Basic Legal Ethics - Cases 61 To 67

A.M. No.
RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz
R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on
April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until
January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th
of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st
1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show
any entry at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st
1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.2
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public
service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics

from Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in this
administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises.3
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja,
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this
office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary

public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E.

Santos submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission

i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the
name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony
Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the
charges against him. He also submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-
Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the
City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register.
The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted
by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized documents
and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas
Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck,
for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned
resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need
to resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat
the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant
requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied
the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded to the
Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The
complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of
Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made
the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of
violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without commission; (b)
tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these
infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present commission, if any,
be revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his
defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the
charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned
as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so
commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record
Books available in the notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro
City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains items
on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary
public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose
so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book.
Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental,
or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under
Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by
the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath of
office of the notary public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the
complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being
commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of
record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues

Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately.
Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA
and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on
October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the
respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the
complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before
his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts
committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing
documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly, and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court
or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government
service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed
with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the Judiciary,
shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication.14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before
the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the

Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated

Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together
with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of
the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the
Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the
complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any
officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base
its final action.15
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as
a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme
Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 616of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was
cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a
justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with
the Supreme Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of
An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If
Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does
not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent
public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty,
he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or

criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued
A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court

Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of
Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection
with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended
to harass the respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation
is approved or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a
lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the
court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory
retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred
at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to
harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such
is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the
respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint,
and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later than 30 days
from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before
the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do
so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld,
taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or

justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint
must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or
justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing;
and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the
Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the
ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the service.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to
be without merit and intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the
instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The
Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment
to the judiciary.22 In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the
immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges
against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the respondent continued the
doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be
continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v.
Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer.
The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands,
and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court
also stated in this case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as a judge will
not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an
officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot
be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged with
immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from
the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and
tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who
aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must
pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be
free from the appearance of impropriety. ...27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by
substantial evidence.28 The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the
respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was,
however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this case because the
complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the
respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right
and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare.
The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court.29 The Supreme
Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. This is why
respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.30
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes

Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.

On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.31Notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without
the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated
as a mere casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible, constituting
as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers
by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and
disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a

time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which
the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."37
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-

emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake
in every aspect of that function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting
the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed.39 Neither
did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor
deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer
that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of
Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register."
Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no
evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as
proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to
controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the
documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as
an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule
13842 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers
which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the
practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness before he
became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,

distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in
the leading case of In re Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court

Administrator’s recommendation that the charge for immorality against the respondent
be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the
respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit
conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s
certificates of live birth to show that her paramour was the father. The complaint in this
case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended.50 The
Court held that administrative offenses do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative
complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed
only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as
no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.
It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and
bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should
particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the
respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to
the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate
The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.52 By his actuations, the
respondent failed to live up to such standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also violated
Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In representing that he was possessed of the requisite
notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer
that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood
of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice
is mandated in this case, considering that the complaint against the respondent was
filed twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained of;56 that there was
no private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely
affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned
retirement benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing

documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 February 13, 2009
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2312-RTJ)
SYLVIA SANTOS,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is the Complaint of Sylvia Santos (complainant) dated July 14, 2005,
against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua (respondent), of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Branch 144, Makati City for serious misconduct and dishonesty.1
Complainant, an aunt of respondent's husband, alleges: In the first week of September

2002, she asked respondent's help, who was then the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 63 of Makati City, regarding the cases2 of
complainant's friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. Respondent, a
former employee of the Court, said that she could help as she had connections with
some Justices of the Court; she just needed ₱100,000.00 which she would give to an
employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of said cases. In the first week of
October 2002, complainant gave respondent ₱100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter's
chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told
her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering ₱10 million to the
Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the ₱100,000.00; however
respondent could no longer be contacted.3
In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denies the charges against her and
avers: In the months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing
protests, damaging newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her
hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of
complainant. When she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her,
and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant
asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant
gave ₱50,000.00 for a favorable resolution of Muñoz's cases. Respondent declined;
thereafter complainant started spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23,
2005, complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover
the money she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused; complainant then repeatedly
tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005 when complainant threatened to file a case
against respondent with the Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters
addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the ₱100,000.00 complainant
allegedly gave her, which letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant
also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she (respondent) was
corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent filed
cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against
complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against her.4
Complainant and respondent filed several pleadings reiterating their respective claims.5
The Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred the instant case to Associate
Justice Marina L. Buzon of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.6
A preliminary conference was set for September 4, 2007.7 On said date, complainant
manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her complaint against
respondent.8 In a Verified Manifestation dated September 6, 2007, complainant stated
that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a long and serious
discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that after a sincere
exchange of views, it dawned on complainant that her accusation against respondent
was brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts
concerning the incident subject of the present administrative case; that for the sake of
unity and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and respondent had
reconciled and restored friendly relations with each other; and that in view of the
foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in pursuing her administrative case
against respondent.91avvphi1
In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could be
drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and
refusal to prove the allegations in her complaint.10
The Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, issued its Resolution dated
December 5, 2007 dismissing the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence.
The Court in the same Resolution also ordered complainant to show cause why she
should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded verified complaint dated
July 14, 2005 against respondent.11
Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that:
xxxx
2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her

administrative complaint against Judge Evelyn Argaya [sic] Chua is not
unfounded;
3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondent's

personal knowledge;
4. The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was
because of the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of
unity and harmony in the family, given the fact that Judge Chua's husband is her
nephew;
5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their
children came to respondent's house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later,
respondent's sister, husband and children, as well as her close friends persuaded
her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake of peace
and unity in the family;
6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that
respondent gave up her complaint against Judge Chua.12 (Emphasis supplied)
In its Resolution dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's compliance
was not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with court processes. The Court then
resolved to: reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more severe penalty
would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of the same offense; recall the
Resolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen the administrative case
against respondent; direct Justice Rebecca D. Salvador13 to conduct an investigation
and submit her report and recommendation; and directed complainant to attend all
hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under pain of contempt of court.14
Justice Salvador issued an order setting the preliminary conference on April 9 and 10,
2008, and respondent filed a motion to defer the proceedings pending her motion for
reconsideration of the Court's March 3, 2008 Resolution.15In a Resolution dated April 10,
2008, Justice Salvador denied the motion to defer proceedings.16 A preliminary
conference was conducted on September 3, 2008 where both parties presented their
respective exhibits; and a clarificatory hearing on September 17, 2008 attended by
complainant, her counsel and respondent.17
In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient
grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that
"respondent be administratively penalized for the grave misconduct and dishonesty
charged by complainant."18
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in
support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked
for and received from complainant ₱100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable
decision on Muñoz's cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her
office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is,
complainant was there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time;
respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainant's request
for favors in June 2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant
asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she
had not heard of Tolosa before; however it was respondent's comment19 and her
husband's affidavit20 which stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005
that Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former
employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a
strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz prior to the
parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband,
stated that Muñoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and that
they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of
case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral
defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however,
that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters
dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a
lawyer, to reply to complainant's first demand letter, was unusual; considering
complainant's advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim -- that complainant's
motive for filing the administrative case was respondent’s refusal to give in to
complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter’s friend -- was too paltry an
explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and
aggravation entailed by the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and
against her; complainant's compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to
show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint
against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and based on
personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as
well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against respondent.
Justice Salvador particularly observed the demeanor of complainant at the September

3, 2008 hearing. According to her, complainant, while weary of the demands entailed
by the administrative case, staunchly stood pat over the veracity of her complaint and
the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same; respondent also had no reason to
ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the
administrative case against her.21
Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainant's testimony that the return of the
money by respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the
complaint.22
Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 claiming that there were significant
omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) particularly on
the statement "Ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera"; such question was also beyond the
scope of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous
testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she
mention the return of the money, and it was only during the clarificatory hearing that it
surfaced; thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine
complainant. Respondent prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the
testimonies of complainant -- that "the money was returned to me" and "ibinalik naman
ho nila ang pera" -- be stricken off; and in case the correction of the TSN was no longer
proper, her manifestation that the said testimony of complainant was given only during
the clarificatory hearing and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine
the complainant.
In the Court's Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondent's
prayer that the proposed corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject
testimonies of complainant be stricken off. The Court, however, granted her prayer and
noted her manifestation that the subject testimony was given only during the
clarificatory hearing and in effect without granting her an opportunity to cross-examine
complainant about the same.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to

establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence,
i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.23
In this case, Justice Salvador found that substantial evidence existed to support the
allegations against respondent.
Try as she might to show the implausibility of complainant's claims, respondent could
not deny that she and complainant met at her office sometime in September 2002; that
she and her husband knew Muñoz and associated with her on several occasions, and
that it was she (respondent), being a former employee of the Supreme Court, who
stood to know who Tolosa was.
But most telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondent's guilt is the unwavering
stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive ₱100,000.00 from her in
order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muñoz's cases.
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the
hearing, was consistent in her testimony:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
x x x At the start of this afternoon's proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the
matters stated in your verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.24
xxxx
Ano ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, "Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na

ng kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi." Ang sabi niya,
"Sige Tita, tutulungan ko."
Evelyn, sasabihin ko ang totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.
Just tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng ₱100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa
loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang ₱50,000.00."
Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya.
Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako
ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, "Evelyn, kahit
konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay Emerita." Unang-una iyang
Emerita may utang sa akin ng ₱20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda
ng alahas. Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to
continue with her testimony because she is already through with her direct
examination.
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record.25
Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true
reasons for withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly
pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7,

