DOEHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC.
, DOHLE (IOM) the Court held that those diseases not listed as occupational
LIMITED AND CAPT. MANOLO T. GACUTAN -versus- HENRY C.
HARO
G.R. No. 206522, April 18, 2016
FACTS:
On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal,
Dohle Ltd., hired Henry Haro as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA
CGM Providencia for a period of nine (9) months with basic monthly
salary of US$547.00 and other benefits.
- Before deployment, Henry Haro underwent pre- employment
medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty.
Henry Haro stated that on June 1, 2008, he boarded the vessel and
assumed his duties as oiler; however, in November 2008, he
experienced heartache and loss of energy after hammering and lifting
a 120-kilogram machine; thereafter, he was confined at a hospital in
Rotterdam where he was informed of having a hole in his heart that
needed medical attention.
After his repatriation on December 6, 2008, Hery Haro reported to
Doehle-Philman which in turn referred him to Clinico-Med.
- Respondent claimed that he was confined for two (2) days in UST
Hospital and that a heart operation was recommended to him.
- He nevertheless admitted that he has not yet undergone any
surgery.
- On April 24, 2009, Henry Haro’s personal doctor, Dr. Luminardo
M. Ramos (Dr. Ramos), declared him not fit to work.
Consequently, on June 19, 2009, Henry Haro filed a Complaint for
disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioners.
- He claimed that since he was declared fit to work before his
deployment, this proved that he sustained his illness while in the
performance of his duties aboard the vessel;
- that he was unable to work for more than 120 days;
- and that he lost his earning capacity to engage in a work he was
skilled to do.
- Thus, he insisted he is entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits.
Petitioners insisted that the determination of the fitness or unfitness
of a medically repatriated seafarer rests with the company-
designated physician; and since Dr. Abesamis declared that
respondent’s illness is not work-related, such determination must
prevail.
- They also stressed that the company-designated doctor
continuously treated respondent from his repatriation in
December 2008, until April 2009, hence, her finding that his
illness is not work-related must be respected.
Finally, petitioners argued that since respondent’s illness is not an
occupational disease,
- then he must prove that his work caused his illness; because of
his failure to do so, then he is not entitled to disability benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits.
RULING:
The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC),
particularly Section 20(B) thereof, provides that:
the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer
suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract.
To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury or illness:
1) must be work-related; and
2) must have arisen during the term of the employment contract.
In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena,
diseases may be compensated if it is shown that they have been
caused or aggravated by the seafarer’s working conditions.
The Court stressed that while the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable
presumption of work-relatedness as regards those not listed as
occupational diseases, this presumption does not necessarily result in
an automatic grant of disability compensation.
- The claimant still has the burden to present substantial evidence
or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion" that his work conditions caused
or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness.
In this case, considering that respondent did not suffer from any
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC,
then to be entitled to disability benefits, the respondent has the
burden to prove that his illness is work-related. Unfortunately, he failed
to discharge such burden.
Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides that the company-
designated doctor is tasked to determine the fitness or the degree of
disability of a medically repatriated seafarer.
- In addition, the company-designated doctor was shown to have
closely examined and treated respondent from his repatriation up
to four months thereafter. Thus, the LA and the NLRC’s reliance
on the declaration of the company-designated doctor that
respondent’s condition is not work-related is justified.
The Court holds that the fact that respondent passed the PEME is of
no moment in determining whether he acquired his illness during
his employment.
- The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It is not intended to be a
thorough examination of a person’s medical condition, and is not
conclusive evidence that one is free from any ailment before
deployment. Hence, it does not follow that because respondent
was declared fit to work prior to his deployment, then he
necessarily sustained his illness while aboard the vessel.
ANDRES L. DIZON -versus- NAESS SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC.
AND DOLE UK (LTD.)
G.R. No. 201834, June 01, 2016
FACTS:
Since 1976, respondents Naess Shipping Phils. Inc. and DOLE UK
(Ltd.) hired petitioner Andres L. Dizon as cook for its various vessels
until the termination of his contract in 2007.
On March 6, 2006, Dizon was hired as Chief Cook and boarded DOLE
COLOMBIA.
- Dizon disembarked after completing his contract on February 14,
2007. He then went on a vacation, and was called for another
employment contract after a month.
When he underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) in
March 2007, he was declared unfit for sea duties due to uncontrolled
hypertension and coronary artery disease as certified by the doctors of
the Marine Medical and Laboratory Clinic (MMLC).
- He was referred to undergo stress test and electrocardiogram
(ECG). He then went to PMP Diagnostic Center Inc. for diagnostic
tests. It was also recommended that he undergo Angioplasty.
- His treadmill stress test showed that he had Abnormal Stress
Echocardiography.
Unconvinced with the doctor's declaration of unfitness, Dizon went to
the Seamen's Hospital and submitted himself for another
examination.
- The result indicated that he was fit for sea duty.
- He returned to MMLC and requested for a re- examination, but
the same was denied.
In November 2008, Dizon filed a complaint before the Department of
Labor and Employment, but subsequently withdrew the same.
- On January 6, 2009, Dizon filed a complaint against respondents
for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, sickness
allowance, reimbursement of medical, hospital and transportation
expenses, moral damages, attorney's fees and interest before the
Labor Arbiter (LA).
Claiming that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefit,
Dizon alleged that he incurred his illness while on board the
respondents' vessel.
- He claimed that his working conditions on board were
characterized by stress, heavy work load, and over fatigue. He
averred that Dr. Marie T. Magno re-evaluated his actual medical
condition on February 16, 2009 and declared him unfit to
resume his work as seafarer since his heart condition is unable
to tolerate moderate to severe exertions.
Dizon asserted that he disclosed his hypertension prior to his last
contract in 2006, but was certified fit for duty for the nine-month
employment contract.
For their part, respondents disavowed liability for Dizon's illness
maintaining that he finished and completed his contract on board their
vessel Dole Colombia without any incident, and that his sickness was
not work-related.
- They rejected the redeployment of Dizon since he was declared
unfit for sea duty in his pre-employment medical examination.
Respondents claimed that they were only exercising their freedom
to choose which employees to hire.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to disability benefits. - NO
RULING:
The law specifically declares that failure to comply with the mandatory
reporting requirement shall result in the seafarer’s forfeiture of his right
to claim benefits thereunder.
In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, 655 SCRA 300
(2011),
- this Court expounded on the mandatory reporting requirement
provided under the POEA-SEC and the consequence for failure of
the seaman to comply with the requirement, viz.:
The foregoing provision has been interpreted to mean that it is
the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task
of assessing the seaman’s disability, whether total or partial, due
to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter’s
employment.
- Concededly, this does not mean that the assessment of said
physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor
tribunal or the courts.
- Should he be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to
request a second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice
regarding his ailment or injury, in which case the medical report
issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and
the court, based on its inherent merit.
- For the seaman’s claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory
that he should be examined by a company-designated
physician within three days from his repatriation.
o Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting
requirement without justifiable cause shall result in
forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation
and disability benefits provided under the POEA-
SEC.
This Court repeatedly denied the payment of disability benefits to
seamen who failed to comply with the mandatory reporting and
examination requirement. Thus, the three-day period from return of
the seafarer or sign-off from the vessel, whether to undergo a post-
employment medical examination or report the seafarer’s physical
incapacity, should always be complied with to determine whether the
injury or illness is work-related.
- To the mind of this Court, Dizon failed to substantiate his
entitlement to disability benefits for a work-related illness under
the POEA-SEC.
- It appears from the records that Dizon did not submit himself to a
post-employment medical examination within three days from his
arrival after completing his last contract with the respondents.
- Dizon does not proffer an explanation or reason for his failure to
comply with the said mandatory requirement given that he claims
that his illness purportedly occurred during the term of his
contract.
It is settled that a person who claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law must establish his right thereto by substantial
evidence or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
- Hence, the burden is on the seafarer to prove that he suffered
from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his
contract. Dizon has the burden to prove through substantial
evidence that he is entitled to disability benefits, which includes
evidence that his illness is work-related and existed during the
terms of his contract.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000
POEA-SEC, two elements must concur:
(1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and
(2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed
during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.
It is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has
rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown
that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or
injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
PHIL-NIPPON KYOEI, CORP. -versus- ROSALIA T. GUDELOSAO
GR No. 181375, 2016-07-13
FACTS:
Phil-Nippon Kyoei, Corp. a domestic shipping corporation purchased
a "Ro-Ro" passenger/cargo vessel "MV Mahlia" in Japan in February
2003.
- For the vessel's one (1) month conduction voyage from Japan to
the Philippines, petitioner, as local principal, and Top Ever Marine
Management Maritime Co., Ltd. (TMCL), as foreign principal,
hired Edwin C. Gudelosao, Virgilio A. Tancontian, and six other
crewmembers.
They were hired through the local manning agency of TMCL, Top Ever
Marine Management Philippine Corporation (TEMMPC). TEMMPC,
through their president and general manager, Capt. Oscar Orbeta
(Capt. Orbeta), and the eight (8) crew members signed separate
contracts of employment.
- Petitioner secured a Marine Insurance Policy (Maritime Policy No.
00001) from SSSICI over the vessel for P10,800,000.00 against
loss, damage, and third party liability or expense, arising from the
occurrence of the perils of the sea for the voyage of the vessel
from Onomichi, Japan to Batangas, Philippines.
- This Marine Insurance Policy included Personal Accident
Policies for the eight (8) crew members for P3,240,000.00
each in case of accidental death or injury.
On February 24, 2003, while still within Japanese waters, the vessel
sank due to extreme bad weather condition. Only Chief Engineer
Nilo Macasling survived the incident while the rest of the crew
members, including Gudelosao and Tancontian, perished.
Respondents, as heirs and beneficiaries of Gudelosao and Tancontian,
filed separate complaints for death benefits and other damages
against petitioners TEMMPC, Capt. Orbeta, TMCL, and SSSICI, with
the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
Labor Arbiter.
Magat rendered a Decision finding solidary liability among petitioner,
TEMMPC, TMCL and Capt. Orbeta.
The LA also found SSSICI liable to the respondents for the proceeds of
the Personal Accident Policies and attorney's fees.
- The LA, however, ruled that the liability of petitioner shall be
deemed extinguished only upon SSSICI's payment of the
insurance proceeds.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA Decision in a Resolution
The NLRC absolved petitioner, TEMMPC and TMCL and Capt. Orbeta
from any liability based on the limited liability rule.
- It, however, affirmed SSSICI's liability after finding that the
Personal Accident Policies answer for the death benefit claims
 under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)
The CA found that the NLRC erred when it ruled that the obligation of
petitioner, TEMMPC and TMCL for the payment of death benefits
under the POEA-SEC was ipso facto transferred to SSSICI upon the
death of the seafarers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable. – YES.
RULING:
Akin to the death benefits under the Labor Code, these benefits under
the POEA-SEC are given when the employee dies due to a work-
related cause during the term of his contract.
- The liability of the shipowner or agent under the POEA-SEC has
likewise nothing to do with the provisions of the Code of
Commerce regarding maritime commerce.
- The death benefits granted under the POEA-SEC is not due to
the death of a passenger by or through the misconduct of the
captain or master of the ship; nor is it the liability for the loss of
the ship as result of collision; nor the liability for wages of the
crew.
- It is a liability created by contract between the seafarers and
their employers, but secured through the State’s intervention as
a matter of constitutional and statutory duty to protect Filipino
overseas workers and to secure for them the best terms and
conditions possible, in order to compensate the seafarers’ heirs
and dependents in the event of death while engaged in the
performance of their work or employment.
The POEA-SEC prescribes the set of standard provisions established
and implemented by the POEA containing the minimum requirements
prescribed by the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers.
- While it is contractual in nature, the POEA-SEC is designed
primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-going vessels.
- As such, it is deemed incorporated in every Filipino
seafarers’ contract of employment. It is established pursuant to
POEA’s power “to secure the best terms and conditions of
employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance
therewith” and “to protect the well-being of Filipino workers
overseas” pursuant to Article 17 of the Labor Code as amended
by Executive Order (EO) Nos. 797 and 247.
But while the nature of death benefits under the Labor Code and the
POEA-SEC are similar, the death benefits under the POEA-SEC are
intended to be separate and distinct from, and in addition to, whatever
benefits the seafarer is entitled to under Philippine laws, including
those benefits which may be claimed from the State Insurance Fund.
- Thus, the claim for death benefits under the POEA-SEC is the
same species as the workmen’s compensation claims under
the Labor Code — both of which belong to a different realm from
that of Maritime Law. Therefore, the limited liability rule does not
apply to petitioner’s liability under the POEA-SEC.
Petitioner is solidarily liable with TEMMPC and TMCL for the death
benefits under the POEA-SEC.
- The basis of the solidary liability of the principal with the local
manning agent is found in the second paragraph of Section 10 of
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, which, in
part, provides:
“[t]he liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several.”
- This provision, is in turn, implemented by Section 1(e)(8), Rule 2,
Part II of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, which requires the
undertaking of the manning agency
to “[a]ssume joint and solidary liability with the employer for
all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with
the implementation of the employment contract [and POEA-
SEC].”
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 gives the
Labor Arbiters of the NLRC the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment,
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damage.
- It further creates a joint and several liability among the
principal or employer, and the recruitment/placement agency,
for any and all claims involving Filipino workers.
EDUARDO C. SILAGAN -versus SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES, INC., ET
AL
G.R. No. 202808, August 24, 2016
FACTS:
On 16 October 2003, petitioner Eduardo Silagan was hired by
Hyundai Merchant Maritime Co., Ltd. thru its manning agent,
Southfield Agencies, Inc. as Third Mate on board ocean-going
vessel, M/V "Eternal Clipper".
- His employment was to run for a period of ten (10) months and he
was to receive, inter alia, a basic monthly salary of US$679.00
with an overtime pay of US$461.00, as evidenced by his Contract
of Employment.
- Under this contract, petitioner is covered by the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Federation of Korean
Seafarer's Union/Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's
Union of the Philippines and herein respondents.
Prior to the execution of the contract, petitioner underwent a thorough
Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and after compliance
therewith, he was certified as "fit to work" by the company designated
physician.
On 28 October 2003, petitioner joined the ship M/V "Eternal Clipper"
and commenced his work on board the sea going vessel. While the
ship was en route to Japan from Mexico on 4 January 2004,
petitioner's right hand was slammed by a wooden door while he
was performing his duties.
- As a result thereof, petitioner suffered a wrist injury causing him
extreme physical pain on the right hand area of his body. The
incident was immediately reported to petitioner's superior who
gave him medication and advised him to perform light duties while
his condition was being treated.
Upon arrival of the vessel in Pyeongtaek, Korea on 29 January 2004,
petitioner was brought to the hospital upon complaints of persistent
pain where he was diagnosed with "fracture, closed, distal third radius
and comminuted, with ulna head dislocation."
- To alleviate the pain, an oral medication was prescribed for
petitioner and he was advised to undergo surgery. Due to the
progression of his condition's symptoms, petitioner was
repatriated back to the Philippines on 2 February 2004.
Upon arrival in Manila, petitioner was immediately seen by Dr. Natalio
G. Alegre, II (Dr. Alegre), the company designated physician, who
initially assessed petitioner's physical condition.
- Dr. Alegre came out with the diagnosis that petitioner suffered
"fracture, closed, distal third, radius comminuted, with ulna head
dislocation." A surgery to correct his condition was recommended.
On 13 February 2004, petitioner underwent "Open Reduction, Plating
with Bone Grafting (Synthetic Bone Graft-Osteopore, Right) and
Application of External Fixator Right" at St. Lukes Medical Center with
Dr. Antonio Tanchuling, Jr. (Dr. Tanchuling) as his surgeon.
- The surgery proved to be successful and he was discharged from
confinement on 18 February 2004. On 1 April 2004, petitioner
underwent another surgery for the removal of the external fixator
and was discharged the following day.
- After the second surgery, petitioner underwent physical therapy to
facilitate for the complete rehabilitation of his injured
On 1 June 2004, petitioner was declared "fit to resume former work"
by Dr. Alegre.
For failure of the company designated physician to assess his
disability grading, petitioner sought an independent orthopedic
surgeon, Dr. Marciano F. Almeda, Jr. (Dr. Almeda), to evaluate the
condition of his injury.
- In a Medical Report dated 3 August 2004, Dr. Almeda found that
petitioner was "partially and permanently disabled with Grade II
(14.93%) impediment."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the disability benefits. - NO
RULING:
Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a
matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by
contract. The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193
under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation
with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the
Labor Code. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under
Department Order No. 4, Series of 2000 of the Department of Labor
and Employment, and the parties' CBA bind the seaman and his
employer to each other.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000
POEA-SEC, two elements must concur:
(1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and
(2) the work- related injury or illness must have existed
during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this
provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or
injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also
be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's
illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
The 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies)
resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 3 2-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
- The ultimate question that needs to be addressed in the case at
bar is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to disability benefits
under the circumstances.
First, Dr. Almeda's assessment was merely based on the physical
examination he conducted on the petitioner and on the medical records
brought by the latter on the occasion of his consultation.
- No diagnostic tests or any medical procedure was conducted by
Dr. Almeda to support his disability grade finding. As aptly
observed by the appellate court, Dr. Almeda examined the
petitioner only once and could not possibly form a reliable opinion
of petitioner's fitness to work based on a single consultation.
- In contrast, Dr. Alegre was able to closely monitor the condition of
petitioner's injury from the day after he was repatriated on 2
February 2004 up to the time that he underwent surgery and
rehabilitation and until his disability rating was issued on 4 June
2004.
- On the basis of the recession of symptoms, the progress of which
the company designated physician has observed for four months,
he has a reasonable basis to arrive at the conclusion that the
petitioner is already fit to render work of similar nature as he was
previously engaged.
Second, petitioner failed to comply with the procedure laid down
under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the
joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision
shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer's personal
doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician's fit-to-work
assessment.
- This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a
mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it
is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should
prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability
rating even against the contrary opinion by another doctor, unless
the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for a referral
to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and
whose decision is final and binding on the parties.
In fine, given that petitioner's permanent disability was not established
through substantial evidence for the reasons above-stated, the Court of
Appeals did not err in reversing the NLRC ruling for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
- Verily, while the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor
of the seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC, when the evidence
presented negates compensability, the claim for disability benefits
must necessarily fail, as in this case.
LEONIS NAVIGATION CO. INC. -versus- OBRERO
G.R. No. 192754, September 7, 2016
FACTS:
Leonis Navigation Company, Inc. (LNCI), for and on behalf of World
Marine Panama S.A., hired Obrero as a messman onboard M/V
Brilliant Arc.
- His fellow crewmates noticed that he was acting strangely, was
unable to sleep well, and could no longer perform daily tasks.
He was examined by Dr. Cruz, the company-designated physician,
and diagnosed to have schizophreniform disorder, which he noted
as not work-related.
- LNCI refused to pay Obrero’s total disability benefits because of
such note.
- Dissatisfied, Obrero sought an opinion of a psychiatrist, Dr.
Salceda, who noted that although Obrero was initially able to
cope with the rigors and stress of his occupation, his coping
abilities were eventually taxed as he was continuously exposed
to the adverse situation of repeatedly being at sea for
prolonged periods of time and that he was not able to handle
the stress of being demoted from seaman to messman as a result
of the discovery of his colorblindness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not schizophrenia a work-related disease, therefore
compensable. - YES
Whether or not the findings of company-designated physicians
conclusive. - NO
RULING:
It has been a principle laid down by this Court in many cases that work
environment can trigger schizophrenia.
- In this case, Dr. Salceda's diagnosis and Obrero's previous
unremarkable stints as a seaman reasonably support the
conclusion that his work environment increased his risk of
developing or triggering schizophrenia.
- Prior to Obrero’s demotion as a messman, he was able to
accomplish his tasks without any issue. It was only after he was
deployed as messman that he began experiencing sleep
interruptions and started having persecutory delusions, ultimately
leading to his erratic behavior.
- Applying the standard of substantial evidence, the Court finds Dr.
Salceda's explanation—that Obrero's prolonged stint at sea
eventually taxed his coping abilities which rendered him incapable
of handling the stress of being demoted—to be reasonable and
highly probable.
While there are instances when we sided with the company-designated
physician, there are also cases when we upheld opposite findings.
- Courts are not bound by the assessment of the company-
designated physician and the seafarer is given the freedom of
choosing his own medical specialist.
- In case of conflict, the determination of which diagnosis should
prevail would primarily depend on the attendant facts and
expertise of the physicians, and the Court is not precluded from
awarding disability benefits on the basis of the medical opinion of
the seafarer's physician.
ELMER A. APINES -versus-. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT
PHILIPPINES, INC., AND/OR DANILO F. VENIDA
G.R. No. 202114, November 09, 2016
FACTS:
Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (ESPI) is a local manning
agency, with Danilo F. Venida as representative (collectively, the
respondents).
- Emirates Trading Agency LLC (ETAL) is among ESPI's foreign
principals. On September 11, 2007, Apines boarded ETAL's ship,
M/V Bandar TBN Trans Gulf, for an eight-month engagement as
bosun.
Apines claimed that sometime in the third week of September, a British
surveyor was on board the ship to inspect the cargo hold. Captain
Glicerio Castañares (Capt. Castañares) and Chief Mate Edgardo
Llevares instructed Apines to put an apparatus on the top tank of the
cargo hold to check for possible leaks.
- Apines promptly complied with the order. On his way up from the
cargo hold, he accidentally stepped on scattered iron ore
pellets causing his left knee to strongly hit the steel railings
of the ladder, and for him to slip and fall.
- According to Apines, despite a sprain and swollen ankle, he was
able to stand up and walk. When the pain eventually became
intolerable, Apines informed Capt. Castañares about his
condition. Apines was given analgesics.
Apines claimed that since the pain in his left knee even worsened, he
requested for immediate repatriation on medical grounds.
- ESPI claimed that it referred Apines to a company-designated
doctor, but the latter consulted his own physicians instead.
- Apines consulted Dr. Patrick O. Leh (Dr. Leh), an orthopedic
surgeon in CGH. The Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Leh
indicated that Apines had "degenerative osteoarthritis" and
"medial meniscal tear" in his left knee.
- Dr. Leh assessed that Apines "may return to work after 30 [to] 45
days," but "needs continued medical treatment for osteoarthritis."
On June 6, 2008, Apines filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a Complaint for total and permanent disability
benefits, reimbursement of medical, hospital and transportation
expenses, moral and exemplary damages, sickness allowance,
attorney's fees and legal interest.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Apines failure to comply with the 72-hour reporting
requirement fatal to his claim. - NO
Whether Apines is entitled total and permanent disability benefits. -
YES
RULING:
The absence of a post-employment medical examination cannot be
used to defeat respondent's claim since the failure to subject the
seafarer to this requirement was not due to the seafarer's fault but to
the inadvertence or deliberate refusal of petitioners.
- As indicated in the Exit Interview and Crew De-briefing Checklist,
Apines promptly reported to ESPI's office within 72-hours from
repatriation.
