ASSESSMENT THE RISK DEGREE

OF THE SEVESO PLANTS

Aleksandra Aleksić, Radoslav Mićić, Jasna Tolmač
8th International Conference of Ecologists of Montenegro
2–6 October 2019, Budva
 July 10th, 1976

Three dioxin-contaminated zones with

decreasing mean soil levels (A, B, and R)

Seveso Risk
Seveso is a borough of Northern Italy, in the Region of Lombardy near Milan. It has been
especially known since an industrial accident from occurred in a small chemical plant owned
by the company ICMESA (Industrie Chimiche Meda Società Azionaria). Then a dioxin cloud
releases in the air (3000 kg of TCDD) and spread in the area after the explosion of a chemical
plant.

The term « Seveso » refers since then to the European «Seveso» Directive which requires the
identification of industrial establishments with major risks.

A Seveso plant is an establishment which has an activity linked to handling, manufacturing,

using or storing dangerous substances (i.e. refineries, petrochemical sites, oil depots or
explosives depots).
RESEARCH PURPOSE

• Although Montenegro is not a producer of hazardous chemicals, it

as a touristic destination and country with all forms of traffic - water,
air, road and railway. It is a place where transport and storage of
significant quantities of hazardous substances are carried out. Also,
according to reports from a consortium of Italy's Eni and Russia's
Novatek research two small oil and gas investigation fields, could
be transformed to offshore drilling rigs.

• This study was performed to investigate the influence of the amount

of hazard substance on the shape and extent of the accidental
hazards.

• The results should clarify importance of this topic in field of

industrial and trafic accidentals from a practical point of view, as
well to highlight importance of the main legislative instruments.
 FACTS AND PROBLEMS
A. ENERGY POLICY
 Development of industrial cogeneration and small cogeneration for the service sector and
households envisaged by the EU Directive (Directive 2012/27/EU) in Montenegro will provoke greater
use of LPG and liquid fuels as cogeneration fuels.

 Consequently, the increase of LPG in trade and traffic over the next decade is certain. That raises
the issue of chemical accidents and regulations in this field.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND RISK POLICES

 Because hazards from chemicals, nuclear power or terrorism, appears to influence the regulation
and management of these technologies, it is important to understand perceiving and evaluation of
risks (Johnson and Tversky 1983: Aven 1992).

 Most countries of the former Yugoslavia regulate the local chemical protection policy based on
the list of hazardous substances and their quantities in accordance with the Seveso Directive (Annex I)
representing a base for all other regulations.
Rules on quantities of hazardous materials by categories which determine the level of risk ("Off.
Gazette of Montenegro" 63/16; Attachment)
RESEARCH THESIS
 Chemical accidentals are possible on places were LPG is
stored, manipulated and/or transported;
 Chemical hazards are regulated;
 Local protection policy concerning chemical hazard is
based on the list of hazardous substances in accordance
with the Seveso Directive (Annex I);
 Quantity of the specific chemical is not a basic measure
of the potential scope and consequence of hazard.
RESEARCH METHOD
 ISO 31000:2015 Risk assessment and IEC/FDIS 31010:2011 Risk management —
Risk assessment techniques/ (FTA, ETA)
 ISO 17776:2016 Petroleum and natural gas industries-Offshore production
installations-Major accident hazard management during the design of new
installations ;
 Aloha® 5.4.4 software;
 Rulebook on detailed content of the prevention and the accident protection plan
(Off. Gaz. of MNE 67/16);
 Rulebook on quantities of dangerous substances by categories that determine the
degree of risk (Off. Gaz. of MNE 63/16).
SELECTED SAMPLES
 Two depots for LPG were selected as industrial test objects and Seveso plants;
Montenegro
Figure 1. Selected depots
LOCATIONS AND FAILURES SELECTED FOR THE ANALYSIS

A. Failure in connection pipe during tank truck unloading A. Failure in connection pipe during road tanker unloading
B. Failure in bottling plant B. Failure in connection pipe during rail tanker unloading
C. Failure related to LPG compressor C. Failure related to tank

Figure 1. INA gas station (LPG depot 1) Figure 2. Energogas (LPG depot 2)

Capacity cca 190 m3 Capacity > 1100 m3

 Sphere tank (1000 m3),

 4 horizontal aboveground tanks (3x60 m3 + 1x10 m3),  Horizontal aboveground tank (100m3),
 Compressor/pump room,  Compressor/pump room,
 Bottling plant,  Gas station,
 Gas station,  Office building,
 Car wash and café,  Parking,
 Cage for LPG containers,  Tank truck loading rack and rail loading
 Office building and parking rack,
 Public road,  Public roads,
 Bakery,  Cage for LPG containers,
 Bus station and private properties (in radius less than 700m).  Private properties (in radius less than 700m).
 METHODS AND SCENARIOS SELECTED FOR THE ANALYSIS
Possible events with higher likelihood to happen - not certain, were analyzed;

Datas and model informations
Table 1. Atmospheric and spatial parameters
ISO 31000:2015; IEC/FDIS 31010:2011 (FТА, ETA), ALOHA
A. Danger identification
A. Failure in connection pipe during tank truck unloading
B. Failure in bottling plant
C. Failure related to LPG compressor
A. Failure in connection pipe during road tanker unloading
B. Failure in connection pipe during rail tanker unloading
C. Failure related to LPG tank

www.meteo.co.me

Table 2. Types and capacities of LPG pressure vessels

B. Analysis of consequences
C. Analysis of RISK
 ISO 9001:2015, ISO 31000:2015 Risk assessment and IEC/FDIS 31010:2011 Risk management
 Rules on quantities of hazardous materials by categories which determine the level of risk ( "Off. Gazette of Montenegro" 63/16),
Article 3:
’’Depending on the amount of hazardous substance, Seveso plants are classified into plants:
1) less risk; and
www.mre.gov.rs;
https://epa.org.me/2018/03/02/obavjestenja-seveso
2) higher risk.’’
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 5. Effects of failures on Table 6. Threat zones in defined cases of failures [m]
LPG depot 1

Table 7. Effects of failures Table 8. Threat zones in defined cases of failures [m]
LPG depot 2

Safe zone in worst case for LPG depot 1 is in radius greater than 195 m, whilst for LPG
depot 2 is in radius greater than 68m
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Vulnerable zones Risk determination

B. Analysis of consequences C. Risk analysis

LPG depot 1 LPG depot 2

Failure 1 Failure 2 Failure 3 Failure 1 Failure 2 Failure 3

No of casualty people - - - - - -

No of serious injured 3-6 1-2 3-6 1-2 1-2 1

Destruction of buildings - yes yes* - yes yes*

Shatters glass yes yes yes yes yes yes

Consequence** significant significant significant significant significant significant
Probability** 100-10-1 100-10-1 100-10-1 100-10-1 100-10-1 100-10-1
RISK** high high high high high high
For the selected scenarios and types of failures on both depots, rated risk is HIGH for all
scenarios.

Rules on quantities of hazardous materials by categories which determine the level of risk ( "Off.
Gazette of Montenegro" 63/16), Article 3:
’’Depending on the amount of hazardous substance, Seveso plants are classified into plants:
1) less risk; and
2) higher risk.’’
 THANK YOU
FOR YOUR ATTENTION