2007, and which had been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "1-B" and submarkings
for respondent. You stated in the verified complaint that the accusation against
respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of
facts and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by "the accusation against
respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of
facts and confusion"?
MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kami't

nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon,
dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na
sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid
ko yan, baka, ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.
So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you
misunderstood or misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po
nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang
sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.26 (Emphasis
supplied)
The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are generally

given by this Court great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the
deportment of the witnesses as they testified.27 As Justice Salvador's observations and
findings are well supported by the records, the Court finds no reason to depart from
such rule.
Indeed, complainant's claim that respondent returned the money to her was given
during a clarificatory hearing. And respondent's belated objections to said testimony,
through a motion submitted to the Court a month later, were accordingly noted. But
respondent could not deny that she was present during the clarificatory hearing and
could have very well objected to and refuted complainant's declaration on the matter.
Respondent, however, did not make any objection at the time, which failure is truly
damaging.
As well explained by Justice Salvador:
Unrefuted by respondent, it would appear from the foregoing declarations that the
return of the money complainant claims to have given the former was, in addition to
the familial interests cited therefor, part of the reason the latter withdrew her complaint
and acceded to the amicable settlement of the case. If it is true that she received no
money in consideration of the favorable and expeditious resolution of G.R. Nos. 142676
and 146718, it necessarily and logically follows that respondent would not have
returned – as in fact she would not have anything to return – said money to
complainant. More so, when it is borne in mind that, as per respondent's September 20,
2005 manifestation, the aforesaid cases had reportedly been decided in favor of
Emerita Muñoz. Finding no refutation of the assertion regarding respondent's return of
the money and no reason to doubt the veracity thereof and/or the credibility of
complainant insofar as said material fact is concerned, the undersigned is constrained
to affirm the existence of a reasonable ground to believe that the former is responsible
for the conduct complained of. If a criminal conviction for which the quantum of proof is
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, may be made to rest on the testimony of a single
credible witness, it stands to reason that an administrative complaint, for which only
substantial evidence is required can be sustained on the strength thereof.28
Clearly, substantial evidence exists in this case to hold respondent liable for gross
misconduct.
As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior; while "gross," has been defined as "out of all measure;
beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.29
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140,30 a judge found guilty of gross misconduct may
be punished with any of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than
₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
This is respondent's first administrative offense.31 In view of such circumstance and the
sanctions provided under Rule 140, the Court finds suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for six months to be proper in this case.32
As a final word, let it be stressed once again that the office of a judge is sacred and
imbued with public interest. The need to maintain the public’s confidence in the
judiciary cannot be made to depend solely on the whims and caprices of complainants
who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.33 Thus, withdrawal of a complaint or
desistance from a complaint will not deprive this Court of its power under the
Constitution to ferret out the truth and discipline its members accordingly.34
WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,
Makati City is found GUILTYof gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from
office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. She is WARNED that the
commission of the same or a similar act in the future shall merit a more severe penalty.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-530 March 07, 2007
FRANCISCO PALON,
vs.
JUDGE PLACIDO B VALLARTA, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
On 8 December 2000, Carlos Pangilinan (Pangilinan) filed a complaint for Frustrated
Murder against Francisco Palon, Jr. (Palon) before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 198-2000. Upon preliminary
investigation before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabiao-San Isidro, Nueva Ecija
(MCTC-Cabiao-San Isidro), respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta (respondent judge)
issued an Order dated 29 May 2001 for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of Palon.[1]
It appears that Palon is the offended party in another case, Criminal Case No. 66-01,
for Attempted Homicide filed against accused Arturo Mendoza (Mendoza) and
Pangilinan. On 7 June 2001, respondent judge issued a warrant for the arrest of
Mendoza and Pangilinan. Respondent judge did not sign the warrant of arrest.[2]
Palon filed the instant complaint for Ignorance of the Law, Dereliction of Duty, and
Partiality claiming that respondent judge failed to "evaluate the Information" filed by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija and likewise failed to sign the
warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 66-01.
Palon asserts that respondent judge refused to act on the information because
respondent judge is related by affinity within the fourth civil degree to Pangilinan, one
of the accused in Criminal Case No. 66-01. Palon further alleges that he filed a
motion[3] to remand Criminal Case No. 198-2000 to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija on the ground that the offense charged is cognizable by the
regional trial court and that respondent judge is related to Pangilinan's sister. However,
respondent judge ignored the motion.
Palon also claims that in the scheduled preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No.
198-2000, he and his co-accused, with their counsel, were present but the hearings
were postponed at the instance of respondent judge. However, on the only occasion
that the accused requested for postponement of the hearing because their counsel
could not attend, respondent judge allegedly retorted, "Wala akong paki-alam kung
hindi darating ang abogado ninyo; magsumbong na kayo kahit saan." When respondent
judge stepped down from his rostrum, he approached the father of Palon and told
him, "Kapitbahay, ang magiging bail ninyo ay P20,000 bawat isa; kaysa ibayad ninyo ito
sa bail ay ibayad na lang ito kay Carlos Pangilinan, at kung kukulangin man, ay ako na
ang bahala, at hulugan ninyo nalang ito."[4]
Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint despite the notice sent to him.
[5]
He is therefore deemed to have waived his right to file the same. Further, it appears
that per Certification by the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Cabiao-San Isidro, respondent
judge filed a letter of resignation on 10 June 2002. The Certification was noted in this
Court's Resolution dated 19 July 2004.
On 16 February 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest, within ten days from
notice, if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings
filed. Complainant filed his manifestation stating that respondent judge did not file his
answer or any responsive pleading and in fact, he had resigned from the service.
Complainant manifested that he was submitting the case for the Court's appropriate
resolution. Respondent judge did not file any manifestation.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that respondent judge was given an
opportunity to explain his side but he chose not to comply with the Court's directives.
His refusal to controvert the allegations against him is deemed an admission of the
truth of the charges.
Upon verification, the OCA found that respondent judge filed a letter of resignation as
municipal judge of MCTC-Cabiao-San Isidro on 10 June 2002.[6] The OCA would have
recommended the dismissal of respondent judge had he not resigned during the
pendency of this case. Instead, the OCA recommended that the benefits and privileges
that respondent judge might be entitled to be forfeited with prejudice to reinstatement
or re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint or file any responsive pleading
or manifestation despite receipt of notice to do so. He, instead, filed a letter of
resignation. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or
imputation and defend himself. It is against human nature to just remain reticent and
say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in this case is an admission
of the truth of the charges.[7] Respondent judge is deemed to have admitted the
charges against him.
Every officer or employee in the judiciary has the duty to obey the orders and processes
of this Court without delay.[8] A resolution of this Court requiring comment on an
administrative complaint is not a mere request from the Court. It cannot be complied
with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents in administrative complaints
should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the administrative
complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. The Court
will not tolerate indifference of respondents to administrative complaints and to
resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints.
There is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of
judicial conduct and integrity. It is gross misconduct, even disrespect to the highest
Court of the land, for a respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution
requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint.[9] Indifference or
defiance to this Court's orders or resolutions is punishable with dismissal, suspension, or
fine as warranted by the circumstances.[10]
Complainant further alleged that respondent judge "failed to evaluate the information"
or "sign the warrant of arrest" because the latter is related by affinity within the fourth
civil degree to one of the accused in the criminal case. The rule is that a judge who is
related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party is disqualified from
sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by
them, and entered in the records.[11] Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct[12] provides:
Rule 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include proceedings where:
xxxx
(d) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; x x x
The rationale of the rule on disqualification of judges springs from the long-standing
precept that a judge should not handle a case where there is a perception, rightly or
wrongly, that he is susceptible to bias and partiality because of relationship or some
other ground.[13]
On the utterances made by respondent judge, we stress that as a dispenser of justice,

a judge should demonstrate sensitivity in his choice of words as normally expected of
men of his stature. Here, respondent judge used language hardly the kind of
circumspect words expected of a magistrate.
Judges must observe judicial decorum, which requires a magistrate to be at all times
temperate in his language, refraining from vilification or inflammatory rhetoric.[14] It is
essential that judges live up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of
culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no place in the judiciary where its
judges and personnel should act at all times with self-restraint and civility even when
confronted with rudeness and insolence.
This is not the first infraction of respondent judge. In A.M. No. MTJ-02-1398
entitled Enriquez v. Vallarta,[15] we found respondent judge guilty of ignorance of the
law and delay in the disposition of cases. We fined him P2,000, with a warning that
repetition of similar infractions would merit more severe sanctions.
In another case, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541 entitled Jacinto v. Vallarta,[16] the Court found
respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and fined him P5,000.
Another administrative case, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1531 entitled Pastora dela Cruz v. Judge
Placido B. Vallarta for Gross Inefficiency, Gross Negligence, and Gross Ignorance of the
Law, is pending before this Court.
With the previous warning, respondent judge deserves the maximum administrative
penalty, which is dismissal from the service. However, since respondent judge has
resigned from the service, we can only order the forfeiture of all his benefits, except
accrued leave benefits.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta guilty as charged. We