- Admittedly, Apines failed to offer documentary proofs of the
respondents' denial to assist him in his medical needs. However,
Apines cannot be faulted for the said lack since the custody of the
documents, if there were any at all, pertains more to the
respondents.
In disability compensation claims, "what is important is that [the
seafarer] was unable to perform his customary work for more
than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability,"
- since "an award of a total and permanent disability benefit would
be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the
employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to
work.
- Due to ESPI's failure or refusal to issue a medical rating
within 120 days from repatriation, in legal contemplation,
Apines' disability is conclusively presumed to be total and
permanent.
GENARO G. CALIMLIM VS. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 220629, November 23, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., for and in behalf of its
foreign principal, Wallem GMBH & Co. KG, represented by its
President, Mr. Reginaldo Oben (respondents), hired petitioner Genaro
G. Calimlim (Calimlim) to work as Bosun on board the vessel,
Johannes Wulff.
- Prior to deployment, Calimlim underwent the required Pre-
employment Medical Examination (PEME) on June 18, 2010 and
was declared fit for sea duty.
On December 25, 2010, while doing his duties on board, Calimlim felt a
severe pain in his stomach causing him to feel weak and go to the
comfort room.
- While emptying his bowels, he noticed that there was fresh blood
in his stool. As his stomach pain and bleeding persisted, he
reported his condition to the Ship Captain who advised him to
seek medical attention upon reaching the nearest port.
When the vessel reached the port of Xingang, China, Calimlim was
brought to the Xingang Hospital where he underwent several
laboratory tests. The tests revealed that he was suffering from
Hemorrhage of the Upper Digestive Tract and Hypertension.
- The doctor recommended that he should not be given any duty on
board due to his sensitive health condition and should be confined
in a hospital. After seven days or on January 17, 2011, when the
vessel reached the port of Indonesia, he was medically
repatriated.
Upon arrival in Manila, Calimlim immediately reported to respondents.
He was referred to the Manila Doctor's Hospital (MDH) for examination
and treatment. He was confined at MDH for four (4) days and was
treated as an out-patient after his discharge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calimlim is entitled to permanent disability
compensation and benefits on account of his medical condition. - NO
RULING:
In this case, after receiving treatment in Xingang, China, at
respondents' expense, Calimlim underwent blood transfusion and
radioscopy. The said treatment proved effective as there was no
recurrence of the dark-colored stools and his abdominal pain had
already subsided as of his February 16, 2011 consultation with the
company- designated physician. Such positive results led to a
declaration that he was fit to work and even to travel on February 17,
2011.
As correctly opined by the CA, such declaration by the company-
designated physician alone sufficed to rule that he was not entitled to
any disability benefits.
- A seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of more
than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is
not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total
and permanent disability benefits in his favor. It cannot be used
as a cure-all formula for all maritime compensation cases. Its
application must depend on the circumstances of the case,
including compliance with the parties' contractual duties and
obligations as laid down in the POEA-SEC and/or their CBA.
In the recent case of Magsaysay, Maritime Corporation v. Simbajon,
the Court mentioned
- that an amendment to Section 20-A(6) of the POEA SEC,
contained in POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 2010,
now "finally clarifies" that "[f]or work-related illnesses acquired by
seafarers from the time the 2010 amendment.
To the POEA-SEC took effect, the declaration of disability should no
longer be based on the number of days the seafarer was treated or
paid his sickness allowance, but rather on the disability grading he
received, whether from the company-designated physician or from the
third independent physician, if the medical findings of the physician
chosen by the seafarer conflicts with that of the company-designated
doctor."
At any rate, there was no referral to a third doctor. The rule is that
when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on
board the vessel,
- his fitness for work shall be determined by the company-
designated physician. The physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if
validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company-designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may
be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose
decision shall be final and binding on them. This procedure must
be strictly followed, otherwise, if not availed of or followed strictly
by the seafarer, the assessment of the company-designated
physician stands.
Here, upon his repatriation back to the Philippines, Calimlim was
referred to the company-designated physician on January 19, 2011.
After receiving treatment, he was declared fit to work and to travel on
February 17, 2011. Acting within his rights, he disagreed with the
findings of the company-designated physician and sought the opinion
of Dr. Jacinto who arrived at a contrary assessment.
The Court notes, however, that Calimlim sought consultation of Dr.
Jacinto only on July 9, 2012, more than sixteen (16) months after he
was declared fit to work and interestingly four (4) days after he had
filed the complaint on July 5, 2012.
- Thus, as aptly ruled by the NLRC, at the time he filed his
complaint, he had no cause of action for a disability claim as he
did not have any sufficient basis to support the same. The Court
also agrees with the CA that seeking a second opinion was a
mere afterthought on his part in order to receive a higher
compensation
119. JEBSENS** MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS LTD.,*** and
ENRIQUE M. ABOITIZ, petitioners, vs. FLORVIN G. RAPIZ,
respondent.
FACTS: Jebsens, on behalf of its foreign principal, Sea Chefs,
engaged the services of Aboitiz to work on board the M/V Mercury as
a buffet cook for a period of 9 months –
WHAT HAPPENED: Aboitiz experienced excruciating pain and
swelling on his right wrist/forearm while lifting a heavy load of
meat. Repatriated to the Philippines –
• Company-designated physician diagnosis: "Flexor Carpi
Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right thumb; Extensor Carpi
Ulnaris Tendinitis, Right," and classifying his condition as a
"Grade 11" disability pursuant to the disability grading
• Independent physician: classified his condition as a Grade 10
disability.
- Requested petitioners to pay him total and permanent
disability benefits, which the latter did not heed, thus,
constraining the former to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
NCMB. As the parties failed to amicably settle the case, the
parties submitted the same to the VA for adjudication
ISSUE: WON entitled permanent and total disability benefits? – NO.
RULING:
SC clarified that for the company-designated physician to avail of the
extended 240-day period, he must first perform some significant
act to justify an extension (e.g., that the illness still requires medical
attendance beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days);
otherwise, the seafarer’s disability shall be conclusively presumed
to be permanent and total.—
Guidelines that shall govern seafarers’ claims for permanent and
total disability benefits:
1) The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of
120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2) If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable
reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and
total;
3) If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or
seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the
burden to prove that the company-designated physician has
sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4) If the company-designated physician still fails to give his
assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless
of any justification.
• October 14, 201: respondent was medically repatriated for what
was initially diagnosed by the ship doctor
• January 24, 2012:or just 102 days from repatriation, the
company-designated physician had already given his final
assessment on respondent
- In view of the final disability rating made by the company-
designated physician classifying respondent's disability as
merely permanent and partial - which was not refuted by
the independent physician except that respondent's
condition was classified as a Grade 10 disability - it is plain
error to award permanent and total disability benefits to
respondent.
Under Section 20(A)(6) of the 2010 (POEA-SEC), the determination of
the proper disability benefits to be given to a seafarer shall depend on
the grading system provided by Sec. 32 of the said contract,
regardless of the actual number of days that the seafarer underwent
treatment.—
• It is well-settled that the POEA-SEC is the law between the
parties and, as such, its provisions bind both of them.
• In this case, respondent's disability was already determined as
only permanent and partial, in view of its classification as Grade
11 by the company-designated physician and Grade 10 by the
independent physician. As such, the award of US$60,000.00
representing Grade 1 (i.e., permanent and total disability) benefits
in favor of respondent clearly has no basis and, consequently,
must be struck down.
120. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, and ADMIBROS
SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., LTD., petitioners, vs.RODRIGO C.
DOCTOLERO, respondent.
FACTS: Status Maritime hired Doctolero as Chief Officer on board the
vessel M/V Dimitris Manios II for a period of 9 months. Doctolero
declared fit to work by (PEME) Pre-Employment Medical Examination
prior to his deployment.
WHAT HAPPENED: Doctolero was on board: he experienced chest
and abdominal pains. He was brought to a medical clinic in Mexico
and no clear diagnosis was made then he resumed work on board the
vessel.
• However, in the evening of the same day he complained again of
abdominal pain, which he was diagnosed from “Esophago-
Gastritis-Duodenitis”.
- Based on the assessment of the attending physician, Dr,
Jorge Hernandez Bustor recommended for his
repatriation.
• Also, Doctolero experienced difficulty of breathing while waiting
for his return flight. He informed the ship’s agent of his condition
and requested for assistance but to no avail.
- Thus, he himself went to the Hospitales Nacionales where
he was admitted. He paid the hospital bills on his own. After
his discharge, he sought assistance from the Philippine
Embassy for his repatriation to the Philippines.
• Company designated physician: found normal diagnostic tests
• Contention: not listed as an occupational illness in the POEA-
SEC and no evidence that shows such illness is aggravated by
the working conditions on board of the vessel.
ISSUE: WON Doctolero is entitled to claim the permanent and total
disability benefits from the petitioner? – NO.
RULING: In order for a seafarer’s claim for total and permanent
disability benefits to prosper, any of the following conditions should be
present:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration
as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the
lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that
further medical treatment would address his temporary total
 disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240
days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the
company-designated physician;
(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea
duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be,
but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section
20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is
partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he
consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that
his disability is not only permanent but total as well;
(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally
and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability
grading;
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his
medical condition is not compensable or work-related under
the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor
selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found
otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and
permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the
corresponding benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and
permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period
but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after
the lapse of said periods.
The conflict between the factual findings of the LA and NLRC, on
one hand, and those of the CA, on the other hand, compel the SC
to dwell on the factual matters and to reexamine the evidence
adduced by the parties.—
• Upon its reevaluation of the records, ththe Court concludes that
the CA’s findings in favor of entitling Doctolero to permanent
and total disability benefits were erroneous.
- While the fact that Doctolero suffered the disability during the
term of his contract was undisputed, it was evident that he
had filed his complaint for disability benefits before the
company-designated physician could determine the
nature and extent of his disability, or before even the
lapse of the initial 120-day period.
- With Doctolero still undergoing further tests, the company-
designated physician had no occasion to determine the
nature and extent of his disability upon which to base
Doctolero’s “fit to work” certification or disability grading.
Consequently, the petitioners correctly argued that Doctolero
had no cause of action for disability pay and sickness
allowance at the time of the filing of his complaint.
121. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC., and MAERSK CO. IOM
LTD., Petitioners, vs. JOSELITO R. RAMOS, Respondent
FACTS: Maersk ltd., through its local manning agent Maersk Inc.,
employed Ramos as able-seaman of M/V NKOSSA II for a period of 4
months.
WHAT HAPPENED: Within the contract period and while on board
the vessel: left eye was hit by a screw. Repatriated.
• Company-designated physician Dr. Dolor: diagnosed with
"corneal scar and cystic macula, left, post-traumatic." Underwent
a "repair of corneal perforation and removal of foreign body to
anterior chamber, left eye."
- He was referred to another ophthalmologist who opined that
"no more improvement can be attained on the left eye
but patient can return back to duty with the left eye
disabled by 30%."
- Dr. Dolor stated that although Ramos’ left eye cannot be
improved by medical treatment, he can return to duty and
is still fit to work. His normal right eye can compensate for
the discrepancy with the use of correctional glasses.
• Dr. Aliwalas, Jr.: diagnosed with "corneal scar with post-
traumatic cataract formation, left eye." Underwent eye
examination and glaucoma test
Maersk paid private respondent's illness allowance equivalent to one
hundred twenty (120) days salary.
• Dr. Catipon-Singson: have ''traumatic cataract with corneal
scaring, updrawn pupil of the anterior segment of maculapathy
OS. His best corrected vision is 20/400 with difficulty."
- "cannot be employed for any work requiring good vision
unless condition improves."
• Ramos visited again the ophthalmologist at the Medical Center
Manila who recommended "cataract surgery with intra-ocular lens
implantation," after evaluation of the retina shall have been done."
Dr. Dolor answered that the evaluation of the physician from ONM
could not have progressed in such a short period of time, which is
approximately 1 month after he issued the medical report and a review
of the medical reports from PGH and the tonometry findings on the left
and right eye showed that they were within normal range, hence,
could not be labeled as glaucoma.
• Ramos underwent cataract extraction on both eyes. He was fitted
with correctional glasses and evaluated. Dr. Dolor found that the
former's "right eye is 20/20, the left eye is 20/70, and when both
eyes are being used, his best corrected vision is 20/20." On the
basis of that report, respondent was pronounced fit to work.
ISSUE: WON Ramos is partially disabled and therefore entitled to
disability compensation – YES.
RULING:
Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that it has
occasioned, but to the loss or impairment of earning capacity.—
• There is disability when there is a diminution of earning power
because of actual absence from work. This absence must be due
to the injury or illness arising from, and in the course of,
employment. Thus, the basis of compensation is reduction of
earning power.
Permanent partial disability occurs when an employee loses the
use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables
him to continue with his former work.—
• In this case, while company-designated physician, Dr. Dolor,
certified that Ramos was still fit to work, Dr. admitted in the same
breath that Ramos’ left eye could no longer be improved by
medical treatment.
- As early as 13 April 2002, Dr. Dolor had in fact diagnosed
respondent’s left eye as permanently disabled, to wit:
- Our ophthalmologist opined that no more improvement can
be attained on the left eye but patient can return back to duty
with left eye disabled by 30%.
Maersk’s argument that the injury was curable because respondent
underwent cataract extraction in on both eyes in 2003, and Dr. Dolor
issued a medical evaluation finding that respondent’s best corrected
vision for both eyes was 20/20 (with correctional glasses), are thus
inconsequential.
• The curability of the injury “does not preclude an award for
disability because, in labor laws, disability need not render the
seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is
enough that it incapacitates him to perform his customary
work.”
The (POEA-SEC) was designed primarily for the protection and
benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment
onboard ocean-going vessels.—
• In resolving disputes regarding disability benefits, its provisions
must be “construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in
the seamen’s favor, because only then can the provisions be
given full effect.”
• Besides, the schedule of disabilities under Section 32 is in no way
exclusive. Section 20.B.4 of the same POEA-Standard
Employment Contract clearly provides that “[t]hose illnesses not
listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as
work related.” This provision only means that the disability
schedule also contemplates injuries not explicitly listed under it.
122. REYNALDO Y. SUNIT, petitioner, vs. OSM MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., DOF OSM MARITIME SERVICES A/S, and
CAPT. ADONIS B. DONATO, respondents.
FACTS: OSM Maritime, the local agent of DOF OSM Maritime
ServicesA/S, hired Sunit to work onboard the vessel Skandi Texel as
Able Body Seaman for 3 months.
• Deemed incorporated in the employment contract is the 2010
(POEA-SEC) and the NIS AMOSUP CBA.
WHAT HAPPENED: During his employment, petitioner fell from the
vessel's tank approximately 4.5 meters high and suffered a
broken right femur. Repatriated.
• Company-designated physician: diagnosed him to be suffering
from a "Fractured, Right Femur; S/PIntramedullary Nailing, Right
Femur."
 - After 92 days of treatment, the company designated doctor
issued a Medical Report giving petitioner an interim
disability Grade of 10.4
• 2nd Opinion Sunit’s Doctor: recommended a disability grade of
3 in his Medical Report.
• Another company physician of OSM: was assessed with a final
disability grade of 10
- Respondents offered petitioner disability benefit of $30,225
in accordance with the disability Grade 10 that the company-
designated doctor issued.
- Petitioner, however, refused the offer and filed a claim for a
disability benefit of USD$150,000.00 based on the POEA-
SEC and NIS AMOSUP CBA.
• 3rd opinion: recommending a Grade 9 disability. Stated therein
that petitioner is "not yet fit to work."
ISSUE: WON entitled permanent and total disability benefits? – YES.
RULING:
Permanent disability vs Total Disability - DEFINITION
Under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, disability that is both
permanent and total disability is defined as “temporary total disability
lasting continuously for more than (120) days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules.”—
• A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or
sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days,
except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
It is the company-designated doctor who is given the responsibility
to make a conclusive assessment on the degree of the seafarer’s
disability and his capacity to resume work within 120/240 days.
• The parties, are free to disregard the findings of the company
doctor, as well as the chosen doctor of the seafarer, in case they
cannot agree on the disability gradings issued and jointly seek the
opinion of a third party doctor
• The above quoted provision clearly does not state a specific
period within which the third doctor must render his or her
disability assessment.
- This is only reasonable since the parties may opt to resort to
a third opinion even during the conciliation and mediation
stage to abbreviate the proceedings, which usually transpire
way beyond the 120/240 day period for medical treatment.
- 240-day period for assessing the degree of disability
only applies to the company-designated doctor, and not
the third doctor.
The employer and the seafarer are bound by the disability
assessment of the third party physician in the event that they
choose to appoint one.—
• Nonetheless, the appointed third party physician must
likewise arrive at a definite and conclusive assessment of the
seafarer’s disability or fitness to return to work before his or
her opinion can be valid and binding between the parties.
A final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to
truly reflect the true extent of the sickness or injuries of the
seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such.—
• Otherwise, the corresponding disability benefits awarded might
not be commensurate with the prolonged effects of the injuries
suffered. Due to the above stated reasons, We see it fit to apply
the same prerequisite to the appointed third doctor before
the latter’s disability assessment will be binding on the
parties.
In determining whether a disability is total or partial, what is
crucial is whether the employee who suffered from disability
could still perform his work notwithstanding the disability he
met.—
• A permanent partial disability presupposes a seafarer’s fitness to
resume sea duties before the end of the 120/240-day medical
treatment period despite the injuries sustained, and works on the
premise that such partial injuries did not disable a seafarer to earn
wages in the same kind of work or similar nature for which he was
trained.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in
the impairment of one’s earning capacity.—
• As petitioner was actually unable to work even after the expiration
of the 240-day period and there was no final and conclusive
disability assessment made by the third doctor on his medical
condition, it would be inconsistent to declare him as merely
permanently and partially disabled. It should be stressed that a
total disability does not require that the employee be completely
disabled, or totally paralyzed.
Procedural Requisites Observed Where the Parties Opt to Resort
to the Opinion of a Third Doctor.—
1) when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while
onboard the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be
determined by the company-designated physician.
2) if the seafarer disagrees with the findings of the company doctor,
then he has the right to engage the services of a doctor of his
choice.
- If the second doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees
with the findings of the company doctor, and the company
likewise disagrees with the findings of the second doctor,
then a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and
binding on both of them. It must be emphasized that the
language of the POEA-SEC is clear in that both the
seafarer and the employer must mutually agree to seek the
opinion of a third doctor. In the event of disagreement on the
services of the third doctor, the seafarer has the right to
institute a complaint with the LA or NLRC.
3) Despite the binding effect of the third doctor’s assessment, a
dissatisfied party may institute a complaint with the LA to contest
the same on the ground of evident partiality, corruption of the third
doctor, fraud, other undue means, lack of basis to support the
assessment, or being contrary to law or settled jurisprudence.
123. MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILIPPINES), INC., THOME SHIP
MANAGEMENT PTE LTD. and/or ALFONSO RANJO DEL
CASTILLO, petitioners, vs. TEODY D. ASUNCION, respondent.
FACTS:
• MST Marine Services, on behalf of its foreign principal Thome
Ship Management, hired Asuncion as a GP1 Motorman on board
the vessel M/V Monte Casino for a period of 9 months.
WHAT HAPPENED: while he was on his way to the Poop Deck of the
vessel, he lost his balance and fell down on the floor. He felt pain
on his back which persisted despite intake of pain relievers.
Repatriated.
• Company-designated physician: "Lumbosacral Strain,'' but to
rule out other possibilities, Asuncion was subjected to a magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) which showed normal results. Results
of his EMG-NCV turned out normal.
• Private physician: "Chronic Low Back Pain Syndrome, Lumbar
Spondylolisthesis L4/L5 and Degenerative Joint Disease."
Asuncion has a permanent disability and is unfit for sea duty in
whatever capacity as a seaman
ISSUE: WON entitled to full and permanent disability benefits to
Asuncion for his inability to work for more than 120 days?
RULING:
SC has already held that the mere lapse of the (120)-day period itself
does not automatically warrant the payment of total and permanent
disability benefits.—
• In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., the Court
ruled that a temporary total disability becomes permanent when
so declared by the company-designated physician within the
period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day
medical treatment period in case of absence of a declaration of
fitness or permanent disability. Besides, permanent disability
benefits will be given based on the schedule provided under
Section 32 of the POEA-SEC.
• In Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., et al. v. Emilio Conag, the
Court reiterated that: For work-related illnesses acquired by
seafarers from the time the 2010 amendment to the POEA-SEC
took effect, the declaration of disability should no longer be based
on the number of days the seafarer was treated or paid his
sickness allowance, but rather on the disability grading he
received, whether from the company-designated physician or
from the third independent physician, if the medical findings of the
physician chosen by the seafarer conflicts with that of the
company-designated doctor.
He neither sought to be referred to a third doctor nor did he offer any
explanation for his non-observance of this procedure. As a matter of
fact, when he filed the complaint for payment of disability benefits on
January 6, 2010, he did so without any factual medical basis.
While a seafarer is not precluded from seeking a second opinion
or consulting his own physician, if his physician’s conclusion is
contrary to that of the company-designated physician, the rule is
clear that a third physician must be jointly appointed by the
employer and the seafarer for a final assessment.—
• Without a third-doctor consultation and in the absence of any
indication which would cast doubt on the veracity of the company-
designated physician’s assessment, the company-designated
physician’s findings shall prevail.
124. C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., NORWEGIAN
CRUISE LINE, LTD. and/or MR. JUAN JOSE ROCHA,
petitioners, vs. RHUDEL A. CASTILLO, respondent.
FACTS: Castillo was hired by petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management
on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd.,
to serve as Security Guard on board the vessel MV Norwegian Sun
under the Contract of Employment
WHAT HAPPENED: While on board the vessel, suffered from difficulty
of breathing and had a brief seizure attack. Repatriated.
• Company-designated physician: suffering from cavernoma –
declared as idiopathic and congenital; and thus, not work-related.
ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to total and permanent disability
benefits. – NO.
RULING:
Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a
matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by
contract.
• By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under DO No. 4, Series
of 2000 of the DOLE, and the parties’ CBA bind the seaman and
his employer to each other.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000
(POEA-SEC), it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s
illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially
disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection
between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he
had been contracted.—
• The illness of respondent, cavernoma, is not included in the list of
occupational diseases under Section 32(A) of the POEA-SEC.
However, Section 20(B)(4) of the contract provides that those
illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as
work-related
In determining the work-causation of a seafarer’s illness, the
diagnosis of the company-designated physician bears vital
significance.—
• After all, it is before him that the seafarer must initially report to
upon medical repatriation.
The conflicting findings of the company’s doctor and the
seafarer’s physician often stir suits for disability compensation.
As an extrajudicial measure of settling their differences, the
(POEA-SEC) gives the parties the option of agreeing jointly on a
third doctor whose assessment shall break the impasse and shall
be the final and binding diagnosis.—
• The POEA-SEC provides for a procedure to resolve the
conflicting findings of a company-designated physician and
personal physician, specifically: If a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third
doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
Based on jurisprudence, the findings of the company-designated
physician prevail in cases where the seafarer did not observe the
third doctor referral provision in the (POEA-SEC).—
• In the instant case, respondent did not seek the opinion of a third
doctor.
