, “one is what one does” (Heidegger, 1973a, p. 283). Unlike in Gandhi, therefore, we do not find the acceptance of a religious metaphysics of the soul in Heidegger, and yet he argued that being manifested itself to the ancients non- technologically, whereas to us moderns being (that is, the way all that exists manifests to the humans) appears “enframed” within technological calculation and measure, For Heidegger, this is not a completely avoidable situation, for the reductive modern metaphysics arose from the long Western interpretation of being as logos and reason. On the other hand, modernity is decadent and hides within it a danger — the danger of not letting other, less violent manifestations of being accessible to the human being, who is the shepherd of being and in whose linguistic ability being makes ils home. For Heidegger, the essence of technology is “enframing” (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 19) — that is, technological understanding challenges and calls upon human beings to view all phenomena in a calculative fashion as a reserve for human machination and that alone. So, the essence of technology is not another technological item or gizmo, but a way of TECHNOLOGICAL Niniuism: GANDHI AND HEIDEGGER | 215 approaching reality. It is a way of bringing forth (poiesis) or producing, a way of unconcealment or truth. This manifestation of truth cannot be without human beings, but it is not simply a human project. Humans are summoned and commissioned in the revelation of the truth of Being. What Heidegger means by the essence of technology is the modernist frame of mind to view the real as resource for human machination and that alone. Possibilities of the real, other than its readiness for human machination and use, are denied to the human agent. In Heidegger's view, the West has fallen prey to the “productionist metaphysics”. Technological rationality is made possible by the new layers added to the Western privileging of the rational over all other aspects throughout several centuries. Michael Zimmerman argues: ‘The metaphysical schemes of Plato and Aristotle, were based on the view that the structure of all things is akin to the structure of products or artefacts. Aristotle's metaphysics, for example, is “productionist” in so far as he conceived of all things, including animals, as “formed matter” The most obvious example of such “formed matter” is the work produced by an artisan who gives form to material. Plato and Aristotle seemingly projected onto all entities the structure of artefacts. — Zimmerman, 1990, p. 157 The later Heidegger's history of being was a valiant, relentless attempt to bring to the fore the unacknowledged anthropocentrie projection of instrumentalist, technological modes of thinking upon the cosmos as a whole (Clark, 2001, p. 30). This reduces the world and nature into mere raw materi: in human hands for fashioning and manipulating, finally culminating into an era of technology. In this era, the valuable is merely what is useful for the human being, Reality itself is considered as resource reserved and stockpiled so that the human could use and reuse them at will. When we look at reality with the technological mindset we see only the readily appearing calculative resourcefulness of things. But Heidegger does not tire of repeating that the being of entities is continuously held up within a play of revealing-concealing. With technological understand- ing, we “may quail at the unconcealed and may misinterpret it” (Heidegger, 1977a, p. 26). We cringe from the unrevealed and hidden horizons of phenomena. The danger is, again, that the human being “exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth” (ibid.). Hence, everything is encountered in the world as a human “construct”, and thus, everywhere humans encounter only themselves. This is the essence of modernity — the march of conquering subjectivity, to which everything real is represented as means. This is not the only danger of technological 216 1 ANoop GEORGE understanding, In the realm of this perspective of reality, the human being is ordered to view the real as resource for her/his own manipulation and thus enframing “drives out every other possibility of revealing” (ibid.) *’The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth” (ibid., p. 28). The site of technological understanding is a tunnel vision that forces us out of the light of every other perspective. Modernity is the narrowing of the human perspective, and thus the narrowing of the being of beings. We are denied several other vital manifestations of being. This danger is even more dangerous because such an understanding sets upon humans without their choice and awareness. That is, such an understanding is so entrenched in the hermeneutical horizon of the modern worldview that we act in obeisance to it when we imagine ourselves to be acting most independently and rationally — that is most modernly. This is what is meant by Heidegger’s characterization of the danger as denial of the other revealings of being. Thus, ruled in this way, the human being today, despite what seems true fo her, never encounters herself, i.e., her essence. «precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter hintself, iat. his essence. Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that he does not apprehend Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists, from out of his essence, in the realm of an exhortation or address, and thus can never encounter only himself. — Heidegger, 1977a, p. 27 tT The specific aspect of modernity that concerns everyone is the notion of the distanced self formally defined in terms of its power to choose. This notion lies behind the feeling that one becomes modern when one sheds the substantive limitations imposed by traditional values and ways of life. Substantive values limit one’s access to a wider field of possibilities; the widest field of possibilities is correlated to an “empty” self, defined by its formal role of maximizing chosen satisfactions or attaining its goals with greatest efficiency (Kolb, 1986, p. xiii). For Gandhi and Heidegger, modernity in these terms is a decadence of human essence, and is a symptom of a deeper malaise. Though technological revamping is embedded in modernity, what is most critical here is that man has become the commanding subject. What TecrnotocicaL NutilisM: GANDHI AND HEiDecceR 1217 is decisive about the modem age is not that humans have liberated themselves from previous obligations, “but that the very essence of man itself changes, in that man becomes subject” (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 128) This also is the crux of modern humanism. Being itself becomes grounded on this “being” and, consequently, the human being, becomes the centre of all that is. The world becomes, thus, a picture for the human being for its machination. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is, is sought and found in the representedness of the latter. —Ibid., pp. 129-30 The representative, calculative project of the modern subject, which culminates in technological nihilism, is guided by a calculative logic (Heidegger, 1969, p. 46). The results of such thinking are familiar: things are converted into commodities, nature is treated only instrumentally, and directs “the human comportment towards the woods as timber, mountains as deposits of coal, river as the treasury of hydroelectric power, wind as the source for renewable energy, and humans as the asset/ resource par excellence” (Siby, 2008, p. 30). There is nothing wrong with this thinking in itself. “Such thought is indispensable” (Heidegger, 1969, p. 46). What makes it destructive is the homelessness behind it. Calculation is in the service of the empty subject. Things are no more experienced in their pure sway over us. Rather, they are experienced as “standing reserve” (bestand) for our machination, stockpiling, and reuse. The essence of technology rules not only the techno-scientific pursuits, but also the highest spiritual pursuits of humans like religion, culture and art. Everything is considered to be at the service of the subject standing above them all to lord over them. Every aspect of contemporary life is a project of the self-conscious subject as represented to itself in its calculative frame. That is why Heidegger speaks of modernity as the age of the “world picture” — everything is pictured or represented to the lordly subject. «For Heidegger, the present modern technology is the way being manifests today. “The later Heidegger, in contrast, not only brings into question the idea that nihiJism can be overcome or cured, but also comes to assert that no endeavour or reaction on our part can immediately alter our destiny in the contemporary, technological world; the contemporary world that is an epoch of complete or ‘consummated nihilism” (Sinclair, 2011, p. 156). 218 | Anoop GEORGE Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth, — Heidegger, 1977a, pp. 129-30 Above all, according to both Gandhi and Heidegger, what plays most in a technological nihilistic era is the dominance of reason. Leibniz formulated the so-called Principle of Reason, which in its simplest formulation means that for everything some reason or ground can or must be rendered. For Heidegger this highlights the dominance of the technological rationale. In his view, technology is a kind of metaphysics, or a kind of essence that is prevalent today, with reason as its primary tool: Modern Technology pushes towards the greatest possible perfection. Perfection is based on the thoroughgoing calculability of objects. The calculability of objects presupposes the unqualified validity of the principium rationis (the principle of reason). It is in this way that the authority of the principle of reason, so understood, determines the essence of the modem, technological age. — Heidegger, 1996, p. 121 There is no doubt that Heidegger's diagnosis that the essence of technology is “enframing”, the reduction of reality to calculable resource- pile for human use at will, meets Gandhi’s