declare the FORFEITURE of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any,
with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Nachura, JJ.,
concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.
A.M. No. MTJ-91-565 August 30, 1993
PATRICIO T. JUNIO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO C. RIVERA, JR., respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Fourteen (14) year-old Cristina Junio filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a
criminal complaint dated 24 May 1991 for acts of lasciviousness against respondent
Judge Pedro Rivera Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan.1 The filing
of this complaint caused the commencement of Criminal Case No. 2422-A against
respondent Judge with Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan.2 Trial of this case has been completed and the case is now pending
decision.3
Meanwhile, Cristina's father, Patricio Junio, filed a sworn administrative charge dated 6
June 1991 against the respondent with the Court Administrator with respect to the
same acts complained of criminally; thus was commenced the present administrative
case. Complainant Patricio Junio further requested, through the Presidential Committee
on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice to do something about the matter.4
In a letter to the Chief Justice dated 16 January 1992, then Justice Secretary Silvestre
H. Bello III suggested that respondent Judge Rivera be placed under preventive
suspension, pending the outcome of both the criminal and administrative cases.5 This
letter was seconded by complainant's own motion to the same effect dated 17 August
1992 and filed in MTJ No. 91-565.6
After considering respondent's answer to the administrative complaint, with its attached
annexes, as well as the Report of the Deputy Court Administrator dated 27 December
1992 on this matter, the Court decided in a Resolution dated 26 January 1993 to
suspend preventively respondent Judge during the pendency of the administrative
case.7To date, the Court has not permitted him to re-assume his official duties.
In two Resolutions dated 9 and 23 March 1993, the Court directed Judge Eugenio
Ramos of Branch 39, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, to conduct an
investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-91-565 and to submit his report and recommendation
thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records of the administrative case.8
Hearings were subsequently conducted by Investigating Judge Ramos on 15 and 29

May 1993, as well as on 5 and 19 June 1993. In order to complete the administrative
investigation promptly, the parties agreed to reproduce by incorporation the transcript
of stenographic notes recorded in the criminal case, containing the testimonies of
witnesses who were presented by the parties anew in the present administrative case.
The parties further agreed to address additional questions on direct examination to
these witnesses in the administrative case, subject to the right of the opposing party's
counsel to cross-examine the witnesses on both the testimony given in the criminal
case, as well as the additional testimony given in this administrative case. 9
The gist of the acts complained of are contained in Cristina Junio's testimony as
summarized by the Investigating Judge: 10
She testified that between the hours of 2:30 and 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 20, 1991 she was helping in the store of her parents
which is located at the Alaminos Commercial Complex. She was sent to
their rented house to get the ingredients for halo-halo. The house is
owned by the respondent who stays at the ground floor, while the Junio
family occupy the second floor.
Upon reaching the house, she went to their housemaid named Concepcion
Tugade who was then helping cook food for the celebration of the
respondent's birthday. She got their housemaid's 1 year old child in order
to dress her up and bring her to the store. The name of the child is Shiela
May. She brought the child to her (Cristina) room to change the former's
clothes.
While dressing up Shiela, respondent allegedly entered her room, took

Shiela and made her sit on the bed and after which he went near Cristina,
embraced her and kissed her. She tried to push him. The respondent,
allegedly let her loose and then left the room while she sat on the bed
and cried.
Then the respondent allegedly returned, went near her, and pushed her
until she was lying on the bed. He then mounted on top of her, kissed her
on the lips, inserted his right hand inside her blouse and, simultaneously,
inserted his left hand inside her maong pants, mashed her breast and
touched her vagina for a long time.
Then Shiela May cried. The respondent stood up and left the room.
Cristina also took the child and went out of the room. The respondent was
allegedly still in the sala and he told her [Cristina] to stop crying. Conching
Tugade arrived and complainant (Cristina) told the former what
happened. She was advised to report it to her parents. Upon arrival in
their store, she told her mother and she also told her father. They then
went to the police headquarters and caused the incident to be entered in
the police blotter. She identified her sworn statement marked as Exhibit
"D" and series (sic) which she subscribed before Fiscal Finez on May 24,
1991. She claims damages in the amount of P300,000.00.
Witness Concepcion Tugade corroborated Cristina's declaration that after the incident,
respondent Judge tried to console her at the sala. 11
Respondent Judge Rivera, in his testimony, gave a different version of the events of 20
May 1991, a version narrated by the Investigating Judge in the following terms:
He has been the Municipal Judge of Alaminos town since July 11, 1989.
His wife is Patria Tady Rivera. He resides in a house inherited from his
parents. It is two (2) stories (sic). He resides in (sic) the ground floor
while the second floor is being rented by the Junio family since 1986. May
20 is his birthday and he heard Mass and received Holy Communion on
that day. His wife Patria was in charge of the cooking. There were actually
three (3) cooks, assisted by 6 or 7 persons.
The party actually began at past 10:00 o'clock with close friends and
relatives in attendance. During lunch there were some 30 guests inside
the garage and some 20 guests inside the dining room. He denied that he
entered the bedroom of Cristina. He admitted going to the second floor
but only up to the front of the staircase and he was with Cesar Villar; that
he told Cristina that it was his birthday and "why don't you kiss Tito
Peter?", which she did by kissing him on the cheeks and he kissed back
also on the cheek; that Villar commented "Ano ba yan? Birthday kiss ba
yan?" He denied that he went back to the second floor a second time
because he was very busy attending to his many guests.
He denied that he held the breast and private parts of the complainant
claiming that he cannot do that because she was like family to him and he
treated her like a daughter. He denied seeing Tugade go up the house
and that although he admits that there are four (4) bedrooms in the
second floor, he does not know the room of Cristina nor as to which room
is occupied by the rest of the Junio family.
xxx xxx xxx
That after May 20, 1991 there was no confrontation with the Junio's who
vacated the second floor they were then renting although they owed back
rentals of some six (6) months although he admits that they have paid
said indebtedness since then.12
The alleged innocent exchange of kisses on the cheek was corroborated by

respondent's witness Cesar Villar. 13
Respondent also presented as his witnesses Dominica Silag, Merlyn Cortez, Eva Pertez
and Joseph Cortez. They gave testimony tending to show that Cristina Junio's affidavit
dated 24 May 1991, after being executed before the police authorities and before its
submission to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was modified by inserting
additional questions and answers describing how complainant's witness, Concepcion
Tugade, came to observe respondent Tugade consoling a sobbing Cristina in the sala
after the incident. 14
The Investigating Judge duly filed a Report dated 29 June 1993 on the administrative
investigation together with his recommendations thereon. 15
The Investigating Judge in his Report "respectfully but strongly recommended" that the
respondent Judge be absolved of the administrative charge. 16
After careful deliberation on the Report of Investigating Judge Eugenio Ramos, and
after close examination of the record of A.M. No. MTJ-91-565, the Court is unable to
accept the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Judge. The conclusions
presented by the Investigating Judge and the reasons which lead us to reject them are
set out below.
The Investigating Judge set out three (3) reasons for his recommendation that
respondent Judge Rivera be absolved from this administrative charge. The first and the
third reasons are interrelated and will, therefore, be dealt with together. The first
reason presented by the Investigating Judge is as follows:
First. The claim of Cristina that the respondent caused her to lay down on
the bed, lay on top of her, inserted his right hand inside her blouse in
order to mash her breast, and simultaneously the respondent inserted his
left hand inside the denim pants of Cristina in order to hold her "vagina"
and that this was done for a "long time" is unbelievable and totally
unacceptable. It was concocted by a person who had no imagination
whatsoever, or at least, had not experience enough to know that
what was pictured was physically impossible of
accomplishment . . . unless Judge Rivera is Mr. Rubber-man himself, or he
is a contortion artist.
To be sure, in order to test and verify if this particular claim of Cristina is

physically possible, the undersigned tried to re-enact it with my wife but it
was determined that it was physically impossible of accomplishment. The
jurisprudence laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court, that "testimony
to be believed must not only emanate from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself" has been constant and fixed as not
to require citation.
Moreover, the respondent, was in barong tagalog and white pants. It is
submitted that Judge Rivera was intelligent enough to know that if he will
lie down on top of a girl who is resisting, his barong will become very
crumpled, as well as his pants. Certainly with visitors coming and going to
wish him well, he will look funny to say the least, meeting his well wishers
in "crumpled" barong pilipino (sic).
The complainant Cristina appeared before the undersigned during the