• However, if the findings of the company-designated physician are
clearly biased in favor of the employer, then courts may give
greater weight to the findings of the seafarer’s personal physician.
Clear bias on the part of the company-designated physician may
be shown if there is no scientific relation between the diagnosis
and the symptoms felt by the seafarer, or if the final assessment
of the company-designated physician is not supported by the
medical records of the seafarer.
It is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the
task of assessing the seaman’s disability.—
• Their declaration should be given credence, considering the
amount of time and effort they gave to monitoring and treating the
respondent’s condition. It bears emphasizing that the respondent
has been under the care and supervision of the company
physicians since his repatriation. The medical attention they had
given the respondent undeniably enabled them to acquire
familiarity and detailed knowledge of the latter’s medical
condition. On the other hand, We note that the certification of Dr.
Vicaldo was replete with details justifying the conclusion that the
illness of respondent is work-related.
While the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed
to be work-related, the seafarer or the claimant must still show a
reasonable connection between the nature of work onboard the
vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated.
While a PEME may reveal enough for the company to decide
whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be
relied upon to inform the company of a seafarer’s true state of
health.—
• As the Court has previously ruled, a PEME is not exploratory in
nature and cannot be relied upon to arrive at a seafarer’s true
state of health.
• The PEME could not have divulged respondent’s illness
considering that the examinations were not exploratory. It was
only after respondent was subjected to extensive medical
procedures including MRI that respondent’s illness was finally
diagnosed as a case of cavernoma.
Claims for compensation based on surmises cannot be allowed;
liberal construction is not a license to disregard the evidence on
record or to misapply the laws.—
• The Court is wary of the principle that provisions of the POEA-
SEC must be applied with liberality in favor of the seafarers, for it
is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into
effect. However, on several occasions when disability claims
anchored on such contract were based on flimsy grounds and
unfounded allegations, the Court never hesitated to deny the
same.
125. PAULINO M. ALDABA, petitioner, vs. CAREER PHILIPPINES
SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., COLUMBIA SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD.,
and/or VERLOU CARMELINO, respondents.
FACTS: Aldaba was hired by Career as a seafarer on one of its ships.
WHAT HAPPENED: In the performance of his duties, Aldaba was
accidentally hit by metal chains where he fell and sustained back
injuries. Petitioner was examined in HKwhere he was declared unfit to
work and was repatriated.
• Company-designated physician: given a grade 8 disability.
Petitioner sought an orthopedic surgeon and was diagnosed of
permanent disability.
ISSUE: WON Aldaba is entitled permanent disability benefits. – YES.
RULING:
The law requires the seafarer to prove his claim for compensation
and benefits under Section 20-B of the (POEA-SEC).—
• In situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation
and benefits that Section 20-B grants to him, the law requires the
seafarer to prove that:
1) he suffered an illness;
2) he suffered this illness during the term of his employment
contract;
3) he complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B;
4) his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease or that
his illness or injury is otherwise work-related; and
5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section
32-A for an occupational disease or a disputably presumed work-
related disease to be compensable.
The company-designated physician, failing to give his
assessment within the period of (120) days, without justifiable
reason, makes the disability of petitioner permanent and total.—
• In the present case, the company-designated physician was only
able to issue a certification declaring respondent to be
 entitled to a disability rating of Grade 8 on the 163rd day that
petitioner was undergoing continuous medical treatment,
which is beyond the period of 120 days, without justifiable
reason. It must be remembered that the employer has the burden
to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period. In this case, the respondents
failed to do so.
126. DE ANDRES v. DIAMOND H MARINE SERVICES & SHIPPING
AGENCY, INC.
G.R. No. 217345. July 12, 2017 – BARREDO
FACTS:
- Petitioner Wilmer O. De Andres was hired by respondent agency
Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc. for and in behalf
of its Taiwanese principal, Wu Chun Hua.
- He entered into an Employment Contract, wherein it was stipulated
that he would be working in the fishing vessel, Yi Man En No. 2; that he
would receive a monthly salary of NT$17,280.00; and that the duration
of the contract was for two years.
- Before he departed for Taiwan, De Andres claimed that he was made
to sign a Contract of Agreement, which they later found out to set aside
the POEA-approved contract.
- At the vessel, he was tasked to work as a wiper, messman and
bosun, and was also required to throw the fishnet, dive in the sea, and
repair the nets.
- On February 27, 2009, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, De
Andres was tasked by the master to lower the nets for the shipping
operation.
- While he was lowering the nets, he was accidentally hit by big waves,
which caused him to be thrown out of the vessel together with the
fishing nets.
- While struggling from the big waves, De Andres was pulled by the
moving vessel with his left leg entangled by the fishing nets. As a
consequence, he sustained an open fracture of the distal tibia and
fibula.
- De Andres was brought to Keelong Hospital in Taiwan and underwent
surgical operation.
- After 20 days of confinement at the Keelong Hospital, De Andres was
transferred to the nearest lodge.
- De Andres underwent more operations after. He was later placed in a
dormitory, where he was left alone with no one to assist him in his
recovery.
- De Andres repeatedly asked for repatriation as no one would attend
to his needs in Taiwan, but his plea fell on deaf ears.
- Almost a year after his accident, De Andres was informed by the
respondents that he was free to go home.
- De Andres later discovered that his repatriation was not due to his
medical condition, but due to the expiration of his employment contract.
- Before he was repatriated, De Andres was made to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement, stipulating that the respondents agreed to
pay him NT$40,000.00 and gave him a plane ticket back to the
Philippines, and that, in return, he would not file any complaint against
the respondents in the future.
- When he arrived in Manila, no representatives from Diamond H
fetched him.
- The next working day, De Andres reported to Diamond H where he
was met by Ellen Purification, Operations Manager.
- Purification invited him to go to the nearest fast-food restaurant and
told him that Diamond H would not entertain any claim and that he
should find a lawyer instead.
- De Andres filed a complaint against the respondents before the LA for
permanent and total disability benefits, sickness allowances, salary
differentials, labor insurance as provided in the contract, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether De Andres has a valid disability claim against the
respondents. – YES.
RATIO: A seafarer claiming disability benefits is required to submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician within three (3) working days from repatriation.
Failure to comply with such requirement results in the forfeiture of the
seafarer's claim for disability benefits. There are, however, exceptions
to the rule: (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the
employer upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer
inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-
employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.
In this case, De Andres' accident occurred on February 27, 2009.
Instead of immediately repatriating him when his condition permitted,
the respondents kept him in Taiwan for almost a year and they waited
for his contract to expire. Obviously, the delayed repatriation was
intended to show that he returned due to his expired contract, and not
for medical reasons. Nonetheless, even if a seafarer's contract expired,
it does not release the employer from its obligations under the POEA-
SEC when there is a claim for disability benefits due to an injury
suffered during the term of the employment contract. Accordingly,
Section 20 (B) (3) must still be complied with.
127. MAUNLAD TRANS., INC./CARNIV AL CRUISE LINES, INC.,
and MR. AMADO L. CASTRO, JR. vs. RODOLFO CAMORAL
G.R. No. 211454, February 11, 2015, J. Reyes
Facts:
Camoral was continuously deployed overseas by Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc., a foreign shipping company, through its local agent,
Maunlad Trans., Inc. In April 2009, they took him on board M/S
Carnival Sensation as ice carver for a period of eight months, the
company doctors having declared him “Fit for Sea Duty”.
As ice carver, Camoral’s job required lifting and carrying heavy blocks
of ice and using heavy equipment and tools, working for hours inside
the freezer in sub-zero temperature. One day in September 2009 while
at work, he suddenly felt excruciating pain in his neck. The pain quickly
radiated to his shoulder, chest and hands. It became so intense that he
dropped to the floor. Pain relievers could not relieve the pain, and the
ship’s doctor advised the Chief Chef that Camoral was unfit for further
duty on board.
On advice of the company doctor in Florida, United States of America,
Dr. James E. Carter (Dr. Carter), a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan
was performed on Camoral’s cervical spine. In his medical report, Dr.
Carter found Camoral with “Cervical Disc Herniation and
Radiculopathy” and declared him “unfit for duty”.
He underwent rigorous physical therapy, but after more than five
months his condition barely improved, and the pain in his neck, chest
and shoulder persisted. He then consulted Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang, Jr.
(Dr. Catapang), a renowned Orthopaedic and Traumatology Surgeon.
The clinical and physical examination of Camoral issued a report
stating he has lost his preinjury capacity and is unfit to work back at his
previous occupation as a seafarer.
Camoral failed to get further financial assistance from Maunlad Trans.,
Inc. for his subsequent treatment and medications, as well as total
disability benefits. He was instead offered $10,075.00 corresponding to
Grade 10 disability the company gave him.
With no income for more than 120 days and having been declared unfit
to return to his previous job due to loss of his pre-injury capacity, he
sued Maunlad Trans., Inc. before the LA for total disability benefits of
US$60,000.00, citing Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on board Ocean-going Vessels (POEA SEC for brevity).
In their answer, the Maunlad Trans., Inc. argued that Camoral was not
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits since he was not
assessed by the company doctors with a Grade 1 disability.
Furthermore, it insisted that regardless of whether the disability is total
or partial, any compensation should be based on the grading provided
in the POEA SEC, which in this case is Grade 10 disability as
assessed by the company doctors.
Issue: Whether the disability grading provided by Maunlad Trans., Inc.
for Camoral’s impediment must control. – NO.
RULING:
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., the Court
harmonized the POEA SEC with the Labor Code and the Amended
Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) in holding that: (a) the 120
days provided in Section 20-B(3) of the POEA SEC is the period given
to the employer to determine the fitness of the seafarer to work, during
which the seafarer is deemed to be in a state of total and temporary
disability; (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be
extended by a maximum of 120 days, or up to 240 days, should the
seafarer require further medical treatment; and (c) a total and
temporary disability becomes permanent when so declared by the
company-designated physician within 120 days or 240 days, as the
case may be, or upon the expiration of the said periods without a
declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability and the
seafarer is still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties.
Furthermore, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must
not be precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his
injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise,
if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful
employment for more than 120 days or 240 days, as is the case here,
then he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
Significantly, the NLRC noted that the medical report and disability
assessment submitted by Maunlad Trans., Inc. after more than 120
days of treatment and rehabilitation did not show how the partial
permanent disability assessment of Camoral was arrived at. It simply
stated that he was suffering from impediment Grade 10 disability, but
without any evidence that in fact only one-third limitation of motion of
the neck or moderate stiffness had affected Camoral. But even without
this observation, it is not, disputed that Camoral has been declared
unfit by both the petitioners' and Camoral 's doctors to return to his
previous occupation. This is akin to a declaration of permanent and
total disability.
128. JULIO C. ESPERE vs. NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING
AGENTS
G.R. No. 212098 July 26, 2017
Facts:
1. On June 21, 2011, petitioner Julio C. Espere was hired as a Bosun,
a ship's officer in charge of equipment and the crew., by respondent
NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. (NFD) for and in behalf of its
foreign principal Target Ship Management Pte Ltd. on board the vessel
M V. Kalpana Prem, for a period of nine (9) months, with a basic
monthly salary of US$730.00.
2. Prior to his employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a
PreEmployment Medical Examination where he was pronounced "Fit
For Sea Duty."
3. Around five (5) months into his deployment, petitioner complained
that he was feeling dizzy, had body malaise and chills.
4. In Vancouver, Canada, he was diagnosed of suffering from
"uncontrolled hypertension", "malaise NYD", and “psychosomatic
illness."
5. He was also declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back to the
Philippines.
6. On May 16, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents
claiming disability benefits for permanent disability and damages.
7. LA dismissed the complaint.
8. NLRC favored the employee.
9. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the LA, on July
30, 2013, issued a Writ of Execution. In compliance with the writ,
respondents deposited the judgment award before the NLRC Cashier.
Issue: Whether or not the employee should restitute the executed
award to the employer. – YES.
RULING:
SC held that the employee was unable to present substantial evidence
to show that his work conditions caused or, at the least, increased the
risk of contracting his illness. Neither was he able to prove that his
illness was preexisting and that it was aggravated by the nature of his
employment. Thus, the LA and the CA correctly ruled that he is not
entitled to any disability compensation.
In view of respondents' prior satisfaction of the writ of execution issued
by the LA while the case was pending with the CA, coupled with
petitioner's admission that he "had already received the full judgment
award of this case,"60 the latter, having been proven not entitled to
such an award, should, thus, return the same to respondents. This is in
consonance with Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by En Banc Resolution Nos. 11-12, Series of
2012 and 05-14, Series of 2014, which provides:
RESTITUTION. - Where the executed judgment is totally or partially
reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
with finality and restitution is so ordered, the Labor Arbiter shall, on
motion, issue such order of restitution of the executed award, except
reinstatement wages paid pending appeal.
129. GREIG PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. GONZALES
G.R. No. 228296; July 26, 2017
FACTS:
Grieg, a shipping agent, first hired Gonzales in 2010. While aboard
Star Florida, Gonzales experienced shortness of breath, pain in his left
leg, fatigue, fever and headaches. A week later, he sought medical
attention in South Korea after experiencing the same symptoms. He
was then sent back to work upon finding that his medical tests were all
normal. After a month, Gonzales’ past symptoms returned with the
added symptom of black tarry stools. He was initially diagnosed with
“Pancytopenia Suspect Aplastic Anemia” and was declared unfit for
sea duty and was repatriated.
Gonzales was admitted at the Metropolitan Medical Center where the
company physicians diagnosed him with Acute Promyelocytic
Leukemia, they opined that Gonzales’ leukemia was not work-related;
although, for humanitarian reasons, Grieg continued to pay for his
treatment. However, the latter claimed that herein respondent suddenly
stopped consulting the company physicians. Gonzales denied and
contended that he informed Grieg that he would be unable to attend
the scheduled appointment on April 28, 2014 for he was still raising
money to travel from his hometown to Manila. Respondent claimed that
his request to reschedule his appointment was granted and was
surprised with the notification that Grieg had discontinued his
treatment.
Gonzales sought a second opinion from an independent physician who
certified that his leukemia was work-related. On July 15, 2014, after his
disability claims were refused, Gonzales filed a complaint against Grieg
before the Labor Arbiter; the latter found that Gonzales’ leukemia was
work-related and that it had permanently incapacitated him to work as
a seafarer.
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before the National
Labor Relations Commission. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.
It also denied Grieg’s motion for reconsideration, resulting the latter to
file its Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, CA upheld the
findings of NLRC and denied Grieg’s Petition and that Gonzales was
entitled to the sickness allowance under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the permanent disability benefits of US$90,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed
grave abuse of discretion in awarding Gonzales’ claim for disability
benefits. – NO.
RULING: The 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract defines work-related illness as “any
sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions
set therein satisfied.”
The relevant portions of Section 32-A are as follows:
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to
the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Gonzales’ tasks included removing rust accumulations and refinishing
affected areas of the ship with chemicals and paint to retard the
oxidation process. This meant that he was frequently exposed to
harmful chemicals and cleaning aids which may have contained
benzene. Furthermore, Star Florida transported chemicals, which could
have also contributed to Gonzales’ leukemia.
Moreover, as to compensability of illnesses, it is not necessary that the
nature of the employment is the sole reason for the seafarer’s illness.
Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel, made mentioned that it is
sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease
suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to
conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at
the very least, aggravation of any preexisting condition he might have
had.
Gonzales was able to satisfy the conditions under Section 32-A and
establish a reasonable linkage between his job as an Ordinary Seaman
and his leukemia. He has submitted his official job description, which
involved constant exposure to chemicals. It is also not disputed that he
contracted leukemia only while he was onboard Star Florida since he
was certified to be fit for sea duty prior to boarding and his leukemia
was not genetic in nature.
Note that even if the opinion of Gonzales’ own physician is to be
disregarded, the Court ruled that petitioners miserably failed to dispute
the medical finding that Gonzales’ leukemia is not hereditary, as his
tests reveal no apparent chromosome abnormality. This undeniable
circumstance, taken together with Gonzales’ testimony, plus the fact
that he was declared fit for sea duty prior to boarding the vessel for two
(2) consecutive employment contracts with the same company, all the
more bolster the conclusion that the conditions set forth in Section 32-
A regarding the work-relatedness of his leukemia are present.
130. VIRGEL DAVE JAPOS v. FIRST AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
GR No. 208000, 2017-07-26
Facts:
Petitioner Virgel Dave Japos was employed by FARMCOOP in 2001
as gardener.
During his stint with FARMCOOP, petitioner incurred... absences
With regard to his June 22-28, 2005 absences, petitioner received on
June 28, 2005 an inter-office memorandum[12] giving him until July 4,
2005 to explain the same in writing. On June 30, 2005, he personally
submitted his signed written explanation[13] of even date
On July 5, 2005, petitioner reported back to work, but he was not
admitted by FARMCOOP as he did not present a medical certificate. It
was only on July 7, 2005 that petitioner was able to secure Dr. Cruz's
Medical Certificate and submit the same to his employer. Also, on July
5, 2005, FARMCOOP issued a Notice of Termination[15] informing
petitioner that effective July 6, 2005, his employment would be
terminated. On July 8, 2005, petitioner submitted a Personnel Leave
Authority Application Form[16] of even date, which was not acted upon
by FARMCOOP as petitioner was already considered dismissed as of
July 6, 2005. In said application, petitioner sought approval of his
leave/absence from June 22 to July 7, 2005.
On February 6, 2008, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents
before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, separation pay,
underpayment of salaries, and other monetary claims
On July 21, 2008, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision[17] finding that
petitioner was legally terminated for the unauthorized June 22-28, 2005
absences.
Petitioner appealed before the NLRC which overturned the Labor
Arbiter.
Respondents moved to reconsider,[20] but the NLRC stood its ground.
In a Petition for Certiorari[21] filed with the CA... respondents sought to
reverse the above dispositions of the NLRC and reinstate the Labor
Arbiter's July 21, 2008 Decision
On July 29, 2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision
Issues:
W/N THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL FOR
FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO ESTABLISH JUST CAUSE. –
YES.
Ruling:
The evidence shows that prior to his June 22-28, 2005 absences,
petitioner already incurred several unauthorized absences for 2005,
specifically on January 26, February 28, and May 24, 2005, for which
written warnings were issued against him.
The Court agrees with the CA's pronouncement that Dr. Cruz's July 7,
2005 Medical Certificate does not constitute reliable proof of
petitioner's claimed illness during the period June 22-28, 2005.
The certificate does not indicate the period during which petitioner was
taken ill. It does not show when he consulted with and was diagnosed
by Dr. Cruz. And it does not specify when and how petitioner
underwent treatment, and for how long.
The Court thus concludes that petitioner's June 22 to July 5, 2005
absences are unauthorized and inexcusable. Consequently, under
FARMCOOP policy, petitioner is deemed to have committed a fourth
infraction, which merits the penalty of dismissal under the AWOL Rule,
as well as an infraction that merits dismissal under the AWOP Rule, for
being an unauthorized absence of at least six consecutive days without
prior notice.
Finally, petitioner's contention that, if at all, he should be penalized only
with suspension, considering that he was not punished for his January
26, February 28, and May 24, 2005 unauthorized absences. Quite the
contrary, he was penalized with written warnings for these infractions.
The fact that he was not suspended is of no moment; FARMCOOP
management merely exercised its prerogative to choose which penalty
to impose upon him.
Respondents' explanation that they took care not to impose severe
penalties upon petitioner out of respect for his father, who was a
founding member of the cooperative, is well taken. Nonetheless, as
elsewhere stated herein, while FARMCOOP opted not to penalize
petitioner with suspension for his February 28 (second infraction) and
May 24 (third infraction) absences as mandated under the AWOL and
AWOP Rules of FARMCOOP's Personnel Policies and Procedures,
these prior absences remain to be infractions that may be considered
in treating his unauthorized June 22 to July 5, 2005 absences as his
fourth infraction.
131. HOEGH FLEET SERVICES PHILS. v. BERNARDO M.
TURALLO
GR No. 230481, Jul 26, 2017 VELASCO JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners hired Turallo as a Messman on board vessel "Hoegh
Tokyo" for 9 months. The employment contract was signed and
covered by a CBA between the Associated Marine Officers' and
Seaman's Union of the Philippines and Hoegh Fleet Services AS,
represented by Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc.
Turallo was found "fit for sea duty" in the Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME).
While on board the vessel, Turallo felt pain on the upper back of his
body and chest pain, which was reported to his superiors, as
evidenced by the "Incident/Accidents Personnel" signed by Turallo's
department head and the master of the vessel. Turallo was referred to
a doctor by the ship's captain. Said referral also mentioned that Turallo
was discharged from the ship.
Upon arrival in Manila, Turallo was referred to the company-designated
physician, who in turn referred him to an orthopedic surgeon and
cardiologist. He underwent medical and laboratory tests and was
advised to return for re-evaluation.
Turallo underwent MRI of the cervical spine and left shoulder and
EMG-NCV.
In a "private and confidential" correspondence dated 23 December
2013 to Capt. Desabille, head of the crew operations, the company-
designated physician reported that Turallo had undergone a C4-C5,
C5-C6 Discectomy Fusion with PEEK Prevail on 19 December 2013,
and that the specialist opined that the estimated length of treatment
after surgery is three (3) months of rehabilitation for strengthening and
mobilization exercise. The letter further stated that based on Turallo's
condition at that time, if the latter is entitled to disability, the closest
interim assessments are Grade 8 (shoulder)-ankylosis of one shoulder
and Grade 10 (neck)-moderate stiffness or 2/3 loss of motion in neck.
In a "private and confidential" correspondence to Capt. Desabille, head
of the crew operations, the company-designated physician reported
that Turallo had undergone Discectomy Fusion with PEEK Prevail and
that the specialist opined that the estimated length of treatment after
surgery is three (3) months of rehabilitation for strengthening and
mobilization exercise. The letter further stated that based on Turallo's
condition at that time, if the latter is entitled to disability, the closest
interim assessments are Grade 8 (shoulder)-ankylosis of one shoulder
and Grade 10 (neck)-moderate stiffness or 2/3 loss of motion in neck.
Turallo consulted with Dr. Manuel Fidel Magtira, a government
physician of the Vizcarra Diagnostic Center who, after x-ray of his left
wrist and shoulder joints, found him to be "partially and permanently
disabled with separate impediments for the different affected parts of
(his) body of Grade 8, Grade 10 and Grade 11, based on the POEA
contract" but declared him as "permanently unfit in any capacity for
further sea duties".
Grievance proceedings were held between the parties at the
AMOSUP, but despite efforts to arrive at an agreement, the parties
failed to settle their differences.
Issues: W/N Turallo's compensation should only be confined to the
amount corresponding to the Grade 8 assessment, a partial disability.
– NO.
Ruling:
Under Section 32 thereof, Turallo is entitled to a total and permanent
disability compensation
In Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, the Court reads Section 32 of
POEA-SEC in harmony with the Labor Code and explained, viz:
While the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is not precluded
from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability
or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or
injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than
120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.
Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a
definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent
disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do
so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the
seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. In this
case, the company-designated physician merely issued an “interim”
assessment. Hence, Turallo should be deemed totally and permanently
disabled.