own diagnosis of the severest problem of modernity as its violent view of nature and the human being. Gandhi also wrote that the other great weakness of modern civilization was its failure to understand the nature and limits of reason, which, once again, meets Heidegger's view that the technological civilization is an outgrowth of the privileging of reason in the West since Plato. Gandhi believed that all evils of today are a result of unbridled rationality. Machinery is a grand yet awful invention. It is possible to visualize a stage at which the machines invented by man may finally engulf civilization. If man controls the machines, then they will not; but should man lose his control over the machines and allow them to control him, then they will certainly engulf civilization and everything. — CWMG 48: 353 Both Gandhi and Heidegger will agree that the human intervention has drastically changed the world and our own very essence. It has come to a stage where we conjure how the world should be. We Have atomic powers to destroy all living beings on the planet, to let things be or not to be. But is there a way beyond nihilism? Technology is not a modern TECHNOLOGICAL NuniLisM: GANDHI AND HEIDEGGER | 219 invention; the ancient Greeks, Chinese and Indians, and the medieval Europeans used technology. But their technology, unlike that of the moderns, was not destructive in the way modern technology is, as Julian Young puts it: Rivers, for instance, those majestic, living, semi-divinities that helped measure out the different places of human dwelling might be bridged. Yet the ancient wooden bridge unlike the hydro-electric dam typical of modernity did not change the essential course or nature of the river. — Young, 1997, p. 175 Gandhi was delighted to see the progress of science and its positive effects on human life. What saddened him was the use of science as a tool for technological mastery and unbridled progress. In this Gandhian sense, modern technology is the self-expression of the greed and avarice, violence and destructiveness of the modern humans. For Heidegger, technology was the completion of Western metaphysics in its unbridled privileging of rationality. The name “technology”, he says, is used by him to mean “completed metaphysics. . . . This name includes all the areas of beings which equip the whole of beings: objectified nature, the business of culture, manufactured politics, and the gloss of ideals overlying everything” (Heidegger, 1973b, p. 93). In this sense, both Gandhi and Heidegger wanted to recover the lost ground and meaning for modern humans. Their discourses, critiquing modern technology, speak of the way how our knowledge production, and the consequent comportments towards the world from the point of view of the new knowledge produced, impact phenomena in ways we could not imagine initially. Further, their discourses also were foretelling about the critique of dehumanizing technology that reduces human existence to mechanical patterns and overarching systems. Today it is incontestable that, in what can be called a decadent modernity, we are faced with the human crisis as well as the environmental crisis. The new humanity created by the many innovations of the modern civilization today looks listless, empty and meaningless, and the environment out of which the modern civilization created its incredible wealth today stands devastated and pillaged. These two forms of decadence are formulated by Gandhi in his inimitably moral and spiritual jargon and by Heidegger in his heavily ontological language. 220 | Asoor GEORGE References Clark, T. (2001). Martin Heidegger. London: Routledege Diamond, J. (2005). Guns, Germs ani Steel. London: Vintage. Feenberg, A. (2005). Heide New York: Routleds Gandhi, MK. (2009), Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. Ed. Anthony J. Parel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Heidegger, M. (1958), The Question of Being. William Kluback and fean T. Wilde (Trans). New York: Twayne. ——— (1969). Memorial Address. In John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (Trans). Discourse on Thinking. New York: Harper Colophon Books. ——— (1973a). Being and Time, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (tr). Oxford Basil Blackwell. —— (1973b). The End of Phitesophy. Joan Stambaugh (Trans). New York: Harper & Row. rand Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History. ——— (1977a). The Question Concerning Technology. 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(1988). The Unarmed Prophet. Muzaffarpur: Maral Prakashan Skinner, B.F. (1973), Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Suffolk: Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press) The Collected Works of Mahatnta Gandhi (CWMG). [(1958-94)]. Vols. 1 to 100. New Delhi: Publications Division. Young, J. (1997). Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zimmerman, ME. (1990). Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. «ger and After. Chicago:

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