investigation. She was already 16 years old. The incident allegedly
happened in 1991 when she was 14 years old. Without casting any
aspersion to Cristina, even today when she is already 16 years of age, the
undersigned did not notice in her a fairy developed bust, as will turn the
male eyes in a manner that will cause him to throw caution to the winds
and make him think unchaste thoughts. It would have been more so, two
years ago when she was only 14. 17 (Emphasis supplied)
The third reason for the investigating Judge is set out the following manner:
Third. The complainants have been living in the second floor of the
respondent's house for several years. Since 1989 the latter has been
staying in the ground floor of his house. It is highly improbable that the
respondent will be stupid enough to choose May 20 to do and perform the
acts of which he is accused on that very day:
a. which is his birthday;
b. with so many people present coming and going to his house, which it
was his social duty and obligation to meet and entertain as guest;
c. at a time when his wife was present;
d. when in thanksgiving he attended the offering of the holy sacrifice of

the mass and received holy communion;
e. when only the first, phase of the celebration, i.e., lunch, was finished
and that more important guests are expected to arrive. 18 (Emphasis
supplied)
The first reason given by the Investigating Judge is totally unacceptable to this Court.
The Investigating Judge has not provided the Court with a cogent judicial basis for
exercising (or refraining from exercising) its disciplinary jurisdiction over judges in the
case at bar. The extraordinary first reason submitted by the Investigating Judge has in
fact given rise to the impression, to the mind of this Court, that he has, in desperation,
bent over backwards to exonerate respondent Judge.
In the first place, this Court does not believe that what Cristina, in her clear and
forthright testimony, said that respondent Judge did, i.e., that he "lay on top of her,
inserted his right hand inside her blouse in order to mash her breast, and . . . inserted
his left hand inside [her] denim pants in order to hold her 'vagina' and that this was
done for a 'long-time'" was "physically impossible." That the investigating Judge may
have found it not physically possible for him to "re-enact" with his wife the testimony of
Christina, does not impress this Court. That the Investigating Judge found Christina at
age 16 (and therefore a fortiori at age 14) bereft of what he considers a "fairly
developed bust" capable of generating "unchaste thoughts", is even less impressive to
this Court. We consider that Judge Ramos' avowed personal tastes in the matter of
female sexual attractiveness prove nothing. There are any number of cases in the
Philippine Reports of males convicted of raping 14-year old, and even younger females.
The fact, therefore, that the Investigating Judge was able to contemplate the offended
party Cristina without experiencing "unchaste thoughts," is no legal reason for
disbelieving her testimony. That the Investigating Judge may have found Cristina
sexually unattractive, certainly does not demonstrate that respondent Judge found her
similarly undesirable, at that particular moment, or that the latter could not have kissed
and fondled Cristina.
The Investigating Judge's argument that respondent Judge Rivera's barong and pants
would have become "very crumpled" if he had indeed lain on top of Christina, is also
unpersuasive. Assuming, for sake of argument, that respondent Judge would have
become terribly conscious of his hypotheticaly crumpled clothing, we note that the
incident took place in respondent Judge's home where he could have quite easily
changed his clothing.
Clearly, the Investigating Judge found the matter a question of credibility and chose to
repose his entire faith and confidence in the word of the respondent Judge as
evidenced by his third reason. But his third reason appears to this Court to be an ad
hominem and post-hoc argument entirely speculative in nature, to which we are unable
to ascribe substantial weight. Moreover, the Investigating Judge disregarded the
testimony given by respondent Judge and his witnesses that alcoholic liquor was served
to respondent Judge's guests during his birthday celebration, 19as well as the testimony
of complainant's witness Concepcion Tugade, who had declared in Criminal Case No.
2422-A that respondent Judge had indeed been drinking liquor along with his guests on
that day. 20 Considering inter alia that the normal effect of alcoholic liquor, even when
the point of intoxication is not reached, is to loosen the ordinary inhibitions of the
drinker, 21 we are not impressed with the Investigating Judge's
third reason. Upon the other hand, it is pertinent to recall that crimes against chastity
have been committed in many different kinds of places, including places which many
would consider as inappropriate or as presenting a high risk of discovery. 22
More importantly, the Investigating Judge has overlooked completely the clear and
forthright manner in which Cristina testified as to what had happened to her in the
afternoon of 20 May 1991 at the second floor of respondent Judge's house. Respondent
Judge has not suggested that Cristina is a dissolute person, a woman-child of ill-repute,
capable of deliberately fabricating a story of lewd or lascivious acts. Neither has
respondent Judge submitted any motive which might reasonably have led Cristina to
engage in such a fabrication. The Investigating Judge himself simply observed that
Cristina, was a poor and innocent [girl] who has been raised as a country lass up to
that moment," who could have misinterpreted an "innocent" gesture (a kiss on the
cheek) administered by respondent Judge. Cristina immediately told Concepcion
Tugade, who arrived shortly after the incident, what respondent: Judge had done to
her. Further, Cristina that very same afternoon reported to her parents what had
happened to her and her parents in turn forthwith reported the matter to the police at
the Alaminos Police Station where the incident was "blottered." 23 The Investigating
Judge in his report decries the acts of Cristina's parents as "over-reaction;" this the
Court is totally unable to understand. Cristina and her parents behaved in exactly the
way we would expect them to behave if Cristina's story was true. They behaved as law-
abiding people subjected to an outrage upon their honor and family can be expected to
behave.
Respondent Judge sought to explain the filing of the administrative and criminal
charges against him in terms of a supposed desire on the part of the Junios to "get
even" with him for his alleged reminders to the Junios about their arrearages of
rent. 24 This explanation inspires little or no confidence. The Junio family vacated the
second floor of respondent's house two (2) days after the incident. At the time they left,
they apparently had four (4) months rent in arrears; respondent Judge himself
acknowledged, however, that they paid their backrentals in full after their
departure. 25 The Junios were evidently a middle class (or lower-middle income bracket)
family. They made their living out of a store in the Alaminos Commercial Complex; they
were, in the eyes of respondent Judge, "lowly businessmen." 26 As such, we find it very
difficult to believe that Cristina and her family would fabricate a tale of sexual abuse by
respondent, a municipal judge who, in a town like Alaminos, Pangasinan, is a
personage of importance and influence, one whom most people would go to some
length to avoid offending.
Cristina Junio underwent all the public travails which await a woman who complains of
acts such as those here attributed to respondent Judge. Cristina testified first before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and then in open court in the trial of Criminal Case
No. 2422-A and finally, once again, in the administrative proceedings before the
Investigating Judge. The record is bereft of any indication that Cristina was any
different from other ordinary teenagers her age; no indication that she was sexually
precocious or a congenital liar. We have already noted that the Investigating Judge
himself had observed that Cristina was an "innocent" girl, "raised as a country lass."
Thus her behavior in immediately reporting what had happened to her parents and then
to the police and the Provincial Prosecutor is consistent only with a genuine desire
to vindicate her honor and redress the wrong she knew had been inflicted upon her. 27
For the above "first" and "third" reasons, the Investigating Judge concluded that, "the
above accusation of Cristina was [merely] concocted," The Report then went to the
second reason adduced by the Investigating Judge:
Second. Obviously therefore the above accusation of Cristina was

concocted. The second manufactured evidence was the testimony of
[Concepcion] Tugade. It was obviously intended to provide the
appearance of a corroborating testimony. It appears to be the result of an
advice overheard by Eva Pertez when Prosecutor Finez told Linda Junio, ".
. . this is not the way to file a case, you return, this is not the way to
make a case . . .." The Rules of Evidence has been particularly harsh on
the "manufacture" of evidence. . . ..
If it is shown that a person has attempted to falsify, fabricate, suppress or

destroy evidence, such conduct may be justly construed as
an indication of his consciousness that his case or defense is lacking in
merit. . . . 28
The Investigating Judge narrated part of the testimony of respondent's witness Eva
Pertez as follows:
. . . She testified that on May 22, 1991 at about 11:00 o'clock in the
morning she was at the store of Mrs. Linda Junio, mother of Cristina
Junio. Linda Junio was talking to Fiscal Genebin Finez. We quote:
Q While there, you said you saw Fiscal Finez

there, what was she doing there?
A They were talking together with Linda, sir.
Q Were you able to hear their conversation?
A I heard them talking together about Judge

Rivera.
Q Will you please explain what is that, that you

heard regarding their conversation involving
Judge Rivera.
A What I heard is that Fiscal Finez said to

Linda "this is not the way to file a case, you
return, this is not the way to make a case you
return." That is what I heard. 29 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Investigating Judge evidently construed the above testimony as proof of a
conspiracy to insert false statements in the sworn statement of Cristina Junio. He was,
in effect, not only imputing perjurious statements to complainant's witness, Concepcion
Tugade, but also gross and probably criminal misconduct to Fiscal Finez. We do not,
however, read the statement attributed to Fiscal Finez as an encouragement or
inducement to add false statements to Cristina's affidavit. Far from it.
Policeman Joseph Cortez testified that after he had prepared Cristina's affidavit, he
directed Cristina and her father to have the document subscribed before Prosecutor
Finez. 30 Stenographer Merlyn Cortez declared, without objection from complainant's
counsel, that prior to being sworn to, Cristina and her father had pleaded with
Prosecutor Finez to modify the document (Cristina's affidavit) because it was
incomplete. 31 Merlyn Cortez declared further that Prosecutor Finez then questioned her
(Cristina) anew on the incident and that as a result, the affidavit was retyped by her
(Merlyn Cortez) to reflect the inclusion of certain words and additional questions posed
by Prosecutor Finez and answers given by Cristina. Relevant portions of the testimony
of stenographer Merlyn Cortez follow:
ATTY. AQUINO: (Counsel for respondent)
Q You said you saw that statement before the filing of the
complaint, where did you see it?
WITNESS:
In our office, sit
ATTY. AQUINO:
Q How did you happen to see it?
A Because I was the one who retyped this affidavit, sir.
Q Now, will you please inform the Honorable Court why did

you have to retype that statement?
A Because the father of Cristina Junio when they were inside

the Office of Prosecutor Finez pleaded to Prosecutor Finez
because the statement taken by the police according to the
girl is lacking.
Q To whom — no. Who is that father you mentioned?
A Patricio Junio, sir.