SHARPE SEA vs MABUNAY
FACTS:
Macario G. Mabunay, Jr. entered into a contract of employment with
Sharpe Sea, an agent for C.F. Sharp & Company Pte. Ltd/Monte Carlo.
Sharpe Sea was represented by its fleet manager, Florem.
- Mabunay was hired as an oiler.
Mabunay slipped and hit his back on the purifier, while he was
cleaning the second floor of the engine room. He lost consciousness
when he fell and when he awoke, his back was numb and he had
difficulty getting up.
- That night, Mabunay informed a certain 2nd Engineer Castro
of his accident .
- However, 2nd Engineer Castro directed him to continue
with his assigned duties.
- Despite the persistent pain in his back and numbness in his
legs, Mabunay continued working, until Chief Engineer
Manuel De Leon allowed him to have a medical checkup
when the ship docked in Nanjing, China.
On April 23, 2009, Mabunay was brought to Nanjing Hospital for a
medical checkup and he was diagnosed with chest and spinal
column bone damage. He was declared unfit to work by his
attending physician.
- Thereafter, he was medically repatriated in Manila.
Mabunay reported to Sharpe Sea's office and was told to report to Dr.
Cruz, a company-designated physician. Mabunay was confined. He
was diagnosed with "Cervical Spondylosis, etc.”
- He was provided with a cervical collar and lumbosacral
corset, told to continue his physical therapy, and advised to
come back on July 7, 2009 for further checkup.
After it was noted that Mabunay was not responding to physical
therapy,
- Dr. Cruz recommended that Mabunay undergo a discectomy
"for decompression of cervical area with fusion and bone
grafting and fixation of cervical plates and screws.”
On November 24, 2009, Mabunay underwent surgery and Dr. Cruz
observed that Mabunay "tolerated the procedure well." On December
5, 2009, Mabunay was discharged from the hospital.
- Mabunay filed a complaint against Sharpe Sea, Monte Carlo,
and Florem for the payment of his medical expenses, total
disability benefits…
On June 3, 2010, Mabunay sought the opinion of Dr. Raymundo, an
orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed him with "herniated disc, C4-C5"
and opined that he was unfit to work as a seaman in his present
condition.
The LA ruled in Mabunay’s favor and directed Sharpe Sea to pay him
permanent and total disability benefits. The NLRC affirmed with
modification.
Sharpe Sea moved to reconsider. The NLRC then modified its decision
by reducing the award of $60,000 to $16,795, corresponding with a
Grade 8 disability.
The CA ruled that Sharpe Sea failed to adequately explain why it only
submitted the medical report with Grade 8 disability in its Motion for
Reconsideration of the NLRC decision. It rebuked the NLRC for failing
to rule on the admissibility of the belatedly filed evidence.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Grade 8 disability rating of the company designated
physician should be upheld over the contrary findings of
respondent’s private physician
2. WON there is sufficient basis for the award of damages and
attorney’s fees
HELD:
1.
While it is true that technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor
cases and the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence for the
first time on appeal, the delay in the submission of evidence must
be adequately explained.
• Petitioners failed to clarify why a document available as early
as August 18, 2009 was only submitted into evidence on July
19, 2011, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that it was
nonexistent on the date indicated in the medical report.
• In this case, despite the uncontested disability of the
employee, he presented all his evidence, even going to
the extent of consulting two (2) other doctors after the
company-designated physicians refused to provide a
disability rating.
This Court notes that petitioners' actuation on the belated presentation
of a suspiciously ante-dated medical certificate borders on a
contemptuous act that, under ordinary circumstances, may amount to
disciplinary charges against counsel.
With the company designated physicians' failure to issue either a fit to
work certification or a final disability rating within the prescribed
periods, respondent's disability was rightfully deemed to be total
and permanent.
2. This Court sees no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence. "[I]t imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud."
By not timely releasing Dr. Cruz's interim disability grading, petitioners
revealed their intention to leave respondent in the dark regarding
his future as a seafarer and forced him to seek diagnosis from
private physicians.
- Petitioners' bad faith was further exacerbated when they
tried to invalidate the findings of respondent's private
physicians, for his supposed failure to move for the
appointment of a third-party physician as required by the
POEA-SEC, despite their own deliberate concealment of
their physician's interim diagnosis from respondent and the
labor tribunals.
- Thus, this Court concurs with the Court of Appeals.
Nonetheless, in light of petitioners' patently malicious act in belatedly
submitting an ante-dated medical report, this Court increases the
award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 as
compensation for the anxiety and inconvenience that respondent
suffered. The award of exemplary damages is also increased from
P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 to serve as a deterrent against the
commission of similar oppressive acts.
Considering that the NLRC absolved petitioner Moises R. Florem, Jr.
from personal liability in the absence of evidence that he had a direct
hand in denying respondent's claim, this Court sees no reason to
disturb this ruling.
Shipping companies should constantly be reminded of the
humanity of their employees. Seafarers who leave their families for
extended periods to pilot and maintain ships that bring profit for these
corporations deserve better treatment than how respondent was
treated in this case.
- In the ultimate analysis, if ever there will be a day of
judgment, all of us will be held to account as to how we
treated our fellow human beings, not by the amount of profit
we generated for our corporations.
Petitioners could have done better in this case. With this judgment, this
Court ends respondent’s travails and can only hope that the benefits
this Court now awards can assuage his suffering.
VENTURA vs CREWTECH SHIPMANAGEMENT
FACTS
Petitioner was employed by respondent Crewtech Shipmanagement
Philippines, Inc. (Crewtech), for its principal, Rizzo-Bottiglieri-De Carlini
Armatori S.P.A. (Rizzo), as Chief Cook on board the vessel
Petitioner complained to the Chief Mate that he was having a hard
time urinating that was accompanied by lower abdominal pain. He
was given pain relievers and advised to take a substantial amount of
water.
- Upon reaching the port of Singapore on April 30, 2014,
petitioner was brought to a specialist at the Maritime Medical
Centre and was diagnosed to have "prostatitis" and declared
"unfit for duty."
- Petitioner disclosed to the foreign doctor that he: (a) has a
history of prostatitis that occurred three (3) years ago; (b)
was treated for kidney stone in August 2013; and (c) was not
under any regular medication.
- Thus, petitioner was medically repatriated and referred to a
company-designated physician for further evaluation and
treatment.
In a Medical Report dated May 5, 2014, the company-designated
physician eventually diagnosed petitioner's illnesses to be "Cystitis with
Cystolithiases; and Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia (BPH)," which he
declared to be not work-related
Notwithstanding this finding, petitioner was consistently monitored by
the company-designated physician and was even recommended to
undergo "Open Prostatectomy..”
The length of treatment was estimated at three (3) months barring
unforeseen circumstances. While awaiting approval of the foregoing
procedures, the company-designated physician noted petitioner's
increasing complaints of pain during urination that was accompanied
with blood, for which he was prescribed medications.
- However, despite the foregoing procedures, petitioner still
suffered from intermittent pain
- the company-designated physician reiterated that
petitioner's illnesses were not work-related, while his
subsequent urethral stricture was only secondary to the
series of surgeries he had undergone and as such, was
likewise not work-related.
Petitioner claimed that he was verbally informed by the company-
designated physician that it would be his last check-up session and
that subsequent consultations would be for his own account.
Considering that petitioner's illnesses remained unresolved and he was
still on catheters, the latter was compelled to seek an independent
physician of his choice
- declared him to be permanently disabled, in view of his
existing indwelling catheter that caused frequent urinary tract
infection and rendered him incapable of performing his job
effectively.
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for total permanent disability
benefits,
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC gravely abused
its discretion when it ruled that petitioner was entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits.
RULING
It is basic that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to
disability benefits is governed by the medical findings, the law, and
the parties' contract.
In this case, petitioner executed his employment contract with
respondents during the effectivity of the 2010 POEA-SEC; hence, its
provisions are applicable and should govern their relations.
Pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for
disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related
injury or illness during the term of his contract.
- In this regard, Section 20 (E) thereof, mandates the
seafarer to disclose all his pre-existing illnesses in his
PEME, failing which, shall disqualify him from receiving the
same, to wit:
- E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing
illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation
and shall be disqualified from any compensation and
benefits.
- This is likewise a just cause for termination of employment
and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions.
Here, contrary to the findings of the CA, there was no concealment
on the part of petitioner when he failed to disclose that he was
previously treated for prostatitis in 2011.
- As culled from the records, respondents were well aware
of petitioner's past medical history given that the
company-designated physician was able to provide a
detailed medical history of the latter in the Medical Report
which showed all of his past illnesses, the year he was
treated and where he obtained his treatment.
Moreover, since petitioner's prostatitis was shown to have been treated
in 2011 with no indication that he was required to undergo further
medical attention or maintenance medication for the same, he cannot
be faulted into believing that he was completely cured and no
longer suffering from said illness.
- Evidently, petitioner's non-disclosure of the same in his
PEME in 2013 did not amount to willful concealment of
vital information and he was in fact, truthful in answering "no"
to the query on whether or not he was "suffering" from any
medical condition likely to be aggravated by sea service or
render him unfit for such service on board the vessel.
Be that as it may, the CA is nevertheless correct in holding that
petitioner's illnesses were not work-related, hence, not compensable.
Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC is explicit that the employer is
liable for disability benefits only when the seafarer suffers from a work-
related injury or illness during the term of his contract. Thus, work-
relation must be established.
- As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that
the disease in question must be one of those listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32-A thereof.
- Nevertheless, should it not be classified as occupational in
nature, Section 20 (A) paragraph 477 thereof provides that
such diseases are disputably presumed as work-related.
- However, the presumption does not necessarily result in an
automatic grant of disability compensation. The claimant still
has the burden to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of
contracting the illness.
In this case, records reveal that petitioner was repatriated after having
been diagnosed with prostatitis.
Upon further examination, the company-designated physician found
petitioner to have cystitis, or inflammation of the bladder.
Although the foregoing illnesses became manifest only while petitioner
was on board the vessel, such circumstance alone is not sufficient
to entitle him to disability benefits.
- It bears stressing that for a disability to be compensable, the
seafarer must show a reasonable link between his work
and his illness in order for a rational mind to determine that
such work contributed to, or at least aggravated, his illness.
- It is not enough that the seafarer's injury or illness rendered
him disabled; rather, he should be able to establish a
causal connection between his injury or illness, and the
work for which he is engaged.
Here, petitioner's general averments that he was exposed to stressful
demands of his duties and responsibilities and subjected to hazardous
condition of his station are mere allegations couched in conjectures.
- There was no evidence presented. The Court cannot just
presume that petitioner's job caused his illness or
aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had.
- Probability of work-connection must at least be anchored on
credible information and bare allegations do not suffice to
discharge the required quantum of proof, as in this case.
Moreover, the Court notes that even petitioner's physician of choice,
Dr. Tan, failed to refute the company-designated physician's
pronouncement that his illness was not work-related.
It is significant to point out at this stage that in determining the work-
causation of a seafarer's illness, the diagnosis of the company-
designated physician bears vital significance given that the latter is
mandated by the 2010 POEA-SEC to arrive at a definite assessment of
the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability.
- And while the seafarer is not irrevocably bound by the
findings of the company-designated physician as he is
allowed to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his
choice, Section 20 (A) (3) thereof further provides that any
disagreement in the findings may be referred to a third
doctor jointly agreed upon by the parties, whose findings
shall be final and binding between them.
The Court has consistently held that non-observance of the
requirement to have the conflicting assessments determined by a third
doctor would mean that the assessment of the company-
designated physician prevails.
Considering that petitioner failed to observe the conflict-resolution
procedure provided under the 2010 POEA-SEC, the Court is inclined
to uphold the opinion of the company-designated physician that
petitioner's illnesses were not work-related, hence, not compensable.
MAERSK-FILIPINAS vs ROSEMARY MALICSE
FACTS
Efren was employed as an able-bodied seaman by petitioner AP Moller
Singapore Pte., Ltd. for a term of nine months through its agency,
Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc.
- Four months later Efren complained of a fever and headache
while on board Maersk Tide.
- When paracetamol, bed rest, and tetracycline administered
by the vessel’s medical staff did not work, he was sent to
Clinica Hospital del Atlantico in Panama. He died.
The death certificate of Efren stated that he died of “multiple
organ dysfunction, Septicemia and Mononucleosis due to
Cytomegalovirus.”
- Neither party disclaimed that Efren died of septicemia,
which is severe blood poisoning or infection.
Maersk, et al. paid Rosemary burial benefits. As for death benefits,
they offered her USD 40,000, which was equivalent to half of the death
benefits provided by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between Maersk and Singapore Organization of Seamen, the union to
which her husband belonged.
- When she demanded a full copy of the CBA, as well as a
copy of the International Transport Workers Federation
Standard Collective Agreement (ITF Agreement) from
Maersk, et al., the latter refused.
Consequently, Rosemary filed a Complaint before the Executive Labor
Arbiter (LA) for death benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
- Maersk, et al. responded that the death of her husband was
not caused by a work-related illness.
- Rosemary countered by arguing that according to the ITF
Agreement, she was entitled to death benefits regardless of
the cause of Efren’s death.
The LA held that the ITF Agreement should prevail over the CBA and
the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers (POEA-SEC). The ITF Agreement,
said the LA, had a more beneficial provision on granting death benefits
since it awards claims regardless of the seafarer’s cause of death.
The NLRC held that the LA correctly appreciated the applicability of the
ITF Agreement. In addition, the NLRC declared that Maersk, et al. had
the burden of proving that Efren had died of a non-compensable
illness.
The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the circumstances, the ITF, CBA, or POEA
provisions are applicable
Whether or not the burden of proving compensability lies with the
employer
RULING:
The SC held that the following are the conditions for the
applicability of the ITF Agreement:
(1) the seafarer is a member of a union,
(2) which is affiliated with the ITF,
(3) that has entered into a special agreement with Maersk, et
al.
The SC found that none of the pieces of evidence adduced by the
parties has depicted with clarity the relationship of Efren’s labor union -
Singapore Organisation of Seamen -with the ITF. Furthermore, none of
the documents portrayed that Maersk, et al. entered into any special
agreement.
In this light, the SC found grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CA for awarding the death benefits provided by the ITF
Agreement sans any proof of the applicability thereof.
Given that the ITF Agreement is not an overriding instrument in this
case,
- the SC applied the minimum acceptable terms in a seafarer’s
employment contract provided by the POEA-SEC.
Citing Legal Heirs of Deauna vs. Fil-Star Maritime Corp., the SC
clarified that beneficial CBA clauses prevail over the POEA-SEC in
that the special clauses on collective bargaining agreements must
prevail over the standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA
in its Standard Employment Contract.
In comparing the provisions of CBA and POEA-SEC, the SC found that
the CBA provides higher death benefits of USD80,000.
- However, the cause of death of the seafarer must be due
to an accident; otherwise, his beneficiaries would receive
only USD40,000.
- That amount is lower than the benefit granted by the POEA-
SEC, which is USD50,000.
- But before beneficiaries may receive compensation under
the POEA- SEC, there must be substantial evidence that
the seafarer died of c. work-related illness.
Thus, the SC concluded that the Rosemary is entitled to the more
beneficial provision of the POEA-SEC if his death is proven to have
been work-related. Otherwise, the CBA’s provision on the grant of
USD40,000 regardless of the cause of death will apply.
- The labor tribunals, therefore, should have ascertained
whether or not Efren’s death was caused by a work-related
illness.
The SC further held that the correct approach in adjudging claims of
seafarers for death and disability benefits is to determine whether the
claimants have proven the requisites of compensability under
Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, viz: (1) the seafarer’s work must have
involved the risks described therein; (2) the disease was contracted as
a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks; (3) the
disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious
negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Here, Rosemary has failed to satisfy the required positive
propositions on compensability.
- First, she did not describe the tasks performed by Efren
on board Maersk Tide. While his employment contract
identified him as an able-bodied seaman, none of the
documents on record enumerated his particular duties.
Rosemary did not even explain how his work environment
caused his fever and headache, and how these conditions
worsened into the alleged fatal illness.
- Second, given the dearth of evidence as regards Efren’s
actual job, there was absolutely no showing of how his
duties or tasks contributed to the development of his
illness. Therefore, there could be no basis to conclude that
his multiple organ failure secondary to septicemia was
contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks of his
trade.
The SC disposed that Maersk, et al. were correct to offer Rosemary
only USD40,000.
- Based on their uncontested narrative, they had already
proposed the payment of that sum to Rosemary as early as
the negotiations preceding the filing of the claims before the
LA.
LEONCIO vs MST MARINE SERVICES
FACTS
Private respondent MST Marine is a domestic manning agency, with
private respondent Thome Ship Management Pte. Ltd (Thome) as one
of its principals. MST Marine repeatedly hired Leoncio to work for its
principals, including Thome.
On August 23, 2001, Leoncio disembarked from M/V Golden Stream,
owned by one of MST Marine’s principals, and was repatriated to be
treated for his Coronary Artery Disease/Hypertensive Cardio-
Vascular Disease (CAD/HCVD) by the company-designated
physician.
- For two months, he received sickness allowance and was in
the care and management of the company-designated
physician.
- Thereafter, he was declared “fit to work” and redeployed by
MST Marine, et al. on board M/V Frontier Express, albeit
with a demotion in rank.
After several more deployments from 2005, Leoncio was employed by
MST Marine, et al. on January 27, 2014 as Chief Cook on board M/V
Knossos under a POEA- SEC.
- Prior to his embarkation, he underwent a pre-employment
medical examination (PEME) and was declared “fit for sea
duty.”
Leoncio eventually boarded the vessel. While performing his duties on
board M/V Knossos, Leoncio suddenly felt heavy chest pains,
shortness of breath, numbness of the left portion of his face, and
hypertensive reaction.
- The Master of the Vessel allowed him to rest and take
medicine when Leoncio reported his condition.
However, Leoncio again experienced the same symptoms. Hence, the
Master of the Vessel asked respondent MST Marine to refer
Leoncio for a medical check-up.
- Leoncio was admitted to the Geelong Hospital in Australia
where he was diagnosed with “unstable angina” and
subsequently, underwent “PCI (Percutaneous Coronary
Intervention) to severe distal RCA (Right Coronary Artery).”
In due course, Leoncio was medically repatriated to the Philippines on
July 12, 2014. Two days later, he was referred to the company-
designated physician for post-employment medical examination and
treatment of his coronary artery disease and hypertensive
cardiovascular disease.
- He was then confined at the St. Luke’s Medical Center for
four days under the care of Dr. Elpidio Nolasco.
- While under treatment, respondent MST Marine inquired
from Dr. Nolasco regarding Leoncio’s condition.
In particular, MST Marine asked the doctor to check or confirm whether
Leoncio had previously undergone stenting procedures. Dr. Nolasco
confirmed that, indeed, Leoncio had previously undergone
stenting procedure sometime in 2008
- Based on said information, MST Marine cut off the medical
and sickness allowances provided to Leoncio on the
ground of his failure to declare during PEME that he
underwent a stenting procedure
Leoncio then promptly consulted Dr. Ramon Reyes. The latter issued
a certificate declaring Leoncio unfit for work.
- Dr. Fernandez, an internal medicine-cardiologist echoed Dr.
Reyes’ findings in a medical certification.
Leoncio filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits
against the private MST Marine, et al..
The LA noted, as Leoncio has insisted, that MST Marine, et al. were
already aware of the existence of Leoncio’s coronary artery
disease since 2001 but nonetheless reemployed and redeployed him
to work for several more years.
the NLRC held that Leoncio’s concealment of the stenting procedure
during the PEME is a misrepresentation that bars his right to any
disability compensation or illness benefit under the POEA-SEC.
CA ruled against Leoncio’s entitlement to the benefits he claimed, and
accordingly the NLRC
ISSUE: whether petitioner committed a fraudulent misrepresentation
that bars his recovery of total disability benefits.
RULING
The SC held that the resolution of this case pivots on the construction
of the phrase “illness or condition” in Section 20 (E) of the 2010 PO
EA-SEC, which states that a seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-
existing illness or condition in the Medical Examination (PEME) shall
be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any
compensation and benefits.
For Leoncio, the phrase refers to his “coronary artery disease.”
- Thus, given his medical repatriation on account thereof in
2001, for which he was compensated and even demoted by
MST Marine, he cannot be considered to have concealed the
same during his PEME in 2014.
MST Marine, et al., on the other hand, maintain that the phrase
includes and requires the disclosure of the stenting procedure on his
LAD and LCX arteries undergone by Leoncio in 2009.
- Thus, for MST Marine, et al., Leoncio’s failure to reveal the
same is a fraudulent misrepresentation that bars his
entitlement to any compensation or benefit under the POEA-
SEC and/ or their CBA.
Even then, Article 4 of the Labor Code is explicit that “all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor.”
- This liberal interpretation of labor laws and rules have been
applied to employment contracts by Article 1702 of the New
Civil Code which mandates that ”all labor contracts” shall
likewise be construed in favor of the laborer.
In this case, nothing can be plainer than the meaning of the word
“illness” as referring to a disease or injury afflicting a, person’s body.
- By the doctrine of noscitor a sociis, “condition” likewise refers
to the state of one’s health. Neither of these words refers to
a medical procedure undergone by a seafarer in connection
with an “illness or condition” already known to the employer
as far back as 2001.
The employer cannot validly decry his supposed concealment and
fraudulent misrepresentation of Leoncio’s illness on account of the
non-disclosure of the stenting procedure.
- Most importantly, the record is undisputed that Leoncio was
first medically repatriated in 2001 due to Hypertension and
Angina Pectoris where he was declared “Fit for Sea Duty”
after undergoing treatment by the company- designated
physician.
Leoncio was initially demoted for one contract after said medical
repatriation but reverted to his old position as Chief Cook on
subsequent deployments.
- MST Marine, et al. cannot claim there was misrepresentation
by the complainant on account of his medical repatriation in
2001 which contradicts their alleged lack of knowledge of
said pre-existing illnesses of the complainant.
- These circumstances indubitably establish MST Marine, et
al.’s awareness M complainant’s impaired medical condition
despite being fit to work.
- Hence, the allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation
by MST Marine, et al. were not given credence.
Simply, a stenting procedure is the “placement of a small wire mesh
tube called a stent to help prop the artery open and decrease its
chance of narrowing again. As it is, the procedure was intended to
improve his health condition.
- Leoncio’s failure to reveal the said procedure does not
amount to a concealment of a pre-existing “illness or
condition” that can bar his claim for disability benefit and
compensation.
Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC lists cardiovascular disease as a
compensable work- related condition.
- Further, in several cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary
artery disease, as well as other heart ailments, were held to
be compensable.
To be sure, it is more than reasonable to conclude that the risks
present in his work environment precipitated the onset of the
acute exacerbation of his heart condition.
- It is likewise a matter of judicial notice that seafarers are
exposed to varying temperatures and harsh weather
conditions as the ship crossed ocean boundaries.
MAGSAYSAY MITSUI vs BUENAVENTURA
FACTS:
Petitioner Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. (Magsaysay), on
behalf of its principal Koyo Marine Co. Ltd., hired respondent Oliver
G. Buenaventura (Buenaventura) as an ordinary seaman onboard the
vessel Meridian.
On 25 January 2007, Buenaventura met an accident wherein a
mooring winch crushed his right hand.
- As a result, he suffered a fracture of the right first metacarpal
bone and open fracture of the right second metacarpal bone,
which required emergency surgical procedures both
done in Japan.
On 21 February 2007, Buenaventura was medically repatriated.
- He was referred to the Maritime Medical Service, the
company-designated clinic, and was attended to by Dr.
Stephen Hebron (Dr. Hebron). Dr. Hebron then referred
Buenaventura to Dr. Celso Fernandez (Dr. Fernandez), an
orthopedic surgeon.
On 3 August 2007, Dr. Hebron declared Buenaventura fit to work
after undergoing conservative management, continuous rehabilitation
physiotherapy, and occupational therapy.
- Nevertheless, Buenaventura still felt pain in his hand
especially during cold weather.
In a medical certificate dated 12 September 2007, Dr. Hebron stated
that according to Dr. Fernandez, the MC plates in Buenaventura’s right
hand might be contributing to the pain.
- According to him, the removal of the MC plates would
cost around P70,000.00, which would not be shouldered
by Magsaysay.
- This prompted Buenaventura to consult Dr. Rodolfo Rosales,
who found him unfit to work and recommended a 10-
week physical therapy.
- He also consulted Dr. Venancio Garduce, Jr., an orthopedic
surgeon, who opined that it would be difficult for
Buenaventura to continue to work as a seaman.

Based on the differing opinions of his physicians of choice,
- Buenaventura filed a complaint for disability
compensation.
ISSUE: Whether Buenaventura was entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits. (NO)
RULING:
As to conflicting findings between the company-designated
physician and
the seafarer’s physician of choice
The company-designated physician has the first opportunity to
examine the seafarer and to issue a certification as to the seafarer’s
medical status.
- However, the seafarer has the option to seek another
opinion from a physician of his choice, without the need
for bad faith or malice on the part of the company-designated
physician.
In case the findings of the seafarer’s physician of choice differ from that
of the company-designated physician,
- he has the duty to submit the conflicting findings to a
third-party doctor, as mutually agreed upon by the parties.
- His failure to do so grants the company-designated
physician’s medical opinion more weight and probative value
over his physician of choice.
- Nevertheless, the diagnosis of the company-designated
physician may be set aside if it is attended with clear bias,
manifested by the lack of scientific relation between the
diagnosis and the symptom or where the opinion is not
supported by the medical records.
Here, Buenaventura did not initiate the process of referring the
conflicting findings of his physicians of choice to a third doctor.
- Consequently, the findings of the company-designated
physicians deserve greater weight and could be set aside
only with a showing of a clear bias against Buenaventura.
In this case, Buenaventura was assessed by an orthopedic surgeon
and was subjected to a lengthy evaluation and treatment before a
certification of fitness to work was issued. A review of the records also
shows that there is insufficient evidence to hold that the
company-designated physicians acted with clear bias against
Buenaventura.
As to the lapse of the 120-day period
The mere lapse of the 120-day period does not automatically
render the disability of the seafarer permanent and total.
- The period may be extended to 240 days should the
circumstances justify the same (e.g., seafarer required
further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative).
Here, the extension of the initial 120-day period to issue an
assessment was justified considering that during the interim,
Buenaventura underwent therapy and rehabilitation and was
continuously observed.
- The company-designated physicians did not sit idly by and
wait for the lapse of the said period. Buenaventura’s further
need of treatment necessitated the extension for the
issuance of the medical assessment.
- It is noteworthy that Buenaventura was declared fit to work
after six months from the time he was medically repatriated
or within the allowable extended period of 240 days.
TEEKAY SHIPPING vs RAMOGA
FACTS:
On February 18, 2010, respondent entered into a contract of overseas
employment with petitioner to work on board the vessel M/T
"SEBAROK SPIRIT".
- After the mandatory pre-employment medical examination
(PEME), respondent was declared fit for sea duty.
He joined the vessel on April 9, 2010. Barely six (6) months after, he
slipped and twisted his left ankle while climbing the stairs on
board the said vessel. He underwent an x-ray examination and a
surgery was recommended for open reduction and internal fixation
of the injured ankle to prevent its further displacement.
Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines.
He underwent a rehabilitation program under the supervision of Dr.
Esther G. Go and was operated for open reduction by the company
designated physician.
On April 8, 2011, the physician issued a certification stating that
[respondent] was fit to return to work.
- Unsatisfied with the company doctor's assessment,
[respondent] sought the help of his own doctor issued a
medical report declaring that [respondent] is unable to work
at his previous occupation.
- Thus, he was declared to be permanently unfit in any
capacity to resume his sea duties.
Consequently, [respondent] lodged a complaint for permanent total
disability benefits, et al, in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-going Vessels.
The LA rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. Upon appeal to the
NLRC affirmed with modification the decision of the LA by deleting the
award of sickness allowance. The CA however affirmed the ruling of
the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that respondent is
entitled to permanent total disability benefits (YES)
RULING:
In the case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils. Inc., et. al. v.
Quiogue, this Court harmonized the periods when a disability is
deemed permanent and total, thus:
- An analysis of the cited jurisprudence reveals that the first
set of cases did not award permanent and total disability
benefits to seafarers whose medical treatment lasted for
more than 120 days, but not exceeding 240 days,
o because (1) the company-designated physician
opined that the seafarer required further medical
treatment or
o (2) the seafarer was uncooperative with the
treatment.
- Hence, in those cases, despite exceeding 120 days, the
seafarer was still not entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits.
- In such instance, Rule X, Section 2 of the IRR gave the
company-designated physician additional time, up to 240
days, to continue treatment and make an assessment on the
disability of the seafarer.
- The second set of cases, on the other hand, awarded
permanent and total disability benefits to seafarers whose
medical treatment lasted for more than 120 days, but not
exceeding 240 days,
o because the company-designated physician did
not give a justification for extending the period of
diagnosis and treatment.
o Necessarily, there was no need anymore to extend
the period because the disability suffered by the
seafarer was permanent. In other words, there
was no indication that further medical treatment,
up to 240 days, would address his total disability.
If the treatment of 120 days is extended to 240 days, but still no
medical assessment is given,
- the finding of permanent and total disability becomes
conclusive.
The above-stated analysis indubitably gives life to the provisions of the
law as enunciated by Vergara. Under this interpretation, both the 120-
day period under Article 192 (2) of the Labor Code and the
extended 240-day period under Rule X, Section 2 of its IRR are
given full force and effect.
This interpretation is also supported by the case of C.F. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc. v. Taok, where the Court enumerated a seafarer's
cause of action for total and permanent disability, to wit:
- The company-designated physician failed to issue a
declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or
disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and
there is no indication that further medical treatment
would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an
extension of the period to 240 days;
- 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued
by the company-designated physician;
As it now stands, the mere lapse of 120 days from the seafarer's
repatriation without the company-designated physician's
declaration of the fitness to work of the seafarer
- does not entitle the latter to his permanent total disability
benefits.
Here, the records reveal that respondent was medically repatriated on
October 4, 2010. It is undisputed that the company-designated
physician issued a declaration as to respondent's fitness to work
on April 8, 2011 or 186 days from his repatriation.
- Thus, to determine whether respondent is entitled to his
permanent total disability benefits it is necessary to
examine whether the company-designated physician
has a sufficient justification to extend the period.
Examination of the records lead Us to conclude that there is a
sufficient justification for extending the period.
- The company-designated physician has determined that
respondent's condition needed further medical treatment and
evaluation.
- Thus, it was premature for the respondent to file a case
for permanent total disability benefits on March 4,
201120 because at that time, respondent is not yet entitled
to such benefits.
- The company-designated physician has until June 1, 2011 or
the 240th day from his repatriation to make a declaration as
to respondent's fitness to work.
Neither is the declaration of respondent's own doctor that respondent
is unfit to return to sea duties conclusive as to respondent's condition.
- It is well-settled that the assessment of the company-
designated physician prevails over that of the seafarer's
own doctor.
ASENTISTA vs JUPP & CO
FACTS:
Asentista was employed by JUPP as sales secretary. On March 14,
2008, she became a regular employee of the company as a sales
assistant and was later appointed in July 2010 as a sales agent of
JUPP for its Northern Mindanao area.
- As a sales agent, Asentista became entitled to a sales
commission of two percent for every attained monthly
quota.
- However, despite reaching her monthly quota, JUPP failed
to give Asentista her earned sales commission despite
repeated requests.
Meanwhile in 2011, JUPP, through its Administrative and Finance
Officer Malou Ramiro, issued a new Toyota Avanza vehicle to
Asentista in view of her sales performance in the Cagayan De Oro
area.
- The ownership of the car, however, remains with the
company.
- Notwithstanding lack of agreement, JUPP deducted car
plan participation payment from her unpaid sales
commission.
On February 4, 2013, Asentista tendered her resignation effective
February 28, 2013 and returned the Avanza vehicle to JUPP through
Emmanuel P. Pabon.
- Thereafter, she filed a claim for unpaid commission and
refund for car plan deduction.
As a result of the respondents' incessant refusal to pay, Asentista filed
a complaint against JUPP and Ascutia
For their part, the respondents opposed the allegations of
Asentista, arguing the burden of proof to substantiate her claim for
unpaid commission and car participation refund rested upon her.
- Since the employment agreement signed by Asentista did
not include any remuneration for a sales commission and car
participation plan, her claim lacked any legal basis for
entitlement.
- Further, Asentista was only allowed to use the Toyota
Avanza with car participation during the amortization period
for both her personal and official use due to the generosity of
JUPP.
On the other hand, JUPP admitted that despite lack of explicit
provision in the employment agreement, Asentista was given during
her employment discretionary sales commission subject to the sole
prerogative of the company.
- JUPP likewise acknowledged sole discretion to allow
Asentista to own the vehicle after the amortization period.
the LA emphasized the non-entitlement of Asentista to claim for
sales commission or refund for amortization payment for the use of the
company's car as shown by the employment agreement between
JUPP and the complainant.
CA agreed with the respondents that Asentista is not entitled to the
grant of sales commission based on the "Job Offer for Regular
Status of Employment."
- Nowhere could it be read in the contract that private
respondent [Asentista] is entitled to the claimed unpaid
commission. The Court cannot give credence to the email
allegedly sent by petitioner Ascutia to private respondent
detailing the computation of her claimed unpaid
commission.”
ISSUE: WON Asentista is entitled to sales commission and car plan
RULING:
At the outset, the respondents can no longer refute Asentista's
entitlement to a discretionary commission since an admission can
already be deduced in their position paper
Moreover, the silence of the employment agreement including
sales commission as part of remuneration does not affect her
entitlement.
As provided by Section 97(f) of the Labor Code, employee's wage
has been defined as
- "remuneration of earnings, however designated, capable of
being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or
other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or unwritten
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, of board, lodging, or other facilities
customarily furnished by the employer to the employee.
In Toyota Pasig, Inc. v. De Peralta citing Iran v. NLRC, the Court
affirmed the inclusion of sales commission as part of a salesman's
remuneration for services rendered to the company.
- This definition explicitly includes commissions as part of
wages.
- While commissions are, indeed, incentives or forms of
encouragement to inspire employees to put a little more
industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still these
commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered.
- The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for
such type of remuneration for services rendered
demonstrate clearly that commissions are part of a
salesman's wage or salary.

In the same way, the Court cannot subscribe to the assertion of the
respondents that the burden of proof to prove monetary claims
rests on the employee.
- It is a settled that in cases involving non-payment of
monetary claims of employees, the employer has the
burden of proving that the employees did receive their
wages and benefits and that the same were paid in
accordance with law.
In this case, the Court agrees with Asentista that she has already set
out the particularities of her unpaid monetary claims against the
respondents based on the electronic messages of Ascutia.
- The respondents should have presented evidentiary proof
based on the employment records and personnel files that
Asentista was already paid of her benefits, instead of
attributing the burden of proof back to her.
Similarly, the Court concurs with Asentista that in the absence of any
express stipulation,
- the respondents cannot deduct car participation and
amortization payment from her unpaid sales commission.
The Court agrees with the factual findings of NLRC that the
respondents and Asentista did not agree on any car participation
plan.
- Since the inception of the complaint, Asentista has been
adamant that she did not authorize the respondents to
deduct a car plan participation payment from her sales
commission
Any benefit or privilege enjoyed by Asentista from using the service
vehicle was merely incidental and insignificant, because for the
most part the vehicle was under the respondents' control and
supervision.
- Given the high monthly quota requirement imposed upon
Asentista to generate sales for the company, the service
vehicle given to her was an absolute necessity.
- In truth, the respondents were the ones reaping the full
benefits of the vehicle assigned to Asentista in the
performance of her function.
139. MANILA SHIPMANAGEMENT VS ANINANG
FACTS: The respondent is a Filipino seafarer, who signed a Contract
of Employment5 as Chief Engineer with HELLESPONT HAMMONIA
GMBH & CO. KG (petitioner), through its manning agent in the
Philippines, petitioner MANILA SHIPMANAGEMENT & MANNING,
INC. The duration of the contract was for six (6) months, with a basic
monthly salary of US$2,435.00, and an owner bonus of US$4,600.00.
The contract specified a 40-hour work week with subsistence
allowance amounting to US$152.00, leave pay of US$649.00, and
fixed overtime pay per month of US$1,464.00.6
On June 26, 2010, the respondent commenced his duties and
departed the Philippines on board "MT HELLESPONT CREATION."
Sometime thereafter, and while still aboard the vessel, the respondent
experienced chest pain and shortness of breath. As found by the CA,
the respondent requested for early repatriation from the master of the
vessel, but was refused, and instead, his contract was extended for
another month from December 12, 2010 to January 31, 2011. On
February 2, 2011, the respondent arrived back in the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, after the respondent's repatriation, the
latter "never voiced out any health concern nor did he report for a post-
employment medical examination."8 The petitioners further alleged
that they had no contact whatsoever with the respondent until the time
that they (petitioners) received the complaint filed by the respondent on
March 6, 2012. The petitioners pointed out that this complaint was
initiated more than one year after the respondent's disembarkation
from "MT HELLESPONT CREATION."
On the other hand, the respondent asserted that upon his arrival in the
Philippines, he "immediately went to private respondent MANSHIP
(herein petitioner) for post-employment medical examination, but
private respondent MANSHIP failed to refer him to the company-
designated physician."10 According to the respondent, petitioners'
refusal prompted him to consult with his personal physician, Dr.
Achilles C. Esguerra, who later on diagnosed him with congestive heart
failure,11 and declared him physically unfit for sea service.12
According to the respondent, on February 15, 2011, less than two
weeks after his arrival in the Philippines, he underwent ECG, ED Echo,
and ultrasound procedures in Clinica Caritas. Few days thereafter, on
February 26, 2011, he suddenly collapsed and was rushed to the
Medical City where he was confined for three days. By September 29,
2011, Dr. Esguerra diagnosed him of his illness. On February 2, 2012,
he was once more confined, this time in St. Luke's Medical Center for
eight days, and was diagnosed with "dilated cardiomyopathy (non-
ischemic) S/P CVD Infarct (2010) and chronic atrial fibrillation."
On the basis of the foregoing, the respondent sought from the
petitioners the payment of disability benefits; medical, surgical, and
hospitalization expenses; and sickness allowance. The petitioners
denied the claim.
The LA ruled that the respondent suffered from total and permanent
disability. This is because "the proximity of the date of repatriation and
the time the complainant collapsed is too close that it leads to the
conclusion that complainant's ailment was work-aggravated during the
term of his contract. The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA
decision. The CA reversed and set aside the NLRC decision.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred when it decided to ignore the 3-day
mandatory reporting requirement provided under the POEA-SEC
HELD:
The Court finds that there is merit in the petition and that the
arguments of the respondent fail.
According to Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 "Amended Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-board Ocean-going Ships" (POEA Contract),
when the seafarer suffers work-related illness during the term of his
contract, the employer shall be liable to pay for: (1) the seafarer's
wages; (2) costs of medical treatment both in a foreign port and in the
Philippines until the seafarer is declared fit to work, or the disability
rating is established by the company-designated physician; (3)
sickness allowance which shall not exceed 120 days; and (4)
reimbursement of reasonable medicine, traveling, and accommodation
expenses.
However, to be qualified for the foregoing monetary benefits, the same
section of the POEA Contract requires the seafarer to submit
himself/herself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return to the Philippines, except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so. The seafarer is likewise required to report
regularly to the company-designated physician during the course of his
treatment.
Scanmar Maritime Services Inc. vs De Leon reiterates that:
The rationale for the rule [on mandatory post-
employment medical examination within three days from
repatriation by a company-designated physician] is that
reporting the illness or injury within three days from
repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to
determine the cause of the illness or injury.
Thus, in InterOrient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Creer III, the Court
ruled that the respondent's non-compliance with the three-day rule
on post-employment medical examination was fatal to his cause.
As a consequence, his right to claim for compensation and
disability benefits was forfeited. The Court ruled that the complaint
should have been dismissed outright.
In the case at hand, the lower Courts found no justifiable cause for the
failure to comply with the reporting requirements. Therefore, after a
detailed study thereof, the Court rules against the respondent.
There is no evidence that would suggest that he presented
himself before the petitioners upon disembarkation.
• He presented no witnesses to support his allegations
• He did not even bother to tell the Court who it is that he
talked with in the petitioners’ office
 • He did not even relay how his request for medical treatment
was supposedly refused.
In addition, the LA decision which exempts him from the
application of the mandatory reporting requirement has no leg to
stand on.
• The POEA contract is clear and admits of no exceptions
save from the instance when the seafarer is physically
incapacitated to report to the employer.
• Section 20(A)(c) requires him to submit a written notice to
the agency within the same period as compliance. This has
not happened in this case.
• When the CA decision admitted the respondent’s allegations
as a fact, it has pointed to no evidence that would support
this assertion.
Therefore the respondent would be hard-pressed to convince the Court
of his arguments
• The respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 20(A)(c) of the POEA Contract
• The ruling of the CA and the LA must be reversed and set
aside.
• the Court has time and again upheld the primacy of labor, for
it is through the effort of the Filipino worker that the economy
is stirred and is steered to the right direction.
• However, as before, the Court shall not be an instrument to
the detriment of the employer if the most basic rules in the
POEA Contract are not complied with as in this case.
140. EBUENGA VS SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES
FACTS:
Ebuenga was hired by Southfield Agencies, Inc. (Southfield) as a chief
cook aboard respondent Wilhemsen Ship Management Holding Ltd.'s
(Wilhemsen) vessel, MTV Super Adventure. Ebuenga boarded the
vessel on December 19, 2010.
About two (2) months into his engagement, or on February 26, 2011,
Ebuenga wrote a letter to Southfield, Wilhemsen, and Captain Sonny
Valencia (Capt. Valencia) (collectively, respondents), asking that he be
repatriated as soon as possible "to attend to a family problem."
Respondents acted favorably on this request and Ebuenga was
repatriated on March 5, 2011.
Without consulting Southfield's designated physician, Ebuenga had
himself checked at St. Luke's Medical Center where he underwent
Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The test revealed that he was afflicted
with "Multilevel Disk Dessication, from C2-C3 to C6-C7." He was
advised to undergo physical therapy. Ebuenga went back to his
hometown in Bogtong, Legaspi City to undergo physical therapy
sessions. Thereafter, he consulted Dr. Misael Jonathan A. Ticman,
who issued a Disability Report, finding him to be permanently disabled
and no longer fit to work as a seafarer. Consequently, Ebuenga filed a
complaint for permanent disability benefits.
In his Position Paper, Ebuenga disavowed voluntarily seeking
repatriation on account of a family concern. He claimed instead that
upon embarkation, a crew member died from overfatigue. He reported
this death to the International Transport Workers' Federation, which
took no action. Incensed at Ebuenga's actions, the captain of the
vessel, Capt. Jonathan B. Lecias, Sr. (Capt. Lecias), coerced him to
sign a letter seeking immediate repatriation. Ebuenga also claimed to
have reported to Capt. Lecias that he was suffering intense back pain
but the latter refused to entertain this because of the animosity
between them. He added that upon repatriation, he sought medical
assistance from the company-designated physician, but was refused.
Thus, he was forced to seek treatment on his own.
In their defense, respondents denied that there was ever an incident
where Ebuenga encountered medical problems while on board the
vessel.
The LA dismissed Ebuanga’s complaint and explained that the latter
failed to prove that he had suffered an illness or injury while on board
the vessel; therefore he can no longer claim disability benefits for
failing to undergo post-employment medical examination with the
company-designated physician.
The NLRC denied Ebuanga’s appeal. The CA found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC and denied Ebuanga’s MR.
ISSUE: WON Ebunaga is entitled to permanent disability
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC established the procedures for
assessing claims for disability benefits:
• It mandates seafarers to sea a company-designated
physician for post-employment medical examination, which
must be done within 3 days from their arrival
• Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to
claim disability benefits
In Manota vs Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, it explained why the
three day period must by strictly observed:
• The 3-day mandatory reporting requirement must be strictly
observed since within 3 days from repatriation, it would be
fairly manageable for the physician to identify whether
the disease . . . was contracted during the term of his
employment or that his working conditions increased
the risk of contracting the ailment.
• Moreover, the post-employment medical examination within
3 days from . . . arrival is required in order to ascertain [the
seafarer's] physical condition, since to ignore the rule would
set a precedent with negative repercussions because it
would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers
claiming disability benefits.
However, this Court has clarified that the conduct of post-employment
medical examination is not a unilateral burden on the part of the
seafarer.
• It is a reciprocal obligation where the seafarer is obliged to
submit to an examination within three (3) working days from
his or her arrival, and the employer is correspondingly
obliged "to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of
the seafarer
Petitioner failed to back up his allegations and falls too short of
the requisite quantum of proof in labor cases. He failed to
discharge his burden to prove his allegations by substantial
evidence
• Labor Arbiter Savari, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and the Court of Appeals are consistent in
finding that petitioner's claim of presenting himself for
examination is direly unsupported by evidence.
• Petitioner could not even state when he actually wanted to
have himself examined. He could neither identify the person
he approached for his request nor disclose the exact manner
and circumstances of his being rebuffed.
• His plea for this Court to overturn the uniform antecedent
findings of the three (3) tribunals demands more than
attaching a copy of the immediately preceding judgments.
Attaching a copy of the assailed judgments to a Rule 45
Petition does not even manage to accomplish any
evidentiary purpose.
• Petitioner's allegation of a deceased colleague could have
been substantiated by official records. He did not adduce
these documents. Worse, he could not even name that co-
worker. The truth is that there is no certainty if someone
actually died on board.
• Likewise, while petitioner claims that respondents were so
hostile to him, he claims to have still managed to lodge a
complaint while on mid-voyage to the International Transport
Workers' Federation. If he was so ingenious to do this mid-
voyage despite the belligerence of his superiors, nothing
could have prevented him from adducing proof that he made
that report. A copy of any form of acknowledgment by the
International Transport Workers' Federation would have
bolstered his cause
Even if this Court were to overlook petitioner's utter failure to
substantiate his version of events, no award of disability benefits is
availing as petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his affliction
was work-related.