Q And what matters are lacking in the unretyped statement
shown to Prosecutor Finez?
A When the statement was explained to the girl — this

statement was not yet signed by the girl. And then, when
Fiscal Finez asked her why she did not yet affix her
signature, the girl said there was something that was not
included in the statement. And then Prosecutor Finez asked
the girl "what is that?" And the girl even demonstrated what
happened to her, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. BOLINAS: (Counsel for complainant)
Q Do you recall, madam witness when you retyped this

document?
A I could not remember the exact date, sir.
Q But you retyped the said document before the filing of the

complaint?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you retyped this document, Fiscal Finez

interrogated the complainant Cristina Junio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you present when the interrogation took place?
A I was outside the room, sir.
Q And did you enter the room in the course of the said
interrogation?
A Yes, sir, when they called for me.
Q And you said that Cristina Junio was interrogated, was the
father present?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how many were inside the room?

A I think they were four (4), sir.
Q You said they were four (4), tell us the names of the
persons who were inside the room?
A Prosecutor Finez, Cristina Junio, Mr. Patricio Junio and

another person, sir. If I am not mistaken, it was Miss
Tugade.
Q You were referring to Conching Tugade?
A Yes, sir.
Q The statement of Cristina Junio was still unsigned when

you saw it for the first time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were present at the time Prosecutor Finez was

explaining the contents of this document to Cristina Junio?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Prosecutor Finez asked Cristina Junio if the said

sworn statement contains what happened, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you heard that Cristina Junio told the Prosecutor that

there is still lacking?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that, what is lacking is what you mentioned as part of

answer and question No. 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q And likewise, what is also lacking are questions and

answers from 11, 12, 13 and 14?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who propounded this question No. 11? "Anong ginawa
mo noong lumabas si Judge Rivera sa kuwarto?" Who asked
this question?
A Prosecutor Finez, sir.
Q And how about this Answer "kinuha ko yung bata and

inilabas ko sa kuwarto at nasalubong ko si Ate Conching ang
ina ng bata at nagsumbong na ako sa kanya." Who gave
this answer?
A Cristina Junio, sir.
Q Question No. 12 is, "Ano ang ginawa ni Ate

Conching?" And the answer is "Tinanong niya kung bakit
ako umiiyak at sinabi kong hinalikan ako ni Judge Rivera at
nilamas niya ang aking suso ang maselang parte ng aking
katawan." Now, who asked this question?
Q And how about the Answer?
Q Question No. 13 states: "Ano ang reaksiyon ni Ate

Conching sa isinumbong mo sa kanya?" Who asked this
question.
ATTY. BOLINAS:
Q And there is an answer. "Siya ay nagalit at pinapunta niya

ako sa puwesto ng Nanay ko." who gave this Answer?
Q There is also a question No. 14 "Sumunod ka ba sa utos ni

Ate Conching?" Who asked this question?

Q And there is an Answer "Opo at ako'y nagsumbong sa
Nanay ko. Ang nanay ko naman ay nagsumbong sa tatay
ko. Silang dalawa ay nagalit." Now, who gave this answer?
Q Madam witness, I direct your attention to question No. 3

and the question is, "Ano naman ang dahilan at gusto mong
idimanda si Pedro Rivera, Jr.?" Was this question re-asked
by Pro. Finez?
A No, sir.
Q But question No. 1 up to No. 8 were admitted by the

complainant Cristina Junio, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. BOLINAS:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we respectfully pray that

question No. 1 up to question No. 8 and answers be
bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-4," Your Honor.
COURT:
Bracket and mark.
ATTY. BOLINAS:
No further question, Your Honor. 32 (Emphasis supplied).
The portions added to the then still unsubscribed affidavit of Cristina marked below by
underscoring:
x x x x x x x x x
09. T: Ano pang ibang nangyari?
S: Sa nangyaring iyong ako ay natulala at hindi makagalaw,

makaraan ng ilang minuto, bumalik uli si Judge Rivera sa
aking kuwarto, habang ako ay nakaupo sa aking kama,
nilapitan niya ako at hinawakan sa magkabilang balikat at
hawak niya ang aking dalawang kamay at pinahiga niya ako
sa kama, gusto kong manlaban sa kanya pero hindi ako
makagalaw, pumatong siya sa akin at hinimas niya ang
aking suso at ang aking pagkababae at habang nilalamas
niya ang maseselang parte ng aking katawan ay
pinaghahalikan niya ako sa bibig, gusto kong sumigaw
upang humingi ng saklolo pero walang boses na lumabas sa
aking bibig.
xxx xxx xxx
11. T: Ano ang ginawa mo noong lumabas si Judge Rivera

sa kuwarto mo?
S: Kinuha ko yonq bata at inilabas ka sa kuwarto at

nasalubong ko si Ate Conching, ang ina ng bata at
nagsumbong ako kanya.
12. T: Ano ang ginawa ni Ate Conching?
S: Tinanong niya sa akin kung bakit ako umiiyak at sinabi

kong hinalikan ako ni Judge Rivera at nilamas niya ang
aking suso at maselang parte ng aking katawan.
13. T: Ano ang reaksiyon ni Ate Conching sa isinumbong mo

sa kanya?
S: Siya ay nagalit at pinapunta niya ako sa puwesto ng

nanay ko, sir.
14. T: Sumunod ka ba sa utos ni Ate Conching?
S: Opo at ako'y nagsumbonq sa nanay ko. Ang Nanay ko

naman ay nagsumbong sa tatay ko. Silang dalawa ay
nagalit. 33
The foregoing compels us to the conclusion that what the Investigating Judge
interpreted as a sinister intercalation was, to the contrary, an innocent and necessary
effort to improve an incomplete or partially inaccurate document by means of a more
thorough interrogation of the affiant by Prosecutor Finez. Prosecutor Finez' purpose in
propounding additional questions to Cristina Junio and in causing the modification of
the affidavit to include such additional questions and answers, was quite professional
and routine.
We conclude that the administrative charges preferred by Cristina Junio and her father
against respondent Judge have been substantiated by a preponderance of evidence,
evidence which is clear and convincing and which respondent Judge has not
successfully rebutted.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes that:
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all

activities.
Rule 2.01 of the same Code provides that:
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in

the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
This Court has laid down exacting standards of morality and decency from those who
serve in judiciary. 34 A member of the judiciary is judge not only his official acts but also
by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized in
behavior. Respondent judge has failed to measure up to those demanding standards.
In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 35 the Court stressed that:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartially of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we
have very recently explained, a judge's official, life can not simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should

freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest

public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion. 36
All judges in all levels of the judicial hierarchy, from this Court down to the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts, are bound observe the above exacting standards. There is,
however, a special reason for requiring compliance with those standards from those
who, like respondent Judge Rivera, are Municipal or Metropolitan judges and are
accordingly "front-liners" of the judicial department. As such, a Municipal (or
Metropolitan) Judge is the most visible living representation of the country's legal and
judicial system. He is the judicial officer who on a day-to-day basis deals with the
disputes arising among simple, rural people who comprise the great bulk of our
population. He is the judicial officer who comes into closest and most frequent contact
with our people. The judiciary as a whole and its ability to dispense justice are
inevitably measured in terms of the public and private acts or judges in the "grass
roots" level, like respondent Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr. 37 It is essential, therefore, if the
judiciary is to engage and retain the respect and confidence of our nation, that this
Court insist that municipal judges and all other judges live up to the high standards
demanded by our case law and the Code of Judicial Conduct and by our polity.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary, and is hereby
DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to re-employment in any part of the
government service including government-owned or controlled corporations, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges (if any), except the money value of
accrued earned leave credits. Respondent Judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and
desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or continuing any proceedings,
in any case whatsoever, effective immediately upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771 May 27, 2004
(Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 99-842-RTJ)
SALVADOR SISON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S. ALVAREZ,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 253, respondents,
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a verified Complaint1 dated
October 12, 1999, charging Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, with grave abuse of authority.
In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order2 dated September 15, 1999 in Criminal
Case No. 99-0023 which the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to
appear before him to explain a traffic incident involving his son and the complainant.
The said Order reads, thus:
Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on
September 8, 1999, at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of said date, said
authorized driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an official
errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while
he was positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to
make a right turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that
swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared that the sign
therefore was still far off and not readily visible to the naked eye; that
nonetheless, he introduced himself as the authorized driver of the undersigned,
his son in fact, and showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned
with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing the bearer of the
card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly begged
that he be allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger
to limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic violation; that
notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the driver’s
license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the
same to somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before.
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his
arrogance and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and
accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one
constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the authorized driver of the
Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand.
WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four (24) hours from

receipt hereof, the accused is ordered to show cause why he should not be cited
as in contempt of court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of this
Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon the accused
immediately and to make a return of his proceedings thereon. After receipt of
this Order, the accused is ordered to personally file his comment in Court, within
the period allowed him herein.
SO ORDERED.4
Because of the complainant’s failure to appear before the respondent judge as directed,
the latter, after verifying that the said order was duly served on the complainant, issued
another Order5 dated September 22, 1999 for the complainant’s arrest and
commitment, and for the latter to appear for hearing before his sala on September 29,
1999. The respondent sheriff then served the order on the complainant. On the
scheduled hearing, the complainant appeared and executed an affidavit6 admitting to
the court that he made a mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding. The
respondent judge, thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order.7
In his complaint, the complainant alleged inter alia the following:
6. That on September 28, 1999, at around 6:00 P.M., the undersigned

complainant was greatly surprised when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ came
and arrested him without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the respondent
Judge, and he was ordered to board a motor vehicle and was brought to the
respondent Judge in Las Piñas City who ordered him detained in the Las Piñas
City Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his family to inform them
where he was because he failed to return home in the evening;
7. That the next day, September 29, 1999, respondent Teodoro Alvarez informed
him that there will be a hearing of his indirect contempt charge before
the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Piñas City. During the hearing, the
complainant was made to admit by the respondent Judge that he made a
mistake in apprehending his driver-son[,] conscious that he committed the
gravest abuse of his authority, and perhaps in anticipation of the legal action the
undersigned complainant may take against him after he is discharged from
detention. Thus, after the complainant admitted his mistakes under duress, and
upon appeal by his counsel assuring the respondent Judge that the same
incident may not be repeated, the complainant was ordered discharged from
detention at around 3:30 P.M. on September 29, 1999;
8. That the undersigned complainant did not know of any offense he had
committed, except for his issuing a traffic violation receipt to the driver-son of
the respondent Judge which he is tasked by law to do so for those found
violating traffic rules and regulations;
9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a traffic violation within
the city limits of Mandaluyong City by the complainant is considered by the
respondents as an offense, then complainant should be tried for the said offense
in Mandaluyong City, and not in Las Piñas City where the respondent judge has
no jurisdiction;
10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the undersigned

complainant, the acts of respondents in arresting him without any warrant of
arrest before a charge of indirect contempt is heard constitute the gravest
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents; and
11. That the manner the respondents are administering justice in Las Piñas City
is despotic and barbaric in the sense that they take the law into their own hands
without due regard for the rights of the others.8
The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from the
service.
In his comment, the respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations against him,
contending that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor due to the courts of
law. The respondent narrated that on September 8, 1999, he ordered his son, Jose R.
Caoibes III, to go to the Pasig City Regional Trial Court to secure certain records. While
on his way there, he was flagged down by the complainant for an alleged traffic
violation. Caoibes III explained to the complainant that he was on an errand for his
father, the respondent judge, to which the complainant reportedly uttered, "Walang
Judge, Judge Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko."
The respondent judge also alleged that he initiated the complaint for contempt
pursuant to the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court: a) Section 3(d) and
Section 4 of Rule 71; b) Section 5(c) of Rule 135; and, c) the last paragraph of Section
3 of Rule 71.
According to the respondent judge, the complainant’s allegation that he failed to

contact any relative is belied by the fact that during the hearing of September 29, 1999,
the complainant was assisted by Atty. Eduardo P. Flores of the MMDA, as evidenced by
the transcript of stenographic notes9 taken during the proceedings. The respondent
prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of legal or factual basis.
For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served copies of the
respondent judge’s orders on the complainant, but averred that he was merely
performing his duties as deputy sheriff of the court. As such, he did not commit grave
abuse of authority in the performance of his functions.10
Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbawi ng

Reklamo dated November 26, 2002, where he indicated that he was no longer
interested in pursuing the administrative complaint against the respondent judge. The
complainant recanted his earlier claim, averring that the respondent judge’s son did not
in fact enter a one-way street and that he was standing by the September 29, 1999
Affidavit he executed during the hearing. He then requested that his complaint be duly
withdrawn.11
Pursuant to the recommendation12 of the Court Administrator, the Court, in a

Resolution13 dated April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the instant administrative
complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez for lack of merit; and (b) refer the matter
against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
for raffle among the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report and
recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled to Associate Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin. The Investigating Justice, thereafter, submitted his Sealed Report dated
February 26, 2004.
According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never appeared to

prove the charges against the respondent judge, the facts averred in the complaint
appear to be substantially correct and true. Thus, the respondent judge abused his
authority to charge and punish any person for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.14 The Investigating Justice recommended that the respondent
be admonished and warned, pursuant to Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and Section 11(c) of the same rule.
The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the complainant on
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or

judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such

without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to
protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein,
and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and
contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.15 Indeed, the power of contempt is
power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience,
disrespect or interference with the court’s orderly process by exacting summary
punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by
tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are ordained to
administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as
respect for the laws themselves.16 And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt
power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly.17 A
judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness
in the performance of his duties.18
At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the
complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s Order
of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant
was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What
triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the
respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the complainant filed
his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by
some staff member in the latter’s sala.19
In Cortes v. Bangalan,20 we held that a judge may not hold a party in contempt of court
for expressing concern on the judge’s impartiality through a motion for voluntary
inhibition, even if the latter may have felt insulted therein. The Court also declared,
thus:
…[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to

preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of
justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their
contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation and
vindication.21
We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge
should have refrained from ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant, since
the incident involved his own son, and the matter was very personal to him. The fact
that the respondent judge insisted that the complainant personally file his comment in
court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it,
the requirement of personal filing was deliberately inserted so that the respondent
could confront and harass the complainant.22
We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin:
…[T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of Sison to let off
Caoibes III from the traffic violation apprehension. The refusal of Sison was
apparently aggravated by the son’s reporting to the father that Sison had
supposedly made the remarks of Walang judge, judge Caoibes sa akin; Kahapon
nga, abogado ang hinuli ko. …
...
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of
Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the
usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its
representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should
not cause resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison most
likely did not yet know at the time) because he knew, as a public official himself,
that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic
regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the wrong
direction, regardless of the office or position of the violator’s father. Secondly,
the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection expected of him as a
judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s attempt
to bluffhis way out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC
judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for
contempt of court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have
challenged the issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent
rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and also
administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither
was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of
the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the driver’s license after
September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation,
then it follows that the respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was
at fault, instead of Sison.
…[T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his son "was at that time
working with (sic) me as my personal driver;" and that his errand was to secure
some papers from the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City involved in a "personal
case" which the respondent Judge had "filed against a bank for specific
performance and damages, and since I just suffered a mild stroke at that time,
specifically on June 10, 1999, and the incident took place (sic) September, I
could not at that time personally go to Pasig to secure the documents I needed
for the next hearing of the case so I had to send my son."
The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis
by which to consider Sison’s apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As
indicated earlier, the act complained against must be any of those specified in
Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt
of court, which requires that the person obstructed should be performing a duty
connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent Judge acted
oppressively and vindictively.
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose herein
that Caoibes III, already 25 years at the time of the apprehension, was serving
his father as the latter’s personal driver, albeit not officially employed in the
Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be doing anything for his
father at the time of his apprehension but was in the place for his own
purposes.23
The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of
retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which mandates that "a judge should so behave at all times to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."24 The very
delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should conduct himself
at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of
the people, for he is the visible representation of the law.25 The irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge
must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.26
We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be merely reprimanded
for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to the improper use by judges of the
erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of
authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in such cases ranges from a fine of
P2,500;27 one month’s salary;28 suspension from the service without pay for a period of
three months;29 and even the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.30
Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was previously
sanctioned by the Court for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, where he
was meted a fine of P20,000.31 He was found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming
a judge, for delivering fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind, the instant
case falls under "similar conduct," which the Court avowed would be dealt with more
severely if repeated, and of which the respondent was duly warned. The respondent
was, likewise, found guilty of gross ignorance of procedural law and unreasonable delay
in the issuance of an order of execution, where he was meted a fine of P30,000;32 and
delay in resolving a motion to dismiss in a civil case pending before his sala where he
was, likewise, fined P40,000.33
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious impropriety unbecoming a
judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government or any of its instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
This decision is immediately executory. The respondent is ORDERED to cease and