 • For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the
2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) that the
illness or injury must be work-related, and (2) that the work-
related illness or injury must have existed during the term of
the seafarer's employment contract.
• Petitioner himself wrote and submitted a letter requesting
repatriation "to attend to a family problem." Petitioner did not
deny the existence of this letter but disavowed it as having
been made under duress. Petitioner's account concerning
this letter is also laden with a fatal inconsistency.
• In any case, contrary to Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC,
petitioner failed to demonstrate how his work necessarily
"involve[d] the risks described" and how he contracted his
affliction specifically "as a result of [his] exposure to the
described risks."
• Contrary to Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, the brevity of his
engagement contradicts the likelihood that his disc
desiccation—a degenerative ailment requiring prolonged
conditions—"was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it.
Petitioner's cause is grossly deficient in several ways.
• First, he failed to undergo the requisite examination, thereby
creating a situation resulting in the forfeiture of his claims.
This alone suffices for the denial of his Petition.
• Second, he posited a narrative of indifference and
oppression but failed to adduce even the slightest
substantiation of it. He asked this Court to overturn the
consistent findings of the three (3) tribunals but offered
nothing other than his word as proof.
• Finally, he averred a medical condition from which no causal
connection can be drawn to his brief engagement as chief
cook. He would have this Court sustain an imputation
grounded on coincidence and conjecture.
141. MAGAT VS INTERORIENT MARITIME
FACTS:
Petitioner has started work with respondent Interorient Maritime
Enterpises, Inc. (respondent company) as an Able Seaman on board
different vessels since March 2007. Sometime in May 2011,
respondent company once again employed the services of petitioner
on board the vessel MT North Star for a period of nine (9) months.
Petitioner underwent a Pre--Employment Medical Examination (PEME)
as a requisite for his latest employment and was certified "fit to work,"
thus, he was deployed on July 1, 2011.
Part of petitioner's job assignment was to paint the ship's pump room
and due to the poor ventilation in the said room, petitioner claimed that
he was able to inhale residues and vapors coming from the paint and
thinner that he used. As such, petitioner suffered shortness of breath
and chest pains which he claimed to have reported to the Chief Mate
but was told by the latter to just rest. When his condition improved,
petitioner continued to perform his duties until he was able to complete
his contract on July 6, 2012.
Upon his repatriation, petitioner reported immediately to respondent
company and asked for a referral to the company physician for a
medical examination of his heart condition but the latter ignored
petitioner's request. Petitioner was then asked to execute an
Offsigner's Data Slip on July 9, 2012 indicating therein that he did not
experience any illness or injury during his employment on board the
vessel, and manifested his willingness to join the vessel again after
three (3) months. However, due to episodes of chest pains, petitioner
went to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center on the same date for
consultation and was attended to by Dr. Liberato Casison, a specialist
in Internal Medicine, advising him to rest and prescribing certain
medications.
After resting and taking the prescribed medication, petitioner re-
applied with respondent company and was recommended for PEME.
The result of petitioner's tests revealed that he had the "Hypertension
controlled with maintenance medication; Dilated Cardiomyopathy;
R/out ischemic etiology; Renal parenchymal calcification bilateral;
Suggest coronaryangiogram." Petitioner was not deployed due to the
said findings.
Thereafter, on March 1, 2013, petitioner again consulted Dr. Casison in
order to find out the real status of his medical condition. After being
examined, Dr. Casison issued his Medical Evaluation, which found him
to have a disabling coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure
and arrythmia (ventricular and atrial), which may prove fatal with the
above condition. Subject is considered disabled for work.
Magat filed a complaint for payment of permanent disability benefits
and other money claims against Interorient. LA ruled in favor of Magat.
NLRC affirmed the LA decision. The CA ruled that petitioner’s bare
allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of
compensability.
ISSUE: WOON the CA committed a serious error of law in annulling
and setting aside the decision of the NLRC which affirmed the decision
of the LA
HELD: SC granted the petition.
The POEA-SEC defines a Work-related injury and work related illness
as:
• Work-related injury - injury(ies) resulting in disability or
death arising out of and in the course of employment
• Work-related illness - any sickness resulting to disability or
death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied.
A careful review of the findings of the NLRC and the CA shows that
petitioner was able to meet the required degree of proof that his illness
is compensable as it is work-connected. The Labor Arbiter, as affirmed
by the NLRC, correctly ruled that his work conditions caused or at least
increased the risk of contracting the disease.
It is well-settled that in order for disability to be compensable under the
POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be
work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have
existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
• As for the first element, we find substantial basis to conclude
that complainant's heart disease is work-related.
Complainant's case falls under Section 32-A, 11(c) of the
2010 POEA-SEC.
• As for the second element, we note that complainant was
repatriated in July 2012. Only about four months thereafter,
he was discovered to have heart disease in November 2012.
Simply, complainant's heart disease could not have
developed during that short period between his repatriation
and medical examination. Complainant acquired or
developed his illness during the term of his contract.
142. PRINCESS TALENT CENTER VS MASAGCA
FACTS:
Sometime in November 2002, respondent auditioned for a singing
contest at ABC-Channel 5 in Novaliches, Quezon City when a talent
manager approached her to discuss her show business potential.
Enticed by thoughts of a future in the entertainment industry,
respondent went to the office of petitioner PTCPI, a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of training and development of
actors, singers, dancers, and musicians in the movie and
entertainment industry. At the office, respondent met petitioner Moldes,
President of petitioner PTCPI, who persuaded respondent to apply for
a job as a singer/entertainer in South Korea.
A Model Employment Contract for Filipino Overseas Performing Artists
(OPAS) To Korea (Employment Contract) was executed on February
3, 2003 between respondent and petitioner PTCPI as the Philippine
agent of SAENCO, the Korean principal/promoter.
The contract has a duration of 6 months extendible by another 6
months by mutual agreement of the parties. Masagca left for South
Korea and worked there as a singer for 9 months, until her repatriation
to the Philippines sometime in June 2004. Believing that the
termination of her contract was unlawful and premature, Masagca filed
a complaint against PTCPI and SAENCO with the NLRC.
Masagca alleged that she did not receive any salary and subsisted
only on the 20% commission that she received for every lady’s drink
the customers purchased for her.

PTCPI alleged that Masagca on her own extended her Employment
Contract with SAENCO and so its liability should not extend beyond
the original 6 month term of the Employment Contract because the
extension was made without their participation or consent.
PTCPI likewise averred that they received complaints that Masagca
violated the club policies of SAENCO against wearing skimpy and
revealing dresses, dancing in a provocative and immoral manner and
going out with customers after working hours. She was repatriated to
the Philippines on account of her illegal or immoral activities. Her
salaries were also paid in full as evidenced by the nine cash vouchers.
PTCPI submitted the affidavits of her co-workers who confirmed that
Masagca violated the club policies of SAENCO and that she received
her salaries.
Moldes disavowed personal liability stating that she merely acted in her
capacity as a corporate officer of PTCPI.
The LA dismissed the complaint:
• no evidence to show that the POEA approved the contract
extension.
• There was no illegal dismissal since Masagca was able to
finish the duration of the contract as approved by POEA.
NLRC ruled in favor of Masagca.
• PTCPI filed MR, which NLRC granted and thereafter
reversed its decision due to fatal procedural defects of
Masagca’s appeal.
CA granted Masagca’s petition. MR of PTCPI was denied.
ISSUE:
1. WON an employee who was dismissed due to contract
expiration and who worked beyond the period of the original
contract without the extension agreement but aware of the
employee’s continued work was illegally dismissed
2. WON an employee can be held responsible for serios
misconduct based on unwritten company policies
3. WON the cash vouchers as evidence of alleged payment of
salary without bearing the name of payor can prove payment
HELD: The SC partly granted the Petition
The SC held that although Masagca’s employment with SAENCO was
good for 6 months only, it is convinced that it was extended under the
same terms and conditions for another 6 months.
Parties submitted evidence establishing that Masaca continued to work
SAENCO even after the original 6 month period under her Employment
Contract had already expired. Ideally, the extension of her employment
should have also been reduced into writing and submitted/reported to
the appropriate Philippine Labor Authorities.
Nonetheless, even in the absences of a written contract evidencing the
6 month extension of employment, the same is practically admitted by
PTCPI subject only to the defense that there is no proof of their
knowledge of or participation in said extension and so they cannot be
held liable for the events that transpired between Masagca and
SAENCO during the extension period.
PTCPI presented nine voichers that Masagca received her salaries
from SAENCO for nine months. It also did not deny that Moldes went
to confront Masagca about her outstanding loan thus, revealing that
PTCPI and Moldes were aware that Masagca was still working for
SAENCO up to that time.
The SC found Masagca to be illegally dismissed. Neither PTCPI or
SAENCO can feign ignorance of the expiration of Masagca’s work visa
at the same time as her original 6 month employment period as they
were the ones who facilitated and processed the requirements for her
employment in South Korea. They should have been responsible for
securing her work visa for the extended period of her employment.
Aside from the bare allegations, PTCPI and Moldes failed to present
concrete proof of the club and pictures of her with her co-workers at
the said club. Based on said poster and pictures, Masagca did not
appear to be wearing dresses that were skimpier or more revealing
than those of the other women working at the club. She also presented
the Affidavit of Wolfgang Pelzer, a Canadian citizen who was a regular
patron of the club. According to Pelzer, Masagca was appropriately
dressed for the songs she sang, and while she was employed as a
singer, she was also pressured into dancing onstage and she
appeared hesitant and uncomfortable as she danced.
As between the allegations of Pelzer and those employees of
SAENCO as regards Masagca’s behavior at the club, the SC accorded
more weight to Pelzer’s testimony being disinterested witness who had
not apparent gain in executing his affidavit.
The SC added that if Masagca was truly misbehaving as PTCPI and
Moldes alleged, SAENCO would have terminated her employment at
the earliest opportunity to protect its interest. Instead, SAENCO her
employment beyond the original period. There is no showing as well
that at any time during the course of employment Masagca was given
a reminder and/or warning that she was violating the club policies.
PTCPI and Moldes submitted nine cash vouchers with Masagca’s
signature. That the cash vouchers did not bear the name of SAENCO
and its TIN is insignificant as there is no legal basis for requiring such.
The vouchers clearly state that these were “salary fully payment” for
the 9 month period. The signatures on all the pages of the Employment
Contract and the vouchers appear consistently the same. The
consistency and similarity of signatures on all the documents support
the genuineness of said signatures. At that point, the burden of
evidence has shifted to Masagca to negate the payment of her
salaries.
Pursuant to 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, Masagca is
entitled to an award of her salaries for the unexpired 3 months of her
Extended Contract.
143. SCANMAR MARITIME VS HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
On July 2, 2009, petitioner Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., for and in
behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Crown Shipmanagement, Inc.,
entered into a Contract of Employment6 with respondent for a period of
nine months as Able Seaman for the vessel Timberland. Respondent
underwent the pre-employment medical examination (PEME), where
he was declared fit for work. He was deployed on August 3, 2009 and
boarded the vessel the next day.
During the course of his employment, respondent experienced pain in
his inguinal area and pelvic bone. The pain continued for weeks
radiating to his right scrotum and right medial thigh. He informed the
Captain of the vessel and was brought to a hospital in Sweden on
February 3, 2010 where he was found unfit to resume normal duties.
Consequently, respondent was medically repatriated to the Philippines
on February 6, 2010.
On February 8, 2010, respondent was referred to the company-
designated physician at Metropolitan Medical Center for medical
evaluation. He was diagnosed to have Epididymitis, right, Varicocoele,
left and was recommended to undergo Varicocoelectomy, a surgical
procedure for the management of his left Varicocoele. On March 26,
2010, the company-designated Urological Surgeon, Dr. Ed R.
Gatchalian (Dr. Gatchalian), performed Varicocoelectomy on him at the
Metropolitan Medical Center after obtaining clearance from a
Cardiologist. The procedure was a success and respondent was
immediately discharged the following day. Thereafter, he continuously
reported to Dr. Gatchalian for medical treatment and evaluation. He
was subjected to numerous laboratory examinations, medication, and
was advised to refrain from engaging in strenuous activities, such as
lifting, while recovering.
Despite continuing medical treatment and evaluation with the
company-designated physician, respondent filed on July 20, 2010 a
complaint with the NLRC for permanent disability benefits, damages,
and attorney's fees against petitioners. On August 12, 2010,
respondent consulted his own physician, Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr.
Pascual), a Cardiologist, who diagnosed him with Essential
Hypertension, Stage 2, Epididymitis, right, Varicocoele, left, S/P
Varicocoelectomy and certified him medically unfit to work as a
seaman. Meanwhile, on August 24, 2010, Dr. Gatchalian pronounced
respondent fit to resume sea duties.
The LA awarded Hernandez total and permanent disability
compensation and attorney’s fees.
• The LA found that Hernandez’ illness had a reasonable
connection with his work condition as Able Seaman, thus,
was work-related and compensable.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the LA.
The CA dismissed the petition and held that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed rulings.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the case 162 days since repatriated and
while the seafarer was undergoing treatment was premature
HELD:
The SC found merit in the Petition.
Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that temporary total
disability continuously lasting for more than one hundred twenty days,
except as otherwise provided in the rules, shall be deemed total and
permanent.
The Rule referred to in the Labor Code provision is Section 2 Rule X of
the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) which
provides:
The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of
such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not
be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where
such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance
beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of
disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability
shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total
and permanent status at any time after 120 days of
continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by
the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental
functions as determined by the System.
Vergara Case:
• The SC held that the 120 days provided under Section
20B(3) of the POEA-SEC id the period given to the employer
to determine fitness to work and when the seafarer is
deemed to be in a state of total and temporary disability.
• The 120 day period may be extended up to 240 days should
the seafarer require further medical treatment.
• A total and permanent disability becomes permanent when
so declared by the company-designated physician within 120
or 240 days, as the case may be, or upon the expiration of
the said periods without declaration of either fitness to work
or disability assessment and the seafarer is still unable to
resume his regular seafaring duties.
Upon Hernandez’ repatriation on February 6, 2010, he received
extensive medical attention from the company-designated
physicians.
• He was endorsed to a urological surgeon. Dr.
Gatchalian, who recommended and performed surgery
on him on March 26, 2010 to address and treat his
varicocoele. After surgery, his condition was continually
monitored as he still complained of scrotal and groin
pains
• After the lapse of 120 days, Hernandez’ treatment still
continued.
Thus, the SC held that the 240-day extension period was justified.
• At the time that he filed his complaint, 162 days since
repatriation and without definite assessment from the
company-designated physician, his condition could not be
considered permanent and total.
• It only becomes such when the company-designated
physician, within 240 day period, declares it to be so, or
when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make
such declaration.
In this case, Hernandez filed his complaint for total and permanent
disability benefits while he was still considered to be temporarily
and totally disabled.
• While the company-designated physician was still in the
process of assessing his condition and determining whether
he was still capable of performing his usual sea duties and
when the 240-day period had not yet lapsed.
The complaint was prematurely filed
• The cause of action for total and permanent disability
benefits had not yet accrued.
• Hernandez failed to comply with the procedure when he
filed his complaint without a definite assessment yet being
rendered by the company-designated physician
• Worse, he sought an opinion from Dr. Pascual, an
independent physician despite the absence of an
assessment by the company-designated physician.
• Indeed, a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other
doctors under Section 20B(3) of the POEA-SEC but this is
on the presumption that the company-designated
physician had already issued a certification as to his
fitness or disability and he finds this agreeable.
• The SC refused to put weight on the findings of Dr. Pascual
given that Hernandez has breached his duty to comply with
the procedure prescribed by the POEA-SEC.
144. LOADSTAR INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING VS YAMZON
FACTS:
Herein petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the shipping
business. On May 7, 2012, petitioner employed the services of herein
respondent Ernesto Yamson (Ernesto) as Third Mate aboard the
vessel "M/V Foxhound" for a period of twelve (12) months, with a basic
monthly salary of US$582.00, as evidenced by his Employment
Contract. On May 9, 2012 Ernesto commenced his employment on
board "M/V Foxhound". His contract was subsequently extended.
On November 15, 2013, the vessel anchored at Paia Inlet, Papua New
Guinea and started to load logs. On November 19, 2013, Ernesto,
while performing his regular tasks on an extremely hot day, felt dizzy.
In the evening of the same day, Ernesto started to feel the left side of
his body getting numb. Around 9 o'clock of the following morning,
Ernesto already felt very weak while performing his duties. He
requested that his blood pressure be checked and that his condition be
reported to the ship captain.
Thereafter, he was ordered to rest in his cabin. However, his condition
deteriorated as he could no longer move the left side of his body in the
evening of the same day. His predicament worsened when he suffered
from LBM the next day forcing him to request that he be brought to the
hospital. Ernesto was, thus, brought to the Pacific International
Hospital in Papua New Guinea where he was confined and was
diagnosed to have suffered from cerebrovascular disease: "left
cerebellar infarct" and hypertension, Stage 2.
The attending physician ordered him to cease from working for a
period of two (2) weeks. Subsequently, on December 1, 2013, Ernesto
was repatriated to the Philippines. Upon arrival in Manila, he was
immediately brought to the Philippine General Hospital where he
underwent medical check-up. Finding that he was in a stable condition,
the examining doctor sent him home as he was classified as an "out-
patient."
However, Ernesto continued to experience headache and numbness of
the entire left side of his body even after arriving home. This prompted
his wife to insist that he be admitted in a private hospital. Thus, on
December 4, 2013, Ernesto was admitted at the Manila Doctor's
Hospital where he underwent CT scans of the head and heart. In his
letter addressed to petitioner, the company--designated physician
reported that the result of the CT scan conducted on Ernesto' showed,
among others, that he has an "old infarct in the left superior aspect of
the left cerebellum."
On December 13, 2013, Ernesto was discharged from the hospital.
Subsequently, he consulted another physician who diagnosed him to
be suffering from Hypertensive Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease
and Cerebrovascular Disease and was advised to cease from working
as a seaman due to his neurologic deficits.
Ernesto filed a complaint praying to be awarded total and permanent
disability compensation, sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days,
medical transportation expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC partly granted
the appeal, whereby it granted sickness allowance and medical and
transportation expenses; but dismissed all other claims for lack of
merit. The CA granted the petition of Yamzon and reversed and set
aside the NRLC decision.
On 30 October 2017, Ernesto’s counsel filed a “Manifestation of the
Death of Respondent and Motion to Substitute the Deceased
Respondent with his Surviving Spouse and Children.” The Court
granted the Motion to Substitute.
ISSUE:
1. WON Ernesto’s illness are work-related or work aggravated
2. WON he is entitled to disability compensation by reason of such
illness
HELD:
1. NO, his illness is not work-related or work aggravated
From the pieces of evidence and arguments presented by the parties,
it appears that the opinion of Ernesto's physician, that his illnesses are
work-related or work aggravated, is diametrically opposed to the
evaluation made by the company doctor which found that Ernesto's
illnesses are not work- related. The LA and the NLRC gave credence
to the findings of the company-designated doctor, while the CA gave
more weight to the findings of respondent's physician of choice.
• In the present case, there is no evidence to show that the
parties jointly sought the opinion of a third physician in
the determination and assessment of Ernesto's disability or
the absence of it.
• the Court finds that there is no cogent reason to depart
from the findings of the LA and the NLRC that Ernesto
failed to establish that his subject illnesses were either
work-related or work aggravated.
To be entitled to compensation and benefits under the governing
POEA-SEC, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or
injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also
be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's
illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
• while the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably
presumed to be work-related, prevailing jurisprudence
requires that the seafarer or the claimant must still show a
reasonable connection between the nature of work on board
the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated.
• Ernesto was unable to present substantial evidence to
show that his work conditions caused, or at the least
increased the risk of contracting his illness. Neither was he
able to prove that his illness was pre-existing and that it
was aggravated by the nature of his employment.
• There is no evidence to prove that the findings of Ernesto’s
private physician, Dr. Joel Carlos, were reached based on an
extensive or comprehensive examination of Ernesto.
• He also failed to present competent evidence to prove that
he was thoroughly examined by Dr. Carlos.
Thus, on the basis of the foregoing discussions, the LA and the NLRC
correctly ruled that Ernesto is not entitled to any disability
compensation. The Court commiserates with Ernesto, but absent
substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for the grant of
benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left with no choice but to
deny his petition, lest an injustice be caused to his employer.
Otherwise stated, while it is true that labor contracts are impressed
with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be
construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule
is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in
the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.
However, the Court takes careful note of the fact that evidence on
record would show that the evaluation made by the company-
designated physician with respect to Ernesto's medical condition was
not completed.
• it is clear that Ernesto did not undergo any kind of treatment
by the company doctor subsequent to being discharged from
the hospital.
• Neither was there any definite declaration or assessment by
the company doctor that respondent is already fit to go back
to work following his hospital discharge.
• Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Ernesto was no longer
able to return to work after his hospital discharge on
December 13, 2013. In fact, Ernesto died on September 28,
2017, pending resolution of this petition, and the immediate
cause of his death was "Brainstem Failure Secondary to
Cerebrovascular Disease, Acute Infarction" which,
undeniably, was related to the illnesses subject of the instant
case.
• If Ernesto were still alive, this Court would have ordered
petitioner to continue, at its expense, Ernesto's medical
treatment until the final evaluation or assessment could be
made, with regard to his medical condition. Unfortunately,
this can no longer be done.
• Taking into consideration the factual circumstances obtaining
in the present case, and the fact that Ernesto, in his own little
way, has devoted his efforts to further petitioner's endeavors,
the Court finds that Ernesto, who is now substituted by his
heirs, is entitled to this kind of assistance in the amount of
P75,000.00.
145. GERE VS ANGLO-EASTERN
FACTS:
The petitioner is a Filipino seafarer who signed a Contract of
Employment with respondent Anglo-Eastern Crew Management (Asia),
Ltd., through its manning agent in the Philippines, respondent Anglo-
Eastern Crew Management Phils., Inc. The petitioner was accepted as
an able seaman aboard the vessel "MV JENNY N" for a duration of
nine (9) months, receiving a basic monthly salary of US$582.00 on a
44-hour work week, with overtime pay of US$324.00 and vacation
leave pay of US$213.00, Also included in the terms of the petitioner's
employment is the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between (1)
the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), of which the petitioner is a member, and (2) the
respondents herein.
On January 4, 2014, the petitioner suffered an accident while
performing his duties on board the vessel. According to the findings of
the CA the petitioner was placing a rat guard on the headline of the
vessel when he accidentally stepped on a bulwark support causing him
to lose his balance and to eventually land awkwardly and heavily on his
right arm. The petitioner was immediately referred to a medical facility
in Trinidad and Tobago, where he was subjected to x-ray and the
placement of a cast over the affected arm.
Due to this, on January 10, 2014, the petitioner was repatriated to the
Philippines for medical reasons. He was confined at the Marine
Medical Services-the respondents' accredited medical services
provider, consequently referred to Dr. Ferdinand R. Bernal, an
orthopedic surgeon at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center, and
underwent different medical examinations, which thereafter disclosed
the impression: "Closed Complete Fracture, Right Radius,
Undisplaced."
From that moment until August 27, 2014, the petitioner underwent
different medical examinations, procedures, and treatments on the
injured arm and, subsequently, on his hips.
According to the respondents, the company-designated physician
issued on April 28, 2014 an interim disability grading of "Grade 10 -
loss of grasping power" and on August 12, 2014, a final disability
grading of "Grade 10 - ankylosed wrist in normal position."
In contrast, however, the petitioner remained firm in asserting that the
respondents have not informed him of these medical assessments.
According to him, more than 240 days of treatment have already
lapsed without the disability grading from the company-designated
physician, and so, on September 11, 2014, he consulted his personal
physician, Dr. Manuel Fidel M. Magtira (Dr. Magtira) of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Medical Center. Dr. Magtira later on opined
that the petitioner suffers from "partial permanent disability with Grade
8 impediment based on the POEA contract." Dr. Magtira further
concluded that the petitioner is "now permanently UNFIT in any
capacity for further sea duties."

Petitioner filed a Notice to Arbitrate before the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators of NCMB. After failure to arrive at an amicable settlement,
the panel rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. CA affirmed with
modifications.
ISSUE: WON such injury is compensable
HELD:
The Court, in recognizing these provisions, and for the final resolution
of any confusion that may arise therefrom, formulated guidelines in the
case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. vs. Quiogue, Jr.,24 as cited
in the recent case of Paulino M. Aldaba vs. Career Philippines Ship-
Management, Inc. Columbia Ship Management Ltd., and/or Verlou
Carmelino25 As it now stands, the rules to be followed are:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final
medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment
or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis
and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer
has the burden to prove that the company-designated
physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his
assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total,
regardless of any justification.
In following the foregoing guidelines, it must be emphasized that the
company-designated physician must not only "issue" a final medical
assessment of the seafarer's medical condition.
• He must also-and the Court cannot emphasize this enough-
"give" his assessment to the seafarer concerned.
• That is to say that the seafarer must be fully and properly
informed of his medical condition. The results of the medical
examinations, the treatments extended, diagnosis and
prognosis, if needed, and, the disability grading must be fully
explained to him/her by no less than the company-
designated physician.
In this regard, the company-designated physician is mandated to
issue a medical certificate, which should be personally received
by the seafarer, or, if not practicable, sent to him/her by any other
means sanctioned by present rules.
• For indeed, proper notice is one of the cornerstones of due
process, and the seafarer must be accorded the same
especially so in cases where his/her well-being is at stake.
• A company-designated physician who fails to "give" an
assessment a herein interpreted and defined fails to
abide by due process, and consequently, fails to abide
by the foregoing guidelines.
In Formerly INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Rosales,27 the Court further
clarified this rule by categorically saying that the referral to a third
doctor is mandatory, and should the seafarer fail to abide by this
method, he/she would be in breach of the POEA-SEC, and the
assessment of the company-designated physician shall be final and
binding. Thus, the Court said:
This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to
be a mandatory procedureas a consequence of the
provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose
assessment should prevail. In other words, the company
can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary
opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer
expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to
a third doctor who shall make his or her determination
and whose decision is final and binding on the parties.
We have followed this rule in a string of cases x x x.
In this light, only when the seafarer is duly and properly informed
of the medical assessment by the company-designated physician
could he determine whether or not he/she agrees with the same; and if
not, only then could he/she commence the process of consulting
his personal physician. If conflicting assessments arise, only then is
there a need to refer the matter to a neutral third party physician.
In the present case, the Court finds that the evidence presented by the
respondents to prove to this Court that they have actually given the
petitioner a copy of the medical assessment fail to convince.
• The interim and final disability ratings were mere suggested
disability ratings. None of the foregoing documents prove
that the petitioner was properly informed of the assessment
• The petitioner was informed of his disability grading only
AFTER he has initiated an action against the respondents
before the Panel of Arbitrators.
The effect of this failure by the respondents to furnish the petitioner a
copy of his medical certificate militates gravely against the respondents
cause.
• without this proper notice, the 120-day and 240-day rule
would have stepped in by operation of law. Insofar as the
petitioner is concerned, there was no issuance of a final
medical assessment regarding his disability.
• Secondly, without the proper notice, the petitioner was not
given thy opportunity to evaluate his medical assessment.
• Therefore, for the respondents' failure to inform the
petitioner of his medical assessment within the
prescribed period, the petitioner's disability grading is,
by operation of law, total and permanent.
In the present case, even the petitioner's personal physician assessed
him only at Grade 8 disability grading. According to the schedule of
disability allowances indicated in the POEA Contract, this impediment
grade translates to only 33.59%, which definitely falls short in the 50%
requirement of Article 20.1.4 of the CBA. On the other hand, neither did
the company-designated physician issue a certification that the
petitioner was medically unfit to continue performing his seafaring
duties. On these grounds, the medical unfitness clause of the CBA
finds no application.
Nonetheless, the petitioner is not without any benefit to lean back om
The POEA contract provides that seafarers suffering from total and
permanent disability are entitled to 120% of US$50,000.00, or a total of
US$60,000.00. Indeed, the Court of Appeals is correct in applying the
provisions of the POEA contract rather than the provisions of the CBA
when it said:
As correctly argued by Petitioners, the permanent medical unfitness
clause under the parties' CBA awarding a total and permanent
disability benefit of US$95,949.00 does not apply to private respondent
because neither the company doctor nor his own doctor assessed
his disability at 50% or more. Moreover, while the permanent
medical unfitness clause provides that any seafarer assessed at less
than 50% disability is entitled to full compensation, the same clause
mandates that the certification must be made by the company
doctor which is not the situation in the present case.
SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR HERNING
SHIPPING ASIA PTE. LTD.,Petitioners, v. ALMA Q. RODEROS, AS
WIDOW AND LEGAL HEIR OF FRANCISCO
RODEROS, Respondent.
FACTS:
The respondent is the widow of Francisco Roderos (Roderos), a
Filipino seafarer, who signed a Contract of Employment5 with
petitioner Heming Shipping Asia Pte. Ltd., through its manning agent in
the Philippines, Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. He was accepted
on board the vessel "MT ANNELISE THERESA" as a Chief Cook for
six (6) months, with a 40-hour work week, and a basic monthly salary
of US $648.00, in addition to overtime pay and annual leave with pay.
Sometime in July 2011, during Roderos's engagement in the vessel,
he experienced constipation and abdominal pains. The symptoms
continued until September of the same year causing him to report the
incident to the Master of the vessel. On September 4, 2011, while on
the Port of Rostock in Germany, Roderos was brought to the Hamburg-
Wilhelmsburg Hospital in Grob Sand where he was found to have
blood in his stool, with swollen intestinal walls and swollen lower
abdomen.7 Few days thereafter, he was repatriated back to the
Philippines.
Upon Roderos's arrival on September 8, 2011, he was admitted to St.
Luke's Medical Center Hospital on September 29, 2011, where he was
diagnosed with "Colon Adenocarcinoma" in a stage four (4) level with
"metastasis on the perocolinic lymph node." One (1) month after, on
October 8, 2011, Roderos was discharged from the hospital, but
underwent chemotherapy sessions under the care of the company
designated physician, Dr. Natalio Alegre.
On October 22, 2011, Dr. Alegre issued a Progress Report,8 where he
indicated (1) the diagnosis and prognosis of Roderos's illness, (2) the
risk factors for the development of the illness, (3) the cost of the
chemotherapy, and (4) the survival rate of patients suffering from the
same illness. Dr. Alegre likewise reported that Roderos's illness was
"deemed not work related."9 Specifically, the report stated:
Mr. Francisco Roderos has been diagnosed with Cancer of the Large
Bowel (Colon).
Thus, Roderos sought the assistance of the Associated Marine
Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), of which
he was a member, for the collection of disability benefits.
Unfortunately, the parties did not reach any settlement. Hence,
Roderos filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability
benefits, illness allowance, attorney's fees, and medical expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent establish by substantial evidence the
reasonable causation, or aggravation, of the exigencies of his work
aboard the vessel "MT ANNELISE THERESA" to his diagnosed
illness? (No)
RULING:
No, after a careful perusal of the arguments presented and the
evidence submitted, the Court finds that the petition is impressed with
merit. Roderos's illness, Cancer of the Large Bowel (Colon), is not an
occupational disease listed in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, and the
respondent failed to discharge the burden of providing substantial
evidence of the causal connection between the work done by Roderos
aboard the vessel and his diagnosed illness.
Work-related illnesses, are determined by the following rules:
First, there is work relation if the illness leads to disability or death as a
result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the
POEA SEC with the conditions set therein satisfied;
Second, for illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC
creates a disputable presumption in favor of the seafarer that these
illnesses are work-related.31 However, this presumption
notwithstanding, the Court has held that the claimant-seafarer must still
prove by substantial evidence that his/her work conditions caused or,
at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease.32 This is because
awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and
presumptions. In order to establish compensability of a non-
occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection-but not
direct causal relation-is required. It is thus this probability of
connection, and not the ultimate degree of certainty, that is the test of
proof of compensation proceedings.33
Thus, for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, all the following conditions, as supported by
substantial evidence, must be established:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risk described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's
exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer.34
In this case, there is no dispute that Roderos's illness, Cancer of the
Large Bowel (Colon), is not among the occupational diseases listed in
the POEA-SEC. In fact, the Court has already stated in Leonis
Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Villamater35 that "under Section 32-A of the
POEA Standard Contract, only two types of cancers are listed as
occupational diseases - (1) Cancer of the epithelial lining of the
bladder (papilloma of the bladder); and (2) cancer, epithellematous or
ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar,
pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin, or compound products or
residues of these substances."36 Cancer of the Large Bowel (Colon) is,
decidedly, not among them.
This thus leads the discussion into the second rule in determining the
work relation of the illness. Did the respondent establish by substantial
evidence the reasonable causation, or aggravation, of the exigencies
of Roderos's work aboard the vessel "MT ANNELISE THERESA" to his
diagnosed illness?
It must be emphasized, however, that with regard to Roderos's dietary
intake while on board the vessel, no evidence other than these self-
serving allegations were presented. There was absolutely no proof of
what Roderos supposedly ate during his work that would have
aggravated his illness. In fact, as the Chief Cook of the vessel, it would
have been within Roderos's control to submit before the Labor
Tribunals what meals he may have prepared during the course of his
employment. It is quite unfortunate that he failed to do so.
In contrast, the petitioners have presented several affidavits of other
seafarers who served with Roderos during his last stint aboard the
vessel. A reading of these statements would reveal that the vessel was
well-provisioned and that there was variety in the kinds and quality of
food served. The list included fresh milk, fruit juices, yogurt, cereals,
oatmeal, eggs, meat, and vegetables.
In the case at hand, contrary to the mandatory proceedings identified
by the Court, Roderos did not demand for his re-examination by a third
doctor, and instead opted to initiate the instant case. This, as the Court
already ruled, is a fatal defect that militates against his claims. To
reiterate, the referral to a third doctor is now a mandatory procedure,
and that the failure to abide thereby is a breach of the POEA-SEC, and
has the effect of consolidating the finding of the company-designated
physician as final and binding.
Thus, for the respondent's failure to (1) present substantial evidence
that would prove reasonable causation, or at the very least,
aggravation of Roderos's work while aboard the petitioners' vessel, and
for Roderos's failure to (2) insist on his re-examination of a third doctor
that could determine with finality as to whether or not his diagnosed
illness was work-related, the Court is constrained to rule for the
petitioners.
RICKY B. TULABING, Petitioner, - versus - MST MARINE
SERVICES (PHILS.), INC., TSM INTERNATIONAL LTD., and/or
CAPT. ALFONSO R. DEL CASTILLO, Respondents.
FACTS:
MST is a Philippine-registered manning agency engaged in the
recruitment of seafarers for its foreign principal, TSM, a Norwegian
shipping company. 3 Tulabing is a seafarer formerly under the employ
of TSM. His employment was covered by the Norwegian International
Ship Register collective bargaining agreement (NIS-CBA), between the
Norwegian Shipowners' Association (NSA), on the one hand, and the
Associate Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP) and the Norwegian Seafarer's Union (NSU), on the other.4
On August 23, 2007, MST, in behalf of TSM, employed TulalJing as
GP2 Wiper for the vessel M/T Champion. Covered by a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment, Tulabing's employment was for a period of nine months
with a basic monthly salary of US$454.00.
On September 13, 2007, Tulabing embarked on his voyage on board
MIT Champion and commenced the performance of his duties
pursuant to his Contract. 6 Sometime in January 2008, while engaged
in the performance of his duties, he felt a sudden crack on his back
which was followed by a severe pain and numbness of the left side of
his body. He was referred to a physician in Brazil for medical
evaluation and was given medicine. Initially, the medicine accorded
Tulabing some relief from the pain but eventually his condition
aggravated and radiated to his left shoulder and upper extremities.
Subsequently, Tulabing complained of chest pain, hence, he was
refen-ed by the vessel master to Dr. J.J. Voorsluis (Dr. Voorsluis) of
the Medical Centre for Seamen in Amsterdam, Netherlands for medical
examination. Dr. Voorsluis diagnosed him of cervical neuralgia and
prescribed him oral medication therefor. He was declared unfit to work
for four days with the recommendation that should his medical
condition fail to improve, he should be repatriated back to the
Philippines.8 On June 13, 2008, Tulabing was repatriated back to the
Philippines.
Tulabing reported to Dr. Nicomedes Cruz (Dr. Cruz), the company-
designated physician for medical evaluation. Dr. Cruz confirmed Dr.
Voorsluis' diagnosis of Tulabing' s cervical neuralgia and noted the
persistence of his upper back pain which continued to radiate to his left
shoulder and upper left extremities.
On November 14, 2008, Dr. Cruz assessed Tulabing's condition as
Grade 10 disability.
Tulabing, however, did not agree. He demanded from MST the
payment of maximum disability compensation in the amount of
US$70,000.00 pursuant to A1iicle 12 of the NIS-CBA.
MST denied Tulabing's claim and instead offered him compensation in
the amount of US$l4,105.00. Tulabing refused the offer, insisting that
his disability was permanent and total, hence, his entitlement to full
compensation.
Tulabing filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint against MST for payment of permanent total disability
benefits of US$70,000.00 pursuant to the NIS-CBA, reimbursement of
medical expenses, and payment of moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees. Tulabing claimed that his disability was of such
nature that no amount of medication or therapy can restore him to his
fom1er physical condition and enable him to resume his customary
work and that based on the medical findings, the severity of his
disability rendered remote and uncertain the possibility of his future
employment for overseas work. 17 MST denied liability on the ground
that under the provisions of his employment contract and the NIS-CBA,
a seafarer is only entitled to claim maximum disability compensation of
US$70,000.00 if the company-designated physician declares him to be
suffering from Grade 1 disability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tulabing is entitled to the award of.full disability
benefits of US$70,000.00, as previously held by the NLRC and
affirmed by the CA. (No)
RULING:
No, There is no question that Tulabing's disability was due to an injury
he sustained while engaged in the performance of his work as MST's
employee. Under the provisions of the parties' NIS-CBA, the maximum
disability compensation that may be paid to an employee is
US$70,000.00. Award of this maximum amount, however,
presupposes a disability grading of" l" or permanent and total disability.
In the case at bench, the companydesignated physician gave Tulabing
a final and definite assessment of Grade 10 disability only. Although
the Court has always been vigilant in ensuring that the rights of
seafarers are protected, it is likewise keen in upholding labor laws. The
entitlement of an overseas seafarer to disability benefits is governed by
( 1) the law, (2) the employment contract, and (3) the medical findings
of the company-designated physician. In sum, the Court holds that the
appellate court clearly etTed when it awarded full disability benefits of
US$70,000.00 to Tulabing, in clear disregard of labor laws and settled
jurisprudence on the matter.
MST Marine Services (Phils.), Inc., TSM International Ltd. and/or Capt.
Alfonso R. Del Castillo are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Ricky
B. Tulabing his disability compensation in the amount of US$ l 4, l
05.00 plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent ( l 0%) of the
judgment award.
HILSYNERGY MARITIME, INC. AND/OR TRIMURTI
SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., Petitioners, v.COLUMBANO
PAGUNSAN GALLANO, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent was employed by petitioner Philsynergy Maritime, Inc.
(Philsynergy), for and in behalf of petitioner Trimurti Shipmanagement
Ltd. (Trimurti; collectively, petitioners), as Master (or Ship Master) on
board the vessel M.V. Pearl Halo under a six (6)-month employment
contract6 that was signed on September 21, 2012, with a basic monthly
salary of US$1,847.00, among others, and covered by a CBA.7 After
undergoing the required pre-employment medical examination (PEME)
where the company-designated physician declared him fit for sea
duty,8 respondent, who was then 62 years old, boarded the vessel on
October 5, 2012.9
On October 10, 2012, at around 10:00 in the evening and while in the
performance of his duties, respondent felt a sudden numbness on the
left side of his body and noticed that his speech was slurred. He was
immediately provided first aid and his condition allegedly improved
after taking an Isordil10 tablet which respondent had personally brought
to the vessel.11 On the next day, his symptoms recurred, but which did
not improve despite taking another dose of Isordil. Thus, respondent
was brought to a local hospital in Poro, New Caledonia, where he was
confined for eleven (11) days and underwent physical therapy from
October 15 to 21, 2012.12 His CT scan (computed tomography scan)
revealed "middle cerebral artery deep right infarct without associated
hemorrhagic alteration," while his MRI (magnetic resonance imaging)
showed "ischemic cerebrovascular accident stroke ischemique, right
middle deep lobe."13
As a result, respondent was repatriated on October 23, 2012 for further
medical treatment and referred to a company-designated physician,
who diagnosed him to be suffering from "Cerebrovascular Infarct
Middle Cerebral Artery, Right [and] Hypertension."14 The foregoing
illnesses were declared by the company-designated physician to be
not work-related, ratiocinating that the risk factors for cerebrovascular
infarct (brain stroke or cerebrovascular accident [CVA]) were
hypertension, Diabetes Mellitus, smoking, lifestyle, dyslipidemia, family
history, age[,] and sex, while the cause for hypertension was
multifactorial in origin which included "genetic predisposition, poor
lifestyle, high salt intake, smoking, Diabetes Mellitus, age[,] and
increased sympathetic activity."15
After series of follow-up check-ups, the company-designated physician,
in a Medical Report 16 dated March 9, 2013, noted that respondent's
treadmill stress test already showed normal results and his blood
pressure controlled. In addition, the company-designated physician
opined that his cardiovascular condition has stabilized, but nonetheless
advised him to continue home exercises/rehabilitation and medication.
Thus, respondent was directed to undergo a repeat laboratory
examination in time for his next follow-up session on April 4,
2013.17 Records, however, are bereft of showing that the foregoing
directives were complied with.
Meanwhile, the company-designated Cardiologist, in a letter18 dated
March 6, 2013 addressed to the company-designated physician,
explicated that the medicine (Isordil) brought by respondent on board
the vessel is a medication used to treat patients with angina (chest
pain), and that while the latter denied taking any maintenance
medications, the company-designated Cardiologist opined that
possession of the same suggests that "he [(respondent)] may be
experiencing some symptoms for which he was given that medications
previously."
On the other hand, claiming that his physical condition did not improve
after having suffered a brain stroke on board M.V. Pearl Halo while in
the performance of his duties, and that more than 120 days had lapsed
from the time he was repatriated, respondent sought for the payment of
total disability benefits from petitioners, which the latter
refused.19 Thus, on April 24, 2013, respondent filed a complaint20 for
total permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages, and
attorney's fees against petitioners and Philsynergy's President, Capt.
Reynold L. Torres, before the NLRC.
ISSUE:
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the NLRC's findings that respondent is entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits under the CBA. (No)
RULING:
No, It is settled that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas
employment to disability benefits is governed by law, by the parties'
contracts, and by the medical findings. By law, the relevant statutory
provisions are Articles 197 to 19949 (formerly Articles 191 to 193) of the
Labor Code50 in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X51 of the Amended
Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC).52 By contract, the material
contracts are the POEA-SEC, the parties' Collective Bargaining
Agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the
seafarer and the employer. In this case, respondent executed his
employment contract with petitioners during the effectivity of the 2010
POEA-SEC; hence, its provisions are applicable and should govern
their relations.
Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is
liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-
related injury or illness during the term of his contract. In this regard,
Section 20 (E) thereof mandates the seafarer to disclose all his pre-
existing illnesses in his PEME, failing in which, he shall be disqualified
from receiving the same.
In this case, petitioners claim that there was willful concealment of a
pre-existing medical condition (i.e., hypertension or heart condition) on
the part of respondent, which thus disqualified him from claiming
disability benefits under the 2010 POEA-SEC. Petitioners anchor their
contention on the fact that respondent personally carried on board
Isordil, a medication used to treat people with chest pain, which he
failed to disclose during his PEME. In this relation, petitioners
submitted the opinion of their specialist that while respondent denied
taking any maintenance medications, the fact that the latter had with
him Isordil suggests that "he may be experiencing some symptoms for
which he was given that medications previously."53
The argument is untenable.
Pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, an illness shall be considered as
pre-existing if prior to the processing of the POEA contract, any of the
following conditions is present: (a) the advice of a medical doctor on
treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or (b) the
seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or
condition but failed to disclose the same during the PEME, and such
cannot be diagnosed during the PEME.54 In this case, the evidence on
record is devoid of any indication that any of the conditions is present.
Isordil (isosorbide dinitrate) tablets are taken for the prevention of
angina pectoris or chest pain due to coronary artery diseases.55 It is,
however, not a medication directly used for hypertension, which illness
petitioners claim respondent to be suffering from prior to his
engagement, as well as the reason for his repatriation.
it is clear that when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness
while on board the vessel, his fitness or degree of disability shall be
initially determined by the company-designated physician. However,
the seafarer is not absolutely bound by the findings of the company-
designated physician as he is allowed to seek a second opinion and
consult a doctor of his choice. In case of disagreement between the
findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's
private physician, the parties shall jointly agree to refer the matter to a
third doctor whose findings shall be final and binding on both.
In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,61 the Court
held that the seafarer's non-compliance with the foregoing conflict-
resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to work
certification of the company-designated physician. However, it bears to
note that "[a] seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes
that the company-designated physician came up with an assessment
as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-
day or 240-day periods"62 provided for by law. Thus, in Kestrel
Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar,63 the Court emphasized that:
A seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the
company-designated physician came up with an assessment as to his
fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-
day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification from the
company-designated physician, the seafarer has nothing to
contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his
disability as total and permanent.64 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, there is no showing that respondent received a timely
conclusive and definitive assessment of his ailment. As borne from the
records, the company-designated physician's last medical report was
issued on March 9, 2013,65 or way beyond the 120-day period
reckoned from the time of respondent's repatriation on October 23,
2012. The said report also failed to provide a definite assessment of
respondent's fitness to work or disability. While respondent's
cardiovascular condition has stabilized, the company-designated
physician nonetheless still advised the latter to continue his home
exercises/rehabilitation and medications indefinitely with no clear
indication as to what kind of rehabilitation is still needed for his further
treatment. The same holds true for the previous medical report dated
February 7, 201366 issued by the company-designated physician
which, other than the advice to continue rehabilitation and medications,
failed to show that further medical treatment was necessary to address
respondent's temporary total disability, thus further discounting the
justification to extend the 120-day period to 240 days.