desist from discharging the functions of his Office. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondent’s personnel records.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1872 October 18, 2004
(formerly AM-04-6-352-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
Judge DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution requires trial judges to decide cases within 90 days from the time the
last pleading is filed.1 Indeed, justice is defined not just by how but, equally important,
by when it is dispensed. When circumstances make it impossible for judges to decide a
litigation within the reglementary period, they are required to inform this Court of the
reasons for the delay and to ask for an extension within which to dispose of the case.
This simple requirement is meant to assure litigants that their causes have not been
forgotten and buried among the myriad concerns courts have to attend to, and to
demonstrate that judges are conscientious of their constitutionally imposed time limits.
The Case
Before this Court is a case that originated as Administrative Matter No. 04-6-352-RTC
(Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Dasmariñas, Branch 90
[Stationed at Imus], Cavite). The Complaint, filed against Judge Dolores L. Español
(ret.) of the said Regional Trial Court (RTC), was for gross inefficiency.2 Upon the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the matter was re-
docketed as a regular administrative case on August 9, 2004.3
The Facts
The facts, as found by the OCA, are as follows:
"A Judicial Audit and Inventory of Cases was conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas (stationed at Imus), Cavite, prior to the
compulsory retirement of Judge Dolores L. Español on January 9, 2004.
"On the basis of the findings of the audit team, a Memorandum dated 27
November 2003 was sent to Judge Español directing her to decide all cases
submitted for decision, resolve all motions/incidents submitted for resolution and
to take actions on the unacted cases as tabulated in the memorandum.
"On May 25, 2004, Judge Español submitted her compliance with the
memorandum dated November 27, 2003. A tabulated list showing the actions
taken on the cases was submitted and copies of the decisions rendered were
attached to the compliance.
"Judge Español in her compliance pointed out that the directive requiring [her] to
take appropriate action in the cases was received by her two (2) days before her
compulsory retirement and due to human limitations, all the listed cases for
action could not be completely done. All the cases may have been unresolved
due to the election protest returned by the Commission on Elections after 17
months and which was given priority."
The OCA’s investigation showed that upon her compulsory retirement on January 9,
2004, Judge Español left a total of 69 cases that had not been acted upon. In
particular, these included six criminal and sixteen civil cases already submitted for
decision, five criminal and eighteen civil cases on appeal, and sixteen cases with
pending incidents for resolution.4
In separate communications addressed to Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose Perez

dated May 27, 20045 and September 1, 2004, respondent judge explained that the
delay in the disposition of cases in her court was due to the following reasons:
1. Only two days before her compulsory retirement on January 9, 2004 did she
receive the Memorandum dated November 27, 2003, directing her to decide all
cases submitted for decision, to resolve all motions/incidents, and to take actions
on cases tabulated therein that had not yet been acted upon. Pointing to "human
limitations," she explained that she could not have disposed of the cases
contained in the directive within her remaining two days in office.
2. She gave priority, as was required by law, to Election Protest No. 01-02, Oscar
Jaro v. Homer Saquilayan. That case took much of her court time and energy, as
it required the revision and review of 52,694 ballots from 453 precincts of Imus,
Cavite, and necessitated the creation of two revision committees. The clerk of
court and three other court personnel, particularly the researcher and two clerks,
had to devote their full time to assist in the revision.
3. In Solar Resources, Inc. v. Rolando Aldunar, 63 counts of unlawful detainer

with damages required the implementations of 63 writs of execution and
demolition. The negotiations undertaken by both the plaintiff and the
defendants, the latter numbering about six hundred families, caused setbacks in
the final disposition of the cases. It was only after the negotiations failed that
respondent’s court was constrained to exercise its firm hand.
4. Delay in the service of the writs in the aforementioned Solar Resources cases
was also partly the fault of Sheriff Tomas C. Azurin, who allegedly frustrated the
enforcement of the writs through highly questionable acts. Among those acts
were cavorting with the leaders of squatter groups that had opposed the
implementation of the Orders and the Writs of the court and contracting the food
preparation of the demolition team, part of which he himself had recruited. In an
Order dated December 29, 2003, respondent judge ordered the relief of Azurin
and the deputization of Sheriffs Danny Lapuz and Rodelio Buenviaje of Cavite
City. The Writs were finally completed on March 8, 2004, as evidenced by the
sheriff’s return and receipt of possession.
5. The transfer of court records from the maintenance room to the courtroom
vacated by Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguanco, as well as the temporary storage of
those records in a 20-foot container van, caused the misplacement of some
records.
In her letter to DCA Perez dated September 1, 2004, respondent denied the charges of
gross inefficiency leveled against her. She alleged that as early as August 2003, in
anticipation of her compulsory retirement, she had approached the Court Management
Office (CMO). She discussed with the CMO the possibility of requesting another judge to
assist her in the ongoing revision of ballots in EPC No. 01-02, as well as in the
implementation of writs in sixty-three appealed cases for unlawful detainer involving
Solar Resources. On the advice of the CMO, however, she did not submit a formal
request.
Respondent also called attention to the fact that, notwithstanding a full calendar and
the absence of an assisting judge, she was not remiss in disposing of cases. Even
before her receipt of the Memorandum of January 7, 2004, which was two days before
her retirement on January 9, 2004, she had already acted on a number of cases not
covered by the Audit Report. The latest tabulation showed that the cases listed in the
Memorandum dated November 27, 2003, had been disposed of accordingly.
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
The OCA found respondent guilty of gross inefficiency and recommended a fine of ten
thousand pesos (₱10,000) to be deducted from the retirement benefits due her.
The Ruling of the Court
We agree with and adopt the findings of the OCA, but adjust the penalty in accordance
with Rule 140.
Administrative Liability
The 1987 Constitution mandates trial judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly
and to decide cases and matters within three (3) months from the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum.6 In the disposition of cases, members of the bench
have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the foregoing rule to prevent
delay, a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in our justice
system.
In the evolvement of public perception of the judiciary, there can be no more conclusive
empirical influence than the prompt and proper disposition of cases.7 Hence, a clear
failure to comply with the reglementary period is regarded as inexcusable gross
inefficiency.8 The speedy disposition of cases by judges is unequivocally directed by
Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics:
"He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering

that justice delayed is often justice denied."
This Court is aware of the predicament that plagues respondent, as well as most other
trial judges in the country. The problem of case inputs grossly exceeding case outputs
may be traced to several factors, the most prevalent of which are the large number of
cases filed, indiscriminate grant of continuances to litigants, inefficient case flow
management by judges, and unrealistic management of the calendar of cases.
To solve these problems, this Court has, in several instances, advised judges to follow
certain guidelines to facilitate speedy case disposition.9 Among these measures is the
discouragement of continuances, except for exceptional reasons. To enforce due
diligence in the dispatch of judicial business without arbitrarily or unreasonably forcing
cases to trial when counsels are unprepared, judges should endeavor to hold them to a
proper appreciation of their duties to the public, as well as to their own clients and to
the adverse party.10
In criminal cases, pretrial is mandatory because, at the outset, litigation is abbreviated