Absent the required certification from the company-designated
physician, the seafarer has therefore nothing to contest and perforce,
negates the need for him to comply with the third-doctor referral
provision under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. As case
law states, without a valid final and definitive assessment from the
company designated physician within the 120/240-day periods, the law
already steps in to consider seafarer's disability as total and
permanent.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court clarifies that respondent's
disability benefits should be awarded pursuant to the provisions of the
2010 POEA-SEC, and not the CBA as held by the NLRC and the CA.
To be entitled to compensation in accordance with Appendix 3
(Compensation Payments) of the CBA,[69 a seafarer must suffer an
injury as a result of an accident, which is defined in jurisprudence as
"an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that
does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be
reasonably anticipated; an unforeseen and injurious occurrence not
attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct. Accident is
that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and
design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."70 Here,
respondent was suffering from an occupational disease; hence, it
cannot be said that respondent figured into an accident. Accordingly,
respondent is entitled to the total disability compensation under the
2010 POEA-SEC in the amount of US$60,000.00. Nevertheless, the
CA correctly granted the award of attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the award, as the same is in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
ORIENT HOPE AGENCIES, INC. G.R. No. 204307 and/or ZEO
MARINE CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. MICHAELE. JARA,
Respondent
FACTS:
Jara was hired by Orient Hope, on behalf of its foreign principal, Zeo
Marine, as engine cadet5 on board M/V Orchid Sun. 6 The
employment contract was for a duration of 10 months with a basic
monthly salary of US$230.00. 7 On its way to Oman, M/V Orchid Sun
sank off Muscat on July 12, 2007, during which Jara sustained leg
injuries. 8 He was treated at Khoula Hospital in Oman and thereafter
repatriated and admitted on August 3, 2007 at the Metropolitan
Hospital in Manila.9 Jara was diagnosed to have suffered from
"fracture, shaft of left ulna ·and left fibula." 10 On August 28, 2007 and
January 9, 2008, he underwent knee operations. 11 He did not return
to the company-designated doctor after his check up on March 17,
2008.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2008, 13 Jara filed a complaint with the Labor
Arbiter, insisting that he was entitled to total permanent disability
benefits amounting to US$60,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Michael E. Jara is entitled to permanent
and total disability compensation considering that there was a Grade
11 disability grading given by the company-designated physician (YES)
RULING:
Yes, failure of the company-designated physician to render a final and :
definitive assessment of a seafarer's condition within the 240-day
extended period transforms the seafarer's temporary and total disability
to permanent and total disability.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the 240-
day presumptive rule and awarding respondent permanent and total
disability benefits despite the Grade 11 disability rating issued by the
company-designated physician. Invoking the ruling in Santiago v.
Pacbasin Shipmanagement, lnc., 80 petitioners contend that the 240-
day presumptive disability rule operates only in default of a declaration
of a seafarer's fitness or disability assessment from a company-
designated physician.81 Petitioners further insist that respondent's
complaint should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action
because the 240-day period had yet to lapse when the complaint was
filed.
This Court is not persuaded.
In Island Overseas Transport Corporation v. Beja,83 this Court clarified
that:
[I]f the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to October 6,
2008, the rule on the 120-day period, during which the disability
assessment should have been made in accordance with Crystal
Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, that is, the doctrine then prevailing before
the promulgation of Vergara on October 6, 2008, stands; if, on the
other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the
240-day rule applies. 84 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
When respondent filed his Complaint on March 6, 2008, or after more
than 120 days had lapsed, the company-designated physician had not
yet determined his disability and respondent had not yet fully
recovered. Applying the above ruling in Island Overseas Transport
Corporation, respondent is deemed to have already acquired a cause
of action for permanent and total disability benefits.
Respondent was last seen by the company-designated physician on
March 17, 2008, or on the 227th day from his repatriation. At this point,
the company-designated physician is nearing the end of the extended
period of 240 days, 13 days to be exact, within which to give
respondent's final disability assessment, yet none was given.
Petitioners, however, would put the blame on respondent for not
returning to the doctor for further consultation and treatment. There is
no showing, though, in the records that the physician required him to
return within a specified period.
Respondent could not be faulted for not returning to the company
designated physician who failed to assess him of rightful disability
grading after treatment of more than seven (7) months. The company-
designated physician should have at least issued a medical report
containing an evaluation of respondent's condition on March 17, 2008.
This is reasonably expected given the proximity of respondent's last
check up to the expiration of the 240-day period. Instead, the
company-designated physician issued an assessment only on May 29,
2008, simply stating that "[b ]ased on his last follow-up, his suggested
disability grading is Grade 11 - stretching leg or ligaments of a knee
resulting in instability of the joint."87
Furthermore, other than this succinct statement, the report is devoid of
any explanation to back up the findings of the company-designated
physician or of any detail of the progress of respondent's treatment,
and the approximate period needed for him to fully recover.
Without a valid final and definitive assessment from th~
companydesignated physician, respondent's temporary and total
disability, by operation of law, became permanent and total.
The standard provisions in the 2000 POEA-SEC is a regulatory attempt
to balance the constitutional protection to labor with the need for
shipping and manning agencies to have an efficient basis for the
resolution of claims against them. Hence, the 120- and 240-day
periods within which a company-designated physician should make a
full, complete, and definitive assessment are accommodations for
them. Generally, between companies and an ordinary Filipino seafarer,
it is the former that has the better capability to comply with the
requirements for determining disabilities of a claimant. Certainly, the
period given to them is more than sufficient and it would be the height
of inequity for this Court to grant them more at the expense of the
seafarer.
DIONELLA A. GOPIO, doing business under the name and style,
JOB ASIA MANAGEMENT SERVICES,Petitioner
vs. SALVADOR B. BAUTISTA, Respondent
FACTS:
On September 26, 2008, respondent Salvador A. Bautista (Bautista)
was hired as a Project Manager for Shorncliffe (PNG) Limited
(Shomcliffe) in Papua New Guinea through Job Asia Management
Services (Job Asia), a single proprietorship owned by petitioner
Dionella A. Gopio (Gopio), which is engaged in the business of
recruitment, processing, and deployment of land based manpower for
overseas work. Bautista's contract stated that his employment shall be
valid and effective for 31 months with a net monthly salary of
₱40,000.00. On October 4, 2008, he arrived at his workplace in Papua
New Guinea.
On July 6, 20091 or just nine months after his deployment in Papua
New Guinea, Bautista was served a notice of termination effective July
10, 2009 on the alleged grounds of unsatisfactory performance and
failure to meet the standards of the company. He was paid his salary
for the period July 1 to 10, 2009, annual leave credits, and one-month
pay net of taxes. Thereafter, he was repatriated on July 11, 2009.8
On July 27, 2009, Bautista lodged a complaint with the arbitration
branch of the NLRC against Job Asia, Gopio, and Shomcliffe for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims. He claimed that he was terminated
without just cause since there· had been no job evaluation conducted
prior to Shorncliffe's. decision to dismiss him from employment. As a
result, he is entitled to the payment of his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract, or for 22 months. He alleged that while his
contract contained an understated monthly income of ₱40,000.00, he
was actually being paid the amount of ₱115,850.00·a month. Other
than salaries, Bautista also claimed unrealized employment benefits,
nine days sick leave pay, four weeks recreation leave pay, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. 9
Job Asia, Gopio, and Shomcliffe, for their part, argued that Bautista's
employment was terminated because he failed to meet Shomcliffe's
standards.
ISSUE:
Whether or .not Bautista was illegally dismissed from employment.
(Yes)
RULING:
Accordingly, regulatory provisions may be read all throughout R.A. No.
8042 that carry out the policy of the State to protect and promote the
rights of Filipino migrant workers. Employment agreements are verily
more than contractual in nature in the Philippines. The Philippine
Constitution and laws guarantee special protection to workers here and
abroad. Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or she is
entitled to security of tenure, among other constitutional rights.
Here, petitioner argues that there was justifiable cause for the
termination of Bautista' s employment since the latter has fallen short
of Shomcliffe's employment and work standards. She cited the report
of Shomcliffe's Chief Executive Officer and Project Team Leader,
Robert Aup, which detailed Bautista's shortcomings, as well as the
report of Paul Thompson, Supervising Engineer of the Project to which
Bautista was assigned, which mentioned the latter's
incompetence.30 Maintaining that the rights and obligations among the
Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW), the local recruiter or agent) and the
foreign employer or principal is governed by the employment contract
which is the law among them, petitioner also claims that Bautista's
employment was validly terminated even without notice as he was
given the equivalent of one-month salary in lieu thereof.31
The Court is not convinced.
As observed by the CA, the evaluation report of Robert Aup was made
only on August 22, 2009, and the declaration of Paul Thompson was
executed only on October 1, 2009, which dates are beyond the date of
termination of Bautista's employment on July 10, 2009. The CA
correctly concluded that these were made as an afterthought in order
to lend credence to the claim that the termination of Bautista's
employment was for a valid reason.32 In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v.
Maguad, 33 we held that the Master's Statement Report presented by
therein petitioners to corroborate their claim that the dismissal of
therein respondents was for just cause, i.e., incompetence, was issued
78 days34 after therein respondents were repatriated to Manila and two
months after the latter instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before
the NLRC. Such report can no longer be a fair and accurate
assessment of therein respondents' competence as the same was
presented only after the complaint was filed. Its execution was a mere
afterthought in order to justify the dismissal of therein respondents
which had long been effected before the report was made; hence, such
report is a self-serving one. 35
The Court thus finds that Bautista's incompetence as the alleged just
cause for his dismissal was not proven by substantial evidence.
In addition, Bautista was not accorded due process. Consequently, the
Court is not convinced that he was legally dismissed.
The due process requirement is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since
it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's
innate sense of justice. To meet the requirements of due process, the
employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two
written notices before termination of employment can be legally
effected, i.e.: (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him. 36
Here, Bautista was dismissed under Article 4.3 of the employment
contract which allegedly permits his employer, Shomcliffe, to terminate
the contract on unspecified "other grounds" by giving one month's
written notice of its intention to terminate, or in lieu thereof, to pay the
employee a sum equivalent to one month's salary.
Bautista was notified on July 6, 2009 that his services will be
terminated effective on the close of business hours on July 10, 2009,
allegedly because his performance was "unsatisfactory and did not
meet the standards of the Company. "37 He was also paid one-month
salary in lieu of one month's notice of the termination of his
employment.38 Surely, this cannot be considered compliance with the
two-notice requirement mandated by the Labor Code in effecting a
valid dismissal. The Labor Code requires both notice and hearing;
notice alone will not suffice. The requirement of notice is intended to
inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss him
and the reason for the proposed dismissal. On the other hand, the
requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer
his employer's charges against him and accordingly defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected. 39 In this case, Bautista was not
given a chance to defend himself. Five days after the notice was
served, he was repatriated. Clearly, he was denied his right to due
process.
Petitioner's argument that she should not be held jointly and severally
liable with Shomcliffe for the payment of monetary awards to Bautista
as she had no control over the manner of implementation of the
employment contract, she had no hand whatsoever in Bautista' s
dismissal, and that her agency was extinguished as soon as the
employee was deployed to and have worked in Shomcliffe's
construction project in Papua New Guinea,57 has no merit.
In the first place, such joint and solidary liability is required prior to the
issuance of a license to petitioner to operate a recruitment agency.
Petitioner thus cannot evade liability by claiming that she did not have
any control over the foreign employer and had nothing to do with
Bautista's dismissal, because her liability is defined by law and
contract.
We have held that the burden devolves not only upon the foreign-
based employer but also on the employment or recruitment agency to
adduce evidence to convincingly show that the worker's employment
was validly and legally terminated. This is because the latter is not only
an agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign
principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the
worker. 59
R.A. No. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate,
the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work
abroad.60
In Sameer, we explained that the provision on joint and several liability
in R.A. No. 8042 is in line with the state's policy of affording protection
to labor and alleviating workers' plight. It assures overseas workers
that their rights will not be frustrated by difficulties in filing money
claims against foreign employers. Hence, in the case of overseas
employment, either the local agency or the foreign employer may be
sued for all claims arising from the foreign employer's labor law
violations. This way, the overseas workers are assured that someone-
at the very least, the foreign employer's local agent-may be made to
answer for violations that the foreign employer may have committed.
By providing that the -liability of the foreign employer may be "enforced
to the full extent" against the local agent, the overseas worker is
assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. The
local agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker's money
claims, however, is not left without remedy. The law does not preclude
it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever
payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money claims
against the foreign employ
ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PANSTAR
SHIPPING CO., LTD., AND/OR GAUDENCIO
MORALES, Petitioners vs. RODEL D. DELOS REYES, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner Abosta Shipmanagement Corp. (Abosta) is a duly licensed
manning agency while petitioner Panstar Shipping, Co., Ltd. (Panstar)
is a foreign principal agency based in Korea.5 Petitioner Gaudencio
Morales, on the other hand, is an officer of petitioner Abosta.
On March 30, 2010, petitioner Abosta employed respondent Rodel D.
Delos Reyes as a bosun on board the vessel MV Stellar Daisy for a
period of nine months.7 Before boarding the vessel, respondent
underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared
fit to work.8
Sometime in July 2010, respondent complained of pain in his groin
while performing his duties.9 He received treatment in Korea and was
diagnosed with Inguinal Hernia. 10
On August 1, 2010, respondent was repatriated and medically
examined by the company-designated physician. 11
On August 23, 2010, upon recommendation of the company-
designated physician, respondent underwent right inginual
herniorrhaphy with mesh imposition. 12
On August 25, 2010, respondent was discharged from the hospital and
was paid two months sickness allowance. 13
On September 2, 2010, 14 respondent was declared fit to work by the
company-designated physician.15
On July 19, 2011, respondent consulted Dr. Li-Ann Lara- Orencia (Dr.
Orencia), who found him to be permanently unfit to work and suffering
from a Grade 1 disability.
Thus, on July 20, 2011, respondent filed a Complaint 19 for Disability
Benefits, Damages and Attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
whether respondent was likewise entitled to total and permanent
disability compensation. (No)
RULING:
We rule in the negative.
There is total disability when employee is unable "to earn wages in the
same kind of work or work of similar nature that he or she was trained
for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of
his or her mentality and attainments could do. "40 On the other hand,
there is permanent disability when the worker is unable "to perform his
or her job for more than 120 days [or 240 days, as the case may be,]
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his or her
body."41
In this case, respondent was repatriated for medical treatment. Upon
the advice of the company-designated physician, respondent
underwent right inginual hemiorrhaphy with mesh imposition. Two
months after his surgery or within the 120-day period, he was declared
fit to work by the company-designated physician.
In case of conflicting medical assessments, the assessment of
the company-designated physician prevails unless a third party
doctor is sought by the parties.
Similarly, in this case, respondent, after consulting with Dr. Orencia,
who happened to be the same doctor in Marlow,failed to refer the
conflicting medical assessments to a third doctor. In fact, after
consulting with Dr. Orencia, respondent immediately filed the instant
complaint without first notifying petitioners. For this reason alone, the
CA should not have given any credence to the Medical Report of Dr.
Orencia. The Court has consistently ruled that in case of conflicting
medical assessments, referral to a third doctor is mandatory; and that
in the absence of a third doctor's opinion, it is the medical assessment
of the company-designated physician that should prevail.44
Moreover, we find it significant to note that medical assessment of the
company-designated physician is more reliable considering that it was
based on the treatment and medical evaluation done on respondent,
which showed that the treatment or surgery undergone by respondent
was successful, while Dr. Orencia's medical assessment merely
quoted the medical definition of hernia and some studies on the
possibility of recurrence of the illness. Under prevailing jurisprudence,
"the assessment of the company-designated physician is more credible
for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and
diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done
in one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records
ALDRINE B. ILUSTRICIMO, Petitioner
vs. NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC./INTERNATIONAL CRUISE
SERVICES, LTD. and/or JOSEPHINE J. FRANCISCO, Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged by respondent International Cruise Services
Ltd., through respondent NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. (NYK), as a
Quarter Master onboard its vessels from 1993 to 2014. His last
employment with the respondents was on board the vessel MV Crystal
Serenity last April 2014. Prior to his embarkation, petitioner underwent
a routine Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared
physically fit to work.
On November 2014, while MV Crystal Serenity was on its way to ·
Florida, USA, petitioner started experiencing gross hematuria, or blood
in his urine. He reported the matter to his superiors and was given
antibiotics for suspected urinary tract infection. Due to his medical
condition, petitioner was brought to a hospital in Key West, Florida,
where he was subjected to a CT Scan. The results revealed the
presence of three polypoid masses in his bladder. Petitioner was
medically repatriated on November 22, 2014 and immediately referred
to the company-accredited hospital for treatment. Dr. Nicomedes Cruz
(Dr. Cruz), the company-designated doctor, diagnosed him with
"urothelial carcinoma of the urinary bladder, low grade" or "bladder
cancer."5
After undergoing a series of chemotherapy sessions and operations,
petitioner's attending doctors assessed him with an interim disability
rating of Grade 7 in a report6 dated March 6, 2015. In the same report,
Dr. Cn1z noted that risk factors for petitioner's illness include
"occupational exposure to aromatic amines and cigarette smoking."
Despite the interim disability grading given, the company doctor noted,
in a report 7 dated June 23, 2015, that petitioner still complains of "on
and off hypo gastric pain." He was then advised to undergo repeat
cystoscopy. On June 30, 2015,8 Dr. Cruz issued petitioner with a final
assessment of Grade 7 disability-moderate residuals or disorder of the
intra-abdominal organ.
In September 2015, petitioner underwent another operation using his
own funds. 9 This prompted him to secure the opinion of another
physician, Dr. Richard Combe, who diagnosed him with bladder mass
and declared him unfit to work due to his need to undergo instillation
chemotherapy and cystoscopy every three months.
Thereafter, petitioner, thru counsel, sent respondents a letter11 dated
October 16, 2015, claiming total and permanent disability benefits.
Petitioner further declared in the said letter his willingness to undergo
another examination to prove the extent of his disability being claimed,
Notwithstanding petitioner's communication, respondents failed to
respond, prompting him to file a complaint for total and permanent
disability before the NCMB.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
total and permanent disability benefits. (Yes)
RULING:
Yes, In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner suffered an
illness while on board the M/V Crystal Serenity. What needs to be
determined is whether petitioner's illness is work-related, and,
therefore, compensable.
According to the VA, petitioner suffered from "cancer of the urinary
bladder" due to the malignant tumors found in his urinary
bladder. 17 The VA then considered the illness as work-related based
on Section 3218 of POEASEC. The VA added that even if petitioner's
illness is not among those specifically mentioned in Section 32, the
same is deemed work-related since the risk factors for the illness
include occupational exposure to aromatic amines as stated on the
company doctors' medical certification.
No less than respondents' doctor diagnosed the petitioner with bladder
cancer and opined that his occupation exposed him to elements that
increased his risk of contracting the illness. As found by the VA,
petitioner was employed by the respondents for 21 years. It is,
therefore, not implausible to conclude that petitioner's work may have
caused, contributed, or at least aggravated his illness. Given the
company doctors' conclusion and the afore-stated facts, the burden on
the part of petitioner to prove the causality of his illness and occupation
had been eliminated.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that respondents themselves did not
dispute petitioner's entitlement to disability benefits. They only dispute
that his disability is total and permanent.
In any event, the rule that the company-designated physician's findings
shall prevail in case of non-referral of the case to a third doctor is not a
hard and fast rule. 31 It has been previously held that labor tribunals
and the courts are not bound by the medical findings of the company-
designated physician and that the inherent merits of its medical
findings will be weighed and duly considered. 32
The June 30, 2015 final report of the company doctor reads:
1. The patient has reached maximum medical cure.
2. The final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities is
Grade 7 - moderate residuals or disorder of the intra abdominal
organ.1âwphi1
Despite the foregoing assessment, the VA disagrees that petitioner
merely suffers from a moderate disorder of intra abdominal organ and
with the final disability grading given. The VA said:
Having said the above, this Panel is also of the opinion that this type of
disorder in the internal organ is not simply moderate but is of
a serious nature. Thus, the grade 7 rating under the list of occupation
disease does not seem to fully describe the gravity of the cancer
suffered by herein complainant. It is thus submitted that the
occupational disease should be that of a serious nature or that which is
considered of a "severe residual of impairment of intra-abdominal
organ which requires regular aid and attendance that will /disable]
worker to seek any gainful employment" which is equivalent to a
Grade I rating. The Panel finds it hard to accept the submission of
respondents that herein seafarer's cancer is but a mere "moderate
residual of disorder of the intra-abdominal organs secondary to
trauma resulting to impairment of nutrition, moderate tenderness,
nausea, vomiting, constipation or diarrhea." x x x (Emphasis in the
original)

The VA noted that petitioner's illness is serious in nature considering

the company doctors' requirement for him to undergo periodic
cystoscopy despite having undergone chemotherapy and surgery. It
further observed that petitioner was never declared "cancer-free" and
"fit to work" by his attending physicians and his illness persisted
despite the final disability grade of 7 given. For the VA, this means that
petitioner could no longer return to the seafaring profession and is,
thus, permanently and totally disabled.

We concur with the VA's conclusion.

In keeping with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and full protection to labor, the Court has applied the Labor Code
concept of disability to Filipino seafarers. 33 Thus, We have held that
the notion of disability is intimately related to the worker's capacity to
earn, and what is compensated is not his injury or illness but his
inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity.
Hence, disability should be understood less on its medical significance
but more on the loss of earning capacity.34

In Hanseatic Shipping Philippines Inc. v. Ballon,35 We defined total

disability as "the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attainments could do." In determining whether a disability
is total or partial, what is crucial is whether the employee who suffered
from disability could still perform his work notwithstanding the disability
he met. 36 A permanent partial disability, on the other hand,
presupposes a seafarer's fitness to resume sea duties before the end
of the 120/240-day medical treatment period despite the injuries
sustained and works on the premise that such partial injuries did not
disable a seafarer to earn wages in the same kind of work or similar
nature for which he was trained. 37

Petitioner cannot be expected to resume sea duties if the risk of

contracting his illness is associated with his previous occupation as
Quarter Master. Indeed, records do not show that he was re-employed
by respondent NYK or by any other manning agency from the time of
his repatriation until the filing of the instant petition. Moreover, the
recurrence of mass in petitioner's bladder, the requirement by both the
company doctor and his personal doctor that he undergo repeat
cystoscopy to monitor polyp growth, his subsequent operation to
remove the growing polyps in his bladder even after the lapse of the
240-day period for treatment and despite the final disability grading
given, all sufficiently show that his disability is total and permanent.