by the identification of contentious issues. In civil cases, judges are also required to
take advantage of the pretrial conference to arrive at settlements and compromises
between the parties, to ask the latter to explore the possibility of submitting their cases
to any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution, and at least to reduce and limit
the issues for trial. Judges are further directed to implement and observe strictly the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 119, providing for a continuous day-to-day trial as far as
practicable until termination.11
The work of magistrates is multifarious. They do not only hear cases and write
decisions in the seclusion of their chambers; equally important, they act also as
administrators. Their administrative efficiency may well define the justice they
dispense.
They should be rational and realistic in calendaring cases. Only a sufficient number
should be calendared in order to permit them to hear all the cases scheduled.12 Hence,
unless the docket of the court requires otherwise, not more than four cases daily should
be scheduled for trial.13 A continuous and physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis
is also recommended, so that they would be aware of the status of each case.
With the assistance of the clerk of court, a checklist should be prepared, indicating the
steps to be taken to keep cases moving.14 While decision-writing is a matter of personal
style, judges are well-advised to prepare concise but complete as well as correct and
clear decisions, orders or resolutions.15 With a table or calendar indicating the cases
submitted for decision, they should note the exact day, month and year when the 90-
day period is to expire.
Prompt disposition of the court’s business is attained through proper and efficient court
management. Judges would be remiss in their duty and responsibility as court
managers if they fail to adopt an efficient system of record management.16
At times, circumstances beyond their control result in the accumulation of ripe cases to
a daunting number, making it humanly impossible for them to comply with the
constitutionally mandated 90-day period. In such instances, all that they should do is
write a request for extension from the Supreme Court, stating therein their reasons for
the delay.17Such administrative requirement finds basis in the 1987 Constitution.18
This Court has further directed members of the bench to call the attention of the OCA
"when the situation requires remedies beyond the control or capability of the judges."
"10.3 The reduction of case loads would be an efficacious design to strengthen public
confidence in the Courts. All efforts should be exerted so that case disposals should
exceed case inputs. Whenever obstacles present themselves which delay case
disposition, the Presiding Judge should immediately call the attention of the Supreme
Court through the Court Administrator when the situation requires remedies beyond the
control or capability of the judges."19
In his recommendation, DCA Perez made the following observation:
"At the very least, Judge Español should have requested for an extension of time
once she knew that she could not comply with the prescribed ninety (90) day
period to render judgment. In doing so, she would have been able to apprise
litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any. It would
have shown that she minded the deadlines.
"While Judge Español professes her human limitations coupled with the
disposition of the election cases which allegedly demand priority, the same
cannot exculpate her for non-compliance with the mandates of the law and the
rules."
As we have stated in Maquiran v. Lopez,20 a heavy case load may excuse the failure of
judges to decide cases within the reglementary period, but not their failure to request
an extension of time within which to decide them on time.
In her letter dated September 1, 2004, respondent aired her frustrations over matters
that allegedly "deter the achievement of a super-efficient court"; among these was "the
lack of materials, equipment and supplies." In her own words, she had to "use her own
funds to provide air conditioning units in the courtroom, computer and cleaning
materials and supplies, repairs of the courtroom and providing for an additional storage
space for court records."21
Her concern over lack of adequate materials and supplies is not unique to her;
presently, the Court is trying to address it. Unfortunately, her initiative in personally
acting on the problem, while commendable, cannot completely absolve her from her
administrative liability in this case. It can however mitigate the penalty to be imposed.
As amended, Section 9 (1) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge. As such, under Section 11 (b) of
the same Rule, this offense is punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less one (1) but not more than three (3) months, or a fine of
more than ₱10,000 but not exceeding ₱20,000.
We close this Decision with a final exhortation. The magistracy is a very exacting and
demanding vocation. Judges are expected to embody "four character traits: integrity,
independence, intelligence and industry." Moreover, in the performance of their tasks,
they must exhibit "four work habits; namely, excellence, ethics, effectiveness and
expeditiousness."22 Only those who patiently cultivate these four character traits and
four work habits can succeed in journeying through the straight and narrow judicial
path.
WHEREFORE, the factual findings of the Office of Court Administrator are ADOPTED.

Judge Dolores L. Español is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is fined in the
amount of eleven thousand pesos (₱11,000), to be deducted from the retirement
benefits due her.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505 November 27, 2013
MAMASAW SULTAN ALI, Complainant,

vs.
HON. BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA, Presiding Judge HON. PUNDAYA A. BERUA,
Acting Presiding Judge HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, Clerk of Court and
MANDAG U. BATUA-AN, Court Stenographer, all of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Municipality of Balin dong, Province of Lanao del Sur, Respondents.
In the Matter of: Petition for Absolute Judicial Clemency of Former Judge
Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna, MTCC Marawi City
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition1 for judicial clemency filed by Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna

(respondent), former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Balindong in Lanao del Sur.
In the Decision2 dated September 25, 2007, respondent was found administratively

liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
and also violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to uphold the
integrity of the judiciary, avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in all
activities and to perform their official duties honestly and diligently. This Court thus
decreed:
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of

Judicial Conduct and gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Baguinda Ali
Pacalna, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Municipality of Balindong,
Lanao Del Sur, is ORDERED to PAY a fine of ₱20,000.00, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Court Stenographer Mandag Batua-an of the same court is hereby REPRIMANDED with
similar WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.3
Respondent did not file any motion for reconsideration and paid the ₱20,000.00 fine on
December 3, 2007.
Just one week after the decision in this case was rendered, another administrative
complaint4 (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791, formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1958-MTJ) was filed
against the respondent by members of the Marawi City Police, namely: PO2 Ricky C.
Gogo, PO2 Mamintal B. Osop, PO2 Casan A. Imam, PO1 Agakhan A. Tomawis, PO1
Anowar C. Modasir, PO1 Alano D. Osop, PO1 Alnasser D. Ali, and PO1 Casanali M. Lawi.
On August 17, 2011, this Court’s First Division resolved to adopt and approve the
findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
Respondent was held liable for grave misconduct and meted the penalty of six (6)
months suspension, converted to forfeiture of the corresponding amount of his salary
which was ordered withheld by Resolution of the Court dated February 16, 2011. Said
administrative matter was further indorsed to the OCA Legal Office for the
commencement of criminal charges against respondent for violation of P.D. No. 1829
(Obstruction of Justice).5
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied under

Resolution6 dated January 23, 2013 of this Court’s Second Division. On September 4,
2013, a criminal complaint for Obstruction of Justice was filed by the OCA with the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. As per Certification dated October 25, 2013
issued by the OCA, the amount of ₱209,810.70 corresponding to six months salary of
respondent, was deducted from his terminal leave benefits.
Respondent resigned on December 1, 2009 while he was being investigated by the OCA
in his second administrative case (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791 formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-
1958-MTJ). He now seeks to rejoin the judiciary and filed his application for the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 9. He informs this Court that he was
already interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in Cagayan de Oro City in
November 2012 and that the only hindrance to his nomination for the said judicial
position was the penalty imposed on him in the present case. Respondent thus pleads
for compassion, at the very least for this Court to reduce to ₱10,000.00 the penalty
imposed under our September 25, 2007 Decision.
This Court in A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency)7 laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations
and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar
misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure
a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or

legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the
legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed

repentance.1âwphi1 His appeal for clemency is solely anchored on his avowed intention
to go back to the judiciary on his personal belief that "he can be x x x an effective
instrument in the delivery of justice in the Province of Lanao del Sur because of his
seventeen (17) years of experience," and on his "promise before the Almighty God and
the High Court that he will never repeat the acts or omissions that he had committed as
a Judge." He claims having learned "enough lessons" during the three years he became
jobless and his family had "suffered so much because of his shortcoming."8
Apart from respondent’s own declarations, there is no independent evidence or relevant

circumstances to justify clemency. Applying the standards set by this Court in A.M. No.
07-7-17-SC, respondent’s petition for judicial clemency must be denied.
In the present case, the Court held that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of
procedure in the conduct of election cases in connection with petitions for inclusion of
voters in the barangay elections, resulting in delays such that complainant’s name was
not timely included in the master list and consequently he was not considered a
candidate for barangay chairman. Such failure to observe fundamental rules relative to
the petitions for inclusion cannot be excused. Further, respondent was found to have
intentionally fabricated an order which supposedly granted a motion for intervention by
the counsel for the incumbent mayor whose re-election complainant and his co-
petitioners were allegedly not willing to support. Respondent’s act of fabricating an
order to cover up his official shortcomings constitutes dishonesty, a reprehensible act
that will not be sanctioned by this Court.
In the subsequent administrative case (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791), respondent was found
to have misused his authority when he, over the vigorous objection of complainants
police officers, took custody of an accused then detained in jail for carnapping charges,
by merely issuing a signed handwritten acknowledgment receipt with an undertaking to
present the said accused to the court when ordered. Said accused was never returned
to jail and while the case against him was dismissed, there was no order for release
issued by the court. Respondent endeavored to justify his act in aiding the accused by
virtue of his position as Sultan in his hometown, but the Court found him liable for
Grave Misconduct, warranting his dismissal from the service. But since the penalty of
dismissal can no longer be imposed on account of respondent’s resignation, he was
meted the penalty of six months suspension converted to forfeiture of the
corresponding amount of his salary. This second administrative offense committed by
respondent also led to the OCA’s filing of a criminal complaint for obstruction of justice
against him.
Given the gravity of respondent’s transgressions, it becomes more imperative to require

factual support for respondent’s allegations of remorse and reform. As this Court
previously declared:
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down
hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen
short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is because a judge is the visible
representation of the law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his
conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the
performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual. His character must be able to withstand the most searching public
scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with

the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there
is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and
promise are indispensable.9 Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Judicial Clemency filed by respondent Baguinda-Ali A.

Pacalna is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Basic Legal Ethics - Cases 61 To 67

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Basic Legal Ethics - Cases 61 To 67

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A.M. No.

RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004

WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:

2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.

3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics

1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary

a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985

b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987

c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989

2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E.

a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980

b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980

c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980

d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission

e. November to December 1980-no entry

f. January to February 1981 - no entry

g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission

h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission

j. July to December 1983 - no entry

k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986

l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986

The Procedural Issues

On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC

On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated

The Substantive Issues

However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or

1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or

Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-

The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record

An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,

In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing

Complainant, an aunt of respondent's husband, alleges: In the first week of September

Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that:

2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her

3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondent's

Justice Salvador particularly observed the demeanor of complainant at the September

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to

And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?

My complaint is true. That is all true.24

Ano ang totoo?

Ang sabi ko sa kanya, "Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na

Evelyn, sasabihin ko ang totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.

Just tell us what happened.

I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.

Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7,

Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kami't

The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are generally

As well explained by Justice Salvador:

As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of

On the utterances made by respondent judge, we stress that as a dispenser of justice,

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta guilty as charged. We

Puno, C.J. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Hearings were subsequently conducted by Investigating Judge Ramos on 15 and 29